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Warszawa 22.06.2023

Autor : Sebastian Czub

Russian Assault Tactics in Ukraine

Introduction

The Russian Ministry of Defence issued a

manual on the conduct of assault
If Russian forces continue to develop in such a
operations based on the experiences of
manner and start applying similar philosophy to
the Russian Armed forces in Ukraine. The
larger formations they could become a much more
manual titled “Особенности ведения
cohesive and effective fighting force with advanced
боевых действий в городе
battle tactics and access to vast amounts of men
(населённом пункте) и лесозащитной
and resources to execute them.
полосе в составе штурмового отряда
(роты, взвода) методические
рекомендации” - which can be loosely In the introduction part of the manual,
translated as “features of conducting the author presents the abilities and
combat operations in a city (settlement) characteristics of Ukrainian defensive
and a forest protection zone as part of an positions, both in urban areas as well as
assault detachment (company, platoon) fortified forest strips. According to the
methodological recommendations”. This 1
document Ukrainian urban positions are
document aims to outline how to assault extremely comprehensive, with
defensive positions that appear continuous replacement of personnel,
frequently on Ukrainian battlefields, steady supply of ammunition,
namely urban fortification as well as transported at night to minimise risks,
forest strips that cut through Ukrainian and a high amount of personnel manning
farmland and steppes. The aim of this the observation posts. The defenders
report is to provide a cohesive overview also heavily utilise urban infrastructure to
of the assault manual and of the their advantage, with numerous
capability of Russian assault strongpoints and observation posts
detachments, and their influence on the present in high rise buildings, that grant
frontline. both high visibility and cover, as well as
Russian Assault Manual incorporation of observation
 Russian Assault Tactics in Ukraine

infrastructure such as for example city well as “camera traps” - small cameras
cameras placed at crossroads, road mounted around the defensive lines that
junctions, and important buildings. This monitor the area. This allows for better
informational edge is further bolstered coordination of supporting fire, as well as
by the wide application of UAVs boosts the capabilities of the heavy
(Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) conducting machine gun nests as some of them are
reconnaissance, ranging from small fitted with remote controls, allowing the
quadcopters to highly advanced drones operator to engage targets from the
like the Fury or even Bayraktar. safety of a bunker or a fortified position.
Artillery supporting the defence lines is
Furthermore, during offensive
located between 8 and 10 kilometres
operations, if a Ukrainian unit is forced to
away, hidden away in shelters and only
withdraw, or eliminated, their position is
brought forward for fire missions. The
targeted by artillery fire - either to cover
artillery fires only if it has a guaranteed
the soldiers retreat or eliminate
opening on the target, the time spent at
advancing assault troops. After around
the firing position does not exceed 15
30 - 40 minutes the lost position is
minutes, after which artillery is moved.
counter-attacked by reserves in the hope
Further manoeuvrable fire assets are
of regaining the lost ground and
present in the area of defence and widely
eliminating remnants of assault forces. In
used, this includes tanks, guns, mortars,
the case of forest strips, Ukrainian
and ATGMs.1
defence is organised in 2 - 3 lines. Fire
weapons (most probably indirect fire Composition and Organisation of
weapons like mortars, or/and weapons Assault Detachments
with anti armour capabilities), are located The second part of the manual focuses
in reinforced positions both on the flanks
on the organisation of a new detachment
and in the depths of the fortified forests. out of readily available units that is
What is more, each of the defensive lines tailored to conducting assault operations
is bolstered by at least 2 fortified on the Ukrainian battlefield, based on
positions, either a combination of wood platoon and company level forces -
and earth or in some cases concrete named and further referred to as the
bunkers, fitted with heavy machine guns.
The defenders are also supported by
1
Here most probably referring to self-propelled
aerial reconnaissance, mostly drones, as guns and self-propelled mortars.

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“assault detachment”. The task of an

assault detachment is to capture
important objects, positions (including
strong points or pieces or terrains), block
and destroy large structures, and assault
buildings in a populated areas. These
units are mostly formed on the basis of a
reinforced mechanised battalion,
although the document also includes
notes on assault detachments formed on
the basis of airborne or air assault
battalions - as they are oftentimes used
as assault and/or shock troops.

The general organisation of the assault

detachment is as follows: Command
group, 2-3 assault companies,
reconnaissance group, tank group,
mobile electronic warfare group,
flamethrower group, UAV group, air
defence group, artillery support units, fire
support group, engineering assault
group, reserve group, medical evacuation
group, VVST evacuation group. The
attack is conducted primarily by the
assault companies which are supported
by the listed additional units (see figure
1. Assault Detachment Equipment for
more details).

The assault company is organised as

follows: command group, UAV group, 2-3
Figure 1. Assault Detachment Equipment

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 Russian Assault Tactics in Ukraine

assault platoons, fire support platoon,

бронегруппа - armoured group, reserve
squad, artillery support platoon, and the
evacuation squad. (see figure 2. Assault
Company Equipment for more details).

Each assault platoon is comprised of 12

to 15 men, divided into 3 men fire teams.
The structure of the assault platoon is
supposed to be flexible, adapted to the
particularities of the battlefield and the
current engagement. However, for
reference and guidance purposes a
“standard” platoon can be organised in
the following manner: the lead team, first
fire team, second fire team, command
team, and reserve team. (see figure 3.
Assault Platoon for more details)

Planning

The tactics of the assault detachments

are based on a very thorough, at least
according to the manual, preparation of
forces. According to the document the
commander must allocate three days to
plan the operation and prepare the
troops. The commander should provide
for the actions of the assault detachment
lasting up to two days. The tasks,
objectives, and plan of action can be
refined by the end of the first day of
Figure 2. Assault Company Equipment
operations. Assault operations should be
launched at different times, with no strict pattern, this is done so presumably to
confuse the defenders. In the course of

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preparing the assault operation, the

commander should take into account the
characteristics of the chosen battlefield,
including terrain, obstacles, buildings, etc.
as well as study the enemy, presence of

prepared positions, strongpoints, and the

relative strength of opposing forces. The
commander is advised to utilise available
UAV assets, quadcopters especially to
conduct the study of the battlefield. The
day before the assault the recon
detachment scouts the potential
battlefield for up-to-date information
and potential lines of advance. Based on
this information the commander should
assess the ability of his unit to complete
the objective. If the decision to continue
is made, the commander is responsible
for setting up tasks for each assault
company and each reinforcement unit
(tank group, detachment artillery group
etc.), including targets and milestones for
the advance. Company commanders are
responsible for platoon tasks, and
platoon commanders for the actions of
the combat threes (fire teams).

Additionally, artillery and fire support

should be organised by echelon
(company commander responsible for
company assets, platoon for platoon

Figure 3. Assault Platoon

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 Russian Assault Tactics in Ukraine

assets etc.) based on existing tasks, and ammunition only at night, and within
direction and range of fire. Each fire 30-40 minutes when assault units
support and artillery unit should have capture their objective. The resupply
pre-planned strike targets. In the case of units utilise armoured transports and
suddenly appearing targets, on duty fire should on the way back from supplying
weapons are used. Furthermore, all the front troops evacuate the wounded.
actions and fires conducted by the Combat Operations – Forest Strips
artillery and fire support are based on
Forest strips are a very frequent area of
operational time periods, which discern
terrain in Ukraine. These lines of trees cut
which targets are to be shelled at which
through farming fields and steppes,
time. This allows the fire support units to
creating a mesh of roughly four-sided
better coordinate with the assault
fields bordered on all sides by treelines.
troopers, who then know which areas of
These treelines are reinforced and
the battlefield are being covered by
changed into defensive positions,
artillery fire, and when and where they
providing much more protection than the
can/need to manoeuvre. During
open fields in between. This part of the
operations artillery units should be
manual describes how to properly
deployed at a distance from each other,
assault these forest strips.
up to 2 km in length, also depending on
the designated targets and missions. When assaulting defensive positions
located within a forest strip, Russian
Assault units should only stop when the
forces rely on coordinated actions of
target objective has been reached. Upon
combined arms. The main assault is
reaching it, the soldiers should prepare
carried out by infantry within the forest
defensive positions. The reserve units
strip. The advancing units are positioned
should be then deployed to reinforce the
within the controlled sections of the
captured positions, while artillery fires
woodland. The units move forward only
target possible avenues of enemy
within the forest strip, soldiers are
counter attacks - such fire missions
forbidden from going to the edge of the
should last up to 60 - 90 minutes. The
treeline or beyond it. This both covers
artillery units then switch to harassing
and camouflages the assault units. The
fire – firing at targets of opportunity and
assault upon defensive positions can
disrupting enemy actions. The assault
only begin after the artillery and fire
units should be resupplied with water

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support units open fire on enemy infantry advances under the cover of the
positions. The fire is directed at the first bombardment. Upon reaching suitable
line of defence, suppressing, and positions the commander of the assault
destroying the garrison soldiers. The unit gives the order to the artillery and

Figure 4. Combat Operations - Forest Strips

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 Russian Assault Tactics in Ukraine

fire support units to transition into the strongpoints, vehicles etc.), however,
next operational time period, thus only the overall commander of the
shifting fire onto the second line of assault detachment can call for aviation
defence. This allows infantry to assault support. The AGS (automatic grenade
softened enemy positions, while the launcher) crews should provide
bombardment suppresses supporting supporting fire from covered positions,
enemy units. In order to execute this using only indirect fire, from a distance of
manoeuvre correctly, the infantry should between 600 - 1700 metres (between
assault enemy trenches within 1 minute the “dead zone” – minimum safe range
after the bombardment shifts forward. and the maximum range of the weapon).

The process is repeated until all three The assault detachment's armoured

enemy defensive lines are captured or group should be set up in firing positions

the designated objectives are achieved. in the controlled section of the forest

When advancing the infantry should also strip. These vehicles should be able to

observe the surroundings for the provide supporting fire along the entire

presence of mine-explosive barriers and line of the assault, and on both sides of

enemy video surveillance equipment. the forest strip. The vehicles’ positions

Upon reaching the designated objective, should be well camouflaged, so as to

assault units should occupy the target avoid being spotted by enemy air assets

and prepare defensive positions, in or other reconnaissance. The vehicles

preparation for enemy counterattack. should not operate out in the open (in the

Russian soldiers are prohibited from fields between the forest strips), if

occupying captured trenches, as the required they should manoeuvre along

enemy knows their precise positions, the edge of a forest strip (along the line

layout, and weaknesses, can accurately of advance) where the advancing infantry

strike them with artillery fire, and they can spot mines and anti-vehicle traps.

can be mined. Combat Operations – Urban Areas

The commanders of the assault units Urban areas are key points of resistance,
also has the ability to call on support oftentimes possessing critical
from their respective armoured group, infrastructure, and are thus, heavily
fire support group, or artillery group to contested. The assault manual describes
engage newly identified targets (enemy how to properly assault such areas, from

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wider perspectives up to block by block wounded in the “yellow” zone

and room by room fighting. (presumably contested area) to the
evacuation squad, which carries out the
Prior to the assault, a thorough
evacuation.
reconnaissance is conducted, aimed to
locate enemy strongpoints, fire weapons, Again, as in operation in forest strips,
emplacements, armoured vehicles, tanks, Russian forces rely on combined arms
and surveillance equipment (observation cooperation to achieve their objectives.
posts, drones, street surveillance However, in the case of urban assaults
cameras) - this is done by normal Russian forces rely a bit more heavily on
observation, or preferably using drones their fire and armour support. Firstly,
(quadcopters). When planning the artillery and fire support units are
assault, the commander should create prescribed targets along the entire
alternative designations for points of frontline of enemy defences - this is
interest such as a numbering system for done to weaken initial enemy resistance
buildings, and/or alternative street and allow assault units to enter the
names. This allows easier planning, urban area. As mentioned earlier, artillery
confuses enemy forces, and allows for and fire support assets are also
open communication between friendly prescribed targets along the entire line of
forces. Furthermore, each cleared advance. Upon receiving an order to
building should be marked with a chosen transition into the next operational time
sign and marked in green on the period the units shift fire to the next set
operations map in the command centre, of targets. This can be noticed in figure 5.
again allowing for better coordination of where as it can be seen, each fire support
forces while denying enemy information. and artillery unit has prescribed targets,
Additionally, the soldiers of the assault with each target having the additional
units should not perform the evacuation note on when it is supposed to be
of wounded personnel themselves in targeted. For example, the denomination
order not to disrupt the operation. “1” would mean that that target would
Servicemembers are instructed only to be targeted in the first operational time
provide first aid, report the location of period, the denomination with several
the wounded, and then continue to numbers “1-3” would mean that these
pursue their mission objectives. The targets will be shelled continuously
commander relays the position of the through several time periods.

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 Russian Assault Tactics in Ukraine

Furthermore, it is vital to highlight the periods are not fixed but denoted as
“destruction targets” which essentially mentioned earlier by the direct order of
mean that the bombardment of such a the assault commander, ordering artillery
denoted target should result in its and fire support units to shift fire. This is
destruction in the allocated time period done in concert with the advance of the
(destruction of an enemy position or assault units, which can then push into
levelling of an entire building). These time

Figure 5. Combat Operations - Urban Areas

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weakened enemy defensive positions. moving forward under artillery cover. The
second variant is a bit different. It is also
In this case armoured vehicles of the
based on artillery supremacy, with fire
bronegruppa will advance along the foot
assets heavily shelling the frontline
troops, providing protection and direct
positions of the enemy however, in this
fire support. Vehicles can use street
case after the initial opening
corners, side streets, and similar forms of
bombardment, the fire focuses on a
cover when advancing through urban
single section of the assault -
areas and/or engaging enemy forces. The
presumably where a single platoon
armoured vehicles, tanks especially, are
would attack. After weakening the
also responsible for the creation of entry
defences, the position is attacked by the
positions for infantry into building and
assault platoon, and the artillery fire
across other obstacles, by blasting holes
shifts to cut off the second line of
through the walls. If possible, the assault
defence from reserves. This forces the
units, along with supporting vehicles,
defenders to either transition troops
should refrain from advancing down long
along the defence line from neighbouring
roads and along long straight streets.
defensive positions, thereby weakening
During the assault soldiers should look to
them or do nothing. In the first case upon
capture enemy electronic tablets
receiving confirmation of lateral
(smartphones), as they could provide
reinforcements the remaining assault
information about the enemy, and help
platoons advance and seize the less
the units navigate. Additionally, in order
defended positions and can then proceed
to combat enemy surveillance soldiers
to eliminate defenders sent to support
should utilise hunting rifles or buckshot
the primary assault target. If the
to destroy low level flying enemy UAVs.2
neighbouring positions do not reinforce
The manual also proposes two variants the assaulted position, it will serve as a
of assaulting urban areas. The first one is breakthrough point, allowing more
basically a repetition of the previous troops to advance through them, thus
outlines - artillery fire targets the first flanking the other defenders. Either way
line of defence and then proceeds the position is taken, and the tactic is
forward covering the assault platoons’ repeated until all objectives have been
advance. This can be described as a achieved.
creeping advance, with infantry steadily

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 Russian Assault Tactics in Ukraine

When assaulting a building the assault breach charge to create an entryway on

platoon should act in the following one of the upper floors). The process is
manner. Firstly, a single soldier should be then repeated.
stationed by the building's entrance, with
In the case in which a building cannot be
the tasks of preventing enemy attacks
assaulted Russian troops are instructed
from the outside, or from the basement.
to use the “extrusion” method. Soldiers
The rest of the platoon proceeds to the
take cover in the buildings / covered
upper floors in combat threes. The
positions, surrounding the target
soldiers clear the entire building on an
building, but do not encircle it. The
apartment basis, with the number of
besieged enemy troops should be left
soldiers dedicated to clearing each
with an avenue of retreat. Once the
apartment based on its size - three men
friendly forces are in cover, the objective
per room. While clearing the building with
is intensively shelled by the artillery and
a joint corridor, and/or stairwell, the
fire support platoon (supposedly the
assault platoon should dedicate between
vehicles of the bronegruppa can also be
1 - 2 soldiers to cover the yet uncleared
used here). Enemy forces occupying the
apartments and the stairs leading up.
building should be forced to retreat due
When the entire building is cleared the
to the intensity of fire, in this case all
assault platoon proceeds to the 2nd
friendly assets shift fire to the escape
floor, where they create a breach to the
route, left unblocked especially for the
next building, for this purpose each and
purpose of shelling it during enemy
every soldier of the assault unit should
retreat. This results in the easy capture
be equipped with a breaching device (this
of enemy strongpoints while at the same
is a peculiarity of Soviet era architecture
time dealing massive casualties. This
where several blocks of flats would be
approach has been observed in action
built right next to each other with
during the battle for Bakhmut, with
conjoined side walls). The assault platoon
Ukrainian soldiers stating that their
also mines (booby traps) the stairwell
strongpoints were shelled until they
leading to the upper floor before
were forced to withdraw, whereupon
proceeding to the next building
their line of retreat was targeted by
(presumably this is done in order to
Russian fire.3
protect against infiltration of enemy
troops in a similar manner, using a

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The manual also provides commanding officers. This is potentially

recommendations for defensive and very useful due to the shortages of
withdrawal operations in urban areas. experienced officers, as well as
Firstly, when preparing defence, a numerous losses among the officer
strongpoint should be chosen from cadre, which cannot be as easily or
among the available buildings/locations. quickly replaced. This manual can bridge
It should be chosen based on its this gap for the Russian armed forces,
structural strength, ability to conduct all either providing guidance to freshly
round defence, ability to set up graduated officers or knowledge to the
observation posts and remote firing commanders promoted in the field.
positions, with covered access to them. Firstly, the entire introduction section of
Units should not be accumulated in one the manual serves both as an overview
area, but rather spread around the and a reminder of the abilities of the
defensive positions. Additionally, these Ukrainian armed forces in defensive
positions should not be located on the operation. It also encourages Russian
building's rooftop. In the case where the commanders to comprehensively study
defensive position is placed in a the area of operations, meaning terrain,
basement, the units should be provided enemy forces, enemy weak- and
with enlarged feeder cable (6 - 12 strongpoints, as well as the capabilities
metres), to mount the antenna on the of their own units. What is probably one
building's roof. The defence should also the most important takeaways from this
utilise mines to block enemy advances. If introductory part is that the Russian
the assault units are repulsed, they forces have a well developed
should be withdrawn at night, to understanding of Ukrainian defences,
minimise casualties. both in terms of utilised equipment as

Consideration from the Russian assault well as tactics.

manual The author of the text goes into detail

about the organisation of Ukrainian
The discovered Assault Manual seems to
defences and especially their strengths
be a very comprehensive training and
and how they are used against attacking
guidance material, meant to supplement,
Russian troops. The level of Russian
or potentially even build from the ground
intelligence on the topic seems very
up the ability and knowledge of Russian

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 Russian Assault Tactics in Ukraine

extensive and if applied correctly could infantry battalions reinforced by

prove very problematic to Ukrainian additional assets from other formations.
defenders. Some experts doubt the The standard Russian mechanised
ability of this document to improve battalion consists of roughly 539 men on
Russian assault tactics, stating that as 44 BTR vehicles or 461 men on 37 BMP
per Russian doctrine such texts will be vehicles. The manual suggests the use of
applied to the letter without any BMPs, though BTRs can also probably be
potential variations, making Russian used.
assaults rigid and attack plans ignorant
Each BMP battalion has roughly 303 men
of the realities of the battlefield. mounted on 33 BMPs as its frontline
However, the text is written in a guiding primary fighting force, which translates
manner, aiming to equip its readers with to 3 companies, each with 101 men and
knowledge and ability, rather than a strict 11 BMPs each. In the assault
set of rules to follow. This can be seen in detachments each company has 4 BMPs,
the opening statements where the supported by a single T-72 tank, with 2 -
author claims that success of combat 3 assault platoons, each consisting of 12
operations is based on a thorough - 15 men. Thus, roughly a single
understanding and study of the mechanised company can be
battlefield, where those combat transformed into roughly 3 smaller or 2
operations will take place. The manual larger assault companies. Or this could
thus, aims to give Russian commanders allow Russian forces to mount assaults
guidance on how to conduct assault without compromising their battle lines
operations against typical Ukrainian to Ukrainian counter attacks. The point is
defensive positions, subject however to that these formations can be created
battlefield circumstances. This could spontaneously without the need for vast
potentially result in greater flexibility and amounts of resources or manpower, or
effectiveness of Russian assaults. extensive prior planning. This is similar to
Secondly, the composition of the assault the idea behind Russian Battalion
detachments provides great flexibility for Tactical Groups, smaller formations
the Russian forces, though potentially at meant to be readily available, quick to
the cost of specialisation. The assault muster, and very flexible to the task at
detachments, as mentioned previously, hand. The core of mechanised infantry (or
are created on the basis of mechanised airborne/air assault troops), readily

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available everywhere along the frontline, leads to the loss of the trained crew as
with involvement of locally available well.
heavier assets, such as tanks, or artillery, The resources needed to replace both the
which can be temporarily borrowed from highly advanced vehicle along with
other formations. trained personnel is much higher in
Third, the reason for the smaller number comparison to the loss of infantry. It is
of heavy assets, tanks, and armoured much cheaper, and easier for the Russian
infantry vehicles in particular, is the Federation to train and equip
characteristics of the battlefield. The infantrymen than armour troops, even if
combat operations in forested and urban the infantry is lost at a much higher rate.
areas using heavy assets, tanks and Furthermore, infantrymen can advance
infantry vehicles especially, oftentimes across the forest strips and engage
results in the loss of said assets. The enemy positions while in cover. Similarly,
characteristics of the battlefield are very infantry is also much more mobile in
unfavourable to the use of armoured urban areas, as it can traverse across
vehicles. The forest strips are difficult to buildings, and take cover in them. Foot
traverse for such vehicles, forcing them personnel is also much more preferable
to operate by the woodland edges or in due to the ability to clear buildings and
the open fields in between them. In both occupy enemy positions. Thus, the
cases the vehicles are very susceptible to assault manual allows Russian forces to
anti tank weapons, artillery, or pre- reorganise themselves into detachments
placed minefields. In urban areas vehicles more suitable to the tasks at hand, while
have an easier time advancing, due to the minimising losses of valuable equipment
existence of streets, but can be very and personnel.
susceptible to anti armour fires. The Fourth, the assault detachments allow
vehicles can be engaged by AT armed Russian forces to engage in coordinated
infantry from above, targeting the combined arms operation on small
weakest points in the top armour. At the organisational levels. The assault
same time artillery strikes can target the detachments are based on reinforced
vehicles easily as they cannot manoeuvre battalions, but their structure allows
easily out of the line of fire due to the even single companies to conduct
surrounding buildings. The loss of combined arms manoeuvres. This allows
armoured combat equipment oftentimes

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 Russian Assault Tactics in Ukraine

Russian forces to plan and execute highly also grants commanders greater
effective operations in a relatively short operational freedom, and capability of
time. At the same time the manual crafting dynamic and favourable
provides guidelines and sample plans, engagements. This closely resembles the
that allows even lower lever, or characteristics of the Battalion Tactical
inexperienced officers to carry out much Group - an independent detachment of
more complex operations. While such combined arms forces tasked with
commanders might be less effective in objectives and granted operational
dynamic situations, the manual also freedom.
provides a number of contingencies and One key difference that should be noted
emergency plans that can mitigate such here is that the assault detachments are
difficulties. only semi-independent. They are not
The additional option to further bolster formed as a permanent self-sufficient
company sized formations by heavier force but are created dynamically from
assets and direct subordination of these units readily available in the area in order
assets to company commanders, also to fulfil specific objectives. The assault
allows for a greater flexibility and detachments are created, disbanded, and
effectiveness of the assault reformed on a dynamic means to an end
detachments. The direct subordination of basis. This ensures that the unit can be
heavy assets, such as artillery pieces or continuously supplied and reinforced
tanks, enhances the detachment’s ability from the parent formation (i.e. a
to engage the enemy by creating a mechanised or an airborne/air assault
smoother chain of command. In this case, battalion). This also allows the parent
instead of requesting support from the formations to conduct offensive
battalion commander, which takes time operations on a smaller scale, with
and complex coordination, the company limited involvement from higher
commander issues orders directly to echelons. This in turn allows Russian
artillery and armour units embedded into forces to maintain initiative and continue
his detachment. Such a configuration offensive operations along the frontline.
allows company sized assault units to Such limited offensive operations find
respond to a plethora of enemy threats, success due to their small size, attracting
even capable of taking the fight to limited attention before the attack starts.
formations of technically larger size. This These assaults also enjoy a limited

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response from Ukrainian forces, other losses and struggle to circumvent them
than the present frontline forces, due to by employing ad hoc formations, patched
their small size and simultaneous similar together to form a fighting force. On the
sized engagements in other sections of other hand, it shows a degree of
the front. This forces Ukrainian defenders ingenuity, making Russian formations
to divide their available resources and more flexible and adaptable. This also
reserves among many different results in more organised combined arms
engagements, or even save operations, with clearly indicated
reinforcements for the more major objectives, manoeuvres, and actions. This
operations. Thus, Russian forces are able might be an important step in Russian
to pierce Ukrainian lines in many operations, due their previous struggles
different places across the frontline and with coordinated action. If Russian forces
achieve small gains, which can later be continue to develop in such a manner and
developed into further, potentially major start applying similar philosophy to larger
offensive operations. Bakhmut is a good formations they could become a much
example of this, where Russian forces more cohesive and effective fighting
used smaller tactical operations to force with advanced battle tactics and
threaten Ukrainian lines and continuously access to vast amounts of men and
advance deeper into the city. resources to execute them.

Conclusion

The Russian Assault Manual provides a

great overview of the Russian approach
to offensive operations in Ukraine. First
of all, it suggests that the Russian officer
corps is lacking, and requires further
preparation to conduct successful
offensive operations. It also shows that
Russian forces are struggling with their

Author: Sebastian Czub, analyst at Casimir Pulaski Foundation

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 Russian Assault Tactics in Ukraine

Founded in 2005, the Casimir Pulaski Foundation is an independent, non-for-

profit, non-partisan Polish-think tank conducting research on different aspects of
European and Transatlantic security, with a special focus on Central and Eastern Europe.

The Foundation brings together dozens of international experts in various fields (foreign
policy, defence, energy, democratic resilience) and publishes analysis describing and
explaining international events, identifying trends in the European and Transatlantic
security environment and recommending solutions for government decision-makers and
the private sector.

The Casimir Pulaski Foundation is also the initiator and main organizer of the Warsaw
Security Forum conference, which since 2014 annually gathers over 2000 stakeholders
from more than 60 countries in order to elaborate shared responses to common
transatlantic security challenges.

Each year the Foundation presents the “Knight of Freedom” award to outstanding figures
who contribute to the promotion of the values of General Casimir Pulaski, such as
freedom, justice and democracy. It is also the home to the Polish branch of the Women in
International Security network.

The Casimir Pulaski Foundation has been ranked as the first among Polish Think Tanks
dealing with defence and national security according to the ‘Global Go To Think Tank
Index’ report in 2018, 2019 and 2020 respectively. The Foundation also has a status of a
partner organization of the Council of Europe.

www.pulaski.pl

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RAPORT PUŁASKIEGO

1
“Ministry of Defense of Russia issued manual on assault operations based on experience of war against
Ukraine. DOCUMENT”, Censor Net, December 12, 2022,
https://censor.net/en/news/3386414/ministry_of_defense_of_russia_issued_manual_on_assault_operations_base
d_on_experience_of_war_against.
2
PStyleOne1, Twitter, March 12, 2023, https://mobile.twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1634873021243723779.
3
Igor Kossov, “Ukrainian soldiers in Bakhmut: ‘Our troops are not being protected’”, The Kyiv Independent,
March 5, 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/ukrainian-soldiers-in-bakhmut-our-troops-are-not-being-protected/.

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