Gender, Land Rights, and Agrarian Change
Gender, Land Rights, and Agrarian Change
2 Shahraof Agrarian Change, Vol. 3 Nos. 1 and 2, January and April 2003, pp. 2–32.
Razavi
SHAHRA RAZAVI
BACKGROUND
The past two decades have witnessed significant shifts in global development
agendas and policies, marked by a resurgence of laissez-faire orthodoxies and a
marked ambivalence, if not outright hostility, towards the ‘heavy-handed’ devel-
opmental state. The debt crises of the early 1980s and the subsequent multilateral
lending programmes provided a decisive opening for the international financial
institutions (IFIs) to impose a neo-liberal agenda of fiscal restraint, open trade
and capital accounts, and privatization on indebted developing countries.
Shahra Razavi, Research Coordinator, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
(UNRISD), Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. e-mail: razavi@[Link]
The author would like to thank Terry Byres for extensive comments, advice and support in
bringing together this special issue; Ann Whitehead, Deniz Kandiyoti and Cherryl Walker for their
helpful comments on the Introduction; Caroline Danloy for excellent research assistance; and all
contributing authors for agreeing to make numerous rounds of revision. Funding for the UNRISD
project ‘Agrarian Change, Gender and Land Rights’ was provided by Sida, UNDP, FAO as well as
the governments of Denmark, Finland, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and
the United Kingdom which provide UNRISD’s core funds.
Issues of agrarian change and rural development have been a palpable part of
these policy shifts. The neoliberal attack on the post-World War Two consensus
was built on a deep aversion to state-led import substituting industrialization,
while agriculture featured as the centrepiece of the narrative in national eco-
nomies where agriculture formed a high proportion of GDP. Here alleged ‘urban
bias’ was to be corrected by ‘getting prices right’ through various measures, such
as exchange rate devaluation, abolishing export taxes and reducing trade barriers,
while tenure insecurity was to be tackled through land titling (e.g. World Bank
1989). These standard measures, it was argued, would restore agricultural export
growth and improve rural incomes and livelihoods. At the same time, cutbacks
in public expenditure outlays on agricultural input subsidies, marketing boards,
and research and extension services (representing an inflow of resources into
agriculture that was largely ignored by proponents of ‘urban bias’) were pre-
scribed and justified on the grounds that state expenditure needed to be signific-
antly lowered and that the benefits were, in any case, either being captured by
big farmers or squandered by state officials. Ironically, these public expenditure
outlays were eroded at a time when they were most needed – when developing
countries were being urged to open up their economies to global agricultural
markets by intensifying their export thrust and exposing themselves to imports
from countries that often provide generous agricultural subsidies to their farm-
ing sectors.
Gender concerns have made a shadowy, and less than satisfactory, appearance
in these global policy debates. In the early 1980s, as a result of criticisms by
feminists that structural adjustment policies were failing to recognize social re-
production as a set of activities that were essential to the economy, some atten-
tion was paid by gender specialists within the World Bank to women’s role in
the reproductive economy. Later, the focus shifted to women’s role in produc-
tion at the household level in sub-Saharan Africa, in what has become known as
the ‘gender efficiency argument’ (Razavi and Miller 1995). This shift in focus –
from women’s role in reproduction to that in production – coincided with the
growing concerns about the lack of agricultural supply response in Africa.1
One strand of thinking, which has been taken up by mainstream policy insti-
tutions, uses neo-classical micro-economic analytical tools to argue that the struc-
ture of male and female incentives in farm households leads to ‘allocative
inefficiencies’ and a muted agricultural supply response (e.g. Udry et al. 1995;
Blackden and Bhanu 1999).2 In these arguments gender is thus effectively about
inequality in resource allocation. These analyses have been abstracted from a set
1
I am grateful to Ann Whitehead for pointing this out to me.
2
For a critical assessment of this literature see Whitehead (2001) and Whitehead and Kabeer (2001).
As Ann Whitehead (personal communication, April 2002) further notes, these arguments have been
widely taken up by the mainstream policy establishment, in part at least, because this kind of analysis
is compatible with the overall orthodox neo-classical position on African agriculture which sees the
absence of a land market (and other ways in which the economy is less than fully commoditized) as
the source of inefficiencies in resource use.
3
For an illustration of this point in the case of Tanzania, see Tsikata’s contribution to this special issue.
The contributions to this special issue critically reflect on the broad set of
issues that have been raised in both the academic literature as well as in policy
debates on the interface between gender and land. Different aspects of the gender
and land question are explored by the contributing authors. The analysis that
they bring to bear on the subject is informed by different understandings of
gender relations and the most important arenas within which those relations
operate. Yet despite their crucial conceptual and methodological variations, and
their different entry points, together they constitute a strong statement on the
importance of taking the contextual specificities of the gender and land question
seriously. They also agree broadly on the inadequacies of policy prescriptions
that rely on the magic of ‘the market’ and downplay the role of the state, while
underscoring the crucial task of making the state more democratic and account-
able to all its citizens irrespective of gender and class.
access that the authors are at pains to highlight. They are deeply apprehensive
about one-size-fits-all gender and development prescriptions that still advocate
a blanket policy of ensuring women’s land access through titling, without any
reference to these African specificities. The paper provides a brief account
of how African land tenure arrangements have changed and been transformed
in colonial, post-colonial and current settings in the context of rapid socio-
economic change and policy interventions by an array of international, national
and local actors and interests. Throughout, the authors highlight and explore
historical shifts in thinking and the evidential and theoretical, as well as political
and ideological, factors affecting these shifts. They examine an emerging con-
sensus among policy advocates from very different political and ideological posi-
tions, that rejects the older idea of making a complete rupture with ‘customary’
systems of land tenure, and instead stresses building on ‘the customary’. Draw-
ing on other feminist literature on women and the state, they discuss some of the
potential problems that such a return to ‘the customary’ will pose for contempor-
ary African women.
The second part of the special issue consists of five country case studies from
diverse regional contexts – sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa, Tanzania), South
Asia (India), Central Asia (Uzbekistan) and Latin America (Brazil). They provide
situated analyses of agrarian change, land tenure reform and gender structures,
but their contours and entry points are different, reflecting the particular agrarian
histories, current processes of land tenure reform and the on-going preoccupa-
tions of women’s movements and advocates in the different countries.
Tables 1 and 2 provide a rough comparative picture of the significance of the
agricultural sector to the national economies of these five countries: the contribu-
tion of the agricultural sector to GDP (Table 1), and the percentage of the eco-
nomically active population in the agricultural sector (Table 2). At one end of the
spectrum are South Africa and Brazil, where the agricultural sector today makes
a relatively small contribution to GDP (3.2 per cent and 7.4 per cent, respect-
ively), while Tanzania appears at the opposite end with the agricultural sector
contributing a far more significant share of GDP (45.1 per cent). Uzbekistan and
India (with 34.9 per cent and 24.9 per cent, respectively) fall somewhere
in-between the two extremes. The labour force statistics produce a roughly
similar ranking of the country case studies. Corresponding to agriculture’s
relatively small contribution to GDP, South Africa and Brazil also have the
lowest proportion of economically active population engaged in the agricultural
sector (9.59 per cent and 16.69 per cent, respectively), while Tanzania has the
highest proportion (80.45 per cent). Again, Uzbekistan (27.65 per cent) and
India (59.64 per cent) fall in-between the two extremes. However, while the
agricultural sector contributes a higher proportion of the GDP in Uzbekistan
than it does in India, it seems to absorb a lower share of the economically active
population in Uzbekistan compared to India.
In her contribution to this special issue, Cherryl Walker examines the disjunc-
ture between high-level policy commitments to gender equality in South Africa’s
on-going land reform programme, and weaknesses in translating these lofty
policy principles into vigorous action on the ground. The South African agrarian
scene is deeply marked by a brutal history of colonial forced dispossession in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the ferocious racial inequalities of land
dispensation put in place by successive minority white governments after 1910.
This was accompanied by a programme of spatial control, which forcefully re-
settled more than 3.5 million black people out of what were deemed ‘white’ areas
and into labour reserves, or ‘bantustans’. For much of the twentieth century, the
bantustans served as labour reserves for the mining and industrial centres of the
country, whereby government policies targeted men as migrant labourers and
women as the reproducers of an impoverished subsistence economy within the
reserves. The land reform programme that emerged out of the constitutional
negotiations and policy debates of the early 1990s attempted to combine a strong
commitment to the goals of social justice and redress – including an explicit
commitment to gender justice – with the principles of market-led land reform.
Yet, a decade later it can be argued that the commitment to gender equity has
operated mainly at the level of lofty principle – a kind of ‘piety in the sky’. To
explain the disjuncture between high-level policy principles and on-the-ground
action, Walker’s account examines the wide range of factors – macroeconomic,
socio-political, institutional and conceptual – which have shaped and constrained
government policy vis-à-vis land.
Land tenure in Tanzania also bears the imprint of colonial policies character-
istic of ‘Africa of the labour reserves’ (Amin 1972)4 in the form of massive land
dispossession and a pro-white settler policy. However, given the much earlier
establishment of independent African rule together with the particular character-
istics of Tanzania’s road to modernization, agrarian relations and land tenure
arrangements present an altogether different scenario to that found in South
Africa. Despite considerable regional and ethnic heterogeneity, Tanzania has been
described as a nation of predominantly ‘peasant farmers, who, virtually without
exception, endeavour[ed] to provision their own staple food needs’ (Bryceson
1993, 2). Post-colonial agricultural policy, in the form of Ujamaa or ‘African
socialism’, entailed extensive state intervention in the agricultural sector. In addi-
tion to state attempts to accelerate industrialization, this involved ‘villagization’
or the physical relocation of the mass of the rural population into concentrated
village settlements where they were supplied with basic social services, while at
the same time marketing boards, crop authorities and cooperatives were also
extended to these settlements for the supervision and control of peasant agricul-
tural production (Gibbon 1995). As far as land tenure was concerned, the post-
colonial government did not pursue the route of individualization, titling and
registration, as occurred in Kenya and some other countries. In the 1980s, how-
ever, the government’s commitment to the policy of ‘villagization’ was reversed
and the conditions were created for the increasing liberalization of agriculture.
This has also coincided with a process of democratic opening. It is within this
contentious liberalizing context that the policy proposals on land tenure reform
were developed and debated beginning in 1992. In her contribution to this spe-
cial issue, Dzodzi Tsikata documents and analyses the debates and controversies
between government officials, academics, and various activist groups and net-
works around land tenure reform, focusing in particular on how women’s inter-
ests in land were understood and debated by these actors. Some of the key
themes and questions that emerge from the Whitehead and Tsikata contribution
– the reappraisal of ‘customary’ laws, the limits of statutory interventions, local
level land tenure institutions as a site of unequal social relations – are explored
further in the light of Tanzania’s agrarian economy and the recent land policy
debates.
Echoing Patnaik’s analysis of the general stagnation of rural non-farm em-
ployment in India in the post-reform period, Bina Agarwal argues that for women
the slowing down of rural non-farm employment opportunities in recent years
has been dramatic. In other words, as more men shift to urban or rural non-farm
employment, while non-farm employment opportunities for women stagnate,
an increasing number of households will become dependent on women bearing
4
According to Samir Amin (1972), what defined ‘Africa of the labour reserves’ was the fact that
capital at the centre needed to have a large proletariat immediately available. This was because there
was great mineral wealth to be exploited. In order to obtain the necessary labour, the colonizers
dispossessed the African communities (sometimes by violence) and drove them deliberately into
small, poor regions with no means of modernizing and intensifying their farming.
the larger burden of cultivation and farm management. This in turn means that
the issue of secure land rights for women is becoming even more important, for
both productivist and equality reasons that are examined in her article. What
then are the prospects for enhancing women’s land access? Agarwal explores the
three main sources of arable land in India today – the state, the family and the
market – and, in relation to market access, she makes a departure from current
discussions by focusing on various forms of collective investment and cultivation
by women, mediated by NGOs. It is argued that these institutional innovations,
which have helped landless women use subsidized credit to lease-in or purchase
land in groups and cultivate it jointly, can provide the basis for reviving land
reform in a radically new form.
In the case of Uzbekistan, as Deniz Kandiyoti illustrates, it was not merely the
stagnation of non-farm employment, but the virtual collapse of public sector
employment and wages due to the crisis in public finance following the break-up
of the Soviet Union, which has had important repercussions for the agricultural
sector. Labour retrenchment in social services, rural industries and collective
farming enterprises has pushed the bulk of the rural population into reliance on
the smallholder economy (composed of household and subsidiary plots) and
precarious forms of self-employment (in informal trade and services) for their
subsistence. The agricultural sector has in effect acted as a ‘shock absorber’,
providing livelihoods for an increasing number of people. At the same time, the
state’s continued dependence on cotton as the major export crop and the stake it
retains in the maintenance of existing export revenues has made the shift away
from the institutional structures of the command economy very difficult. The
smallholder economy is thus effectively acting as a social safety net, but exists in
a symbiotic relationship with an export sector (in the form of ‘independent
farms’ and restructured collective enterprises) that is in turn tied to the state
procurement system. However, as Kandiyoti shows, a thorough understanding
of the actual workings of this mutual dependency – between smallholder agricul-
ture and the export sector – reveals the marked feminization of labour in both
sectors, whether as family or casual labour.
Agricultural reforms in Uzbekistan are sometimes compared to the Chinese
agrarian reforms initiated more than two decades ago under the Household Re-
sponsibility System (HRS). However, while the shift from work brigades to
‘family leaseholds’ in Uzbekistan was modelled on the Chinese HRS, it has not
granted farmers the decision-making freedom that was a key element of China’s
agrarian success in the 1980s. State dependence on cotton exports in Uzbekistan
is the main factor inhibiting agricultural liberalization, while in China state-
owned industrial enterprises were the state’s ‘cash cow’ during the early period
of reform (Pomfret 2000, 274), thereby reducing the state’s dependence on sur-
plus extraction from the agricultural sector. The diversification of livelihoods in
the two contexts has also taken very different routes, given the dynamic rural
industrialization process in China compared to the stagnating non-farm sector in
Uzbekistan. While women’s informal activities in rural Uzbekistan generally
constitute survivalist, low-return strategies in an overcrowded informal sector,
5
‘Globalization’ has become a catch-all term for many different trends; it is therefore crucial that we
clarify what we mean by it. Here we are concerned with economic globalization, which is taken to
mean greater openness of economies to international trade and capital mobility.
reduction and open capital accounts. Together these measures have had a
deflationary impact on the economies undergoing reform, which has prevented
governments from dealing effectively with unemployment and underemploy-
ment. The main targets of macroeconomic policy have been low inflation and
balanced budgets, regardless of their impact on social development – and indeed,
on economic growth.6 While the disruptive social consequences of deflationary
macroeconomic policies, marked by rising levels of social inequality and
marginalization, have been widely recorded and commented upon, it is becom-
ing increasingly clear that the orthodox policies have been far from successful in
generating even moderate rates of economic growth. Economic growth has slowed
dramatically over the past two decades (1980–2000), especially in the less developed
countries, compared with the previous two decades (1960–80) (Weisbrot et al.
2000, see also Table 1 in Patnaik, this issue).
Patnaik’s contribution to this special issue provides a penetrating analysis of
the political forces underpinning neoliberal deflationary policies of the past two
decades. Deflationary macroeconomic policies combined with the removal of all
national barriers to the free movement of finance capital constitutes the core of
the policy agenda of finance capital – a narrow but powerful interest group
which has moved into a position of global dominance since the late 1970s. One
of the central arguments of her paper is that the current global crisis of liveli-
hoods is of a scale and magnitude which is unprecedented since the run-up to the
Great Depression 70 years ago, and furthermore, that the 1920s too, like the
current era of neoliberal prescriptions, was a period when finance capital was
dominant.
Two questions are of particular interest to this special issue. First, how are
deflationary macroeconomic policies impacting on livelihoods in the rural areas
of developing countries? It is the changing nature of rural livelihoods that will
affect the processes driving attachment to, and functions of, land in rural and
non-rural household economies. Second, are deflationary macroeconomic poli-
cies gendered in their content and impact? Patnaik’s contribution provides an
answer to the first question, by outlining two powerful mechanisms at work.
First, as a result of cuts in state spending, economies have become demand-
constrained in the present era; in the case of India, which is her main point of
reference, the post-1991 cuts in the state’s development expenditures to contain
the budget deficit have caused the collapse of rural non-farm employment (which
in India refers to all forms of work other than crop and livestock production, and
covers a vast variety of possible activities, both formal and informal) and rural
wages, and a consequent decline in mass incomes.
6
As Elson (2002) rightly argues, very high rates of inflation can indeed be an important problem
for poor people, but so are very low rates of inflation, which generally come with stagnant employ-
ment opportunities. Moreover, inflation can be brought under control through a number of different
mechanisms, with a varying balance between cutting expenditure on public services important to
poor people and raising taxation on the incomes of rich people.
7
It is difficult to know whether the ensuing food insecurity has given rise to gender-differentiated
nutritional outcomes, especially in view of the fact that much of the earlier micro-level research
found inconclusive evidence of anti-female bias in nutritional status (Harriss 1990; Saith and Harriss-
White 1999).
8
The decisions concerning land use of collective enterprises and shirkat are made administratively
from the top and get passed down to all the localities which receive a plan concerning what acreage
will be planted with which crops.
9
Unlike cotton, wheat makes it possible to plant other crops after the harvest in June. The intro-
duction of polythene covers (which helps protect cotton from late frost) lengthens the growing
season and necessitates back-breaking work, since hoes can no longer be used for weeding and
thinning (women have to bend low under the polythene covers and weed with spoons).
As for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), there are strong indications that both export
crop and food crop sectors have performed poorly in the 1980s and 1990s, rather
than any massive crop-switching taking place (along the lines suggested by Patnaik
for India). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, SSA has witnessed the steady de-
cline of its agricultural exports as a share of the world’s agricultural trade, as well
as dramatic surges of agricultural imports, notably food, into the continent
(Bryceson 1999).10 In fact, as we noted earlier, much of the debate on structural
adjustment policies (SAPs) and African agriculture has been about the muted
supply response to price changes. By the mid-1990s, the World Bank had come
to admit that African agriculture’s response to SAPs had been disappointing,
which compelled the organization to ask ‘What nonprice factors are still con-
straining the supply response: Does the sector have adequate capacity to adjust to
changing incentives?’ (World Bank 1994, cited in Mkandawire and Soludo 2000,
53–4) – questions that critics of SAPs had been raising over the years.
These critics have argued that the objective of getting prices right was far
from adequate under the prevailing African conditions. The excessive focusing
on prices, they claim, took attention away from other problems and constraints,
such as the feebleness of commodity and financial markets, structural bottle-
necks, the immense climatic uncertainties and the low levels of irrigation and
fertilizer use (Binswanger 1989; UNCTAD 1998; CUTS 1999; Mkandawire and
Soludo 2000). Moreover, SAPs largely dismantled African marketing boards and
parastatals, which had serviced smallholders’ input requirements, provided mar-
keting channels to geographically dispersed and under-capitalized farmers, and
enforced commodity standards (Wold 1997; Bryceson 1999; MAFF 1999; Oxfam-
IDS 1999; Deininger and Olinto 2000; Winters 2000). The private traders that
have come to replace them vary in their performance through time and space,
but mounting evidence suggests that, with their patchy marketing services, they
have not lived up to the hopes vested in them by the IFIs (Wold 1997; Bryceson
1999; MAFF 1999; Oxfam-IDS 1999; Deininger and Olinto 2000; Winters 2000).
It is in the context of these debates that the micro-economic gender literature,
referred to briefly in the Background section, has come to identify the intra-
household structure of male and female incentives in African farm households as
a major source of ‘allocative inefficiency’ and the muted supply response of
African agriculture to price changes.11 But, as Whitehead (2001) argues, the evid-
ence and arguments that are presented by this set of literature are not very
convincing as accounts of the economic imperatives and constraints that exist for
both women and men smallholder farmers in SSA. Not only do some of the
10
It is noteworthy that countries like Nigeria departed from the standard SAP package prescrip-
tions by banning staple food imports (in the early stages of SAP implementations and again more
recently). This in turn provided an opportunity for domestic food producers to sustain their produc-
tion for the urban markets without the threat of being undercut by cheaper foreign imports (Bryceson
1999).
11
Whitehead (2001) provides what is probably one of the most up-to-date and comprehensive
analyses of the empirical studies on which the more abstract modelling exercises have been built.
empirical studies adopt a very narrow focus (e.g. treating the production of a
single crop in isolation from the farming and livelihood system as a whole), but
with their attention focused on the intra-household structure of incentives (e.g.
women’s poor incentives arising out of separate resource streams in farm house-
holds) as the explanation for a muted supply response, they effectively exclude
from consideration a much more important set of constraints that are to be found
in women’s difficulties in accessing resources, especially their weak command of
labour, their severe capital constraints, as well as their difficulties in accessing
markets. ‘Here again, the literature picks out land rights as highly significant,
but this emphasis seems to be grounded in theoretical rather than empirical
considerations’ (Whitehead 2001, 26–7).
From these brief observations, we can then draw out a number of feasible
gender implications. First, the evidence cited above seems to suggest that defla-
tionary macroeconomic policies can have a particularly detrimental impact on
the formal employment opportunities for women; in both Uzbekistan and India
the retrenchment of employment has disproportionately affected women. As
Elson and Cagatay (2000, 1355) observe more broadly, the deflationary bias of
macroeconomic policy has ‘a disproportionately negative effect on women . . .
Women in the formal sector tend to lose their jobs faster than men, and usually
have worse access than men to social safety nets. They crowd into the informal
sector, driving down earnings there’. These two authors also draw attention to a
second source of gender bias in deflationary macroeconomic policies which is
not highlighted by our case studies, namely the intensification of women’s care
work as a result of cutbacks in public expenditure outlays on social services
which forces women to become the ‘unpaid provisioners as of last resort’ (Elson
and Cagatay 2000, 1355).
But as far as the impacts of trade and agricultural liberalization on export
performance are concerned, our country case studies provide diverse scenarios.
Some countries have accelerated their agricultural export thrust (e.g. India) at the
expense of domestic food crop production and food security, with dire con-
sequences as farming households have become exposed to the vagaries of world
commodity markets in a deflationary context. In some of the other case studies,
agricultural supply response has been sluggish at best, if not downright negative.
In many sub-Saharan African countries, agricultural exports have performed
rather poorly, while food crop production has also suffered as a result of import
liberalization and multiple infrastructural and institutional inadequacies. Here
women smallholders continue to encounter severe constraints on their agricul-
tural operations, although the nature of those constraints is the subject of con-
troversy. We shall return to this question below, when we look at the debates
about African land tenure arrangements and women smallholders. In Uzbekistan,
abrupt change in the external environment – the decision to accelerate wheat
cultivation as a result of the sudden disruption of Soviet trade links – affected
agricultural production. Here there has been an intensification of female labour
in the subsistence sector (the expanded household plots) as well as in the export
cotton sector.
12
In addition to labour contributions, the other important contributions that agriculture can make
to economic growth and industrialization are: (a) capital and entrepreneurs (i.e. landlords or capitalist
farmers who then become industrialists and merchants); (b) agricultural commodities as cheap food
and other wage goods; and (c) a domestic market for industrial commodities.
13
Kay (2001) and Hart (1996) emphasize different aspects of this question. Kay argues that the
relatively equitable income distribution in East Asia, as a result of land reform in the countryside,
widened the size of the domestic market for industrial commodities, which is particularly important
in the initial stages of industrialization. In Latin America, however, the limited extent of agrarian
reform coupled with the fact that it was implemented several decades after the onset of industrializa-
tion, denied the region this potential widening of the domestic market and created a distorted and
inefficient industrial structure. Hart’s focus, as the following paragraphs illustrate, is on the contribu-
tion that agriculture (and redistributive land reforms) can make to the ‘social wage’ and the satisfact-
ory reproduction of labour as a precondition for successful industrial accumulation (Hart 2001).
Diversification thus refers to several different economic processes and its blanket
use to describe all forms of non-farm employment hides important differences. It
is particularly important, from the point of view of thinking about how to lift
farming households out of poverty, to distinguish between diversification as a
survival strategy and diversification that feeds into a process of accumulation
(Hart 1994; Whitehead and Kabeer 2001). One finding that emerges from some
of the contributions to this special issue is the tendency for women to be con-
fined to the less lucrative segments of the non-farm sector, in the form of
survivalist strategies, which do not offer good long-term prospects. This seems
to be the case in both India and Uzbekistan.
In the case of India, Agarwal argues that women tend to be largely concen-
trated in the low-and-insecure-earnings end of the non-farm occupational spec-
trum, which she attributes to their domestic work burden, lower physical
mobility, lesser education and fewer assets. Similarly, Kandiyoti’s research in
rural Uzbekistan shows that women are crowded into precarious forms of self-
employment in informal trade and services, which have a very limited market
since there is an oversupply of such services. While there are exceptions, such as
the more lucrative cross-border trading operations, this avenue is open to a small
minority of women with ‘courage, wit and resourcefulness’. In conclusion, she
thus notes that whereas some skilled men may achieve more sustainable forms
of self-employment, women’s survival strategies in rural Uzbekistan have
involutionary properties that do not offer good long-term prospects.14
Under what circumstances then can a more dynamic interaction between the
agrarian and industrial sectors be created? China is often singled out as a country
where such positive synergies were successfully forged. Here the diversification
of income-earning opportunities for rural residents has taken the form of both
farm-based businesses and non-farm employment (in TVEs and foreign-owned
export-oriented industries). While the land reforms under HRS boosted incomes
from farming in the first half of the 1980s, the TVEs and other non-farm em-
ployment provided the main stimulus to rural incomes afterwards (Summerfield
2002). These activities seem to have provided an avenue of accumulation for
rural residents, including women, even though gender inequalities in wages and
work conditions persist. Nevertheless, both employment in TVEs and the set-
ting up of some forms of off-farm sidelines seem to have added substantially to
women’s incomes and exerted a positive impact on their intra-household posi-
tion (Summerfield 2002).
Summerfield (2002) argues that it was the higher incomes from farming,
brought about as a result of the HRS, which initially provided the necessary
investment funds for enterprises run by townships and villages. In addition,
some villages had retained funds from the collective period, which they invested
14
A recent review of the literature on the non-farm sector in sub-Saharan Africa reached similar
conclusions, namely that the non-farm sector is segmented by gender and that women tend to be
crowded into the low-profit niches of trading and services (Whitehead 2001).
in TVEs. Later, a substantial inflow of funds came through foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), much of it from overseas Chinese. However, as Chris Bramall
(2000) has convincingly shown by analysing the experience of four very different
regions of China, these external sources of growth (i.e. FDI and growing ex-
ports) were far less significant than is often claimed, while domestic sources,
including financial flows from agriculture, have been crucial to Chinese accumu-
lation.15 In turn, the cash income from non-farm employment is invested in
other household activities, including green revolution agricultural technology
and animal husbandry (Bramall and Jones 2000).
It has been argued that successful industrialization in the East Asian countries
of Taiwan and China was built on changes in agrarian property relations in the
form of highly redistributive land reform programmes. Agriculture was thereby
able to provide both a broad basis for industrial growth by making the necessary
contributions (of labour, cheap food) and providing a domestic market for in-
dustrial commodities. Hart (1996) draws attention to a rather different aspect of
the agro-industrial linkages in these East Asian success stories, which highlights
the inter-connections between three crucial sets of issues: land reform, industrial
accumulation and restructuring, and livelihoods diversification.
Since the 1960s, much of the growth of small-scale, labour-intensive industry
in Taiwan, as well as in post-reform China, has been located in rural areas, and
industrial accumulation has effectively benefited from, and been subsidized by,
the population’s broad-based access to land for their subsistence (Hart 1996).
Hart’s own research in northwestern Kwazulu Natal (South Africa), by contrast,
reveals that Taiwanese industrialists who, over the past decade, have invested
directly in the clothing industry in this district, have encountered intense diffi-
culties in recruiting labour. One of the reasons why these garment factories
operate so problematically in South Africa, she argues, is to be found in the
conditions of social reproduction, which in this case primarily turns on lack of
access to land. In sharp contrast with conditions in Taiwan and China, where
subsistence guarantees in the form of broad-based access to land guaranteed
workers’ livelihoods by underwriting the money wage, in South Africa the
workforce has been constituted through a particularly brutal process of land
dispossession (i.e. very unequal property relations).16 In other words, low wages
in rural industries are not backed up by systems of support from household
subsistence production as part of the overall livelihood strategy, as they are in
East Asia. This understanding of agro-industrial linkages and the ‘social wage’ in
turn has major implications for how land reform is understood.
Instead of focusing primarily on small farmers and agriculture, land reform
needs to be understood as a means to create conditions in which people can
15
Moreover, as Hart (1995) argues, the foreign-owned, export-oriented industries located in the
southern coastal provinces of China profit directly from the social investments made during the
communist era, while running these investments down.
16
On the continuing (and increasing) importance of land as social insurance after the dissolution of
the communes in 1983 and the reduction in the role of the state, see Bramall and Jones (2000).
17
These findings are synthesized from the De-Agrarianisation and Rural Employment (DARE)
Research Programme (Africa-Studiecentrum, Leiden), which includes extensive field research in the
following countries: Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, South Africa and
Zimbabwe.
imposition of ‘user fees’ at health centres and schools as well as rising food
prices, have intensified households’ diversification strategies and the proliferation
of income earners within the rural household.
Most of this livelihood diversification is for ‘survival’ rather than ‘accumula-
tion’, which is another way of saying that these households are not meeting
conditions of social reproduction. Importantly though, these are not areas where
households lack access to land. What they lack are the resources to work the
land, and also the institutional and infrastructural support that would enable
them to take advantage of prices for agricultural products (although there are
questions as to whether the terms of trade in a globalized economy are ever
going to enable them to make a living out of selling agricultural commodities).
This then raises the general argument for SSA about what is the role of land as
a site of food production and as a site of income production in households that
are pursuing these multiple, spatially extended livelihood strategies. And what
are the effects as other more powerful interests start alienating this land (for
tourism, for highly commercial forms of agriculture, for dams, for industrial
production) – the predation that is referred to in the Whitehead and Tsikata
contribution?
In the very different political economy of Uzbekistan, where public-sector
employment and wages have collapsed, Kandiyoti documents a dual process of
demonetization and re-agrarianization as the rural population falls back on house-
hold and subsidiary plots for self-subsistence. But, at the same time, it is import-
ant to underline that while in the face of stagnation or collapse of non-farm
employment, land remains (or becomes) critically important for household re-
production, land is not the single most important basis for livelihoods. Nor does
the process of re-agrarianization in Uzbekistan mark a re-turn to the old subsist-
ence farming – state pensions, other social benefits and social assistance continue
to play an important role in people’s livelihoods, and people scramble for a place
in the over-crowded informal sector of trade and services. Kandiyoti is emphatic
that the cry for land in rural Uzbekistan must be understood as the product of a
very specific conjuncture – when rural inequalities in access to land are not
curbed by significant mechanisms of rural out-migration, receipt of migrants’
remittances, or diversification into off-farm employment. Women’s current land
hunger thus encapsulates both a wish to reinstate the terms of their former social
contract with the collective enterprises (which included access to subsidiary plots),
and their despair in the face of the apparent lack of any other alternative.
The second important implication, and indeed question, emerging from the
East Asian experience cited above, concerns the gender sub-text of how the
agrarian question is resolved. If the logic of accumulation and labour mobiliza-
tion in the Asian success stories was based on a patriarchal social structure which
still managed to provide subsistence guarantees in the form of broad-based access
to land – through a highly egalitarian distribution of use rights among, though
not within, households (Hart 1996, 258) – then what is this reading of East Asian
experience saying about women’s likely place in the changes in the links between
agrarian and industrial sectors taking place elsewhere? More specifically, what
are the gender dynamics of these processes – both in terms of women exercising
political pressure for access to land, and in terms of women being able to sustain
that pressure and maintain their own (independent?) access to land? It is to these
questions that we now turn.
18
See especially Agarwal (1994) for a scholarly analysis of the gender and land question in South Asia.
19
Nor have processes of land registration and titling and the development of land markets enhanced
agricultural investment and productivity (see sources cited in Whitehead and Tsikata, this issue), even
though secure individual tenure and a land market have been promoted in the belief that they will
lead to higher levels of agricultural investment and productivity, while customary land management
has been perceived as an obstruction to capitalist agriculture.
rights. But the use of this distinction both in colonial times and today is mislead-
ing. Currently, a major contestation is between those who use the term ‘bundle
of rights’ to describe multiple claims in land, and see them as being hierarchically
ordered and gendered (with women having the weaker ‘use rights’, while men
or lineages have the stronger ‘ownership’ or ‘control’ rights), and others who,
while arguing that there are multiple claims, reject the core distinction between
primary and secondary rights and also the idea of a hierarchical ordering of
claims. The latter authors stress instead the negotiated dynamic and fluid nature
of the tenure relations and tenure claims and treat their socially embedded nature
in radically different ways.20
There is, however, no doubt that women are losing out as land scarcity bites,
but how this is happening needs to be fully understood. Discriminatory inherit-
ance laws and poor land access constitute significant constraints on the agricul-
tural operations of some rural women in the region, but elsewhere inability to
get access to land is rarely a major factor constraining women’s agricultural
output and income and thereby a cause of female poverty (Whitehead and
Lockwood 1999; Whitehead 2001). ‘There are a number of areas of Africa where
this is certainly not the case and where although land is not “abundant” the main
constraints in farming and on incomes remain lack of capital to invest in farming
and lack of labour too’ (Whitehead and Tsikata 2001, 16). This is an important
observation to bear in mind.
The three factors highlighted above – women’s relatively strong claims to
land in indigenous African land tenure systems; the gender-inequitable outcomes
of land titling and registration in modernist African states; and the fact that the
main constraints on female farming in the region stem from capital, labour and
marketing constraints, rather than land constraints – underpin Whitehead and
Tsikata’s discomfort with many gender and development policy documents that
still advocate a blanket global policy of ensuring women’s land access through
private property rights and titling, without reference to these African specificities.
Does this mean that public policy in the region should not concern itself with
land tenure arrangements – thereby allowing existing indigenous land tenure
arrangements to evolve at their own pace? Their answer to this question is
clearly and vehemently negative: the rural customary, they argue, cannot be left
to muddle along without widening the gap between men’s and women’s land
access; it is necessary to manage and direct change in order to produce greater
gender justice with respect to resource allocation for rural women. This in fact
constitutes the second pillar of their argument, and the point is forcefully made
because such a laissez-faire position (trust ‘customary law’ and ‘the local’) does
seem to be emerging from policy institutions across the political spectrum (Land
Policy Division of the World Bank, OXFAM-Great Britain, International Institute
for Environment and Development – IIED). The emerging consensus maintains
that the local/indigenous land tenure institutions and arrangements should be
20
See Whitehead and Tsikata (this issue) for references.
left to manage land disputes and land claims on their own, because they can
do the job more cheaply, more flexibly, more effectively, and by provoking less
conflict.
Natal, on the place of traditional authorities in rural local government. Given the
fact that the traditionalism that is espoused by IFP and many of its adherents in
the Tribal Authorities is deeply patriarchal, Walker (1994, this issue) maintains
that these political manoeuvrings have effectively blunted ANC’s commitments
to gender equity in rural affairs. Whitehead and Tsikata voice similar concerns
about the political dynamics that are being unleashed by the return to ‘customary
law’, the revival of ‘traditional’ authorities and the renewing of chieftaincy in
many parts of SSA – warning that these trends could have highly disempowering
implications for rural African women and their claims on resources.
Questions regarding traditional authorities aside, there are many warnings
across the literature that ‘the local’ is a site of unequal rural social relations, with
crucial implications for women. And even more problematically, stark inequal-
ities and grave injustices can exist without being openly contested by those who
are the victims. This last point, which has been the subject of on-going feminist
debate (Kandiyoti 1988, 1998), is brought out in Walker’s contribution to this
special issue, where she looks at women’s involvement in the three land reform
projects in KwaZulu Natal. The demand-driven nature of the South African land
reform programme, and the fact that officials from the Department of Land
Affairs (DLA) were working with already-constituted social groups and existing
power relations between men and women, ensured that initially very little atten-
tion was paid to gender equity – in the words of one DLA official ‘it (gender
equity) did not even emerge as an issue’. As Agarwal (this issue) notes in re-
sponse to those who argue that policy priorities should be identified on the basis
of expressed wants, in situations of deprivation people often adapt their prefer-
ences and felt needs to what they see as attainable. Women, in particular, may be
so thoroughly subordinated that they are unable to recognize any injustice in the
prevailing order. Even though such a statement edges disturbingly close to no-
tions of ‘false consciousness’, it has been an indispensable component in feminist
thought (Phillips 2002).
On the positive side though, what we see from Walker’s account is that the
constitutional commitments to gender equity in land reform have created some
space and provided some institutional mechanisms for gender issues to be brought
in by the DLA – though unevenly across the three land reform projects, depend-
ing on how active DLA staff have been around gender issues, as well as the
presence of external agencies such as land rights NGOs. This seems to have
encouraged community debate on the subject, even though the results to date are
modest. Women’s presence on land reform committees, which is considered as
DLA’s most tangible achievement in relation to women’s land rights, is itself not
a guarantee that women’s specific concerns and demands will necessarily be
voiced. The fear of ridicule for stepping outside their socially designated roles is
cited as one of the main reasons why women committee members have kept
a low profile. Yet from informal discussions it is clear that women recognize
their vulnerabilities in relation to their husbands, and are interested in exploring
ways in which their rights and interests can be made more secure (more on this
further below). But as Walker rightly warns, ‘social process’ work is difficult,
time-consuming and expensive, and yet essential if the DLA’s gender policy is to
serve more than a largely rhetorical function.
In Brazil, for example, even though constitutional guarantees of women’s
land rights (in 1988) were combined with pressure from below in the form of
women’s active involvement in dynamic rural unions and in the nascent landless
movement to create what would appear to be highly propitious circumstances
for the substantiation of women’s land rights, the outcomes have been far from
automatic. By the mid-1990s, rural Brazilian women constituted what is, by
regional standards at least, a very modest proportion (12.6 per cent) of the bene-
ficiaries of agrarian reform. Deere identifies a number of factors to explain why
it took so long (almost 12 years) for organized rural women to even demand
effective recognition of their land rights, and even longer for these voiced de-
mands to find meaningful representation in the rural social movements.
Even if women’s demands are being promoted by powerful and dynamic
social movements, having the weight of the state behind the agenda for gender
justice is a sine qua non for its realization. The central instrument for the protec-
tion of rights has been, and must remain, the state (Molyneux and Razavi 2002).
Hence the role of the state in raising such issues and providing the institutional
mechanisms and macroeconomic and statutory frameworks for their realization
is highly significant. Whether states advance or curtail women’s rights cannot, of
course, be explained in terms of any single variable, although democratic institu-
tions and procedures are generally assumed to allow greater voice and presence
to social forces pressing for reform (Molyneux and Razavi 2002), assuming that
democratic processes and institutions are ‘thick’, and that they adequately engage
with issues of gender equity.21
Statutory Interventions
There are plenty of examples across this special issue documenting both the
considerable progress that was made throughout the 1980s and 1990s in making
formal laws more gender-equitable (e.g. Hindu and Muslim laws pertaining
to land in India, gender-egalitarian constitutional principles in Brazil and South
Africa, and so on), as well as evidence of repeated failures in making these
statutory interventions ‘real’. The reasons for failure are legion – from budgetary
constraints arising from government fiscal discipline, to administrative and insti-
tutional weaknesses within government in the management of gender policy,
and weak political accountability for gender policy within parliament and/or
civil society. The legal domain itself, with its implicit gender-biased assumptions
and discourses, such as the unencumbered individual of contract theory and the
notion of individual rights, and its inaccessible institutions and mechanisms, has
not been a comfortable terrain for women to operate within. There are then
21
Peter Evans (2002) makes the distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ democratic processes; the
former refers to having leadership succession determined by a regular electoral process, while the
latter means having continuous deliberative involvement of the citizenry in the setting of economic
and social policies and priorities.
admits that even where women have been listed as independent household heads
and as beneficiaries in their own right, their access to land has been mediated
overwhelmingly through their membership in patriarchal households. Neverthe-
less, rather than endorsing individual rights as the solution (which is a com-
ponent of the new land reform policy, ‘Land Redistribution for Agricultural
Development’ or LRAD, issued in November 2000), she thinks that there needs
to be deeper appreciation of the importance of household membership in poor
women’s lives, and thus the importance of ensuring women’s rights to house-
hold resources. Had the LRAD framework, with its emphasis on individual
rights, been in place from the start of the land reform programme, she argues,
very few, if any, of the women in the present beneficiary communities would
have been able to access land through it – they are simply too poor, too isolated
and too dependent on male authority to be able to establish individual rights to
land. Moreover, many women beneficiaries endorse the household model im-
plicit in DLA’s work, and some have struggled very hard to secure household
interests. While a minority seemed interested in the idea of individual titles, de-
linked from that of their husbands or families, few saw this as the solution to
their problems. They were more interested in mechanisms that would secure and
extend their rights to household resources (through joint titles, and copies of title
deeds). Moreover, given the weak presence and patchy coverage of land rights
NGOs in KwaZulu Natal, it is rather difficult to imagine that they would be able
to provide, on a sufficiently large scale, the kind of institutional experimentation
suggested by Agarwal.
It is clear from the above statements that the question about joint or individual
titles is in fact not as straightforward as it appears. Implicitly, it is a question
about the conceptualization of conjugal relations and the forces that bind agrarian
households together. The two positions, by Agarwal and Walker, in fact bring
to the fore some of the tensions within the current, second-generation feminist
(F2) conceptualizations of the household, where the first-generation feminist
critique (F1) has established, in both theoretical and empirical terms, serious
flaws in the previously dominant unified household paradigm.22 While most
feminists would agree that households are sites of struggle and inequality (as per
F1), there is currently far less agreement as to how the given inequalities and
tensions, as well as common interests and cooperative behaviour, should be
understood and conceptualized. Do conflictual and bargaining models sufficiently
capture the common interests that all household members have in the overall
economic success of their households? What makes women and junior men stay
inside the patriarchal household, even though they are allocated fewer resources
and enjoy less leisure time? Is it really pure despotism on the part of the male
household head, and ‘false consciousness’ on the part of the junior household
members, that binds the household together (Whitehead and Kabeer 2001)?
22
My distinction between first-generation and second-generation feminist conceptualizations of the
household should not be confused with the distinction between first wave and second wave feminism
used historically.
These are not questions to which any definitive answers can be given. But
there are powerful arguments for seeing households as ‘maximizing a range of
utilities – these might include capacity for diversification, flexibility in the case of
agro-climatic shocks, other kinds of risk spreading (against illness and death, for
example), long term investments, social reproduction and so on and so forth’
(Whitehead 2001, 19). It is within this broader understanding of households and
their positioning within the social economy that the ‘woman and land’ question
needs to be placed. In some contexts and for some groups of women, mech-
anisms that secure and extend women’s rights to household land can provide
appropriate forms of access and entitlement, yet without having to venture down
the risky path of individual rights where rural power relations are stacked against
them. In other contexts, where rural class structures and power relations are less
menacing, it may be more feasible to experiment with alternative institutional
arrangements that require (and enhance) women’s greater autonomy from male-
dominated households.
And yet, while the trends towards democratization have revitalized the na-
tional debate on agrarian reform in a number of countries, and provided greater
voice to women’s advocates, the dominant anti-state rhetoric does not bode well
for women, nor are there any reasons to believe that, in such a climate, processes
of devolution and decentralization will necessarily enhance equity and gender
justice in access to resources. These trends raise many urgent questions about
power configurations at the local level, and the political and institutional obs-
tacles to ensuring greater gender equity in access to resources, including land.
Finally, several contributors to this special issue emphasize the importance of
taking seriously the contextual and institutional specificities that shape women’s
access to resources, including land. There are numerous warnings about the
dangers of ‘downloading’ all-purpose gender and development (GAD) analytical
frameworks and blindly reproducing policy prescriptions developed with other
contexts in mind. This de-contextualized approach to ‘doing gender’ is in fact
part of a broader problem that currently afflicts gender policy, as GAD tool kits,
planning modules and institutional blueprints are carelessly replicated across
diverse contexts. While there may be some vague benefits to institutional learn-
ing, the dangers of ‘institutional monocropping’23 (Evans 2002) in the field of
gender and development need to be taken far more seriously.
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