REFERENCE 21-023/MSG-367 - Page 74

PNEUMATIC

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

89 737 PRSOV Downstream 3214552-2, -3, -4, -5, Boeing 737NG 36-11 UAL
Sense Line Port Plug -6
Honeywell

DESCRIPTION:
Shortly after a PRSOV replacement, United Airlines occasionally experiences high bleed duct pressure events on
the 737NG fleet due to a missing plug which is supposed to be installed in one of the openings on the downstream
sense line port. This plug is AMM 36-11-04 PB 401 Item [11]. There are instructions to remove and retain the plug
from the removed valve if the new valve does not have it. United does not believe this to be a reliable and
repeatable process. Without the plug installed, the valve cannot function properly in flight and results in high duct
pressure in a critical flight phases (TAKEOFF, CLIMB).

United Airlines has reached out to Boeing as CMM 36-13-87 does not contain the subjected plug [11] as part of the
PRSOV assembly. UAL has requested Boeing consider adding plug [11] to the assembly procedures in
CMM 36-13-87 so that a more reliable shop-based process can be established to ensure the plug is installed.

CURRENT STATUS
Boeing’s response to UAL: “During production, the plug was part of the engine buildup (see Powerplant Buildup
Manual Figure 18-1). The plug is not part of the pressure regulator and shutoff valve (PRSOV) assembly and is
shipped by the supplier without the plug installed. Since the Component Maintenance Manual (CMM) only covers
the PRSOV itself, the plug is not included in the CMM.”

As a follow-up to Boeing’s response, UAL requested an AMM figure equivalent to PPBU 71-00-02 Figure 18-1 Sheet
1 be added to AMM 36-11-04 PB 401 to be referenced by the PRSOV removal/installation tasks. The PPBU 71-00-
02 Figure 18-1 Sheet 1 provides a much clearer depiction of the required plug and we believe this would add value
and help reduce the risk of forgetting to install the plug.

Boeing has agreed to update the AMM Task to add a graphic view similar to the PPBU figure referenced. This
change will be reflected in the 15-Jun-2021 revision of the 737NG AMM.

Current AMM Figure:

Powerplant Buildup Manual (PPBU) Figure:

PNEUMATIC

QUESTIONS:
1. To Boeing:
Can Boeing provide current status on the AMM updates? Is this still on track to be published in June 2021?
2. To Operators:
Do any other operators have difficulty or inconsistency in retaining the PRSOV downstream sense line plug for
installation on the new valve?
If so, do you also observe high duct pressure events as a result of missing plugs?
3. To Honeywell:
Would the Honeywell repair shop be willing to stock the plugs and ship with PRSOVs?

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate
Airline

90 Bleed Isolation 1001248-2 Collins Embraer 36 LHT Spairliners

The failure of the closed position switch (PN 740215-27) of the Bleed Isolation Valve (PN 1001248-2) has shown to
be a key driver in failures of the LRU.

Main removal reasons: “X BLEED VLV FAIL” or “X BLEED FAIL” advisory msg with a position disagree.

Shop data reveal an increasing number of switch replacement over the last years (see next page).

Main findings of the switch are corrosion, the switch being unable to break the circuit and too high resistance.
However, corrosion is the most often finding in the shop which leads to a faulty signal of the switch and ultimately to
LRU removal.

LHT requests an improved design that is less prone to corrosion and therefore leads to higher reliability of LRU on-
wing.

Questions:
1. Do any other operator seen similar failures as described above?
2. Does Collins plan to redesign the Closed Position Switch (PN 740215-27) in the future?

Collins and other operator comments, please.

PNEUMATIC

Shop History for Bleed Isolation Valve

80%
60
70%
50
60%

40 50%

30 40%

30%
20
20%
10
10%

0 0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Shop Events Switch Replaced Probability of Switch Replacement per Event

Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate
Airline

91 HPV /PRV 6764B series LIEBHERR A330 36 AFR-KLM AFR

The Bleed circuit has been, since the use of the "Bleed ON/Pack Off" procedure, subject to mechanical and
thermal stresses that go beyond the design specifications. The fact that the Pack is "Off", forces the PRV to
remain closed.

That induces an increase of pressure and temperature between the HPV and the PRV, which can reach very high
pressures and temperatures values. This leads to rapid degradation of seals and diaphragms. It also has an
impact on the materials, especially on the springs.

Actuator spring load holding measurements were carried out in the workshop and showed a loss of free length of
30 mm on average, a loss of force under load (9.18 daN for 11.4 daN at 117 mm).

At a length of 150 mm (which corresponds to the 'CLOSED' position), the spring load is only 8 daN, compared to
10.35 daN when new (Influence/origin of the Bleed Not Closed?).

Q: Is it possible to modify this procedure to prevent this issue? Such as a leakage after the PRV valve to keep a
small cooling flow.

Operators, Liebherr, and Airbus, comments please.