U A L P S I S OF

DEEP ATTACK OPERATIONS

OPEXATION BAGRATION
BELORUSSIA 22 JUNE-29 AUGUST 1944

Lieutenant Colonel W i l l i a m M. Connor

Combat Studies Institute

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
March 1987
 CONTENTS

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Title Page

1 Strategic Setti- 1

2 ~perational/TacticalSituaticn 16

3 Conduct of Operations 37
4 Conclusions 57

Annexes

A Strategic Setting

B Soviet Force Structure (1944;

C Correlation of Forces

D Planning Sequence

E Major Elements o f Front' Placs

F Disposition
 OPERATION BAGRATION

22 June-28 August 1944

1. S t r a t e g i c S e t t i n g .

a. P r i n c i p a l Events.

Operation BAGRATION took place during what t h e Soviet a n a l y s t s consider

the t h i r d period of t h e war: t h a t of thD S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e s which

marked t h e ascendancy of t h e Soviet armed f o r c e s over t h e German Wehrmacht.

During t h i s period, t h e armed f o r c e s of t h e s o v i e t Union held t h e s t r a t e g i c

i n i t i a i t v e and used i t t o defeat the Wehrmacht, gain c o n t r o l of Eastern

Europe, 'and invade Germany proper, meeting Allied f o r c e s on t h e Elbe River

on 25 April 1945. The period i s regarded a s beginning January 1944 and

ending with t h e V-E Day, 7 May 1945.

During t h e f i r s t two major periods of t h e w a r , t h e Red Army had had

f i r s t t o conduct a s t r a t e g i c defense, more through f o r c e of circumstances

than through any r a t i o n a l plan. During t h i s period of s t r a t e g i c defense,

which l a s t e d from 22 June 1941 t o 1 9 November 1942, t h e Wehrmacht generally

held t h e s t r a t e g i c i n i t i a t i v e and used i t t o advantage. Their f i r s t

offensive, from 22 June t o 5 December 1941 had n e a r l y ended with t h e capture

of Moscow, a s well a s r e s u l t i n g i n the d e f e a t of the Soviet Army which t h e

Wehrmacht saw before i t on 22 June 1941. They had not, however, counted

upon t h e Soviet a b i l i t y t o r a i s e new formations and manpower nor t h e

movement of t h e f a c t o r i e s east. Given t h e s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e of the German

invasion, t h e Soviet government had shaken but not f a l l e n , and t h e

governmental reorganization which followed would be one of t h e major f a c t o r s

i n t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e S o v i e t Union t o decide s t r a t e g y and conduct
operations. Nor could t h e S o v i e t Union receive s u b s t a n t i a l help from

p o t e n t i a l a l l i e s during t h i s first advance by the Germans, a s Great B r i t a i n

was j u s t capable of defending h e r own t e r r i t o r y a g a i n s t t h e Germans.

F i n a l l y , t h e Gennans had not reckoned upon the s o v i e t s ' use of t h e i r F a r

Eastern armg t o reinforce t h e i r European forces, made possible by t h e

N e u t r a l i t y Fact signed between Japan, Germany's a l l y , and t h e Soviet Union

i n April 1941. . A s s t r a t e g i c consumption of German f o r c e s proceeded and they

m e t a reorganized and r e i n f o r c e d Red Army i n t h e b a t t l e f o r Moscow, t h e

German t i d e was h a l t e d , and t h e Soviet counteroffensive began on 6 December,

growing out of l o c a l c o u n t e r a t t a c k s which exposed t h e weakness of t h e

forward German forces. In t h e spring of 1942, t h e Soviet f o r c e s again

attempted an o f f e n s i v e , b u t t h e y were defeated, and t h e Gennan f o r c e s used

this event t o launch t h e i r o m offensive i n southern Russia i n summer 1942.

This r e s u l t e d i n t h e S t a l i n g r a d campaign, i n which t h e Gennan armies were

h a l t e d a t Stalingrad on t h e Volga River and i n t h e Caucasus mountains by

Russian defense and s t r a t e g i c consumption of t h e i r own f o r c e s again.

The second period of t h e w a r began with the Soviet counteroffensive

a g a i n s t t h e Ge wan forces surrounding Stalingrad. This time, however, the

counteroffensive was not a development of events on t h e ground but r a t h e r

had been planned by Stavka, t h e Soviet High Command. Tbe counteroffensive

was successful, and t h e German S i x t h Army was surrounded and destroyed by

February 1943. However, when t h e Soviet forces attempted t o exploit t h e i r

success, they were defeated by t h e Germans i n a counteroffensive by Manstein

from 18 February t o t h e end of March 1943. The l e s s o n uas c l e a r t h a t the

 Red Army ma s t i l l not a b l e t o take the o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t t h e Wehlmacht.

Thus, f o r t h e summer campaign, t h e Stavka decided not t o i n i t i a t e offensive

operations but t o wait f o r t h e expected German offensive, d e f e a t i t , and

then conduct a counteroffensive. Due t o good i n t e l l i g e n c e from such HUMINT

sources a s Sorge i n Tokyo, Lucy, and t h e Red Chorus and t h e b a t t l e f i e l d

preparations of t h e Germans, t h e Red Army determined t h e l o c a t i o n , Kursk,

and timing, July, of t h e German offensive. The Red Army' then prepared t h e i r

p o s i t i o n s and gathered reserves t o meet t h e t h r e a t . The r e s u l t was t h e

complete defeat of t h e last s t r a t e g i c offensive e f f o r t t o be made by t h e

Geman Wehmcht on t h e Eastern Front. The Red Army followed up i t s

successes with another counteroffensive which l i b e r a t e d t h e Ukraine e a s t of

the Dnieper River and i t s c a p i t o l Kiev by November 1943, and i n December

expanded i t s bridgeheads on t h e western bank of t h e Dnieper River,

preparatory t o f r e e i n g t h e r e s t o f the Ukraine.

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By the beginning of 1944, t h e Red Army c l e a r l y had the i n i t i a t i v e on t h e

. Eastern Front; moreover, s i n c e t h e beginning o f t h e second .period, t h e

Soviet Union a l s o had s t r o n g a l l i e s who could provide a s s i s t a n c e i n two

ways: the United S t a t e s and Great Britain. The main f a c t o r i n the a l l i a n c e

had been the e n t r y of t h e United S t a t e s i n t o World War I1 s i n c e t h e Japanese

a t t a c k on Pearl Harbor i n December 1941. A s t h e Soviet Union saw i t , t h e

most important contribution which these a l l i e s could make t o her

s t r a t e g i c a l l y would be t o open a second Front a g a i n s t the Germans. Although

t h i s was not t o happen during the f i r s t period, they d i d c o n t r i b u t e i n two

other ways. They commenced Lend-Lease a i d , although this would not amount

t o s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t i e s t o a f f e c t Soviet operations u n t i l l a t e 1943 and

1944. They also opened indiretct a t t a c k s on Germany through t h e i n i t i a t i o n

of t h e s t r a t e g i c bombing campaign a g a i n s t Germany proper and commencing

o f f e n s i v e s and landings a g a i n s t Axis f o r c e s i n North Africa ( a t t h e

beginning of t h e S o v i e t ' s second ~ e r i o d ) . The invasions of S i c i l y and I t a l y

followed i n the second period, Imocking I t a l y o u t of its a l l i a n c e with

G e m and d i v e r t i n g German f o r c e s t o defend i n I t a l y . The invasion of

S i c i l y may a l s o have contributed t o the German decision to break o f f its

Kursk o f f e n s i v e s a s well i n J u l y 1943. Moreover, by the end of t h e second

period of t h e war, t h e A l l i e s had f i n a l i z e d t h e i r plans for t h e opening of

the Second Front d i r e c t l y by landing i n northern and southern France i n May

1944, and the Soviet leadership had been s o informed a t the Teheran

Conference i n November 1943. Indeed, j u s t t h e t h r e a t o f t h e invasion had

.
been s u f f i c i e n t t o a c t a s a d i s t r a c t i o n t o t h e Germans by this time, and

Lend-Lease a i d had now entered t h e S o v i e t armed forces i n quantity.

In t h e t h i r d period o f t h e war, t h e r e f o r e , t h e Soviet Union 'held the

s t r a t e g i c i n i t i a t i v e , and t h e y e a r opened with the f i r s t two of w h a t would

come t o be known a s the "Ten Destructive Blows" of 1944: Leningrad and t h e

Ukraine. The offensive a t Leningrad commenced on 1 4 January 1944 and ground

t o a h a l t on 1 March with t h e German s i e g e of Leningrad broken,. the German

S i x t e e n t h and Eighteenth Armies defeated, Soviet advances of up t o 200

kilometers, and Soviet forces on t h e border o.f Estonia. The blow i n the

Ukraine commenced on 2 4 January 1944, l a s t i n g u n t i l mid-April, and involved

a l l o f the f r o n t s i n t h e Ukraine. F i n a l l y , t h e various fronts were ordered

by Stavka t o go on the defensive between 17 A p r i l and 6 May t o prepare f o r

t h e summer offensive.
 By t h e time o p e r a t i o n s halted, t h e S o v i e t s had regained almost a l l o f

t h s Ukraine and were threatening t h e borders o f Poland, Czechoslovakia, and

Rumania. In April-May, Soviet f o r c e s invaded and f r e e d y e t another German

holding i n t h e t h i r d blow of t h e year, t h e Crimea and Odessa.
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The Soviet o f f e n s i v e s had smashed f i v e German awies: two i n t h e north,

two in t h e south, and one i n t h e Crimea. German personnel c a s u a l t i e s may

have amounted t o a s many a s 1,000,000 i n t h e s o u t h alone. German equipment

l o s s e s claimed by t h e Soviets f o r t h e f i r s t h a l f o f 1944 amounted t o 8,100

guns, 3,500 mortars, 23,500 machine &a, 18,400 r i f l e s , 1,000 tanks and
a s s a u l t guns, 3,300 t r a c t o r s and prime movers, 61,300 v e h i c l e s , 11,700,000

p r o j e c t i l e s , and 2,300,000 mines.

Finally, t h e German d e f e a t s had put p r e s s u r e on two German a l l i e s ,

Finland and Rumania. The f o u r t h blow o f 1944 commenced on 1 0 June against

Finland, and V i i p u r i f e l l within t e n days. F i g h t i n g continued throughout

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the summer, and Finland ended h o s t i l i t i e s on 4 September. In addition, on

other f r o n t s , t h e A l l i e d invasion of Europe had commenced on 6 June, and

Rome had f a l l e n on 4 June.

b. S t r a t e g i c objectives.

(1) S o v i e t Union:

(a) Recover Soviet t e r r i t o r y from German occupation.

(b) Destroy Genaan forces.

(c) Liberate o t h e r European c o u n t r i e s under German control.

(d) Conduct s t r a t e g i c operations s e q u e n t i a l l y r a t h e r than

simultaneou sly.
 The first look a t s t r a t e g i c concept8 by which t o accomplish t h e

above o b j e c t i v e s took p l a c e with a meeting of a commission o f t h e S t a t e

Defence. Committee beginning 5 A p r i l 1944. They appear t o have considered

three options:

First, they could have continued t h e i r s u c c e s s f u l southern

offensive southward i n t o t h e Balkans, hopefully c u t t i n g o f f t h e German

f o r c e s i n t h e southern Ukraine. Besides destroying German f o r c e s , t h i s

would have f r e e d Arropean c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y Rumania and Bulgaria, which

were wavering i n t h e i r a l l i a n c e with Germany. But t h e d i r e c t i o n was away

fran Germany, and i t would have had t o be done with very powerful,

undefeated Gennan f a r c e s on t h e i r f l a n k and rear. F i n a l l y , t h e remaining

S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y l a y n o r t h o f t h e P r i p e t Marshes.

The second o p t i o n considerdd was t h a t o f a s t r o k e north f r o m

t h e northern Ukraine toward t h e B a l t i c . I f s u c c e s s f u l , such a s t r i k e would

have e n c i r c l e d t h e German f o r c e s north o f t h e P r i p e t Marshes, l i b e r a t e d the

l a s t major Soviet t e r r i t o r y s t i l l remaining in-German hands, and been on t h e

road t o Berlin. But this course was regarded a s beyond Soviet c a p a b i l i t y ,

and i t would have a l s o l e f t major German f o x e s on i t s f l a n k s , t o say

nothing of t h e encircled f o r c e s which would have t o be reduced.

'Ihis l e d t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n of mounting t h e offensive d i r e c t l y

a g a i n s t the German f o r c e s i n Belorussia, which represented t h e l a s t major

undefeated German f o r c e on t h e Eastern k n t . If t h e o f f e n s i v e were

. s u c c e s s f u l , t h a t would a l s o l e a d t o reconquest of t h e l a s t remaining Soviet

t e r r i t o r y s t i l l i n German hands. Following t h a t , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a drive

t o t h e B a l t i c , t o Konigsberg, i n Eastern P r u s s i a , o r t o Riga t o e n c i r c l e

Army Group North s t i l l remained. Most important, from the S o v i e t p o i n t o f

view, while t h e goal was l e s s decisive, immediately, than e i t h e r of t h e

o t h e r two courses, i t was f e a s i b l e , and i t could lead t o s t r a t e g i c a l l y

deciaive results..

S t a l i n and t h e S t a t e Defense Committee approved t h e

commission's recommendation by 12 April, and o r d e r s went out by 1 7 A p r i l

d i r e c t i n g t h e c e s s a t i o n of offensive operations described i n paragraph l a .

The commission had a l s o determined t h a t simultaneous offensives were s t i l l

not possible, e i t h e r ; t h e r e f o r e , t h e summer campaign would have t o c o n s i s t

of sequential offensives.

Thus, t h e s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s were now a s follows:

(a) ~ e c o v e r / l i b e r a t eBelorussia from Germany.

(b) Destroy o r defeat ~ e - n f o r c e s i n Belorussia, A r m y Group

Center.

(c) Liberate o t h e r Eumpean c o u n t r i e s under German control.

(d) Conduct s t r a t e g i c operations sequentially r a t h e r than

simultaneously during t h e summer.

(2) Germany:

(a) Defeat Allied landings i n France.

(b) Win time f o r c o a l i t i o n t o break up.

(c) Defend t e r r i t o r i a l g a i n s i n East with forces i n t h e a t e r .

(d) Defeat expected Soviet summer offensive i n south with

mobile reserves s t a t i o n e d i n North Ukraine.

(e) Hold Allied forces i n I t a l y .

 In deciding i t s s t r a t e g y , Germany had t o consider t h e nature of

a l l t h r e a t s against it. A s a r e s u l t , H i t l e r had pointed o u t that t h e

expected Allied landings i n n o r t h e r n R a n c e were t h e most immediately

dangerous t h r e a t t o Germasy, with t h e Red Army over 1,000 kilometers from

th.' German f r o n t i e r but t h e A l l i e s only 300-500 kilometers away a f t e r

landing. Thus, t h e E a s t e r n Front could expect no reinforcement u n t i l a f t e r
t h e A l l i e d landing had been defeated and thrown back i n t o t h e s e a o r

contained. U n t i l t h e d e c i s i o n i n t h e West, t h e f o r c e s on t h e Eastern Front

would have t o defend, and they would have t o defend a l l p o s i t i o n s . They

would not be allowed t o t r a d e space f o r time.

German i h t e l l i g e n c e had a l s o i d e n t i f i e d t h e first two o p t i o n s

described above which were a v a i l a b l e t o t h e S o v i e t s , and they f e l t that

t h e i r f o r c e s , with s t r o n g armored f o r c e s i n t h e northern Ukraine, could

handle t h e defensive misaion. They were not worried about Army Group Center

because i t had been s u c c e s s f u l i n t h e w i n t e r and spring; moreover, the

f o r c e r a t i o s i n A p r i l were n o t t h o s e which t h e S o v i e t s l i k e d when they went

on the offensive. F i n a l l y , t h e t e r r a i n i n t h e s e c t o r of Army Group Center

favored t h e defense and w a s e s p e c i a l l y a hindrance t o t h e movement of l a r g e

armored forces. One o f t h e moat important i n d i c a t o r s which t h e Gennans

would use t o p r e d i c t t h e next o f f e n s i v e would be the l o c a t i o n of the tank

armies, a l l f i v e of which were i n t h e Ukraine a s of April 1944.

c. Allocation of ~ e s o u m e s / ~ o r c e s .

(1) Forces and f o r c e s t r u c t u r e . ( s e e Annex A) Ey t h e s t a r t of t h e

summer, t h e Soviet f o r c e s had s u p e r i o r i t y i n personnel of 1.7 times t h e

G e r m a d ~ x i sf o r c e s , 1.8 times t h e a r t i l l e r y and mortars (with t h e S o v i e t

 a r t i l l e r y on average heavier than German a r t i l l e r y ) , 1.6 t i m e s t h e tanks and

a s s a u l t guns, and 4.9 times t h e operational a i m r a f t . These r a t i o s do not

include t h e Stavka reserves o r German OKV reservee; however, t h e Soviet

Stavlca reserves v a s t l y exceeded those of Germany, and t h e Soviet Stavka

could count on uaing those reserves on t h e Eastern F'ront, whereas such

Gennan Om reserves a s e x i s t e d were l i k e l y t o go t o t h e Western Front.

Ihus, t h e r a t i o s could be a s high a s 2:l i n personnel, o v e r a l l , 2: 1 i n

a r t i l l e r y , 1.8:l i n tanks, and 5.4:l i n a r i c r a f t . These r a t i o s led t h e

Stavka t o the conclusion t h a t t h e r e were i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e s t o undertake

simultaneous offensive a c t i o n over t h e whole f r o n t .

(a) Gennan ( s e e Annex A).

By June 1944, t h e German armed forces counted some 9.1 m i l l i o n

men, with 4.55 m i l l i o n i n t h e f i e l d ~rmkand Waffen SS, organized i n t o 324

divisions: 258 i n f a n t r y , 34 panzer, 17 panzer grenadier, and 6 parachute.

Of these, some 3.13 m i l l i o n men were on t h e Eastern Front, i n 179 d i v i s i o n s

and 5 brigades, including 23 panzer and 7 panzer granadier divisions.

S a t e l l i t e c o u n t r i e s provided a n a d d i t i o n a l 800,000 men, 49 d i v i s i o n s , and

. 18 brigades, mostly i n f a n t r y and s t a t i o n e d i n t h e south, These d i v i s i o n s

were 63% of a l l those a v a i l a b l e t o Germany, while t h e manpower was more on

the order of 7@ of a l l t h a t a v a i l a b l e f o r f i e l d s e r v i c e i n Germany and h e r

satellites. The German f o r c e s on t h e Eastern Front a l s o had the bulk of t h e

armored f o r c e s and a i r forces: 5,250 tanks o r a s s a u l t guns and 2,796

operational a i r c r a f t . Although t h e West R o n t only had 1,550 tanks and 300

assault guns, t h e s e numbers had r i s e n from 650 and 220, respectively, i n

December 1943. The German f o r c e s i n t h e e a s t were supported by an estimated

48,635 guns and mortars. These c o n s t i t u t e d ?ol
f%a l l guns and mortars, 57%

of a l l tanks and a s s a u l t guns, and 51% of a l l o p e r a t i o n a l a i r c r a f t . It has

been estimated t h a t Germany's o t h e r a c t i v e theaters--Prance, I t a l y , and the

a i r b a t t l e over Germany--consumed 30035% of Germany's o v e r a l l combat power.

Within t h e E a s t e r n Front, a l s o , t h e German f o r c e d i s t r i b u t i o n

was uneven. North o f t h e P r i p e t Marshes, which c o n s t i t u t e d over 6G of t h e

f r o n t a g e , Germany had o n l y about '409 of i t s d i v i s i o n s and only 10-159 of i t s

mobile d i v i s i o n s , and t h e average d i v i s i o n s e c t o r f o r an on-line d i v i s i o n

amounted t o 1 9 kilometers. South of t h e P r i p e t Marshes, however, with only

4@ of t h e frontage, Germany had 6@ o f the Eastern Front d i v i s i o n s ,

including-moat o f t h e s a t e l l i t e d i v i s i o n s and t h e t h r e e s a t e l l i t e s armies,

and 80085% of t h e mobile d i v i s i o n s . The average d i v i s i o n frontage h e r e was

.
t h e Germans had l o s t some t h i r t y d i v i s i o n s i n t h e preceding
8 kilometers.

w i n t e r offensives, and t h o s e d i v i s i o n s which remained were a t varying l e v e l s

o f s t r e n g t h , although t h e l u l l of April-May gave t h o s e not i n the a c t i v e

s e c t o r s some chance f o r reinforcement. Nevertheless, d i v i s i o n s remained a t

b e s t a t 6,000-8,000 men, with a n i n f a n t r y s t r e n g t h of only 2,000, o r 300 men

per infantry battalion.

(b) S o v i e t ( s e e h e x A) .
Although t h e Soviet Union, l i k e Germany, had a two-front

problem, s t r a t e g i c a l l y , t h e y only had t o devote about an estimated 7% o f

t h e i r combat power t o t h e i r second f r o n t , a g a i n s t Japan i n t h e F a r East.

This was due t o the s t r a t e g i c depth provided by t h e d i s t a n c e from the Far

East t o European Russia and t h e N e u t r a l i t y Pact signed i n ~ ~ r1941

i i between

Japan and t h e Soviet Uniop. Xoreover, t h e proportion would f a l l , as new

production and f o m e s went exclusively t o the Eastern R o n t o p p o s i t e

German/Axis f o r c e s u n t i l t h e l a s t months of t h e war, when t h e S o v i e t s

started t h e build-up f o r t h e Manchurian campaign and t h e maneuver i n

Centeral Europe had compressed t o t h e point t h a t i t s f o r c e s would no l o n g e r

fit on t h e t e r r a i n a v a i l a b l e .
I n s p i t e o f t h e l o s s e s suffered during t h e winter campaign, t h e
Red Army had continued t o grow. Although personnel had increased by only

200,000 o v e r a l l , t h i s s t i l l meant t h a t t h e l o s s e s had been made more than

good. Moreover, t h e number o f tanks and a s s a u l t guns had increased by

4,357, o r 77%. enabling t h e Stavka reserves t o be increased e i g h t - f o l d , and
a i r c r a f t increased by 5,969, o r 6€$, i n c r e a s i n g Stavka r e s e r v e s by
four-fold. While t h e number of a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s o v e r a l l had remained
constant, i t s power had increased due €0 t h e replacement of lower-caliber

guns and mortars with l a r g e r - c a l i b e r , more powerful weapons.

Within t h e E a s t e r n Front, t h e S o v i e t d i s t r i b u f i o n mirrored t h a t

o f the German Forces described above, i . e . , approximately 4C$ o f t h e r i f l e

d i v i s i o n s but 80-8s o f the Mobile d i v i s i o n s s o u t h of t h e P r i p e t Marshes.

I n f a c t , i n the w i n t e r campaign a l l of the Soviet tank armies (5) had

p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e south, and i t was t o be expected t h a t t h e i r presence

would i d e n t i f y f u t u r e main e f f o r t s . In p r e p a r a t i o n f o r Operation BAGRATION,

however, a s u b s t a n t i a l regrouping of f o r c e s would take place, as described

i n paragraph 2 below. Within t h e r i f l e d i v i s i o n s , t h e replacements had

brought t h e d i v i s i o n s back up t o 6,000-8,000 men p e r d i v i s i o n compared t o a n

authorized s t r e n g t h of 9,600 p e r r i f l e division.
For f o r c e s t r u c t u r e of Soviet formations, see Annex B.
 (2) Previous pezfonnance .
A l l t r e n d s were down f o r t h e German forces. While t h e number of

d i v i s i o n s had continuad t o r i s e , t h e average number of men, e s p e c i a l l y

i n f a n t r y , i n them had declined, both from reorganization, i n t o regiments of

-
two b a t t a l i o n s i n i n f a n t r y regiments, and from casualties. Nor were

replacements t o be had. By t h i s period, Gemany had l o s t a cumulative t o t a l

of 3.28 m i l l i o n men, and t h e Field Army was understrength a s a whole by an

estimated 2@. Of t h e one million men l o s t i n t h e winter campaign, only

100,000 had been replaced. The shortage of German manpower was acute, and

d r a f t requirements were not being met. In addition, the l o s s of t e r r i t o r i e s

meant t h e l o s s of populations averaging 500,000-600,000 per month, which

populations u s u a l l y became a v a i l a b l e t o t h e Soviet Army. The German l a b o r

f o r c e had dropped from t e n and 1/2 m i l l i o n i n 1939 t o seven and 3/4 m i l l i o n

by t h e end of 1943, i n s p i t e of over 2 1/2 m i l l i o n women working i n

. .
industry. The Allied a i r r a i d s .and s t r a t e g i c bombing campaign kept t h e

s t r e n g t h a r t i f i c i a l l y high (and men away f r o m t h e Eastern ~ r o n t )i n order t o

man a n t i a i r c r a f t defenses i n Gennany.

One b r i g h t spot was the continued increase of German production,

which peaked during 1944. B u t t h i s v a s mitigated by the f a c t t h a t the

production could not make up the l o s s e s , nor could i t catch up with the

Soviet increases and Lend-Lease m a t e r i a l s discussed below. The tank

production i n 1943 w a s 10,800, and i t jumped i n 1944 t o 17,800. For the war

a s a whole i t was 76,000. Likewise, a r t i l l e r y production rose from 12,000

a l - t i l l e r g pieces i n 1942 t o 40,600 i n 1944. Aircraft production increased

from 25,200 i n 1943 t o 34,300 i n 1944, but i n 1943 17,400 a i r c r a f t had been
destroyed, and t h e proportion was holding i n 1944, e s p e c i a l l i on t h e Western

Front. More t h a n replacing a i r c r a f t , however, t h e d i f f i c u l t f a c t o r f o r t h e

Luftwaffe w a s r e p l a c i n g t r a i n e d p i l o t s , both due t o personnel l o s s e s and t o

f u e l s h o r t a g e s (which kept t r a i n i n g f l i g h t s down and grounded o p e r a t i o n a l

a i r c r a f t ) , which were groving i n 1944.

German d o c t r i n e was now e x c l u s i v e l y c o n t r o l l e d by Adolf H i t l e r , and

he i n s i s t e d upon holding a l l t e m t o r y taken by t h e Wehrmacht. He intended

t o accomplish t h i s through d e c l a r i n g important communication c e n t e r s o r

regions f o r t r e s s e s which must be held by t r o o p s who could not be moved by

t h e Army Group commanders without H i t l e r ' s personal approval. As a

c o r o l l a r y , t h e r e f o r e , he would n o t allow t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o r preparation of

l i n e s t o t h e r e a r , a s h e f e l t t h a t such p r e p a r a t i o n s became a

s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy. Those commanders who would have contradicted him,

and had done s o i n t h e p a s t , had been relieved by now, t h e l a s t being

Manstein and K l e i s t i n Harch.

In c o n t r a s t t o t h e Germans, t h e t r e n d s were up f o r t h e Soviet

forces. They were a b l e t o make up t h e i r manpower l o s s e s . Out of an

a v a i l a b l e manpower pool of a n estimated 35,000,000, they eventually c a l l e d

up 25,000,000, and 13,700,000 were k i l l e d , along with 7,000,000 c i v i l i a n s .

By 1944, however, t h e reconquest of Soviet t e r r i t o r i e s was adding some

500,000-600,000 men p e r month - t o t h e pool. Additionally, t h e annual c l a s s

f o r the S o v i e t Union was about t h r e e times t h a t of Germany. Thus, although

the r i f l e d i v i s i o n s were not a t . f u l l s t r e n g t h , they were a t l e a s t f u l l e r

than German d i v i s i o n s , and t h e prospects f o r replacements were b e t t e r than

f o r the Germans.
 I n production, t o o , t h e S o v i e t Union was f a r i n g b e t t e r than were t h e

Gennans, For t h e war as a whole, S o v i e t i n d u s t r y produced 107,000 tanks and

a s s a u l t guns while German i n d u s t r y produced 76,000. On top of t h i s

production, t h e S o v i e t Union received a n o t h e r 13,000 armored v e h i c l e s

through Lend-Lease. In 1943, t h e t a n k production was 24,000, and i t

i n c r e a s e d t o 29,000 i n 1944. A r t i l l e r g production i n 1943 w a s 45,000 f i e l d

and a n t i t a n k guns, r i s i n g t o 56,000 f i e l d and AT guns i n 1944. Aircraft

were a n o t h e r major iten, with production o f 30,000 i n 1943, 32,200 i n 1944

(exceeded by Germany t h a t y e a r o n l y ) , and Lend-Lease of 19,000 a i r c r a f t f o r

t h e war a s a whole.

But . t h e most important Lend-Lease m a t e r i e l provided by t h e US t o t h e

S o v i e t Union i n t h e war were t r u c k s , o f f o u r and s i x wheel d r i v e

construction. These t r u c k s amounted t o 220,817 through A p r i l 1944, and

would t o t a l 427,000 f o r t h e w a r (of a ' s o v i e t t r u c k park of 665,000 t r u c k s ) .

These t r u c k s had cross-country m o b i l i t y s u p e r i o r t o t h o s e o f t h e Germans,

and they enabled t h e q u a n t i t i e s o f i n f a n t r y necessary t o be motorized t o

support t h e tanks i n t a n k and mechanized corps. They a l s o provided good

cross-countl-g mobility f o r s u p p l i e s t o accompany S o v i e t f o r c e s forward of

the railheads. This q u a n t i t y o f t r u c k s , which were a l r e a d y s u p e r i o r

q u a l i t a t i v e l y t o German t r u c k s , exceeded t h e e n t i r e Germzn output o f t r u c k s

f o r t h e y e a r s 1939-1945.

S o v i e t d o c t r i n e had by t h i s time matured, and Operation BAGRATION

would r e f l e c t t h a t maturity. It emphasized keeping t h e i n i t i a t i v e , u s i n g

maskirovka, o r o p e r a t i o n a l c o v e r and deception, t o conceal t h e main a t t a c k s

o f t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s , c o n c e n t r a t i o n a t t h e s e l e c t e d p o i n t s - t o overwhelm t h e
enemy with a t t a c k s throughout t h e depth o f h i s position, and e x p l o i t a t i o n a s

soon a s t h e t a c t i c a l had been made t o operational deptha, t o

defeat t h e enemy's o p e r a t i o n a l reserves, and develop operational success

i n t o s t r a t e g i c success. In o r d e r t o accomplish t h i s success, t h e S o v i e t s

h a d developed both t h e numerical s u p e r i o r i t y ( a l b e i t not, i n this period,

overwhelming) and t h e f o r c e s t r u c t u r e s t o achieve t h i s aim. The f o r c e

s t r u c t u r e s which were t o lead t o t h i s o p e r a t i o n a l success were t h e tank

army, a corps-sized echelon composed of two o r t h r e e tank corps

(division-size elements) and/or one t o two mechanized corps ( s e e Annex 3).

I n f a c t , the s t r u c t u r e of t h e tank army could vary with t h e operation, with

fewer tank corps o r more mechanized corps depending on the mission and

enemy's s i t u a t i o n . Another f o r c e s t r u c t u r e used f o r deep a t t a c k operations .

was the Cavalry-Mechanized Group, of wh5ch two m u l d be seen i n Operation

BAGRATION. This formation was usually temporary and intended f o r use i n

t e r r a i n which m u l a not support a tank army.

Soviet d o c t r i n e c a l l e d f o r almies o r specially-reinforced armies

called shock armies t o be given the t a s k of breaking through t h e enemy's

t a c t i c a l defenses. The f r o n t s would reinforce armies making-the f r o n t main

e f f o r t with tank o r mechanized corps. These armies would then introduce

these mobile groups i n t o t h e b a t t l e t o exploit t o t h e depths of t h e t a c t i c a l

defenses o r t o r e i n f o r c e success. Ihe tank armies o r cavalry-mechanized

groups were committed by t h e f r o n t commander on h i s own o r d e r (but i n

accordance with h i s approved plan) o r with Stavka approval, e i t h e r from

Stavka i n Moscow o r from t h e Stavka representative sent out t o coordinate

t h e operations of a group of fronts. Ihe l a t t e r method was t h e n o m f o r

s t r a t e g i c operations.

15
2, ~ ~ e r a t i o n a l / T a c t i c aSli t u a t i o n .

a. Opposing Forces. For c o r r e l a t i o n of forces, s e e Annex C.

(1) Soviet Forces.

The Soviet f o r c e s assembled f o r Operation BAGEATION consisted of 166

d i v i s i o n s , o f which 124, including s i x c a v a l r y divisions, took p a r t i n the

i n i t i a l assault. Mobile f o r c e s amounted t o e i g h t tank o r mechanized corps

(equal t o German panzer o r panzer g r e n a d i e r divisions)--two tank cbrpa i n

5 t h Guards Tank A m y , one mechanized corps i n each of two cavalrg-mechanized

groups, and the o t h e r f o u r tank corps separate--and two c a v a l r y corps--one

i n each of t h e two cavalry-mechanized groups. Each of these corps had,

however, about twice a s many tanks a s a companble German d i v i s i o n ;

moreover, these fonnations included 4 a - 5 @ of the tanks and a s s a u l t guns i n

t h e Soviet forces. More than 6,000 a i r c r a f t l organized i n t o f i v e a i r annies,

one supporting each f r o n t except 1st Belorussian where two a i r armies were

a l l o c a t e d , would provide a i r support. Additionally, n e a r l y 1,000 a i r c r a f t

of Soviet Long Range Aviation would support t h e offensive from bases i n

southern Russia. O f these i n i t i a l d i v i s i o n s , ninety-seven would make the

Six main penetrations of t h e German f r o n t , On the penetration, o r

breakthrough, s e c t o r s , t h e S o v i e t s would a l s o concentrate 65% of the men,

63% of t h e guns and mortars, 769 of t h e tanks and assault guns, and 73% of

t h e a i r c r a f t (not including t h e f r o n t and army r e a r s e r v i c e s , a i r force

personnel, o r t h e troops of t h e l e f t wing of t h e 1st Bel0~SsiaI-iFront).

This concentration would t r a n s l a t e t h e o v e r a l l 3:1 s u p e r i o r i t y i n men and

d i v i s i o n s , 8:l i n guns, 10:l i n tanks and a s s a u l t guns, and 4:l i n a i r c r a f t

i n t o t a c t i c a l s u p e r i o r i t i e s o f 10: 1 i n those sectors. These concentrations

were n o t unnoticed by t h e Germans, b u t t h e cover and deception o p e r a t i o n s ,

c a l l e d maakirovka by t h e S o v i e t s , caused them t o m i s i n t e r p r e t them, as

explained below. .

The S o v i e t f i g u r e s i n C o r r e l a t i o n of Forces do n o t r e f l e c t t h e

left-wing armies and f o r c e s o f t h e 1st Belorussian Front i n t h e south.

These f o r c e s amounted t o a n o t h e r forty-two d i v i s i o n s i n s i x combine6 arms

armies, one t a n k army, and one a i r army. However, they would only e n t e r t h e

b a t t l e when t h e main BAGRATION f o r c e s passed Slonim on t h e i r way west. Nor

do they count two whole combined armies i n Stavka r e s e r v e , l o c a t e d a t

Smolensk t o be s u r e , b u t u n a v a i l a b l e t o t h e f r o n t commanders f o r t h e i r

commitment on t h e i r own a u t h o r i t y .

Moreover, t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s had some p o t e n t i a l l y e x p l o i t a b l e

realmesses. I n t h e first p l a c e , t h e auihorized personnel s t r e n g t h o f t h e i r

r i f l e d i v i s i o n s was about one-third l e s s than t h e German i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n

o f t h e time, and t h e a c t u a l personnel s t r e n g t h of the r i f l e d i v i s i o n s w a s a t

about one-half of a u t h o r i z e d s t r e n g t h . They had, however, been r e i n f o r c e d

f o r this o p e r a t i o n , s o t h e s t r e n g t h may.have been up, although i t was not

f u l l strength. Nor were t h e i r a r t i l l e r y units a t d i v i s i o n l e v e l a s numerous

o r a s capable a s t h o s e a t d i v i s i o n l e v e l i n t h e German d i v i s i o n ; r a t h e r ,

t h e i r a r t i l l e r y a t d i v i s i o n c o n d u c t e d . d i r e c t f i r e i n support of i n f a n t r y ,

and a t t a c h e d a r t i l l e r y u n i t s o r a r t i l l e r y a t corps f i r e d i n d i r e c t f i r e

missions. This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c extended t o o t h e r sugporting arms w i t h i n t h e

Soviet r i f l e division. They were not as numerous o r a s ca?able a s l i k e

u n i t s i n t h e German i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n . The S o v i e t r i f l e d i v i s i o n depended

upon attachments from h i g h e r o r support from c o r p s t o g i v e them t h e

c a p a b i l i t y and s u s t a i n a b i l i t y of German d i v i s i o n s . The number o f

i d a n t m e n , however, was about equal t o t h a t o f t h e Geman i n f a n t r y

d i v i s i o n of t h e time (2,000 infantrgmen a t b a t t a l i o n l e v e l ) , which w a s a l s o

understrength. Thus, a S o v i e t r i f l e d i v i s i o n was about h a l f a German

division i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s , making t h e 118 S o v i e t r i f l e d i v i s i o n s equal t o

about f i f t y - n i n e German d i v i s i o n s . In a n o t h e r comparison, a n American

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n of 1944 w i t h i t s h a b i t u a l attachments was e q u a l t o a

S o v i e t r i f l e corps o f two t o t h r e e d i v i s i o n s , and, t h e r e f o r e , a S o v i e t army

was about e q u a l t o a n American corps and a S o v i e t f r o n t equal t o a n American

f i e l d amy.

(2) German Forces.

The German f o r c e s o f Army'Group Center c o n s i s t e d of f i f t y d i v i s i o n s

and t h r e e brigades. These included t h i > t p e i g h t i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s , one

Panzer d i v i s i o n , t h r e e panzer g r e n a d i e r d i v i s i o n s (one o f which w a s OKH

r e s e r v e ) , t h r e e Hungarian d i v i s i o n s , and f i v e s e c u r i t y d i v i s i o n s i n t h e

rear. The two l a t t e r c a t e g o r i e s o f d i v i s i o n s were not a v a i l a b l e t o counter

Soviet b a t t l e forces i n the field. O f the r e s t , thirty-eight divisions,

i n c l u d i n g two panzer g r e n a d i e r d i v i s i o n s , were a l l o c a t e d t o t h e f r o n t - l i n e

defense, while f o u r divisions--the panzer d i v i s i o n , t h e OKH r e s e r v e panzer

g r e n a d i e r d i v i s i o n , and two i n f a n t r y divisions--were i n reserve f o r t h e

armies. Immediately t o t h e s o u t h of Army Group Center a t Kowel l a y t h e LVI

Panzer Corps of two panzer d i v i s i o n s which had u n t i l May belonged t o Army

Group Center. By S o v i e t e s t i m a t e s , o t h e r f o r c e s which from n o r t h and south

of Army Group Center which could r e i n f o r c e brought t h e Cotel of d i v i s i o n s

a v a i l a b l e t o t h e defenders t o 63-66 d i v i s i o n s . While i n t h e Army Group

Center proper t h e r e may have been a s few a s 200 t a n k s / a s s a u l t guns, o r a s

many a s 400, b u t p o t e n t i a l reinforcements brought t h e p o s s i b l e t o t a l u p . t o

900 a v a i l a b l e t o t h e Germans a s committed f o r c e s o r reinforcements. There

were approximately 9,500 guns and mortars, and t h e 6 t h Air F l e e t supported

Army Group Center w i t h 1,342 aircraft, although some s o u r c e s r e p o r t o n l y

f o r t y f i g h t e r s a v a i l a b l e t o Army Group Center. Other p a r t i c i p a n t s r e p o r t e d

seeing no German a i r c r a f t d u r i n g t h e campaign. On t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t ,

Luftwaffe s t r e n g t h was d e c l i n i n g due t o t h e Allied bombing campaign and t h e

a i r b a t t l e which i t had engendered a s t h e Luftwaffe defended Germany. The

l o s s e s t o t h e Luftwaffe i n a i r c r a f t and p i l o t s i n A p r i l and May 1944 had

been 5,000. Only from t h e E a s t e r n Front could replacement a i r c r a f t and

p i l o t s be obtained. -
(3) Logistical.

The S o v i e t f o r c e s had made s u b s t a n t i a l e f f o r t s t o provide proper

l o g i s t i c a l support f o r t h e operation. For t h e s i z e o f f o r c e s involved, t h e

movements had t o be s u b s t a n t i a l , and they were. There were 90-100 r a i l r o a d

t r a i n s d a i l y t o t h e f r o n t s involved i n t h e o p e r a t i o n before t h e ' start of i t ,

f o r a t o t a l of appmximately 5,000 t r a i n s , each of f i f t y c a r s average. Of

t h e t o t a l , 2,000 t r a i n s were used t o t r a n s p o r t personnel o r formations, and

3,000 were employed f o r s u p p l i e s . .Division s t o c k s were brought up t o f i v e

u n i t s .of f i r e ( n e c e s s i t a t i n g 13,500 r a i l c a r s ) , f o u r t e e n days ' r a t i o n s , and

t e n t o twenty r e f i l l s of POL. For t h e f o r c e a s a whole, t h e r e were brought

i n 150,000 m e t r i c t o n s of r a t i o n s , 900,000 m e t r i c t o n s of a r t i l l e r y

ammunition, and 1,200,000 m e t r i c t o n s of POL, t h a t i s , approximately

three-fourths of t h e t o t a l supply e f f o r t was taken up by j u s t t h o s e t h r e e

19
c l a s s e s o f supply. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e o p e r a t i o n would need 45,000 metric t o n s

p e r day o f s u p p l i e s i n t h e advance, o r a n average of 275 m e t r i c tons p e r day

per division. ( B c~o n t r a s t , U.S. p l a n n e r s used 600 t o n s o f s u p p l i e s p e r day

p e r division.) To c a r e f o r c a s u a l t i e s , t h e r e were 294,000 h o s p i t a l beds,

about e q u a l t o 18%o f t h e force. (The S o v i e t planning f i g u r e seems t o have

averaged about 2% o f t h e f o r c e f o r World War 11.)

I n o r d e r t o move t h e s e s u p p l i e s forward o f t h e r a i l h e a d s , t h e r e were

about 12,000 t r u c k s , organized i n t o f o u r t r u c k brigades of 1,275 trucks

each, one p e r f r o n t , and one t r u c k regiment o f 348 t r u c k s p e r army, an

average o f f o r t y t r u c k s p e r d i v i s i o n . In a d d i t i o n t o r a i l and road

t r a n s p o r t , a i r t r a n s p o r t was employed d u r i n g t h e operation. To be s u r e , i t

w a s n o t a mass c a r r i e r , but i t helped. During t h e o p e r a t i o n , aerial

resupply d e l i v e r e d 1,182 metric t o n s o f f u e l , 1,240 metric t o n s of

Ammunition, and around 1,000 t o n s o f equipment and s p a r e p a r t s t o forward

u n i t s , pr$marilymobile groups.

(4) Command, c o n t r o l , communications.

lZle o p e r a t i o n was c e n t r a l l y planned and c o n t r o l l e d i n t h e i n i t i a l

s t a g e s , b u t i t became d e c e n t r a l i z e d i n execution i n t h e l a t t e r stages. The

planning echelons were Stavka i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e and t h e f r o n t s i n t h e

second i n an i t e r a t i v e process which a l s o involved the supreme commander,

Joseph S t a l i n himself. The primary executing. echelons were t h e armies and

fronts. The d i s p a t c h of Stavka r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o t h e fronts--Kershal

Vasilevskg, Chief of t h e General S t a f f , t o c o o r d i n a t e 1st B a l t i c and ?d

Belorussian F r o n t s i n t h e north, and Marshal Zhukov, Oeputy S u ~ r e m e

commander, t o coordinate 2d and 1st Belorussian Fronts i n t h e south--would

provide t h e key l i n k between planning and e x e c u t i o n and between Stavka and

the fronts. These Stavka r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s would remain a t t h e command p o s t s

o f t h e f r o n t s making t h e main e f f o r t s : 3d B e l o r u s s i a n f o r Vasilevsky and

1st Belorussian f o r Zhukov. Later, Stavka r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n

o f a v i a t i o n would a l s o a r r i v e a t t h e f r o n t s .

There were a l s o requirements f o r f r o n t s t o c o m u n i c a t e d i r e c t l y and

immediately w i t h t h e General s t a f f i n Moscow, and t o t h i s end, each f r o n t

had a c h i e f o f o p e r a t i o n s communications l i n k s on t h e r o l l s of t h e f r o n t

Main s i g n a l s D i r e c t o r a t e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e headquarters organized

operations groups, headed by t h e c h i e f o f o p e r a t i o n s s e c t i o n o r deputy c h i e f

of s t a f f and s t a f f e d by o f f i c e r s from t h e o p e r a t i o n s , i n t e l l i g e n c e , and

c i p h e r sections. Amy o p e r a t i o n s groups a l s o included r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from

a r t i l l e r g , armored/mechanize6 t r o o p s , and e n g i n e e r troops. he f r o n t

o p e r a t i o n s would have t h e commanders o f t h o s e anus and s e l e c t e d members o f

t h e i r own s t a f f s as w e l l as t h e commander of t h e supporting a i r army.

Operations groups were equipped w i t h mobile communications c e n t e r s , and they

were expected t o o p e r a t e c l o s e t o t h e f r o n t .

Communications h e r e c o n f l i c t e d with t h e c o v e r and deception plan, o r

maskirovka, b u t s o l u t i o n s were t o be found. A s t h e r e were s t r i c t

r e s t r i c t i o n s o f t h e use of r a d i o , wire was t h e primary zeans o f

c o m u n i c a t i o n before t h e o p e r a t i o n , and, below army, a f t e r i t had begun. In

order t o h e l p f r o n t commanders keep b e t t e r informed, they were assigned

detachments of s p e c i a l l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s e q u i ~ ~ ewdi t h s p e c i a l r a d i o s ,

encryption g e a r , and even observation planes. These l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s had

t h e mission of r e p o r t i n g back t o t h e i r f r o n t commanders, acd they a l s o had

 t h e a u t h o r i t y t o = p o r t any negative i n f o r m a t i o n back t o t h e i r f r o n t

commanders as w e l l as r e l a y h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s t o subordinate commanders. Nor

were t h e i r r e p o r t s r e s t r i c t e d j u s t t o t h e supported f r o n t commander; they

could a l s o communicate d i r e c t l y with Stavka ( o r t h e Stavka r e p r e s e n t a t i v e

with the fronts). A t each f r o n t were s p e c i a l purpose communication c e n t e r s

f o r communications d i r e c t l y back t o Stavka.

The a v a i l a b i l i t y of equipment had improved both q u a n t i t a t i v e l y and

q u a l i t a t i v e l y s i n c e t h e beginning o f t h e war, and t h e Soviet f o r c e s '

p r o f i c i e n c y had a l s o improved. HF multiplexing equipmezt w a s received and

p u t i n t o s e r v i c e a t h i g h e r echelons. A t lower echelons, t r o o p s had begun

r e c e i v i n g u l t r a - s h o r t wave r a d i o s with a range of 1 0 kilometers.

' Q u a n t i t a t i v e l y , t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of equipment had increased two-fold over

t h e s t a r t o f t h e y e a r and s i x - f o l d sinc-e t h e s t a r t o f the war.

(5 ) Deception and i n t e l l i g e n c e .

One o f t h e most important. a s p e c t s o f t h e BAGRATION planning was t h e

c o v e r and deception plan, c a l l e d maskirovka by t h e Soviets. I n t h e Soviet

meaning, maskirovka c o v e r s much more t h a n j u s t c o v e r and deception. It even

has a connotation of p o s i t i v e o r a c t i v e c o n t r o l o f t h e enemy. By 1544,

maskirovka had come t o be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h i s scope and d i v e r s i t y . It

included t h e use o f reconnaissance on a wide f r o n t , simultaneously, a c t i v e

o p e r a t i o n s o f aviation--on main and secondary f r o n t s , . reparation of

o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s i n a number of s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o c s a t once, switch t o

o f f e n s i v e from defense on secondary d i r e c t i o n s o r f r o ~ t si n i t i a l l y , and

concentrated use of smoke, Above a l l , maskirovka was coordinated and

i n t e g r a t e d from t h e very top--Stavka--and implemented as t h e p l a n f i l t e r e d

down t o t h e lower echelons.

 I n t h e c a s e o f Operation BAGRATION, maskirovka l e d t o some most

impressive accomplishments. F i r s t , t h e magnitude and l o c a t i o n o f t h e

movement o f t h e s u p p l i e s discussed e a r l i e r was hidden from t h e Germans.

Second, t h e concentration o r r e l o c a t i o n o f f i v e combined arms armies, two

tank armies, two mechanized corpa and two cavalry corps, eleven a v i a t i o n

corps, and 210,000 replacements f o r f o r c e s i n place were s u c c e s s f u l l y

hidden. Nore important, t h e l o c a t i o n , s t r e n g t h , and timing of t h e o f f e n s i v e

were concealed s t r a t e g i c a l l y , t h e l o c a t i o n , s t r e n g t h , and o b j e c t i v e s of

a t t a c k i n g f o r c e s were concealed o p e r a t i o n a l l y , and t h e p e n e t r a t i o n

concentrations of f o r c e s and guns were concealed t a c t i c a l l y . These

successes were due t o t h e use of maskirovka measures a t t h e s t r a t e g i c ,

operational, anti t a c t i c a l l e v e l s .
-
*

The s t r a t e g i c measures undertaken were d i r e c t e d by Stavka and

c a r r i e d out by t h e r e s p e c t i v e f r o n t s . In some cases, t h e s e measures f i t

i n t o p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r subsequent o f f e n s i v e operations by t h o s e f r o n t s . One

of the most important w a s t h e c r e a t i o n of diversionary, dummy c o n c e n t r a t i o n s

of troops of the f l a n k s o f t h e t h e a t e r , . t o be "shown" duri'ng t h e period

5-15 June. I n t h e south, 3d Ukrainian Front created one such concentration,

i n the v i c i m t y of Kishinev, and t h e 3d B a l t i c Front prepared a n o t h e r such

concentration t o its r e a r e a s t o f t h e Cherekha River. Each o f t h e s e

concentrations was t o show a combined arms army of e i g h t t o n i n e r i f l e

d i v i s i o n s reinforced by tanks and a r t i l l e r y . Second, o f f e n s i v e s were timed

and located t o s e r v e a s d i v e r s i o n s from t h e preparations i n t h e center.

Thus, t h e Crimea o f f e n s i v e i n t h e south from 8 April-12 May c r e a t e d one such

diversion. Likewise, t h e Karelian o f f e n s i v e against Finland w a s e x p l i c i t l y

timed--commencing 1 0 June--to s e r v e as another such d i v e r s i o n . Third, major

formations which could s e r v e as i n d i c a t o r s of o f f e n s i v e reparations were

shown i n l o c a t i o n s where t h e Germans expected then t o be. For example, t h e

t h r e e t a n k armies o f t h e 1st Ukrainian Front were l e f t i n t h a t f r o n t ,

r e i n f o r c i n g t h e German p r e d i s p o s i t i o n f o r offensive i n t h e south. Of

course, they a l s o k e p t German mobile f o r c e s from Army Group Center; indeed,

t h e y probably l e d t o t h e assignment of t h e lone panzer corps with panzer

d i v i s i o n s , LVI Panzer Corps, i n Army Group Center t o Army Group North

Ukraine i n May. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e 5 t h Guards Tank Amy, which d i d t r a n s f e r

from t h e south t o Operation EAGRATION, w a s f i r s t shown i n t h e r e a r of 3d

Ukrainian Front, f u r t h e r t o t h e s o u t h , before i t s move. n o r t h , where i t

a r r i v e d o n l y on 1 6 June. The S o v i e t s a l s o r a i s e d another t a n k army, f o r a

t o t a l o f 6 compared t o t h e 5 f o r which t h e Gennans were looking. The

S o v i e t s a l s o l e f t t h e b u l k o f t h e i r Long Range Aviation air annies ( 6 of 8 )

i n t h e s o u t h , r e i n f o r c i n g t h e German i n c l i n a t i o n s , while they could a t t a c k

t a r g e t s i n t h e BAGRATION a r e a from t h o s e locations.

Among o t h e r measures which were employed t o a i d t h e maskirovka was

t h e l i m i t a t i o n of o v e r a l l knowledge o f t h e plan t o f i v e people besides

Stalin: u t ~ Comander) , Vasilevsky ( Chief, General

Zhukov ( ~ e ~ Supreme

S t a f f ) , Antonov (Deputy Chief, General s t a f f ) , Shtemenko !~ e ~ Chief

u t of
~

S t a f f , operations) , and h i s deputy. Although t h e number of personnel w i t h

a c c e s s was l a t e r expanded, t h e a c c e s s remained r e s t r i c t e d t o a few o f f i c e r s

a t f r o n t l e v e l and arms and s e r v i c e s l e v e l . There was a l s o public

announcement of d e f e n s i v e aims, such a s by S t a l i n a t t h e Yay Day parade of

1944, and t r o o p s were informed t h a t t h e y were t o defelld i n t h e i r s e c t o r and

would j o i n t h e expected o f f e n s i v e from t h e south a f t e r i t commenced. Then,

too, much o f t h e personnel build-up consisted o f r e i n f o m i n g formations

a l r e a d y i n t h e s e c t o r , both with lower-echelon units and with personnel and

equipment replacements, r a t h e r than major i n t r o d u c t i o n af new u n i t s . This

held except f o r mobile groups, and those were s u c c e s s f u l l y hidden f r o m t h e

Germans.

Operationalmaskirovka measures aimed a t conceeling t h e f r o n t main

a t t a c k a r e a s and t h e f o r c e s t o be employed i n them a s well a s t h e timing of

t h e attacks. Especially concealed were t h e s h i f t of 6th Guards Army i n 1st

B a l t i c Front's s e c t o r from t h e r i g h t of t h e s e c t o r t o the c e n t e r - l e f t , next
t o 43d Amy, t o make t h e p e n e t r a t i o n and encirclement ncrth of Vitebsk, t h e

a r r i v a l of 5th Guards Tank Army i n t h e l e f t r e a r of jd E e l o m s s i a n f r o n t ,

and t h e deployment of 28th Army a s p a r t 'of t h e p e n e t r a t i o n and encirclement

of Bobruisk from t h e south. The S o v i e t s d i d show t h e i r p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r

offensives a t Orsha, Mogilev, and Bobruisk from t h e Rogachev. d i r e c t i o n n o r t h

o f t h e c i t y and e a s t o f t h e Beresina. They f u r t h e r simclated o f f e n s i v e

a c t i o n a g a i n s t Vitebsk on i t s f a c e r a t h e r t h a n a t t h e shoulders of i t s

s a l i e n t where t h e main a t t a c k s were, i n f a c t , located. In a d d i t i o n t o

concealing t h e i r e f f o r t s a t t h e shoulders of Vitebsk, they a l s o concealed

t h e i r e f f o r t a g a i n s t Bobruisk from south o f t h e c i t y an:! west o f the

Beresina.

Also, diversionary reconnaissances-in-force were conducted during

the period 20-23 June by 2d a n d jd B a l t i c and 1st Ukraizian Fronts,

i n i t i a l l y , i n reinforced compaoy and reinforced b a t t a l i o n s t r e n g t h s . They

were joined i n t h e l a t t e r s t a g e s by f o r c e s of t h e 1st S a l t i c and X , 2d, and
1st B e l o r u s s i a n Fkonts. A t i t s e x t e n t , t h i s d i v e r s i o n involved 60

detachments o v e r 1,000 kilometers of f r o n t a g e ; moreover, t h e RIF'S of 1st

B a l t i c &ont were s o s u c c e s s f u l t h a t t h e f r o n t commander e x p l o i t e d them and

forswore h i s prepared a t t a c k .

0t h e r o p e r a t i o n a l measures included e s t a b l i s h i n g a 25-kilometer

s e c u r i t y zone n o t o n l y i n t h e s e c t o r of Operation BAGRATION b u t a l s o along

the e n t i r e front. S p e c i a l s e c u r i t y was e f f e c t e d f o r a l l r a i l movements t o

B e l o r u s s i a , w i t h r i f l e d i v i s i o n s making joint--foot and rail--movements and

at night, i f possible. S o v i e t a i r s u p e r i o r i t y denied t h e Germans any use of

a e r i a l reconnaissance, and r a d i o s i l e n c e w a s decreed f o r major formations

( f r o n t a s w e l l a s army) and new formations which were not y e t on l i n e . A

General C o n t r o l l e r s ' S e n r i c e was e s t a b l i s h e d t o r e g u l a t e t h e concealment of

9

movements and camouflage o f s t a t i o n a r y t r o o p s , and t h e y were headed by t h e

Chief o f S t a f f a t f r o n t and by t h e m i l i t a r y c o u n c i l a t army and corps.

T a c t i c a l maskirovka measures aimed a t preventing t h e Germans from

l e a r n i n g t h e i d e n t i t i e s o f e x i s t e n c e o f mobile groups and reinforcements not

a l r e a d y on l i n e . Thus, wire o r c o u r i e r were t h e primary xeans of

communication b e f o r e t h e offensive began. In a d d i t i o n , w i t h i n t h e 25

kilometers s e c u r i t y zone, ground reconnaissance was denied by vigorous

patrolling. Ground and a i r movements by t h e S o v i e t s were c o n t r o l l e d forward

of t h e f r o n t r e a r boundary, and main movements were made a t n i g h t . At

n i g h t , a l s o , t h e t r o o p s worked on t h e i r camouflage, which w a s inspected

d a i l y and reported on t o t h e f r o n t commander, and t h e y used v e r t i c a l masks

o r s c r e e n s i n f r o n t o f t r e n c h e s and works t o h e l p h i a e them from

observation. The S o v i e t s d i d not t r y t o h i d e e v e r y t h i n g from t h e Germans,

however, a s t h a t would have been a s r e v e a l i n g as having e v e r g t h i n g o u t i n

t h e open. Rather, they aimed a t l e t t i n g t h e Gemans see what t h e y knew was

t h e r e o r w h a t t h e S o v i e t s wanted them t o see.

S o v i e t maskirovka and i n t e l l i g e n c e would be inmeasurably aided by t h e

us; o f t h e p a r t i s a n f o r c e s of Belorussia. These p a r t i s a n s performed

reconnaissance f u n c t i o n s f o r t h e f r o n t s , a c t i n g under o r d e r s put o u t from

t h e B e l o m s s i a n P a r t i s a n S t a f f i n Gomel, and they would a l s o perform

i n t e r d i c t i o n f u n c t i o n s i n t h e German r e a r a r e a s . I n s p i t e o f two very heavy

a t t a c k s by Gennan f o r c e s i n t h e s p r i n g , t h e Belorussian p a r t i s a n s s t i l l
numbered 143,000 i n 150 b r i g a d e s and 49 s e p a r a t e detachments. DuriQ3 t h e

period 19-22 June, t h e y attempted some 2,000 c u t s of railways and succeeded

i n 1000 of them, s e t t i n g some 10,000 i n d i v i d u a l charges p e r n i g h t . !hey

-
a l s o a t t a c k e d some 26 headquarters. These a c t i v i t i e s a f f e c t e d German

reinforcements a r r i v i n g a f t e r t h e b a t t l e more than they d i d i n t e r n a l

communications o r resupply, t h e l a t t e r due t o t h e speed with which t h e

German defenses f e l l . Had they had t o f i g h t f o r a n extended p e r i o d ,

depending upon t h e l i n e s f o r resupply, they might w e l l have f e l t t h e e f f e c t s

i n resupply a s well.

, S u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e S o v i e t a i r f o r c e s were n o t employed t o any g r e a t

extent i n interdiction a c t i v i t i e s . I n s t e a d , t h e i r main t a s k s were t o

s a i n t a i n a i r s u p e r i o r i t y over t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , provide c l o s e a i r support t o

ground f o r c e s , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e mobile f o r c e s which had outrun t h e mass of .

Soviet a r t i l l e r y , and conduct reconnaissance f o r t h e ground f o r c e s . Soviet

Long Range Aviation f o r c e s a t t a c k e d l i k e l y German headquarters and a i r f o r c e

i c s t a l l a t i o n s r a t h e r than engaging i n a e r i a l i n t e r d i c t i o n .
 The Germans d i d o b t a i n some o f t h e p i c t u r e , b u t , because of t h e i r

p r e d i s p o s i t i o n toward a S o v i e t a t t a c k i n t h e south, t h e y read those

i n d i c a t o r s as r e f l e c t i n g a d e f e n s i v e r a t h e r t h a n o f f e n s i v e i n t e n t i o n i n Army

Group Center. OKH ( t h e Geman High Command f o r t h e E a s t e r n Front) did know

tha-t a l l o f t h e S o v i e t tank armies (which t h e y believed t o number f i v e ) were

i n t h e south; t h e y were unaware t h a t t h e Stavka had r a i s e d a s i x t h tank army

which had replaced t h e 5th Guards Tank Army. They a l s o s a w t h e 2d Tank Army

i n t h e l e f t wing of 1st Belorusian Front a s belonging t o t h e f o r c e s

d e d i c a t e d t o t h e southern o f f e n s i v e r a t h e r t h a n a s p a r t of BAGRATION. They

d i d not know t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e t h r e e armies which took p a r t i n t h e

l i b e r a t i o n o f t h e Crimea--two o f which, 2d Guards Army and 51st Army, would

form Stavka r e s e r v e a t Smolensk f o r BAGRATION. They s a w t h a t f r o n t a l

a v i a t i o n i n t h e s o u t h , a l r e a d y t h e s t r o k e s t p a r t o f t h e S o v i e t Air Forces,

had increased, b u t they f a i l e d t o n o t i c e t h a t f r o n t a l a v i a t i o n i n t h e c e n t e r

had i n c r e a s e d even more t h a n i n t h e s o u t h although t h e southern f r o n t a l

a v i a t i o n remained stronger. This e s t i m a t e was strengthened by t h e presence

of t h e bulk of Long Range Aviation a s s e t s i n t h e s o u t h a l s o . They saw a w

p r e p a r a t i o n s i n t h e c e n t e r a s being, a t worst, p a r t o f a diversionary

o f f e n s i v e ( s ) t o precede t h e main o f f e n s i v e i n t h e n o r t h Ukraine.

Army Group Center had a somewhat c l e a r e r p i c t u r e , although i t , too,

d i d n o t have t h e whole p i c t u r e . They had obtained a f a i r l y good estimate of

t h e S o v i e t o r d e r o f b a t t l e i n a r t i l l e r y and a i r f o r c e s , but they had v a s t l y

underestimated t h e enemy d i v i s i o n and mobile f o r c e s f a c i n g them. lhey had

o n l y i d e n t i f i e d 140 enemy d i v i s i o n and 3 tank/mechanized corps, a miss of

409 i n d i v i s i o n and 30Qf i n mobile forces. The e r r o r was a l s o a s bad when

i t came t o numbers of Soviet tanks f a c i n g them: they estimated 400-1,800

tanks facing then a g a i n s t t h e 4,000-5,200 a c t u a l l y available. They had,

however, c o r r e c t l y placed t h e bulk of the tanks i n t h e 3d and 1st

Balorussian fronts. By 14 June, Army Group Center wes s u f f i c i e n t l y

concerned t o r a i s e t h e i s s u e i n a conference with OKH representatives,

expressing t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t t h e r e would be main a t t a c k s on t h e i r f l a n k s and

t h a t i t would commence soon.

The armies had come c l o s e r t o t h e mark with r e l a t i o n t o t h e

locations of enemy f o r c e s f a c i n g them although they underestimated t h e

strength and f a i l e d t o s e e enemy c a p a b i l i t i e s i n a larger, o r operational,

context. The 3 Panzer Arm, i n t h e north, had i d e n t i f i e d t h e chance of a

main a t t a c k t o the s o u t h e s t of Vitebsk and, based upon i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of 3 -

new divisions, 100 tanks, and new a r t i l l e r y , a supporting a t t a c k northwest

of Vitebsk. Fram 13 June on, they had seen a f u r t h e r concentration north of

the Smolensk-Hiask highway through Orsha. Actually t h i s w a s a lapse in

cmouflage d i s c i p l i n e by 5 t h A r t i l l e r y Breakthrough Corps. From 1 9 June an,

they expected t o be attacked a t any time, with t h e main e f f o r t t o be a l o c a l

envelopement of Vitebsk; they d i d recognize that t h e r e was some significance

t o the concentration along t h e highway n e a r Orsha, but they d i d not pursue

it.

The 4th Army, i n t h e c e n t e r , had e a r l y assessed t h a t t h e

concentration near Orsha could be a main a t t a c k , and frcm 16 June on, they

were a l s o aware o f a buildup e a s t o f Mogilev i t s e l f . They had expected an

a t t a c k from 11 June at any time, then on 16 June estimated one t o occur at

22 June. By 19 w e , they expected a n a t t a c k within. the aext 2-3 days, but

they saw no l a r g e r significance t o t h e a t t a c k s and l o c e t i o n s i n t h e i r sector.

In t h e south, t h e 9th Army had gained t h e c l e a r e s t p i c t u r e of a l l ,

but even they only saw a l o c a l significance. They had seen t h e a t t a c k

p r e p a r a t i o n s towards Bobruisk from Rosacheve from 30 Fag on, a s the Soviets

desired. From 7 June on they a l s o saw a supporting a t t ~ z kwest of the

Beresina and s o u t h o f Bobruisk, and by 12 June, they h a t assessed both

l o c a t i o n s a s main.attacks, with t h e one west of the Beresina t h e most

dangerous. They did not r e a l i z e , however, j u s t how d e - s r o u s i t was with

the a d d i t i o n o f 28th A r y. On 13 June, they expected t=e Soviet a t t a c k

e i t h e r 15, 20 o r 22 June; by 1 7 June, they estimated t h e time a s 20 June,

and on 20 June, they estimated 22 June, They saw t h e eremy o b j e c t i v e s a s

.
t h e s e i z u r e of Eobruisk, s p l i t t i n g t h e army and c u t t i n g off German forces

e a s t of t h e Beresina,

I n sum, then, t h e Soviet maskirovka had conceaied t h e location and

s t r e n g t h o f t h e summer offensive s t r a t e g i c a l l y . Operationally, Anny Group

Center-had some d i s q u i e t f e e l i n g s , but they had not iaer:ified the strength

of t h e S o v i e t forces. While they had i d e n t i f i e d some of t h e eventual

concentrations, they had not put them i n t o any c o n t e r t l a r g e r than

tactical. The armies had a b e t t e r idea of l o c a t i o n s azi timings, but even

they had not appraised the operational o r s t r a t e g i c s i g e f i c a n c e of t h e i r

knowledge .
(6) Doctrine.

(a) Soviet.
 By t h e t h i r d p e r i o d o f t h e war, S o v i e t d o c t r i n e had come t o

view t h e double envelopment a s t h e b e s t way t o d e s t r o y l a r g e enemy

fonuationa. 'hey viewed accomplishing t h e s e i n f i v e s t a g e s : p e n e t r a t i o n of

t h e enemy'a t a c t i c a l zone: e x p l o i t a t i o n and linkup by t h e e n c i r c l i n g forces:

formation o f t h e inner am o f t h e encirclement; formation o f t h e o u t e r arm:

and c o n t i n u a t i o n of subsequent operations. Generally, i n o r d e r t o

c o n c e n t r a t e t h e s t r e n g t h necessary f o r a large-scale double envelopment, t h e

S o v i e t s employed t h e f o r c e s o f a t l e a s t two f r o n t s . Of t h i r t y encirclement

b a t t l e s , twenty-two were c a r r i e d o u t by groups o f f r o n t s . Indeed, during

t h e planning f o r t h i s o p e r a t i o n , one p o i n t of c o n t e n t i o n i s reported t o have

heen General Rokossovsky's i n s i s t e n c e upon a double envelopment of Bobruisk

by h i s f r o n t ; he held t h i s p o s i t i o n with S t a l i n h i m s e l f , even a f t e r Molotov

had taken him f r o m t h e room and asked i f he remembered w i t h whom h e w a s

arguing. S t a l i n agreed e v e n t u a l l y , reminding Rokossovsky t h a t i t w a s now

h i s responsibility . I n encirclement o p e r a t i o n s each f r o n t organized i t s

f o r c e s i n t o " a s s a u l t groups" and mobile groups. They employed combined arms

armies, s u i t a b l y r e i n f o r c e d and t a s k organized, f o r t h e i n i t i a l a s s a u l t and

t a c t i c a l breakthrough and t h e mobile groups f o r t h e e n c i r c l i n g f o r c e , t h e

o u t e r arm o f t h e encirclement, and t o continue f u r t h e r operations. me

combined arms armies of t h e f i r s t echelon o r t h e second echelon a m i e s would

a l s o form t h e i n n e r arm of t h e encirclement.

In o r d e r t o accomplish t h i s they f i r s t concentrated t h e i r

s t r e n g t h a t t h e p o i n t of d e c i s i o n , zassed u n i t s t o c r e a t e high t a c t i c a l

d e n s i t i e s , and echeloned t h e i r f o x e s t o ensure depth. Soviet f r o n t

commanders t a s k organized t h e i r " a s s a u l t groups" with i n f a n t r y , t a n k s ,

a r t i l l e r y , and e n g i n e e r u n i t s f o r t h e p e n e t r a t i o n and t a c t i c a l

breakthrough. The a s s a u l t commanders might form s p e c i a l mobile groups i n

t h e l e a d r i f l e d i v i s i o n s , o f t e n c o n s i s t i n g of a r i f l e b a t t a l i o n , t a n k

regiment o r brigade, e n g i n e e r s , and SP a r t i l l e r y commanded by t h e d i v i s i o n

deputy commander, t o p e n e t r a t e r a p i d l y t o s e i z e deep t a c t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s ,

such a s breaking through t h e t a c t i c a l defense zone o r s e i z i n g a r i v e r o r

obstacle crossing. In t h e t h i r d period o f t h e war, S o v i e t a s s a u l t f o r c e s

u s u a l l y p e n e t r a t e d t h e main p o s i t i o n s of t h e enemy's t a c t i c a l defense zones

w i t h i n t h e f i r s t day of a n o f f e n s i v e , u s i n g d i v i s i o n s ' forward detachments

and quickly opening t h e way f o r second echelon u n i t s o r mobile groups t o

p a s s through t h e gap, even while t h e t a c t i c a l b a t t l e might be raging, i n t o

t h e enemy's r e a r a r e a s .

When combined-arms a s s a u l t f o r c e s penetrated t h e enemy's

t a c t i c a l defenses, t h e d e c i s i v e moment came with t h e commitment o f f r o n t and

srmg mobile groups t o e x p l o i t -the breach, d r i v i n g f o r deep o p e r a t i o n a l

objectives. The o f f e n s i v e entered a phase i n which t h e m o b i l i t y and

maneuverability o f u n i t s o f t e n meant t h e d i f f e r e n c e between v i c t o r y and

defeat. Front-level mobile groups were g e n e r a l l y composed o f t a n k armies

and/or "cavalrg-mechanized groups," which c o n s i s t e d o f a c a v a l r y .corps

(which had organic t a n k s ) joined with a mechanized ( l e s s f r e q u e n t l y , tank)

corps. They were used where t h e terrain o r weather precluded o r l i m i t e d t h e

employment of l a r g e armored forces. Tank and/or mechanized c o r p s made up

t h e mobile group(s) of a n army. Army and f r o n t commanders moved mobile

groups through t h e gaps t o go deep, d i s r u p t , and destroy. h y mobile

groups maneuvered w i t h i n 50-100 kilometers of t h e f r o n t l i n e t o e n c i r c l e

 t a c t i c a l l y and d e s t r o y enany formations i n c o o p e r a t i o n with combined arms

units. Front mobile groups ranged wider, with o p e r a t i o n a l missions: smash

o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s , d i s r u p t communication and supply networks ; s e i z e

important t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s , such as c r o s s r o a d s o r r i v e r c r o s s i n g s ; overcome

'
p o s i t i o n s i n t h e o p e r a t i o n a l defense zone; s e i z e and hold bridgeheads; c u t

enemy r e t r e a t r o u t e s end t h r e a t e n o r accomplish encirclement; pursue enemy

forces. Usually, mobile groups needed d e d i c a t e d a i r support as they would

outrun t h e i r nonnal f r o n t and army a r t i l l e r y support.

(b) German.

While t h e German m i l i t a r y recognized t h e ceed f o r shortening

t h e i r l i n e s s o t h e y could form o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s with m o b i l i t y , Adolf

S i t l e r prevented t h i s e l a s t i c defense. Therefore, t h e combination of l i n e a r

and strongpoint defense which he p r e s c A b e d played d i r e c t l y i n t o t h e Soviet

doctrine. Moreover, t h e extended f r o n t a g e s which r e s u l t e d caused t h e

Germans' mobile f o r c e s t o be too spread o u t , t a c t i c a l l y , t o allow much of a

counterattack, whether t a c t i c a l l y o r o p e r a t i o n a l l y . The s t a t i c defense,

l i n e a r o r f o r t r e s s , a l s o allowed t h e o t h e r g r e a t powerhouse o f t h e Red Amy,

t-he a r t i l l e r y , t o wreak havoc upon t h e d e f e n d e r s before t h e a s s a u l t f o r c e s

even reached them.

b. F i l i t a r g 0 b jectives/2lissions/Tasks

( 1 ) Missions of opposing f o r c e s .

( a ) Soviet. For a d e t a i l e d o u t l i n e o f t h e planning sequence,

see Annex D.

-1. 1st B a l t i c Front:

--Penetrate enemy ' s defense southwest of Gorodo k and

c r o s s t o west bank of Western Dvina River.

33
 --Encircle Vitebsk from west and south, s e i z e Vitebsk,

and d e s t r o y enerqp f o r c e s i n Vitebsk r e g i o n i n conjunction w i t h f o r c e s from

3d B e l o r u s s i a n Front o n l e f t .

--Advance on Lepel' (75-100 k i l o m e t e r s ) ' and along west

bank o f Western Dvina, p r o t e c t i n g n o r t h e r n f l a n k o f t h e o f f e n s i v e .

-2. 3d Belorussian Front :

--Penetrate enemy's defense s o u t h e a s t o f Vitebsk and

advance northwest t o Western Dvina River.

--&circle Vitebsk from e a s t and south, s e i z e Vitebsk,

and d e s t r o y enemy f o r c e s i n Vitebsk r e g i o n i n conjunction w i t h f o r c e s from

1st B a l t i c Front.

--Seize c i t y o f Senno and continue advance t o southeast.

--Penetrate. enemy ' s defense n o r t h o f Smolensk-Minsk

highway'to s e i z e Orsha and d e s t r o y enemy forces.

--Advance along a x i s o f highway and d e s t r o y enemy f o r c e s

i n v i c i n i t y of Borisov.

--Break'through t o west bank of Beresina i n v i c i n i t y of

~orisov.

--Concentrate main f o r c e s i n Orsha-3orisov s e c t o r f o r

f u r t h e r operations.

-3. 2d Belorussian Front.

--Penetrate enemy f o r c e s defending Mogilev and d e s t r o y

them.

--Continue advance along Mogilev-Xinsk highway t o

Beresina River.
 -4. . Is t B e l o r u s s i a n R o n t .
-Penetrate enemy d e f e n s e s from Rogachev n o r t h of

Bobruisk and e a s t o f Beresina River.

--Penetrate enemy d e f e n s e s from s o u t h o f Bobruisk and

west o f B e r e s i n a River.

--Encircle Bobruisk and d e s t r o y enemy f o r c e s i n region.

--Continue advance i n two d i r e c t i o n s : Bobruisk-Minsk

and Bobruisk-Baranovichi.

--Commence advance of t r o o p s of l e f t wing ( n e a r Kovel' )

a f t e r t r o o p s of r i g h t wing p a s s Slonim.

(b) German f o r c e s . ( s e e Haps a t Tab 2$ The German f o r c e s were

ordered t o conduct a s t a t i c d e f e n s e along t h e Dnieper R i v e r e a s t o f t h e Drut

and Western Dvina R i v e r s ( ~ a p2 ~ ) . S p e c i f i c a l l y , they had t o hold t h e

c i t i e s o f Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobmisk, Borisov, and Minsk a s f o r t i f i e d

p l a c e s , r e q u i r i n g a minimum o f one d i v i s i o n p e r c i t y a s t h e g a r r i s o n . The

German t a c t i c a l zone included two l i n e s of defense. Of t h e two, t h e l i n e

along t h e f r o n t was t h e b e t t e r prepared because manpower and time only

permitted work on t h e l i n e c l o s e s t t o t h e enemy (i3ay 2~). The Germans a l s o

attempted t o c o n s t r u c t l i n e s a t depths of up t o 250 k i l o m e t e r s , but H i t l e r

had c a t e g o r i c a l l y f o r b i d d e n c o n s t r u c t i o n on t h e l i n e along t h e Beresina and

Dnieper, f e e l i n g t h a t i t would become a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy. The f i r s t

l i n e had two o r t h r e e b e l t s , each with two o r t h r e e l i n e s of t r e n c h e s . The

depth o f t h i s l i n e w a s about 3.7 kilometers. The second i i n e only had one

b e l t of two o r t h r e e t r e n c h e s , much of which w a s not f i n i s h e d .

 The t e r r a i n i n Army Group C e n t e r ' s s e c t o r (Hap 1 ) favored t h e

d e f e n s e and, moreover, p r e s e n t e d o b s t a c l e s t o t h e movement o f mass armored

formations. Most important of t h e n a t u r a l f e a t u r e s i n t h e area were t h e

numerous r i v e r s which almost all r a n n o r t h o r south, t h e Dnieper, Drut,

B e r e s i n a , Western Dvina, S v i s l o c h , P t i c h , and Neman. A l l were p o t e n t i a l

b a r r i e r s , which u n f o r t u n a t e l y went u n r e a l i z e d by t h e defecders. The r i v e r

system contri-buted t o t h e second most i m p o r t a n t o f t h e t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s i n

the area: t h e marshes, bogs, and, f i n a l l y , t h e P r i p e t Xarshes t o t h e

south. These bogs and marshes r e s t r i c t e d cross-count rg aovement and made

t h e roads, r a i l r o a d s , and c i t i e s more i m p o r t a n t t h a n e v e r , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e

which passed through g a p s i n t h e bogs ( ~ a p2 ~ :) Molodechno and

Baranovichi. Thus, t h e Soiriets would u s e o n l y one tank army i n t h i s akea

b u t two cavalry-echanized groups, and t h e i r deep o b j e c t i v e s would be t h o s e

key c o r p u n i c a t i o n s c e n t e r s .

c. Courses o f a c t i o n considered.

(1) Soviet. See Annex D.

Among t h e courses o f a c t i o n c o n s i d e r e d , and e v e r implemented-in t h e

first Stavka d r a f t , was t h a t of a d i r e c t p i n c e r move from n o r t h and south,

through V i t e b s k and Bobruisk, t o Minsk, e n c i r c l i n g t h e German f o r c e s

e n t r a s ~ e dt h e r e i n . The d i s a d v a n t a g e s t o t h i s p l a n were t h a t i t d i d not fix

o t h e r German f o r c e s w i t h i n t h e s a l i e n t s u f f i c i e n t l y , i t aimed a t l o c a t i o n s

a t which t h e k r m a n s were s t r o n g (and had proved i t i n t 3 e r e c e n t

winter-spring campaign when they had stopped t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s a t ViteSsk,

Orsha, u l d ~ o b r u i s k ) ,and i t d i d n o t provide enough a l t e x a t i v e s t o g e t t h e

mobile groups o u t r a p i d l y , before German 'countermeasures could s e a l o f f

s u c c e s s a t the gaps. Although t h e Minsk-Smolensk highway through Orsha w a s

t h e main high-speed a x i s of advance through t h e Army Croup C e n t e r a r e a , i t

narrowed a t Borisov, -and t h e Germans had recognized t h e same f a c t o r . The

o r i g i n a l p l a n a l s o aimed a t a much s h o r t e r advance, 200-250 k i l o m e t e r s , and,

t h e r e f o r e , i t would n o t be a s t r a t e g i c success, even i f it w a s an

o p e r a t i o n a l one.

The r e v i s e d plan, on t h e o t h e r hand, had t h e advantages of making

i t s advances i n s t a g e s , although w i t h t h e v a r i o u s e c h e l o n s aiming

simultaneously a t s u c c e s s i v e l y g r e a t e r d e p t h s , f i x i n g t h e Gerinan f o r c e s i n

p l a c e more s e c u r e l y , and providing f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n beyond t h e l i n e s p l a ~ e d

i f they were more s u c c e s s f u l t h a n thought. It a l s o took advantage of t h e

t y i n g o f German f o r c e s t o known l o c a l i t i e s , such a s t h e 6 f o r t r e s s c i t i e s .

(2) German-

The main a l t e r n a t i v e a v a i l a b l e t o t h e Germans w a s how much t o t r a d e

space f o r t i m e , but this was n o t p e r m i t t e d by e i t h e r r e s o u r c e s or Hitler.

Additionally, H i t l e r ' s personal orders e s t a b l i s h i n g 6 f o r t r e s s c i t i e s

reduced t h e Anny Group's o p t i o n s f o r s e l e c t i n g l o c a l i t i e s t o defend and

soaked up p o t e n t i a l r e s e r v e s , o r t h i c k e n i n g f o r c e s w i t h which t o weight t h e

defense, by t y i n g them t o s p e c i f i c c i t i e s . The removal o f L V I Panzer Corps

then e l i m i n a t e d any o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s from t h e Army Group. Even l o c a l l y ,

t h e German f o r c e s had a very t h i n d e f e n s i v e l i n e , and any break o r r u p t u r e

would be c a t a s t r o p h i c .

3. Conduct o f Operation.

a. Disposition o f forces.
 (1) Soviet. See Annex E f o r o v e r a l l . groupings. See map f o r

22 June 1944 a t Tab 3 f o r l o c a t i o n s .

The S o v i e t d i s p o s i t i o n s concentrated tremendous combat power i n t h e

a r e a s s e l e c t e d f o r t h e s i x p e n e t r a t i o n s and e x e r c i s e d economy of f o r c e
-
elsewhere. Even so, t h e number of d i v i s i o n s and t h e l e n g t h of t h e s e c t o r

caused a l l f o u r f r o n t s t o a r r a y themselves i n a s i n g l e echelon, with a l l o f

t h e i r combined anns armies on l i n e ; moreover, w i t h i n t h e armies, t h e

predominant a t t a c k formation was a l s o s i n g l e echelon. Only t h e 6th Guards

Amy o f t h e 1st E a l t i c Front and t h e 3d and 65th Armies of t h e 1st

Belorussian Front used two echelons, each army keeping one r i f l e c o r p s i n

t h e second echelon. The d e s i r e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n of combat power took p l a c e by

narrowing t h e a t t a c k zone and breakthrough o r p e n e t r a t i o n s e c t o r s o f t h e

a s s a u l t r i f l e corps, who t h e n a t t a c k e d i n two o r even t h r e e echelons. See

nap a t Tab 3, Dispositions 0600, 22 June 1944, t o f o l l o w t h e d i s c u s s i o n of

Soviet dispositions. Also, See Annex F f o r some f i g u r e s on t h e

c o n c e n t r a t i o n s achieved by t h e S o v i e t s a t s e l e c t e d p e n e t r a t i o n s e c t o r s .

The mobile f o r n a t i o n s were a l l o c a t e d only t o a x e s of main e f f o r t .

Armies had organic t o them t a n k brigades, which they a t t a c h e d forward t o

r i f l e c o r p s , u s u a l l y those making t h e main e f f o r t . I n t u r n , the r i f l e corps

would a t t a c h those brigades t o a l e a d r i f l e d i v i s i o n which would then use

them t o form, with a r i f l e b a t t a l i o n and e n g i n e e r s , folrward detachments,

o f t e n commanded by t h e d i v i s i o n deputy commander. Tiie tank corps were

attached t o c e r t a i n armies f o r t h e i r u s e i n developing success o r

reinforcement. The cavalry-mechanized groups and t h e tank a n y were

a l l o c a t e d t o t h e f r o n t s making t h e main e f f o r t , b u t t h e i r employment was a

m a t t e r of Stavka concern, e s p e c i a l l y i f i t would d e v i a t e from t h e plan.- In

g e n e r a l , t h e corps and army deep a t t a c k s by armies without t a n k c o r p s were

about 50-60 k i l o m e t e r s deep. But even t h e y could be used f o r a n important

objective. For example, t h e encirclement o f Vitebsk was e f f e c t e d by t h e

forward detachments o f 43d Army from t h e n o r t h and tank brigades of 3 9 t h

army from t h e south. Tank c o r p s were employed a g a i n s t c'cjectives up t o

100-150 kilometers deep, and f r o n t mobile groups would ?z&e deep a t t a c k s

a g a i n s t o b j e c t i v e s 200-250 k i l o m e t e r s deep.

In 1st B a l t i c Front, 1st Tank Corps was attached t o 6 t h Guards Army

f o r use i n developing success t o t h e west once t h e Weste-n Dvina had been

crossed. The 3d B e l o r u s s i a n Front a t t a c h e d i t s 2d Guards Tank Corps t o t h e

l l t h Guards Army, f o r u s e i n e x p l o i t a t i o n along t h e Orsta-Borisov a x i s . The

Oslikovksy C a v a l r y 4 e chanized Group ( CMG ) and 5t h Guards Tank Army remained

under Front c o n t r o l , although t h e CMG w a s t o be employed through 5 t h Army i n

t h e northern p e n e t r a t i o n by 3d B e l o r u s s i a n Front t o develop s u c c e s s towards

t h e Beresina and, beyond t h a t , towards Minsk. The d e c i s i o n 0.n employment of

t h e 5th Guards Tank Army had been a m a t t e r f o r Stavka az5 S t a l i n t o decide.

3ventually. they decided t h a t i t should be introduced i c l l t h Guards Army's

s e c t o r , a s t r i d e t h e Minsk-Smolensk highway, towards Borisov, and, a f t e r

t h a t , making t h e encirclement o f German f o r c e s from the z o r t h passing e a s t

of Yinsk. There was p r o v i s i o n , however, f o r i t t o e n t e r b a t t l e through 5 t h

Amy's s e c t o r .

No major mobile formations had been a l l o c a t e d t c 2d S e l o r u s s i s n

Front. A s a r e s u l t , i t took and o f i t s organic tank brigades and a t t a c h e d

i t t o t h e a s s a u l t army, 49th Army, f o r u s e i n developing success. The 1st

B e l o r u s s i a n Front, making t h e o t h e r main e f f o r t a t Bobruisk, a t t a c h e d i t s

9 t h Tank Corps t o 3d Army, o f t h e n o r t h e r n group, f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n towards

Bobruisk and Minsk. The o t h e r t a n k c o r p s o f t h e Front was a t t a c h e d t o 65th

Army i n t h e south, with t h e same mission as 9 t h Tank Corps. The P l i y e v CMG.

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was t h e Front mobile group, l o c a t e d i n 28th Amy's s e c t o r , and had t h e

o b j e c t i v e s o f S l u t s k , Osipovichi (towards Minsk), o r Bobruisk.

The a t t a c k northwest o f Vitebsk by 6th G ~ a r d sAxmy andqjd Army w a s

t o be made by t h r e e c o r p s on a n exceedingly narrow f r o n t : t h e l e f t r i f l e

c o r p s of 6th Guards Army and t h e two r i g h t wing corps of 4X h y . These

t h r e e corps, with 1st Tank Corps and two r i f l e corps i n 6 t h Guards A r m y

faced about 1 1/2 German d i v i s i o n s . South of Vitebsk, t h e a d j o i n i n g corps

of 3 9 t h and 5 t h Armies would launch a n a t t a c k south of Vitebsk due west and

southwest. The 3 9 t h Armg would swing i t s f o r c e s back north t o complete t h e

encirclement o f Vitebsk while 5 t h Army would continue t h e a t t a c k westward.

See Annex F, paragraphs 1 and 2, f o r examples of t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of combat

power f o r t h e a t t a c k s of 5 t h Army and 5 t h Guards 3 i f l e Corps o f 39th Army.

I n t h e Orsha-Mogilev s e c t o r , l l t h Guards Amy i n t h e n o r t h would

launch a n a t t a c k on Orsha from n o r t h and e a s t . It would employ two r i f l e

c o r p s i n a very narrow s e c t o r t o i n i t i a t e t h e advance, b a s i c a l l y along t h e

main highway and r a i l r o a d towards Orsha from t h e n o r t h e a s t . Again, see

Annex F, paragraphs 1 and 2 f o r examples of t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of combat

power by l l t h Guards Army and one of i t s corps. A f t e r t h e f i r s t day of t h e

o p e r a t i o n , General Galitskg, t h e commander, had t o a l t e r h i s p l a n because of

t h e German r e s i s t a n c e . Indeed, he s h i f t e d f o u r d i v i s i o n s and 2d Guards Tank

Corps t o his n o r t h e r n f l a n k a f t e r t h e f i r s t day. The 31st Army south of

l l t h Guards Army had i t s a t t a c k weighted t o its r i g h t f l a n k , where two r i f l e .

c o r p s would a t t a c k i n c o n c e r t with t h e two l e f t f l a n k corps o f l l t h Guards

Army. However, t h e y had no mobile group.

In 2d Belorussian Front a r e a , only one a s s a u l t was t o be made, by

4 9 t h Army d i r e c t l y e a s t o f Mogilev. This army had n e a r l y h a l f t h e combat

power o f t h e Front, and i t had f u r t h e r concentrated i t s f o r c e s , t h r e e r i f l e

c o r p s on a n exceedingly narrow f r o n t w i t h d i v i s i o n s i n t h r e e echelons i n

some cases. Wen though n o t a l l o c a t e d any major mobile f o r c e s , t h e army

would use one o f i t s o r g a n i c t a n k b r i g a d e s a s a mobile group. See Annex F,

paragraph 1, n o t e a . , f o r t h e r e l a t i v e combat power. The o t h e r two armies

acted as holding f o r c e s w i t h no d i s t i n c t o f f e n s i v e mission.

F u r t h e r south, i n t h e 1st Belorussian Front a r e a , 3d Army, with two

o f i t s f o u r c o r p s c o n c e n t r a t e d i n a very narrow s e c t o r on t h e l e f t f l a n k ,

would a t t a c k n o r t h o f Rogachev, side-by-side with two corps o f 48th Army,

concentrated on 4 8 t h Army's r i g h t f l a n k i n narmw s e c t o r s a l s o . See

Annex F, paragraphs 1 and 2, f o r concentration o f t h e f o r c e s o f 3d Army and

i t s two corps. The remainder o f 48th Amy's f r o n t w a s held by a small r i f l e

corps and a f o r t i f i e d region ( a d i v i s i o n - s i z e f o r c e intended f o r holding,

economy-of-force missions). For t h e southern a s s a u l t a g a i n s t Bobruisk, 65th

Army had i t s combat power developed on i t s l e f t f l a n k i n t k e 1 8 t h R i f l e

Corps of f i v e d i v i s i o n s backed up by t h e 1st Guards Tank Corps. See

Annex F, paregraphs 1 and 2, f o r concentration f i g u r e s . CI? t h e l e f t flarlk

of t h e s o u t h e r n a s s a u l t , 28th Amy deployed i t s combat power i n two r i f l e

corps on i t s r i g h t f l a n k a d j a c e o t t o 65th Army's a s s a u l t force. Located t o

i t s r e a r w a s t h e Front mobile group, t h e Pliyev CMG. These t h r e e c o r p s w i t h

t e n d i v i s i o n s , one t a n k c o r p s , and t h e f r o n t CMG f a c e d about one and

one-half Gennan d i v i s i o n s , w i t h t h e understrength 20th Panzer D i v i s i o n i n

r e s e r v e a t Bobruisk.

Because o f t h e l e n g t h y time of preparation, t h e S o v i e t s had

a v a i l a b l e a l a r g e number o f i n f a n t r y support tanks and a r t i l l e r y . Also,

they d i d a l o t o f t a s k o r g a n i z i n g o f low l e v e l u n i t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e c r e a t i o n

of a s s a u l t groups and t a i l o r e d advanced b a t t a l i o n s , i n c l u d i n g engineer

support o f s u b s t a n t i a l proportions.

(2) Gennan f o r c e s . See Hap 2A.

A s seen on t h e referenced map, t h e German f o r c e s occupied p o s i t i o n s

w i t h s e c t o r s o f 10-20 k i l o m e t e r s p e r f r o n t l i n e d i v i s i o n . The occupied

p o s i t i o n s were i n a s i n g l e echelon with only f o u r d i v i s i o n s i n r e s e r v e a t

army l e v e l , with o t h e r d i v i s i o n s as mentioned e a r l i e r . Because o f t h e width

o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s e c t o r s , even t h e d i v i s i o n s could n o t c o n c e n t r a t e i n v i t a l

s e c t o r s b u t had t o deploy a l l o f t h e i r b a t t a l i o n s forward. Only i n t h e

Vitebsk s e c t o r was t h e r e a n apparent c o n c e n t r a t i o n of d i v i s i o n s , b u t s i n c e

t h e y were holding a s a l i e n t , a s i n t h e n o r t h , t h e t r o o p d e n s i t y was s t i l l

only 1 0 kilometers p e r d i v i s i o n . There were one i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n and two

a s s a u l t gun b a t t a l i o n s , a l b e i t a t reduced s t r e n g t h , i n t a c t i c a l reserve.

The defenses a t Orsha appear t o have been more concentrated, with

7 8 t h I n f a n t r y Division and 25th Panzer Grenadier D i v i s i o n on l i n e a s t r i d e

t h e main highway and a n o t h e r i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n i n r e s e r v e north c f Grsha.

Yet, when 1 1 t h Guards Army (122,000 men, 2637 guns/mortars, and

4W t a n k s / ~ G ' s ) pressed, i t e v e n t u a l l y found t h e s e c t o r where t h e Germans

had economized and pushed t h e i r a s s a u l t through t h e r e . The d i v i s i o n s
defending t h e Mogilev approach w e r e supported only by one Panzer g r e n a d i e r

d i v i s i o n , F e l d h e r n h a l l e , which w a s u n d e r s t r e n g t h i n i t s a s s a u l t gun

b a t t a l i o n and, f u r t h e r , r e q u i r e d OKH a p p r o v a l f o r commitment.

O n . t h e Bobruisk approach, t h e r e was a panzer d i v i s i o n i n t a c t i c a l

reserve f o r Ninth Army, b u t i t was u n d e r s t r e n g t h and i n a d e q u a t e l y armed i n

tanks. Moreover, t h e i n d e c i s i v e n e s s w i t h which i t was f i n a l l y employed

contributed greatly t o its ineffectiveness. I n t h e breakthrough s e c t o r o f

3d and 48th Annies, each S o v i e t c o r p s opposed no more than one two-battalion

German regiment, w h i l e S o v i e t f o r c e s o f no more t h a n equal s i z e t o t h e

German f o r c e s held t h e s e c t o r between t h e r e and t h e s o u t h e r n breakthrough

sector. There, a g a i n , t h e two German d i v i s i o n s i n t h e s e c t o r defended

a g a i n s t t h i r t e e n ~ i v i e tR i f l e d i v i s i o n s , one t a n k c o r p s o f about 300 t a n k s

and a CMG. !hat gave a S o v i e t s u p e r i o r i t y of about one d i v i s i o n f o r each

German b a t t a l i o n .

b. Opening Moves. ( s e e maps a t Tab 3 f o r d a i l y summaries-22 June-

13 July 19443
Operation BAGRATION d i d n o t commence a t one time, b u t r a t h e r ,

developed s u c c e s s i v e l y from n o r t h t o south. The reconnaissance' phase of t h e

a t t a c k commenced i n t h e 1st B a l t i c , 3d Belorussian, and 2d B e l o r u s s i a n Front

s e c t o r s on 22 June. I n t h e 1st B a l t i c s e c t o r , t h e gains were s o impressive

t h a t o v e r n i g h t , General Bagramyan, t h e commander, decided t o d i s p e n s e with

h s formal a t t a c k on 2 3 June and e x p l o i t e d t h e g a i n s of h i s RIF. By t h e n ,

h i s a s s a u l t f o r c e s , some f i f t e e n b a t t a l i o n s , were a l r e a d y 5 k i l o m e t e r s i n t o

t h e German defenses. The d i - r i s i o n s s e n t o u t forward detachments on 23 h e ,

which had t h e mission o f r e a c h i n g t h e Dvina R i v e r a s scon a s p o s s i b l e . As

you can s e e from t h e map o f 23 June, some o f them had reached i t by

n i g h t f a l l , and t h e breach had reached 1 6 kilometers i n depth and 50

kilometers i n width. Although Bagramyan ordered 1st Tank Corps forward, t h e

c o n d i t i o n o f t h e roads prevented i t from e n t e r i n g t h e b e t t l e t h a t day.

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The X and 2d Belorussian Fronts commenced t h e i r o f f e n s i v e s on

23 June 1944, with a massive a r t i l l e r y and a i r barrage followed by the new

penetration tactics. I n t h e X Belorussian Front s e c t o r , t h e 39th and 5th

Armies obtained t h e g r e a t e s t success on t h i s day. They penetrated t o a

depth of 10-11 kilometers on a 50 kilometers f r o n t , and, i n 3 9 t h Armyes

s e c t o r , t h e tank and a s s a u l t gun brigades supporting each a s s a u l t d i v i s i o n

passed through and commenced t h e i r e x p l o i t a t i o n f o r t h e Dvina River and

link-up w i t h 433 A m y forces. In 5 t h Army's s e c t o r , conditions were r i p e

f o r t h e e a r l y commitment of the Oslikovsky CMG t h e next day. On t h e Orsha

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a x i s , however, t h i n g s d i d not go s o well. In s p i t e of t h e numerical

s u p e r i o r i t y o f 1 1 t h Guards Army, i t s progress i n t h e s e l e c t e d breakthrough

s e c t o r was only a few kilometers, but t h e r i g h t f l a n k corps was achieving

success. Thus, t h e army commander, General Galitskg, decided t o commit h i s

army mobile group, 2d Guards Tank Corps, t o t h e n o r t h , along with f o u r r i f l e

d i v i s i o n s from t h e south of h i s s e c t o r . Army Group Center committed the two

d i v i s i o n s s t a t i o n e d i n t h e Vitebsk and Orsha areas--95th and 1 4 t h Infantry

Divisions--against t h e penetrations, but piecemeal.

The 49th Amy of the 2d Eelorussian Front made t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t

advance o f t h e day, penetrating 10-12 kilometers i n i t s s e c t o r , a l b e i t a t

heavy c o s t t o t h e a t t a c k i n g infantry. It d i d , however, cause commitment of

 t h e German F e l d h e r r n h a l l e Panzer Grenadier Division a g a i n s t i t . The f o m a r d

detachments of t h e a s s a u l t r i f l e d i v i s i o n s l e d t h i s advance.

On 24 June, t h e most important event of t h e o p e r a t i o n occurred i n

the southern sector: 1st B e l o r u s s i a n Front opened i.ts o f f e n s i v e n o r t h e a s t

-.
and s o u t h of Bobruisk. The a t t a c k of 3d A r m y i n t h e n o r t h gained only 2

k i l o m e t e r s and bogged down i n t h e designated breakthrough s e c t o r , but t h e

northernmost corps of t h e army had had success, and t h e army commander

decided t o c o m i t h i s mobile group, 9 t h Tank Corps, through i t t h e next

day. The southern a t t a c k by 65th and 28th Armies had been d e v a s t a t i n g , with

. t h e a r t i l l e r y p r e p a r a t i o n a l o n e n e a r l y vaporizing t h e f a c i n g German

divisions. The 65th Army committed i t s mobile group, 1st Guards Tank Corps,

a t 1600 hours that day. While t h e a n n i e s had breached t h e enemy's defenses

on a f r o n t o f 30 k i l o m e t e r s t o a depth of 5-10 k i l a n e t e r s , t h e 1st Guards

Tank Corps pushed t h e advance t.0 20 .kilometers. The tank c o r p s had t h e

missions of c u t t i n g t h e road w e s t o f Bobrvisk and e n c i r c l i n g t h e enemy along

t h e Beresina south of Bobruisk. Zhe Germans comnitted t h e i r reserve, 20th

Panzer Division, but i n d e c i s i v e l y . F i r s t , they ordered i t north, and then

they ordered i t back south b u t minus some o f i t s armor. A s a r e s u l t , i t saw

a c t i o n i n n e i t h e r s e c t o r t h a t day.

To t h e north, 4 3 l and 6 t h Guards Armies of 1st B a l t i c Front secured

bridgeheads over t h e m n a from t h e n o r t h and expanded t h e breakthrough t o

30 kilometers deep and 90 k i l o m e t e r s wide. The 39th Army advance elements

reached t h e Dvina from t h e south. I n 5th Army's s e c t o r , t h e CMG had j u s t

s t a r t e d t o g o i n t o a c t i o n , and 5 t h Tank Army had commenced i t s move towards

t h e 5th Army s e c t o r f o r commitment. The CMG had p o s i t i o n e d jd Guards

Mechanized Corps on t h e north and 3d Guards Cavalry Corps to the south; the

group's o b j e c t i v e was t h e Beresina River. Further south, the Soviet

p e n e t r a t i o n continued t o develop i n t h e northern p a r t of the l l t h Army

s e c t o r , with the a d d i t i o n a l r i f l e d i v i s i o n s coming i n t o action and 2d Guards

-
Tank Corps moving north, a l s o . The Stavka representative, Marshal

Vasilevsky, decided t o change t h e a x i s of 5th Guards Tank Army, a l s o , from

t h e Orsha a x i s t o 5 t h Army's sector. This would t a k e a t l e a s t t h i r t y - s i x

hours t o accomplish.

I n t h e 2d Belorussian Front s e c t o r , t h e advance on Mogilev

continued, unimpeded by t h e FH Panzer Grenadier Division. The 49th Army had

committed i t s own mobile group, b u i l t around organic u n i t s and t h e 22d

.
Guards Tank Brigade, and t h i s helped t h e advance d r i v e deep.

On 25 June, t h e f i r s t encirclement closed on Vitebsk, a t a depth of

about 50 kilometers. Trapped were f i v e d i v i s i o n s , and 3d Panzer Army had

only two of i t s eleven d i v i s i o n s and one of t h r e e corps l e f t . The 39th and

4% Armi'es would take about t h r e e days t o l i q u i d a t e t h e pocket, accepting

t h e surrender of about 15,000 of an estimated 30,000 i n the u n i t s i n the

pocket o r t o i t s flanks. Nor were r e l i e f attempts t o succeed, f o r on t h e

south t h e CXG had begun i t s e x p l o i t a t i o n towards Borisov on t h e Beresina.

Behind i t , 5th Guards Tank Army was assembling and would be ready f o r

commitment the following day. In l l t h Guards Army sector; 2d Guards Tads

Corps would a l s o be ready f o r commitment t h e following day. The 3

Belorussian Front had broken t h e German defenses on z 100 kilometer f r o n t

and moved forward 30-50 kilometers. The 49th Army continued t o make steady,

i f c o s t l y progress, and approached the Dnieper on t h e north of Wogilev. In

t h e 1st B e l o r u s s i a n Zkont, 3d Amy commander committed 9 t h Tank Corps where

t h e b e s t g a i n s had been made w i t h o r d e r s t o move on Bobruisk and s e i z e a

blocking p o s i t i o n east o f t h e c i t y . Meanwhile, 1st Guards Tank Corps moved

northwards, t r a p p i n g a p a r t o f 3 4 t h German Division a g a i n s t t h e Beresina.

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?he f r o n t commander, General Rokossovsky, ordered t h e commitment o f h i s CMG

( 4 t h Guards Cavalry c o r p s and 1st Xechanized Corps) w i t h t h e m i s s i o n t o

advance through t h e German d e f e n s e s and turn west f o r S l u t s k , s o u t h o f

Minsk, a g a i n s t t h e key communications j u n c t i o n o f Baranovichi .

By 26 June, S o v i e t f o r c e s i n t h e n o r t h were chopping up t h e Vitebsk

pocket while mobile groups were r a c i n g f o r t h e Beresina R i v e r and Borisov.

5th Guards Tank Army e n t e r e d a c t i o n and deployed s o u t h o f Oslikovskg CMG,

p u t t i ~ ga phalanx of f o u r c o r p s deployed w i t h b r i g a d e s a b r e a s t i n column

f o n n a t i o n moving 'southwest on t h e Beresina- and Borisov. !be 2d Guards Tank

Corps c u t t h e Vitebak-Orsha road, swung s o u t h and c u t German communications

between Orsha and Minsk, a t a d e p t h o f 50 kilometers. The 4 9 t h Army had

reached and crossed the Dnieper n o r t h o f Mogilev. In t h e s o u t h , 1st

Belorussian Front c l o s e d on Bobruisk from t h e e a s t , w i t h 9th Tank Corps,

canmitted t o combat t h a t day, d r i v i n g about 50-75 k i l o m e t e r s t o t h e

o u t s k i r t s of Bobruisk o n t h e e a s t . 1st Guards Tank Corps w a s j u s t west o f

Bobruisk and preparing t o c u t t h e Eobruisk-Zinsk highway, and t h e P l i y e v CMG

had reached t h e P t i c h R i v e r and was t u r n i n g towards S l u t s k t o t h e west of

Bobruisk.

The first German reinforcements f o r Army Groug Center had j u s t

a r r i v e d , 5th Asnzer D i v i s i o n headed f o r Borisov, and 1 2 t h Panzer D i v i s i o n

headed f o r Bobruisk. A s t h e y a r r i v e d by r a i l , t h e y were dispatched

piecemeal, and, t h u s , n e i t h e r was e s p e c i a l l y e f f e c t i v e i n h a l t i n g t h e

o n m s h i n g juggernaut.

On 27 June, t h e i n e v i t a b l e happened, and 1st Guards Tank Corps and

-
9th Tank Corps linked up west and n o r t h o f Bobruisk, t r a p p i n g about 70,000

i n t h e pocket. O f t h e s e , some 8-15,000 managed t o g e t out. The CT3G

continued west f o r S l u t s k . In t h e n o r t h , a major gap had opened between t h e

remnants of 3d Panzer Army i n t h e n o r t h and 4 t h Army i n t h e c e n t e r , and t h e

CMG and 5 t h Guards Tank Army marched i n t o t h e gap. Meanwhile, t o t h e south,

2d Guards Tank Corps completed t h e encirlement of 78th German I n f a n t r y

D i v i s i o n i n Orsha. Mogilev i t s e l f w a s now e n c i r c l e d , and 2d Belorussian

Front had made i t s first a s s a u l t upon i t , only t o be repulsed.

By 2 8 June, t h e magnitude o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s opening up caused .

Stavka t o r e v i s e i t s d i r e c t i o n s t o t h e f r o n t s . It e s s e n t i a l l y changed t h e

o r i g i n a l second phase from a n encirclement e a s t o f Minsk by f o r c e a from

n o r t h and s o u t h t o a wide encirclement west of Minsk, with s t r o n g mobile

formations holding t h e s h o u l d e r s and gaps northwest a t Molodechno and

southwest a t Baranovichi while combined armies formed t h e i n n e r encirclement

e a s t o f Minsk around t h e formations o f t h e c e n t e r o f Army Group Center.

S p e c i f i c a l l y , 1st E a l t i c Front was t o t u r n f u r t h e r n o r t h but continue

p r o t e c t i n g t h e n o r t h e r n f l a n k o f t h e offensive. The 3d Belorussian Front

was t o d i r e c t i t s CNG t o Molodechno and 5 t h Guards Tank Army t o e n c i r c l e

Minsk t o t h e west. The 2d Belorussian Front was t o provide t h e d i r e c t

p r e s s u r e f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e German f o r c e s , moving on Minsk from t h e e a s t .

The 3d B e l o m s s i a n %ant w a s t o send both i t s t a n k corps towards Minsk,
while i t s CMG continued west t o Baranovichi.

On t h e 28th, t h e f o r c e s i n t h e n o r t h had reached t h e Beresina, w i t h

t h e CMG c o n s t a n t l y o u t f l a n k i n g t h e German 5 t h Panzer Division over t e r r a i n

where t h e panzers could not follow. I n t h e s o u t h , 1 2 t h Panzer D i v i s i o n d i d

g e t a b a t t l e group i n t o t h e Bobruisk pocket long enough t o e f f e c t t h e

rescue o f some 15,000, b u t t h e r e s t remained e n c i r c l e d . The CMG had reached

S l u t s k and was menacing Earanovichi, having advanced n e a r l y 100 kilometers

i n t h r e e days. With t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e Bobruisk pocket on 29 h e , t h e

first s t a g e of Operation BAGRATION came t o a n end. The Germans had l o s t

n e a r l y 200,000 men k i l l e d o r taken p r i s o n e r , two armies (3Panzer and 9th)

were i n e f f e c t i v e , a t h i r d w a s i n daxiger o f being e n c i r c l e d with a n o t h e r

150,000 men, and t h e f o u r e a s t e r n f o r t r e s s e s had f a l l e n : Vitebsk, Orsha,

Mogilev, and Eobruisk. The Red Army was n e a r l y 120-150 kilometers i n t o t h e

sector. The s u c c e s s was o p e r a t i o n a l and needed only one more success t o

r a i s e i t t o a s t r a t e g i c success.

c . Subsequent Phases.

Subsequent phases of Operation BAGRATIOI? occurred a s follows. From

29 June t o 4 July t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s conducted a t t a c k s t o e n c i r c l e t h e German

4 t h Amy f o r c e s moving west from Xogilev towards Xinsk, with t h e deep

a t t a c k s aimed a t t h e c a p t u r e of Minsk i t s e l f and a t c u t t i n g Minsk o f f from

o u t s i d e h e l p a t t h e gaps of Xolodechno i n t h e ncrth and Baranovichi i n t h e

south. Then, from 5-16 July t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s , i n response t o a n o t h e r set

of o r d e r s from Stavka, exploited t o t h e borders of Belorussia, t a k i n g t h e

key c i t i e s o f Vilnius and Earanovichi and c r e a t i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e

1st Ukrainian Front t o commence i t s L'vov-Sandomierz o p e r a t i o n south of t h e

P r i p e t Marshes. The next phases were t h e a t t a c k of t h e l e f t wing of the 1st

Belorussian Front, t a k i n g Lublin and Brest and c r o s s i n g t h e V i s t u l a a t

Warsaw (17-31 July) and t h e Kaunaa Operation i n t o Lithuania by 'the Ist

-
B a l t i c Front from 28 July-28 August. Although t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s concluded

t h e Belorussian o p e r a t i o n by 29 August on t h e Vistula, i n E a s t Prussia, and

i n t h e B a l t i c s t a t e s , t h e deep a t t a c k operations had ended i n 3d and 2d

Belorussian Fronts with t h e withdrawal of t h e i r tank corps and tank army by

13 J u l y from t h e v i c i n i t y o f Vilnius, i n 1st Belorussian Front by 1 August

with its h a l t i n Praga, a suburb of Warsaw, and i n 1st B a l t i c Front with t h e

end of t h e Kaunas o p e r a t i o n on 28 August. Gains made during t h e periods

a f t e r those c i t e d above were made by t h e r i f l e armies with i n f a n t r y support

tank f o r c e s r a t h e r than by deep a t t a c k operations.

By 28 June, t h e mobile groups o f t h e north were moving i n a phalanx .-

with t h e CMG a t t h e Beresina River n o r t h of Borisov, 5 t h GTA with i t s two

t a n k corps p r e s s i n g t h e German 5th Panzer Division d i r e c t l y along t h e

highway t o Borisov, and 2d GTC moving on t h e Beresina River s o u t h of

Borisov. While t h e f i g h t i n g around Borisov by 5th GTA continued v e q

heavily on 29 and 30 June, t h e CMG n o r t h crossed t h e Eeresina and began t o

envelope t h e 5th Panzer Division from t h e north, while 2d GTC had reached

and crossed t h e Beresina from t h e south. In t h e south, t h e tank corps were

s t i l l helping with t h e encirclement of Bobruisk while the CRG advanced west

towards Baranovichi, reaching S l u t s k by 29 June, about 80 k i l o m e t e r s from

Baranovichi. Moreover, t h e tank corps were disengaging from Bobruisk and

beginning t o advance up t h e Bobdsk-Minsk road. In the c e n t e r , f o u r

50
armies, 3lst , 33d, 49th.. and 50th, pursued t h e German 4th Army (with

elements from 3d Panzer Army and 9 t h ~ r m y )and began e n c i r c l i n g i t n o r t h and

south, while t h e deep a t t a c k p i n c e r s f r o m Borisov and Bobruisk m u l d

preclude any escape o r r e l i e f from Minsk.

-
By 30 June, t h e defense o f Borisov and t h e Beresina had c o l l a p s e d as

t h e 5 t h Panzer Division withdrew from Borisov t o avoid encirclement from t h e

CMG n o r t h and 2d GTC t o t h e s o u t h , both o f which had crossed t h e r i v e r along

with 5 t h GTA a t Borisov. Now o r d e r s reached t h e CMG t o d i r e c t its advance

upon Molodechno, approximately 100 k i l o m e t e r s away and t o t h e northwest of

Minsk, l e a v i n g t h e t h r e e t a n k c o l p s o f 5 t h GTA and 2d GTC t o advance on

Minsk. The S o v i e t concept h e r e w a s t o hold t h a t gap f o r t h e i r own f u r t h e r

operations as w e l l a s t o prevent Germap reinforcements from i n t e r f e r i n g with

t h e c a p t u r e o f Minsk and t h e encirclement of t h e 4 t h h y . While p a r t s of

4 t h A r m y had reached t h e Beresina, o t h e r s were as many as 50 kilometers

e a s t , while S o v i e t f o r c e s were a c r o s s i t n o r t h and south and 50-80

kilometers c l o s e r t o Minsk w i t h more.mobile f o r c e s than those a v a i l a b l e t o

t h e Germans. I n t h e south, t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s were w i t h i n 50 kilometers of

Baranovichi, but r e s i s t a n c e was s t i f f e n i n g , with t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of German

4th Panzer Division and 2 8 t h J a g e r Division. The d r i v e on Kinsk from t h e

south now had t h e r i f l e armies, except 48th Amy which w a s withdrawn i n t o

f r o n t r e s e r v e , supporting t h e advance o f t h e t a n k corps up t h e road t o

Xinsk, approximately 75-80 k i l o m e t e r s t o t h e s o u t h e a s t .

Although 1 July w a s e s s e n t i a l l y a day f o r regrouping f o r S o v i e t

f o r c e s , Rokossovsicy i n t h e south made a n important d e c i s i o n , t o send t h e 4 t h

Guards Cavalry Corps of t h e CMG n o r t h o f Baranovichi cross-country t o c u t

51
t h e railway i n t o Minsk a t S t o l b t s y . He a l s o - d i r e c t e d the 9 t h TC from t h e

d i r e c t Bobruisk-Minsk road west t o t h e Slutsk-Minsk road, from which i t

would outflank t h e r e s i s t a n c e of 12th Panzer Division i n the advance on

Minsk. In t h e nqrth, t h e CMG =oriented i t s e l f f o r t h e d r i v e on Molodechno

-
while 5 t h GTA prepared f o r t h e f i n a l d r i v e on Minsk a s t r i d e t h e

Borisov-Ninsk Highway with 2d GTC on i t s l e f t flank. In t h e c e n t e r , the

German 4 t h A r m y spent 1-2 J u l y crossing t h e Beresina under pressure.

!he Soviet d r i v e s renewed on 2 July, and by 3 July a l l major

o b j e c t i v e s had been achieved. In t h e north, t h e CMG had reached Molodechno

and Smorgon (northwest of ~ o l o d e c h n o ,) although Molodechno d i d not f a l l

u n t i l elements of 5th Army could a s s i s t 4 t h GCC i n the seizure. The d r i v e

on Minsk, led by 5th GTA and' 2d GTC on i t s l e f t entered uinsk on July 3,-

covering 50 kilometers i n two days, and t h e tank f o r c e s swept on through t h e

c i t y t o p o s i t i o n s west and southwest of it. Four hours l a t e r , t h e f o r c e s

from t h e south entered, l e d by t h e converging of t h e 9 t h TC d i r e c t l y south

and 1st GTC from southeast. No sooner d i d they reach the city than they

were ordered t o t u r n south f o r redeployment a g a i n s t Baranovichi. The -

S o v i e t s had estimated t h a t i t would take them u n t i l 7 o r 8 July t o reach

Minsk, and they had done i t i n two days. In t h e pocket thus formed were

approximately 105,000 Germans, and i t took t h e r i f l e armies of 2d

B e l o m s s i a n Front, 3lst (from 3d BRF), 333, 49th, and 5Cth, u n t i l 11 July t o

reduce i t . They k i l l e d approximately 40,000 and paraded 57,000 through

Moscow on 1 7 July on t h e i r way t o internment i n S i b e r i a . The success was

now s t r a t e g i c , with 3CO-350,000 German c a s u a l t i e s and 25-28 d i v i s i o n s

destroyed, leaving a gapping hole of nearly 400 kilometers i n t h e German

lines.
 With t h e magnitude o f t h e s t r a t e g i c success c l e a r now, Stavka on 4

J u l y i s s u e d new o r d e r s f o r t h e o f f e n s i v e , d i r e c t i n g 1st B a l t i c F r o n t on

Kaur~asi n L i t h u a n i a , X W F t o V i l n i u s and t h e n t h e rJeman River, 2d BRB t o

t h e Neman, and 1st BRF t o t h e western Bug, on t h e borders o f Poland, f i n a l l y

-
b r i n g i n g his l e f t wing i n t o a c t i o n . The mobile groups were t o l e a d o f f

immediately, w i t h t h e r i f l e armies t o reduce any bypassed enemy f o r c e s .

This d e c i s i o n represented a change from t h e u s u a l S o v i e t s t y l e , a s t h e y had

previously h a l t e d a f t e r a n advance of 200 kilometers t o regroup and b r i n g up

s u p p l i e s and f o r c e s , and t h e advance t o Minsk had been 200-250 kilometers,

with some f o r c e s advancing up t o 280 kilometers.

The f r o n t s jumped o f f on t h e t h i r d phase on 5 J u l y w i t h t h e same

success which had m e t t h e f i r s t two p k s e s . On 5 J u l y , they changed t h e

t a s k o r g a n i z a t i o n t o conduct t h e new operation. In t h e north, they

disbanded ' t h e CMG, u s i n g i t s 36 GMC t o spearhead t h e advance o f 5 t h Army on

Vilnius, while t h e 5 t h GTA added i t s weight t o 3d G C C ' s a t t a c k s on

Molodechno, which f e l l t h a t day. The 5 t h GTA would then spearhead t h e u n i t s

of 11th GA. While 2d BRF was occupied by e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e 4th Army, 1st

Ba moved i t s t a n k c o r p s from Minsk i n t o p o s i t i o n for a n a t t a c k on

Baranovichi from t h e n o r t h e a s t and e a s t .

On-6 J u l y t h e Soviet advance on V i l n i u s began with t h e 3d GMC

leading t h e forward detachments of r i f l e d i v i s i o n s . This advance was

v i r t u e l l y unopposed, and Soviet f o r c e s reached Vilnius on 7 July. The 5 t h
'

GTA reached V i l n i u s on 8 July and i n v e s t e d i t from t h e south, having

advanced a n o t h e r 100 kilometers i n some two days from Eolodechno. A t times,
both f o m e s were some 30-40 k i l o m e t e r s ahead o f t h e i r s u p p o r t i n g r i f l e

divisions. However, V i l n i u s d i d not f a l l immediately, and t h e Germans would

make a n e f f o r t t o r e l i e v e t h e g a r r i s o n .

I n t h e south, t h e a t t a c k on Baranovichi opened w i t h t h e main a t t a c k

coming from t h e northeast. and supporting a t t a c k from t h e e a s t along t h e

Bobruisk-Baranovichi road. The Gezman f o n e s r e s i s t i n g were good--4t h

Panzer D i v i s i o n , 28th Jager Division, 1 2 t h Panzer Division, and two s m a l l e r

c a v a l r y u n i t s , a l l under t h e command o f 26 Army a s 9 t h Army w a s no longer

capable of command. Nevertheless, they were worn down from t h e b a t t l e s

e a r l i e r f o r t h e defense o f Baranovichi, and when t h e . f u l l power o f t h e r i g h t

wing o f 1st BiF was brought t o b e a r on them, t h e r e s i s t a n c e crumbled, with

Baranovichi f a l l i n g on 8 July.
.
It f e l l t o a Soviet f o r c e breaking through

t o t h e n o r t h o f Baranovichi, almost e n c i r c l i n g t h e defenders and compelling

them t o withdraw t o Slonim. In t h e c e n t e r , 2d BRF w a s a l s o r e i n f o r c e d w i t h

a mobile group, X GCC fmm t h e CMG. !bey used them t o spearhead t h e

advance t o Lida, where t h e y overcame t h e German defenders by 9 July.

The f i g h t i n g around Vilnius occasioned sane extremely hard work

meeting German c o u n t e r a t t a c k s a s w e l l a s reducing t h e German pocket. As a

r e s u l t , t h e S o v i e t armor i n t h e mobile groups was s o used up t h a t they began

t o be withdrawn. The f i r s t t o go was 2d GTC on 10 J u l y , and 5th GTA, down

t o about twent y e i g h t t a n k s o p e r a t i o n a l a f t e r r e p u l s i n g t h e German

c o u n t e r a t t a c k on 1 3 July. The f r o n t s d i d , however, have s u f f i c i e n t combat

power and momentum t o reach t h e Nernan River, a move o f about 2 1;0 k i l o m e t e r s

from Minsk f o r 2d 9RF and 180-200 kilometers f o r 3d BRr'. Meantime i n the

south, 1st BRF had pursued through Saranovichi t o S l o n h , which f e l l

54
quickly. By 10 July, t h e 61st Army, 1st BRP, which connected t h e r i g h t wing

o f 1st BRF with t h e l e f t wing, came i n t o play, and i t l i b e r a t e d t h e c i t y of

Pinak on 1 4 July and linked up with 1st BRF, which -had advanced 150-170

kilometers i n twelve days.

A l l of t h i s success had drawn German d i v i s i o n s from o t h e r army

groups, amounting i n i t i a l l y t o s i x d i v i s i o n s from Anny Group North Ukraine,

including t h r e e panzer d i v i s i o n s . Later reinforcements t o t a l e d . twenty-eight

d i v i s i o n s from Amy Group North, Army Group North Ukraize, and Army Group

South Ukraine. That made conditions r i p e f o r the next Great Blow, t h e

L'vov-Sandomiercz Operation by t h e 1st Ukrainian Front commanded by Marshal

Koniev. It commenced on 1 2 J u l y t o complicate f u r t h e r the Germans'

s t r a t e g i c problems. F i n a l l y , t h e long,-awaited l e f t ~ n ofg t h e 1st BRB

attacked on 18 July, t a k i n g Lublin on 23 July and Brest on 2 8 July. The 2d

Tank Anny reached R a g a beside Warsaw on 31 July, and 8th Guards Anny under

~eneraC
l huikov, the bulldog defender of S t a l i n g r a d , crossed t h e Vistula on

1 August. The advance-was some 300 kilometers i n two weeks, a pace which

met the b e s t e f f o r t s of t h e r e s t of Operation BAGRATIOL.

On t h e same d a t e , Bagrtxqein i n 1st BAF had reached the B a l t i c and

c u t Army Group North o f f from Army Group Center. Later advances by 3d and

2d BRF would bring the f r o n t another 100 kilometers f u r t h e r west, i n t o t h e

e a s t e r n borders of Eastern P r u s s i a and Poland, but these advances would be

made by t h e r i f l e armies with such mobile groups a s theye were providing

i n f a n t r y support. During t h i s period, t h e 7 t h "Great Elow" commenced on

20 August, t h e Jas sy-Kishinev Operation a g a i n s t Army Grcup South Ukraine.

German counterattacks i n t h e north, a g a i n s t 1st BAF a t Shyualyai, and i n t h e

s o u t h , a g a i n s t t h e f o r c e s o f 1st -Ukrainian Fkont a c r o s s t h e San R i v e r n e s t

of t h e V i s t u l a , e f f e c t i v e l y ended Operation BAGRATION by 29 August 1944.

d. Outcome.

Operation BAGRATION had r e s u l t e d i n t h e reconquest o f B e l o r u s s i a and

even t h e i n v a s i o n o f p a r t of Germany i t s e l f , Eastern k s s i a , as w e l l as

p e n e t r a t i n g Poland t o t h e V i s t u l a R i v e r and Warsaw. It had allowed t h e

1iberatio.n o f L i t h u a n i a and p a r t o f Latvia, and t h e r e were bridgeheads over

the V i s t u l a River, as w e l l a s t h e f u l l c r o s s i n g of t h e Neman and Narev

Rivera on t h e way t o E a s t P m s s i a . A s a r e s u l t o f paving t h e way f o r l a t e r

o f f e n s i v e s , i t i n d i r e c t l y led t o t h e p r e c i p i t a t e withdrawal of Rumania from

t h e w a r , t h r e e days a f t e r t h e Jassy-Kishinev Operation commenced i n t h e

south. L a t e r on i n t h e y e a r , Bulgaria,. Hungary, and Finland would a l s o be

taken o u t o f t h e w a r .

In t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of Army Group Center during t h e f i r s t two weeks

of t h e o p e r a t i o n , i t had achieved s t z k t e g i c r e s u l t s , and t h e e f f e c t s were

also strategic. Its successes drew f o r c e s away from t h e o t h e r s e c t o r s of

t h e f r o n t k h i c h t h e Red Army planned t o h i t during t h e summer, making them

more s u c c e s s f u l . It had a l s o caused t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h i r t y d i v i s i o n s and

t h e d i v e r s i o n of twenty-eight d i v i s i o n s t o i t s f r o n t . Three German armies

had been wrecked and a f o u r t h , t h e 1 6 t h i n Army Group l o r t h , s e v e r e l y mauled.

The Red Army had advanced almost 600 kilometers d u r i n g t h e summer,

approximately t w i c e a s f a r a s t h e A l l i e s and P a t t o n advanced a f t e r t h e

breakout from Normandy t o t h e German f r o n t i e r . It had e n c i r c l e d Geman

f o r c e s a t Vitebsk and Bobruisk, a t Minsk, and a t V i l n i u s and Brest-Litovsk.

It had widened t h e advance f r o n t a g e from 700 kilometers a t i t s start t o

1,000 k i l o m e t e r s a t i t s end and sucked i n a n estimated ninety-eeven German

d i v i s i o n s and . t h i r t e e n brigades, piecemeal. Those German d i v i s i o n s faced an

overall f o r c e of 2,500,000 men, 45,000 guns and m o r t a r s , 6,000 tanks and

a s s a u l t guns, and approximately 7,000 a i r c r a f t ,

The S o v i e t f o r c e s had accomplished t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s on a v a s t e r

s c a l e than e v e r before, and i t was t h e i r most s u c c e s s f u l s t r a t e g i c

operation. They had taken o n l y one week t o reduce t h e Kinsk pocket, while

the S t a l i n g r a d pocket of similar s i z e had t a k e n n e a r l y two months t o reduce

e i g h t e e n months e a r l i e r . They had a l s o used very s o p h i s t i c a t e d techniques

o f d i r e c t and p a r a l l e l p u r s u i t a t a depth of 250 k i l o m e t e r s t o c l o s e t h a t

pocket. Their o p e r a t i o n a l a r t , i n t h e m a t t e r o f deep a t t a c k s , had been very

much r e s t r i c t e d t o maneuver f o r c e s , l e d by t a n k o r mobile f o r c e s o r groups.

They had used t h e i r r i f l e d i v i s i o n s t o make t h e t a c t i c a l breakthroughs, and

had used forward detachments (made p o s s i b l e by t h e attachment of army

s e p a r a t e tank b r i g a d e s ) , t a n k corps ( a t army) and CMG o r tank armies ( a t

f r o n t ) , introduced even while t h e t a c t i c a l b a t t l e was going on but no l o n g e r

i n doubt, t o e x p l o i t a s soon a s possible. Sometimes they were committed as

soon a s t h e f i r s t day. The pace had averaged 20-25 kilometers per day

before t h e withdrawal of t h e major t a n k formations i n mid-July and 13-14

kilometers p e r day a f t e r , although t h e l e f t wing of 1st BRF had again

averaged 20-25 kilometers p e r day i n i t s r u s h t o t h e Vistula.

4. Conclusions.

The deep operations i n Operation EAGRATION ranged from 60-250 k i l o m e t e r s

i n depth of operations. Tbey were p r i m a r i l y conducted by maneuver elements;

t h o s e elements depended upon t a n k f o r c e s f o r t h e i r success. A key t o t h e

u s e o f t h o s e t a n k f o r c e s w a s t h e growing S o v i e t d o c t r i n e which emphasized

c a r r y i n g t h e b a t t l e t o t h e enemy simultaneously throughout t h e depth of h i s

position. Thus, a s s a u l t r i f l e d i v i s i o n s making a t t a c k s i n main d i r e c t i o n s

could be r e i n f o ~ c e dby a tank brigade and expected t o form a forward

detachment which could c a r r y o u t o p e r a t i o n s - t o t h e depth of t h e enemy's

t a c t i c a l defenses. A s soon a s it was c l e a r t h a t t h e enemy's defenses were

crumbling, l a r g e r S o v i e t t a n k f o r c e s would be committed through t h e p o s i t i o n

t o car- o u t t h e i r m i s s i o n s i n t h e enemy's r e a r while t h e a s s a u l t d i v i s i o n s

might s t i l l be f i g h t i n g t h e i r way through t h e t a c t i c a l defenses.

These l a r g e r S o v i e t f o r c e s t r u c t u r e s were organized t o allow them t o

c a m t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s p r o g r e s s i v e l y f u r t h e r i n t o t h e enemy's r e a r , and they

d i d so. The tank c o r p s could c a r r y about 100 kilometers i n t o t h e rear, and

t h e tank amy o r CMC c o u l d ' c a r r y about 200 kilometers i n t o t h e enemg's r e a r

b e f o r e they would need support. Moreover, t h e d o c t r i n e allowed t h e s e

formations t o run without maintaining connection with t h e i r following

combined anns o r r i f l e armies. Thus, t h e encirclement a t Vitebsk could be

made by t a n k brigades and forward detachments, while t h a t a t Bobruisk could

be made by t a n k corps. However, t h e encirclement of Minsk, 250 kilometers

deep could n o t have been made without t h e CWG o r t a n k army. More

remarkably, t h o s e formations s t i l l had enough combat power t o continue

o p e r a t i o n s f o r a n o t h e r 150-200 kilometers, past V i l n i u s and Earanovichi,

b e f o r e they were used up.

The d e c l i n e i n t h e average r a t e of advance showed t h e e f f e c t s of t h e i r

withdrawal, y e t they imparted enough momentum t o t h e S o v i e t advance t o allow

 t h e r i f l e o r combined arms armies t o advance a n o t h e r 200 k i l o m e t e r s b e f o r e

t h e advance ground t o a h a l t , about 400 kilometers beyond where t h e Germans

had expected them t o h a l t . !llhat first advance o f 300-400 k i l o m e t e r s took

p l a c e i n t h e f i r s t t h r e e weeks of t h e o p e r a t i o n , leaving a n o t h e r f i v e weeks

-
of slower advances while t h e German d e f e n s e s were rebuilding. Moreover, t h e

f a i l u r e t o keep an e n c i r c l e d f o r c e bagged which had plagued t h e Red Army

during t h e winter campaign i n t h e Ukraine d i d n o t recur. Rather, t h e f o r c e s

which had formed t h e o u t e r encirclement kept moving out t o prevent t h e

rescue o f t h e e n c i r c l e d f o r c e which had occurred a t l e a s t twice t h e previous

winter.

The S o v i e t s had developed t h e h i g h e r l e v e l f o r c e s t r u c t u r e which allowed

them t o g e t s o deep:. t h e t a n k army. The CMG a l s o proved u s e f u l a s a

s u b s t i t u t e i n t e r r a i n n o t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e employment of masses of annor.

These formations were not t o be committed t o f i g h t through t h e t a c t i c a l

defenses, but r a t h e r drove deep f o r o p e r a t i o n a l o r s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s .

Thus, one can s e e deep o p e r a t i o n s o c c u r r i n g a t s e v e r a l echelons

simultaneously.

O f course, t h e Soviet concept of and conduct of masldrovka, o r cover and

deception (but more i n c l u s i v e ) , a l s o f u r n i s h e d a major f a c t o r i n the s u c c e s s

of t h e operation. The maskirovka p l a c was prepared a t t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l s

and disseminated t o a l l l e v e l s . Thus, i t supported not only Operation

BAGRATION but a l s o t h e o t h e r o f f e n s i v e s o f t h e summer by d i s g u i s i n g t h e

. exact l o c a t i o n of t h e next blow, o r a t l e a s t removing t h e Germans' a b i l i t y

t o r e a c t e f f e c t i v e l y t o t h e next move. In Operation BAGRATION, t h e S o v i e t s

achieved s u r p r i s e a t t h e s t r a t e g i c and o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l s a t l e a s t , and they

achieved some t a c t i c a l s u r p r i s e i n t h e s t r e n g t h which they had t o employ.

Maskirovka was o n l y one p a r t o f a very s o p h i s t i c a t e d p l a n which took t h e

o p e r a t i o n by b i t e - s i z e p i e c e s and o n l y proceeded t o t h e next p i e c e when

-
c e r t a i n o f s u c c e s s i n t h e preceding s t a g e . Thus, t h e d e c i s i o n f o r t h e

encirclement o f Minsk w a s f i n a l l y made a f t e r t h e Vitebsk and Bobruisk

pockets had occurred, and t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n t o the borders o f B e l o r u s s i a was

ordered o n l y a f t e r t h e s u c c e s s of t h e Minsk pocket and t h e s e i z u r e of t h e

main e x i t s from i t northwest and southwest. However, t h e S o v i e t s had seen

t h e l i b e r a t i o n o f B e l o r u s s i a and t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of A m y Group Center as t h e

ultimate a i m of t h e operation,

One manner i n which t h e Red Army cquld have conducted deep a t t a c k

o p e r a t i o n s was a e r i a l i n t e r d i c t i o n , b u t t h e y d i d not do s o t o any marked

degree. In f a c t , throughout t h e w a r they only devoted about 5% o f t h e i r

s o r t i e s t o i n t e r d i c t i o n a s we understand i t . Another means of deep a t t a c k

which t h e y d i d n o t u s e b u t which they possessed was a i r b o r n e a t t a c k . They

d i d , however, use p a r t i s a n s i n support o f t h i s operation a s a form o f deep

attack. This would be an anomaly, because i n t h e Ukraine t h e p a r t i s a n s were

n o t s o r e l i a b l e , some bands being q u i t e a n t i S o v i e t . Lndeed, they k i l l e d

Marshal Vatutin, a f r o n t commander i n t h e spring of 1944. Nor would

p a r t i s a n s n e c e s s a r i l y be a v a i l a b l e i n o p e r a t i o n s o u t s i d e t h e countrg.

The success of deep a t t a c k o p e r a t i o n s i n Operation BAGRATION was a b e t t e d

a l s o by t h e German d e f e n s i v e d i s p o s i t i o n s and doctrine. Although the German

military l e a d e r s d i d know how t o p r a c t i c e defense i n depth, Adolf H i t l e r

would n o t allow withdrawals t o s h o r t e n t h e l i n e s i n o r d e r t o provide g r e a t e r

operational reserves, nor, even operationally, would he allow construction
of works and l i n e s t o operational depth. !he l a t t e r s t r i c t u r e only

aggravated t h e s i t u a t i o n caused by l a c k of manpower t o complete t h e second

l i n e of t a c t i c a l defenses i n t h e a r e a of Amy Group Center. Thus, Army

Group Center was l e f t with inadequate f o r c e s and preparations for t h e

frontage which it had t o defend. The u n i t a v a i l a b l e t o Army Group Center

which might have provided operational reserves, L V I Panzer Corps, was

removed from Army Group Center's c o n t r o l , and i t was mal-positioned t o r e a c t

t o t h e blows which eventually f e l l .

 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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1968.

9. DA Pamphlet No. 20-240, Rear S e c u r i t y i n Russia. Washington, 1951.

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Operational A r t : 1941-194 5. " C a r l i s l e Barracks, PA, 1985.

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16. Glante, David M., "Toward Deep B a t t l e , t h e S o v i e t Conduct of Operational

Maneuver. " C a r l i s l e Barracks, 1985.

17. Hoeffding , Oleg , "Soviet b t e r d i c t i o n Operations, 1941-1945. " Santa

Monica, CA, 1970.

18. Kardaahov, V. , Rokossovskii . Moscow, 1984.

19. Kiselev, V. N. , "Narashchivanie v s i l i i voisk v b o d e -frontovykh

nastupatel'nykh o p e r a t s i i Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny [ ~ u i l d - u p of

e f f o r t i n Front Offensive Operations of t h e Great

h t r i o t i c / ~ a t h e r l a n dwar 1, " Voepno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 8 : 8 6 ,

pp. 22-29.

20. Losik, O., "Primenenie bronetankovykh i mekhanizirovannykh voisk v

Belorusskoi o p e r a t s i i [Ehployment of Tank and Mechanized Forces i n

t h e Selorussian operation], " Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 6 :84,

21. Matsulenko , V. A., O p e r a t i m a p maskirovka voisk [operational Cover and

Deception o f ~ 0 r c e s . j . Moscow, 1975.

11
22.. irlikhalkin, V., Boevoe primenenie a r t i l l e r i i v Belorusskoi o p e r a t s i i

[hployment of A r t i l l e r y i n t h e Belorussian Operational j,"

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23. Ogarkov, 1. V. , "Dal'naia o p e r a t s i i a ( b o i ) [The Deep Operation
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v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny [ ~ i r e c t i o no f f o r c e s i n the
Years of t h e Great F k t r i o t i d F a t h e r l a n d war]. Foscow, 1974.

25. Pospelov, P. IT., I s t o r i y a Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny sovetskogo

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t h e Soviet ~ n i o n ] . Moscow, 1962.

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Proceedings, 1985 Art of War Symposium. C a r l i s l e Barracks, PA, 1985.

27. Radzievskii, A. I., ed., Armeiskie o p e r a t s i i [Army operations]. Moscow,

1977.

28. Sasso, Claude R., S o v i e t Night Operations i n World Yar 11. Fort
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29. Savkin, V. E., The Basic P r i n c i p l e s o f Operational A r t and ' ~ a c t i c s ,

t r a n s l a t e d by USAF. Washington, 1979.

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 Seaton, Albert, S t a l i n a s a M i l i t a r y Commander. New York, 1976.

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Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal , 6 : 8 6 , pp. 17-24.

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. voennoe iskusstvo v Belorusskoi o p e r a t s i i 1944 goda
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Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 6:84, pp. 10-18.

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science]. Moscow, 1966.

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s i l v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine 1941-1945 f victories of Soviet

Armed Forces i n the Great ~ a t r i : o t i c / F a t h e r l a n dwar]. Moscow, 1953.

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H i s t o r i c a l Analysis of the Use of Mobile Forces by Russia and the

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U SSR. College S t a t i o n , TX, 1985.
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o p e r a t i v n o i g l u b i n e [Ehployment of Air Army Formations f o r Front

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,

zhurnal, 8:86, pp. 14-21. .

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Washington, D C. . , 1968.
 ANNEX A
Correlation of Porces ( s t r a t e g i c )
June 1944

1,- Soviet.

P e r s o ~ e lFormations Active Fronts S tavka

Armament Mil. Equip. and Fleets fieserves Total

Ground Forces 5,691,000 386,000 6,077,000

Air Forces 377,000 70,000 447,000

Airborne Forces

Total - .. 6,425,000 514,000 6,939,000

R i f l e , Mo t o r - r i f l e
Cavalry, and Airborne
Divisions

Detached Brigades

Fortified Areas
-

Tank and Mechanized Cows 22 15 37

Detached Tank Bdes 30 1 37

Artillery and Mortar

Divisions
 Personnel Formations Active di?ronts
Amament N i l . Equip. and F l e e t s Total

Detached Artillery
and Mortar Bdes

Aviation Divisions 132 21 153

Guns and X o r t a r s 92,557 4,4~3 97,050

T a n k s / ~ s s a u l t Guns

Operational Aircraft 13,428 i, 353 14.7~7

2. German.

Pe r s o m e l Field dese,me
Formations Army- 0t h e r or Total
Armament Eastern Fronts Satellite
Equipment Front

Ground Torces 3,130,000 1,420,000 ~ 8 0 ~ , 0 0 0 ) 4,550,WOU {GE)

Air r'orce 1,800,a10 1,81)i),000

Navy 80,000 80,000

Total 3, 130,000 3,3oo,900 2,000,m0 d,43b,;00

Infant rj
Divisions
 Pe raonne 1 Field Reserve
Formations b y - 0 ther or 'total
Armament Eastern Fronts Satellite
Ruipmen t Front

Parac hut e
. Divisions
--

Brigades

Panzer
Divisions

Panzer Grenadier
Divisions

SS Divisions 9

Guns and Mortars 48,635 19,865 'Jnk 68,500 {GE)

Tanks/Assault
Guns

Operational
Aircraft
 ANNEX B - SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE (1944)
1. SOVIET RIFLE FORCES

R i f l e Army
3 r i f l e corps
- 7-12 rifle d i v i s i o n s
1 a r t i l l e r y brigade
2 gun a r t i l l e r y regiments
1 tank destroyer regiment
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 mortar regiment
1 engineer/sapper brigade
1 tank regiment
1 signal regiment
1 tank o r mechanized corps
( optional)
strength: 80,000-120,000 men
300-460 tanks ( i f tank/aech corps a t t a c h e d )
1,700-2000 guns/mortars
30-225 SP guns

R i f l e Corps
3 r i f l e divisions
1 a r t i l l e r y brigade (guard corps)
1 a r t i l l e r y regiment ( r e g u l a r corps)
1 self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 guards mortar regiment
1antiaimnf t a r t i l l e r y b a t t a G n
1 sapper b a t t a l i o n
1 signal battalion
strength: 20,000-30,000.men

R i f l e Division
3 r i f l e regiments ( 4 x 7 h , 12 x 45ms)
1 a r t i l l e r y brigade
1 gun a r t i l l e r y regiment (32 x 76mm)
1 howitzer a r t i l l e r y regiment (20 x 122mm)
1 mortar reginent ( 2 0 x 12Qum)
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n (12 x 37mm)
' ( i n guards d i v i s i o n s )
1 tank destroyez b a t t a l i o n (18 x 45, 57, 7 h )
I sapper b a t t a l i o n
1 s i g n a l compazy
1 reconnaissance company
 strength: 9,380 men*
64 guns
127 mortars
12 AA guns
54 AT guns
*Bifle d i v i s i o n s t r e n g t h s a r e by TOE - Actual strengths nuch smaller
i 500-6,000)
2. SOVIET CAVALRY FORCES

Cavalry Corps
3 cavalry d i v i s i o n s
2 tank regiments (39 tanks each)
I reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n
1 tank destroyer regiment
1 mortar regiment
1 guards mortar b a t t a l i o n
1 self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 engineer regiment
1 signal battalion
strength: 14,000-15,000 men
80-100 tanks,
268 guns /mortHrs
4 8 'AT guns
.
34 AA guns
Cavalry Division
3 cavalry regiments (6 x 76mm. 6 x 45mm)
1 a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t squadron
1 engineer squadron
1 s i g n a l squadron
strength: 4,700 men
42 guns
18 AT guns
3. TANK/MECHANIZEDFORCES
Mechanized Corps
3 mechanized brigades
- 3 motorized r i f l e b a t t a l i o n s
1 tank regiment (35 tanks)
1 tank brigade (65 tanks)
- 1 l i g h t self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment (sU--76)
1 med self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment (SU-85)
1 heavy self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment (sU-152)
( i n some corps)
1 mortar regiment
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 guards mortar b a t t a l i o n
1 motorcycle b a t t a l i o n
1 signal battalion
1 sapper, engineer b a t t a l i o n
1 medical b a t t a l i o n
1 transport company
1 r e p a i r , reconstruction company
strength: 16,442 men
183 tanks
63 SP guns
234guns/mortars
8 multiple rocket launchers

Tank Corps
3 tank brigades (6 5 tanks each) .
1 motorized r i f l e brigade
1 mortar regiment
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 l i g h t self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment (SU-76)
1 med self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment (sU-85/122)
1 heavy self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment (SU-152)
( i n some corps)
1 l i g h t a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 guards mortar b a t t a l i o n
1 motorcycle b a t t a l i o n
1 transport company
2 r e p a i r companies ( a r t i l l e r y , tank)
1 s e d i c a l b a t t a l i o n (Nay 1944)
1 s a p p r battalion
1 signal b a t t a l i o n
1 a v i a t i o n company
1 chemical defense company
s t r e w t h : 12,010 men
207 tanks
6 3 SP g u n s
182 guns/mortars
8 multiple rocket launchers
 Tank Army
2 tank corps
1 mechanized corps (optional)
1 motorcycle regiment
1 l i g h t a r t i l l e r y brigade
2 gun a r t i l l e r y regiments (76mm)
- 1 gun a r t i l l e r y regiment (1OChm)
1 l i g h t self-propelled a r t i l l e r y brigade
3 l i g h t self-propelled a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s (SU-76)
1 machine gun b a t t a l i o n
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t machine gun company
2 mortar regiments
1 guards mortar regiments
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y div
4 a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y regiments
1 morotized engineer brigade
2 motorized engineer bns
1 pontoon bridge b a t t a l i o n
1 s i g n a l regiment
1 a v i a t i o n communications regiment
1 t r a n s p o r t regiment
2 repair/reconstruction b a t t a l i o n s
strength: 50,000 men .
500-650 tanks, SP guns
6 50-850 guns /mortars
 ABXEX. C

CORRELATION OF FORCES
BELORUSSIA - JUNE 1944
S OVTET GERMAN

-
1st Baltic F ront (3d Air ~ r m y )( ~ B A F ) .XPanzer Army ( 3 P z ~ )

6th Gds Army [ ~ G A ) IX AC

4th Shock Army (4sA) L I I AC

43d Army (4%) VI A C

1 s t Tank Corps (1TC)

227,000 men 120,000 men

-
3d ~ e l o r u s s i a hFront ( 1 s t Air Army) (33RF)

39th Amy (3%) .

5 t h Army ( 5 ~ )

5 t h ~ d Tank
s Army (SGTA) 4 t h Army ( 4 ~ )

3d Gds Mech Corps XXVII AC

CMG
3d Gds Cav Corps

2d Gds Tank Corps ( ~ G T C )

389,500 men 165,000 men

1,810 Tks/sPs
 -
2d B e l o r u s s i s n F ront ( 4 t h A i r Army) (2~R2)

202,900 men

-
1st B e l o r u s s i a n F r o n t (16th A i r Army-Rt W i n g ; (l3Rlj
(6th Air A m y- L e f t Xi%)

4 8 t h Army (48A)

65th Army (65A)

28th Amy ( 2 8 ~ ) LV AC
9th Tank Corps (9TC) 120,000 men

1st Mech Corps

( CMG )
4th %Is Cav Corps
1st Cds Tank Corps ( ~ G T C )

5th Air F l e e t

Totals

Initisl 1,250,000 men ( combat) 3 x 1 4G0, CWLJ 3en ( combat j

(124 d i v i s i o n s , 9 T C / X ) ( 3 x 1 ) < 3 6 1 3 , 5 ? Z / ? ~ ~ r 3 i v7, r e s )
Total 2,400,000 men ( t o t a l ) 3 x 1 303,000 ae3 ( t o t a l )
(166 divisions, 1 2 TC/YC) ( 3 x 1 ) (60 d i v )
Initial 4,050 T"S/SPS 10 x 1 40d T ~ s / S i ' a
Total (5200 'Ilcs/SP 6 x 1 (900 '~lrs/s?j
5,100 aircraft 4 x 1 1,324 aircraft
33,000 guns/morters 8 x 1 4,000 gnns/mortars
 ANNEX D - PLANNING SEQUENCE
5 April--Commission o f GKO e s t a b l i s h e d t o study E a s t e r n Front f o r s t r a t e g y .

12 April--Commission r e p o r t s ; GKO d e c i d e s f o r o f f e n s i v e i n B e l o r u s s i a and

s p l i t o f Western Front ( c o n t r o l l i n e o p e r a t i o n s i n ~ e l o r u s s i a )i n t o 3 and 2d
Belorussian Ronts.

17-19 April--Stavka t r a n s m i t t e d d i r e c t i v e s t o a l l f r o n t commanders t o assume

t h e defense; e s t a b l i s h 25 km " s e c u r i t y zone."

24 April--Western Front replaced by 2d and 3d Belorussian Fronts.

30 April--Stavka completed i n i t i a l d r a f t o f concept o f o p e r a t i o n .

1-7 May--Planning d i r e c t i v e s based upon Stavka concept i s s u e d t o f r o n t
commanders.

-Two phases:

--Ehcirclement o f German f o r c e s a t Vietbsk and 3obruisk.

--Exploitation t o Minsk from Vitebsk and Bobruisk f o r encirclement of

Army Group Center's main f o r c e s .

--Main a t t a c k s t o be made by jd Belorussian and 1st Z e l o r u s s i a n f r o n t s

a g a i n s t Vitebsk and Bobwisk,' r e s p e c t i v e l y , then l i n k i n g up a t Minsk.

--1st B a l t i c Front t o make deep a t t a c k t o Molodechno.

-Four penetrations:

--1st B a l t i c Front

--3d Belorussian Pront

--1st . ~ e l o r u s s i a nFront ( 2 )

1 5 Xay--Four f r o n t commanders submit p l a n s t o Stavka.

20 May--Stavka d r a f t p l a n completed and issued a s a planning rnemorandun

signed by Army General A . I . Antonov, DCS Ops f o r t h e 3ed Army and S a w .
Named BAGRATION.

22-23 May--Plan reviewed by Su?rerne Commander Joseph S t a l i n and n i s d e p u t i e s

along with t h e f o u r f r o n t commanders and t h e i r c h i e f s of s t a f f . Changes:
 --1st B a l t i c Front t o advance along Western Wina a i v e r t o protect
northern f l a n k of offensive.

--Phase one t o include encirclement of Minsk (depth of 200-250 km);

phase two t o include l e f t f l a n k of 1st Belorussian Front a f t e r r i g h t flank
f o r c e s reach Sloaim and advance of 550-600 km.
. --Operation's first phase t o be accomplished i n s t a g e s :
---1st--encirclements of enemy t a c t i c a l defenses a t Vitebsk by 1st
B a l t i c and 3d Belorussian Fronts and Bobruisk by 1st Belorussian Front, witn
secondary penetrations a g a i n s t Orsha and Mosilev t o f i x enemy f o r c e s (depth
approximately 50-60 h)

---2d--Mobile groups t o encircle/destroy enemy 0 3 e r a t i o n a l reserves

and e n c i r c l e main body f o r c e by driving on Hinsk and c u t t i n g i t o f f from
north and south a t Nolodechno and Baranovichi, respectively.

--Forces making main e f f o r t s now 97 d i v i s i o n s , up from 7 7.

-Six penetrations:

--1st B a l t i c Zkont--northwest of, Vitebsk t o e n c i r c l e Vitebsk from

north; e x p l o i t a t i o n f o r c e t o Western Dvina River.

0-3Belorussian Front--two penetrations. One southeast of V i tebsk t o

e n c i r c l e city from south, and t h e o t h e r t o penetrate G e m n defenses a t
Orsha and destroy enemy f o r c e s there. Cavalry-Mechanized Group t o follow
northern penetration and s e i z e Molodechno.

--2d Belorussian- Front--east of Mogilev t o destroy enemy forces i n

a r e s and break through t o Beresina River.

--1st Belorussian Front--two penetrations, north i3ogschev s e c t o r ) and

south of Bobruisk, one on each s i d e of Beresina River. Tank corps of front
t o be used i n encirclement of Bobruisk and/or encirclement of NLnsk;
Cavalry-Mechanized Group t o e x p l o i t t o Baranovichi t o iso1at.e Minsk from
south.

24-30 Fay--S tavka revised d r a f t Plan.

31 Yay--Stavka issued revised planning d i r e t i v e t o f r o n t commanders. 5th

Guards Tank Army assigned t o 3d Selomssian Front with s i s s i o n o f passing
through Orsha penetration and attacking towards Borisov and ;dIinsk.

041600 June--7lasilevsky a r r i v e s a t 3 aelorussian Front t o coordinate

northern group of f r o n t s . Chief Barshal of Avn A. A. Novikov t o a s s i s t on
a v i a t i o n maters.
050500 June--Zhukov a r r i v e s a t 1st Belorussian Front t o c o o r d i n a t e .southern
group o f f r o n t s . Harshal o f Avn Faiaieyev t o assist on c o o r d i n a t i o n o f am
matters.

13 ~ u n e - - ~ t a l i nagreed t o f our-day postponement o f BAGRATION (i.e., from

15-20 June t o 19-23 ~ u n e ) .
14218 June--Army and corps plans wargamed before f r o n t commanders and Stavka
representatives. -

1 5 June--front p l a n s f i n a l i z e d and reviewed by Stavka.

19 June--Partisan a c t i v i t i e s begin. Reisovaya voina, 10K detonations; 4OK

f o r f o u r days. Estimated 1000 c u t s i n r a i l s and roads sade of 2000 planned.

20-22 June--RIF ( r e i n c o & bn) conducted by 2d and 3 S a l t i c and 1st

Ukrainian Fronts, a s well as by BAGRATION Fronts.

20 June-By t h i s d a t e , t h e f o u r f r o n t s had received a l l t h e i r r e i n f o r c i n g

troops and completed t r a i n i n g .

22 June-RIF by BAGRATION f r o n t s commenced; success i n 1st B a l t i c Front

converted i n t o o f f e n s i v e . .
23 June--3 & 2d Belorussian Fronts ( n o r t h e r n and c e n t e r ) commence o f f e n s i v e .

24 June--1st Belorussian Front ( s o u t h ) commences o f f e n s i v e .

28 J u n e - S t a v k a o'kders CAA of f r o n t s t o e n c i r c l e German 4 t h Army e a s t of

Minsk and CMG' s o f f r o n t s t o c u t roads west of Minsk a t Baranovichi and
Xolodechno; 5 GTA t o e f f e c t o u t e r ( X ) encirclement of Hinsk.

4 . Jul--Stavka o r d e r s p u r s u i t t o borders of S e l o r u s s i a ; 5 GTA & CKG ( 8 ) t o .

Vilnius, CMG ( S ) t o Belostock.

12 July--L8vov-Sandomiercz Operation ( 1 s t Ukrainian Front) starts.

18 July--Left Wing of 1st Belorussian Front opens offensive toward L u b l i n

and Warsaw; p r s u i t by r e s t of BAGRATION f o r c e s t o V i s t u l a River and 2 .
Prussia .
 ANNEX E

Major Elements o f Front Plans

Total Width Formations

Width of of Naking Exploitation
Front Frontage Penetration Penetrations Force Bemarks
(Kilometer) (~ilometer)

1st B a l t i c 160 25 6 t h Guards Is t Tank

Army; 4 3 Co rps

3-d Belorussian 130 18 a . Northern ;-Iechanizeci 5th Guards

Shock Cavalry Tank Army
Group Group (3d t o be com-
39th Cavalry and mitted as
Army; 3d Guards the front ' s
5 t h Army M e c k n i zed main ex-
cows) plo i t i n g
force i n
zone of
group
enjoying
greater
success

15 b. Southern 2d Guards
Shock Tank C o q s
Group
llth
Guards
h y ;
31s t h y

2d Belorusaian 160 15 44th Army ist 3 i f l e Initially,

Co q s t h i s front
limited.
objective
of s e i z i n g
$iogilev
 Total Width Formations
Width of of Xaking Exploitation
Front Frontage Penetration Penetrations Force Remarks
(Kilometer) (Kilometer)

1st Belomssian 650 17 a. Northern 9th Tank Initially,

(250) Shock corps only right
Group wing o f
x h y ; this front
48th Army ( four
armies)
were t o b e
committed.
Pour armies
b. Southern l a t Guards had a
Shock Tank Corps frontage o f
Group 250 kilo-
65th Army; meters.
28th
Mechanized
Cavalry
Group
 Ai!i!NEX P

Dispositions

1. Army o p e r a t i o n s i n breaking through enemy t a c t i c a l zones.

AFW/ S e c t o r Width Depth Ava Dly Length of Op

Front i n km in h Advance i n Dys Remarks
Zone Pen End ( hi t i a l )

5 h y / 22 12 63 150 18-20 km 8 CXG; 5 GTL

1st BR 22 t a n i c s / ~ ~
/km i n f s p t

11 Gds k m y / 35 8 35 160 16-16 km 9 2GTC

1st BR 1.1 ian/aiv;
181 guns/km;
22 t a n k s / A ~
/km i n f s p t;
46 t a n k / A ~
/lan t o t a l

49 Amy/ 50 12 45 60 1 2 km 5 See note a .

2d BR

3 h y / 53 12 65 80 16 km 5 9TC ;
1st BR 16 taruts/~c;
/km i n f s p t

65 Army/ lGTC
1st BR 24 6 40 65 1 3 hn 5 75;b of per-
sonnel, a&
or^ guns/nor-
t a r s , 4% o f
tanks /AG ' s
13 t a ~ u t s / ~ ~
/ai n f s p t

Notes:

a. 49 Army Concentration of Forces

 ~orces/ Own Forces GE P o n e s delative
Naterial Total Per km Total Per km Superiority

Battalions 91 7.6 12 1.0 7.6: 1

2. Tactical d e n s i t i e s i n Rifle Corps i n Operation BAGRATION.

Atk Pen - Density Per km Pen S e c t o r

Corps Zone Sector Rifle Bn Guns/i;lo r t Tanks/~~

1 i3R/ 18th
55 Army
3. I n t r o d u c t i o n o f 2d Echelons and Xobile Groups o f Armies.

Name of Day of Entry i n t o B a t t l e Immediate Task

Operation Army 2d Echelon Mobile Group 2d Echelon Mobile Group

Orsha 11 GA R i f l e Div- 2d GTC- S e i z e 2d Def S e i z e army

2d Day 4 t h Day Line o b j ; develop
tactical
success
into
operational

Bobruisk 3 Army R i f l e Div- 9 t h TC- S e i z e 1st Obj S e i z e 1st a b j

2d Day; 2d Day S e i z e 2d Obj
46 X C - 3 3ay (46 X C >

Bobruisk 65 Army R i f l e Div- 1st GTC- S e i z e 1st Obj S e i z e 1st Obj

1st Day Is t Day