< Chapter 7

Impact of Change
 Social changes occurring in recent decades have had an enormous impact on the lives of people. As a

consequence, there is a growing preoccupation in the social change literature with the impact of change

(Brannigan & Goldenberg, 1985; Goldhaber, 1986; Finsterbusch, 1980; Finsterbusch, Llewellyn, & Wolf,
1983;

Furlong & Cartmel, 1997; Zellner, 1995). The term “impact” refers essentially to the effect or influence of a

particular change or innovation after its introduction. A change may have an impact at any level in

society, or it could influence the course of an entire society. The impact of a change may be major or

minor, important or insignificant, direct or indirect, short-term or long-term. Depending on one’s

particular perception, interpretation, and evaluation, the impact of a particular change may have harmful

or beneficial effects, or it may be functional or dysfunctional for a given social system. In this chapter, the

impact of change will be examined from the following perspectives: social impact of technology,

responses to change, social disorganization, unintended

consequences of change, and ways of coping with change.

More often than not, the study of the impact of change is a complicated undertaking. In some
instances, it is relatively easy to identify the direct consequences of a change. In most cases, however,
complications arise when attention is focused on other impacts or consequences. As an example, let us
consider the 1973 Supreme Court decision that declared restrictive state abortion laws to be
unconstitutional. According to the guidelines set by the Court, an abortion decision during the first
trimester of pregnancy is left to a woman and her physician, free of any regulation by government. Since
1973, close to 60 million legal abortions have been performed in the United States; close to one-third of all
pregnancies now end in abortion, at a rate of well over 4,000 per day. In some areas, such as New York
State, the number of abortions every year nearly equals the number of live births. Almost half of
American women have terminated at least one pregnancy and millions more are involved as partners,
parents health care workers, counselors and friends (Reagan, 1997). In the early 1990s, the number of
abortions hovered over 1.6 million per year. Since then, abortion rates have started to drop slightly
because of reduced access to the procedure—more than 80 percent of U.S. counties have no abortion
providers and some whole states have only one or two; increased use of condoms; increasing numbers of
single women who are keeping their babies; and the fact that baby boomers are getting older. Specifically,
the figures suggest that the overall abortion rate in the United States decreased by 11% between 1994 and
2000, from 24 to 21 abortions each year per 1,000 women aged 15–44. [By contrast, nearly two-thirds of
Russian pregnancies end in abortion (Isachenkov, 2002).] This decline was not shared equally among all
groups, and rates increased among economically disadvantaged women, according to a new analysis
based on a survey of more than 10,000 women obtaining abortions in 2000–2001 (Jones et al., 2002). The
study further found that:

• 56% of U.S. women who obtain abortions are in their 20s;

• 67% have never married;
• 61% have one or more children;
• 88% live in a metropolitan area;
• 57% are economically disadvantaged (living below established poverty levels); and
• 78% report a religious affiliation (43% Protestant, 27% Catholic and 8% other religions).
Certain effects flow immediately from the content of this change. The direct effect of an abortion is
to terminate the fetus. The immediate effect of the Court decision was to enable women to obtain
abortions legally. This resulted in an increase in the number of abortions performed; “a decline in
birthrates and rates of illegitimate births; a decrease in the number of women with dependent children on
welfare; lower maternal-mortality and infant-mortality rates” (Mauss, 1975:473); and a reduction of the
cost of abortion.
Another impact of the abortion decision was the revitalization of the various pro-life (antiabortion)
movements. Abortion remains a topic of considerable controversy, and it has been called “feticide,” “war
on the unborn,” “baby killing,” and “slaughter of the innocent” by its opponents. Specific individuals and
organizations are conducting a nationwide campaign of intimidation, bombings, and other violent acts
including the murder of physicians who perform the procedure (Parenti, 1995:306–307). At the same time,
pro-choice proponents emphasize individual rights and the quality of life and proclaim that abortion is a
merciful, humanitarian backup method of birth control that is necessary in population growth.
Regardless of one’s position on the controversy, the abortion question is at once a moral, medical, legal,
sociological, demographic, psychological, and political problem (Callahan, 1970:1–2). Let us consider each
of these briefly.
As a moral problem, abortion raises the question of the nature and control of incipient human life.
Pro-life morality tends to subordinate all other considerations to the fetus’s right to life. Pro-choice
proponents contend that the mother’s rights are prior to all other considerations. In this view, a woman’s
freedom rests finally on her control of her own reproductive processes. Thus, she alone has the right to
decide to abort. A third position tries to balance the relative rights of mother and fetus.
As a medical problem, abortion affects the doctor’s conscience and medical skills. Should medical
technology designed to improve human life be used for this purpose? There are also questions about the
viability of the fetus and the unsettled issue of when life begins. From a different perspective, many
physicians who perform abortions are now concerned about harassment, personal safety, increased
litigation, and rising malpractice insurance and fewer and fewer medical schools teach first-trimester
abortion as a routine aspect of gynecology.
As a legal problem, abortion raises the question of the extent to which society should concern itself
with the unborn life, with motherhood, with family, use of law-enforcement personnel, and with public
control of the medical profession.
Sociologically, abortion touches on the woman’s role in society, family organization and
disorganization, national demographic policy, and the role of formal and informal sanctions (see, for
example, Basu, 2003). Prochoice proponents tend to be highly educated, well-paid careerists with few
children, almost no ties to formal religion, and a strong vested interest in their work roles. These women
see themselves as equal to their husbands, and the unavailability of abortion would limit their
competitive chances in the world. Thus, abortion is perhaps as much an economic issue as a psychological
and physical one. By contrast, pro-life advocates generally tend to be practicing Roman Catholic women
with large families and low-paying or no outside jobs. They believe in traditional sex roles and see
motherhood as the highest mission in life. For the first group, loss of the right to abortion would threaten
their place in the world of work; for them, motherhood is an option and children a project. For the second
group, motherhood is a calling and children a gift. These different views are shaped by divergent social
and economic expectations. In an insightful book on abortion in American history, Leslie J. Reagan (1997)
suggests that the abortion debate is really an ideological struggle over the position of women. How free
should they be to have sexual experiences, in or out of marriage, without paying the price of pregnancy,
childbirth, and motherhood? How much right they should have to consult their own needs, interests and
well-being regarding child bearing? How subordinate they should be to men, how deeply embedded in
the family, how firmly controlled by national or racial objectives?
As a demographic problem, abortion raises the question as to whether it provides a useful,
legitimate, and desirable means of fertility regulation where such regulation is needed.
 As a psychological problem, abortion involves highly emotional issues such as conception,
pregnancy, birth, and child rearing. Some women feel exploited by abortion, and they regret having
ended their pregnancies. At times, this feeling may result in depression, or in extreme cases, suicide.
Finally, as a political problem, abortion presents the American political system with a unique
difficulty. The American political system is built, to a great extent, on interest-group bargaining, which is
well suited to producing compromise. But abortion is among the very few issues that inherently does not
admit compromise.
Just as a woman cannot be slightly pregnant, neither can her fetus be a little bit aborted. And, if one side
takes the position that life begins at conception, while the other argues that it is a gradual development
achieved by degrees over nine months of gestation, there is no way to compromise between the absolutist
and relativist positions. In the political arena, one is either for or against abortion. In an era of single-issue
politics, candidates for political office and elected officials are well aware of this dilemma.
Thus, the impact of abortion needs to be considered in all of the domains discussed above.
Additional effects, such as the consequences of more frequent abortions on infertility and premature
deliveries, the effects of women’s ability to exercise greater control over their reproductive lives, and its
significance for the changing role of women, need to be entertained. On a global basis, abortion is
considered perhaps the most widely used single method to control fertility (Petersen, 1975:205). As such,
its long-term consequences need to be viewed in the context of broader population policies. Obviously, in
such a context, the consequences of abortion could reverberate on many other aspects of life.
This discussion on the impact of abortion clearly illustrates the complexity of the effects of social
change. In most instances, no social change leaves the rest of social life entirely unaffected. In some cases,
the impact of change can be shattering. Recall the case of Caliente, which involved the introduction of a
new invention in an American community, or the introduction of the steel ax to the Yir Yoront of
Australia. The consequences of these innovations are dramatic, but so are the effects of a number of other
innovations. Let us briefly consider some of them.

THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

There are many ways to consider or categorize the social impacts of technology. One common way is
simply to examine specific impacts of certain technologies, such as the effect of television on violence or
the effects of the introduction of computers in the office (Goldhaber, 1986:32–33). This approach was
taken by William F. Ogburn (1933:153–156) in a now-classic article entitled “The Influence of Invention
and Discovery.” He compiled a list of 150 effects attributable directly to the introduction of the radio.
These effects are listed under the following eleven broad headings:
1. Uniformity and diffusion
2. Recreation and entertainment
3. Transportation
4. Education
5. Dissemination of information
6. Religion
7. Industry and business
8. Occupations
9. Government and politics
10. Other inventions
11. Miscellaneous

Ogburn suggests that each one of the 150 items listed under these categories might be broken down
into additional, particular, and more detailed effects. For example, the impact of the radio on increasing
interest in sports is broken down in detail to show an additional fifteen social effects. More than two
generations after Ogburn’s article, a study conducted in rural Uganda underscores the multiple impacts
of the radio (Robbins & Kilbride, 1987:256–259). The radio is given a prominent and visible place in the
home. Often, the radio is decorated and proudly shown. Radio ownership enhances one’s social position.
Among the radio’s effects: “It makes a person get more friends than before and the neighbors come for
news and announcements....To those who are not married, the radio makes women to love men....It
shows that the person is rich....In the old days, men did not respect their wives. They could beat them.
The radio has made men change....The radio has given knowledge as to how to care for children and to
prevent diseases....” (Robbins & Kilbride, 1987:256–257).
In addition to the radio, Ogburn also analyzed a number of other inventions. For example, for the x-
ray machine, he listed sixty-one influences that caused changes in industry, in medicine, in science, and in
trade.
Similarly, he noted 150 social effects from the use of the automobile. [Forty years later, Gabor Strasser
(1973:926– 928) almost doubled Ogburn’s figure of social effects attributable to the automobile, and his list
may well be incomplete.] But neither took into consideration the decline in public trans- portation; how
emission controls have been canceled out by an increase in the miles driven; that salt used on ice and
snow causes trees and vegetation to wither; and that Americans are fat because they drive rather than
walk (Kay, 1997). And no one thinks of the 300 million or so tires that are annually discarded. As one
observer noted: “You can’t bury ’em. You can’t put ’em in the water. No one will steal them. They’re just
there.” But back to Ogburn.
Ogburn has distinguished three general forms of the social effects of invention. The first is
dispersion, or the multiple effects of a single mechanical invention, as was illustrated in the case of the
radio or the automobile. The second general effect is succession, or the derivative social effects of a single
invention, which means that an invention produces changes, which, in turn, produce further changes,
and so on. “Derivative effects of invention follow one another like ripples after a pebble is thrown in
water...the invention of the tin can is said to have influenced the movement for woman suffrage. It first
led to canning factories, then it reduced the time in preparing meals in the home; it thus gave women
more time for activities outside the home, including participation in the movement for woman’s rights
and the suffrage. In turn, woman’s suffrage has had a series of derivative effects” (Ogburn, 1933:124).
Another illustration of the derivative social effects would be the invention of the cotton gin, which
simplified cotton processing and made cotton more profitable, resulting in the encouragement of planting
of more cotton, which, in turn, required more slaves. The increase in slavery and growing Southern
dependence on cotton exports helped to provoke the Civil War, which greatly stimulated the growth of
large-scale industry and business monopoly. These, in turn, encouraged antitrust laws and labor unions,
and the chain reaction is still continuing. Obviously, not all these developments are viewed as directly
related to the cotton gin, but it helped to produce them all.
The third form of the social effects of invention is called convergence, that is, the coming together of
several influences of different inventions. For example, the automobile, the electric pump, and the septic
tank helped to make the modern suburb possible.
Ogburn further notes that the effects of invention on society are of various degrees and kind. One of
the first effects of invention is the change in the habits of the individuals using them, as in the case of
persons who use typewriters instead of pen and ink. When there is a large number of individuals whose
habits are changed, then a social class is affected. Thus, there develops a class of women typists and
stenographers who have a place in society in relation to other groups and classes. This, in turn, changes
certain organizations, and the organization of various business is affected by the use of typewriters. At
times, inventions have far-removed effects on social institutions, such as the family, which is affected by
the employment of daughters, wives, and single women in offices and factories. Additional influences are
those that affect ethics and codes of conduct related to these material changes. For example, years ago “it
was almost a moral precept that woman’s place was in the home. The appearance of women on the streets
and in places of business for many years slowly affected manners and customs closely related to ethical
codes” (Ogburn, 1933:162). The final influence, he notes, is on systems of thought or social philosophies
that tend to be influenced by inventions. Thus, the inventions that attract women away from home are
related to the social philosophy concerning the equality of sexes and in the resulting greater social justice
for women.
Technological innovations also affect wealth, power, culture patterns, gender relationships, work
(Goldhaber, 1986:33–82), and even diet (Schlosser, 2002). Technological innovation is one of the principal
ways of creating and redistributing wealth. Examples abound. Toward the end of the nineteenth century,
elevators increased already high land values in major cities. Air conditioning has opened up areas in the
South with hot and humid climates to modern commerce and industry. Mechanization of farm
technology resulted in the growth of agribusiness, causing many farmers with small holdings to go
bankrupt. Certain skills also lose their value when a new technology is introduced. For example, the
traditional Swiss watch industry declined as a result of the transition to electronic, digital watches. The
potential of labor-saving technology also reduces the value of many skills. Final, in the context of food
consumption, some consumer groups are urging the public to consider a new issue: whether to buy meat
that has been mechanically deboned. The most widely used method squeezes meat scraps from a carcass,
ideally leaving the bones intact. Investigations revealed, however, that pieces of bone, bone marrow, and
spinal cord sometimes get into the meat. This may be a cause for concern because spinal cords can carry
bovine spongiform encephalopathy, commonly known as mad cow disease, which has been linked to
several deaths in Britain in the late 1990s and early 2001 and resulted in a serious of measures impacting
the cattle industry in the United Kingdom and beef distributors, processors and restaurants in Europe
(Schlosser, 2002:271– 275). Concerned consumers may now want to ask about processing methods, since
mechanically deboned beef is not labeled as such (Atlantic Monthly, 1997).
Technology can extend the power of the already powerful, and it can increase the power of the
relatively weak. For example, advances in communication technology are useful for augmenting the
power of small groups of managers in multinational corporations or governmental bureaucracies.
Information technologies allow organizations to have access to a far wider range of information than in
the past, and to be able to use it in turn for strengthening themselves even further. By contrast, bicycles
can augment the power of large groups to communicate, or to organize to resist centralized authority.
Similarly, new information technologies such as video recorders, cable television, and computer bulletin
boards can lessen the power of those who control the major networks to decide the flow of issues and
concerns that command public attention.
New technologies alter culture patterns and ways of life. A good example is how the bicycle
changed mate selection practices in the French countryside in the late nineteenth century. Young men
suddenly had the opportunity to travel longer distances, which extended the number of potential
available spouses beyond one’s village. This changed traditional courtship practices and a whole set of
criteria to select a husband or wife. And, what was true for the bicycle is even more the case for cars and
airplanes. Technology has had a profound impact on patterns of intimacy, home life, socialization
practices, and leisure-time activities, in addition to many other areas.
In virtually all societies, tasks and social roles are divided along gender lines, although the divisions
vary from society to society. Gender roles are often tied to particular technologies, often leaving women
in a lowerstatus position. In traditional societies, certain tools are considered feminine, others are
masculine. Similarly, in modern societies, certain technologies seem to have gender attached to them. To
illustrate: The introduction of typewriters into offices coincided with the introduction of women into
clerical roles; the early telephone operator or receptionist came to be identified as female. Computers are
often seen as “male” tools, whereas the almost identical word processors are frequently perceived as
“female” tools.
One of the most pronounced technological impacts on work is automation. As a result, old skills
become obsolete, the character and the composition of the labor force change, and more and more
workers who cannot obtain new skills enter lower-paid occupations or join the ranks of the unemployed
or early retirees. Technology is also helpful to compensate for a skill that cannot be easily learned. For
example, authentic Persian carpets are handmade individual products of particular Iranian villages. The
designs are unique to areas and villages. The carpets are hand-knotted and have visible irregularities of
symmetry, of color, and of shape. With the help of computers, the basic patterns can be analyzed;
variations and irregularities can be programmed. As a result, modern rug-making factories can reproduce
the intricate patterns with ever-greater fidelity, making it difficult to distinguish the imitations from the
real thing. And the imitation can come from any place where there is a rug factory with state-of-the-art
machinery.
 The computer further altered the nature of the workplace by changing the kind and number of
workers needed along with the type and amount of information needed and used. The computerization
of an office, for example, may reduce the number of workers required, and those who are needed will
have new skills, although the impact of computers on productivity is still being debated. With computers,
more information can be utilized and stored, and this brings about an increase in the gathering of new
information. The computer’s impact reverberates in virtually all human activities. In education,
computer-assisted instruction is gaining in popularity even though there is no good evidence that most
uses of computers significantly improve teaching and learning (see, for example, Oppenheimer, 1997).
Computers altered health care (but did not reduce waiting), and allowed people to shop from their
homes.
But computers can also be used in less desirable ways. Tapping into a vast trove of government,
legal and medical databases, dozens of companies are into a booming business peddling personal details
on anyone—to anyone willing to pay the price. One of the concerns is that personal data services could
enable stalkers or spouse-abusers to find their victims (Beiser, 1997). Another concern is that personal
information will be used for “identity theft,” an exploding category of crime in which a crook
masquerades as someone else. With your name and social security number, anyone can apply for credit
cards and loans and leave you to pay the bills. Through computerized job and other forms of surveillance,
companies can invade the privacy of their employees (Murphy, 2002). Credit bureaus hold and share over
200 million files on people and their consumption and spending patterns. New information is added to
these files every time one applies for a personal loan, credit card, or mortgage. This is in addition to
information about us that is stored in school, hospital, government, and other data banks and the rapidly
emerging biometrics technologies which are used to identify people through various body characteristics
such as faces, hands, voices eyes and even smells (Hansell, 1997). Any one of these sources can be a
potential threat to our privacy, or what’s left of it. As stated in a front-page article on cyberspace in The
New York Times, “Indeed, as the free-flowing exchange and exploitation of information is being
celebrated as the main engine of economic prosperity into the next century, individual privacy is looking
more and more like an endangered natural resource” (Bernstein, 1997:A1). The question of privacy is
further compounded by events flowing from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center. The government is calling for a new security infrastructure, one that employs advanced
technology to protect the citizenry and track down malefactors. Databases are being coordinated for a
variety of purposes, from checking the identity of visa applicants to the establishment of a financial-crime
data source. Technologies are being developed or refined for iris, retina and fingerprint scanners, hand-
geometry assayers, remote video surveillance, face recognition, smart cards with custom identification
chips, tiny radio implants beneath the skin that continually broadcast people’s identification codes—the
list goes on and on.
Finally, computers can also be used to commit crime. At the workplace, computer crime is costing
business billions of dollars annually. [Black-market activity conducted online alone reached an estimated
$36.5 billion in 2002, about the same amount consumers spent on the legitimate Internet (Business Week,
2002).] Basically, computer crime is any illegal act for which knowledge of computer technology is used to
commit the offense. There are five broad categories of computer crime (Conly & McEwen, 1990:3).
Internal computer crimes are alterations in computer programs to modify outcomes. For instance, in a
brokerage house or bank, financial records can be systematically changed or deleted. Telecommunication
crimes involve the use of telephone lines to gain illegal access to computers or to access phone companies
to make illegal phone calls. This process is known among hackers as phreaking—a play on the words
freak, phone, and free (Mungo & Clough, 1992:3). Longdistance and international access codes are sold,
or, at times, given away by phreakers, and phone companies lose large sums as a result. Computer
manipulation crimes are those that create new records or change data in a system to carry out some illegal
activity. For example, embezzlers use this method to alter data in existing accounts. Support of criminal
enterprises involves the use of computers and databases for money laundering, drug trafficking,
intellectual-property piracy, creating fake identity, or running a network of call girls. Finally, hardware
and software theft includes illegal copying of software and thefts of trade secrets and microprocessor
chips. Hackers are increasingly getting a bad reputation (Schell & Dodge, 2002) and computer crimes
have become so widespread that many law enforcement agencies had to create new units and task forces
to deal with the continuously emerging problems. In the next section, responses to the effects of social
change will be considered.

RESPONSES TO CHANGE

The effects of social change are never evenly distributed, and in a socially differentiated and
heterogeneous society, the impact of a change will tend to differ for individuals, groups, and social strata
variously located in the structure. However, it is possible to make some generalizations about the
consequences and impacts of large-scale social changes and some of the more typical responses to them.
For the first part of the discussion, the emphasis will be on the forms of alienation and their behavioral
consequences that may be construed as responses to change.
The analysis will take place in the context of the influential so-called mass-society “theory,” in
which, according to Melvin Seeman, the major theme is that the passing of the old community has had
powerful and often destructive impact. It is a theory in the sense that it states three major elements in the
transition process. “It becomes a theory—at least in the sense that it can produce testable propositions
through a set of independent, intervening, and dependent variables—by combining (1) a historically
oriented account of contemporary social structure, (2) assertions about the psychological effects of that
structure, and (3) predictions about the resulting individual behavior” (Seeman, 1972:468–469). In this
theory, alienation is the principal intervening variable; it is produced by the social structure, and, in turn,
it produces distinctive behavioral responses. Seeman concedes that the theory is highly debatable, and it
currently has more critics than adherents. An oft-noted shortcoming of the theory is its lack of sufficient
articulation of the process by which the various responses come about. It is also plausible that some
students in the universities will not see the mass-society thesis as credible because it goes against their
own past experience and does not reflect their present circumstances. Some may even see it as a threat to
their hopes and aspirations (Hamilton & Wright, 1986:401). Still, in the present context, Seeman’s thesis is
important and informative.
As Table 7.1 shows, the structural features that are the independent variables are quite standard
ones in the sociological literature. They demonstrate what is happening in a broad social change process
from a historical perspective. The five trends that constitute the basis of this part of the argument are:

1. The decline of the importance of kinship and family in decision-making and the consequent increase of anonymity
and impersonality in social relations.
2. The decline of traditional social forms and the rise of secularized, rationalized forms, which include (a) the
emergence of bureaucracy as an organizational form, (b) the growth of mechanization and standardization (in
work and elsewhere) as a technical form, and (c) the secularization of beliefs and values, an ideological form of
secularization involving the weakening of “given” standards of behavior.
3. The shift from homogeneity to heterogeneity, entails increased social differentiation involving an increased
specialization of tasks for individuals and institutions with increased division of labor and interdependency. This,
of course, brings about standardization in other spheres such as in mass culture and consumption.
4. Increased physical and social mobility, which implies the waning of community ties and immediate interpersonal
bonds.
5. Enlargement of scale, meaning that the bases of action (for example, communication, transport, politics,
urbanization, etc.) have become massive in the literal sense that big corporations, cities, and nations make
decisions that affect large populations. (Seeman, 1972:469–470)

These historical trends, Seeman points out, are guides to measurable variables. However, once the
related indices are specified, a number of assumptions may be made between the relationship of social
change and alienation. Alienation refers to the fact that there are “six related but distinguishable notions,
and that these six varieties of alienation can be rather sharply defined in terms of the person’s
expectancies or his values” (1972:472). Therefore, to be alienated means to be characterized by one or
more of the following:
 1. A SENSE OF POWERLESSNESS: A LOW EXPECTANCY THAT AN INDIVIDUAL’S OWN BEHAVIOR
CAN CONTROL THE OCCURRENCE OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL REWARDS; FOR THE
ALIENATED INDIVIDUAL CONTROL IS LOCATED IN EXTERNAL FORCES, POWERFUL OTHERS,
IN LUCK, OR FATE.

2. A sense of meaninglessness: a sense of the incomprehensibility of social affairs, of events whose dynamics a
person does not understand and whose future course the individual cannot predict.
3. A sense of normlessness: a high expectancy that socially unapproved means are required to achieve given
objectives; the perspective that an individual is not bound by conventional standards in the pursuit of what may
be, after all, quite conventional goals, for example, wealth, or high status.
4. Value isolation (or cultural estrangement): a person’s rejection of commonly held values in the society; the
assignment of low reward value to goals or behavior that are highly valued in a given society. An illustration of
this would be the highly alienated artist or intellectual who rejects the going standards of success.
5. Self-estrangement: to be engaged in activities that are not rewarding in themselves. For example, the classic
description of a worker carrying out unfulfilling or uncreative work.
6. Social isolation: a person’s low expectancy for inclusion and social acceptance, typically manifested in feelings of
loneliness, rejection, or repudiation. (Seeman, 1972:472–473)

The behavioral consequences of the various forms of alienation are illustrated in Table 7.1. “These
consequences in turn become matters that a democratic society would find important in its accounting of
the personal meaning of social change” (Seeman, 1972:474). Furthermore, each of the dimensions or forms
of alienation is associated with a series of more specific and empirically demonstrated consequences. Let
us select just one dimension: powerlessness. It has been associated with membership and participation in
organizations that can mediate between the individual and the state or corporation, with a tendency not
to engage in planned and instrumentally oriented action, and with a readiness to participate in relatively
unplanned and/or short-term protest activities, with poor learning, and with a greater sense of
powerlessness among minority groups. It may also be a factor in the rise of conspiracy theories and the
widespread cynicism and disillusionment of Americans toward government. For example, according to
a 1997 poll, 51 percent of the public believes it is either “very likely” or “somewhat likely” the federal
officials were “directly responsible for the assassination of President Kennedy” in 1993; more than one-
third of those surveyed suspect the Navy, either by accident or on purpose, shot down TWA Flight 800
near New York in 1996; and a majority also believe that it is possible that the Central Intelligence Agency
intentionally permitted Central American drug dealers to sell cocaine to inner-city African American
children (Hargrove & Stempel, 1997).
The concept of alienation has been used to account for a number of diverse responses to rapid social
change. For example, Ted Gurr (1972:134) drew together a sample of incidents in which alienated groups
expressed their disenchantment by resorting to violent uprisings. His focus was on discontent that
resulted not from objective wants but from perceived discrepancies between human needs and
opportunities to satisfy those needs. Using as his sample 1,100 occurrences of strife in 114 nations during
the period of 1961–1965, he found that 93 percent originated in such discontent. The same conclusion is
reiterated in a variety of historical and theoretical studies of revolution (DeFronzo, 1996; Goldstone, 2003).
Mass alienation has also developed as a response to state socialism, giving rise to many sociological
problems, such as a loss of respect for authority and the necessity of using black markets to survive. Such
behaviors continue even as major democratic reforms take place since new social norms have not been
formed, creating development problems for the functioning of newly formed democratic institutions in
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Tong, 1995).
Although Seeman’s conceptualization of the forms of alienation and their behavioral consequences
is a good way of viewing responses to social change, it’s not the only way, as evidenced by a review of the
literature. For example, the Cargo cult, which was discussed in Chapter 5, can also be considered as a
response to, and a way of coping with, accelerated change induced by European contact in Melanesia
during the period of colonial rule. The Cargo cult is “one of the basic modes of reaction or adjustment to
situations of rapid culture change characteristic of an entire area in a specific historical phase” (Schwartz,
1976:159). The cult responses are comparable to forms of religious responses to rapid culture change,
crises, and domination reported throughout the world (Lanternari, 1965; Zellner, 1995). Social movements
are also considered responses to changing social conditions (Oberschall, 1993).
Responses to change can also be viewed in the context of Hagen’s notion of status withdrawal,
which was discussed in Chapter 2 (Hagen, 1962). Hagen applied Robert K. Merton’s typology of modes of
individual adaptation to the analysis of individual and group responses to social changes resulting in
status withdrawal brought about by conquest, colonialization, or changes within the elite. Status
withdrawal was defined as the perception on the part of individuals or groups that “their purposes and
values in life are not respected by groups in the society whom they respect and whose esteem they value”
(1962:185). Several responses to a situation of status withdrawal are possible. Initially, aggression and
rebellion may occur or attempts may be made to ignore the situation and pretend that things have not
changed. According to Hagen, the usual response is retreatism, in which an attempt is made to maintain
the traditional and valued ways of life, clandestinely as necessary. The adult generation experiencing this
conflict retreats to a passive “safe” lifestyle, and, although behavior may change, there are no basic
personality changes.
Retreatism can also be seen as a response to status withdrawal on the part of groups. As a whole, the
Native Americans have been forced into a retreatist position in response to a conflict between their values
and way of life and their defeat and placement on reservations by the federal government. Traditional
avenues to status have been closed off, and the opportunities and means for achievement in the white
society are extremely limited. The retreatist response is perpetuated by the children being raised to
esteem traditional values but with no clear role model for the future (Hagen, 1962:490).
Retreatism as it has been described by Hagen is one possible response to a particular type of change
situation. Other responses, following Merton’s typology, could entail innovation, ritualism, and rebellion.
Innovation offers a potential for responding in a fashion which is beneficial to the individuals or groups
involved.
Ritualism may entail the rejection of new cultural goals, and rebellion, a nonacceptance of the change and
possible attempts to counteract it.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

Well over a generation ago, Robert E. Park (1975:38–39) gloomily but aptly noted:

We are living in a period...of social disorganization. Everything is in a state of agitation—everything seems to

be undergoing change....Any form of change that brings any measurable alteration in the routine of social life
tends to break up habits; and in breaking up the habits upon which the existing social organization rests,
destroys that organization itself. Every new device that affects social life and the social routine is to that extent
a disorganizing influence. Every new discovery, every new invention, every new idea, is
disturbing....Apparently anything that makes life interesting is dangerous to the existing order.

In many instances, indeed, social change is disruptive, and an underlying condition for social
disorganization is change.
A widely accepted definition of social disorganization refers to “inadequacies in a social system that
keep people’s collective and individual purposes from being as fully realized as they could be.”
Obviously, the concept of social disorganization is relative; “It is not tied to any absolute standard, which
would be Utopian, but to a standard of what, so far as we know, could be accomplished under attainable
conditions.” Quite simply stated, “When we say that a group or organization or community or society is
disorganized, we mean that its structure of statuses and roles is not working as effectively as it might to
achieve valued purposes” (Merton, 1976:26). Thus, social disorganization entails the breakdown of the
organizational structure, the various elements in society become “out of joint,” and the influence of social
norms on particular groups or individuals is weakened (see, for example, Hechter & Opp, 2001). The
result is that the collective purposes of society are less fully realized than they could be under a different,
better organized system. Value and norm conflicts, mobility, weak primary relations, lack of group
cohesiveness, and other ingredients of social disorganization can also lead to deviance such as mental
illness, drug abuse, alcoholism, suicide, and crime (Clinard & Meier, 1995:64–68; Liska & Messner,
1999:63–64).
The processes of social change can provide the impetus for social disorganization by creating
conditions for conflicting interest and values, conflicting status and role obligations, faulty socialization,
and faulty social communication (Merton, 1976:26–27).
Conflicting interests and values are produced by the increased complexity and diversity of social life
as illustrated by the different demands and expectations of workers, management, and stockholders.
Individuals occupy a variety of statuses in society, and these statuses “can pull in different directions by
calling for opposed modes of behavior” (Merton, 1976:26). When there is no provision of a shared set of
priorities among these competing obligations, the individual’s behavior becomes unpredictable and
socially disruptive, and regardless of how it is judged, it remains disorganizing. For example,
“Competition between obligations of home and work, of local mores and national law, of religion and
state, of friendship and the ‘organization’ make for potential conflicts” (1976:27). Social change also brings
about faulty socialization by not providing adequate resocialization of individuals involved in these
processes. Individuals simply do not know how to behave in their newly acquired statuses or in radically
changed social situations. Finally, faulty social communication is produced in situations of change by
structural inadequacies or partial breakdown in channels of communication between people in a social
system.
Social disorganization is also generated by the fact that change tends to be uneven, resulting, as was
discussed in Chapter 2, in what William F. Ogburn (1950) calls culture lag. Some areas of society change
faster than others, with the result that the parts of the system no longer mesh as a whole. In general,
technological changes take place more rapidly than changes in other institutions and values; humanity
accepts new tools more readily than new ideas. For example, industrialization has proceeded much faster
than the development of social controls over the pollution that industrialization generates. Similarly,
although developments in medical science have contributed to a global population explosion, religious
prohibitions against artificial methods of birth control have not been modified, nor in most parts of the
world has there been any change in the traditional attitudes and preference systems for large families
(Brown, 2001).
Social disorganization is also produced by what Philip M. Hauser (1973:430) calls the social
morphological revolution (changes in the size, density, and heterogeneity of population and the impact of
these changes on humans and society). This is the result of three developments: (1) the remarkable
increase in the rate of population growth itself, often referred to as “the population explosion” (see, for
example, Grant, 2001); (2) the increasing urbanization and metropolitanization of the people, which he
calls the “population implosion”; and (3) the increasing heterogeneity of the population composed of
different nationalities and racial groups, which he designates “population diversification.” These
demographic changes have in turn been affected by technological and social changes. These
developments are highly interrelated and constitute the elements of the social morphological revolution.
Hauser (1973:435–436) asserts that the combined effects of these developments have profoundly
altered human nature and the social order.

. . . the social morphological revolution has modified the human aggregation as a physical construct and as an
economic mechanism; it has transformed human behavior and social organization, including the nature of
government; it has generated and aggravated a host of problems—physical, personal, social, institutional and
governmental....Examples of the physical problems are given by the problems relating to housing supply and
quality, circulation of persons and goods, solid and human waste removal, air and water pollution, recreational
facilities, urban design, and the management of natural resources....Examples of personal, social and
organizational problems are given by the incidence of delinquency and crime, alcoholism, drug addiction, and
mental disorders....It is revealed also in unemployment, poverty, racism, bigotry, intergroup conflict, family
disorganization, differential morbidity and mortality, labormanagement conflict, the conservative-liberal
debate, the maladministration of criminal justice; and in corruption, malapportionment and inertia in
government, and the fragmentation and paralysis of local government.
 In short, the social morphological revolution has transformed
the “little community” (a concept used by Redfield) into the “mass society.” Hauser suggests that much
of the chaos and disorganization of contemporary society may be understood as frictions in the transition
still under way from the little community to the mass society, and he cites governmental, racist, and other
“lags” that have taken place. Without a doubt, population growth has affected all social institutions.
Judah Matras (1977:251–256) cites a number of instances, in support of Hauser’s contentions, in which
population growth or changing age, class, or ethnic composition may render political institutions and
community decision-making processes ineffective by forcing them to form coalitions, political machines,
and political exchange and trade-off routines. These, in turn, become disorganized under changing
population composition and need to be periodically revamped. Similarly, various forms of population
pressures, such as the influx of large groups of immigrants in a short period, can affect and disorganize
educational institutions, churches, voluntary organizations, police forces, business and industry,
communications, recreational institutions and even the Social Security system (Huddle & Simcox, 1994).
Social disorganization is often associated with personal demoralization. For example, Vine Deloria,
Jr. (1988) notes that the extermination of the buffalo highly demoralized the native Americans of the Great
Plains. As it was described earlier, the buffalo provided food, clothing, and shelter, and dozens of parts of
the buffalo carcass were used by the tribespeople. The buffalo hunt provided the principal object of their
religious ceremonials and the main avenue to social status and recognition. Other status-conferring
activities, such as warfare, were also dependent on a large supply of dried buffalo meat. The
government’s attempt to pacify the tribes through the extermination of the buffalo resulted in their
demoralization. The integrating and status-conferring functions of the war party and the buffalo hunt
have disappeared. Religious ceremonials became empty and meaningless. The hunting economy was
destroyed, and the native Americans lived, and at times starved, on government handouts. The
traditional goals and values that gave meaning to their lives were now unavailable; they found it
extremely difficult to substitute the white man’s goals and values for their own. In a few instances in
which they did successfully adopt the white man’s economy, this, too, was soon destroyed by the white
man’s “need” for their land. They suffered from the destruction of their own culture, but they were
denied full access to the white man’s culture. Moreover, they were subjected to unknown diseases and
corrupted by alcohol. Thus, it is no surprise that many of the tribes became deeply demoralized.
Depopulation became widespread, and only in recent decades has the Native American population
begun to grow again.
Developing countries have perhaps the highest disorganization rate because they are undergoing
accelerated changes that are compounded by population pressures, sporadic food shortages, scarcity of
resources, and environmental problems (Harf & Trout, 1986). Modernization and “progress” bring new
hardships to many in developing countries (Scott & Kerkvliet, 1973). Robert H. Bates (1974) points out
that modernization promotes new systems of social stratification and encourages increased ethnic
competition within developing countries, thus contributing to disorganization. It should be noted,
however, that although modernization is generally associated with social disorganization, there is no
empirical evidence that modernization directly contributes to personal disorganization and psychic strain
(Inkeles, 1973:358–359).
It is important to note that under some circumstances, disorganization can be both the cause and the
effect of social change. The notion of disorganization is based on the assumptions that at some point in
the past, a given problem did not exist or was not recognized and that society had a fairly stable
equilibrium in which practices and supporting values were in harmonious agreement. For example, prior
to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, trafficking of women for the sex trade had not been
an issue. Now there are an estimated 700,000 women transported annually, mostly involuntarily, over
international borders each year for the purpose of prostitution and sex slavery from the former Soviet
Union and Eastern bloc countries and the Balkans (Binder, 2002). Many even turn up in the United States
—in Anchorage as well as Miami, New York, and Los Angeles.
Then social change of some kind disrupted this harmonious agreement and brought to the fore new
practices or new conditions in which the old practices no longer worked properly, or new knowledge that
made old practices obsolete, or new value judgments that declared old practices no longer endurable.
This, in turn, created a confusion in which old rules were both debated and ignored, yet no new rules
were generally accepted. In other words, change had disorganized and disrupted the organization of the
former system of behavior. Eventually, however, new rules and practices will develop, and, at least for a
while, a new equilibrium will appear and will be preserved until disrupted by another round of change.
In brief, disorganization and reorganization are going on continuously. Moreover, as it was shown in the
preceding chapter, willful, purposeful disorganization can be used as a tactic of achieving some desired
change. Illustrations of purposeful disorganization would be some of the tactics used in the effort to
thwart the Vietnam war or to obtain greater justice for black students through the takeover of university
buildings in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Allen (1971:380) suggests that, to some extent, one could say
that the use of disruption in order to obtain desired changes amounts to “disorganization for good
reasons.” In the examples given, “if disorganization was a ‘means,’ the ‘ends’ were stopping the Vietnam
war, increasing justice for blacks, and so on.”
The issue of disorganization for “good reasons” raises some interesting questions. Although
individuals generally prefer social order and tend to dislike anarchy and chaos, “nevertheless
organization is not inevitably linked with what is ‘right’ nor disorganization with what is ‘wrong.’ One
can point out that a good example of a well-organized nation would be Germany under Hitler. Other
sociocultural systems or subsystems may be well organized but open to serious criticisms. Justice is just
as important as ‘order,’ and other values may be of prime consideration” (Allen, 1971:381). Obviously,
whether or not disruption and disorganization is the “right” course of action to be followed is a value-
laden issue open to considerable debate. The important point to remember for the present purpose is that
disorganization can be seen both as an effect and as an instrument of social change. In the next section,
the unintended consequences of change will be considered.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

Any change of a certain magnitude will disturb the prevailing and ever-temporary balance of social forces
and will bring about subsequent changes, some of which can have unintended ramifications throughout
the social structure. Technological innovations and attempts to solve social problems are notable
examples. Consciously designed changes foster subsequent unplanned and unintended developments—
unanticipated consequences that invariably differ in character and scope from the initial planned change.
It should be noted, however, that many of the unanticipated consequences are not at all the results of
consciously designed change efforts. Instead, as Robert M. MacIver (1942:20) presciently stated many
years ago, they “are the social resultants of a great many individual or group actions directed to quite
other ends, but together conspiring to bring them about.” To illustrate this point, businesspeople, labor
unions, and politicians may all pursue a common goal of economic prosperity, but the conjecture of their
separate efforts may instead produce an economic slump.
Examples of unanticipated consequences of change efforts are almost bewildering in their
abundance. Almost every effort is accompanied by them. Perhaps the best-known example is Prohibition,
which was designed to end alcohol consumption in the United States. In fact, it did little to reduce
consumption rates. More serious, however, was its consequence—of making potential criminals of
millions of citizens and yielding vast profits for organized crime. Similarly, the efforts by the Drug
Enforcement Administration to crack down on the importation of marijuana resulted in a phenomenal
increase in domestic production. Currently, over 50 percent of marijuana consumed in the United States
is produced domestically, and, in some states, such as Hawaii, Oregon, and California, it is the biggest
cash crop (Vago, 2003:212–213). Similarly, the quota system imposed in the mid-1980s on imported
Japanese cars backfired. Instead of the quota protecting American car manufacturers and workers, the
Japanese benefited from
it. The trade limits created a shortage of Japanese autos in American showrooms, thus enabling their
makers to increase prices and boost their revenues by as much as $2 billion per year. That extra profit,
which came out of the pockets of American consumers, gave the Japanese carmakers even more money
for research to improve their competitive position against Detroit. The demand for Italian luxury goods
also created a market for cheap counterfeits for customers who like brand names but not premium prices.
For decades, Italian luxury goods makers have had to fight a flood of counterfeits made in Asian factories
—a nuisance, but not a major threat, because of the shoddy quality of the bogus handbags, scarves and
shoes gave them away to discerning eyes. Lately, industrial piracy has been taking place at home, with
the result that one of the most skilled sectors of the Italian economy is now competing against itself on
world markets. The same specialist workshops that provide goods for brand name companies also
provide them for the black market. By the late 1990s, counterfeiting had become so widespread that it
anchored some local economies. Its current prevalence helps explain why some areas with high
unemployment, like Naples, have escaped social unrest: many jobs exist that are not on anybody’s books
(Tagliabue, 1997:3)
There are many other instances of politically sponsored and governmentally enforced changes that
have produced unintended consequences. Many people benefited from the federal programs addressed
to the alleviation of poverty. Some of these activities, however, have served to perpetuate poverty among
the beneficiaries and others have not directly benefited them. In the Seattle-Denver minimum-income
maintenance experiment, for example, the guaranteed payments were shown to be a disincentive to work
and destructive of family bonds. In comparing the rate of marital breakups between those receiving the
minimum payment and those in a control group, it was found, unexpectedly, that “those in the benefit
group suffered from a higher incidence of breakups” (Institute for Socioeconomic Studies, 1979:4). Several
other programs of urban renewal thus far have created further slums. One reason for that unintended
result was the practice of demolishing ruined apartment houses, the renovation of which could not be
financed. This, in turn, displaced slum dwellers, who were forced to move someplace else, where they
created new slums.
Closer to home (or university), there are also some unintended consequences of the familiar Buckley
amendment, which requires that in institutions with federal support, all records (particularly those
concerning students) be open to inspection by persons concerned. Warren Bennis (1976) raised an
important question in his article “Have We Gone Overboard on ‘The Right to Know’?” He admitted that
the Buckley amendment is laudable in its intent, but one consequence of it is already clear. College
administrators are now reluctant to put any very substantial information into any student’s record. “What
will be set down will be so bland and general as to be useless, for example, to college-entrance officials
who want to make a considered judgment of an applicant’s overall merits. If, for example, he had
threatened to cut a teacher’s throat but had not done so, he could scarcely be described as ‘possibly
unstable.’ The student or his parents might sue” (1976:21). The various “sunshine” laws that have been
passed by numerous states prohibiting closed meetings and the Freedom of Information Act, which
became effective on February 19, 1975, requiring that most records of federal agencies be provided to
anyone upon request, also resulted in fewer written recorded discussions, more private meetings, and
greater secrecy with “more winks than signatures (‘don’t write, send word’) if for no other reason than
the avoidance of some new capricious lawsuit” (1976:20).
In all of these illustrations, the changes were undoubtedly initiated with the best of intentions on the
part of those who proposed them. Few individuals would question, for example, the intentions of sending
emergency food supplies to disaster-stricken countries and even fewer would consider the possibility of
unintended consequences. But even such an action can have deleterious consequences, as evidenced by
the donation of emergency food supplies by the United States to Guatemala after the earthquake.
According to The New York Times (Riding, 1977), it was entirely unnecessary, and had the effect of
hurting the very farmers it was intended to help. When an earthquake struck on February 4, 1976, taking
24,000 lives and leaving 1.2 million people homeless, Guatemala had just harvested its largest grain crop
in many years. The food was undamaged, and within days was recovered from the rubble of devastated
homes. The United States sent thousands of tons of grain to be donated to rural victims of the quake. It
knocked out the bottom of the grain market in the country, and did considerable damage to the
vulnerable economies of the small farmers—Indians living in the highlands north of Guatemala City, who
were worst hit by the disaster. Dependent on sales of grain to generate money to rebuild their homes,
they found that the aid supplies caused the market price of corn to drop drastically so that they could not
sell their own products to obtain sufficient funds for reconstruction. Moreover, with the decline of farm
income, the string of small mountain cooperatives suddenly found themselves decapitalized, dangerously
weakening a new and important experiment in local organization. The food aid also upset community
leadership patterns. Some leaders were more successful than others in obtaining food handouts, and
those who were able to produce “free things” suddenly assumed greater positions of power and
influence.
On many occasions, even seemingly trivial changes forced upon people tend to produce
dysfunctional consequences. For example, Christian missionaries to the South Seas were distressed by the
near-nudity of the natives; to them it was an indication of sexual immorality,

for in Western society clothing not only is a protection of the body against the elements, but is also, although
perhaps only incidentally, a requisite for virtue. On the assumption that lack of clothing stimulated sexual
desire, they attempted to improve the sexual morality of the natives by inducing them to clothe their bodies. It
may be doubted that putting clothes on the natives had any significant effects upon their sex conduct; but there
is no doubt that it contributed along with newly introduced diseases, alcohol, and Western food practices, to
the decimation and sometimes total extermination of native populations. For as is now clear, under the high
temperature and humidity conditions of tropical regions, clothing has markedly adverse effects on physical
welfare. (LaPiere, 1965:76–77)

It is probably inevitable that, in the short run, most change efforts will produce some unintended
consequences, and, over the long run, even the most successful attempts will have some unplanned by-
products. It should be noted, however, that the unintended consequences are not always deleterious. A
good illustration of a positive, but unintended, consequence of a change effort has to do with the effects of
the liberalization of pornography laws in Denmark on the incidence of child molestation. In the words of
Bert Kutchinsky (1973:179), “The unexpected outcome of this analysis is that the high availability of hard-
core pornography in Denmark was most probably the very direct cause of a considerable decrease in at
least one type of serious sex offense, namely, child molestation. Between 1965 (the first year of the
availability of hard-core pornographic pictures) and 1969 (the year of the repeal of the Penal Ban, and of
peak production) the number of cases of this type dropped from 220 to 87. The implication of our
conclusion is that a large number of such offenses have been avoided since the late 1960s, because
potential offenders obtained sufficient sexual satisfaction through the use of pornography, most probably
combined with masturbation.” In a later study, Kutchinsky found a similar decrease in child molestation
in the former West Germany, which he attributed to an increased availability of pornographic material
(U.S. Department of Justice, 1986:974). Bear in mind that the intent of liberalizing pornography laws was
not even remotely related to an attempt to reduce sex crimes. While discussing matters related to sex, it is
worth noting that even Viagra has some unanticipated consequences. Since the drug was introduced in
1998, the trade in some wild animal parts (i.e., hooded and harp seal and tiger penises) used in the
creation of “impotence cures” has fallen drastically (Talbot, 2002:133) along with a long list of animal
products, including some derived from threatened or endangered species of sea horses, geckos and green
turtles that are often used to alleviate sexual dysfunctions.
It is easy to go on listing unanticipated consequences of change. The important point to remember is
that change has by-products both in the long run and in the short run, and, in most cases, the unintended
consequences, both beneficial and deleterious, tend to increase over time. The impact of the automobile,
for example, in 1895, when there were fewer than a dozen such machines on the road, is qualitatively
different from today, when there are over 180 million in the United States alone. Consider the following
statement from Scientific American, published in 1899 (quoted by Ayres, Simon, & Carlson, 1973:738):
“The improvement in city conditions by the general adoption of the motor car can hardly be
overestimated. Streets clean, dustless and odorless, with light rubber-tired vehicles moving swiftly and
noiselessly over their smooth expanse, would eliminate a greater part of the nervousness, distraction, and
strain of modern metropolitan life.” As this quote illustrates, the determination of the impact of
automobile technology has not been notably successful. Its byproducts are too well known to warrant
further reiteration here. The automobile, in turn, created a series of other changes whose unanticipated
consequences could fill another volume. Again, the important point to remember is that most social and
technological changes have brought in the wake of their primarily intended effect a series of unforeseen
effects—some adverse and some beneficial. In the next section, ways of coping with both intended and
unintended effects of changes will be examined.

COPING WITH CHANGE

In the always-eloquent and but at times overdramatic words of Alvin Toffler (1970:11): “Western society
for the past 300 years has been caught up in a fire storm of change. This storm, far from abating, now
appears to be gathering force. Change sweeps through the highly industrialized countries with waves of
ever accelerating speed and unprecedented impact.” Warren G. Bennis and Philip E. Slater (1998:124)
describe modern society as The Temporary Society—“of temporary systems, nonpermanent relationships,
turbulence, uprootedness, unconnectedness, mobility, and above all, unexampled social change.” These
writers take the position that in many areas accelerated social change complicates life by shifting
standards, updating some behaviors as desirable, outdating others as old-fashioned and out of place.
Ways of behaving that at one time may have been effective in establishing individuals’ positions and
identities became obsolete. Middle-class white parents, proud of their achievements in acquiring material
goods and providing their children with the “best” in schooling, travel, recreational opportunities, and
living conditions, find these values viewed as unimportant or as evidence of materialistic decadence.
Black parents who learn to shelter their children from hostile environments through accommodation find
themselves attacked as weaklings or “Uncle Toms.” Men who learned to behave in protective, although
patronizing, ways toward women are not only “politically incorrect” but are called “chauvinist pigs,” and
women who learned to play seductive and submissive roles toward men are considered
“unliberated.”
Change further complicates life by increasing the rate of friction between groups and within groups.
As established standards of behavior break down, as efforts to develop appropriate standards for dealing
with a changing order come to the fore, as underprivileged groups seek changes to improve their
situation, and as new notions of appropriate identity emerge, friction increases. Moreover, change is
always difficult, and it is especially difficult for those benefiting from the status quo. As was shown in
Chapter 6, it is not surprising that change elicits resistance and resentment among some segments of the
population. By the same token, lack or slowness of change will result in anger and protest among other
segments. When change comes about in one area, it will reverberate in other aspects of social life,
although it should be recalled that some aspects of social life (such as values and thought systems) change
more slowly than others (such as technology). Change, in many instances, is disturbing; it upsets the
routine and the predictability of everyday life.
In particular, in the domain of technological changes, as Donald Schon (1971:27–28) writes:

Individuals must somehow confront and negotiate, in their own persons, the transformations which used to be
handled by generational change...while technological change has been continuing exponentially for the last
two hundred years, it has now reached a level of pervasiveness and frequency uniquely threatening to the
stable state.

These technological changes cannot be isolated from the social relationships in which they are
embedded. Even an apparently minor innovation such as the introduction of hybrid maize may
undermine a whole tradition of peasant life, as it did in France when it revamped agricultural and dietary
practices.
In many instances, change in every level of society is disruptive, can result in a series of
unanticipated consequences, and can bring about social disorganization in its wake. When change is
especially frustrating or upsetting, the question of coping with it becomes of paramount importance.
On the individual level, there is a set of rather versatile psychological defense mechanisms (such as
rationalization, repression, projection, denial, reaction formation, and sublimation) that can be relied on
in case of unexpected or threatening developments (Albrecht, Chadwick, & Jacobson, 1987:11). These
defense mechanisms can be used to facilitate adjustment and coping. In the case of certain personal
problems, for example, it is more a question of learning to live with them than of resolving them. This is
particularly true in the case of adjusting to typical “private” problems such as death or divorce. The
psychological literature is extensive on this topic, and it outlines the various strategies for coping
(Bridges, 2001; Coelho, 1972).
Coping is required in situations of fairly drastic change that defy familiar ways of behaving and that
require the production of new behavior, “and very likely gives rise to uncomfortable affects like anxiety,
despair, guilt, shame, or grief, the relief of which forms part of the needed adaptation. Coping refers to
adaptation under relatively difficult conditions” (White, 1974:48–49). This is particularly true for
displaced persons and immigrants who have to learn new skills to cope with a foreign environment and
to develop a new set of social relationships (Bun & Chiang, 1994: 197–198).
The past few decades have offered many opportunities to observe ways in which people cope in
extreme situations. David A. Hamburg and his associates (1974:412–414) describe some instances of
coping under extreme stress in the Nazi concentration camps. They cite the work of Eitinger, which was
based on direct observations in the camps followed by semi-structured interviews and medical
examinations over many years. The principal question is: How it was that some people were able to
survive this prolonged physical and psychological ordeal? Obviously, a certain physical minimum of
survival possibilities were present, and Eitinger has been concerned with patterns of coping behavior that
tended not only to foster physical survival but to maintain mental health both during the stay in the camp
and after it. One of his major findings was that “identification with the aggressor” was not frequently
used by inmates, and when it was used, it tended to have a damaging effect on self-esteem and
interpersonal relationships in the long run. Inmates were found to be greatly helped if they felt they had
something to live for. “The prisoners who fared best in the long run were those who for one reason or
another could retain their personality system largely intact—where previous interests, values, and skills
could to some extent be carried on during the period of incarceration. Very fortunate in this respect were
some members of service professions, such as physicians, nurses, clergymen and social workers”
(Hamburg, 1974:413).
Another method of coping in this extreme situation that has proved effective in the long run
involved linkages with valued groups (see, for example, Bartrop, 2000). To illustrate, prisoners who were
able to stay together with family members or to remain in contact with some of their prewar friends
benefited from such relationships. Moreover, strong identification with ethnic or national groups also
proved quite supportive. For example, when Norwegian prisoners were asked several years later what
helped them to survive, their response very often conveyed a strong thrust: “Being together with other
Norwegians.” Basically, the maintenance of selfesteem, a sense of dignity, sense of group belonging, and
a feeling of being useful to others all seemed to contribute significantly to survival, both in physical and
psychological terms.
By contrast, conditions of high physical and psychological vulnerability are summarized by Eitinger
(quoted by Hamburg, 1974:413) as follows: “Prisoners who were completely isolated from their family,
bereft of all contact with groups to whom they were related before the war, people who very quickly
abandoned themselves and their innermost values, people who were completely overwhelmed by the
notion that they had nobody and nothing to struggle or live for, all felt completely passive and had lost
their ability to retain some sort of selfactivity. They were those who most usually succumbed.” This work
on coping and on survival under extreme conditions underlines the importance of both group support
and of individual strategies in coping and adaptation.
Fortunately, not too many change situations result in such extreme hardship and stress threatening
the survival of individuals, as in the case of the Nazi concentration camps. In the context of less drastic
change on the individual level, a person can develop what David Mechanic (1974:33) calls coping
capabilities. Such capacities entail the ability not only to react to changes, but also to influence and control
the demands to which an individual will be exposed. But to do so, Mechanic suggests that the individual
must be motivated to meet those demands as they become evident in a change situation. He points out
that there is a way of escaping anxiety and discomfort by lowering motivations and aspirations, but there
are many social constraints against this mode of reducing stress. For successful coping, the individuals
must also have the capabilities to maintain a state of psychological equilibrium “so that they can direct
their energies and skills to meeting external, in contrast to internal, needs” (1974:33). Defense mechanisms
that may be successful in diminishing pain and discomfort may be catastrophic for personal coping if
they retard enactment of behavior directed toward changing conditions.
“To put the matter bluntly, such defenses
as denial—a persistent and powerful psychological response—will do a drowning man no good!”
(Mechanic, 1974:33).
Mechanic points out that people’s abilities to cope depend on the efficacy of the solutions that their
culture provides, and the skills they develop are dependent on the adequacy of the preparatory
institutions to which they have been exposed. “To the extent that schools and informal types of
preparation are inadequate to the task men face, social disruption and personal failure will be inevitable
no matter how strong the individual’s psychological capacities” (1974:33). In the same vein, the kinds of
motivations that individuals have, and the directions in which such motivation will be channeled, will
depend on the incentive system in a society, that is, the patterns of behavior and activities that are valued
and those that are condemned. In this context, social supports are essential in maintaining an individual’s
psychological comfort, for “men depend on others for justification and admiration, and few men can
survive without support from some segment of their fellows” (1974:33–34).
The ways in which individuals cope with changing conditions are institutionalized, and they tend to
be cumulative through the generations. People learn from the experience of others, and mechanisms of
coping are taught from one generation to another. The ability of people to adapt to the conditions of their
lives depends in large part on the adequacy of institutionalized solutions. But institutionalized solutions
to problems must change as the problems themselves change. With rapid technological and social change,
“institutionalized solutions to new problems are likely to lag behind, and the probability increases that a
larger proportion of the population will have difficulties in accommodating to life
problems....Increasingly, it is clear that major stresses on modern man are not amenable to individual
solutions, but depend on highly organized cooperative efforts that transcend those of any individual man
no matter how well developed his personal resources” (1974:34).

Mechanic advocates a kind of “collective”

coping through group organization and
cooperation that allows for the development
of mastery through
specialization of function, pooling of resources
and information, developing reciprocal help—
giving relationships, and the like. The
effectiveness of people in many situations is
dependent on the
 maintenance of viable forms of organization
and cooperation that allow important tasks
to be
mastered. Mechanic also notes that “individuals
who may be adaptive and effective persons
from a psychological perspective may be
unfitted because of their values and individual
orientations for the kinds of group cooperation
that are necessary in
developing solutions to...problems. Thus,
many effective copers may become
impotent in
influencing their environment because of their
resistance or inability to submerge themselves
into cooperative organized relationships with
others” (1974:36–37).
Peter Marris (1986) presents a somewhat different perspective on coping with change at the level of
individuals from that of David Mechanic. He argues that people assimilate new experiences by placing
them in the context of a familiar, reliable construction of reality. This structure, in turn, rests not only on
the regularity of events themselves, but on the continuity of their meaning. This is accomplished through
what Marris calls the conservative impulse, which is a tendency of adaptive beings to assimilate reality to
their existing structure and to avoid or reorganize parts of the environment that cannot be assimilated. He
posits that conservatism and adaptability are interdependent, and the readiness to react to new kinds of
experience depends on the ability to assimilate them into familiar principles. This is exemplified by the
social dimensions and impact of AIDS on people and social institutions (McCoy & Inciardi, 1995). Coping
with change by those who are infected in this instance is, in a sense, an ability to interpret new events in
light of familiar principles.
Of course, coping with change is not limited to the level of individuals. At the primary group level,
for example, coping with change is an essential function of the family (Leslie & Korman, 1989). In a sense,
the family is a system of accommodation to social change. At the level of organizations, coping with
change, among other things, entails the manipulation of the environment for the purpose of continuously
attaining organizational objectives and internal adjustments in structure, procedures, and personnel
(Gross & Etzioni, 1985; Hall, 2002).
 At the level of society, there have been several historical illustrations of successful coping with
change. For example, Everett E. Hagen (1962:350) notes that many of the samurai of Japan turned to
business to recover the purpose and prestige they had lost in the disintegration of feudal society.
According to Levy (quoted by Greer, 1975:132), others joined the police force because this preexisting
social character fitted nicely the requirements of the function, and the dangerous samurai had a job in
modern Japan. Similarly, Clifford Geertz (1963) has shown how the Balinese aristocracy exploited old
feudal ties to create new large-scale commercial organizations, after Dutch rule and the Populist regime
that followed had deprived them of political authority. Both these groups have in common a sense of
superiority derived from pride in their social class, their ethnic culture, and a sense of frustration because
their superiority could not find recognition through conventional careers. In a way, the revitalization
movements, such as the Ghost Dance and Cargo cults that were discussed earlier in this text, are also
attempts to cope with dramatic changes. Finally, the more recent movements of national liberation and
decolonization in developing countries also seek, at least in principle, to enable the populace to adjust to
changing conditions.
Undoubtedly, ways of coping with social change are an important aspect in the study of change.
Thus far, much of the research on coping and adaptation has been limited to specific individual strategies
in dealing with stress and disaster situations or with extreme hardships such as in prisons or
concentration camps or to formal organizations such as hospitals (Powell, 1975). Certainly, we need to
know more about major cultural differences in coping behavior and how coping strategies may be used
under diverse situations and at different levels, and we need to further our understanding about long-
term versus short-term coping strategies. Additional information about coping patterns under specified
conditions could benefit individuals, organizations, and institutions challenged by crises of social change,
as is the case currently, for example, in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and assist them
further in anticipating typical or recurring coping exigencies. In the long run, it should be possible to
identify change situations that are especially disruptive and to design coping strategies for various levels
by pertinent social criteria such as age, sex, ethnic group, and the like, and to identify the risks, costs,
opportunities, and benefits associated with each strategy in each situation, taking into account important
considerations such as cultural and subcultural settings. It is not difficult to imagine the utility of such
knowledge for educators, planners, and policymakers.

SUMMARY

This chapter considered the impact of change from the following perspectives: social impact of
technology; responses to change; social disorganization; unintended consequences of change; and ways
of coping with change.
Technology can have a multitude of social impacts. Ogburn, for example, compiled a list of 150
effects that are directly attributable to the introduction of the radio, and it would be safe to assume that
the television has brought still more. There are three general forms of social effects of inventions:
dispersion, succession, and convergence. In various ways, technology affects habits of individuals, which
in turn reverberate in social classes and social institutions. Additional influences are those affecting ethics,
codes of conduct, and social philosophies. Technological innovations have important implications on
wealth, power, culture patterns, gender relationships, and work.
Responses to change were first considered in the context of the mass-society theory, which
encompassed contemporary structural trends, forms of alienation, and behavioral consequences. The
various manifestations of alienation, such as powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, value
isolation, self-estrangement, and social isolation, were seen as responses to change. Other forms of
responses discussed included the Cargo cult, religious responses, social movements, status withdrawal
(in the context of retreatism), and an expansion of Merton’s typology of modes of individual adaptation.
Social change is disruptive, and underlying much social disorganization is the phenomenon of social
change. The processes of change provide the impetus for disorganization by creating conditions for
conflicting interests and values, conflicting status and role obligations, faulty socialization, and faulty
social communication. Disorganization is also generated by the fact that change tends to be uneven,
resulting in culture lag. The social morphological revolution has greatly altered individual behavior and
social organization, and generated and aggravated a host of problems. Social disorganization is often
associated with personal demoralization, as evidenced by the Native Americans of the Great Plains, who
suffered social disorganization as a result of the extinction of the buffalo. The rate of social
disorganization is perhaps highest in developing countries, for they are undergoing accelerated changes
and at the same time they are relatively unfamiliar with change processes. Disorganization can be both
the cause and the effect of social change, and, at times, it may take place “for good reasons.”
Social change entails a series of unintended effects, some adverse and some beneficial. There is an
abundance of illustrations of unanticipated consequences of change efforts. In many cases, these
unanticipated consequences are deleterious to individuals affected by the change. In the short run, most
change efforts will result in unintended consequences, and, over the long run, even the most successful
attempts will have some unplanned by-product. The unanticipated consequences can be beneficial, as
illustrated by the unintended effects of the liberalization of pornography laws in Denmark and in the
former West Germany on the incidence of child molestation.
Change has become the prevailing life mode; a life rooted in constants seems a thing of the past.
Social change complicates life by shifting standards, values, and behavior patterns. It also increases
friction between groups and within groups. When change is especially frustrating or upsetting, the
question of coping with it becomes of paramount importance. Coping is required in situations of drastic
change that defy familiar ways of behaving and require the production of new behavior or new
responses. Under conditions of extreme stress, as in the case of the Nazi concentration camps, individuals
were greatly helped if they felt they had something to live for and when they maintained linkages with
valued groups. In less extreme situations, individuals can develop “coping capabilities,” which are based
on socially conditioned and institutionalized patterns of responses. In many instances, the major stresses
on modern people are not amenable to individual solutions, but depend on highly organized cooperative
efforts in the form of “collective” coping through group organizations. Coping is also facilitated when
new experiences are placed in the context of a familiar, reliable construction of reality. Our knowledge of
coping strategies under diverse situations and by diverse groups requires further expansion. In the next
chapter, the costs of change will be considered.