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Pre-week Notes in Political Law for 2023 Bar Examination

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Prof. Ramel C. Muria, LL.M.

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Basic Principles

Nature of baselines laws. Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III

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States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn,
either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
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maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours
could not be any clearer: Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the
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territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall

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be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis
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supplied) Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States
parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In
turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime
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space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the
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exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs,
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fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to

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exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and

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continental shelf (Article 77). (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011, Carpio,
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J. EnBanc)
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Distinctions between government and state. The following are the basic distinctions
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between government and state: In the first place, the government is an essential mark of the state.
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There cannot be a state without a government; but there can be a government without there being
a state. In the second place, a state possesses the quality of permanence, while a government may
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come and go, leaving the state to continue unimpaired and unaffected. The government of a state
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may be overthrown, and another government set up; but the state remains, with the same
personality. In the third place, the state is an ideal person, the government is the instrumentality
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of this political unity (Arguego, Principles of Political Science, 1976 Ed., pp.19-20).
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The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province,
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city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
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"associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that
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go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
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implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
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contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence. (Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591, October 14,
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2008).
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What is an associative state. The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been
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intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact.

Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD
- by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international
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legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the
term "associative" in the [Link] and Reisman state that [a]n association is formed

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when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one
state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while

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maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground
between integration and independence. (Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel, G.R.
No. 183591, October 14, 2008).

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Sovereignty as auto-limitation. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
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absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their
state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact
(Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 66).
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It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of
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its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character.
That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has
the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may
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refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence. Simply stated, the Doctrine of

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Auto-limitation is wherein the Philippines adhere to principle of International Law as limitation to the
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exercise of its sovereignty. It means that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a

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restriction of its sovereign rights. A state then if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what
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otherwise is illimitable competence. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power

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plenary in character (Reagan vs. Commission of Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968).
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Continuing mandamus maybe resorted to compel government agencies to conduct environmental

clean up. MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid
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disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory
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imposition under Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. The MMDA is duty-bound to
comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the
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minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum
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operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. RA
9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste management. It
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implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect
and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
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harmony of nature (MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 574 SCRA 611, 2008).
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Legislative Department
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Criteria for participation in the party-list elections

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1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
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organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or

organizations.
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2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
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underrepresented sector.
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3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
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party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidate in legislative district elections can
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participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independed sectoral

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party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or

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lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
“marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisher folk, urban poor,

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indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
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women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
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underrepresented” sector they represent.

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6. National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
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of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified. (Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 204486,
April 2, 2013, Carpio, J., Enbanc)
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No undue delegation of legislative power in the law mandating the K to 12 Law. Under
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the two tests (completeness and sufficient standard tests), the K to 12 Law, read and appreciated

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in its entirety, is complete in all essential terms and conditions and contains sufficient parameters

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on the power delegated to the DepEd, CHED and TESDA. The fact that the K to 12 Law did not
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have any provision on labor does not make said law incomplete. The purpose of permissible
delegation to administrative agencies is for the latter to "implement the broad policies laid down
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in a statute by 'filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
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competence to provide." With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant
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peculiar problems, the legislature has found it necessary to entrust to administrative agencies,
who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them, the authority to provide
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direct and efficacious solutions to these problems. This is effected by the promulgation of
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supplementary regulations, such as the K to 12 IRR jointly issued by the DepEd, CHED and
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TESDA and the Joint Guidelines issued in coordination with DOLE, to address in detail labor

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and management rights relevant to implementation of the K to 12 Law. (Council of Teachers v.

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Secretary of Education, GR No. 216930, October 9, 2018; GR No. 216930, October 9, 2018,
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Caguioa, J.)
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There is nothing in the UDHR, ICESCR and CRC which proscribes the expansion of
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compulsory education beyond elementary [Link] is absolutely nothing in Article 26

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that would show that the State is prohibited from making kindergarten and high school
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compulsory. The UDHR provided a minimum standard for States to follow. Congress complied
with this minimum standard; as, in fact, it went beyond the minimum by making kindergarten
and high school compulsory. This action of Congress is, in turn, consistent with Article 41 of the
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CRC which provides that "[n]othing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions which
are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child and which may be contained in: (a)
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[t]he law of a State party; or (b) [i]nternational law in force for that State.'' The enactment of
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the K to 12 Law was the manner by which the Congress sought to realize the right to education
of its citizens. It is indeed laudable that Congress went beyond the minimum standards and
provided mechanisms so that its citizens are able to obtain not just elementary education but also
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kindergarten and high school. Absent any showing of a violation of any Constitutional self-
executing right or any international law, the Court cannot question the desirability, wisdom, or

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utility of the K to 12 Law as this is best addressed by the wisdom of Congress. (Council of
Teachers v. Secretary of Education, GR No. 216930, October 9, 2018; GR No. 216930, October

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9, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

Students do not enjoy vested right to graduate after completion of four years of high

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school under the law prior to the K to 12. The K to 12 Basic Education Program is not being
retroactively applied because only those currently enrolled at the time the K to 12 Law took
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effect and future students will be subject to the K to 12 BEC and the additional two (2) years of
senior high school. Students who already graduated from high school under the old curriculum
are not required by the K to 12 Law to complete the additional two (2) years of senior high
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school. More importantly, BP Blg. 232 does not confer any vested right to four (4) years of high

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school education. Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has
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become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. The right must be
absolute, complete, and unconditional, independent of a contingency, and a mere expectancy of
future benefit, or a contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing
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laws, does not constitute a vested right.211 Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the rights of
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students under Section 9 of BP Blg. 232 are not absolute. These are subject to limitations
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prescribed by law and regulations. In fact, while Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 232 states that students

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have the right to continue their course up to graduation, Section 20 of the same law does not

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restrict elementary and high school education to only six (6) and four (4) years. Even RA No.
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9155 or the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, which was enacted under the 1987
Philippine Constitution, does not specify the number of years in elementary and high school. In
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other words, BP Blg. 232 or RA No. 9155 does not preclude any amendment or repeal on the
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duration of elementary and high school education. In adding two (2) years of secondary
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education to students who have not yet graduated from high school, Congress was merely
exercising its police power and legislative wisdom in imposing reasonable regulations for the
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control and duration of basic education, in compliance with its constitutional duty to promote
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quality education for all. (Council of Teachers v. Secretary of Education, GR No. 216930,
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October 9, 2018; GR No. 216930, October 9, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

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The Constitution does not limit the medium of instruction to English or Filipino only. It is
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thus clear from the deliberations that it was never the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
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use only Filipino and English as the exclusive media of instruction. It is evident that Congress
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has the power to enact a law that designates Filipino as the primary medium of instruction even
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in the regions but, in the absence of such law, the regional languages may be used as primary
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media of instruction. The Congress, however, opted not to enact such law. On the contrary, the
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Congress, in the exercise of its wisdom, provided that the regional languages shall be the primary
media of instruction in the early stages of schooling. Verily, this act of Congress was not only
Constitutionally permissible, but was likewise an exercise of an exclusive prerogative to which
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the Court cannot interfere with. (Council of Teachers v. Secretary of Education, GR No. 216930,
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October 9, 2018; GR No. 216930, October 9, 2018, Caguioa, J.)

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Legislative district is not a political unit. The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5
speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit because it is the basis for the election of a
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member of the House of Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It is not,
however, a political subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. It can

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more appropriately be described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the
whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a

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corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the district; it
merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their
national affairs. (Bagabuyo vs. Commission on Elections, 573 SCRA 290)

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Statute enacted as response to a problem or incident or occurrence is not impermissible
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for being enacted which is limited to existing condition only. As regards respondents' contention
that since RA 9483 came about because of the spate of oil spillage at the time of its enactment,
this violates the requirement that the classification must not be limited to existing conditions only,
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the argument does not hold water. A statute or provision thereof is said to be limited to existing

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conditions only if it cannot be applied to future conditions as well. Here, We cannot, by any
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stretch of imagination, agree with respondents' proposition. Suffice it to state that enacting a
piece of legislation as a response to a problem, incident, or occurrence does not make it "limited
to existing conditions only." Assessing whether a statute or provision meets said requirement
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necessitates a review of the provision or statute itself and not the cause or trigger for its
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enactment. To require otherwise would be to improperly tie the hands of our legislature in
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enacting laws designed to address the various matters, incidents, and occurrences that may arise

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in a highly-dynamic and unpredictable society. Viewed within the purview of RA 9483, it can

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easily be seen that the statute also applies to future conditions as it covers any and all oil spills
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that may occur within Philippine waters. (DOTR v. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport
Association, GR No. 230107, July 24, 2018, Velasco, J)
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Requiring supramajority votes for future amendment of a statute is unconstitutional.
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Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law. Even assuming that RA
No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we have already established that the supermajority
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vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 905415 is unconstitutional for
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violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. The power of the legislature
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to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its

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own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike
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down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v.
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Dade:A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining
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to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the
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old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or

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restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except
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when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its
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predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original
act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in
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advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing
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statutes. [emphasis ours] Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to
approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is quorum.17 In requiring all laws which
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amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides
(2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which we
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sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and
cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures. (Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012)

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SET has no power to nullify agreements between the COMELEC and third party

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providers. A cursory reading of the foregoing umnistakably would show that the SET has no
express, inherent or 'implied power to declare void or unconstitutional Section 6.9 of the AES
Contracts, which requires the protestant to shoulder the retention costs. The authority of the SET

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is limited to matters affecting the validity of the protestant's title. While it may be true that the
SET has the power to control its,proceedings, such power cannot, by any means, be construed as
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including the power to interpret much less invalidate a contract between third parties. Thus, any
issue concerning the contract between the COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM is beyond the
jurisdiction and constitutional mandate of the SET. To rule otherwise is to overstretch if not to
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go astray from the interpretation of the SET's constitutional grant of jurisdiction as the sole judge

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of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of the Senate,
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as laid down in Javier. (Francis N. Tolentino v. Senate Electoral Tribunal and Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 248005, May 11, 2021, Lopez, J.)
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Termination of Senate’s inquiry in aid of legislation. The legislative inquiry of the Senate
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terminates on two instances: First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report
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and; second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of one (1)

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Congress. As stated in Neri, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and

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even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of
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that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while the
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Senate is a continuing institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that
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Congress at the final adjournment of its last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon
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that expiration, the imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends. (Balag v. Senate of the
Philippines, GR No. 234608, July 13, 2018, Gesmundo, J.)
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A joint resolution cannot ripen into law. The Senate's definition of a joint resolution
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states that it is no different from a bill. However, under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987

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Constitution, only a bill can be enacted into law after following certain requirements expressly
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prescribed in the Constitution. A joint resolution is not a bill, and its passage does not enact the
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joint resolution into a law even if it follows the requirements expressly prescribed in the
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Constitution for enacting a bill into a law. Section 6439 of the Rules of the Senate states that
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"[p]rior to their final approval, bills and joint resolutions shall be read at least three times."
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However, Section 6840 of the same Rules provides that "[n]o bill shall be passed by the Senate
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unless it has passed three (3) readings on separate days x x x."41 There is no express provision in
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the Rules of the Senate that applies Section 68 to Joint Resolutions. The approval process under
Section 68 only applies to bills and not to joint resolutions. In short, there is no express language
in the Rules of the Senate that a joint resolution must pass three readings on separate days. Thus,
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the Senate can pass a joint resolution on three readings on the same day. In contrast, Section
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5842 of the Rules of the House of Representatives states that "[n]o bill or joint resolution shall
become law unless it passes three (3) readings on separate days and printed copies thereof in its
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final form are distributed to the Members three (3) days before its passage except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
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emergency." In any event, neither the Rules of the Senate nor the Rules of the House of
Representatives can amend the Constitution which recognizes that only a bill can become a law.

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However, a joint resolution can be part of the implementation of a law as provided in the law
itself. A joint resolution can also be treated as a recommendation to the Executive on how the

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law can be implemented. (Ang NARS v. DBM, GR No. 215746, August 8, 2019, Carpio, J.)

Congress supposed “corrollary/auxillary” powers cannot validate the claim that a

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franchise will be granted by the Congress to a television station. At any rate, the Court finds that
ABS-CBN failed to provide sufficient legal basis to support its theory on Congress' so-called
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"corollary/auxiliary" powers pending determination of the renewal of its expired franchise. On
the contrary, what is sufficiently clear to the Court is that, under our present legal framework, a
legislative franchise granting broadcasting entities the privilege to broadcast their programs
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through television and radio stations in the country must be in the form of a duly enacted

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law. The congressional deliberations on pending bills are not equivalent and cannot take the
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place of a duly enacted law, which requires the entire constitutional process for legislation to
take its full course. Neither can it be inferred from our Constitution and our present statutes
that temporary statutory privileges may be accorded to a franchise applicant pending
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deliberation of a franchise grant or renewal. Indeed, it is only upon the completion of the full
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law-making procedure in accordance with the parameters prescribed by the Constitution can it
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be said that Congress has granted a broadcasting entity the statutory privilege to so broadcast

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its programs through its television and radio stations. Absent a valid and subsisting legislative

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franchise embodied in a duly passed law, no such statutory privilege, even if temporary, can be
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enjoyed. (ABS-CBN Corporation v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 252119,

August 25, 2020)
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Revenues from commercial activities by exempt institutions are exempt from taxes if use
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directly, actually, and exclusively to the institutions’ purposes. Considering the clear explanation
of the nature of the money involved, it is evident that all of petitioner Foundation's income is
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actually, directly and exclusively used or earmarked for promoting its educational purpose. To
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reiterate, respondent never argued that the income of petitioner Foundation was used in any
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manner other than for promoting its purpose as a non-stock, non-profit educational institution, In

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fact, there is not even a single argument or evidence presented to cast a doubt in the proper usage
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of petitioner Foundation's income. Furthermore, a simple reading of the Constitution would show
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that Article XIV, Section 4 (3) does not require that the revenues and income must have also
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been earned from educational activities or activities related to the purposes of an educational
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institution. The phrase "all revenues" is unqualified by any reference to the source of
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revenues. Thus, so long as the revenues and income are used actually, directly and exclusively
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for educational purposes, then said revenues and income shall be exempt from taxes and duties
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(Innovators Foundation (Dela Salle University College of St. Benilde) Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. No. 202792, February 27, 2019, A. Reyes, Jr., J.)
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Lump-sum appropriations are not necessarily unconstitutional. The existing Calamity

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Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified
amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line-item" appropriations which are
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rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be
validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each
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percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to
be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid

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appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting
practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in

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which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the
President's item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would
equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule

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on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added
that Section 25 (4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations
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bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 25 (6), Article VI of
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the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to

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be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
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law."(Belgica v. DBM, GR No. 210503, August 8, 2019, Per Curiam)

Unconstitutional lump sum appropriations. In contrast, what beckons constitutional

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infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped
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as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
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further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the

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appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot

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be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money" and
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hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the
President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if
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he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as
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not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such
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arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority
would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual
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purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects
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of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative
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prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability. (Belgica v. DBM, GR No. 210503,

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August 8, 2019, Per Curiam)

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Power of Congress to approve extensions of the declaration of martial law is not limited.
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The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the
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President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
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of habeas corpus. Such silence, however, should not be construed as a vacuum, flaw or
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deficiency in the provision. While it does not specify the number of times that the Congress is
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allowed to approve an extension of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only limitations to the exercise of the
congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are that the extension should
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be upon the President's initiative; that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or
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rebellion and the demands of public safety; and that it is subject to the Court's review of the
sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen. A cardinal rule in statutory
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construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction or interpretation, but only for application. Thus, whenever there is a
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determination that the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires the extension of
martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ, the Congress may exercise its

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authority to grant such extension as may be requested by the President, even if it be subsequent
to the initial extension. Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the

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proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority to decide on
its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be "for a period to be
determined by the Congress." If it were the intention of the framers of the Constitution to limit

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the extension to sixty (60) days, as petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 theorize, they would not have
expressly vested in the Congress the power to fix its duration. (Lagman v. Senate President
io
Aquilino Pimentel III, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018, Tijam, J.)

Public Trust Doctrine. Hand-in-hand with police power in the promotion of general
ss

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welfare is the doctrine of parens patriae. It focuses on the role of the state as a "sovereign" and

i
expresses the inherent power and authority of the state to provide protection of the person and
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property of a person non sui juris. Under the doctrine, the state has the sovereign power of
guardianship over persons of disability, and in the execution of the doctrine the legislature is
possessed of inherent power to provide protection to persons non sui juris and to make and
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enforce rules and regulations as it deems proper for the management of their property. Parens
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patriae means "father of his country," and refers to the State as a last-ditch provider of protection
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to those unable to care and fend for themselves. It can be said that Filipino consumers have

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become such persons of disability deserving protection by the State, as their welfare are being

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increasingly downplayed, endangered, and overwhelmed by business pursuits. While the
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Regalian doctrine is state ownership over natural resources, police power is state regulation
through legislation, and parens patriae is the default state responsibility to look after the
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defenseless, there remains a limbo on a flexible state policy bringing these doctrines into a
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cohesive whole, enshrining the objects of public interest, and backing the security of the people,
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rights, and resources from general neglect, private greed, and even from the own excesses of the
State. We fill this void through the Public Trust Doctrine.
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The Public Trust Doctrine, while derived from English common law and American
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jurisprudence, has firm Constitutional and statutory moorings in our jurisdiction. The doctrine

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speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative of continuing supervision over
O

the taking and use of appropriated water. Thus, "[p]arties who acquired rights in trust
an

property [only hold] these rights subject to the trust and, therefore, could assert no vested right
et
to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust." (Diosdado Sama v. People, G.R. No.
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224469, January 05, 2021, Lazaro-Javier, J.)

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Executive Department
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Presidential immunity from suit. (I)f this Court were to first require the President to
respond to each and every complaint brought against him, and then to avail himself of
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presidential immunity on a case to case basis, then the rationale for the privilege – protecting the
In

President from harassment, hindrance or distraction in the discharge of his duties – would very
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well be defeated. It takes little imagination to foresee the possibility of the President being
deluged with lawsuits, baseless or otherwise, should the President still need to invoke his
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immunity personally before a court may dismiss the case against him. (De Lima v. Duterte, GR
No. 227635, October 15, 2019, Bersamin, CJ)

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The President has no ministerial duty to subject anti-COVID vaccines to clinical trials.

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When R.A. 11494 granted the President the authority "to exercise powers that are necessary and
proper x x x," Congress devolved its power in favor of the President to give him full authority in

n
terms of the direction to be taken by the government in its response to the spread of COVID-19.
The President was given ample authority to exercise discretion in handling the procurement of
io
the necessary vaccines. To bolster the discretion given to the President, he was even given the
authority to procure vaccines that did not undergo Phase IV trials as required by the Universal
Health Care Law. The only standard that has to be taken into account is that these vaccines are
ss

recommended and approved by the WHO and/or other internationally-recognized health agencies.

e
Notably, all the vaccines that came into the Philippines need not undergo any clinical trial as

i
long as it has been recommended by the WHO and/or other internationally-recognized health
fe

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agencies. Petitioner did not even mention that the Sinovac vaccine was not recommended by any
of these institutions.(Nepomuceno v. Duterte, UDK No. 16838, May 11, 2021, Lopez, J.)
o

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Doctrine of non-diminution of the power of pardon. Under the present Constitution, "a
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pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action." Thus,

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it is unmistakably the long-standing position of the Supreme Court that the exercise of the
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pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or

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the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution. This doctrine
s

of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress,

es

specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the

framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception
e
from the pardoning power of the President in the form of "offenses involving graft and
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corruption" that would be enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment of a law
(Risos-Vidal v. Estrada, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015).
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Nelson Mandela Rules. The Nelson Mandela Rules and its precedent, the United
n

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Nations Minimum Standard on the Treatment of Prisoners, cannot simply be disregarded as non-
binding norms. The principles and fundamental rights on which these declarations are based—
O
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the right to life, the prohibition of torture, and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment—
have attained a jus cogens status. These Rules have been adhered to and transformed into local
et
legislation and incorporated in our penal institutions. (Leonen, J., Separate Opinion, IN THE
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MATTER OF THE URGENT PETITION FOR THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS ON

HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS IN THE MIDST OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, Dionisio
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Almonte, et. al, v. People, G.R. No. 252117, July 28, 2020, Enbanc)
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The Nelson Mandela Rules

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The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) was the agency
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leading the revision process. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) ensured that the revised rules reflected international
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human rights standards adopted since the 1950s. As a result, the Mandela
Rules provide States with detailed guidelines for protecting the rights of persons

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deprived of their liberty, from pre-trial detainees to sentenced prisoners.
The Rules are based on an obligation to treat all prisoners with respect for

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their inherent dignity and value as human beings, and to prohibit torture and other
forms of ill-treatment. They offer detailed guidance on a wide variety of issues

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ranging from disciplinary measures to medical services. For example, they prohibit
the reduction of a prisoner’s food or water, as well as the use of instruments of
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restraint that are inherently degrading or painful, such as chains or irons.
The Rules restrict the use of solitary confinement as a measure of last resort, to
be used only in exceptional circumstances. Mandela found solitary confinement to
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be “the most forbidding aspect of prison life. There was no end and no beginning;
there’s only one’s own mind, which can begin to play tricks”.

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At the Robben Island prison in South Africa, Mandela led a movement of civil
disobedience that led to better conditions for inmates. His autobiography, Long
Walk to Freedom, describes how the food improved, short trousers were replaced
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with long ones, newspapers were permitted and manual labour was discontinued.
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The Nelson Mandela Rules emphasize that the provision of health care for

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prisoners is a State responsibility, and that the relationship between health-care

professionals and prisoners is governed by the same ethical and professional

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standards as those applicable to patients in the community. Moreover, the
s

Rules oblige prison health-care services to evaluate and care for the physical and
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mental health of prisoners, including those with special needs. (Source:

[Link]
persons-deprived-liberty#:~:text=to%20sentenced%20prisoners.- e
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,The%20Rules%20are%20based%20on%20an%20obligation%20to%20treat%20al
l,disciplinary%20measures%20to%20medical%20services.)
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The doctrine of command responsibility is not applicable in the Writ of Amparo. It may

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plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police

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commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made
an

applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now
et
constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the
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incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these

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proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form
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of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be
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any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings
on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
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administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National
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Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and
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effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life,
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liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, "is not an action to
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determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings." Of the same
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tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said
in Razon v. Tagitis: It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the

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disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for

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purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extra-judicial
killings]. (Rubrico v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010)

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Guidelines as the modality for evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawal
from international agreements. First, the president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from
io
agreements which he or she determines to be contrary to the Constitution or statutes; second, the
president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were entered into pursuant to
congressional imprimatur; and third, the President cannot unilaterally withdraw from
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international agreements where the Senate concurred and expressly declared that any withdrawal

i
must also be made with its concurrence. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, GR No. 238875, August 7,
fe

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2018, Leonen, J.)

No unbridled discretion in the withdrawal from treaties on the part of the President. In
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sum, at no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled authority to
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withdraw from treaties or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be anchored on a
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determination that they run afoul of the Constitution or a statute. Any such determination must

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have clear and definite basis; any wanton, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious withdrawal is

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correctible by judicial review. Moreover, specific circumstances attending Congress's injunction
s

on the executive to proceed in treaty negotiation, or the Senate's specification of the need for its
concurrence to be obtained in a withdrawal, binds the president and may prevent him or her from
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proceeding with withdrawal. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, GR No. 238875, August 7, 2018, Leonen,
J.) e
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Appointment of resigned Commissioner to the position of the Chairman of the
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Commission is valid. A commissioner who resigns after serving the Commission for less than
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seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion
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of the term of the departing Chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
R

reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and
O
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the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided
further that the vacancy in the position of the Chairman resulted from death, resignation,
et
disability or removal by impeachment (Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
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192791, April 14, 2012).

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Impeachment vis-à-vis quo warranto against impeachable officials. The causes of action
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in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on
the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of a public office, while in
o

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impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense. Stated in a different manner, the

crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not
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respondent legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in
In

the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent's prosecution for certain
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impeachable offenses. To be sure, respondent is not being prosecuted herein for such
impeachable offenses enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment. Instead, the resolution of this
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case shall be based on established facts and related laws. Simply put, while respondent's title to
hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily

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presupposes that respondent legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer,
the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal

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from office (Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018).

Winning bidder cannot modify any provision of the awarded contract. If the winning

n
bidder is allowed to later include or modify certain provisions in the contract awarded such that
the contract is altered in any material respect, then the essence of fair competition in the public
io
bidding is destroyed. A public bidding would be a farce if, after the contract is awarded, the
winning bidder may modify the contract and include provisions which are favorable to it that
were not previously made available to the other bidders. The government cannot enter into a
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contract with the highest bidder and incorporated substantial provisions beneficial to him, not

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included or contemplated in the terms and specifications upon which the bids were invited
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(Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation v. Pozzolanic Philippines
Inorporated, G.R. No. 183789, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 214, 232).
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Judicial Department
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Operative fact doctrine. The operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence and validity

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of a legal provision prior to its being declared as unconstitutional and hence, legitimizes

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otherwise invalid acts done pursuant thereto because of considerations of practicality and
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fairness. In this regard, certain acts done pursuant to a legal provision which was just recently
declared as unconstitutional by the Court cannot be anymore undone because not only would it
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be highly impractical to do so, but more so, unfair to those who have relied on the said legal
e
provision prior to the time it was struck down. (Film Development Council of the Philippines v.
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City of Cebu, G.R. No. 203754, October 15, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, J. Enbanc)
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Application of the operative fact doctrine. With the unconstitutionality of these

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provisions, proprietors, operators or lessees of theatres or cinemas are no longer under any
n

obligation to remit to FDCP the amusement taxes on graded films, which should have accrued to

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the LGUs. Conversely, FDCP no longer had any legal right to receive or demand the same.
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However, in light of the operative fact doctrine, the Court gave these provisions limited
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application in that FDCP was authorized to retain the aforesaid amusement taxes already
et
received from proprietors, operators or lessees of theatres or cinemas during the provisions'
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effectivity. With the Court's final denial of FDCP's motion for reconsideration on October 15,
h

2019, FDCP had lost its right to retain, nay, collect or demand, any amusement tax from
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proprietors, operators or lessees of theatres or cinemas pursuant to the stricken down Sections 13
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and 14 of RA 9167. The limited recognition of FDCP's right to these taxes, although coming
from unconstitutional and hence, void provisions, is only based on the operative fact doctrine,
which is in turn, premised on the public reliance thereto at the time of their existence. Thus, since
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Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 had already been declared unconstitutional with finality on
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October 15, 2019, no one can validly claim reliance on these provisions anymore from that point
on, much less be a source of any right or entitlement in favor of FDCP. (Film Development
In
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Council of the Philippines v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 203754, November 03, 2020, Perlas-
Bernabe, J. Enbanc)
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Locus standi for non-government organizations. For organizations to become real parties

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in interest, the following criteria must first be met so that actions may be allowed to be brought
on behalf of third parties: [F]irst, "the [party bringing suit] must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact,'

al
thus giving him or her a 'sufficiently concrete interest' in the outcome of the issue in dispute";
second, "the party must have a close relation to the third party"; and third, "there must exist some
hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests." Organizations may

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possess standing to sue on behalf of their members if they sufficiently show that "the results of
the case will affect their vital interests" and that their members have suffered or will stand to
io
suffer from the application of the assailed governmental acts. The petition must likewise show
that a hindrance exists, preventing the members from personally filing the complaint. (National
Federation of Hog Farmers, Inc., et. al., v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 205835, June 23,
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2020, Leonen, J.)

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Power of judicial review for violations of the Constitution by the Legislative Department.

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To question the constitutionality of the subject issuances, respondents should have invoked the
expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Section of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The
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adverted section defines judicial power as the power not only "to settle actual controversies
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involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether
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or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

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the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." There is a grave abuse of

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discretion when there is patent violation of the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence.
s

On this score, it has been ruled that "the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
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errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
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judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act
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of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
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ministerial functions." Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies
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where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution.
(DOTR v. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association, GR No. 230107, July 24, 2018, J.)
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Horizontal and vertical tests of “earliest opportunity” element of judicial review.

Philippine jurisprudence has traditionally applied the "earliest opportunity" element of judicial
et
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review vertically, i.e., the constitutional argument must have been raised very early in any of the
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pleadings or processes prior in time in the same case. But this does not preclude the Court from
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adopting the horizontal test of "earliest opportunity" observed in the United

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States, i.e., constitutional questions must be preserved by raising them at the earliest
opportunity after the grounds for objection become apparent. Otherwise stated, the threshold is
not only whether the earliest opportunity was in the pleadings and processes prior in time in the
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same case, but also whether the grounds for the constitutional objection was already apparent
when a prior case relating to the same issue and involving the same petitioner was being heard.
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(Ang Partido ng mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc. (ANGKLA) v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
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246816, September 15, 2020, Lazaro-Javier, J.)

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Authority of courts to determine whether a legislative franchise was violated by the
grantee. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of persons, the final

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arbiter of their rights and obligations under the law. The question of whether a franchisee is in
breach of the franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is in breach of the franchise specially

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enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited to a court of law, and not for an administrative
agency, much less one to which no such function has been delegated by Congress. In the same
way that availability of judicial review over laws does not preclude Congress from undertaking

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its own remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo warranto in the
instant cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by abrogating the
io
legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed enough by the franchisees’ violation
of the franchises extended to them (Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., G.R.
162272, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 213, 251).
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President can choose from any of the nominees submitted by the JBC. It is apparent from
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the aforequoted CONCOM deliberations that nomination by the JBC shall be a qualification for
appointment to the Judiciary, but this only means that the President cannot appoint an individual
who is not nominated by the JBC. It cannot be disputed herein that respondents Musngi and
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Econg were indeed nominated by the JBC and, hence, qualified to be appointed as
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Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC
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cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to

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choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still

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paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the
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appointment is valid. On this score, the Court finds herein that President Aquino was not obliged
to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by
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the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on
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President Aquino's power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had
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considered to be qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate [Link],
in the case at bar, there were six simultaneous vacancies for the position of Sandiganbayan
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Associate Justice, and the JBC cannot, by clustering of the nominees, designate a numerical
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order of seniority of the prospective appointees. The Sandiganbayan, a collegiate court, is
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composed of a Presiding Justice and 20 Associate Justices divided into seven divisions, with

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three members each. The numerical order of the seniority or order of preference of the 20
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Associate Justices is determined pursuant to law by the date and order of their commission or
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appointment by the President (Aguinaldo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016).
et
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PHILSAT cannot operate to dictate upon law schools who will be admitted to study. The
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Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum standards for law
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admission. The PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in
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measuring the applicants' aptness for legal education along with such other admissions policy
that the law school may consider, is such minimum standard. However, the PhiLSAT presently
operates not only as a measure of an applicant's aptitude for law school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass
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or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law
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program. When the PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools,
as its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere supervision and regulation,
In
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violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional.

In striking down these objectionable clauses in the PhiLSAT, the State's inherent power to
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protect public interest by improving legal education is neither emasculated nor compromised.
Rather, the institutional academic freedom of law schools to determine for itself who to admit

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pursuant to their respective admissions policies is merely protected. In turn, the recognition of
academic discretion comes with the inherent limitation that its exercise should not be whimsical,

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arbitrary, or gravely abused. (Pimentel v. LEB, GR No. 230647, September 10, 2019, Reyes, Jr.,
J.)

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Amendment and Revision of the Constitution
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Distinction between constituent power and legislative power. (a) Constituent power is the
power to formulate a Constitution or to propose amendments to or revisions of the Constitution
and to ratify such proposal, whereas legislative power is the power to pass, repeal or amend
ss

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ordinary law or statutes (as opposed to the organic law). (b) Constituent power is exercised by

i
Congress (by special constitutional amendment), by a Constitutional Convention or Commission,
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by the people through initiative and referendum, and ultimately by the sovereign electorate,
whereas legislative power is an ordinary power of Congress and of the people, also through
initiative and referendum. (c) The exercise of constituent power does not need the approval of
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the Chief Executive, whereas the exercise of legislative power ordinarily needs the approval of
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the Chief Executive, except when done thorugh initiative and referendum (Bernas, 2011:541).
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It is conventional wisdom that, conceptually, the constituent power is not to be confuse with

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legislative power in general because the prerogative to propose amendments to the Constitution
s

is not in any sense embraced within the ambit of ordinary law-making (Fred Ruiz Castro, Jr.,
Sanidad v. Comelec).
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Distinction between constitutional revision and amendment. An amendment envisages an
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alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an
amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
li

conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to
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be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-
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examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all

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implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered.
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Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a
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revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch
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from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important
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provisions of the Constitution (Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, citing
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Bernas, S.J.).
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Two-part test to determine whether the proposition is a revision or an amendment. The

quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
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existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not
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consider the degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish
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such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of
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inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in the nature of

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the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances." (Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153,

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October 25, 2006)

Requirement for the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment under the people’s

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initiative contemplated in Section 2, Article XVII. The framers of the Constitution intended that
the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people
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"before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for
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signature." The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon

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a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
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essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.
No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full
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text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by
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signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the
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people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains

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the full text of the proposed amendments (Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25,

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2006).
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What maybe subject to judicial review. The amending process, both as to proposal and
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ratification, raises a judicial question This means that the Supreme Court may inquire into
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wheher or not the prescribed procedure for amendment has been observed (Sanidad v. Comelec,
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73 SCRA 333; Cruz, 2014: 824).
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Distinction between referendum and plesbicite. A "referendum" is merely consultative in

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character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted to the
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people foe their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the

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executive power of the President. It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen,
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regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts . A "plebiscite,"
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on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
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disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the
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Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
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months preceding the election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not
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imposed. It is generally associated with the amending process of the Constitution, more
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particularly, the ratification aspect (Sanidad v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976).

Local Government
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Puerto Princesa City’s exclusion from the plesbicite for the division of the Province of
Palawan into two will not invalidate the plesbicite. As made abundantly clear in Umali, the
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economic factors contemplated in the determination of "political units directly affected" by an

LGU change or conversion pertain strictly to fiscal or budgetary relations among the political
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units concerned, specifically, the sharing of internal revenue allotments, budgetary allocations,
and taxing powers, all of which are governed by the pertinent provisions of the LGC and other

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laws. An expansion the scope of economic impact analysis outside these factors, as petitioners
would want this Court to do, will require the presentation and evaluation of evidence: a task

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which is outside the purview of this Court's functions. Furthermore, the holistic consideration of
the economic effects of LGU changes or conversions is a matter of policy in which the judiciary
must defer to the other two great branches of government. The holistic analysis of the economic

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impact of an LGU change or conversion on its neighboring LGUs concerns the wisdom,
prudence, and economic viability of the proposed division, and do not pertain to the legality
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thereof. Confining ourselves, thus, to the consideration of what is essentially the fiscal impact on
Puerto Princesa of the division of Palawan into three provinces, We must again have recourse to
the provisions of the Constitution and the LGC. As an HUC, Puerto Princesa, in its own right,
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has the power to impose its own taxes, fees and charges, the revenues of which shall accrue to its

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own treasury. It is likewise entitled to its own internal revenue allotment and its own share in
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whatever natural resources may be found within its territory. It is therefore clear that Puerto
Princesa has been rendered fiscally autonomous from the province of Palawan by virtue of the
city's conversion into an HUC.
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The foregoing disquisitions make it abundantly clear that Puerto Princesa has become a
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distinct political entity independent and autonomous from the province of Palawan, by virtue of

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its conversion into a highly urbanized city in 2007. Hence, it can no longer be considered a

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"political unit directly affected" by the proposed division of Palawan into three provinces; and
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perforce, the qualified voters of the city of Puerto Princesa, including herein petitioners Cynthia
S. Del Rosario, Federico N. Virgo, Jr., Renato V. Baladad, Beatriz A. Dioso, and Corazon
es

Manalon Davila were properly excluded from the coverage of the plebiscite scheduled by RA No.
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11259. (Cynthia S. Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 247610, March 10, 2020)
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The base of the IRA should be “national taxes” and not just “national internal revenue
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taxes.” Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional
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lawmaking remains subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. The phrase
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national internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than

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the term national taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress has actually departed from the
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letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be the base from which the
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just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum
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(from the words of a statute there should be no departure). Equally impermissible is that
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Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under
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the 1987 Constitution. Taxes are the enforced proportional contributions exacted by the State
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from persons and properties pursuant to its sovereignty in order to support the Government and
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to defray all the public needs. Every tax has three elements, namely: (a) it is an enforced
proportional contribution from persons and properties; (b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of
its sovereignty; and (c) it is levied for the support of the Government. Taxes are classified into
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national and local. National taxes are those levied by the National Government, while local taxes
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are those levied by the LGUs. (Mandanas v. Hon. Ochoa with MR, GR No. 199802, April 10, 2019,
Bersamin, J.)
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Courts cannot be compelled to relinquish jurisdiction in favor of local or indigenous tribal courts.
To yield criminal prosecution would be to disregard the State and the Filipino people as the objects of
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criminal offenses. The application of customary laws may enable a measure of reparation for private
injuries engendered by criminal offenses, but it will never enable the consummate recompense owed to

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the State and the Filipino people. Ultimately then, yielding prosecution would mean sanctioning a
miscarriage of justice. It was never the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's intent to facilitate such

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miscarriage of justice. Its view of self-governance and empowerment is not myopic, but is one that
balances. Preservation is pursued in the context of national unity and is impelled by harmony with the
national legal system. Customary laws cannot work to undermine penal statutes designed to address

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offenses that are an affront to sovereignty. Viewed through the lens of the requisites for issuing a writ of
mandamus, there is no right or duty to even speak of here. Nowhere in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act
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does it state that courts of law are to abandon jurisdiction over criminal proceedings in favor of
mechanisms applying customary laws. Petitioner derives no right from the Dadantulan Tribal Court to be
spared from criminal liability. The Regional Trial Court is under no obligation to defer to the exculpatory
pronouncements made by the Dadantulan Tribal Court. Instead, it must proceed to rule on petitioner's
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alleged liability with all prudence and erudition. (Ha Datu Tawahig v. Hon. Cebu City Prosecutor, GR No.
221139, March 20, 2019, Leonen, J.)

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Bill of Rights
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A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
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overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen

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statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a
vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society

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of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
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statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
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could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society

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in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
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possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394).
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As applied challenge to the constitutionality of statutes. In an "as applied" challenge, the

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petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground -
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absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or
vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation
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of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely
on the violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
et
prohibition against third-party standing. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge
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to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the
assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the
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statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that
conies from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech
constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking
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in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into
silence. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578. December 07, 2021, Carandang, J.,
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Enbanc, quoting Justice Puno)

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Strict scrutiny test. The strict scrutiny standard is a two-part test under which a law or
government act passes constitutional muster only if it is: (1) necessary to achieve a compelling
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State interest; and (2) the least restrictive means to protect such interest or narrowly tailored to
accomplish said interest.231 Unlike the overbreadth doctrine, it is not limited to free speech

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cases. It is employed by the courts when the law or government act interferes with other basic
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. When the freedom of speech is involved, strict

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scrutiny has been applied when the restraint on speech is content-based, i.e., the restriction is
based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
252578. December 07, 2021, Carandang, J., Enbanc)

n
Section 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (RA 11479) is constitutional. To reconcile the
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seemingly competing interests of national security and exercise of human rights, it is important
to acknowledge that human rights are not absolute. Under a strict scrutiny lens, national security
is a compelling state interest that justifies some necessary, proportionate, and least intrusive
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restrictions on the exercise and enjoyment of particular liberties. The Court finds that the main

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part of Section 4 of the ATA adopts the necessary, proportionate, and least restrictive means in
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its implementation to counter the complex issue of terrorism in the country. Again, the general
wording of the law is a response to the ever-evolving nature of terrorism. Congress cannot be
expected to enumerate all specific acts which may be resorted to by terrorists in pursuing their
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goals. In any event, concerned citizens are not left without a remedy since any perceived
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vagueness or overbreadth of the terms used in the main part of Section 4 may still be assailed in
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the appropriate actual cases that may be brought before the courts at the proper time beyond the

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auspices of this delimited facial challenge. Inasmuch as terrorism is an ever-evolving

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phenomenon, so too must jurisprudence evolve based on actual cases, not speculative theories or
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ideas. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578. December 07, 2021, Carandang, J.,
Enbanc)
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The Not Intended Clause in Section 3 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (RA 11479) is
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unconstitutional. the "Not Intended Clause" fails the void for vagueness, overbreadth, and strict
scrutiny tests, because it curtails, as well as obscures, not only certain kinds of protected speech
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but the very freedom to speak itself. While Congress is constitutionally empowered to restrict
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certain forms of speech to prevent or deter terrorism, it must do so in a reasonably clear and non-
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abusive manner narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose, so as not to sweep unnecessarily and

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broadly towards the protected freedom of speech. Considering the foregoing disquisition, it is
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evident that the "Not Intended Clause" in Section 4's proviso impermissibly restrains freedom of
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speech or expression. With that in mind, however, the Court need not strike down the entirety of
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the proviso. It is proper for the Court to excise only so much of a statute as is necessary to save it
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from unconstitutionality. The Court finds that only the "Not Intended Clause", i.e., "which are
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not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to
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create a serious risk to public safety" needs striking down. What precedes it, the phrase
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"Provided, That, terrorism as defined in this section shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent,
stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political
rights," is hereby retained because it accurately reflects the legislative intent and affirms the
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Court's view on this issue. Therefore, the Court strikes down the "Not Intended Clause" as
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unconstitutional and categorically affirms that all individuals, in accordance with Section 4 of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, are free to protest, dissent, advocate, peaceably assemble to
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petition the government for redress of grievances, or otherwise exercise their civil and political
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rights, without fear of being prosecuted as terrorists under the ATA.(Calleja v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 252578. December 07, 2021, Carandang, J., Enbanc)

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Strict scrutiny is required for statutes which will likely infringe on fundamental rights.
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. It includes

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the right to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and
the right to vote. On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the
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scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the
promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare. It essentially involves a public
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right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to

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take precedence over the latter. Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the
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same principle applies with respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of
law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
violates one of the essential requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly, the limitation
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of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as
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it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. A Filipino who is married to
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another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.

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There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be

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treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are
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political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to
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contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
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another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino
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spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner. (Republic of
the Philippines v. Manalo, GR No. 221029, April 24, 2018, Peralta, J.)
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License to possess firearm is not property right. It is settled that the license to possess a
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firearm is not property. In Chavez, then Chief of Police Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., taking cue
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from a speech delivered by then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, issued the Philippine
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National Police Guidelines suspending the issuance of permits to carry firearms outside of
residence "to avert the rising crime incidents." Francisco I. Chavez (Chavez), a licensed gun
et
owner with a permit to carry a firearm outside of residence, petitioned this Court to void the
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Guidelines for allegedly violating his right to due process. He argued that "the ownership and
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carrying of firearms are constitutionally protected property rights which cannot be taken away
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without due process of law and without just cause." This Court disagreed with Chavez, ruling
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that there is no vested right in the continued ownership and possession of firearms. Like any
other license, the license to possess a firearm is "neither a property nor a property right." As a
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mere "permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful," it does not act as "a contract
between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted[.]" Being in the nature of a
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license, the permit to carry firearm outside residence is neither a property nor a property right. A
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grantee of the permit does "not have a property interest in obtaining a license to carry a
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firearm[.]" Citing Erdelyi v. O'Brien, decided by the United States Court of Appeals Ninth
Circuit, this Court held that the "[p]roperty interests protected by the Due Process Clause ... do
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not arise whenever a person has only 'an abstract need or desire for,' or 'unilateral expectation of
a benefit." True property rights "arise from 'legitimate claims of entitlement ... defined by

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existing rules or understanding that stem from an independent source, such as ... law[.]" Chavez's
petition was, therefore, dismissed. (Acosta v. Hon. Ochoa, GR No. 211559, October 15, 2019,

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Leonen, J.)

Warrantless searches and seizures. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure

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without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be
io
made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search
in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
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waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. (People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299,

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January 22, 1999, Puno, J., Enbanc)
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Plainview search. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion
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or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in
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plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
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may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement

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officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can

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particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a
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piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent. (Miclat v. People of the Philippines, GR No. 176077, August 31, 2011,
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Peralta, J.).
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Stop and frisk. A stop-and-frisk situation must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to
the person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police
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officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
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has weapons concealed about him. (Arsenio Valdez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No 170180,
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November 23, 2007, Tinga, J.)

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Guidelines for Bus Searches

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Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine
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inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray
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scanning machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of
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electronic scanners, passengers can be required instead to open their bags and luggages for
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inspection, which inspection must be made in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger
object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.
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While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security
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personnel of the bus owner in the following three instances.

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First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal

articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an
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inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that
is forced to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles

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carried by a passenger on board.

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Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can
be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by
government agents or private security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at

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the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers
along the way, making it possible for these passengers to evade the routine search at the
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bus terminal.

Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints

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where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and

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their bags or luggages.
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In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal
and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a
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valid reasonable search.
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First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must

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uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, if not altogether eradicating,

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any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule.
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Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as
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insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the
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fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other
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similar groups should be protected.
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Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public

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safety.
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Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be
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convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was
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planted against the accused. (Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018, Carpio,
et
Acting CJ, Enbanc)
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Search of a particular passenger cannot be justified as a valid warrantless search of a

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moving vehicle. The search in this case could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In
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this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a· specific person. Further, in
search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal
items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger
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of that particular bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus,
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they searched the bag of the person matching the description given by their informant and not the
cargo or contents of the said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so happened that the alleged drug
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courier was a bus passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles
would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which can be conducted by the mere
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expedient of waiting for the target person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along
the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order

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to search the target person. (People v. Camporado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018, Martires, J.)

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Stop and frisk is different from search incidental to lawful arrest. One of these
jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches are
often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches

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incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there
io
are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence. On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches
are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court
of Appeals was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose object is either to determine the
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identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police

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officer seeks to obtain more information." This court stated that the "stop and frisk" search
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should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the
city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant." The search
involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the
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requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution. "Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes
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referred to as Terrysearches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be
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given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced

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with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the

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Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation where
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the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience
of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals
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and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they
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themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic
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criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the
facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. [The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a
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passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing suspicious,
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moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was
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not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the

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police that Cogaed was "suspicious."] (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014,
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Leonen, J.)
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Issuance of traffic citation ticket is not an arrest; hence, no search may be conducted on
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the person of the motorist. At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
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ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part
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of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the
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issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself
testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been
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flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that
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they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody xxx there being
no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following
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are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
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consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent
and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search

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incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case. It must be noted that the evidence seized,
although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually

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concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not
immediately apparent. Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is
not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in

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order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims
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that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to
prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to
take out the contents of his pocket. Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a
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question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this

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determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment
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in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public
or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police
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procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the
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nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9)
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the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the

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burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and

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was freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at
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the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search. (Luz v.
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People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012, Sereno, J.)

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Permissible drug test for persons arrested for commission of crimes. First, "[a] person
apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime.
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The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15
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comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.
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Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others,

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the "importation", "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and

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transportation", "manufacture" and "possession" of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors

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and essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"; being
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"employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort"; "maintenance of a den, dive or resort"; "illegal
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chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals"; "manufacture or delivery"

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or "possession" of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous

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drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs
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"during parties, social gatherings or meetings"; "unnecessary" or "unlawful" prescription thereof;

"cultivation or culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof; and
"maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/or
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controlled precursors and essential chemicals." To make the provision applicable to all persons
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arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly
expanding its meaning. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of
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extortion. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014, cited in People v. Sullano,
People vs. Sullano, GR No. 228373, March 12, 2018, Gesmundo, J.)
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Prisoners’ right against unreasonable searches and seizures. It is clear that a prison
inmate's right against unreasonable search and seizure and right to privacy, cannot be equated or
likened to the rights and personal liberties enjoyed by individuals outside penal institutions. To

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permit prisoners to enjoy the same level of expectation of privacy will defeat the inherent
objectives of penal institutions. Extending to prison inmates the same standard of liberties

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enjoyed by private individuals is incompatible with penal institutions' duty to stop the
proliferation of illegal activities within the facility. The loss of privacy is a natural consequence
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of incarceration. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that this limitation should only be made
applicable to searches conducted by correctional officers or other law enforcers in charge of
securing the subject detention facility. Although personal rights and liberties are restricted as a
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consequence of an individual's arrest and detention, inmates are not totally stripped of their

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constitutional rights, particularly Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states:

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Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
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against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
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be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

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complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
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searched and the persons or things to be seized. Legitimate government interest in the

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preservation of internal order and security is a compelling ground to permit warrantless
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inspections of jail cells. However, this exception pertains only to searches incidental in

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adopting of reasonable measures based on the needs and exigencies of penal institutions.
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Where the purpose of the search goes beyond maintaining internal order and security in a
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detention facility, and the search is used as a tool to gather evidence against an inmate in
order to prosecute him, compliance with the provisions in Rule 126 of the Rules must be made.
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[ A.M. No. RTJ-17-2494 [FORMERLY A.M. No. 16-11-03-SC], January 26, 2021; RE: MOTU
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PROPRIO FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION ON THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH SC]
WARRANT AND OTHER PENDING INCIDENTS IN THE CASE OF THE DECEASED MAYOR
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ROLANDO ESPINOSA, SR.; [A.M. No. RTJ-19-2557 [FORMERLY OCA IPI No. 18-4897-RTJ]],
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CONFUSED CITIZENS OF REGION 8,COMPLAINANTS, VS. HON. CARLOS O. ARGUELLES,
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PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC), BAYBAY, LEYTE, BRANCH 14, Per
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Curiam, Enbanc).
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Note: Justice Caguioa’s dissenting opinion: A warrant was indeed necessary for
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the search to be valid. The search was evidently not for a legitimate interest in
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institutional security. Neither was the search random nor suspicionless, or applicable to
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all prison inmates or detainees as when there are routine inspections for contraband. The
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clear purpose of the search was to further a criminal investigation and the law
enforcement objectives of the State, and ultimately, to obtain evidence for the prosecution
of Espinosa, Yap, Alvarez, and Balagbis for crimes in addition to the offense for which
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they were incarcerated. The ostensible objective of the search, therefore, determines the
necessity for a warrant (Caguioa, J., Concurring and Dissenting)
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Dismissal of a bible teacher by his religious sect is pure eccliasiastical matter. Court sees
that respondent's appointment as instructor of petitioners' own educational institution was by

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virtue of his membership with Abiko Baptist Church. It is one of his duties as a
missionary/minister of the same. He himself admitted that he was teaching "bible history,

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philosophy, Christian doctrine, public speaking, English and other religious subjects to
seminarians in [MBIS intending] to be [a] pastor/minister[.]" These subject matters and how
they prepare or educate their ministers are ecclesiastical in nature which the State cannot regulate

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unless there is clear violation of secular laws. It follows, therefore, that even his alleged
exclusion as instructor is beyond the power of review by the State considering that this is purely
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an ecclesiastical affair. It is up to the members of the religious congregation to determine
whether their minister still lives up to the beliefs they stand for, continues to share his knowledge,
and remains an exemplar of faith to the members of their church. (Bishop Shinji Amari v.
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Villaflor, G.R. No. 224521, February 17, 2020, Gesmundo, J.)

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The State is barred from appealing the decision of the Court of Appeals which degraded
the conviction of the accused. With the CA's modification of respondent's conviction from
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attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness, it has already acquitted respondent of attempted rape,

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which is already final and unappealable. Thus, double jeopardy has already set in and petitioner
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is already barred from filing the present petition for review on certiorari assailing respondent's

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acquittal of attempted rape on such ground. While a judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the
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People through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without placing the accused in double

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jeopardy, however, it must be established that the court a quo acted without jurisdiction or grave
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abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The People must show that the
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prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham, thus,
rendering the assailed judgment void. It is their burden to clearly demonstrate that the lower
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court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
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dispense justice. (People v. Arcega, G.R. No. 237489, August 27, 2020, Peralta, CJ)
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Exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy is not
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without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where

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there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under
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exceptional circumstances. (People v. Arcega, G.R. No. 237489, August 27, 2020, Peralta, CJ)
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Presumption of innocence. Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides
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that every accused is presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is
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"a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution
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the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense." This presumption in favor of the accused
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remains until the judgment of conviction becomes final and executory. Borrowing the words of
the Court in Mangubat, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al, "[u]ntil a promulgation of final conviction
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is made, this constitutional mandate prevails." Hence, even if a judgment of conviction exists, as
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long as the same remains pending appeal, the accused is still presumed to be innocent until his
guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in People v. Mingming, the Court outlined what
the prosecution must do to hurdle the presumption and secure a conviction: First, the accused
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enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence until final conviction; conviction requires no
less than evidence sufficient to arrive at a moral certainty of guilt, not only with respect to the

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existence of a crime, but, more importantly, of the identity of the accused as the author of the
crime. Second, the prosecution's case must rise and fall on its own merits and cannot draw its

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strength from the weakness of the defense. (People v. Ansano, G.R. No. 232455, December 02,
2020, Caguioa, J.)

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Belated publication of an administrative order has no retroactive effect. While the
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subject circular was, indeed, published, the publication came months after its effectivity. Settled
is the rule that a belated publication cannot have retroactive effect of curing the infirmity
attendant in the passage of the administrative regulation. Time and again, the Court has held that
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the publication requirement on laws is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of due
process. Its omission is tantamount to denying the public of knowledge and information of the

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laws that govern it; hence, a violation of due process. Effectivity of laws, therefore, depends on

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their publication. Without such notice and publication, the conclusive presumption cannot apply
for laws and rules are to be binding only when their existence and contents are confirmed by a
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valid publication. What is required by law, therefore, is prior publication. The fact that the
assailed circular herein was published in the Philippine Star on February 25, 2012, or two
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months after the issuance of the same cannot be permitted to have any curative effect, especially

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in light of the fact that it aims to impose restrictions on the grant of the CNA Incentive for the

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previous fiscal year 2011. (DENR Employees Union (DENREU) v. Sec. Florencio Abad, G.R. No.
204152, January 19, 2021, Peralta, J.)
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