FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS

FROM INDIA

COMPILED IN THE

NOTICK.

Qtber volumes will be de«:patcliocI vviion ready.

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOL. I

TRIBES NORTH OF THE KABUL RIVER

SIMLA
GOVERNMENT MONOTYPE PRESS
1907
 ,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS

FROM INDIA

.>;

COMPILED IN THE

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

DIVISION OF THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF

ARMY HEAD QUARTERS

. INDIA

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOL. I

TRIBES NORTH OF THE KABUL RIVER

SIMLA
GOVERNMENT MONOTYPE PRESS
1907
 PRINTED AT THE
aOVBSNMBNT MONOTYPE FBBSS, SIMLA.
 j^7 s; I

Ul
CO
>-

acz
OQ

INTRODUCTION.
FAOBS
boundary lines of British Influence and
The Nortli-West Frontier Unc-the
of BritishAdministration-the latter divided into six distncts-theiv
frontier-description of the
description-the Gujars-defence of the
relations with the border tribes- fighting
Pathau andBiloch races-early tit—a;i«
^

qualities- means of punishing them

CHAPTER I.

THE GILGIT AGENCY.

boundaries— passes— main lines of
p.r^ril description of the country—
^''^tmmt'icSion-garrisou-population-Captain Biddulph s M.sion
Depai-^ment and
18?6-Kashmir State brought under the Foreign
r^^tain Biddulph made Political Agent— Agency abolished 1881— m
report 1888-
SCScklwt's Mission, 188C-Captain Durand's
18S9-jurisdielion of the Agency at that
Age^icy re-established in
time-detailed description of the
various districts m
the Agency- the
Bunji-Punial-Hunza and Nagu^ex-
ISor Tehsil-the Nkbat of Yasm
gainst Hunza and Nagir in 1891-the Governorship of
pedUion
and Shkfman-Chilas-operations
independent tribes of Shinaka and
Kohistan
1892-the
in Chilas, November
.... 1—37

CHAPTER II.

CHITRAL.
the distui^^ance
the country-the people -histoiy-
General description of
takes possession o Chitral Fort-
•

Robertson
m
^'""'•''^Sgl-Sur-eon-Maior
lbJi>-bm»toi i
Gilgit— Chitral line of communi-

:S^U:1^^^^^
?Tl.nt
party-Lptain
-measures
detachment-
Aloberlv's advance from
Mastu
Boss'
for relief of
.

of Gilgit column
SnTgavrtn-th: siege of Chitral- Operations
of Chitral- subsequent events
to
Snder Lieit.-Colonel Kelly-Belief population of Chitral-
districts and
;?esent date- appendices :
^ ^^_^^
casualty return

CHAPTER III.

CIS.INDUS, SWATI, AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES.

description of the valley-

inhabitants- origin of cis-Indus Swatis-
Allni
AUaiwals-fighting strength, etc.-approaches from
tTiba c VI lo^is of on survey
^"tish Government-attack
B Sh t^^^^^^^^^^
^"tl^
in lS77-blockade of the
tribe-arms
II in ISGS-raid on Bathal
Tffied to them-Wihar-Tikaii-Deshi-T^^^^ ^^ich occupy it-
?a?ntxibes-description of the mountains-
tribes
the fight-
u ocl,n i^ Al-i7^is— Chacrarzais- Pariari Saiyids— noteF. onMackeson's
the tribes- Lieut. -Colonel
SrsTeng^ an^ rms of^
1852-53-expedition against the
exped on agXstthe Hassanzais in
Major-General \\ ilde m 86»--
Hack Mountain tribes by a force under m 187.5-^
events-submission of Black Mountam tribes
^JbLq^nt 82—137
Hazara Field Force, 1868 . . • •
appendix: stafE of the

357954
 — —

CONTENTS.
CHAPTER IV.
BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES— {continued).
rAQE»
History of the tribes between 1875 and 1888.— the Chagarzais and Pariari
—
Saiyids the Hassanzais —
the Akazais —
affair on the Agror frontier,
—
18th June 1888 Brigadier-General McQueen's expedition 188£»— results
of the expedition — —
subsequent events Major-General W. K. EUes's
—
expedition in 1891 expedition against the Isazai clans by a force
under IMajor-General Sir W. Lockhart in 1892 subsequent events—
—appendices staff of the Hazara Field Force 1888— of the Black
:

Mountain expedition 1891 138—192

CHAPTER V.

TUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES BETWEEN THE BLACK MOUN-

TAIN AND SWAT.
— —
Origin of the Yusafzai tribe the Nawab of Amb details of the various
tribes— — —
the Mada Khels the Amazais the Utmanzais the Gaduns —
— —
the Khudu Khels the Chamlawals the Bunerwals affair with the —
—
Hindustani fanatics in 1853 affairs at Shekh Jana and Narinji under
—
Major Vaughan in 1857 expedition against the Khudu Khels and
Hindustani fanatics by a force under Sir Sydney Cotton in 1858
appendices: genealogical table shoMdng relationships of the different
Yusafzai Pathans— Staff of the Sitana Field Force 1858 . . . 193—229

CHAPTER VI.

YUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES BETWEEN THE BLACK

MOUNTAIN AND SWAT—{coniimied).

The Ambela Expedition, 1863.

The Hindustani fanatics' outrages in Hazara —
re-occupation of Sitana by
—
the Saiyids and Hindustanis blockade of the Gaduns and IJtmanzais
, — —
decided on British dispositions.— Guides' camp at Topi Topi attacked
— —
bv Maulvi Abdulla Hassanzai raids British expedition decided on
— —
plan of operations the Ambela campaign coercion of the Gaduns
—
and Utmanzais at the end of the expedition destruction of Mandi
— svTbmission cf the other tribes —
appendices: staff of the Yusafzai
—
Field Force 1863
command . . • ... . ...
disposition of the force on General Garvock assuming
230 294

CHAPTER VII.

YUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES BETWEEN THE BLACK MOUN-

TAIN AND SWAT~{continued).
—
Dealings with the tribes subsequent to 1864 the Hindustani fanatics
the Gaduns— the Khudu Kliels— the Bunerwals attack on Sural —
Malandri by a colunm under Colonel Browne in January 1887 names —
of the tribes who participated in the attacks on the Malakand and
—
Chakdara in 1897 Sir Bindon Blood's expedition against the Buner-
—
wals and Chamlawals in 1897 subsequent behaviour of the tribes
—
to the present time appendix : command and staff of the Buner
Field Force 295— 32a
 CONTENTS. Ill

CHAPTER VIII.
SWAT TRIBES.
PAQi3
Ranizais-the Abazais—
Description of the Swat vallev-the Baizais— the
Ghafur, Akhund of bwat—
the Khadakzais— the Dusha Khels-Aldul
-Colonel Bradshaw s
operations by Major Lawrence in 1847- Lieut.
Baizais in 1849-subsequent deahngs with the
expedition against the
Baizais— Sir Cohn Campbell's expeditions against the
Ranizais Marchm
18G3-change of
and May 1852-attitude of Swat Tribes in 1857 and
the Swat frontier- death
policy of the A]chund-<^nd of disturbances on
1877-expediticn against the Ranizai village of
of the Akhund in
of the ^'^^^^^
Shakot in 1878-submission to the Government-conduct ^l-SfiO
up to 1884

CHAPTER IX.
SWAT TRIBES— {continued).
to 1884— attitude of
Umra Khan's influence on the S^vat valley subsequent
muUas—hviei allusion to Sir R. Low's passage of the Malakand in
the
Chapter XII)— subsequent arrangem.ents
1895 (fully described in
with the tribes— the Mad Fakir- attack on the
Malakand and Chakdara
1897— operations of the Malakand Field Force in Swat- subse-
posts
quent dealings with the Swat tribes up to the present time— appendices-
of the
composition and staff of the Malakand Field Force-genealogy
dbl— ^y<
Swat tribes (Akozai-Yusafzai)

CHAPTER X.
THE UTMAN KHEL TRIBE.
Campbell's operations against
Origin and description of the tribe-Sir Colin
the independent Utman Khels in 1852— operations m
1878— subse-
quent dealings— conduct of the tribe in 1 897—
punishment of the
trans-Swat Shamozais— expedition against the cis-Swat
Utman Khels
under Colonel A. F. Reid— subsequent conduct of the
by a force J.
tribe-appendices genealogy of the Utman Khel-composition
of ^t^^
:
^'^'^
Utman Khel column under Colonel Reid
CHAPTER XL
THE MOHMAND TRIBE.
Campbell's operatioris
Description of the tribe and their country-Sir Colin
ISSl-S-''— affair at Panjpao in April 1852— Colonel Sydney Cotton s
in
operations against the Michni Mohmands in
1854-subsequent outrages
Edwardes
by the Mohmands— British terms to the tribe— Colonel
letter to Saadat Khan— engagements near
Shabkadar m1863-64—
Major Macdonald in 1873— operations against the Mohmands
murder of
operations in 1880— action on
in 1879— affair at Kam Dakka—further
the tribes— settlement
the Gara heights— subsequent dealings with
the " assured clans " in 1896— the attempted Anglo-Afghan demar-
of
of Lalpura— the
cation in the Mohmand country, 1897— the Khan
Hadda Mulla— raid on Shankargarh and attack of Shabkadar
m
August 1897-action of Shabkadar— the Mohmand expedition
an
1897— subsequent dealings with the tribe—the Musa Khel become
"assured clan "—the Shinpokh-Smatsai affair 1903— raids on Jogiu
genealogy of the
and Tangi in 1906—present situation— appendices :

Mohmand tribe— estimate of the numbers of Mohmands at Shabkadar

1897-dispo.
—composition and staff of the Mohmand Field Force,
en 28th September 1897 41J-5Ul^
sition of the Mohmand Field Force . •
 —

iy CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XII.
AKOZAI-YUSAFZAI AND TARKANEI TRIBES OF DIE AND
BAJAVE.
PAGES
Description of Dir and Bajaur — the people— the Painda Khel, Sultan Khel,
Nasruddin lOiel, and Ausa Khel sections of the Malizai-Khwazazai
branch of the Akozai-Yusafzai— the Ismailzai, Isazai, Salarzai, and
Mamiind sections of the Tarkanri or Tarkanluwvi— alien races Bashkaris :

and Mashwanis— religion— m«ZZfls in Dir and Bajaur^character of the

tribes — fighting strength — \^hat assistance they can reckon on in the
event of a general rising — s,ystem of land tenure in Dir and Bajaur
system of tio^^ernment — the Chitral Relief Expedition under Sir Robert
Lo^ — British policy regard to Chitral subsequent to the
-\\ith — relief

arrangements with the Khans of Dir and Nawa gai and the Swat Khans—
Dir and Swat Agency established— appendices genealogy of the Yusaf-
:

zai tribes — genealogy of the — genealogy of the Tarkanri— staff

]\Ializai

of the Chitral Relief Force— strength and disposition of the force on

1st May 1895— arrangements for the lines of communication
sanctioned on lOth May 1895— agreement with the Khan of Dir . 501 —563
CHAPTER XIII.

AKOZAI-YUSAFZAI AND TARKANEI TEIBES—contd.

Situation in Dir and Bajaur at end of 1895 —
abolition of tolls causes impetus
to trade —Klian of Dir invades Jandol valley in 1896 Khan of Nawagai —
attacks Khan of Pashat —
Umra Khan, after a journey to Mecca, re-
turns to Kabul, refusing British offer of a residence at Quetta activity —
of mullas in 1897— Ghulam Haidar's conduct —
Muhammad Shari
Khan of Dir created Naioah, after a settlement had been made between
—
him and the Swat jirgas arrival of the Mad Fakir causes complications —
action of the Khans of Dir and Nawagai subsequent to the fighting
—
on the Malakand, 1897 operations of the Malakand Field Force in
Dir and Bajaur with brief recapitulations of operations in Swat and
—
the Utman Khel and Mohmand countries British rewards to the
Khans of Nawagai, Khar, and Jhar for their assistance in Bajaur sub- —
—
sequent events in Dir and Bajaur situation at the present time 564 . . —591
LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.
General Map to illustrateVolume I . In pochet at beginning of hoo^'
. .

View of Nilt ravinefrom Maiun, looking south to face page

. 18 .

Reconnaissance Sketch of enemy's position at Chakalwat,

91h April, 1895 „
_
„. 73 .

Reconnaissance Sketch of enemy's position at Nisa Gol,

12th April, 1895 „ „ 75
Sketch of British Position above Panj Dara or Ambela
Pass „ „ 246
The Malakand Position, 1897 „ ,,370
Action at Shabkadar, 9th August, 1897 . . „ „. 475
Sketch plan of action at Bedmanai Pass . „ „. 483 .

Map to illustrate action at the Malakand Pass. 3rd April 1895 „ 528
Map to illustrate the Black Mountain Expeditions In pocket at end of hook.
.
 —

PKEFAC E.

the Punjab Government considered

IN "1866 desirable that a
Eecord should be composed of the expeditions made from time
it

to time against the North- West Frontier Tribes, with such further
information as might render the work a valuable guide to those
who might have future dealings with these turbulent neighbours."
The first edition of the work was compiled in 1873 by Colonel W. H-
Paget, 5th Punjab Cavalry, under the title of "A Record of Ex-
peditions against the North- West Frontier Tribes," and was revised
and brought up to date in 1884 by Lieutenant A. H. Mason, R.E.
Similar considerations have now prompted the compilation of
a record of expeditions against frontier tribes on all the frontiers of
India, and embarked in by the Indian Government
of operations
overseas and as the latest edition of Paget and Mason had become
;

out of print, it was decided to incorporate that work, revised and

brought up to date, in the present volumes, instead of again issuing
it as a separate compilation.

The arrangement adopted in the former

work, namely, each
tribe being dealt with separately, has been followed in the present
instance, but for the sake of convenience the present record has been
divided into six volumes, each volume dealing with a distinct
geographical division. This division is as follows :

Vol. I.— North-West Frontier Tribes north of the Kabul river.

Vol. II.—North-West Frontier Tribes between the Kabul and
Gumal rivers.

Vol. III. — Baluchistan, and the First Afghan War.

Vol. IV.—North and North-Eastern Frontier Tribes.
Vol. V. —Burma.
Vol. VI.— Overseas Expeditions, including Part
I, Africa Part II, ;

Ceylon and the islands of the Indian Ocean Part III, ;

Arabia and Persia Part IV, Malay Peninsula and Archi-

;

pelago ; Part V, China.

i
( )
Vol. I.
j5
ii
PREFACE.

Of the first three volumes, the accounts of dealings with the

North- West Frontier and Baluchistan Tribes previous to 1884 have
been extracted from Paget and Mason's book, while the history
of subsequent operations has 'been compiled for these volumes by
Major 0. K. Tancock, E. G. A., Major E. J. M. Molyneux, D. S. 0.,
12th Cavalry, Captain W. L. Maxwell, 127th Baluch Light Infantry,
and Lieutenant C. F. Aspinall, Eoyal Munster Fusiliers. The
remaining three volumes are new, and Volume IV has
of these

been compiled by Lieutenant J. L. Mowbray, R. H. A., and Volume

V by Lieutenant C. F. Aspinall. The latter officer has also been
responsible for the editing of Volumes I, II, IV, and V. Volume
VI has been compiled by Major E.G. Burton, 94th Russell's Infantry,
Major W. H. Brown, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry, Captain R. S.
Phillips, 52nd Sikhs, and Lieutenant G. P. Morris, 30th Lancers.
The general editorship of Volumes III and VI has been under-
taken by Major R. G. Burton.
It is especially requested that any errors in these volumes may
be brought to the notice of this Division as speedily as possible.

W. MALLESON, Lieut.-Colonel,

Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence,

Division of the Chief of the Staff.

Simla :

nth September 1907.

 INTRODUCTION TO VOLS. I, II, and III.

Since 1884, the year which Paget and Mason's " Kecords of
in
Expeditions against the North- West Frontier Tribes " was pub-
lished, the Frontier of British Influence has, by the Durand
Agreement, extended far beyond the limits therein described,
and now, including as it does nearly all the frontier tribes, is
coterminous with Afghanistan from the Kilik pass in the north to
the borders of Persia in the west.
The boundary line of 1884 was what is now, roughly, the
administrative border of the North-West Frontier Province. In
the present work, in order bo differentiate between these two
boundary lines,that of British Influence and that of British
Administration, the former will be called the Frontier and the
latter the Administrative Border Line.
The border line skirts the six districts of Hazara, Kohat,
Peshawar, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan,
the first five of which belong to the North-West Frontier Province,
and the last to the province of the Punjab. Of these six districts,

two, Hazara and Kohat, are hilly and in parts mountainous. The
other four are almost level plains, only broken by deep ravines
and torrent beds, which make even the Peshawar valley difficult
for the movements of cavalry and guns. The characteristics of
the people inhabiting them differ very greatly, and it is necessary,
in as few words as possible, to describe each district before giving
an account of the tribes beyond their border.
The Hazara district is the most northern. The upper portion
of it, especially that known as Kaghan, is entirely composed of
mountain ranges covered with magnificent forests ; the lower
portion of the district is, although elevated, more level, and,
possessing an abundant supply of water, produces excellent crops.
The population is generally peaceable and unwarlike. Its largest
element consists of immigrants expelled, some centuries ago,
( iii )

B2
iv INTRODUCTION.

from the neighbouring Swat valley, a physically weak and con-

temptible race. These form nearly a third of the inhabitants
of the Hazara district nearly half the remainder is composed of
;

descendants from Rajput and other Hindu tribes, GujarSj^ Ghak-

kars, Dunds, and Karals, who have for the most part adopted the
Muhammadan creed. They are industrious and good cultivators,
and form the best part of the Hazara population. Descendants of
Afghan immigrants, related to the Yusafzai and other tribes in
th,e neighbourhood, constitute a fifth of the whole.
The Peshawar district contrasts remarkably with that just
described. Consisting of a wide level plain, it is abundantly
watered by the large rivers of Swat and Kabul, and is broken only
by deep ravines which intersect it in all directions. The length
from north to south is 54 miles, but the western border is 170 miles
long, and adjoins the lands of the Gaduns, Bunerwals, Baizais,
Ranizais, Utman Khels, Mohmands, and Afridis. From Sikh and
Afghan days Peshawar has had an infamous reputation for the
character of its inhabitants, who required for their control the

sternest administrators of the Sikh Government, and for its climate,

which, owing to excessive irrigation, and also from the valley
being enclosed by lofty hills, is, at certain seasons of the year,
extremely unhealthy. The inhabitants are strangely mixed. About
ninety-two per cent, are Muhammadans, the few Hindus being
found as merchants and shopkeepers in Peshawar and the larger
villages. The total population of the district is about three-quar-
ters of a million, of which about one-sixth are Yusafzais, an Afghan
clan inhabiting the high plain to the north. After the Yusafzais
the most important tribes are the Mohmands and the Khattaks.
The remainder of the population is made up of numerous Afghan
tribes, and of Punjabi Muhammadans from cis-Indus districts.
The district of almost entirely composed of a system
Kohat is

of low, barren hills, from which it derives its name, intermingled

with small but fertile valleys. The importance of the district is

1 The Gujars aro found amongst many war. They are a fine, stalwart race, and,
of the independent tribes between the though as a rule quiet and industrious, are
Kunar river and the Hazara district. Their apt to break out into lawlessness hke the
occupation is chiefly cattle rearing, as their people amongst whom they dwell. They
name implies, and tlie cultivation of land are supposed to be the descendants of the
which they hold in lease from the owners, possessore of the country previous to the
whom they are bound to serve in time of arrival of the Pathans.
 INTRODUCTION.

the produce of which

due to the existence of extensive salt mines,
is used throughout trans-Indus
territory and Afghanistan, and
is taxed much more
which, chiefly from political considerations,
mines, which supply
lightly than the produce of the Jhelum
to the east of the Indus.
the greater part of Northern India
raised, and
About 1883 the price of salt at the Kohat mines was
further on, when we come
this subject will again be referred to
prmcipal
speak of our relations with the Afridis, who
are the
to
carriers of the Kohat The city of Peshawar is the central
salt.

depot of the salt trade,' whence it is taken

by traders to Jalalabad,
produce of these
Kashmir, and Kashgar, and exchanged for the
countries. About two-thirds of the population of the Kobat
one-third are Khatbaks, who,
district are Afghans, and of these
inhabiting the north of the district, are
one of the finest tribes
regiments with many of
on the whole frontier, and supply our
theirbest soldiers. The Bangash tribe is almost as numerous,
and is generally quiet and well disposed.
Peshawar,
The Bannu district consists of a flat open plain like
and, like it, is abundantly watered
by the Kurram and Gumbela
iivers. The rainfall being very scanty, cultivation is almost
entirely dependent upon irrigation
from the streams. In the trans-
Bannuchis, a mongrel Afghan
Indus portion of the district are the
tribe,who are about the worst specimens of the race on the frontier.
malarious climate, is as degraded
Their physique, owing to the
as their morals. They are cowardly and unwarlike, and on this
most important section
account give less trouble than the next
the Wazirs, who axe in appearance and in
of the population,
character immeasurably their superiors.
The south of the Bannu
district is inhabited by the
Marwatis, a high-caste Pathan race,

brave, simple, and honest, who

form as great a contrast as can be
the Bannuchis.
conceived to their northern neighbouBS,
the Dera Ismail Khan district, owing to the
rainfall being
In
the country for the most part
very small and irrigation wanting,
islittle better than a desert,
and can only be cultivated in those
exceptional years when abundant rain may happen to fall.

That portion of the district, however, which has a sufficiency

of irrigation, and especially
the Tank valley, is fertile. The country
an almost imperceptible slope
on the west of the Indus falls with
 —

vi INTRODOOTION.

from the hills to the Indus. The original population of the dis-
trict seems to have been Jats. Then came an immigration of
Balochis from the south, forming the bulk of the present popula-
tion of the Kulachi sub-division, below the Usbarana country,
few being found north of the town of Dera Ismail Khan. In the
south they are the dominant class in the country cis-Indus they
;

are mixed with, and practically on an equality with, the Jats. The
only Baloch tribe found together in any numbers are the Kasranis,
inhabiting the country about Daulatwala. The Pathans occupy
the north of the district up to Isa Khel, together with Marwatis,
all recent settlers, and rapidly increasing in numbers.

The characteristics of the Dera Ghazi Khan district resemble

closely those of the trans-Indus portion of Dera Ismail Khan.
It consists of a strip of country lying between the Indus and che
hills, here entirely occupied by Baloch tribes. The character of
its trans-border neighbours has exercised as great an influence
upon the interior of Dera Ghazi Khan as
has in the districts to
it

the north. One-third of the population is Baloch, one-half are

Jats, and the remainder is composed of Pathan immigrants, and
a larger proportion of pure Hindus than are found elsewhere on
the border. The character of the population of Dera Ghazi Khan
may generally be described as being as well disposed and law-
abiding as that of any district in Northern India.
Until 1903 the military defence of the frontier was, with the
exception of the Peshawar district, entrusted to the Punjab
Frontier Force, consisting of

4 Regiments of Punjab Cavalry,

1 Regiment, Corps of Guides, Cavalry and Infantry,
4 Mountain Batteries of Artillery,
1 Garrison Battery of Artillery,
4 Regiments of Sikh Infantry,

5 „ „ Punjab Infantry,
1 Regiment of Gurkhas,

and was commanded by a Brigadier-General. Peshawar itself

was the head- quarters of a brigade of the Bengal Army, and,
with Nowshera and five outlying fortresses in the valley, absorbed
nearly a fourth of the whole Bengal force in the Punjab.
 INTRODUCTION. vil

In 1903, however, the Punjab Frontier Force was abolished,

and the frontier is now defended by the Peshawar and Quetta
Divisions and the Kohat, Derajat, and Bannu Brigades, assisted
by the Frontier Militias.

We now come to the consideration of the tribes beyond the

administrative border. The two great nations, the Baloch and
Pathan, hold the whole country to the west of the Punjab, the
former lying roughly to the south and the latter to the north of
a line drawn from the western face of the Suleimans, opposite
Dera Ghazi Khan, almost due west to Quetta.
The Balochis and Pathans^ are both foreigners in the Punjab
proper, and have entered its political boundaries within the last
few hundred years, though it is not impossible that in doing so
the Pathans only re-entered a country which their ancestors
had left more than a thousand years before. Yet their
freedom from the irksome and artificial restrictions of caste, and
the comparative licence which their tribal customs permit
fchem in the matter of inter-marriage, have caused their example
to produce a marked effect upon the neighbouring Indian races ;

and it is the proximity of these races, and the force of that ex-
ample daily set before them by nations living next door, to which,
far more than to the mere political supremacy of a Muhammadan
dynasty, or adoption of the Muhammadan creed, may be attribut-
ed the laxity of caste rules and observances which charac-
terizes the people of our western plains.
The Baloch presents in many respects a very strong contrast
to his neighbour the Both have most of the virtues
Pathan.
and many of the vices peculiar to a wild and semi-civilized life.
To both, hospitality is a sacred duty and the safety of the guest
inviolable both look upon the exaction of
;
" blood for blood "
as the firstduty of man both follow strictly a code of honour
;

of their own, though one very different from that of modern

Europe both believe in one God, whose name is Allah and whose
;

prophet is Muhammad. But the one attacks his enemy from the
front, the other from behind the one is bound by his promises,^ the
;

1 This account of the Baloch and Pathan " stone, or cairn of cursing?," erected as
races is taken from Ibbetson's Report of the a perpetual memorial of one who betray.
Census, 1881. ed his fellow.
2 There is in th* hills above Harrand a
viii INTRODUOTJON.

other by his interests ; in short, the Baloch is less turbulent, less

treacherous, less bloodthirsty,and less fanatical than the Pathan ;
he has less of God in his creed and less of the devil in his nature.
His frame is shorter and more spare and wiry than that of his neigh-
bour to the north, though generations have given to him, too,
a bold and manly bearing. Frank and open in his manners, and
without severity, fairly truthful when not corrupted by our courts,
faithful to his word, temperate and enduring, and looking upon
courage as the highest virtue, the true Baloch of the Derajat is
a pleasant man to have dealings with. As a revenue payer he is
not so satisfactory; his want of industry, and the pride which
looks upon manual labour as degrading, making him but a poor
husbandman. He is an expert rider horse racing is his national ;

amusement, and the Baloch breed of horses is celebrated through-

out northern India. He is a thief by tradition and descent, for hie
says, God will not favour a Baloch who does not steal and rob,"
'
'

and
'
The 'Baloch who steals secures heaven to seven generations
of his ancestors." But lie has become much more honest under
the civilizing influences of our rule. His face is long and oval, his
features finely cut, and his nose aquiline he wears his hair long, ;

and usually in oily curls, and lets his beard and whiskers grow, and
he very filthy in person, considering cleanliness as a mark of
is

effeminacy. He usually carries a sword, knife, and shield he ;

wears a smock-frock reaching to his heels and pleated across the^

waist, loose drawers, and a long cotton scarf, and all these must be
white, or as near it as dirt will allow of, insomuch that he will not
enter our army because he there would be obliged to wear a
coloured uniform. His wife wears a sheet over her head, a long
sort of night-gown reaching to her ankles, and wide drawers her ;

clothes may be red or white and she plaits her hair in a long
;

queue.
As the true Baloch is nomad in his habits, he does not seclude
his women but extremely jealous of female honour. In cases
; he is

of detected adultery, the man is killed and the woman hangs her-
self by order. Even when on the war trail, the women and
children of his enemy are safe from him. The Baloch of the hills
lives in huts or temporary camps, and wanders with his herds from
place to place. In the plains he has settled in small villages ;
 ;

INTEODUCTION, IZ

but the houses are of the poorest possible description. A tally

of lives due is kept between the various tribes or families, and
when the accounts grow complicated, it can be settled by
betrothals, or even by payment of cattle.
The Balochis are nominally Musalmans, but singularly igno-
rant of their religion and neglectful of its rites and observances
and though, if their ejection from Arabia be true, they must have
originally been Shia, they now belong almost without exception
to the Sunni sect. The Balochis themselves claim to be .Arabs
by origin, while some hold them to be of Turkoman stock ; their
customs are said to support the latter theory ; their features cer-
tainly favour the former. Their language is a branch of the old
Persian, but it is being gradually superseded on the Punjab frontier
by Multani or Jatki. They have no written character and no
literature ; but they are passionately fond of poetry, chiefly consist-
ing of ballads describing the events of national or tribal history,,
and of love songs and local poets are still common among them.
;

When the Balochis moved northwards towards our border,

they were divided into two great branches, the Eind and the
Lashari, and at the present day all the Baloch tribes consider
themselves as belonging to one or other of these divisions.
The tribe, at least in its present form, is a political and not
an ethnic unit, and consists of a conglomeration of clans bound
together by allegiance to a common chief. Probably every tribe
contains a nucleus of two, three, or more clans descended from
a common ancestor but round these have collected a number of
;

affiliated sections ; for, the cohesion between the various parts

of a tribe or clan is not always of the strongest, and it is not
very uncommon for a clan or portion of a clan to quarrel with its
brethren, and, leaving its tribe, to claim the protection of a
neighbouring chief. They then become his hamsmjas, or dwellers
beneath the same shade, and he is bound to protect them and they
to obey him. In this manner a small section, formerly belonging
to the Laghari tribe and still bearing its name, has attached itself
to the Kasranis. Thus, too. Rind tribes are sometimes found
to include Lashari clans. So when Nasir Khan, the great Khan
of Kalat, who assisted Ahmad Shah in his invasion of Delhi,
reduced the Hasani tribe and drove them from their territory,
Vol. I. o
X INTRODUCTION.

they took refuge with the Khetrans, of which tribe they now
form a clan. Even strangers are often affiliated in this manner.
The tribe {fuman), under its chief or tumandar, is divided into
a small number of clans {fara) with their mukadams or headmen,
and each clan into more numerous sections {fhcdi). Below the
'phali come the families, of which it will sometimes contain as few

as a dozen. The clans are based upon common descent and iden- :

tity of clan name, even in two different tribes, almost certainly

indicates a common ancestor. The section is of course only an
extended family. The tribal names are often patronymic, ending
in the Baloch termination, ani, such as Gurchani or in some ;

few cases in the Pushtu, zai.

An individual is commonly known by the name of his clan,

the sections being comparatively unimportant. Marriage within

the section is forbidden, and this appears to be the only res-
triction.
The Balochis freely marry Jat women, though the first wife

to a chief will always be a Balochni.

The Pathan, as already stated, presents in many respects

a strong contrast to the Baloch. He is bloodthirsty, cruel, and

vindictive in the highest degree ; he does not know what truth or

faith is, insom.uch that the saying Afghan be iman has passed
into a proverb among his neighbours and though he is not with- ;

out courage of a sort, and is often reckless of his life, he would

scorn to face an enemy whom he could stab from behind, or meet
him on equal terms if it were possible to take advantage of him,
however meanly. It is easy to convict him out of his own mouth.
Here are some of his proverbs " A cousin's tooth breaks upon a
cousin."
— " Keep a cousin poor, but use
:

him." —" When he is

little, play with him ; when he is grown up, he is a cousin ; fight

liim."
— " Speak good words to an enemy very softly ; gradually
destroy him root and branch. ^ At the same time he has his code
'
'

of honour, which he observes strictly, and which he quotes with

pride under the name of It imposes upon him three
Pahhtunwali.
chief obligations— to and protect
shelter even an enemy who
comes as a suppliant to revenge by retciliation and to give open-
; ;

handed hospitality to any who may demand it. And of these

\ The Pushtu word tahur is used indifferently for cousin or for enemy.
 INTHODUCTION. Xl

three, perhaps the last is the greatest. There is a sort of

charm about him, especially about the leading men, which almost
makes one forget his treacherous nature. As the proverb says,
" The Pathan is one moment a saint and the next a devil. " For
centuries he has been, on our frontier at least, subject to no man.
He leads a wild, free, active life in the rugged fastness of his moun-
tains ; and there
is an air of masculine independence about him

which is refreshing in a country like India. He is a bigot of the

most fanatical type, exceedingly proud, and extraordinarily super-
stitious. He is of stalwart make, and his features are often of
a markedly Semitic type. Hishair, plentifully oiled, hangs long and •

straight to his shoulders he w^ears a loose tunic, baggy drawers,

;^

a sheet or blanket, sandals, and a sheepskin coat with its wool

inside his favourite colour is dark blue ;- and Ills national arms,
;

the long, hec)vy Afghan knife and the matchlock or jazail. His
women wear a loose shift, wide, wrinkled drawers down to their
ankles, and a wrap over the head. Both sexes are filthy in their
persons.
Such is the Pathan in his home among the fastnesses of the
frontier ranges. But the Pathans of our territory have been much
softened by our rule, and by the agricultural life of the plains, so
that they look down upon the Pathans of the hills, and their pro-
verbs have it—" A hill man is no man" and again, " Don't class
;

burrs as grass, or a hill man as a human being." The Pathans are

extraordinarily jealous of female honour, and most of the blood-
feuds for which they are so famous originate in quarrels about
women. As a race, they strictly seclude their females but the ;

poorer tribes and the poorer members of all tribes are prevented
from doing so by their poverty. The Pathan pretends to be purely
endogamous, and beyond the border he probably is so while even ;

in British territory the first wife will generally be a Pathan, except

among the poorest classes. At the same time, Pathan women
beyond the Indus are seldom if ever married to any but Pathans.

They intermarry very closely, avoiding only the prohibited degrees

of Islam. Their rules of inheritance are tribal and not Muham-
madan, though some few of the more educated families have lately
1 This is not the case with the northern 2 The colour and cut of the clothea
Pathaus, who shave their heads and often vary greatly with the tribe.
their beards also.
02
3di INTRODUCTION.

begun to follow the Musalman law. Their social customs differ

much from tribe to tribe, or rather perhaps from the wilder to
the more civilized section of the nation. The Pathans beyond
and upon our frontier live in fortified villages, to which are attached
stone towers in commanding positions, which serve as watch
towers and places of refuge for the inhabitants. Raids from the
hills into the plains are still not uncommon and beyond the Indus,
;

the people, even in British territory, seldom sleep far from the
walls of the village.
With regard to the tribal organization of the Pathans, the
tribe is probably more homogeneous in its constitution than
far
among the Balochis. Saiyid, Turk, and other clans have occasionally
been afiiliated to it but as a rule, people of foreign descent
;

preserve their tribal individuality, becoming merely associated,

and not intermingled, with the tribes among whom they have
settled. Even then they generally claim Pathan origin on the
female side, and the tribe is usually descended, in theory at least,
from a common ancestor.
The hamsaya custom, already mentioned, by which strangers
are protected by the tribe with which they dwell, is in full force
among the Pathans as amongst the Balochis. But with the former,
though it does protect, in many cases, families of one tribe who
have settled with another, it seldom accounts for any considerable
portion of the tribe and its action is chiefly confined to traders,
;

menials, and other dependents of foreign extraction, who are pro-

tected by, but not received into, the tribe. The nation is divided
genealogically into a few great sections which have no corporate
existence, and the tribe is now the practical unit, though the com-
mon name and tradition of common descent are still carefully pre-
served in the memory of the people. Each section of a tribe, how-
ever small, has its leading man, who is known as malik, a specially
Pathan title. In many, but by no means in all, tribes, there is
a Khan KJiel, usually the eldest branch of the tribe, whose malik is
known as Khan, and acts as chief of the whole tribe. But he is
seldom more than their leader in war and their agent in dealings
with others lie possesses influence rather than power, and the real
;

authority rests with the jirga, a democratic council composed of

all the malihs. The tribe is split up into numerous clans, and these
 INTBODVCTIOi}. XUl

again into sections. The and section are alike distin-

tribe, clan,
of the common
guished by patronymics formed from the name
zai being the
ancestor by the addition of the word zai or
hliel ;

son, while kliel

corruption of the Pushtu word zoe, meaning
or company. Both
is an Arabic word meaning an
association
smaller divi-
terms are used indifferently for both the larger and
sions. ^ The stock of names being limited, the nomenclature is
extremely puzzling, certain names recurring in very different tribes
Moreover, the title which genea-
in the most perplexing manner.
would very different
allot to a tribe or clan is often
logical accuracy
which is known for practical purposes,
the people
from that by it
ancestor who
having preferred to be called by the name of a junior
whether within
had acquired a local renown. The frontier tribe,
or beyond our border, has almost without
an exception a very
distinct corporate existence each tribe, and within
;
each tribe each

clan, occupying a clearly defined tract of country, though they

in the Indus valley often the owners merely,
rather than the
are
occupiers, of the country, the land and smaller villages being largely

in the hands of a mixed population of Hindu origin, who cultivate

subject to the superior rights of the Pathans. These people are

included by the Pathans under the generic and
semi-contemp-
Jat of the
tuous name of Hindki— a term very analogous to the
Baloch frontier, and which includes all Muhammadans who,
being of Hindu origin, have been converted to Islam in
compara-
tively recent times.
The original Afghans are probably a race of Jewish or Arab
extraction, and the Pathans of Indian origin but on this
point ;

there is and not a few deny that there

a great conflict of opinion,
is any distinction whatever between the
original Afghan and

Pathan stocks. But, however this may be, the nation to which

the names are now applied indifferently in Persian and Pushtu,

res-

pectively, are without exception Musalmans, and for the most part

bigoted followers of the Sunni sect, hating and persecuting the Shias.
The following extract from a report on the relations of the
British Government with the frontier tribes in 1855, written by
Mr. Temple, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the
Punjab,

1 When our iU-fated Resident, Sir Louis the British were as known Cavagnarizai,

Cavagnari, was living at Kabul under the and the national party as Yakubzai. 1 he
Amir Yakub Khan, those who favoured ending zai is never used by the Alndis.
 —

xiv INTRODUCTION.

is of interest as showing our estimation of their character at that

time, and the manner in which we dealt with them :

Now these tribes are savages —noble savages, perhaps — and not with"
out some tincture of virtue and generosity, but still absolutely barbarians
nevertheless. They have nothing approaching to government or civil
institutions. They have, for the most part, no education. They have nomi-
nally a religion, but Muhammadanism, as understood by them, is no better,
or perhaps is actually worse, than the creeds of the wildest race on earth. In
their eyes the one great commandment is blood for blood, and fire and sword
for all infidels, that is, for all people not Muhammadans. They are supersti-
tious and priest-ridden. But the priests {mullas) are as ignorant as they
are bigoted, and use their influence simply for preaching crusades against
unbelievers, and inculcate the doctrine of rapine and bloodshed against the
defenceless people of the plain. The hill men are sensitive in regard to their
women, but their customs in regard to marriage and betrothal are very
prejudicial to social advancement at the same time they are a sensual race.
;

They are very avaricious ; for gold, they will do almost anything, except
betray a guest. They are thievish and predatory to the last degree. The
Pathan mother often prays that her son may be a successful robber. They are
utterly faithless to public engagements it would never even occur- to their
;

minds that an oath on the Koran was binding, if against their interests. It
must be added that they are fierce and bloodthirsty. They are never with-
out weapons when grazing their cattle, when driving beasts of burden, when
;

tilling the soil, they are still armed. They are perpetuall)^ at war with each
other. Every tribe and section of a tribe has its internecine wars, every
family its hereditary blood-feuds, and every mdividual his personal foes.
There is hardly a man whose hands are unstained. Every person comits
up his murders. Each tribe has a debtor and creditor account with its neigh-
bours, life for hfe. Keckless of the lives of others, they are not sparing of
their own. They consider retaliation and revenge to be the strongest of
all obligations. They possess gallantry and courage themselves, and admire
such qualities in others. Men of the same party wdll stand by one another
in danger. To their minds, hospitality is the first of virtues. Any person
who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe, but will
be kindly received. But as soon as he has left the roof of his entertainer,
he may be robbed or killed. They are charitable to the indigent of their
own tribe. They possess the pride of birth, and regard ancestral associations.
They are not averse to civilisation whenever they have felt its benefits. They
are fond of trading, and also of cultivating but they are too fickle and ex-
;

citable to be industrious in agriculture or anything else. They will take

military service, and, though impatient of discipline, will prove faithful,
 INTRODUCTION. »
Such, briefly, is their character, replete Tvith
unless excited by fanaticism.
with that mixture of opposite vices and
the unaccountable inconsistencies,
virtues, belonging to savages.
character, what has been their conduct towards us ?
Such being their
new'ones with our subjects in the
They have kept up old quarrels, or picked
they have descended from the hills
plains and valleys near the frontier;
they have plundered and burnt
and f oucrht these battles out in our territory ;

they have committed mmor robberies

our villages and slain our subjects;
they have often levied blackmail
and isolated murders without number ;

intrigued with the disaffected every

where and
from our villages ; they have
subjects to rebel and they have for ages regarded the
tempted our loyal ;

and its inhabitants their game. When mclmed for

plain as their preserve,
to take
cruel sport thev sallv
forth to rob and murder, and occasionally

prisoners into captivity for

ransom. They have fired upon our own troops,

and even killed our officers in our

own territories. They have given an asylum
proclaimed criminal who can escape from British
justice.
to every malcontent or
enter our villages, trade in our markets ;

They traverse at will our territories,

no servant of the British Government, would
but few British subjects, and
on any account whatever.
dare to enter their country
been the conduct of the British C4overn-
In return for this, what has
their independence it has asserted
ment towards them ? It has recognised
;

to them it has claimed no revenue from

them,
no jurisdiction with regard
;

case, and that as a punishment. But it has

and no tribute, except in one
within its territory it has uniformly
confirmed whatever fiefs they held
;

and that it only

or territorial aggrandisement
declared that it seeks no fiscal
;

tranquillity on the frontier. It has never

wants and is resolved to have,
yard beyond the old limits of the Sikh dommions.
extended its jurisdiction one
not a portion of the Punjab as we found
Nothinc^ has been annexed that was
Government was equally
it Whatever revenue has been paid to the British
higher rate. In one solitary case has it
paid to its predecessors, only at a
for offences; in all other cases of
misconduct
accepted tribute in satisfaction
has
it has avoided
making any pecuniary demands on its own behalf. It
over the independent hill tribes it
claimed no feudal or political ascendancy
;

it
in, or connection with, their affairs
has abstained from any interference
;

and has never assisted either party it

has taken no part in their contests,
;

from entering into disputes with them.

has striven to prevent its own subjects
subjects to defend themselves at the
Though permitthig and encouraging its
from retaliating afterwards and from
time of attack, it has prevented them
to men flying for their lives, it
making reprisals. Though granting refuge
to seek protection in its territory, nor
to
has never allowed armed bodies
people to settle, to
resistance or attack. It has freely permitted hill
organise
XVI INTRODUOTWN.

cultivate, to graze their herds, and to trade in its territories. It has accorded

to such the same protection, rights, privileges, and conditions as to its own
subjects. Its courts have been available, and its of&cers accessible, to them ;

its markets have been thrown open to them all restrictions on trade and ;

transit, all duties (except one)

i which would be imposed by any native
government, have been removed and remitted for them. It has freely admitted
them to its hospitals and dispensaries its medical officers have attended
;

scores of them in sickness, and sent them back to their mountain homes cured.
The ranks of its service are open to them, and they may eat our salt and draw
our pay, if so inclined. What more can a civilised Government legitimately
do for its rude neighbours than the above ?

There is, perhaps, one method to which the Government might resort
more extensively than it is the payment of black-
does at present, and that
mail. It does, indeed, purchase the good offices of the tribes round the

Kohat pass. It does permit a section of the Mohmands to hold a fief, and
more unworthy feudatories could not be found. It does also make payments
to certain Derajat chiefs such as the Bozdars.^ But the other chiefs who
receive money are British subjects, and really perform responsible police duties
in return.In the case of the Afridis, Mohmands, and Bozdars, however, the
Government only continued a concession originally granted by its prede-
cessors. It has originated no new grants of blackmail, though it enhanced
one grant. There is reason to believe that such grants would embolden rather
than ward off depredation ; once bought off, the hiU people would molest us

with greater zest than ever, ofi again.

in order to be bought They would
actually resort to plundering as a means of extorting blackmail. The appetite
once gratified would become sharpened. Such concession would be regarded
by the tribes as a confession of weakness, and would absolutely operate as an
incitement to mischief. Certain chiefs are known to commit depredations
in the hope of being bought off by fiefs, and one mode of avoiding annoyance
is to let it be known that under no circumstance will the Government be

induced to compromise by grants of blackmail.

The character of the hill tribes given in the above report applies
rather to the Pathan than the Baloch tribes. The latter are
free from the religious bigotry which forms such an important
element in the character of the former. Afghans are blindly sub-
servient to their priests, and this is the chief reason that European
life is so insecure in their hills, while it is safe among the Balochis,

there being no instance on record of a European being assassinated

1 The salt tax.

2 This payment was discontinued in March 1856.
 INTRODUCTION. Xvii

by them. The absence of this religious bigotry in the Balochis

makes their control comparatively easy, for there is not the per-
petual fear of some outbreak of fanatical rage against the infidel
which to the north, and among Afghan tribes, has always to be
guarded against. Another fact which renders the control of the
Baloch more easy than that of the Pathan tribes is that the former
recognise the authority of their acknowledged chiefs, and pay them
loyal obedience and service, and their chiefs thus become the natural
channel of communication with their tribesmen, through M^hom
control can be effectively exercised on the tribe. This manner of
influencing the Baloch tribes has, for many years been follow-
past,
ed in the Dera Ghazi Khan district, and generally with success.
With the Pathan on the other hand, this mode of control
tribes,
is impossible, every tribe is divided and sub-divided into
for
numerous sections, each independent of the other, and yielding but
small obedience to its own petty headmen hating each other
;

with the hatred begotten of generations of blood-feuds, and only

uniting under the most exceptional circumstances against a com-
mon enemy.
With regard to the fighting qualities of the border tribes, these
vary considerably in the different tribes those on the Hazara
;

border are contemptible as soldiers, their extreme religious bigotry

alone making up for their absence of martial quahties. Between
Buner and Dera Ismail Khan, the Afghan tribes are both fanatical
and brave an extraordinary degree. Courage with them is the
in
and cowardice the worst of crimes. The Balochis,
first of virtues,

as turbulent, and formerly of habits quite as predatory as their

neighbours, are still of a far milder and more amiable disposition.
They, are as brave as the Afghans; but they are animated by no
fanatical hatred of the English they have not the military genius
;

of the Afghans, and as an enemy on the hillside they are far less
formidable.
It now only remains manner in which offences
to note the
committed by independent tribes beyond the border are punished.
The most simple way of punishing a refractory tribe, and in many
cases the most effectual, is to inflict a fine and demand compensa-
tion for plundered property, or for lives lost. When the tribe is
dependent upon trade with British territory, or when a portion
Vol. T. 2)
xviii INTRODUCTION.

resides within Britisli limits, oris easily accessible from the

plains tc

an attack of a military force, the demand for payment of fine or

compensation is generally acceded to, and being paid, the tribe is

again received into favour. Should the demand be refused, hostages
found
are demanded, or members of the tribes and their property
within British territory are seized, until such time as the compen-
the
sation and fine are paid. Against some tribes, as in the case of
Afridis of the Kohat pass in 1876-77, a blockade is an effec-

tive measure of punishment. It can only be employed against

such tribes as trade with British territory, and while it lasts,

any
member of the offending tribe found within our border is at once
seized and detained. This means of punishment has often been
and effectual, it is preferable to a military ex-
found effectual, if

pedition, which often leaves behind it bitter memories in the des-

truction of property and loss of Hfe. Last, as a means of punish-

ment, comes the military expedition, which is only resorted to

in exceptional circumstances, and when every other means of

coercing a hostile tribe has failed.

Mr. Davies, the Secretary to Government, Punjab, in 1864,
thus alluded to the necessity for expeditions from time to time :—

Whilst any hasty exertion of physical pressure, to the exclusion of other

methods of adjustment, is confessedly impolitic, there is a point beyond which

the practice of forbearance may not be carried. As without physical force

in reserve there can be no governing power, so
under extreme and repeated
provocation its non-employment is not distinguishable from weakness. In
each case separately, therefore, it must be judged whether or not offensive
measures have been justified. It must be noted that the despatch of an
expedition into the hills is always in the nature of a judicial act. It is the
delivery of a sentence, and the infliction of a punishment for international
offences. It is, as a rule, not in assertion of any disputed right, or in ultimate

arbitration of any contested claim of its own, that the British Government
resolves on such measures, but simply as the only means by which retribution
can be obtained for acknowledged crimes committed by its neighbours, and
by which justice can be satisfied or future outrages prevented. In the extreme

cases in which expeditions are unavoidable, they are analogous to legal penal-
ties for civil crime, —
evils in themselves, inevitable from deficiencies of pre-

ventive police, but redeemed by their deterrent effects. Considerations of

expense, of military risk, of possible losses, of increasing antagonism and

combination against us on the part of the tribes, all weigh heavily against
 INTRODUCTION. a:

expeditions ; and to set them aside, there must he an irresistihle ohligation to

protect and to vindicate the outraged rights of subjects whom we debar from
the revenge and retaliation they formerly practised.
 —

TRIBES NORTH OF THE KABUL RIVER.

CHAPTER I.

THE OILGIT AGENCY.

THE northernmosfc to which British paramountcy extends

limit
formed by the Hindu Kush and Karakoram,
is or Mustagh,
ranges —the mountain barrier which divides India from
great
Afghanistan, Russia, and "China.
Immediately south of these ranges the first district to be dealt
with is that now known as the Gilgit Agency, which includes :

(1) The Gilgit Wazarat, made up of the Tehsils of Astor and Gilgit,
and the Niabat of Bunji.
(2) The Punial jagir.
(3) The States of Hunza and Nagir.
(4) The Governorship of Yasin, Kuh, and Ghizr and the Governor-
;

ship of Ishkaman.

(5) The republican communities of the Chilas district.

Of these the Wazarat is Kaslimir territory and is governed by

a Wazir appointed by the Durbar. Punial is also Kashmir territory,
but hitherto the Kashmir authorities have only been permitted
to interfere in cases of serious crime, such as murder, which are tried
in the Wazarat courts. All other matters concerning the adminis-
by the Governor, Raja Sifat Baha-
tratioD of the jagir are dealt with
dur, who advised direct by the Political Agent.
is The other
districts of the agency are under the suzerainty of His Highness
the Mahaiaja, but are not Kashmir territory, and His Highness'
officials are not permitted to interfere in their internal adminis-

tration. Details regarding the administration of these districts

will be given later in this chapter, and it will be sufficient to
note here that the various chiefs, governors, and jagirs are inter-
fered with as little as possible, but that all are subject to the general
guidance and control of the Political Agent.

Vol, I.
g
 — ;

2 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FRO 31 INDIA.

It will be seen that Agency contains a multiplicity of

the
forms of government. The explanation is that the peoples
of the various districts differ widely in their origin and customs.
It may be noted, eti passant, that no less than four different
languages are spoken within the limits of the Agency, viz. Shina, : —
Burushaski, Khowar, and Wakhi ; and that as regards religion,
although all are Muhammadans, the people belong to three
different sects, viz. : — Sunni,
and Maulai.
Shia,
For generations previous to the advent of British officers
the different communities had been in a state of constant war with
each other, and it was out of the question to attempt to bring
them under one form of government; Even now the inhabitants
of the various districts show little inclination to mingle with one
another, and any concerted action by them against the paramount
power is inconceivable.^
The geographical boundaries of the Agency are, on the north,
the Mustagh mountains, which divide Hunza-Nagir from the
Chinese New Dominions, and the Hindu Kush, in continuation of
the Mustagh range, separating Ishkaman and Yasin from Wakhan.
On the east lies the Skardu district of Jammu and Kashmir
and onthe west the Shandur range, on the opposite side of which
is the Chitral district of the Dir and Swat Agency. The southern
boundaries are the Burzil pass, separating the Astor tehsil from
the Kashmir province of His Highness the Maharaja's dominions,
and the Babusar pass, by which communication is maintained
with Gilgit from the Punjab, via the Kaghan valley. In the
Indus valley the boundary is, on the right bank of the river,
the watershed between the Hodar and Khanbari valleys, and,
on the left bank, the watershed between the Thor and Harban
valleys. Both Thor and Hodar are included in the Chilas district.
The Hindu Eaj range forms the boundary between the Agency
and the independent communities of Tangir, Darel, and the Swat
Kohistan.
The following are the chief passes leading into Gilgit :

From the north, the Kilik, 15,600 feet, and the Mintaka,
15,430 feet, give entry to Hunza and Nagir from Yarkand, Kashgar,
1 Note. —For an example of tlieir in- attack Chilas Avliile the siege of Chitral
capacity for combined action, witness the Fort was in progress. See page 35.
failure of the Indus valley tribesmen to
 THE OILGIT AGENCY. 3

and the Taghdumbash Pamir. By the Shingshal, 14,720 feet, lies

a way from the Raskam valley, while the Irshad passes, 16,000 and
16,180 feet, respectively, supply routes from Wakhan. The snow
and glaciers of these passes present in winter a practically insur-
mountable barrier to an invading force of any real strength,
though small caravans of traders well acquainted with the route
penetrate from Yarkand to Hunza and Nagir by the Kilik and
Mintaka during the summer, and the hitter pass is used by the
postal service to Kashgar during the winter, when it can be crossed
by small parties with some difhculty. The tracks lead over pre-
cipitous cliffs and along deep gorges, in many of which a thousand
men might well be stopped by a hundred rifles at any place along
the eighty miles separating Hunza from the frontier. From Hunza
a good track road runs into Gil git along the banks of the Hunza
river.

From Wakhan two routes lead towards Yasin : the Baroghil

pass, 12,460 feet, which is fifty-three miles and the
from Yasin ;

Karumbar,^ and Khora Bhort passes, which are 14,000 and

15,000 feet, respectively. The latter pass is 36 miles from Imit,
and 108 miles from Gilgit.
At Gupis the main communication between Gilgit
line of
and Chitral is met. This, the Shandur pass at
after crossing
eighty-seven miles from Chitral, and sixty-five from Gupis, becomes
the excellent 6-foot road which runs through Punial to Gilgit.
An alternative route to the Shandur pass lies in the Chamarkand,
13,000, a shorter but rougher road. In the summer there is com-
munication between Ghizr and Kuh on the one side and Swat
Kohistan on the other by several passes and in Punial communi-
;

cation with Darel is practicable by all the main nalas which drain
into the Gilgit river on its right bank.
On the east the path from Skardu to Gilgit is perhaps the
most any used means of communication in the northern
difficult of

Himalayas. The road by the Deosai plains, averaging from

12,000 to 13,000 feet, which crosses from Skardu to Astor, is closed
by snow in all except the summer months.
1 The route from the Karumbar pass to which blocked the mouth of the Sokhta
Imit was. in 190(5, rendered impracticable valley,
by the advance of the JCarumbar glacier,
B 2
4 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The southern routes are the most important to the Agency,

for it is by these that connection with India is
maintained. The
present main thoroughfare from Srinagar is the 10-foot road
which crosses the Eajdiangan or Tragbal pass on the northern
shore of the Wular lake into the Gurais valley, from whence
it

leads over the Burzil pass, 13,500 feet, into the Astor valley.

From here winds down the Hattu Pir, and crosses the
it
Ramghat
bridge on to the Bunji plain. After leaving Bunji the Indus is

crossed at Partab bridge and the road then follows the right bank
of the Gilgit river to Gilgit, which is reached
at thirty-seven miles

from Bunji, 193 from Bandipur, and 228 from Srinagar. The dis-
tance from Eawal Pindi to Baramula is 162 miles, and Gilgit is
therefore about 390 miles from its present railway base.
The shortest and easiest route, however, from India to Gilgit
is the 10-foot road up the
Kaghan valley route, via the Babusar
pass. This leaves the North- Western Railway at Hassan Abdal,
and, following the Kaghan valley up to the Babusar pass, drops
down the Thak Nala on to the left bank of the Indus, a few miles to
the east of Chilas. By this route the distance to Gilgit is 250 miles
from, the railway, and the road crosses only one snow pass, whereas

the road from Pindi traverses two.

The whole of the Gilgit Agency is mountainous in the extreme.

Lofty snow-clad peaks, rugged and barren at their base, but soften-
ing off towards their summits into pine clad slopes and grassy
maidans, overhang deep valleys in which the heat of the summer
and the cold of winter are alike intense. The rainfall is small,

and the land under cultivation is chiefly irrigated by canals led

from the mountain streams. The hillsides are generally too pre-
cipitous to allow of cultivation, and this is consequently mostly
" fans," formed by deposits
confined to the valleys, and to alluvial
of stone and detritus brought down by the rivers.

The present garrison of Gilgit (1907) consists of two regiments

of Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry, one Imperial Service Moun-
tain Battery of four guns, and two companies of Sappers and
Miners, which units are distributed as follows :
—
Gilgit. —Five Companies, Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry.
Two companies, Sappers and Miners,
 —
'
THE GILQIT AGENCY. 5

Bunji. —Kashmir Imperial

Service Mountain Battery.
Three companies,
Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry.
Chilas. —
Two companies, Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry.
Gufis.—Two companies, Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry.

The Kashmir State maintains two brigades of Imperial Ser-

vice troops of equal strength, one of which is stationed in the Gil-
git Ageiicy, and the other at Satwari, near Jammu. The two
brigades relieve each other biennially. Two British officers, who
perform the duties of inspecting officers for the infantry and
artillery, reside at Satwari ; and three British officers are stationed
in the Gil git Agency, there being one assistant inspecting officer
with the battery and one with each of the infantry battalions.
The senior assistant inspecting officer, is usually stationed at Gil-
git, and advises the Kashmir General Officer Commanding in all
important matters.
In addition to these troops there are a certain number of
from the best material in the district, who are paid
levies, selected

a small retaining fee on the understanding that they are liable for
service whenever the Government of India may think fit to call
them out.
The population of the Agency, according to the last census,
is 58,358. The people are lazy and unwarlike, but are good
mountaineers. Both men and women are of strong physique.
The total number of men within the limits of the Agency who are
considered fit to bear arms is approximately as follows :

Wazarat
6 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA,

directly under the Foreign Department of the Government of

India, and in that year Captain Biddulph was appointed Political
Agent in Gilgit. He remained there till 1881, when the Govern-
ment decided to abolish the Agency.
In 1886 the growth of the Imperial and Kashmir interests
in and near the Mustagh and Hindu Kush ranges, and in the petty
states tributary to Kashmir adjoining the northern frontiers of the
Indian Empire, determined the Government of India to depute
an officer to make a further report on the hitherto little known
countries of Hunza, Nagir, Yasin, and Chitral. The late Lieutenant-
General Sir William Lockhart, then Colonel Lockhart, was con-
sequently sent with a mission to Gilgit, which visited the districts
mentioned, penetrating as far as the valley of Kafiristan, and suc-
cessfully collected a vast quantity of important information.
In 1888 the unsettled state of affairs in the Gilgit district, and the
frequent aggressions of the petty tribes against the Kashmir
Durbar, again induced the Government of India to send an officer
to visit these parts. Captain Durand was accordingly selected
for this duty, and, in submitting his report on the situation, recom-
mended the re -establishment of an Agency there. This measure
was sanctioned by the Secretary of State for India in 1889.
The jurisdiction of the Agency at that time extended over
Gurais, Astor, Bunji, Sai, and Gilgit, or, in other words, the pre-
sent limits of the Gilgit Wazarat and the Gurais Tehsil. Chitral,
Punial, Hunza, Nagir, Darel, Gor, Chilas, and Hodar were nominally
tributary to Kashmir through this Wazarat. Gilgit was then
garrisoned by the regular troops of the Kashmir Durbar and the
outposts were held by irregulars. The former were armed with
muzzle-loading weapons, and the latter with flint-locks. Military
discipline was indifferent, and service in Gilgit was most unpopu-
lar with the men, who, owing to the poorness of pay, and insuffi-
ciency of rations and clothes, coupled with the fact that the district
was at that time used as a penal settlement, looked upon a tour of
duty there as equivalent to a term of imprisonment.
On the re-introduction of the British Agency in 1889, special
service officers were sent to the district, to reorganize the force,
which was soon put on a better footing and is now in a thoroughly
efficient state.
 THE GILGIT AGENCY.

The Gilgit Wazarat.

The Astor Telisil.

Astor, or, as the Dogras callHasora, was a place of some

it,

political importance prior to the permanent occupation of Gilgit

by the Imperial Service troops of the Maharaja of Kashmir. Little
is known of its early history, but, some fifty when the dis-
years ago,
trictwas being torn by internal dissensions and ravaged by inces-
sant incursions from Chilas, Ranjit Singh intervened. Astor then
became an integral part of the dominion of the Maharaja of Kashmir,
and the independence of the local ruler disappeared. The district

developed into a large military ^^^ace d'armes, and its Ra was made
a Jagirdar of Kashmir. Since then the pohtical metacentre of the
Maharaja's provinces has shifted to trans -Indus territory, and Astor
is now governed from and not from Kashmir. The district
Gilgit

has been settled and the Chilas raids have ended in the capture of
that place and its incorporation into the Gilgit province.
the only part of the Wazarat where pack animals are
Astor is

procurable. The people have even less aptitude for military ser-
vice than the Gilgitis, but their ponies, of which about 330 are
available for transport, would be a valuable asset in time of trouble.

The Niabat of Bunji.

Bunji the head-quarters of the Imperial Service Battery and

is

one of the two battalions which constitute the garrison of the Gilgit
Agency. The place is small, though, like many portions of this
countrv, was at one time populous. Its situation is strategically
it

important. Placed half-way between the Ramghat and Partab

bridtres, over the Astor and Indus rivers, it stands at the junction

of four roads, Kashmir and Chilas respectively,

two from India via

the third from Gilgit via the Gilgit valley, and the fourth from Skardu
via Haramosh. Except for some twenty zemindars' houses the
buildings consist of a rubble fort and the barracks. A ferry is
maintained about a mile above the fort for communication with
the Sai valley, which is immediately opposite on the right bank
of the Indus. The fort would be of little use against modern
armaments. Owing to the intense heat which prevails at Bunji
in the summer, the majority of the garrison spend that part of the
year at Gilgit.
8 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Punial.

Punial is practically a portion of the Cxilgit valley, and is politi-

cally included in the Gilgit Wazarat, although all local questions are
decided by the Burushe Raja, who holds the post of Governor. The
district extends from the plain near Shakot to Thamushki, just
beyond the Hupar Pari^ on the Gupis-Yasin road. The popula-
tion amounts to about 3,000, most of whom belong to the Yaskun
tribe. The people are of much the same type as the Gilgitis, but,
judging from the good service rendered by the Punial levies in
Chilas in 1892, and again in Chitral in 1895, they appear to have far
more aptitude for a military life. The Puniaiis are also of a more
cheerful disposition than the Gilgitis. As regards religion all are
Muhammadans, three-fom'ths being Maulais and the rest Sunnis.
The language in general use is Shina, but most of the Burushe ^
family understand Khowar, the language of Chitral.
The mass of the people live in hovels within the walls of the
various forts, a custom which was no doubt necessary in the days
when the country was a bone of contention between the rulers of
Yasin and Gilgit, but which might now be abandoned with advan-
tage to the public health.
With regard to communications there is a good pack road pass-
bank of the river, but the tra chs
ing through the district on the right
on the bank are
left impracticable for laden anim^als. Communica-
tion between the two banks of the river is maintained by nu niercus
rafts and rope bridges, and a suspension bridge is in course of ccn-
struction at Gakuch which will facilitate communication with the
Ishkaman district.
Hunza and Nag ir.
As the annals of Hunza and Nagir are closely intermingled,
the two countries will be dealt with under the one heading.
Hunza, which lies to the north-west of Gilgit, bounded c n the
is

north and east by the Hindu Kush an d

Hunza. tt- r^
i
• -,

Karakoram mountains. On the west

it is divided by another range from the Karumbar and Garmas ei

1 Gallery.
2 TheBurushe is the ruling famliy of They are now very numerous, and. a^
Punial, and is closely connected with that they pay no taxes, and have an inordinate
of Chitral and Yasin. All the males of the opinion of their OAvn imj^ortanc^, they are
Burushe clan are locally called " Gushpur. " a great burden on the distr ct.
 —

THE GILGIT AGENCY.

valleys, while the southern formed by a spur running

boundary is

between the Shingshal and Hispar rivers, and by the Hunza river
which separates it from Nagir. Hunza has also certain claims to
jurisdiction over the Taghdumbash Pamir, the State of Shakshu
Pakhpu, and the Raskam valley.

Hunza may be considered to consist of three parts, which are

to a great extent ethnological divisions

:

(1) Hunza Proper, lying between the Bulchidas and Tashot spurs,
is inhabited by Burush stock, speaking the Burush-
people of
aski language they are known as Birchik, or Yashkun. The
:

population of Hunza Proper is about 6,000.

(2) Herbar, or little Gujhal, includes the main valley and all the
lateral valleys north of the Bulchidas spur. All the people of

this district can speak Burushaski, but amongst themselves

they usually speak Wakhi. The majority of the inhabitants
no doubt hail from Waklian, but many of the families are
descendants of settlers from Hunza and Chaprot. The popula-
tion is about 1,600.
(3) Shinaki, the 3rd division, comprises that part of the country on
the right bank of the Hunza river extending from the Tashot
spur to the spur which separates Hunza territory from the
Karumbar and Garmasai valleys. It contains the two fort
villages of Maiun and Hini. The inhabitants speak the Shina'
tongue.
/

Nagir bounded by Hunza on the north, and by the Gilgit

is
^

province and Baltistan on the south ; it

*^^'^'
also includes the districts of Chalt, Chap-
rot, and the Buladas or Garmasai valley, on the right bank of the
Hunza river. The country may be divided into two parts, namely,
(1) Nagir Proper, and (2) Shinaki, or Shen Bar. The first named
district extends from Hispar to Dadimal, and its inhabitants are of
the same stock as in Hunza Proper, speaking the Burushaski tongue.
The latter division extendsfrom the village of Minapin as far as
Chalt, and includes Chaprot, Bar, and Buladas, with a few hamlets
only occupied during the summer, chiefly for grazing purposes.
Shina is spoken in all the villages, but the people can also speak
Burushaski. Chaprot once belonged to Hunza, and the people of
Hunza intermarry with the villagers of that place, though they will
Vol. I. C
10 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Nagir
not do so with any one from Nagir Proper. The population of
is about 10,000.
There are fairly good roads on either side of the Hunza river
leading to Gil git, but the country is, as
Communications.
^ ^^^^^^ exceedingly rugged and difficult,

and most of the so-called roads are mere mountain tracks which are
occasionally carried along the face of precipices by overhanging
which could be easily cut away. Serious damage has been
galleries
caused to communications in Hunza-Nagir on various occasions
owing to the action of a glacier in the Shingshal valley. This

glacier periodically dams the Shingshal river, and a lake forms

behind the barrier of ice. Eventually the water breaks through the
ice and causes a flood in the Hunza river. In July 1906 a most
serious flood was caused in this way which amongst other damage,
wrecked the suspension bridge at Askurdas and the bridge across
the Gilgit river at Chamogah, and practically destroyed the whole
road between Chalt and Nomal.
Both states are governed by their own rajas or rulers, who are
. TT known in their own country by the name
Government
1^
of Hunza and
.,,ri
, ,. •
re •
i x-.i •

Nagir. of Tluim, tliough then' omciai title is

Mir. Each by a wazir or chief minister, whose office

is assisted

•is hereditary. Murder, and other serious crimes, are dealt with by
the Mir other oSences, except those of a petty nature, by the
;

wazir. In minor cases, justice is administered by the headman

of the village group of villages. This official is called the
or

Trangfa or Jangayo, and has one or more assistants called CJiarhu.

Other minor officials assist in collecting taxes and revenue, and in
providing coolies, supplies, etc., as required. Among these may
be mentioned the Ferash, who from his duties might be called

comptroller of the Mir's household, and the Yarfas, or land

stewards, who superintend the cultivating and harvesting of the
Mir's crops.
Almost all available land in Hunza and Nagir is cultivated,
and the system of irrigation canals, or hhals, is excellent.
The revenues of the Thams or Mirs are derived from taxes
on cultivation, marriage and divorce, trade, live stock, and gold-
washing, which latter is quite a considerable industry in these
parts.
 THE GILGIT AGENCY. 11

It may be assumed that in the event of invasion from

outside,
the two States could muster about 3,500 fighting men between
them
Military.
*^^ ^^^le of the rest of the male
^^^^^^
population would be available for the
carriage of supplies and the erection of sangars.
7V system of levies obtains, by which all enrolled levies
are
called out annually for one week, and are put through a short course
of musketry by the mihtary assistant to the Political Agent. They
are armed with Snider carbines which are kept in Gilgit, and only
issued when the men are under training.
For hardiness and activity
on the mountain side the men of both States are noted throughout
the Hindu Rush region. Contingents of levies from Hunza and
Nagir accompanied Colonel Kelly on his march to Chitralin 1895
and rendered valuable services. As noted elsewhere the peoples
of the two States are extremely jealous of each other. They
have, however, been known to unite against a common foe, as
for instance when they combined against Colonel Durand's
force
in 1891^ ;
but
cannot be said that
it they offered each other
wholehearted support on that occasion.
Although of the same race and origin, the people of Hunza
and Nagir vary considerably in physique
People.
and physiognomy. The former people
are of a cheerful, open disposition, and are as a rule powerfully
built and of medium stature. Their complexion is rather fair, and
men with reddish and sandy coloured hair are often met with. The
people of Nagir, on the other hand, do not seem to posssess the
fine
physique which seen in Hunza, and are generally of darker
is

complexion. In religion the Hunza men, with few"^ exceptions,

belong to the Maulai sect, while the
Nagirs are all Shias.
Polo is the great national pastime in both States, as in
Gil^rifc
and Yasin; and each village has its own polo-ground where the (^ame
is played whenever time can be spared. The grounds vary "from
200 to 300 yards long by 20 to 30 wide, and are surrounded by walls
of stone and mud about three to four feet high. Any number of
players join in the game and it is a common sight to see
as many
as eight and twelve a side. A description of the game appears
unnecessary, but it may be mentioned that few of the English

1 See page 17.

C8
12 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

rules seem to be observed. Other pastimes are shooting at a mark

from horseback at and tent-pegging.
full gallop,

Owing to and inaccessible nature the two countries,

their wild
especially Hunza, have seldom been successfully invaded. Both
were formerly ruled over by the same chief but one of these
;

princes, Lali Tham,^ having two sons, Girkis and Moghlot, divided
his territory between them, giving Hunza to the elder, and Nagir
to the younger brother. These two princes quarrelled, and Grirkis
was killed by a servant of Moghlot. From this time forward the
two countries were continually at war with each other, and even
now they are far from being on good terms. The people of Nagir
more than once allied themselves with the Kashmir troops against
Hunza, but never with any success and the fighting was generally
;

of a guerilla nature. If the Hunza men took a prisoner he was

sold into slavery when the Nagirs took a captive he was killed.
;

It is doubtful which was the less enviable fate.

The district of Chaprot used to be a constant source of strife
between the two states, and was from time to time held by each
in turn. In 1877, the Hunza garrison was driven out by the allied
forces of Nagir and Kashmir, since when the place has belonged
to Nagir. When Colonel Lockhart visited Hunza with his mission,
however, the Tham would only allow him to enter the country on
condition that he would restore Chaprot to Hunza. Colonel
Lockhart consequently induced the Nagir garrison to retire, and
since then the place has been solely occupied by Kashmir troops.

Expedition against Hunza and Nagir in 1891.

In February 1888 the Eajas of Hunza and Nagir rose against

Kashmir, and, with a combined, force of 2,000 men, expelled the
Kashmir garrisons from the northern outpost of Chalt. Tiiey next
threatened to attack Nomal, a fort some fifteen miles north of
Gilgit. This post, however, was reinforced, and on 17th March
the garrison made a successful sortie, causing the besiegers to with-
draw to Chaprot. Although there were some 4,800 Kashmir troops
and irregulars divided between Nomal, Gilgit, Astor, and Bunji, the
force was without transport, had practically no organization, and
was quite unfit to undertake military operations. Consequently
J Tke Nagir people state this man's ns^me was Shah,
 THE OILQIT AGENCY. 13

with the Hunza and

the Kashmir Durbar preferred to negotiate
agreed to where-
Nagir Chiefs. An arrangement was accordingly
troops, the cultivators
by Chalt was to be garrisoned by Kashmir
was to
who had hitherto lived there being removed, and Chaprot
be handed over to Gauri Tham (a son of Zafar
Khan, Raja of Nagir),

who was also furnished with an escort of twenty-five Kashmir sepoys.

Shortly after these events Captain Durand, as has
abeady been
of India
described, was deputed by the Government
to visit Gilgit

and submit a report on the military situation with

reference to the
ensuring the security
recent tribal disturbances, and the means of
of the country up to the Hindu Kush.
Captain Durand reported that affairs in Gilgit were most
unsatisfactory from a military point of view, and made various
recommendations for their improvement. As a result of this report
Gilgit Agency
the Government of India decided to re-establish the
which had been withdrawn in 1881.
The following year (1889) a Mission, consisting of Captain
Durand, Lieutenant J. Manners-Smith and Surgeon G. S. Robertson,
with a small escort of the 20th Punjab Infantry, was deputed to
visit the States of Hunza and Nagir.

At Nagir, a place hitherto unvisited by Europeans— the Mission

was cordially received. The Raja, Zafar Khan, and his son, Uzar
Khan, appeared to be well disposed towards the British, and
readily consented to the conditions on which the Government
proposed to grant an increased subsidy, viz., the exclusion of
foreigners, and free passage through their territory for British
officers.

The Mission next proceeded to Hunza, where the Raja,

Safdar Ali, agreed to the following terms in return for the grant
officers, exclusion of
of subsidy, viz., free passage for British
foreigners, cessation of raiding on the Yarkand road, and non-

interference on the part of China in the internal affairs of his

country.
In 1890 the Hunza Raja, in contravention of his agreement,
raided a Kirghiz encampment on the Taghdumbash Pamir. The
Raja of Nagir also was reported to have kidnapped a boy in Gilgit
territory late in 1889. Otherwise there was nothing to disturb our
relations with these two States up to the end of 1890.
14 FBONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the 25tli May 1891 tlie Britisli Agent at Gilgit received

information that Uzar Khan of Nagir had murdered his brothers,

Gauri Tham and Ding Malik, and intended to seize the outposts
of Chalt and Chaprot. Eaja Zafar Khan also wrote to the effect
that Uzar Khan threatened to murder a third brother, Sikander
Khan, then in Gilgit, should the latter return to Chaprot. Captain
(now Lieut. -Colonel) Durand promptly made preparations to safe-
o-uard the Gilgit frontier, and moved to Chalt with a small force
on the 29th, being joined on the way by Eaja Akbar Khan of
Punial and some of his men. This rapid and unexpected move
surprised and disconcerted the people of Hunza and Nagir. Wazir
Dadu of Hunza and Uzar Khan, who had collected their respective
forces at Maiun and Nilt, tried to induce Raja Zafar Khan to join
them in an advance against Chalt, but the latter refused and the
attempt was abandoned.
Letters and messages were now interchanged, and, on the 15th
June, vakils {jirgas) from both states came in. The Hunza vakil
disclaimed all connection with Chalt or Chaprot, and stated that
there was no intention on their part of attacking these places.
The Nagir vakil assured Colonel Durand in Zafar Khan's name of
their Chief's loyalty, repudiated all responsibility for Uzar Khan
and his doings, and promised,
the troops were withdrawn, to
if

prevent the latter from giving further trouble.

The following day at a Durbar attended by the Punial Raja,
the headmen of Chalt, Chaprot, Bar, and Buladas, and the Hunza
and Nagir vakils^ Colonel Durand explained his reasons for moving
to Chalt, and announced that in consequence of the assurance of
the Hunza and Nagir Rajas that they would not interfere with
Chalt and Chaprot in future, he would withdraw his troops.
He, however, warned them that any further attack on the border
villages or movement of armed men between Chalt and Nomal
would be considered an act of war by Hunza and Nagir against the
Kashmir Durbar and the British Government.
Having provided for the garrisoning of Chalt and Chaprot,
Colonel Durand withdrew the remainder of his troops to Nomal
on the 20th June. He, however, had but little hope that this settle-
ment was final, and in a report to the Government of India he urged
the complete subjection of Hunza and Nagir, the gist of the reasons
 THE QILGIT AQENCT. 15

on which he based his recommendation being as follows that, : —

owing to their isolated position in a country extremely difficult
of access, and their exaggerated ideas of their own power and im-
portance, these people were likely to be a constant source of anxiety
and trouble on the frontier that the Hunza Chief had for some
;

time past been guilty of intrigues with other Powers, and that it
was necessary that we should have access through his country to
the passes on to the Pamirs and, lastly, that the Hunza Chief
;

had, moreover, broken all the agreements in return for which he

received a British subsidy.
In September 1891 the Government sanctioned the establish-
ment of a garrison and fort at Chalt, and the improvement of the
Gilgit-Chalt road. It was also decided to inform the Chiefs of
Hunza and Nagir that roads must be made through their territories
from Chalt to Hunza and Nagir, and possibly on to Gircha, the
point of junction of several routes : the Chiefs were to be assured
that no interference with the government of their countries was
intended, but that they, as tributaries, would be expected to aid in
the work, and that in the event of their objecting, our troops would
enter their country and construct the roads.
In anticipation of the above-mentioned proposals leading to
hostilities, a detachment of 200 men of the l-5th Gurkhas under

Captain Barrett, with Lieutenants Boisragon and Badcock, and

a section of the Hazara Mountain Battery under Lieutenant Gorton,
E.A., was ordered from Abbottabad to Gilgit, which place they
reached about the 21st November.
In crossing the Burzil pass they had encountered very bad
weather, and Captain Barrett and a number of men suffered
severely from frostbite.
During the week preceding the arrival of the Gurkhas, letters
were received from the Hunza and Nagir Chiefs protesting against
our preparations ; and the Eaja of the latter State went so far as
to threaten that any attempt to build a bridge at Chalt would lead
to war. Both Chiefs were invited to send in their vaJcils. Their
tribesmen, however, were collecting at Maiun and Nilt, and were
strengthening the defences at both places. It, therefore, appeared
evident that the two States were determined to combine against us.
The section of the mountain battery and half the Gurkha
detachment had been pushed on to Chalt by the 21st, and the road
 — . . ..

16 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

between that place and Gilgit was strongly held. Martial law
was
now proclaimed in the Gilgit district, and the carrying of arms was
^''^^'*'^*
-Uveo.ee.. Qn
^ thc 28th
,.,
British N.-C. ofhcers,
officers. and men.
Novembei thc
Section No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery 2 76
1
l-5th Gurkha Rifles .. -.2 188
+^^^-^„ Q««-hnwTi
trOOpS, as ShOWn
Bengal Sappers and Miners . . 1 7 jj^ ^j^e margin,
°"' '"""' '"" 2B were concentrat-
''t^'.'^''".''' 1
^^
Signallers .. .. , „ •; •' ed at Chalt. A de-
ist Kashmir Infantry (Ragu Pertab Regi-
mgiit) .. •• ..2 2o7
404
tacnment oi 200
2nd Kashmir Rifles (Body-Guard Regiment) 3
picked Pathan
Punial Levy . • • . 1 15U r
road coolies,
Total ••
^^_^^^ under Mr. Char-
Staff. les Spedding (the
Lieut. -Colonel A. G. A.Durand, Commanding. contractor for
Captain R. H. Twigg, 12th Bengal Infantry, D.A.A.G. ^r . •

C. T. Mackenzie, Seaforth Highlanders, D.A.Q.M.G. the llashmir-

''
I;J^^y^i?'^TT??"^T^nffi Gilgit
o road) was
,, W. H. M. Stewart, Political Oflficer. ''

Lieutenant T. Manners-Smith, ,, „ attached to the

Surgeon-Captain T. R. Roberts, i.M.s., P.M.O. c
oq 0^, 17^1 o-i
General Suram Chand, Commanding Kashmir Troops at ^"^^^ ^^ ^'^ "^^gl"
Gilgit. neer Corps. Sup-
plies had all to be brought from Kashmir, and the complete
breakdown of the contractors' arrangements caused Colonel Durand
much anxiety. Lieutenant Baird, however, was despatched to
Bunji in November and succeeded in forwarding sufficient supplies
to enable the force to advance by the end of the month. The
rations issued to the troops were nearly on active service scale,
including one chittack of ghi, and meat whenever possible. This
contributed much to the successful resistance of the extreme cold,
especially in the case of the Kashmir troops, who had previously
suffered considerably from bad and insufficient food.
On the 29th November Colonel Durand forwarded an ulti-
matum to the Rajas of Hunza and Nagir, of w^hich the following
is an extract :

It is necessary for the protection of Kashmir and of your State that the
troops of the Supreme Government should have free access to your country.
By this means alone can the requisite arrangements be made for safeguard-

ing here the frontier of the Empire. It is not the intention of the Supreme
Government in any way to interfere with the form of rule in your State, but
the arrangements for protecting its frontier necessitate on the part of
 THE GILGIT AGENCY. 17

Government tlie making of roads which will enable it, should occasion arise,

to place troops rapidly in positions guarding the passes leading from the
Pamirs. The Supreme Government has, therefore, decided to make a road
^""^la i qj.
from Gilgit
° to Chalt, where a fort will be built, and from Chalt to
Nagir

beyond that place as may be necessary. As a feudatory of the British

so far
Government you are now called upon to give any aid in your power towards
the construction of the road. I am further directed to inform you that,
in so far as concerns the road beyond Chalt, which will pass through your
territory,no refusal on your part to permit its construction will be accepted.
The road must be made. Unless you instantly comply with the demands
of the Supreme Government, troops will enter your territory, and the road

will be constructed in spite of any opposition you may offer.

Three days from this date will be allowed during which your answer
will be awaited, and I warn you that should it not be completely satisfactory,
the troops under my command will move forward and carry out the orders
of Government. The British Government has ever treated you with marked
consideration and generosity. I trust that the remembrance of this fact

will influence your counsels, and that by a wise compliance with the wishes

of the great and magnanimous Government, whose loyal servant you have

constantly confessed yourself to be, you will avoid bringing on your country
and people the calamity of war.

With this -ultimatum letters were sent pointing out the hope-
lessness of resistance and advising the Chiefs to avoid war. On
the 30th November, however, our envoy returned bringing defiant
answers from both the Rajas, and Colonel Durand determined to
advance on the expiration of the three days' law which had been
promised.
Meanwhile Mr. /Spedding, with his 200 Pathans, had been
rapidly improving the road from Nomal to Chalt, and 800 more
coolies were at work on the road between Nomal and Gilgit.
was considered necessary to make arrangements to safe-
It
guard the line of communications Astor-Bunji-Gilgit against any
possible interference on the part of the Shinaki ^ tribes of Chilas,
Gor, Tangir, and Darel. These tribes had in the past sided with
Hunza and Nagir against Kashmir, and had been accustomed to
look to those States for aid in the event of invasion of their countries
by Durbar troops. Reports stated that they intended to give

1 Hunza or Nagir, according to the letter.

2 For the names of all the tribes to which the term Shinaki is applied, see page 30.
Vol. I.
18 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

trouble on the present occasion, but, altbougli there seems to have

been a war party in each community, they were unable to bring over
the majority to their views, and no trouble was experienced from
them.
the 1st December the force crossed the Hunza river, which
On
had been bridged by Captain Aylmer, and entered Nagir territory.
No opposition was met with on this day. On the 2nd, the force
advanced nine miles to Nilt, a fort of great strength, situated at
the junction of a deep ravine from the
Capture of Nilt.
Rakaposhi glacier with the Hunza river.

The banks of both the ravine and the river at this place consist
of precipitous and almost inaccessible cliffs, and it was on the
edge of these cliffs, overlooking the ravine, that the fort had been
built. The march to bank of the river, was
Nilt, along the left

unimpeded, except where the enemy had destroyed the path across
two difficult nalas running at right angles to the main stream.
Some road-making was necessary before the force could cross
these obstacles. Here and there sangars had been erected, but
they were not held, and no sign of the enemy was seen until Nilt
was reached.
Owing to the configuration of the ground, the fort could not
be properly seen until the column was within 300 yards, nor could
rifle gun fire be brought to bear on it until within even less dis-
or
tance. The walls of the fort, which averaged fourteen feet in
height and eight feet in thickness, were of solid stone, cemented
with mud and strengthened by large timbers. Towers, placed at
the angles, and in the centres of the faces, afforded good flanking
fire, and good head-cover was provided throughout. The main
gateway which was in the south- Vv^est corner of the fort was pro-
tected, and completely hidden, by a loopholed wall, which ran
along in front of the main wall. In front of this again was a deep
ditch encumbered with abatis and another broad band of abatis
;

filled the space intervening between the ditch and a precipitous

spur which projected from the hill above into the narrow strip of
cultivation in front of the fort. This hill was crowned by our
infantry, but their fire could not touch the defenders in the fort,
who were under perfect cover, nor could the guns be taken up, until
some improvement of the path was effected. The attack had, there-
fore, to be made straight to the front, over a space narrowing
 o

Q J» ^ CO
o
Q d

Z
D
<

o T
H
Ll
D
LU O
z CO
> o
< z
o
o
Li.

O
„ 1 0A\\IV^^;MJ
UJ
>

'^f V¥^-

o 5
 THE OILQIT AGENCY. 19

down to a width of about sixty yards. As, throiigliout the march,

there had been no path down the steep river bank passable for
animals, the force had been unable to water since leaving Chalt.
Colonel Durand therefore decided to carry the fort by assault at

once.
The only possible entrance was by the gateway in the south-
west corner of the fort, described above. The back of the fort was
situated on the edge of the cliff, with a covered way leading to the
ravine below, so that the defenders could retire in safety when
they saw the place was taken.
The 7 -pounder K.M.L. mountain guns not being powerful
enough to breach the walls, Colonel Durand ordered Lieutenant
Boisragon to advance with the 5th Gurkhas. Captain Aylmer, with
his small party of Bengal Sappers and Miners, was directed to
accompany the Gurkhas and blow in the gate.

The assaulting party dashed forward tovv-ards the west face of

the fort, on nearing which Boisragon, with Captain Aylmer and

a few Gurkhas, managed to find a way through the thick abatis, and,
under a heavy fire, worked round to the gate in the outer wall.
This gate was promptly hacked down, and the party rushed into
the courtyard of the main entrance. Captain Aylmer, assisted by
Sapper Hazara Singh, then placed a charge of guncotton, tamped
with stones, against the inner door, which was stoutly constructed
and strongly barricaded. This point was under fire from the towers
flanking the gateway and from loopholes in the gate itself. Captain
Aylmer was wounded in the leg while placing the charge, but
managed to withdraw under shelter of the wall to await the explo-
sion. The fuse, however, failed, and Aylmer had to return to re-
adjust and re-light it, when he was again wounded, his hand being
severely crushed by a stone flung from the fort. This time the
explosion was successful, and the door was blown in. At the same
moment. Lieutenant Badcock, having found the gap in the abatis,
came up with a few more Gurkhas, and the whole party forced their
way into the porch under heavy fire, two Gurkhas being killed in the
doorway, and several being wounded. Captain Aylmer, in spite of
his injuries, remained in the porch, killing several of the enemy
with his revolver, until, being faint with pain, he was carried by
his orderly into the ditch outside. As only a few men were able to
P2
20 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

find the gap through the abatis, Lieutenant Boisragon, leaving his
little party in the porch, now went back ancj
collected some rein-

forcements from the various nalas round the fort. The blowing in
of the gateway had been carried out earlier than had been expected,
and the explosion had been mistaken for the bursting of one of the
enemy's guns consequently the supporting troops continued to
;

keep up a heavy shell and rifle fire on the fort, which added con-
siderably to the dangers of the assaulting party, and to the diffi-
culties of Boisragon's task. Meanwhile Lieutenant Badcock, picking

up a rifle, killed several of the enemy, but was shortly after severely
wounded while leading an attack into the interior of the stronghold.
The enemy being unable to dislodge the party in the gateway, and
seeing reinforcements coming up, now began to evacuate their

position. About this time the ofiicer commanding the force, having
been informed of the successful blowing in of the gate, ordered the
reserves, composed of Kashmir Imperial Service Troops, to advance,
and, after a hand-to-hand fight through the maze of alleys and
passages inside, the fort was taken. Colonel Durand was wounded
effect of the artillery fire,
early in the action, vv^hilst watching the
and the command now devolved on Captain Bradshaw.
Before the Gurkhas commenced their advance Captain
Mackenzie, with the detachment of the 20th Punjab Infantry, the
satling gun, and the men of the Punial Levy, was sent to seize the
hill on the right commanding the fort.
It was intended that this

party should cross the ravine running in rear of the fort and turn
the enemy's position, and that the reserves should take up the
pursuit and carry the defences on the opposite bank. The enemy,
however, had destroyed the paths down the precipitous sides of the
ravine, which prevented Captain Mackenzie from carrying out these
intentions, and Captain Bradshaw was obliged to abandon the idea
of any forward move on that day. Captain Mackenzie's party,
however, accounted for a considerable number of the enemy in
their flight.
Our casualties amounted to three British officers severely
wounded three men killed one native officer, and twenty-five non-
; ;

commissioned oflicers and men wounded. The enemy's loss was

estimated at eighty killed and many wounded among the former
;

was the wazir of Nagir.

 21
THE OaOIT AOSSCT.

subsequently awarded to Captain

The Victoria Cross was oeea-
for tlieir gallantry on this
Aylmer and Lieutenant Boisragon
while Lieutenant Badeock, who
had also been recommended
2n Order six
the Distinguished Service
for this distinction, received
;

men received the Order of Merit.

comparatively little loss
The capture of this stronghold with
gallantry of the three oifi-
was almost entirely due to the personal
Lieutenants Boisragon and Bad-
cers^Captain Aylmer, R.E., and
advanced party. Ihe
cock-andthe few brave men forming the nature
5th Gurkhas for from the
brunt of the fighting fell on the The
use.
in support could be of
lit le
of the ground, the troops
gallantry and dash, and the
Gurkhas behaved with their customary
showed remarkable coolness in
Kashmir Imperial Service Troops
this their first action.

was found immediately to follow up the

to be impossible
As it
night at Nilt, camping on the cul-
enemy, the force halted for the
tivated land outside the fort.
great ravine running from the
In front of the force lay the
some thousands of feet above, ihe
tar
river-bed to the daclers
commanded every possible track
bank lined with sangars which to
feet, where it joined the river
up it, varied in height from 600
precipitous. To the left of the
1500 feet, and was absolutely
river, on the right bank of
which was the strongly
f ;rt ran the Hunza
mile up the river, on the left bank
was
held fort of Maiun. Half a
the great ravine
a from which to the junction with
fortified ziarat,
sangars. During the night all the
ran one continuous line of
sangars were strongly reinforced,
and those exposed to shell fire were
The British held the edge
provided with bomb-proof head-cover.
snow-
of their side of the ravine
with a line of picquets up to the
the Punial levy holding the
upper positions.
line,

On the morning December an advance was attempted.

of 3rd
all the sangars durmg the
The enemy, however, had re-occupied
strengthened their defences. Tlie
previous night, and had areatly
fort had been destroyed was
path leading down the ravine from the
impassable for mules, and our
swept by a searching fire, and was
bomb-proof sangar exactly
advance was further barred by a large
opposite, held by 100 of the
enemy. After.a loss of one man
Lieutenant Gorton, K.A.,
killed and seven wounded, including
22 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the attempt was abandoned. The situation was a difficult one. The
force was very small and opposed to it was a numerous enemy, holding
a well entrenched position of great natural strength. An attack on
the large sangar on the opposite side of the ravine offered no
prospect of success, while an advance up the river-bed, exposed to
a cross-fire from both banks, might have involved heavier losses than
the little force, with its limited number of British officers, could
well afford. For seventeen days therefore the force v/as obliged to
remain stationary. It was evident that only tv/o courses were
open, either to cross the river and storm Maiun, or to turn the
enemy's defences on the opposite side of the ravine. On the
nio-ht of the 12th Decem^ber an attempt was made to carry out

the first of these plans, but it met with no success. Night after
night reconnaissances of the enemy's position were made, in th-e
hope of finding a path up the precipice by which their defences
mif^ht be turned. During all this time, the enemy w^ere constantly
on the alert, and kept up a heavy fire or rolled down avalanches of
stones to prevent the approach of our men.
During this enforced inactivity, the conduct of the troops was
excellent and the determination of the force seems to have discon-
certed the enemy, who were unaccustomed to such continuous effort
on the part an invader. On the 9th December Safdar Ali Khan
of

sent in a letter to Mr. Robertson, the Political Officer, who returned

an answer to the effect that complete submission was a neces-
sary preliminary to negotiation. On this the Hunza Chief apparently

at once retired to Upper Gujhal and prepared for flight.

The prolonged delay had its dangers for the British force :

there was always the possibility that the Shinaki tribes, encouraged
by our non-success, might combine to attack Gilgit and Bunji,
while the Hunza and Nagir men were already considering an attempt
to cut communications with the advanced base, at Chalt.
At last, on the 19th December a Dogra sepoy named Nagdu,
of the Body-Guard Regiment, who had been constantly employed
in the night reconnaissances, reported the discovery of a path by
which the cliff below the enemy's upper sff?^gr«rs could be scaled.
Captain Colin Mackenzie, who had
Action of 20ih December.
^ssumcd Command on the 18th, in the
temporary absence of Captain Bradshaw at Gilgit, at once decided
to attack. The plan of attack was as follows a storming party was
:
 TUE GILGIT AGENCY. 23

to cross the exposed ground north of the fort under cover of dark-
ness, and take up a position in the ravine below. On the follow-
ing morning, this party was to scale the almost precipitous cliff on
the extreme the enemy's position, and capture the four upper
left of

sangars on the summit. Covering parties on the ridge opposite,

and in Nilt fort, v/ere to assist this advance by directing a heavy
fireon the enemy's defences, and so distracting their attention
from the turning movement.
On the evening of the 19th December the storming party, con-
sisting of 100 rifles of the Body- Guard Eegiment, under Lieutenants
Manners- Smith and F. H. Taylor, took up their position in the
upper part of the ravine, at the foot of the cliff, unobserved by the
enemy. There they remained all night, and, when daylight broke,
owing to the precipitous sides of the cliff, they were still concealed
from the enemy's view.
Before daylight on the 20th, the ridge facing the enemy's
breastworks was occupied by the covering party, consisting of
twenty-five rifles, 20th Punjab Infantry, under Mr. E. F. Knight
(who had volunteered Gurkhas, under
for duty), fifty rifles, l-5th
Lieutenant Boisragon, thirty rifles, Kagu Pertab Regiment, under
Lieutenant Townshend, thirty rifles, Body- Guard Regiment, under
Lieutenant Baird, and two guns of the Hazara Mountain Battery
under Lieutenant Molony. The infantry were divided into four
parties, with orders to distribute their fire on the four sangars
opposite, at a range of 400 to 600 yards. The loopholes of the fort
were also manned, and dispositions were made to, as far as
possible, prevent the enemy retiring from or reinforcing any
particular sangar.
At about was opened on the enemy's defences, and
8 A.M. fire
shortly afterwards Lieutenant Manners-Smith, with his advanced
party of fifty rifles, commenced his perilous ascent of the clifi, which
rose almost sheer for about 1,500 feet above him. The well-
directed fire of the covering party on the ridge compelled the
defenders of the sangars to keep under cover, and prevented them
from leaving this protection to fire over the edge of the cliff or to
hurl down stones.
Lieutenant Manners-Smith had completed about half of the
ascent, when, having moved fm'ther to his left than was originally
24 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

intended, his further advance was checked by an inaccessible por-

tion of the precipice, and he was obliged to retrace his steps to
the ravine below. A was made at 10 a.m. and
fresh attempt
the first party reached a point about sixty yards from one of the
sangars before they were discovered by the enemy. The defen-
ders now began to hurl dovv^n showers of stones and rooks, but
Lieutenant Manners- Smith, ^ skillfully manoeuvring his men, soon
reached the summit and rushed the first sangar. Lieutenant
Taylor now followed with the supports, and the combmed party
cleared the other three sangars on the left flank, thus completely
turning the position and compelling the enemy hastily to evacuate
the fortified ziarat and the stronghold of Maiun.
The infantry were now withdrawn from the Nilt ridge, and
the whole force, with the exception of the guns, was launched in
pursuit. Leaving Nilt shortly after 1 p.m., the force crossed the
ravine,and captured the large lower sangar on the opposite bank,
whose defenders, to the number of about 100, threw down their
arms and surrendered, their escape having been cut off by Lieu-
tenant Manners-Smith's party.
Lieutenant Townshend, with the Ragu Pertab Eegiment, now
moved on to Thol, and, after clearing the neighbouring sangars
at the point of the bayonet, captured the fc»rt, killing twenty-two
of the enemy. Sixty- five men of the Punial Levy, having crossed
the river on a raft, captured and destroyed the fort of Maiun,
on the defenders a loss of ten men killed. They then
inflicting
advanced along the right bank of the Hunza river, and levelled the
defences of Hini.
Leaving a small detachment to hold Gulmit, the remainder of
the force, with the 5th Gurkhas as advanced guard, and a flanking
party of fifty men crossing the heights on the right, now pushed on
to Pisan, seven miles from Nilt, which was reached at dusk. A
strong position, known as the Yol Pari, just west of Pisan, was
evacuated as our troops came up, and some of the fugitives were
fired on.
Lieutenant Molony, who had been obliged to wait with the
guns until the path across the Nilt Nala had been improved,

1 Lieutenant Manners-Smith was awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallantry on
thi-s occasion.
 THE OILOIT AGENCY. 25

reached Pisan, at 3 a.m. on the 21st. The baggage, which had been
ordered to follow as quickly as possible, was still in rear. Ample
supplies, however, were found in the fort at Pisan, and a full ration
was issued to all the troops. Our casualties on the 20th were only
two sepoys wounded. The enemy lost about 100 killed on the
Nagir side of the river alone, and 118 prisoners were taken. These
were sent back to Chalt, in charge of an escort under Mr. Knight.
On the 21st, Captain Mackenzie, with the two mountain guns,
100 men of the 5th Gurkhas, and 250 of
Occupation of Nagir. ^^^ Body-Guard Kegiment, made a
forced march of twenty- seven miles to Nagir. A few volleys were
fired at small parties of the enemy on the opposite bank of the
river but they generally
;
dispersed without replying. At Tuishot,
a village between Pisan and Nagir, Jafar Ali Khan, the TJiam of
Nagir, surrendered to Surge on-Major Eobertson, who was now
Acting Political Officer. Before reaching Nagir a deputation of
Kanjutis from Hunza, headed by Muhammad Riza, brother of
a former wazir, was received by Surgeon-Major Robertson. They
announced that the people were now willing to submit, and stated
that an armed party of tribesmen had been despatched in pursuit
of the fugitive Tham and his followers. On the 22nd the troops
marched back about five miles to Samaya, a village on the Nagir

side of the river opposite the fort of Hunza, or Baltit, as it is locally

named. Here they were joined by the remainder of the force with
the baggage and rear-guard. As a proof of their complete
submission, the tribesmen assisted to build a temporary bridge at
Samaya, and on its completion. Captain Twigg, with the Gurkhas,
crossed the river, and occupied the fort and village of Hunza.
All opposition was now at an end. Lieutenant Townshend
was appointed Military Governor of Hunza, and measures were
taken to disarm the population of both States.
Proclamations were issued by the British Agent to reassure
the people. They were informed that they would not be subjected
to oppression of any kind, but that slave-dealing, man-stealing, and
brigandage must be given up at once that they must obey the
;

orders of the British Government, but would be allowed to live

their own lives, as heretofore, without interference. The people,
relying on these assurances, speedily returned to their homes and
Vol. I. P
26 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

appeared to be grateful for the unexpected kindness and clemency

shown to them.
On the 25th December a small flying column under Lieutenants
Baird and Molony, with Lieutenant Manners- Smith as Political
Officer, set out for Upper Gujhal. The object of the expedition was,
possible, to intercept the Tham of Hunza and other
important
if

fuoitives, who had accompanied him, and also to arrange for the

disarmament and pacification of that portion of the country. The

column proceeded as far as Misgar, six marches from Hunza, and
was well received by the people en route, who even pulled down
their defensive towers, and offered the
timbers as fuel in token of
submission. It was not, however, found possible to overtake the

Hunza Chief, Saf dar Ali. Accompanied by Uzar Khan of Nagir and
Wazir Dadu, with a following of some 500 men, women, and
children he had already made good his escape and eventually found
refuge on the Tagdumbash Pamir.
A small garrison of 280 men was left atHunza, and the
remainder marched back to Gilgit,
of the force where it was broken
up on 11th January 1892. The total British casualties in the ex-
pedition had been four Non- Commissioned Officers and men killed
and four officers, one native officer, and thirty- fom- men wounded.
Lieut. -Colonel Durand in his despatch made the following

remarks relative to the conduct of the troops

:—

discipline of the troops has throughout been admirable.

The conduct and
As the officer to has fallen the honour of commanding a body of the
whom
in which they have been called
Imperial Service Troops on the first occasion
fight in the interests of the
Empire side by side with our own troops,
upon to
with pride and pleasure that I Avould wish to
draw the especial attention
it is

of His Excellency the

Commander-in-Chief to the conduct of the Body-Guard
had these regiments under my orders
and Kaf^u Pertab Regiments. I have
years, and have seen them grow in efficiency under the careful in-
for two
structions of Captain Twigg and Lieutenant Townshend, and the steady
efforts of some of theh own ofiicers. The result has been most satisfactory,
take their place in line with our own
and they have proved themselves fit to
regiments in frontier warfare. They have
shown coolness under fire, and
discipline in camp. The attack by the detachment of the Body-Guard Regi-
the ravine was a task to try the
ment on the sangars crowning the side of
Regiment had not the opportimity of
best regiment and if the Ragu
;
Pertab
 27
THE OILGIT AGENCY. ^

they showed no lack of keeness,

when they
showing such high qualities, yet
enemy.
had the chance of meeting the
the withdrawal of the expedi-
The events which followed
settlement
subsequent arrangements for the
tionary troops, and the
briefly described
of the affairs of
the two States, will now be
InNacrir the former ruler, Z afar
Khan, was appointed Gover-
opposition
that he had been coerced into
nor as it was considered
Ali, and that he could
This more powerful neighbour, Safdar engagements This
to remain loyal to his
in future be trusted
Government of India, and Zafar
appointment was ratified by the
granted the title of Raja. Being an old
man, feeble m
Khan was
Khan, was allowed to act for him, and on
health bis son, Sikander
as ruler
in 1904, this man was confirmed
the de'ath of bis father
of the State. , , .

the majority of the fugitives,

,-, . v
During February and March 1892,
were either sent back by the
who had crossed into Chinese territory,
returned voluntarily to their homes Uzar
Chinese authorities, or
Taotai of Kashgar, and was deport-
Khan was also sent back by the
ed to Kashmir, where he has since remained.
Tagdumbash Pamir, had sent letters
Safdar Ali, on reaching the
of Kashgar representing himself
to have been
to the Chinese'Taotai
the victim of an
unprovoked attack on our part. His complaints
first from the Taotai of
Kashgar, and sub-
resulted in protests,
Ambassador in London and the Tsungli
.Pouently from the Chinese
of the ruler of a State which was
Yamen, against our treatment
China.
claimed as tributary to , ^ . .
,1.
informed of the true state of affairs, however, the
On bein^
that the measures taken to ensure the pre-
Chinese acknowledged
security in Hunza were just and necessary.
servation of order and
that the Government of India had no
An assurance was given Government.
desire to annex
Hunza, or to upset the existing form of
Chinese representatives were invited m
As a further concession,
the installation of the new Mir or Tham,
Tune 1892 to attend
Raja Ghazan Khan, and half-
Muhammad Nazim Khan, a son of
brother of Safdar Ali.
The selection of this member of the Hunza
matter for congratulation, because he had been
oval family was a
was therefore not likely to be
recommended by the Taotai and
objected to by the Chinese Government.
^^
28 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Safdar Ali seems to have attempted to escape into Russian

territory, but was arrested in Tashkurgan by the Taotai and taken
to Kaskgar. He was subsequently released and has since remained
in exile in Chinese Turkistan.
Aliabad was garrisoned by a company of Kashmir troops and
a political officer was stationed in the country. This garrison,
however, and the political officer have since been withdrawn.
Since these events the people of Hunza and Nagir have lived
peaceably, and no further troubles with them have arisen.

The Governorship of Yasin and Ishkaman.

The Yasin district, which now includes the sub-districts of

Ghizr and Kuh, is separated from Wakhan on the north by the
Hindu Kush, and from Chitral on the west by the Shandur range.
The Hindu Raj separates it from the Swat Kohistan and Tangir
and Darel in the south, while the eastern boundary is the lofty
range of mountains which forms the jiratershed between the Hunza
and Karumbar rivers.
The Ishkaman district, which was formerly included in the
Yasin Mehtari, is now a separate charge, and includes the country
on both sides of the Karumbar river from its source as far as and
including the hamlet of Kuchdeh on the left bank and the Shah
Choi nala on the right.
The chief route through Yasin is the road from Gilgit to Chit-
ral. This is a fairly good 6-foot road from Gilgit to Gupis, whence
rough tracks branch off, one through Yasin to the Baroghil, and
another through Dahimal, Ghizr, and Langar across the Shandur
pass. Other passes leading out of Yasin are the ChilHnji, Khora
Bohrt, Darkot, Thui, and Chamarkand. The first two are rarely
practicable, and the remainder are only open for a period of from
four to six months.
The climate of Yasin is dry and healthy. Rapid streams
fed by mountain torrents water the Ghizr, Yasin, and Ishkaman
valleys. The mountains are chiefly composed of sandstone, which
contains a large proportion of iron, and there is much saltpetre in
the soil. Slight earthquakes are frequent, while landslips and
avalanches constantly occur when the snows melt in spring.
The population is about 10,000, and is almost entirely agricul-
tural, all other labour being held in contempt. The people of
 THE OILGIT AOENCt. 2&

Upper Islikaman are AVakhis, and are said to be hardy, indus-

trious, and contented. The remainder of the people of Yasin
are of a somewhat mixed race though formerly reputed to be
;

treacherous and unreliable, they have, by the latest accounts, settled

down, and can probably be trusted to remain quiet.
The Khowar, or Chitrali language is understood by all the
inhabitants, many of whom also speak two or three of the other
tongues in use in this country, viz., Wakhi, Shina, and Burushaski.
A few of the leading families are Sunnis, but the majority of
the inhabitants are Maulai, and, though slack in their rehgious
observances, are greatly under the influence of their pirs. These
latter are often inclined to use their influence to foster local dis-
turbances.
The physique of the people
probably better than that of
is

any other district in the Agency with the exception of Hunza. It is

estimated that about 1,000 fighting men could be raised in the
district, of whom about 100 are worked as levies under the same

system as prevails in other parts of the Agency.

Yasin, though practically independent, has always been closely
connected with Chitral, and in recent times its ruler was frequently
a nominee of the Chitral MeJilar. In 1895 when the British troops
advanced through this country to Chitral, the Yasinis protested
against being ruled by a representative of Chitral. Since that
date the governor has appointed by Kashmir, and in 1899
been
the district was transferred to the Gilgit Agency.
The district has never come directly into colHsion with the
Government of India.

Chilas.

The district now known is roughly the area which

as Chilas
drains into the Indus between the point where that river is joined
by the Astor stream, and the western limits of the Thor and Hodar
communities. The distance from east to west is about sixty-five,
and from north to soutli about fifty miles. The district is divided
into two practically equal parts by the Indus, which throughout its
course from Ramghat to Thor flows through an absolutely barren
country. From Ramghat to Chila?, a distance of forty-five miles,
there are only three villages on the river ; the only vegetation con-
sists of stunted shrubs ; lofty mountains shut in the valley ; and
30 FEONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the whole journey gives an impression of utter desolation. The

inhabitants for the most part live in the higher reaches of the
ravines which drain into the main valley, and where vegetation is

plentiful.

Although the name Chilas is now applied to the whole district

administered by the Assistant to the Political Agent in Gilgit, it

properly belongs community in the country. From

to but one
Ramghat down the river as far as Tangir and Jalkot the country
draining into the Indus valley is known as Shinaka. Each nala
or group of nalas is held by separate small republics, all professing
the same language, religion, and customs, but all at enmity with
each other.
The names of these different communities, from east to west,
are Gor, Bunar, Thak, Chilas, Hodar, and Thor. These six republics
constitute the present Chilas district. Lower down the Indus are
the independent Shinaka communities, identical in language and
customs with the Chilasis. These are Tangir and Darel on the right
bank, and Harban, Shatial, Sazin, Somar, and Jalkot on the left.
It is difficult to say where the Shinaki country stops for instance, ;

the Jalkot headmen are inclined to pretend that they are Kohis-
tanis, the general terms for the non-Shinaki tribes of the lower
Indus, but as the Jalkoti all show the castes and customs
peculiar to the Shinakis, they must be classed with them.
The people of the Chilas district still preserve the social dis-
tinctions of their ancestors and are separated by tradition and
marriage laws into four classes, viz., Shins, Yashkuns, Kamins
(also called Kramins), and Doms.
Of these the first two only are
important. They are nearly equal in numbers, and divide the
authority of the country between them.
Manual labour in the fields is distasteful to the people as
a whole, and they lead a pastoral, rather than an agricultural, life.
In addition to being an indolent race they are inordinately timid,
and though they intrigue and quarrel amongst themselves, the
tongue is a more frequent weapon than the sword. Until lately of
sordid manners and customs, they are now, under the advantages
of a settled and orderly government, becoming an improved and
healthier race. All the people without exception are Sunni
Muhammadans, and speak the Shina dialect, which differs from that
 31
THE OILGIT AGENCY.

the country is a marked absence

spoken in Gilgit. A pecnliarity of
"' previous to the middle
*mt'rknown of the history of Chilas
that time the people of
Bunar and
century. At
of the nineteenth
of trouble to the
Kashm. troops and
Gor gave a certain amount
as the Astor Teh il
officials by their raids
into what is now known
Kashmir troops mvaded Chda
toolnk in 1851 a force of
declare that dunng th
The people
bf the ILakdaii pass.
finally almost
suffered heavily and were
exped tion the Dogra troops troops agam
!vterminatcd Two years later the Maharaja's
Chilas and until ^- I-P--1
nvadTt'e ountry, and captured ;

GTvernment took over the present

Chilas district m
1892 the trrbes-
to the Kashmir Durbar.
men paid an annual tribute
Operations in Chilas, November 1892.
established in Gilgit in 1889 the
When the British Agency was means
promise of causing trouble on the sole
Shinaki tribes gave
aamimstration
with India which the new
of communication
At that tmre the
possesred. namely the Gilgit-Kashmir road.
ferocity
seem to have had aieputafon for
Indus valey tribesmen
hardly justified by our subsequen
eiurJe, and determination be that
of their true character, but
and more intimate knowledge
in a position to annoy us w-henever
Is it may, they were certainly
only line which fed Gilgit with men and stores.
they chos to i4d the
the operations in Hunza
and Nagir in 1891-92 there
^D^ing tribes, and
the Chilasis and other Shinaki
was some unrest among had to take into
the British force in Gilgit
The Commander of people
of a general r.smg of these
consideration the possibility
epidemic of smallpox aud the wan of
But a that time an
their councils prevented
a combination of these
unlimity in
The however, still remained
Chilasis,
an m
tribesmen against us.
Hunza-
unsettled frame of mind,
and after the termination of the
to be apprehensive of an
Nat campaign they were reported
invasion of their country
by British troops.
anxious to avoid any conflict, sent
The British Agent at Gilgit, whose
to the headmen. The
messenger however
a conciliatory letter Kashmir Durbar
the tribute due to the
duty was Ilso to receive
Chilas. No reply was vouchsafed to he
was not allowed to enter
message was sent, statmg that the
British Agent's letter, but a verbal
32 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

tribute would be paid in a montli's time. In July 1892 a Cliilasi jirga

visited Gilgit and was received by the British Agent. The mem-
bers of this deputation expressed regret for past misconduct and
promised amendment, even offering men for military service.
On their return they took with them the Kashmir official who had
previously been evicted. After the return of the deputation to
Chilas it was soon evident that their promises were not intended
to be kept. Raids into Kashmir territory recommenced, and, in
reply to a protest from the British Agent, the Chilas headmen
declared that they would in future receive no instructions from
Gileit, and would never permit a road to be made through their
country. In consequence of this rupture the Kashmir Agent was
recalled to Gilgit.

With a view to coercing the Chilasis, and preventing further

raids, it was now proposed to send a small Kashmir force to occupy
the tributary state of Gor.
On the 3rd November 1892, the people of Gor received a Sanad
from Colonel Durand, in the name of the Maharaja of Kashmir,
excusing them from Jcarhegar, payment of revenue on kharid grain
or fodder, or any addition to the tribute previously fixed, in return
for which concessions they on their side agreed to open their country
to officials and troops of Kashmir, to assist British officers travelling
in Gor territory, and to obey all orders received from Gilgit.^
Having obtained the consent of the headmen to this proposal

Surgeon-Major Robertson^ proceeded to Gor on the 11th November

marching from Gilgit by the right bank of the Indus. He was
accompanied by an escort composed of fifty men of the Kashmir Body-
Guard Regiment, fifty Punial Levies, and sixty or seventy men of the
Sai valley, all under command of Major Twigg. After a cordial
reception at Gor, the little force proceeded to Ges, two marches
down Here news was received of intended opposition
the Indus.
on the part of the tribesmen. As the position at Ges was
unfavourable, the force moved on ten miles down the river to
Thalpin. Here a small fort was promptly put in a state of defence
and the rafts belonging to the ferry just below were secured.
Captain Wallace, 27th Punjab Infantry, now relieved Major Twigg,
who was required at Gilgit.

X The state of Gor was incorporated in the Qiilas district in January 1896.
a Now Sir G. Robertson, K. C.S.I.
 THE OILOIT AGENCY. SS

During the march to Thalpin the and Thak

jirgas of Chilas

made some feeble efforts to render submission, but, whether from

suspicion or ignorance on the part of the envoys, these overtures did
not penetrate as far as the British officer. It is certain that in the
subsequent fighting the people of Thak remained inactive with
a flock of sheep ready for presentation to the victors, while the
I

Chilasis, aidedby the Thoris and Darelis, attacked the invaders.

This diplomatic attitude of the Thak contingent was solely due to
the craft of Arab Shah, their principal headman, who counselled
inaction until the affair should be definitely decided. A half-hearted
attempt was made by the Thak representatives on the 18th
November to consult with Dr. Robertson when he was encamped at
Thalpin, but as the raft sent to fetch the envoys across the river
was fired on, almost all the sepoys killed, and Captain Wallace
wounded, further deaHngs with them were dispensed with. The
situation was now more clearly defined the Chilasis seized the
;

Thak live stock brought as an offering to the victors, and on the

following day a determined attack was made on the British position
ab Thalpin.
After some stiff fighting the Punial levies cleared the heights
above the camp, and the enemy were eventually repulsed with
a loss of sixty killed and many wounded. Two days later a re-
inforcement of forty rifles under Major Twigg and Lieutenant
Harman arrived, having left a detachment at Ges.
On the 26th a detachment Kashmir sepoys under Suba-
of 100

dar Hathu, marching from Ges, were attacked about two miles from
Thalpin by over 2,000 Shinaki tribesmen from Darel and Tangir,
Harban and Sazin. The Subadar entrenched his party during
the night, and early next morning attacked and drove back the
enemy with a loss of fifty killed. Seven Kashmir sepoys were
wounded in this skirmish.
Surgeon-Major Robertson now assumed the offensive, and
crossing the river burnt the village of Chilas and occupied the fort
on the 30th November 1892. The people of Bunar and Thak im-
mediately tendered their submission, and their example was
shortly afterwards followed by most of the Chilas jirga.
In this fighting our principal opponents were the Chilasis and
Thoris, aided by contingents from Darel, Tangir, and Jalkot,
Vol.. I, y
34 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

though these last were far from numerous. The Chilasis had no
doubt of the result, and hoped for great spoil in the shape of arms
and ammunition. A force of 300 rifles from the Kashmir Body-
Guard Eegiment was left in Chilas fort, and this party maintained
communication with Bunji by a series of fortified posts, situated
along the left bank of the Indus. The people below Thor could not
understand how so small a force could have occupied Chilas, and
attributed Dr. Kobertson's success to the feebleness of the defence
offered by the inhabitants.
For the next few months, notwithstanding constant rumours
of intended risings, no disturbance occurred but on the night of
;

^he 4th March 1893, a force of from

Attack on Chilas Fort, March
1893. 1,200 to 1,500 Shinaki tribesmen, includ-
ing some 400 Kohistanis, occupied Chilas village, which was close
to the post, and opened fire on the garrison. Major Daniell, who
was in command, sent out, before daybreak. Lieutenant Moberly,
with thirty-five men, to clear the enemy out of the village the ;

attempt failed and Moberly was slightly wounded.

Major Daniell then attacked the village in front and flank
with 140 men. His intention was completely to surround the
enemy's position, and prevent their escape but after having made
;

his way round the village he was unfortunately killed close to the
entrenchment. Fighting continued for two or three hours, and the
enemy was severely handled. The senior native ofiicer. Adjutant
Nain Singh, who had gallantly led his men into the village, was shot
dead, and Jemadar Gan Singh, finding his men running short of
ammunition, withdrew in good order to the post. Lieutenant
Moberly sent out a covering party to assist. The enemy kept
up a desultory fire till midnight, when they evacuated the village
under cover of the darkness, leaving a number of dead in and
near their position.
Our losses were Major Daniell, three native officers, and nineteen
men killed. Lieutenant Moberly, one Native officer and twenty-
eight men wounded. The enemy's loss was about 200 killed,

besides a considerable number wounded.

Reinforcements were at once despatched from Bunji, arriving
at Chilas on the 9th March, and a detachment of fifty men of the 15th
Sikhs, with a section of a mountain battery, were also sent up from
 ;

TEE QILOIT AGENOT. 35 =

Gilgit. The enemy, however, evinced no desire for further fighting

and dispersed to their homes. As a precautionary measure the
23rd Pioneers were subsequently ordered to Chilas, where
they
arrived on the 15th October wa the Babusar pass.
Since that time no attempt has been made by the tribesmen
against the Government. In the winter of 1893-94 the mullas, who
resented the occupation of Chilas, tried to stir up the Shinakis to
rebel, but in consequence of the refusal of the Kohistanis to join,
the attempt was abandoned and even in 1895, during the
; disturb-
ances in Chitral, the whole of this country remained quiet, in
spite
of intrigues by Muhammad Wali in Tangir. This tranquillity was
thought, at the time, to be due to the presence of a well-armed
garrison in Chilas ; but no one who has met those Vho took part in
the fight of the 5th March 1893, and who has heard their account,
can fail to realize that it was primarily due to the result of that
engagement. Had Major Daniell acted vv^ith less determination the
tribesmen would have certainly tried the fortunes of war once again
but their heavy casualty list on that day convinced these clans
for the present at least, that they dare not cope with the Govern-
ment of India.
The military occupation of Chilas was followed by the appoint-
ment of an officer of the Political Department, who administers the
district under the orders of the Political Agent of Gilgit.
In the beginning of 1899, at the urgent request of the people of
Thor, that valley was incorporated with the Chilas district.
There is now
a well built fort at Chilas, reconstructed by
the
23rd Pioneers in 1894, which is quite capable of resisting any attack
by local tribesmen. It is garrisoned by two companies of Kashmir
Imperial Service Troops armed with Martini-Henry rifles. The
ordnance of the fort consists of an obsolete brass 7-pounder gun
suitable for firing case shot, and two 7-pounder R.M.L. mountain
guns of 200lt), for which an ample supply of ammunition and pack
equipment is kept up.
The independent tribes of Shinaka and Kohistan.
The tribes to the
immediate west and south-west of Chilas are
known as the independent tribes of Shinaka and Kohistan. The
Government of India has no direct dealings mth these people, but as
many of them use the Chilas grazing-gxounds in summer, a certain
F2
 —

56 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

amount of hold could be easily exercised over them. No detailed

account of the tribes appears necessary, and it will suffice to say
that the Shinaka communities consist of Darel and Tangir on the
right bank of the Indus, and Harban, Shatial, Sazin, Somar,
and Jalkot on the left ; while the Kohistan tribes comprise Khili
or Kandia, Seo, Pattan, and Dobel on the right, and Palas and
Koli on the left.

The only recent affair of interest between these tribes and the
Giligit Agency occurred in 1902 when five men from Diamir in
Tangir attacked the levy post in the Kargah Nala, killing two levies
and carrying off five Snider carbines. For this act Tangir was fined
Rs. 2,000, and Darel Rs. 500, the last named community being
fined because they had made no efforts to arrest the raiders
during their subsequent passage through their limits. As neither
Darel nor Tangir made any effort to pay the fine, a blockade was
established, and all Tangiris and Darelis found within the Agency
limits were arrested and deported to Kashmir. The fines were
paid by 1904, in which year the blockade w^as raised.
The fighting strengths of the various tribes, according to the
latest reports is as follows :

Shinaka.
 THE OILOIT AOENOT. S7

other by entertaining the community to dinner on alternate days.

The side which spends most succeeds in enlisting the majority of his
compatriots to his interests and is thought to have proved his case.
The Kohistan Eepublics do not seem to differ materially from
.their Shinaki neighbours. Though all are Sunni Muhammadans, who
strive to follow the advice and orders of their mullas, there is never-
theless an entire absence of fanaticism. This is all the more remark-
able when we consider that these mullas have practically all been
trained in Swat or Peshawar, and that during the summer there is
free and frequent communication between the Indus valley and Swat.
The tribesmen's arms are knives and country guns, which are made
locally and Tangir and Dobel are reported the best at making these
;

weapons. In winter, communication between the various nalas is

effected by the tracks along both banks of the Indus. The river is
crossed by rafts made of inflated skins or logs. These rafts are
manned by gold-washers, a distinct and migratory tribe, who are
allowed to wash for gold in return for keeping up a raft. In sum-
mer, the people, who all prefer a pastoral to an agricultural life,
withdraw to the grazing-grounds at the heads of the nalas with
their flocks.

357954
 CHAPTER II.

CHITBAL.

Immediately to the west of the Gilgit Agency, and, like that

district,bordered on the north by the Hindu Kush, lies the
country of Chitral, also known as Chitrar or Kashkar. On the
west a spur of the Hindu Kush, sometimes called the Kafiristan
range, divides this country from the Afghan province of Kafiristan,

and forms the British- Afghan frontier. On the east the Shandur
spur and the watershed between the Chitral and Panjkora rivers
divide it from Yasin, Kohistan, and Dir. To the south, the
watershed of the Arnawai stream forms the boundary between
Chitral and the districts of Dir and Asmar.
The whole of this area, which is estimated at about 4,500
square miles, is of a rugged mountainous character. On the
Pathan and Kafiristan borders, the habitations are usually cluster-
ed together, and sometimes surrounded by rough walls, with
towers dotted here and there, thus indicating the frequency of
inter-tribal fights and raids in former days. In other parts of the
country, where raids were not so common, the houses are scatter-
ed, each small proprietor building on his own plot of land
and, as ;

each house is usually surrounded by small orchards, with well-

tended grassy lawns, the general effect is very refreshing to the
eye. Up to an elevation of 9,000 feet, fruit is ^abundant and
often forms the staple food of the inhabitants, much of it being
dried and carefully put away for winter consumption. Beyond a
radius of about twenty miles above Chitral the country is practically
rainless, and the hills are bare and rugged, the only trees found
being the dwarf juniper, with occasional patches of mountain
birch and willow. At Chitral itself, and from thence south, the
valley opens out considerably. Cultivation is more continuous,
and the hills are thickly wooded with fine specimens of deodar,
pine, fir, and ilex.

(38)
 CHITBAL. ^9

Chitral watered by the Yarkhun river (also known as the

is

Mastuj or the Chitral river), with its two main tributaries, the
Torikho and the Lut-Kuf. The Yarkhun takes its rise from the
Showar Shur glacier in the Hindu Kush, and flows in a south-
westerly direction to Asmar, whence it continues its course, under
the name of the Kunar, until it falls into the Kabul river near
Jalalabad. It receives various minor affluents, which drain the
valleys on either side the most important of these are the
;

streams from the Gazan, Chumarkhan, and Kokhsun gols or nalas

above Mastuj the Laspur river, between Mastuj and Kosht and
; ;

the streams from the Owir, Eeshun, and Golen nalas, between
Kosht and Chitral. Below Chitral it is joined by the Bashgul
river, and the streams from the valleys of Oyon, Birir, Jinjoret, and
Urtsun on the right, and the Shishi-Kuf, Ashreth Gol, and Arandu
(or Arnawai), on the left. The river is spanned by several canti-
lever bridges, of fairly good construction, in addition to numerous
rope bridges of the usual pattern. Since 1895, good suspension
bridges have been erected at Mastuj, Sanoghor, Chitral,
also
Gairat, Drosh, and Naghr.
The Torikho river, which has two affluents, the Tirich and the
Khot, joins the Yarkhun near Kosht. It is crossed by cantilever
bridges at Drasan, Wahrkup, and Khambakhi. The Lut-Kuf,
which rises near the Dorah pass, drains the country between
Kafiristan and Tirich Mir, and flows into the Yarkhun, a few miles
above Chitral. It is joined by two minor streams, the Arkari
and Ojhor, and is crossed by cantilever bridges at Sin and Shoghot.
The rivers are usually unfordable in spring and summer and ;

in winter, although the fords are numerous, they are, more often
than not, extremely difficult to negotiate.

There are two main routes from Chitral, namely, (i) from
Chitral, via, Drosh,to the Lowari pass, and thence through Dir
and Swat to the rail head at Dargai. (m) From Chitral to the
Shandur pass, where it joins the Gilgit-Teru road. A third route,
which, although there is no made road, is practicable for laden
animals during about eight months of the year, leads up the
Yarkhun valley to the Baroghil pass. Other less important
passes leading from Chitral which deserve mention are ; —The
Shawitakh and Kankon, giving access to Wakhan : both are
40 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

practicable for pack transport ; the Karumbar, ^ a difficult pass

leading to the Ishkaman valley ; the Darkot, Thui, and Chamar-
khan passes all communicating with Yasin, but more difficult than
the usual route over the Shandur. All the above passes lead out
of the Yarkhun valley. From the valley of the Torikho, three
difficult passes lead into Wakhan, which can
be reached also
from the Arkari valley by the Sad-Istragh, Khatinza, Nuksan,
and Agram passes but these too are all difficult, and could only
;

be crossed by a lightly equipped force of selected troops under

favourable circumstances. A number of passes lead into Kafiris-
—
tan, but only four the Zidik and Shui from the Lut-Kuf valley,
and the Shawal and Paitasun from the valleys Bumboret and of

Urtsun, are practicable even for lightly laden animals. At the

head of the Lut-Kuf valley, is the Dorah pass, communicating
with Badakshan. Besides the Lowari, the chief outlets to the
south and south-east, are the Zakhanna, Shingara, Gurin, and
Atchiku passes, all more or less difficult.
Chitral is divided into the following districts : Laspur, Mastuj,
Torikho, Mulrikho, Kosht, Owir, Khuzara, Chitral, and Drosh.
According to a census taken about the year 1899 the total popu-
lation amounted which the number of fighting men
to 48,740, of
was estimated at rather more than 4,200. The latest estimate of
the Chitrali fighting strength is, however, 6,000.
The Chitralis are a mixed race of Aryan type, whose exact
origin not easy to trace. The majority of the middle and
it is

lower classes are believed to be descendants of the Kalasli Kafirs,

who formerly occupied the whole Chitral valley below Reshun, but
are now Rumbur, Bumboret, and Birir,
confined to the valleys of
and some on the right bank of the river below Drosh.
villages
Among the people of Torikho and Mulrikho, (locally known
as Kho) are descendants of Badakshis, Shignis, Wakhis, and Gil-
gitis. In the Arandu Gol, the people are Narsatis and at Madag- ;

lasht, in the Shishi-Kuf valley, is a colony of Persian speaking

Tajiks.
Chitrali, or Khowar, isthe lingua franca of the people, while
the Persian tongue is used by a few of the aristocracy ; there are ^

also some eight or nine other languages or dialects spoken in

various parts of the country.

I See foot«note, page 8.

 —

CHITBAL. 41

The Cliitralis are divided into three classes, which are social

not racial, viz., Adamzadas, Arbabzadas, and Fakir Misldn. The

Adamzada class is composed of (i) members of clans descended
from the founder of the ruling family (w) families of the Zundre ;

or Ronu caste (m) descendants of men who have been ennobled

;

for services to the ruling family. The Arbabzada and Fakir

Miskin are really of the same class but the former are com-
;

paratively prosperous, while the latter are generally extremely

poor. With the exception of the members of the Royal clan,
men frequently take wives from the lower classes.
The menof Chitral are splendid mountaineers, with great

powers of endurance, and, when well led, have proved themselves

to be good fighters. In disposition they are a lazy, pleasure -loving
people, excitable and easily led, untruthful and treacherous. Sir
G. Robertson thus describes them :

There are few more treacherous people than the Chitralis, and they
have a wonderful capacity for cold-blooded cruelty yet none are kinder to
;

little children, or have stronger affection for blood or foster relations when
cupidity or jealousy do not intervene. All have pleasant manners and engag-

ing light-heartedness free from all trace of boisterous behaviour, a great

fondness for music, dancing, and a passion
singing,
for simple-minded osten-

tation, and an instmctive yearning for softness and luxury, which is the main-
spring of their intense cupidity and avarice. No race is more untruthful,
or has greater power of keeping a collective secret. Their vanity is easily

iniured, they are revengeful, and venal, but they are charmingly picturesque,

and admirable companions.

The custom of foster-relationship, which was perhaps more

prevalent under the old regime than at the present day, is worthy
of mention. When a child is assigned to foster parents, the whole
family or clan divide the honour of his up-bringing, and in after-life
allthe foster kindred share his good or evil fortune. When an
Adamzada fosters a son of the Mehtar, there is always crreat
competition among all the people, irrespective of clan or class, to
share in the honour. It is thus that the factions supportin^^ the
various sons of the ruling chief are built up. It is not an
exaggeration to say that as many as fifty women sometimes assist
in suckling a legitimate son of the Mehtar.
Though not strict in their religious observances the Chitralis
are all Muhammadans, and, in ceremonies connected with marriage,
Vol. I. Q
 -

42 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

divorce, burial, etc., follow the usual practices of tliat faith. In tlie
higMands the Maulai sect predominates, but in the lowlands the
majority of the people are Sunnis.
The land under cultivation is rich and fertile, but very limit-

ed in area. Wheat, barley, Indian corn, rice, beans, and millet

are grown, but only in quantities barely sufficient for the needs
of the people. Neither fodder nor other supplies would be locally
procurable for a force of any but strictly limited size.
Before 1895 the Chitralis were armed with matchlocks made
by the Tajik mistris at Madaglasht or imported from Badakshan.
Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk also received from the British Government
at various times 640 Snider rifles and carbines, and 200 muzzle
loading Enfield rifles.

Two 3-pounder brass guns also were presented to this ruler in

1884 but they were never of much use.
The early history of Chitral is a record of intrigues, civil wars,
and assassinations with which
beyond it is
^^^'*^'
^^
the scope of this work to deal.
At the
time of the British occupation of the Punjab one Gauhar Aman
was master of Mastuj and Yasin, while the whole of Lower Chitral
was ruled by Shah Afzal II. In 1854 Gauhar Aman invaded Gilgit,
and the Maharaja of Kashmir appealed to Chitral for assistance.
In answer to this request, Afzal attacked Mastuj, and then followed
another series of wars and intrigues, which lasted, almost without
intermission, until 1880, at which time Aman-ul-Mulk, who had
succeeded his father. Shah Afzal, was practically master of the
whole of Chitral.
About Aman-ul-Mulk, realizing that the Amir of
this time,
Afghanistan desired to annex Chitral, tendered allegiance to Kashmir,

and a treaty ensued, with the approval of the Government of India,

whereby the former acknowledged the suzerainty of the latter
and received from him an annual subsidy. At the same time a
Political Agency was established at Gilgit. The objects of the
policy adopted by the Government of India towards Chitral, in
pursuance of which this was the first step, were, to control the
external affairs of Chitral in a direction friendly to our interests,
and to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes.
In 1885-86 Aman-ul-Mulk was visited by the mission under
Colonel Lockhart, who entered into negotiations with him on behalf
 CHITBAL. 43

of the Government of India. Similar visits were paid in 1888 and

1880 by Colonel Durand, and in the latter year the Political
Agency
at Gilgit, which had been withdrawn in 1881, was re-established,

and the Mehtar of Chitral was granted a subsidy of Ks. 6,000 per
annum and a large consignment of rifles.
In 1891 the Government of India, with the intention of streng-
thening the position of the Mehtar, decided to double this subsidy
on the condition that he accepted the advice of the British Agent
in all matters relating to foreign policy and the defence of the
frontier.
On the 30th August 1892 Aman-ul-Mulk died suddenly of heart
failure while engaged in holding a durbar. His second son Afzal-
ul-Mulk happened to be at Chitral on this date while the elder
brother Nizam-ul-Mulk, was absent in Yasin. Promptly seizing all
the arms and treasure in the fort of Chitral, Afzal-ul-Mulk pro-
claimed himself Mehtar, and then proceeded to murder his half-
brothers Shah-i-Mulk, Bahram-ul-Mulk, and Wazir-ul-Mulk, besides
other leading men who might have endangered his position. Mean-
while Nizam-ul-Mulk fled to Gilgit, where he claimed the protection
of the British Agent. Afzal-ul-Mulk was now acknowledged as

Mehtar by the Government of India, but his triumph was only short
lived. In November 1892 his uncle, Sher Afzal, who had been
expelled by the old Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, suddenly crossed the
Dorah pass with a few followers, and at nightfall reached Drushp
in the Lut-Kuf valley. Here he surprised and slew Murid Dastgir,
an illegitimate son of Aman-ul-Mulk, who was acting as Governor
of the valley. Continuing his march to Chitral next day, he
arrived at the fort in the dead of night and promptly attacked it.
Afzal-ul-Mulk, who rushed down to repel the assailants, was shot
dead in the melee which ensued. Sher Afzal now became master of
Chitral fort and was proclaimed Mehtar. The rapidity of his
advance and the secrecy which cloaked his movements after enter-
ing Chitral territory are evidence that he had many adherents in
the country.
As soon as he heard the news of his brother's death, Nizam-ul-
Mulk determined to proceed to Chitral and oust Sher Afzal. He
announced his intentions to the British Agent at Gilgit, and as ho
was in no way under detention, Lieut. -Colonel Durand was obliged
to allow him to depart. But in order to strengthen his own
G2
ii FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

position, and to secure the tranquillity of the Gilgit frontier, Colonel

Durand despatched a small force, with two mountain guns, to

Gupis. Nizam-ul-Mulk, on crossing the frontier, was joined by the

people of Torikho and Mulrikho and some 1,200 men, sent by Sher
;

Afzal to oppose his advance, also went over to him. He then

continued his advance to Mastuj and Drasan, the latter place being
captured on 1st December. Sher Afzal, being now persuaded that
his rival was supported by the British, lost heart and fled into
Afghanistan. During the following year, he was summoned to
Kabul and detained there by the Amir, who subsequently gave
a written assurance to the Government of India that he would
not again be permitted to interfere in Chitral affairs.

Nizam-ul-Mulk having assumed the Mehtarship, and recognis-

ing the value of British support, now invited the Government to
send an officer to Chitral. In accordance with this request Surgeon-
Mai or Robertson and Captain F. E. Younghusband, with an escort
of fifty rifles, 15th Sikhs, were deputed to visit the Melitar, and
arrived at his capital on 25th January 1893. The British Political
Officer was authorised to promise the new Mehtar, on suitable
conditions, the same subsidy and support as had been given to his
father Aman-ul-Mulk. Nizam-ul-Mulk was a man of weak charac-
ter, and was unpopular with the Adamzadas, who were inclined to

resent his dependence on British support. Moreover, the presence

in Chitral of numbers of Sher Afzal's sympathisers, armed with
rifles which that Chief had distributed, was a source of no little

anxiety. A rising in Yasin, headed by Muhammad Wall Khan, son

of Mir Wali,^ and the encroachments of the Jandol Chief, Umra
Khan, in the Narsat district, still further aggravated the difficul-
ties of the Mehtar 's position. No disturbance arose however, and
as Nizam-ul-Mulk appeared to be fairly well established, Surgeon-
Major Robertson was directed to return to Gilgit in May, and
subsequently he relieved Colonel Durand in charge of the Agencies,
leaving Captain Younghusband as Political Officer in Chitral.

It will here be convenient to say a few words about Umra

Khan, whose actions are greatly respon-
Umra Khan of Jandol. m i
i xi, i.i j. x* "l •
t.
sible lor the troublous times which

now befell Chitral. This man was the grandson of Faiz Talab

1 Who had murdered an English traveller, Mr. Hayward, in 1870. ,

 CHITRAL. 45

Khan, Chief of Bajaur, who fought against us in the Ambela

campaign of 1863.^ Having quarrelled with his father, Aman
Khan, Chief of Jandol, Umra Khan was expelled from his villages
of Mundah and Tor, and took refuge in Shamozai country,
whence he made a pilgrimage to Mecca. On the death of his father
in 1878, Umra Khan returned to Jandol, killed his elder brother
Muhammad Zaman, and seized the Khanship
of Barwa. During
the next year, assisted by the KhanKhar, he defeated the
of
combined forces of the Khans of Nawagai, Asmar, and Dir, and
made himself master of the whole of Jandol. Ten years of con-
tinuous fighting ensued in Dir, Bajaur, and Nawagai, which
resulted in the complete triumph of Umra Khan, who finally ex-
pelled the Nawab Muhammad Sharif Khan from Dir, and made
himself master of that country.
In 1891 Shah Tahmasp, the Khan of Asmar, died, and, in order
to check the aggressions of Umra Khan, the Afghan Sipah Salar,
Ghulam Haidar, occupied this district with his troops. The Khan
of Nawagai, incited by the Afghans, now collected a force of
Tarkanri tribesmen, and attacked Umra Khan, but was decisively
defeated. Attempts by the Mian Gul, a supporter of the deposed
Khan of Dir, and by the Khan of Lalpura, who was persuaded
by the Afghan General to combine with the Nawagai Chief
in a second venture, met with no better success.

In 1892 a postal road through Lower Swat and Dir to Chitral

was opened by arrangement with Umra Khan. In this year the
Afghan Sipah Scdar threatened to invade Jandol from Asmar,
but on this occasion Umra Khan was saved by the intervention
of the British Government, and later, in June of the same year, he
joined the Mamunds in a successful attack on some Afghan troops
who had occupied Shurtan in the Kunar valley. Meanwhile
Aman-ul-Mulk tried to induce the Yusafzai tribes to rise against
the Jandol Chief, and the Khan of Nawagai was also again pre-
paring to attack him. Umra Khan, therefore, appealed to the
Government of India for assistance in the shape of arms and am-
munition, but his request was refused. During the next year,
however, he succeeded, by his own efforts, in maintaining his
position.

1 Sec page 23U.

 46 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

In 1893, as a result of the Durand Mission to Kabul, the

disputed territory of Asmar was awarded to Afghanistan. This
decision, coupled with our refusal to assist him materially in his
schemes, was a cause of great offence to Umra Khan. He was,
however, assured by the British Government that he need fear no
interference on the part of the Afghans with his legitimate posses-
sions, unless he himself provoked hostilities.

It is at this period that the intrusion of this ambitious adven-

turer into the turmoil of Chitral politics may be said to have
begun.
During the confusion which followed on the death of Mehtar
Aman-ul-Mulk, Umra Khan had seized the Chitrali fort of Narsat,
which commands the country on either side of the Chitral river
between Arandu and Bailam, and had retained it in spite of the
remonstrances of the British Agent.
On the advent of Sher Afzal, he, under the pretence of assisting
Nizam-ul-Mulk, moved to Drosh, but, on being informed that the
Government disapproved of his action, withdrew to Jandol. About
this time he was joined by Amir-ul-Mulk, brother of Nizam-ul-Mulk,
and in November 1893 he declined to keep open the postal road
through his territories, unless the Government acceded to his
demands for arms and ammunition.
Early in 1894 Umra Khan further encroached on Chitral terri-
tory by attacking some villages in the Bashgul valley and erecting
forts at Arandu and Birkot, in the valley of the Kunar. Towards
the end of this year he patched up his quarrel with Safdar Khan,
Chief of Nawagai, and made an alliance with him, an arrangement
which left him free to turn his attention to the northern border
of his possessions.
Captain Younghusband had moved to
In September 1894
Mastuj, which he made his head-quarters, and in October he
was succeeded by Lieutenant Gurdon. The Political Officer's
escort was increased to 100 rifles, and a post v/as established at
Gupis, in order to secure the communication with Gilgit.
The disturbance in Yasin had been allayed, and with the excep-
tion of the unrest on the southern border caused by the aggressive
actions of Umra Khan described above, matters in Chitral were
now fairly satisfactory. The retention of Captain Younghusband
as Political Agent had the effect of ameliorating the conditions of
 —
4.7
*'
CniTBAL.

and
govemment in the State, and of giving increased stability
time
Nizam-ul-Mulk and at the same
popularity to the rule of
;

to the
ft strengthened the
ties by which that ruler was bound
Britisli Government.
tranquillity
. -u
which had been estabhshed
w m
^ •«
The comparative
to contmiie.
1894 was, however, not destined
hawking near Broz with his
On the 1st January 1895, while out
Mehtar was treacherously shot by
one
brother Amir-ul-Mulk, the
attendants. Amir-ul-Mulk ^^ ^^^ P^^^^f^
of the 'former's
himself Mehtar.
Ohitral and havingseized the fort, proclaimed
G-don, the Political Ofhcer, who
Tl^fe^^L^^^
Chitral, to acknowledge him as
ruler,
happened to be on a visit to
orders
action could be taken without the
but was informed that no
of the Government.
cold-blooded murder was insti-
These is little doubt that this
faction, and that Umra Khan, if
not actua -
gated by the Sher Afzal
plot, was nevertheless fully
aware of it. Amir-ul-
Iv a party to the
youth, and merely a tool m the hands
Mulk who was a dull-witted
denied all connection with Umra
Khan but
of st'ronger men,
directly after the murder
he sent information to that chief and
days later he again changed his mmd
requested his support. A few
and tried to dissuade the
Khan from interfermg, but his protest, if
genuine, was of no avail.
Under pretext of a religious war against
the Kafirs, Umra Khan,
with a force of some 3,000 men crossed the
and when Amir-ul-Mulk refused to
Lowari pass int6 Lower Chitral,
Drosh.
meet him, advanced to Kala
Gilgit Agency were located as
At this time the troops of the
follows :

Effective strength.

C32nd Punjab Pioneers ... 821 •\

Astor, Bunji, and \ ^^^ Kashmir Light Infantry . 594 ^ 1,424

^^'^'''- 9 J
(.Details
r 14th Sikhs 99

\ 4th Kashmir Rifles .... 287 1

/

Gilgit .... < 6th Kashmir Light Infantry . 344 - 878

Kashmir Sappers and Miners . 139 i

i Details ^ J

Carried over . . 2,302

 .

48 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Brought over . . 2,302

Effective strength.

No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Bat- "]

tery. (4 guns) .... 150 /

Gilgit and Hunza <J

6th Kashmir Light Infantry . 261 r 481
Bengal and Kashmir Sappers \

andMi.ners ...... 70 J

Gakuch and | ^^h Kashmir 33

Rifles
Kosnan J

Gupis .... 4th Kashmir Rifles 286

Mastuj .... 14th Sikhs 103*

Grand Total . . 3,205

Lieutenant Gurdon at once summoned fifty men of his escort

from Mastuj, and reinforcements were promptly pushed forward
to that place from Gupis and Ghizr. At this time a Mission
under Mr. Udny, which had been appointed to demarcate the
Afghan-Bajaur-Chitral Boundary had arrived at Birkot, a few
miles south of the junction of the Arnawai stream with the Chitral
river. The Afghan Si'paJi Salar and other representatives were with

this Mission, but Umra Khan had declined to attend in person.

News of had quickly reached the British

the events in Chitral
Commissioner, and both he and the British Agent in Gilgit address-
ed letters of remonstrance to Umra Khan and demanded his
immediate withdrawal
In reply to Surgeon-Major Eobertson's demand for an ex-
planation of his conduct, Umra Khan stated that his intention
had been to support Amir-ul-Mulk, but since the Mehtar had acted
in a hostile manner towards him he was compelled to retaliate ;

with the British Govern-

he trusted, however, that his friendship
ment would be in no way affected.
On the 1st February Surgeon-Major Eobertson arrived at
him the remainder of the escort of the 14th
Chitral, bringing with
Sikhs and a detachment of the
4th Kashmir Rifles.

The Chitralis had mustered about 3,000 men to oppose Umra

Khan but owing to the weakness and incapacity of their leader,
Amir-ul-Mulk, and the treachery of certain of the Adamzadas,

* Less eight men with Lieutenant Gurdon, then at Chitral.

 OHITRAL
49

their resistance soon collapsed. On the 25tli January they were

driven from their position in front of Drosh, after an
engagement
in which both sides suffered some loss, and fell back on the
fort.
On the 9th February the fort of Drosh was surrendered with its
garrison and some 200 rifles, and the Chitralis again
fell back on
Gairat.
Surgeon-Major Robertson now decided to take possession
of the fort at Chitral in case of emergencies,
and directed the troops
to move in with all their baggage and stores, and a
quantity of
supplies which Lieutenant Gurdon had prudently collected.
On the surrender of Kala Drosh a number of Khuswaktis,
incensed at the conduct of Amir-ul-Mulk, revolted
against his
authority and returned to Chitral, where they appealed
to Surgeon,
Major Robertson. After some discussion the British
Political
Agent arranged to protect the interest of the Khushwakt
community,
while Amir-ul-Mulk guaranteed the good behaviour of
his Kators!
Towards the end of February letters were received from
Govern-
ment authorising the British Agent to afford the Chitral people
" such material and moral support as might be
consistent with the
safety of his own party, and to call up reinforcements from the
Kashmir regiments in the Gilgit command if necessary." Surgeon-
Major Robertson, however, in anticipation of these instructions,
had already allowed some of the troops to assist the Chitralis
at
Gairat. Rumours of desertions from Umra Khan's force were now
rifeand the Chief himself was believed to be on the point of retir-
ing to Warsat. The conditions of affairs seemed to be improving,
and the British Agent was able to make a favourable report!
His satisfaction was, however, soon rudely disturbed by a
report
that Sher Afzal had arrived at Drosh. The appearance on the
scene
of this new claimant, probably the most popular of all
the mem-
bers of the Chitral royal family, was indeed an unexpected com-
plication. As already related, this Chief had ruled Chitral for
a few
weeks as the successor of his victim, Nizam-ul-Mulk, and had
then
fled to Kabul, where he remained as the frotege of the
Amir, who
had promised that he should not again intrude in Chitral affairs.
As soon as the arrival of Sher Afzal was confirmed, the British
Agent entered into communication with him, and on the the
27th
February received a confidential messenger, whom the former
deputed to explain his intentions.
Vox.. I,
50 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The envoy, wlio was overbearing in Ms manner, announced that

Sher Afzal was willing to be friendly with the British Government
on condition that he received a subsidy as Mehtar. He also added
that no Europeans could be allowed to remain in Chitral, demanded
the immediate withdrawal of the troops to Mastuj, and threatened
that, in the event of these terms not being complied 'with, it would
be impossible to restrain Umra Khan.
Surgeon-Major Kobertson replied to the effect that Sher Afzal 's
message was and that it was necessary to
disrespectful in tone,
await the decision of the Government with regard to the Mehtarship.
Meanwhile he sent a letter of protest to Sher Afzal and warned him
of the consequences of any hostile act.
A few of the lower class Chitralis had joined Sher Afzal on
his arrival, and by the end of February practically the whole of
the Adamzadas went over to him. Gairat, being now deserted, was
occupied by Sher Afzal's party, and he himself advanced to Oyon.
Surgeon-Major Robertson accordingly withdrew his escort to
Chitral. Amir-ul-Mulk, who was now thoroughly terrified at the
consequences of his rash act, tried to intrigue with Umra Khan,
with the result that the British Agent placed him in custody and
formally recognized his younger brother, Shuja-ul-Mulk, as Provi-
sional Mehtar.
The escort of the British Agent, which had been reinforced
during the month, now consisted of 100 men of the 14th Sikhs
under Lieutenant Harley, and 320 of the 4th Kashmir Rifles under
Captain C. P. Campbell, Central India Horse.
The numbers of Umra Khan's force were not accurately known>
but the original party of 3,000, which crossed the Lowari, was be-
lieved to have been largely increased by the arrival of considerable
bodies of tribesmen from the south, and his total strength was esti-

mated to be between 5,000 and 8,000 men.

On the afternoon of the 3rd March Sher Afzal, with an armed
Engagement of 3rd March at
force, reached Chitral and took up a, posi-
Chitral. tion in some villages about two miles
south-west of the fort. Captain Campbell, with 200 men of the 4th
Kashmir Rifles, moved out to check the enemy's advance.
Captain Baird, with fifty men, was directed to make a flank
attack along some high ground to the west, while Captain Campbell,
 CHIT HAL. 51

with Captain Townshend and the remainder of the torce, attacked

the position in front. The enemy, however, was strongly posted
and met the advancing troops with a destructive fire. An attempt
to carry the village by assault failed, and as darkness was coming
on Captain Campbell was compelled to retire. The enemy followed
up closely and, overlapping the flanks, inflicted heavy loss on the little
force, but on nearing the fort they were checked by a party of fifty
men of the 14th Sikhs, under Lieutenant Harley, who successfully
covered the retreat. Meanwhile Captain Baird's detachment on
the right was isolated. Baird himself was mortally wounded, but
was carried back by Surgeon -Captain Whitchurch. This officer
and the other survivors of the party after a desperate hand-to-hand
fight, during which nearly all were wounded, eventually made their
Avay along the river to the fort.
For his gallantry in this affair Surgeon -Captain AVhitchurch
received the Victoria Cross, and Subadar Badri Nar Singh and
twelve non-commissioned officers and men of the 4tli Kashmir Rifles
were admitted to the third class of the Order of Merit.
The casualties in this affair were : Killed — General Baj Singh,
Imperial Service Troops Major Bhikam Singh, 4th Kashmir Rifles
; •

1 Hospital Assistant; 21 non-commissioned officers and men, 4th

—
Kashmir Rifles. Wounded Captain J. McD. Baird, 24th Punjab
Infantry (succumbed to his injuries on 4th March) Captain C. P. ;

Campbell, Central India Horse 1 native officer,

; 15th Bengal
Lancers 28 non-commissioned officers and men, 4th Kashmir
;

Rifles ;
—
or a total of 25 killed (including Captain Baird) and
30 wounded, out of 200 men, of whom only 150 were actually
engaged. The enemy's losses are not known. During the day 15,935
rounds of Snider ammunition were expended, about 100 rounds
per man.
The little British force was now beleagured within the walls of
the fort, and no news of their fate reached the outside world for
many weeks.

Events on the Gilgit-Chitral line of communications.

We may here conveniently turn to the events which were now

taking place on the line of communications between Chitral and
Mastuj.
H8
 — — —

52 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the 26th February, Captain Baird, who was acting as Staff

Officer to the British Agent in Chitral, had issued instructions to
the following effect :

Lieutenant Edwardes was to hand over command of the troops

at Ghizr, and proceed to Chitral to take charge of the Puniali
levies, which had been ordered up from Gilgit Lieutenant Fowler, ;

E.E., who was expected at Mastuj with a detachment of Bengal Sap-

persand Miners, was to continue his march to Chitral and a con- ;

signment of Snider ammunition was also to be despatched to that

place with a suitable escort.
In accordance with the above orders, Lieutenant Moberly, who
was commanding at Mastuj, sent off sixty-eight boxes of ammuni-
tion under escort of a native officer and thirty-nine men of the
4th Kashmir Eifles. On the next day. Lieutenant Moberly, hearing
that the Chitral road was blocked, sent to recall the escort, but on
receiving reassuring news as to the state of affairs he subsequently
cancelled this order and allowed the party to proceed. At the same
time he wrote to Captain Ross, who was due at Laspur on that date
with 100 rifles, 14th Sikhs, requesting him to hasten on to Mastuj.
Captain Ross reached Mastuj on the 3rd March, and left again
on the following day for Buni to support the ammunition escort,
which had halted there owing to a break in the road beyond. On
the 5th, the detachment at Buni was further strengthened by the
arrival of Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes with twenty men of the
Bengal Sappers and Miners.
It should be mentioned that on the morning of the 3rd March
Captain Baird wrote from Chitral to Lieutenant Moberley as fol-
lows :

If communications with Mastuj are interrupted, the British Agent wishes

the following measures taken to restore them
The levies to move on to Drasan and take that place. The day after they
leave Mastuj, Fowler will proceed to Drasan with 200 Eaganaths^ and his
sappers. You go in charge of Raganaths, and as Political Officer. Make
over political charge of Mastuj to Edwardes with all mstructions. Ross and
his Sikhs to remain, in garrison at Mastuj. Order up the remainder of the
Raganatlis from Ghizr. Gough and ]00 Raganaths to remain in garrison
at Ghizr. Please inform Fowler that he is to take command, and on arrival

1 Uh Kashmir Eifles.
 CHITRAL. 53

at Drasan, is to reopen communications with Chitral. Above instructions

depend on communications being broken.

The levies should be at Mastuj about the 12th. No British officer is

to accompany them to Drasan.

It is certain, however, that these orders never reached Lieu-

tenant Moberly.
On the evening of the 5th March, a report reached Mastuj that
matters had been satisfactorily arranged in Chitral and that Umra
Khan had agreed to retire.
On the 6th Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler, v/ith the Sappers
, .
, ...
Lieutenant Ldvvaides party
, ,and Miners and the ammunition escort,
, , ,

at Keshun. marchcd to Resliun, whi'e Captain Ross,

and the Sikhs returned to Mastuj. The next day, the two British
officers, with part of tlic detachment, went on to repair the road,

which was reported to be broken about three miles from Reshun. A

native officer and guard of the 4th Kashmir Rifles was left in charge
of the .stores and ammunition, with instructions to entrench
a position on the height commanding the bridge and approaclies to
the river. Immediately after leaving Reshun, the road to Chitral
ascends a steep spur to the height of 1,000 feet, and, descending
again to the level of the river, enters a narrow defile with the un-
fordable river on one on the other. A halt
side, and lofty cliffs

was made at the entrance of this defile, and Lieutenant Fowler, with
a few men, climbed the heights, which overlooked some mngars
on the opposite bank of the river. These sangars were promptly
occupied by some 200 men from Parpish village, who, opening
fije, killed a naick and wounded Lieutenant Fowler and two men.

Lieutenant Edwardes, seeing that the enemy were too strong to

permit of an advance, withdrew with his detachment to the place
where the remainder of the party had been left with the stores.
This position, however, proved unsuitable, and some houses near the
polo-ground were accordingly occupied and put in a state of defence.
The enemy, who closely followed up the retreating force, kept up
a hot fire which only slackened at sunset. Eight more men were
wounded during this retirement. The wounded and most of the
ammunition and stores were now brought in from the abandoned
position by volunteers of the Kashmir Rifles, who were reported to
have behaved splendidly.
54 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

During the enemy, who appeared to be well supplied

niglit the

with rifles, made a determined attack at close quarters, but were

eventually repulsed. The defenders lost four men killed and seven
wounded, but, owing to the darkness, the numbers and losses of
the enemy could not be ascertained. For the next five days the
little garrison defended their post with great gallantry against
repeated attacks from the enemy, who had managed to build several
scmgars close to the defences. Lieutenant Fowler distinguished him-
self by making several successful sorties to obtain water, in one of
which he inflicted heavy on the assailants. On the 13th March
loss

the enemy hoisted a white and sent Muhammad Isa, a foster-

flag,

brother of Slier Afzal, to arrange a truce. This man, who was re-
ceived by Lieutenant Edwardes just outside the post, stated that the
fighting in Chitral had ceased, and that Sher Afzal, who was friendly
to the Government, was corresponding with the British Agent.
Terms were accordingly arranged whereby the besiegers agreed not
to approach the walls near the post, and consented to allow access
to the water and to furnish supplies to the defenders, who were mean-
while to remain in their position. At the same time, Lieutenant
Edwardes wrote to the British Agent in Chitral informing him of
the situation.
On the following day, another interview took place between
Lieutenants Edwardes and Muhammad Isa, who was accompanied by
Yadgar Beg, an illegitimate son of Sher Afzal. The latter confirmed
his companion's story, and both assured the ofiicer of their good in-
tentions.

On the 15th, friendly relations being apparently established,

the two British officers were persuaded to go and watch a game

of polo. As the ground was commanded by the defensive post,

the walls of which were manned, there seemed but little risk in
this proceeding. When the two officers got up to return, however,
they were suddenly seized by Muhammad Isa and his followers,
who proceeded to bind them hand and foot. The defenders
promptly opened fire from the post, but the Chitralis who were
well protected by cover, which it had been impossible to demolish,
succeeded in rushing the defences. A number of the garrison were
lolled, and the remainder were made prisoners, while some 40,000

rounds of ammunition fell into the hands of the enemy.

 —

CHITRAL. 56

Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes were taken to Chitral, where

they arrived on the 19th March under escort of a party of Umra
Khan's men, who had forcibly wrested them from their Chitrali
guardians en route. At Chitral, they were received by Sher Afzal,
who expressed regret for the treachery which had been practised
upon them, and promised to institute a search for the survivors
of their party. They were now allowed to communicate with the
British garrison besieged in the fort, but permission to visit them
was refused. On the 24th the prisoners were taken to Drosh, where
they were met by Umra Khan, who gave them the choice of remain-
ing at that place or proceeding to either Jandol or Chitral. As Umra
Khan refused to allow the sepoy prisoners, who had joined them, to
return to Chitral, the officers asked to go to Jandol. Eventually
they reached Mundah on 12th April, and were shortly afterwards
releasedand sent to the British force under Sir R. Low. The cir-
cumstances under which they obtained their freedom will be more
fully dealt with in the
acount of the operations of the Chitral Relief
Force in Chapter XII.
To revert now
to the other detachments on the Chitral-
Mastuj Lieutenant Edwardes having sent back news of the
line.

enemy's presence beyond Reshun, Captain Ross determined to

_ ,
proceed to his support, and on the 7th
Captain Ross detachment. nr
March movedt to -tT
i • •

Bum with ,his detach- , .

ment of the 14th Sikhs, strength two officers (himself, and

Lieutenant H. J. Jones), one native officer, and ninety-three men.
Nine days' rations and 150 rounds of ammunition per man
were taken. The next day, having left a party of thirty- three men,
under the native officer, at Buni, Ross continued his march, and
halted, about 1 p.m., at the village of Koragh, about half-way
between Buni and Reshun. The disaster which now overtook this
ill-fated detachment has been graphically described in the following
words :

About half a mile from Koragh the track enter a narrow defile and
for an equal distance traverses a succession of precipitous rocky bluffs.
Between these bluf?s lie great fan-shaped slopes of detritus, which fall at

a very steep angle from the foot of inaccessible crags above to the river's edge
below these slopes are several hundred feet in height, and at their base
;

have an average breadth of about 100 yards.

Where the path crosses them,
it can be swept from end to end by a torrent of rocks, merely by loosening
56 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the soil above, and the Chitralis, in their dispositions for an ambuscade or
of this peculiar
for the defence of a position, rely much on the deadly effect
weapon. About one mile from Koragh, the track, leaving the level of the
river, ascends a steep spur, beyond which the defile maintains an equally

formidable character for several miles in the direction of Reshun.

Leaving Koragh at 1-30 p.m. the advanced party of Captain Ross' detach-
ment ascended about half-way up this spur, when they were fired on from
across the river and, at the same time, men appeared on the mountain
;
tops

and ridges, and rolled stones down all the " shoots. " At the first shot the

coolies dropped and bolted. Captain Ross, after an inspection

their loads

of the enemy's position, decided to fall back on Koragh, and with this object

ordered Lieutenant Jones with ten men to seize the Koragh end of the defile
and cover his retirement. In his attempt to carry out this order. Lieutenant
Jones lost eight men wounded, and was thereupon recalled by Captain Ross,
who had meanwhile occupied two caves in the river bank, which afforded good
cover. At 8 p.m., an endeavour was made to force a way back to Koragh,
but so continuous was the fall of rocks from the cliffs above, that, fearing the
total annihilation of his party. Captain Ross was compelled to retire again to

the caves. After a brief halt, he next made an effort to scale the clifTs, but,

after a toilsome and dangerous climb, the party was confronted by a preci-

pice,up which they searched in vain for a practicable path. Recognising that
any attempt at escape in this direction was futile, and that the only course

open was to force his way, at all costs, back to Koragh by the road he had

come, Captain Ross rested his men in the shelter of the caves till the morn-

ing of the 10th March. Issuing thence at 2 a.m., at which hour it was hoped
that the Chitralis might be taken unawares, the Sikhs drove the enemy from
the nearest sangars, but were then met by a very heavy fire from both banks
of the river and by a deadly hail of rocks from the cliffs above. Captain
Ross himself was killed in front of the sangars and out of the whole detach-
;

ment only Lieutenant Jones and seventeen rank and file won their way to
the open ground on the Koragh side of the defile. Here they halted for
ten minutes, endeavouring to silence the enemy's fire and so cover the retreat
of any others of the detachment who might be near the mouth of the defile.
Twice they were charged by the enemy's swordsmen, whom they repulsed
with great loss but when two more of the little party were killed, and one
;

mortally wounded, and when the enemy began to threaten their line of re-
treat, Lieutenant Jones gave the order to retire slowly on Runi, which place
he reached at 6 p.m.

Our losses in this affair were one British officer, forty-six men,
one Hospital Assistant, and six followers killed ; of the fifteen
survivors Lieutenant Jones and nine men were wounded. This
 CniTRAL. •.
57

party having joined the detachment which had remained in the

village on the 8th, now occupied a house, which they held till the
17th, when they were relieved by Lieutenant Moberly.

Up March Lieutenant Moberly had received reports

to the 13th

Lieutenant Moborly'g ad- ^^0"^ native sourccs assuring him of the

vance from Mastiij. safety of the detachments which had
recently left Mastuj for Chitral. Becoming anxious, hov/ever, at
receiving no communication from Captain Eoss, he advanced on
the 16th with 150 men, and reached Buni unopposed on the follow-
ing day, where he found Lieutenant Jones' party. The enemy
were now reported to be massing at Drasan with the object of
cutting Lieutenant Moberly's communications. He accordingly
decided to and, after a two hours' halt at Buni, commenced
retire,

his return march, reaching Mastuj before midday on the 18th. This
place had been reinforced a few days previously by 166 Kashmir
Rifles (who had arrived with Captain Bretherton) and the total
strength of the garrison now amounted to 327
men. fighting
Meanwhile the enemy advanced, and by the 23rd the British force
was closely invested inside the fort. The enemy, avoiding a deter-
mined attack, kept up an ineffectual rifle fire from sangars and
houses surrounding the fort until the 9th, on which date, alarmed
at the advance of Colonel Kelly's column from Gilgit, they drew
off in the direction of Sanoghar.
During this little siege the garrison expended 987 rounds
of Martini-Henry and 4,603 rounds of Snider ammunition. The
only casualty on our side was one man wounded, while the enemy's
loss was estimated at about forty killed and wounded.

Lieutenant Moberly had abstained from attemptinf^ any

counter-attack until he could co-operate with the Gilgit column •

and eventually the enemy's retirement was so rapid and sudden

that he was unable to collect his force in time to follow them up
effectually.

On the 7th March the Government of India had received

Measures for relief of Chitral from Gilgit disquieting reports as
to the
Garrison. statc of affairs in Chitral.
_ The last com-
munication from burgeon-Major Robertson was dated 1st
March
and was therefore written before the action which resulted
iu
the beginning of the siege. Although full information was
not
Vol. I.
58 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

at once fortlicoming, it was nevertlieless apparent that communica-

tions with Chitral were interrupted and that the retreat of the
British Agent and his escort was probably cut off. It was under-

stood from previous reports that the supplies available for the
garrison in Chitral which was estimated at about 420 men, would
,

last till about the end of April and it was therefore necessary that
;

its relief should not be postponed beyond that date.

In order to be prepared for the possible necessity of despatch-
ing a relief force from India via Swat, Government sanctioned the
mobilisation of the 1st Division^ on 14th March. On the same date
a final letter was forwarded through Mr. Udny to Umra Khan,
demanding his im_mediate withdrawal from Chitral territory.
Instructions, which, however, were not received, were also sent
to the Agent in Chitral to warn Sher Afzal that his connection
with Umra Khan was displeasing to Government.
On the17th March the Assistant British Agent at Gilgit report-
ed that in consequence of the disturbed state of the country he
had summoned half the battalion of 32nd Pioneers to Gilgit from
the Bunji-Chilas road, where they were employed on engineer-
ing work.
On the 21st March came the news of the disasters which had
befallen the detachments under Captain Ross and Lieutenant
Edwardes. This intelligence materially altered the situation. It
was now realised that Sher Afzal and Umra Khan had already
embarked on hostilities against us, and that it was no longer neces-
sary to wait to see if the latter intended to comply with the demands
of Government. Moreover, the urgency of relieving the Chitral
Garrison without further delay was now evident. It was conse-
quently decided that the 1st Division should advance as rapidly
as possible, and although it was not considered that relief from
Gilgit, over 220 miles of mountainous country, was practicable,
instructions were sent to Colonel Kelly directing him to assume
military command in that district, and authorising him to make
such dispositions and movements as he thought best.
The operations of the 1st Division will be dealt with in chapter
XII, and we will now return to the besieged garrison in the fort
of Chitral.

1 With certain modifications as regards cavalry and artillery.

 GHITRAL. 59

The Siege of Chitral.

The siege of Chitral commenced on the evening of the 3rd

March 1895, after the action, already described, which resulted in
the enforced retirement of the British garrison to the shelter of
the fort.
As Captain Campbell's wound proved to be very severe, the com-
mand now devolved on Captain Townshend. The other officers
were Surgeon-Major Robertson, British Agent, with Lieutenant
Gurdon as his assistant. Lieutenant H. K. Harley, 14th Sikhs, and
Surgeon Captain Whitchurch, I.M.S. Captain Baird, who had been
mortally wounded on the 3rd, died of his injuries on the following
day.
The fighting ranks numbered 99 men of the 14th Sikhs, and 301
of the 4th Kashmir Rifles. In addition there were 85 followers
and 52 Chitralis, making a total of 543 persons. It was estimated
that, by issuing half rations, the supplies would last for two and a
half months. The ammunition available amounted to 300 rounds
of Martini-Henry, and 280 rounds of Snider per rifle.
The fort was of the ordinary local type, about seventy yards
square. The walls, which were twenty-five feet high, and seven or
eight feet thick, were constructed of
rough stone, rubble, and mud,
and were held together by a kind of cradle work of timbers. At
each corner a square tower rose about twenty feet above the walls
and a fifth tower, known as the water tower, guarded the path to
the river, which was further protected by a recently constructed
covered-way. Outside the north-west face was a range of stables
and outhouses. The fort was practically commanded on all sides
and, except on the river front, w^as surrounded by houses, walls, and
trees, which allowed the enemy to approach under cover close to
the defences.
The demolition of this inconvenient cover was at once under-
taken, and was continued from time to time during the siege as
opportunity offered. Unfortunately the defenders were unable to
destroy the summer house, situated opposite the south-east or
gun tower, and lessthan fifty yards distant from it. Inside the
the defences
fort, were strengthened and improved. Loopholes
were made, and head-cover constructed with beams and boxes
filled with earth ; communications were safeguarded as much
as
12
60 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

possible from the enemy's rifle fire, curtains and screens being uti-
lised to give cover from view, where more adequate protection could
not at first be provided. After the first few days, when the de-
fenders had begun to settle down to the routine of their new duties.
Captain Townshend was enabled further to improve his measures
for defence.. The ofiicers, of whom only three were available for
ordinary military duty, took watch and watch, as if on board ship.
The garrison always slept on their alarm posts, and guards and pic-
quet duties were necessarily very heavy. Independent firing by
night was strictly forbidden. A system of extinguishing fires was
organized, a very necessary precaution, owing to the great quan-
tity of woodwork used in the construction of the fort, and the de-
termined attempts of the enemy to set fire to it. Police were de-
tailed to control the Chitralis, whose conduct in certain instances
was a source of some anxiety. Hand-mills were made for grind-
ing grain, and non-combatants were detailed for this and other suit-
able duties. Every endeavour was made to provide for proper
sanitation, but this was. naturally a matter of great difiiculty
owing to the cramped space available.
At the British Agent's request Captain Townshend ordered
thirty rounds to be fired daily at a house about 1,000 yards distant,
which was occupied by Sher Afzal.
Taking into consideration the small number of British officers
with the force, and the fact that the Kashmir troops were somewhat
shaken by their losses in the affair of the 3rd March, Captain
Townshend decided not to attempt counter-attacks or sorties,
unless forced to do so by the enemy's action, until he obtained
news of the approach of a relieving force.

On the 6th March XJmra Khan's Diwan was accorded an inter-

view by the British Agent. This emissary stated that his Chief
wished to remain on friendly terms with the British, and had tried
to prevent the fighting against them, and that the presence of his
troops at Drosh was solely due to his intention of warring against
the Kafirs. He further advised Surgeon-Major Robertson to leave
Chitral, and offered him, in the name Khan, a safe escort
of the

either to Mastuj or Asmar. The British Agent politely declined

to accept these proposals, and requested that as the fort was
besieged, the Khan should in future address his communications to
Mr. IJdny in Asmar.
 CniTRAL. 61

On the March, just before daybreak, an attack was made

8tli

on the water tower, but was quickly repulsed, though not before
a few of the enemy had effected an entrance to the passage beneath
the tower, where they lighted a fire. This, the enemy's first attempt
at incendiarism, was promptly extinguished by the hhistis.
By the end of the first week, our casualties amounted to five ;

but, owing to sickness, only 80 men of the Sikhs and 240 Kashmir
Rifles remained fit for duty.
On the 11th, further futile communications were received from
both Sher Afzal and Umra Khan, and the besieged ofiicers now
heard the news of the defeat of our detachments at Reshun and the
Koragh defile.
On this night, the men of the Punial levy cleverly succeeded
in demolishing some walls opposite the west and south faces of the
fort, under a but ineffectual fire from the enemy.
fierce

On the night of the 13th-14th the besiegers renewed their

attack from the wooded garden on the east of the fort, with the
apparent intention of rushing the waterway. They were dispersed
by a few volleys, but in order to be better prepared for a similar
attempt. Captain Townshend ordered the stables alongside the water
tower to be loopholed and occupied by a detached post.
On communications received from
the 16th, in consequence of
Sher Afzal, a three days' truce was arranged, which was subsequently
extended till the 23rd. Amir Ali Khan, the Agency Munshi, was
sent to interview Sher Afzal, who was accompanied by two of Umra
Khan's representatives, named Abdul Majid and Abdul Ghani.
The former of these two appeared to have great influence among
the besiegers, but according to the Munshi'' s report it was evident
that there was considerable friction between Abdul Majid's Jan-
doli and the Chitralis. This circumstance induced
followers
the British Agent to enquire if Sher Afzal's repeatedly-expressed
desire for peace was genuine, and what guarantees would be given
if the garrison consented to withdraw to Mastuj.

On the 19th, letters were received from the three leaders, ignor-
ing the question of guarantees, and offering to make peace on
condition that the garrison should surrender the fort and return
to India by the Jandol valley route. They also took the oppor-
tunity to inform the British Agent of the capture of Lieutenants
Edwardes and Fowler. Surgeon-Major Robertson had previously
62 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

been made aware by a letter received from Edwardes himself that

tlieir party was besieged in Eeslmn. On tlie 20tli, the two cap-
tured officers reached Chitral, and were seen by the MunsJii, who
made unsuccessful attempts during the next two days to procure
their release.
Negotiations continued without result, as Surgeon -Major
Robertson definitely refused to listen to the demand that he should
v/ithdraw via Jandol.
On the 23rd, Umra Khan's Diwan again appeared, and
truculently threatened that non-acceptance of his master's terms
might unfavourably affect the treatment of the officers who
were now prisoners of war. The British Agent finally declined to

listen to the Diwan'' s suggestions, and sent a letter to Umra Khan,

in which he stated that if the officers had been fairly captured in
war, he had no complaints to make but, if they were the victims
;

of treachery, he advised the Khan to hand them over at once,

with a letter of apology.
On this evening the truce expired. During the time that
hostilities were suspended Captain Townshend had busily employ-

ed his men in improving the defences. A semi-circular loopholed

fleciie was made outside the water gate, and the clearance of an old
disused well was begun. Heavy rainfall occurred during the night
of the 23rd and for the next two days, bringing down a portion

of the parapet on the west face, which had to be repaired at the cost
of much labour. On the 22nd, the British officers had killed

and salted their ponies, and commenced to eat horse flesh.

Onthe 26th a few shots were fired at the enemy's sangar

opposite the west face from one of two mountain guns found
in the fort, for which an emplacement had been prepared outside
the main gate. The result, however, was disappointing, and as there
were no trained gunners available, artillery fire was not again re-
sorted to. Machicoulis galleries were now constructed on each
parapet, andbeacon fires were lighted in these at night
to illuminate the ground in front. This arrangement proved more
effective and economical than the fireballs of shavings and tow
soaked in oil, which had previously been used to throw over

the walls when the enemy attempted night-attacks.

Meanwhile the besiegers continued to harrass the garrison by
desultory rifle fire, throughout the day and night.
 ..

CEITRAL. 63

By the end of March, Captain Townshend had 343 men

effective, of wliom half were employed on guard and picquet duties,
Main gate .. ..10 ^^ ^^^^'^'^ ^^ *^^ margin.
ParapL'ts (20 on each face) 40 The ammunition remaining
Water picquet .

„ tower 2? amounted to 29,224 rounds

Stable picquet .
20 of Martini-Henry and 68,587
Water gate
4 Tow'e's, G each 24 rounds of Snider. There was
Guard on Amir-ul-Mulk ^'
sufficient grain for another
„ ,, Chitralis
,, ,, Ammunition G and some
seventy- four days,
Caiden gate
,, ., *J
rum and
but the stock of tea,
Total 171 fjhi had run low and only
twelve days' supply was left
for hospital use and lighting. In order to check the sickness,
which was now becoming serious, a dram of rum was issued to
the Sikhs every fourth day, and the Kashmiri sepoys received
a ration of tea every third day.
On the night of the 30th-31st, the enemy built a sangar
on the far side of the river, about 175 yards from the spot
whence the defenders obtained their water-supply. At the same
time, the besiegers began to connect their lower smigar on the
west with the river by a covered-way running parallel to that
of the defenders, and about eighty yards distant from it. Only
about eight yards of this work, however, was completed, when
therifle fire from the fort compelled the enemy to discontinue their

efforts.

On the 31st Sher Afzal sent a message to the British Agent

requesting him to retire to Mastuj, and offering safe conduct for
the garrison, with stores and arms, as far as Gilgit ; and for several
days he continued to keep up a futile correspondence. During the
night of the 6th April, the enemy pushed forward a sangar made of
fascines to within forty yards of the gate in the west front, and made
a palisade they also occupied the summer house
alongside it ;

on the south-east, andmade another sangar close to the east (^ate.

This advance on the part of the enemy considerably increased the
the garrison, and especially harrassed the picquet in
difiiculties of

the gun tower, which was now exposed to rifle fire from very close
range. The defenders replied by manning the walls which still
stood outside the west gate with twelve rifles of the 14th Sikhs
and some Punialis,
64 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Early on the morning of tlie 7tli the besiegers opened a heavy

fire from the wooded
ground on the
Attack on gun tower. i m ,^ e , , e ,

up to the loot oi
, ,

west, while a party crept

the gun tower and set it on fire. As there was a strong wind
blowing, and the tower was largely constructed of wood, a fierce
blaze soon resulted, which threatened to become dangerous. The
inlying picquet, however, succeeded, after strenuous efforts, in sub-
duing the flames and eventually, by pouring water down through
;

holes picked in the inside wall, the fire was extinguished, though it
smoldered on during the rest of the day. The men employed in
this work were exposed to fi^re from high ground on the south-west
and from the other side of the river, and two men were killed and
Surgeon-Major Robertson and nine men wounded. Subadar Badri
Nar Singh and Sepoy Awi Singh, 4th Kashmir Rifles, and Sepoy
Bhola Singh, 14th Sikhs, especially distinguished themselves on
this occasion.
The Kashmir whose lack of vigilance the enemy's
sentries, to

success in firing the tower was attributed, were now replaced by

men of the 14th Sikhs. At the same time the machicoulis galleries,
which had been subjected to a storm of Snider bullets from the
summer house, were repaired and strengthened, and the arrange-
ments for discovering fires were further improved.
and extinguishing
On the 8th the Punialis completed the demolition of the walls outside

the main gate, and a stone tambour was made there, which flanked
the west face. As a further precaution, an officer and fourteen men
were permanently posted in the gun tower.
On the night of the 10th, an attack on the waterway was
repulsed with the loss of one man of the Puniali levy wounded.
During the next night and the following day, a number of the enemy
retired up the valley in the direction of Drasan and Mastuj to join
in opposing the relieving column advancing from Gilgit under Colo-
nel Kelly. The approach of this force, although no news of it
yet reached the garrison, inspired the besiegers to redouble their
efforts to capture the fort. Accordingly
Enemy's mine. - , , t •
c -,

began to dig a mane from the

they
summer house to the gun tower, keeping up meanwhile a desultory
fire and an incessant noise of shouting and tom-toms in order to

distract the attention of the defenders, and to drown the sound of

the picking of the miners. On the 16th, one of the native officers,
 CHITRAL. 65

becoming suspicious of the enemy's proceedings, suggested to

Captain Townshend that they might be making a mine. The
sentries were accordingly warned to be on the alert, and that
night one of them reported that he coiijd hear a noise of picking ;

but his officers failed to detect it. The next morning, however,
sounds were distinctly heard, which removed all doubts as to the

Sortie under Lieutenant enemy's intentions. Captain To\vnshend,

Hariey. after cousultatiou with the British Agent,
promptly decided that the only course open to him was to make
a sortie and rush the summer house, whence it was supposed
the mine started.
Lieutenant H. K. Harley was selected to carry out this enter-
prise with a detachment of forty rifles, 14th Sikhs, and two native offi-
cers and sixty men, 4th Kashmir Rifles. Captain Townshend's orders
were as follows : —
Lieutenant Harley was to lead his whole party,
without dividing it up, straight to a gap in the summer house wall
and rush the place, using the bayonet only. He was then to hold
the house with part of the detachment, while the remainder des-
troyed the mine. If necessary he was to rush the sangar opposite
the east gate from the rear, sounding the cease fire to stop the
garrison from shooting at this target, and he was to bring back
a few prisoners, if possible. The party carried with them three bao-s
containing llOlb of gunpowder, 40 feet of powder hose, a number
of picks and shovels, and forty rounds of ammunition, per man.
At 4 P.M. Lieutenant Harley led his men from the east gate,
and rushing across the short open space between it and the sum-
mer house, captured the post mth a loss of two men killed. The
occupants, who proved to be some thirty Pathans, being taken by
surprise, had only time to fire a few hurried shots and then fled
hastily through the garden to the wall at the end, whence they re-
opened fire on Harley's party.
After detailing some men to return this fire, Harley led the
remainder to the mine shaft, which was discovered behind the wall
of the garden, just outside the house. Thirty-five Chitralis, armed
with swords, rushed out and were bayoneted. Having cleared
the mine, Harley arranged his powder bags and fuze, and al-
though the charge exploded prematurely, before it had been prop-
erly tamped, the result was effective enough completely to des-
troy the enemy's work, which, when opened up, was seen to have
Vol. I. 3^
 . .. ...

66 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA,

reached within a few feet of the gun tower wall. The party having
completed their task in a little over an hour now rushed back to
the gate, under a heavy firefrom the enem.y at the end of the gar-
den. Meanwhile the rest of the garrison had been engaged with a
considerable gathering of the enemy who threatened to attack the
east tower and waterway. The and driven
assailants were checked
off by the fierce fire from the fort, but their movements caused
Captain Townshend some anxiety, and he had sent to urge Lieu-
tenant Harley to complete his work as quickly as possible.
This sortie, which was most gallantly and effectually carried out,
cost the garrison a loss of eight killed and thirteen wounded. The
enemy's loss was estimated at about sixty, including two men who
had remained inside the mine and were killed by the explosion. The
expenditure of ammunition on this day was about 3,000 rounds.
Two prisoners, who were brought in by Lieutenant Harley, stated
that a British force had been defeated at Nisa Gol by Muhammad
Isa, and had retired on ]\Iastuj. They also added that no other
mines, except the one just destroyed, had been projected but to ;

make quite sure, Captain Townshend decided to countermine the

gun tower, and during the 18th the troops were busily employed on
this work. The troubles of the little garrison were, however, now
at an end. On the morning of the 19th April it was discovered that
the enemy, alarmed at the near approach of the relieving forces,
had abandoned the siege and withdrawn en massz during the night.
Most of the Jandolis went to join Umra Khan in Asmar, while Sher
Afzal, with a number of the Chitralis, fled towards Bashkar, where
they were captured a few days later by the Khan of Dir's people.
During the day, news was brought of the approach of the relief
force under the command of Sir Robert Low, arid a letter from
Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly announced that this column would reach
Chitral on the morrow.
The losses of the garrison during the siege, and inclusive of
the action on the 3rd March, were, according to Captain Townshend's
report, 104 killed and wounded^ of all ranks, viz. —
Killed. Wo. nded.
British officers . . . i 2
Central India Horse . . 1

Carried over . 2 2

I These figures differ slightly from those quoted in the return given in Appendix B.
CHITRAL.
 ——

68 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Onthe 22nd March the Pioneers arrived at Gil git, and on the
same day Lieut. -Colonel Kelly received the following instructions
by telegram from the Adjutant-General in India :

In consequence of affairs in Chitral, you will assume military command

in the Gilgit Agency, and make such dispositions and movements as you may
think best. You are not to undertake any operations that do not offer reason

able prospects of success. So long as communications with Eobertson are

interrupted, you will be Chief Political Officer Mdthin the zone of your military
operations. On or about the 1st April a strong force of three brigades will

advance on Chitral via Swat. You will report direct to the Adjutant- General
at Calcutta till 28th, then to Simla, repeating to Eesident, Kashmir.

Beyond the fact that the British Agent, with his escort of the
14th Sikhs and 300 Kashmir Imperial Service Troops, was be-
siesed in Chitral by the combined forces of Slier Afzal and Umra
Khan, and that Captain Ross' detachment had been cut up in the
Koragh defile, Lieut. -Colonel Kelly had no certain information
beyond Mastaj, which was held
as to the condition of the country
by a small detachment under Lieutenant Moberly. The fate of
the party under Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler was as yet
unknown.
The troops at Lieut. -Colonel Kelly's disposal (excluding those
at Mastuj and Chitral) were distributed as follows
:

Men.
Astor 5th Kashmir Light Infantry 29
r32nd Punjab Pioneers 442
Between Bunji
< Bengal Sappers and Miners 12
and ChiJas.
L5th Kashmir Light Infantry 466
/"No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Batter^

Hunza valley
]
(2 guns).
(.6th Kashmir Light Infantry 209
( No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery

I
(2 guns).
32nd Punjab Pioneers 403
4th Kashmir Kifles 34
Gilfjit
5th Kashmir Light Infantry 108
6th ,, „,, 140
Kashmir Sappers and Miners 111
Details 14
GakucJi 6th Kashmir Light Infantry 23
Roshan 10
 CHITRAL. 69

Men.
r, r4:th Kashmir Rifles .. 34
Gums . .
^
^ 6tli Kashmir Light Infantry . . 69
r4th Kashmir Rifles ")

Ghizr .. j 6th Kashmir Light Lifantry J "

^Kashmir Sappers and Miners . . 52

It was necessary, besides organising a column for an advance

towards Chitral, to provide for the safety of Gilgit, and the line of
communications between that place and Mastuj. Moreover, al-
though the attitude of the Hunza and Nagir people was most friend-
ly and loyal, it was not advisable to denude the Hunza valley of
troops. The Chilasis also, (though they had been submissive
since their defeat in 1893), and the independent Kohistanis and
Shinaki tribes on their border, required watching. Finally, the
Yasinis, through whose country the column must advance, could
not be trusted to abstain from active sympathy with their Chitrali
neighbours.
These considerations, and the paucity of supplies and trans-
port available, decided Lieut. -Colonel Kelly to limit his force to
a small column consisting of 400 men of the 32nd Pioneers and
a section of No. Kashmir Mountain Battery.
1

The Chiefs of Hunza and Nagir, who had already furnished

100 levies employed at Ghizr, now brought 900 men with 14
days' supplies. A hundred of these were selected to follow the
column to Ghizr, and another hundred were detailed to garrison
Eoshan, while a number of the remainder were employed in
conveying supplies to Gupis.
Lieut. -Colonel Kelly was confronted by a task of very
great difficulty. As far as Gupis a made road existed, which,
though rough and difficult, was fit for mule transport. Beyond
that place the route was a mere track, and the Shandur pass was
at this time of year certain to prove a formidable obstacle. All
the country beyond the pass was known to be up in arms, and
there was a possibility that on the Gilgit side also the inhabitants
would prove hostile and thus render the task of reaching
Chitral almost hopeless ; for both in the matter of supplies and
transport the column must to a very great extent necessarily
depend on the country through which it had to pass. It was
known that the reserves stored in Gupis would suffice the
 1

70 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

column for the requirements of the road, and that at

actual
Ghizr there was stored enough to maintain 1,000 men for 11
days. The actual amount, however, that had been forwarded from
Gupis could not be ascertained, though it was believed that at
Mastuj there were probably some sixteen days' supplies for the
garrison.
Lieut. -ColonelKelly divided the column into two parties
of which the first, consisting of 200 men of the 32nd Pioneers,
piarched from Gilgit on the 23rd March the remainder of the
;

Pioneers and two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery followed

the next day. No and baggage was limited to
tents were taken,
15lb per man. The two detachments reached Gupis on the 26th
and 27th. Here coolie and pony transport replaced the mules
brouc^ht from Gilgit. In order to reduce the amount of transport,
some stores, including Pioneer equipment, were now left at Gupis.
Leaving that place on the 27th and 28th March, the column reached
Ghizr on the 30th and 31st, v/here it was reinforced by 40 Kashmir
Sappers and Miners, and 100 levies from Hunza and Nagir, led
by Wazirs Humayun and Taifii. From Ghizr Lieut. -Colonel Kelly
resumed his march with the whole column, intending to halt at
Langar, thirteen miles distant, on the 1st April.
It was found that a number of the Yasini coolies and some of
,,,.., . ponies had bolted during
the r to
the r
pre-
Crossmg of the fchandur
pass. vious night, and consequently, although
Lieutenant C. G. Stewart succeeded in bringing a portion of them
back, only six days' supplies could be transported, instead of ten,
as originally intended. Snow had been falling for five days, and
about three miles from Ghizr it lay so deep that the further pro-
gress of the laden animals was utterly impossible. Accordingly, at
3 P.M. the order to retire was reluctantly given. An hour later
Teru was reached, and here Lieut. -Colonel Kelly again divided his
force, leaving 200 Pioneers, 40 Sappers and Miners, and 50 levies,
with the whole of the coolie transport, at that place, under com-
mand of Captain Borradaile. This officer was instructed to cross
the pass on the following day, and entrench himself at Laspur,
whence he was to send back the coolie transport, and, if possible,
open up communication with Mastuj. Lieut.-Colonel Kelly

with the remainder of his force, meanwhile returned to Ghizr,

but a further fall of snow prevented Captain Borradaile from
 CEITBAL. 71

leaving Tern on the next day as arranged. The men of the 4th
Kashmir Rifles now volunteered to assist the gunners in making
a road through the snow from Teru to Langar, and to help them
in getting the Having obtained permission
guns over the pass.
to make the attempt, Lieutenant Stewart, with his gunners, went
on to Teru on the 2nd to prepare the road, leaving the drivers and
mules at Ghizr he was accompanied by Lieutenant H. A. K. Gough,
;

and fifty Kashmir sepoys. On their arrival at Teru, the men of 32nd
Pioneers, through their native officers, asked permission from Captain
Borradaile, to be allowed to assist the gunners and Kashmir Infan-
try men and ammunition over the Shandur pass.
to carry the guns
This request was acceded to. The guns arrived from Ghizr next
dav, and about noon Captain Borradaile, with the whole party,
set out for Langar. The battery mules were soon in difficulties
owing to the deep snow. A small herd of half-bred yaks was at
first driven ahead, to trample down a track, but the result was

disappointing, as the laden mules still sank in too deep to make

any headway. Lieutenant Stewart then tried to march his section
along the Langar river-bed, but men and animals soon became numb-
ed in the icy cold water. Eventually some of the loads were slung
and carried by the men, while others were dragged on sledges^on-
structed from boxes. The Pioneers of the rear-guard and Kashmir
sepoys, encumbered though they were with their own kit and
equipment, manfully aided the artillerymen in their desperate task
of carrying the heavy loads through the deep snow, and after a most
laborious struggle the party reached Langar at 11 p.m. The guns
and artillery loads were stacked on the snow and left under a guard
some distance back, as the men were too exhausted to carry them
further that night. They were brought on to Langar next day by
the gunners and men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, while the mules '

were sent back to Ghizr.

Langar is above sea-levol, and the cold was
about 12,000 feet
intense. One small hut was found, and used for the few sick men,
while the remainder bivouacked in the open, sitting round some
small fires which they managed to light. Fearing to exhaust his
men by a repetition of the heavy work of the previous day, Captain
Borradaile left the guns and escort of 4th Kashmir Rifles at Langar,
and started up the pass with the remainder of his detachment
72 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

at 9 A.M. on the '4tli' April. Thougli the Shandur is considered

an easy pass in ordinary seasons, tlie softness of tlie fresh-fallen
snow, now from three to five feet deep, rendered the progress of the
men, heavily weighted as they were with arms, ammunition, and
accoutrements, intensely difficult. They suffered much from the
fierce glare of the sun, which caused many cases of snow-blindness.
The rate of march averaged no more than one mile an hour, and
Laspur was not reached till 7 p.m. Here the villagers, who were
taken by surprise at the unexpected arrival of the British force
across a pass which they then believed impracticable, offered no
opposition.
The next day Captain Borradaile completed the defences of
some houses which he had occupied, and collected supplies and
transport. Some of the villagers, who had volunteered to assist
us, were sent back to bring the guns from Langar. In the
evening the detachment which had been left at that place arrived
with the guns, which they had carried over the pass with the aid
of the Laspuri coolies. This most creditable feat was due to the
indomitable perseverance of Lieutenants Stewart and Gough, and
to the splendid endurance of the gunners and the men of the 4th
Kashmir Eifles, who so ably assisted them. Meanwhile Captain
Borradaile, who had gone out to reconnoitre, ascertained that
a number of the enemy were in the vicinity.
On the morning of the 6th Captain Borradaile with 120
Pioneers and 2 guns made a reconnaissance as far as Gasht.
Having obtained information that the enemy were holding the
Chakalwat defile, three miles further on, with 300 to 500 men, he
returned to Laspur.
Lieut.-Colonel Kelly, with Lieutenant W. G. L. Beynon,
Staff Officer, and fifty Nagir Levies, reached Laspur on this date.
On the 7th a halt was made in order to rest the men and give those
suffering from snow-blindness a chance to recover. The artillery-
men, being without goggles, were especially afi^ected and would have
been unable to lay their guns at any distance. During the day the
force was further increased by the arrival of fifty Puniali Levies
under Raja Akbar Khan with some ninety Balti coolies carrying
supplies. On the 8th Lieut.-Colonel Kelly, rightly believing
that a further delay would only allow the enemy to increase
their numbers and strengthen their position at Chakalwat,
 <
-J
<
<
o

C «3

o *

"t^

a* o
I" a>

c a
5 ?

^ Uj <> Q Uj OQ

i»j : i :
 GHITRAL. 73

moved on to Gasht, without waiting for the remainder of the column.

His force consisted of 200 Pioneers, 40 Sappers and Miners, 100
Hunza and Puniali Levies, and 2 mountain guns. Lieutenant Gough,
with 25 Kashmir sepoys and the rest of the levies, was left to hold
Laspur until the arrival of the second detachment of Pioneers.
On arrival at Gasht, Lieutenant Beynon, with the Hunza
Action of the ciiakahvat Levies, reconnoitred the enemy's
position
defile. at Chakalwat, which commanded a
ford
across the Laspur stream. This position, like most of the
darbands
which the Chitralis regard as impregnable, was of great natural
strength. A line of sangars stretched across the edge of
an alluvial
fan some considerable height above the river, blocking the
paths
up the cliffs from the ford below and commanding the road on the
right bank. On the enemy's right was a mass of fallen snow descend-
ing to the river, and above it a precipitous spur crowned
with more
sangars the other flank was protected by shale slopes
;
above
which the enemy had prepared the usual stone shoots.
The road
from Gasht led across a boulder-strewn alluvial slope, intersected
bv
7ialas, and then ran along the foot of steep shale
slopes opposite
the sangars. On the
9th Lieut. -Colonel Kelly, leaving his
baggage
at Gasht under a small escort, advanced with the
remainder of
Advanced Guard- ^^^ ^.^^^Psi^ the Order noted
in the
Half company, 22nd Punjab margin. Lieutenant Bevnon witli
*i'ini t-li^
IJIQ
Pioneers tt t • »

2iain Body-
Munza Levies, t ni
had already ascended the
Kashmir Sappers and Miners heights above the enemy's
Half Company, 22nd Punjab ri<rht
J-^guu in
in
j n
Order xto outflank ^
Pioneers. the position, while the
''°""- P^^i^lil^evies had been entrusted
^^"S:^'"^^ t^e task of driving the enemy
with
One Company, 22Dd Punjab away from
^'°'"™-
^toiie shoots on the
^^'"'"^
- slopes above
the right bank of the river
At about half a mile from the position, the force'
deployed for
attack and occupied a gently sloping spur facing
the enemy's two
right hand lower sangars. [A and B in plan.] The guns opened
fireat 82o yards range, and, aided by the
well-directed volleys of
the infantry, cleared the enemy out of
their right sanqar
\k^
Lieutenant Beynon with the Hunza Levies,
meanwhile drove the
enemy back from their position on the spur
above. Fire was now
concentrated on the next sangar [B], which
was soon evacuated. The
occupants of these .a«s«« were now joined by their conirades who
h
74 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

had been driven down from the on either side by the levies, and
hills

a general flight ensued. A few rounds were fired at the fugitives

by the guns. The column then crossed the river and, having
occupied the sangars, continued its advance for Ij miles, when
a halt was made.
The casualties on our side were one native officer and three
men wounded, while the enemy, who numbered 400 to 500 men,
last between 50 to 60 killed.

After a short halt, the march was continued to Mastuj, which

was reached without further opposition. The garrison, seeing the
besiegers retiring from their positions during the day, had come out
to meet the relieving force about three miles from the fort.
Lieut. -Colonel Kelly halted at Mastuj for three days, which
were spent in collecting transport and supplies, and repairing
the damaged bridge over the Yarkhun river, a mile below the fort.
Some ponies were also procured for the carriage of the guns.
The second detachment, under Lieutenant Patterson, which had
crossed the Shandur on the 9th, reached Mastuj on the 1 1th.

Reconnaissances were made on the 11th and 12th, and the enemy
were found to be holding a strong and well fortified position, block-
ing the advance through the narrow valley of the Yarkhun or
Chitral river, where it is cleft by a deep ravine known as the Nisa
Gol.

The road from Mastuj runs along the centre of an open plain,
above the right bank of the river, which here flows through a valley
about a mile in width, and hemmed in on
Action of Nisa Gol. . , -j i, a. i i,-n • •
i
either side by steep rocky hills rising several
thousand feet above it. Issuing from the mountains on the right
bank, the Nisa Gol, a gorge 200 or 300 feet deep with precipitous
sides, cuts through the plain to the river, which here hugs the lofty
cliffs on its left. The main road crosses this
ravine near its junction
with the river, and a rough track passes across about the centre ;
this second path, however, had been destroyed by the enemy.

On the far edge of the gol, the enemy had built a line of san-
gars, sunk in the ground, and well provided with head-cover. On
their left, in line with these, several more sangars were built on the
spur above, and higher still parties of men were posted to hurl down
rocks on their assailants. Their right was defended by a series of
 CEITRAL. 75

sangars, stretching away above the snow-line, on a spur rather in

front of the main position.
Lieut. -Colonel Kelly's Staff Officer had supplied him with
an excellent sketch and full information as to the defender's

dispositions. He accordingly decided to attack the position on the

13th, and to endeavour to turn the enemy's left. The plan of
attack was as follows The advanced -guard (one company) was, on
:

gaining the plain, to make its way well to the right and high up
the slope, where the formation of the ground favoured an advance
under cover to within 500 yards of the gol. It was then to attack
with well-directed volleys the lower smicjar on the spur protecting
the enemy's left flank [No. 17 in plan] until the guns and the
remainder of the force came into position. After this sangar was
destroyed, the main defences, Nos. 12 to 15, were to be attacked,
while the levies made their way high up the gol in search of a path
by which they might cross and turn the enemy's left.
The company forming the advanced guard came into contact
with the enemy at 10-30 a.m., when, instead of working towards its
right, as ordered, it deployed at about 900 yards from the gol and
advanced in extended order on the centre of the position. The next
company, coming up shortly afterwards, prolonged the hue to the
right. The two reserve companies of the Pioneers now deployed
and advanced, and subsequently in turn reinforced the firing
line, extending it still further to the right.
Meanwhile the guns
shelled No. 17 sangar, and temporarily silenced its fire after par-
tially destroying the wall. The guns then moved forward to engage
the sangar at the foot of the spur [No. 16 on plan], which was not
visible till within 150 yards. This was found to be unoccupied,
but the occupants of No. ,17 reopened fire, and the guns accordingly
silenced them with common shell and case shot. The Kaslimir
artillerymen, who were under a hot fire at close range, served their
guns with admirable steadiness, though they lost seven killed and
wounded in the section during the space of a few minutes. Of this
number three were drivers, men taken prisoners at Chakalwat, and
leading — —
under escort ponies also captured at that place.
During this time the levies were making their way up the gol
to carry out the turning movement, while the four companies of
Pioneers engaged the sangars on the edge of the ravine, and on the
spur to their right front,
Xi2
 — —

76 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

After silencing No. 17 sangar, the guns took up a third position,

whence they shelled the enemy's centre at about 900 yards' range
and then switched their fire on to a large breastwork [No. 11 in
sketch] further to the enemy's left, which commanded the main

road. About this time, Lieutenant Beynon discovered a place where

the gol could be crossed, opposite the rough track which ascended
the far bank. Some sappers, under Lieutenant Oldham, r.e.,
and the company of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, under Lieutenant
Moberly, were now called up and the
; sappers, with the aid of scal-
ing ladders and ropes, descended the ravine, and after about half an
hour's work, made a practicable path down the cliff. The three
officers, with about a dozen men, reached the opposite side just as
the levies arrived at having run the gauntlet
No. 17 sangar^
of a stone shoot on the way. The enemy, realizing that their
position was turned, now left their cover and made a hurried
retreat, during which they were shelled by the guns at ranges from
950 to 1,425 yards, while the infantry poured in a few well-directed
volleys. A general advance was now ordered, and a company was
quickly despatched in pursuit, but the enemy's flight was rapid, and
being aided by the ground, which afforded good cover till they were
out of range, they were able to make good their escape in the direc-
tion of Drasan. The column bivouacked for the night opposite
Sanoghar, close to the scene of action.
To quote from the official report :

It will be observed that Lieut. -Colonel Kelly adopted the same tactics
which had proved so successful in the engagement at Chakalwat. He brought
his artillery fire to bear on the sangars, keepmg up an incessant rifle fire as
well, while the hardy levies climbed the precipitous hillsides high up the
gol to turn the sangars on the enemy's left flank.
The total number enemy were estimated at 1,500, among whom
of the

were some 40 of Umra Khan's men they were commanded by the treacherous
;

Muhammad Isa, and were all armed with Martini- Henry or Snider rifles.
The casualties on our side amounted to seven men killed, and one native officer
and twelve men wounded, while those of the enemy were, according to native
information, sixty men lolled and one hundred wounded.

In reporting the above engagement, Lieut.-Colonel Kelly re-

marked :

Confronted as they were by an enemy they could not see, I cannot

speak too highly of the extreme steadiness and bravery of the troops during
 '

77
'
CEITBAL.

wh.ch they were

which lasted two hours, dunng
the course of the action,
trying Ere from the front
and left flani.
subjected to a verv heavy and

the Utli the wounded were sent back to Mastu], where

On
Surgeon Captain L^^^^ l.M^s
a fieldhospital was established by
its march at 7 a.m. On
The remainder of the column resumed
was
the road along the Ch.tralnver
reaching a point opposite Buni,
so the orce, tummg r.gh -hand^
ported to'have been broken down,
of 2,000
brought them, after a stiff climb
ed ascended a spur which towards the
plateau which sloped gradually
down
ee't to a grassy
the Torikho. An easy march
along
unction of the' Yarkhun and
was found to
the column to Drasan, which
his highland brought
the surrounding villages.
The bridge over
be deserted, as were all with
had been destroyed, was repaired
the Torikho stream, which to
the fort, so as to allow the troops
beams and timbers taken from the guns,
cross drv-shod. It was,
however, not strong enough to bear
the animals swain across.
which were carried over the ford while
coolies with the baggage,
who did not arrive till after dark also
The the bridge
river rather than wait to cross
nreferred to ford the
the fort, but, as
in sin-Tie file. Large supplies of grain were found in
available to remove it, a quantity was issued
there was no transport
to the coolies. , ,

to Kusht, and pushed on

On the 15th the column marched
next day, in heavy rain to Lun.
Burnas, haymg
On 17th Lieut.-Colonel Kelly reached
the
dangerous ford about a mile above that
crossed the river by a
ordinary main road to Chitral runs
Sace From Sanoghar, the
aloncr'the left bank Yarkhun, and it was on this road that the
of the
under Captam Eoss and
disas'ters occurred to the detachments
By abandoning this route, and makmg
Lieutenant Edwardes.
west oi
a d6tour, via Drasan
and Lun, over the high ground to the
Kelly outwitted the enemy, and avoided
the river Lieut.-Colonel
defiles, where they had hoped to
the Koragh and other formidable
check his advance. j
On the 18th, as less than three days'
supplies remamed
•

hand, m
•
i, j

early and on their return a short

foraging parties were sent out ;

march was made to Maroi. Here it was reported that a party of

Isa had retired during the day
towards
the enemy under Muhammad
Gol
Chitral, and intended to
hold a darband called the Golen
had destroyed all bridges and
The next day, although the enemy
 —

78 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

broken down the road in several places, no opposition was met with ;
and it was ascertained at Koghazi, where the column halted, that
Muhammad Isa had been hurriedly recalled by Sher Afzal to
Chitral.

This same afternoon a letter was received from Surgeon -Major

Robertson, announcing the flight of the enemy and the end of the
siege. On the afternoon of the 20th April, Lieut. -Colonel Kelly's

colunm marched into Chitral and joined the garrison who had so
gallantly defended it throughout the forty-six days' siege.

On the following day the position occupied by the combined

force was entrenched, and communication was opened up, through
Dir, with the Relief Force under Sir Robert Low, whose operations
will be described in chapter XII.

On receipt of the news of the arrival of the column at Chitral

the following telegram was sent from Simla, by the Foreign Secre-
tary, to Sir Robert Low, for transmission to Colonel Kelly :

I am by the Viceroy to express warm congratulations from

desired
himself and from Government of India to you and to your gallant troops on
your admirable and successful advance to Chitral under circumstances of the
greatest difficulty, arising not only from the opposition of the enemy, but
also from enormous physical difficulties, which have been overcome with
skill and rapidity.

On the 6th May 1895 Lieut. -Colonel Kelly submitted a des-

patch describing the operations of the Gilgit column, in transmitting
which to the Government of India, His Excellency the Commander-
in-Chief recorded his high appreciation of the skill and ability dis-

played in the conduct of this long and arduous advance to the relief
of Chitral. Lieut. -Colonel Kelly's despatch and the Adjutant
General's forwarding letter were published in the Gazette of India
of the 25th May 1895, together with a Government General Order
in which His Excellency the Viceroy expressed his deep sense of
the admirable and valuable services performed by the officers and
men of the Gilgit column under circumstances of extraordinary
difficulty.

Surgeon-Major Robertson was made a Knight Commander of

the Star of India. Captain C. V. F. Townshend received the Com-
panionship of the Bath and a brevet majority, and Surgeon-
Captain Whitchurch was awarded the Victoria Cross.
 OHITRAL . 79

The events which followed on the relief of Chitral, and the

measures adopted for the settlement of the country may now be
briefly summarised.
Amir-ul-Mulk and Sher Afzal^ were deported to India in
May. On the 2nd September Shuja-ul-Mulk was installed as
Mehtar of the Kator portion of Chitral, while the two Khushwakt
districts of Mastuj and Laspur were placed under the rule of inde-
pendent Governors, but were retained in the Chitral Agency. A
garrison consisting of two battalions of native infantry, one com-
pany of sappers and miners, and one section of a native mountain
battery was retained in Chitral, and has since been relieved annually
via Swat and Dir. In 1899 this force was reduced by one battalion,
and it is now stationed at Drosh, with a detachment at Chitral. For
the defence of Lower Chitral some 200 levies armed with Sniders
are now stationed at various posts. ^ They serve throughout the
year, being relieved monthly, and are paid Es. 10 fer mensem.
There are also about 150 unpaid levies employed to watch the
passes leading from Dir and Kafiristan.
In 1903
the formation of a corps of Chitrali scouts was
sanctioned. This force consists of 9 Native Officers and 990 Non-
commissioned Officers and men under 2 British Officers, with 8
Native instructors from the regular army. One-sixth of this force is
called up at a time for two months' training, during which the men
receive pay and rations. They are armed with Lee-Metford rifles.
The Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk receives a subsidy of Es. 1,000
fer 7nensem and an annual allowance of Es. 8,000 as compensation
for the loss of the Mastuj and Laspur districts. He has paid
three visits to India and was made a CLE. at the Delhi Durbar
in 1903. His loyalty to the British Government appears to be
assured, and he seems to have become firmly established as a
capable ruler. The Adamzadas and mullas, who were at first
bitterly opposed to British interference and control, have now
become more reconciled to the existing regime, and since 1895
nothing has occurred to disturb the peaceful relations between
the British Government and the people of Chitral.

iSher Afzal, with a number of the lead- whence he was taken to the British camp
ingmen in Chitral, had been captured by at Dir.
the Khan of Dir's lashkar in Bashkar, 2 Gairat, Lower Drosh, Merkhani, Arandu,
Kaoti, Ashreth, and Ziarat.
 APPENDIX A.

Districts and population of Chitral according to a census taken about

1899-1900.
Meu, women
District.

Laspur
Mastuj Governorship.
Mastuj
Yarkhun valley
Kuli
Torikho district.

Toriklio
Kkou valley
Eeck
Mulrikho district.

Mulrikho
Kushm and Madak
Tiricli valley

KosM district

Owir district

Khuzara district.
Ojkor valley
Shogot
Lut Kuf 1

Arkari valley
Chitral district
Drosh district
 APPENDIX B.

Casualties in action during siege of Chitral and operations from Gilgit side.
 CHAPTER III.

CIS-JNDUS bWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES.

Allai.

Allai is a bounded by Kohistan on the north and east, ^

valley
by the Bhogarmang valley, Nandihar, and Deshi on the south,
and by the river Indus on the west. With the exception of the
valley known as the Chor glen, the whole of Allai is drained by one
main stream running from east to west into the Indus.
Allai is divided from Kohistan on the north by a high range
of mountains, rising to a height of over fifteen thousand feet.
On the south it is divided from Nandihar and Deshi by another
range running from the British boundary to the Indus above Tha-
kot. The country of the Allaiwals is conterminous with British
territory to the north of the Bhogarmang valley, but they are
separated from one another by a range of mountains rising from
eleven to thirteen thousand feet. The main stream, known as the
Allai Sirhan, which runs through the whole valley, has its source
in this range, whence, running west, after receiving several lesser
streams, it falls into the Indus near the village of Thandul, opposite
Barkot, about eighteen miles from its source. The average breadth
of the valley is about twelve miles, and the total area about two
hundred square miles. Its eastern end is a succession of grass and
forest- covered mountain slopes as the elevation becomes less,
;

fields of wheat, barley and Indian corn begin to appear, and near
the Indus extensive rice cultivation is carried on. The valley is
studded by numerous hamlets, but none of them are fortified,
nor is their position as a rule, good for defence.
,

Politically the two principal villages are Bandi and Pokul, or

Shingari. There are two leading maliks in the tribe, Arsala Khan
and Bahadur Khan, who have an old-standing enmity with each
1 The Chor glen to the east of Allai is geographically a part of Kohistan, but the
Allaiwals have taken possession of it.

( 82 )
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES, 83

other ; perhaps the most powerful, and has in his day-

the former is

been something of a firebrand, but he is now (1907) an old man. He

has a son named Ghazi Khan. The Allaiwals are ever engaged in
internal quarrels ; blood-feuds are rife, and often embroil the
whole tribe.
The Allaiwals are nearly all of the Swati tribe, and intermarry
with the Swatis of Bhogarmang and Nandihar. It should be
noted that these cis-Indus Swatis have no connection with the
Yusafzai Pathans who now occupy the Swat valley. When the
Pathans came eastward from Afghanistan and took possession
of the Peshawar valley, they also seized the adjacent hill tracts on
the north, and either drove before them the ancestors of these
Swatis, or reduced them to a state of servitude, from which they
released themselvesby leaving their country, under the leadership
of Saiyid Jalal Baba, the son or descendant of Pir Saiyid Ali,
(more generally known as Pir Baba, who settled in Buner and
died there), and the common
ancestor of the Kaghan Saiyids,
the Saiyids late of Sitana, and several other Saiyid communities
who live amongst the tribes along our border. These Swatis,
under their religious leader, were composed of the original
inhabitants of Swat, and a few Pathans, probably, who possessed
no landed property and did not belong to the conquerinf^
Pathan clan. This force went eastwards towards the Indus,
and, crossing that river, took possession of the countries now
occupied by their descendants. When the country had been taken
full one-fourth of the whole was set aside as the share
possession of,

of the Saiyid leader and his family, and the Mada Khel and
Akhund Khel religious fraternity. The Swatis are now spread
over upper Hazara in British territory, and, in addition to Allai,
in independent territory, Nandihar, Deshi,and Tikari are peopled
by this race.
The cis-Indus Swatis appear to have all the vices of the
Pathan— rankly luxuriant, and, as with them, cold-blooded murder
and grinding avarice are the salt of life ; but those in British
territory can only indulge the first taste at the risk of unpleasant
consequences. They certainly have not any of the courage of
the Pathan, and the bold, frank manner of the latter is replaced
with them by a hang-dog look. They are all Sunni Muhammadans,
and are very bigoted.
M2
 —

Si FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The population of Allai consists of 5,830 families, divided as

follows : — Swatis \ 4,100 ; Saiijid, Tirimzai, 430 Mada Khel, 440
; ;

Akhund Khel, 520; Gujars and others, 340.

The fighting men number about 8,720, ^ viz. — Swatis, 6,490;
Saiyids, Tirimzai, 580; Mada Khel, 570; Akhund Khel, 980;
Gujars and others, 100.
Their arms are guns, swords and shields, and pistols. About
two-thirds of their fighting men are armed with guns, for the
most part matchlocks, with a few muskets. They may possibly
have a few rifles. Their pistols are flintlocks. Every man is
supposed to be armed, and they are said to be good marksmen.
They purchase their gunpowder and lead from Swat and Chakesar.
In the event of their country being invaded, they might get aid
from the neighbouring Swati tribes, and also from Kohistan,
but the latter would be doubtful, as there is enmity between the
AUaiwals and the Kohistanis, owing to the forcible seizure of Chor
by the former.
In the event of a British force entering their country, the
people of Nandihar and Tikari would hardly dare to give them
assistance, as they are themselves open to attack from British
territory. Supplies in Allai are sufiicient for the inhabitants, but
a force entering the country would have to take its own. These
could be had from Konsh and Agror. Grass, fuel, and water are,
however, plentiful. The AUaiwals are but little dependent upon
British territory.
From the south, Allai may be entered either through the
Bhogarmang through Nandihar, or along the bank of
valley, or
the river Indus. The easiest routes are those through Nandihar,
and of the passes leading thence into AUai the Ghabri is said to
be the most frequently used. The Ghorapher pass lies to the
west of the Ghabri. The Dabrai pass, still more to the west, leads
to Thakot.
During the Black Mountain Expedition of 1868 it was
proposed to punish the AUaiwals for an attack on a survey
party under Mr. G. B. Scott in Bhogarmang in August of
that year, but the intention of entering the Allai valley was
subsequently abandoned, as it was considered inexpedient to

1 The Swatis of Allai are again divided into eight sections.

2 This estimate has not been revised since 1884. {Editor.)
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. S5

extend the military operations at that time. A fine of Rs.

500 was imposed on the Allaiwals for the attack on the survey
party but up to the present time the fine has not been realised,
;

and is an outstanding claim against the tribe. In November

still

1874, the Allaiwals, headedby their chief, Arsala Khan, made a raid
within British territory upon a party of Kohistanis, murdering
three men and carrying off their flocks. This was at once
punished by the seizure of some sixty Allaiwals, with flocks
numbering 4,000 head, in British territory a blockade of the
;

tribe was proclaimed, and, notwithstanding the sympathies of

our own Swati subjects with the marauders, the jirga of the
tribe, for the first time in their history, came
in and made
their submission to the British Government. For the next three
years the Allaiwals gave no trouble but in November 1877 they
;

again committed some raids on the British border, which rendered

a blockade of the tribe necessary. The first raid was committed
on the village of Bathal in the Konsh valley, on the 16th of
November, at the instance of Arsala Khan, who was himself
present in person and was the leader of the gang. In this raid
two Hindus of Bathal were killed and twelve carried off. Houses
were also set on fire, and property, valued at Es. 37,000 by the
owners, was carried off. The raiders were estimated to have lost
thirteen killed, and twelve were taken prisoners their numbers
;

were about 300.

The operations of the blockade progressed but slowly. As
already pointed out, AUai is but little dependent upon us, and conse-
quently an effective blockade is most difficult to carry out. About
the middle of June 1879 a jirga of the Allaiwals came in to the
Deputy Commissioner. It was not accompanied by Arsala Khan, or
by any other influential man, and it proposed that neither fine nor
compensation should be demanded, and that the Allaiwal
prisoners should be surrendered previous to the Hindus being
given up. These proposals could not, of course, be listened to,
and the was dismissed. The Allaiwals were at the same time
jirga
given distinctly to understand that no terms would be made
with them until the British subjects who were in their hands were
released. When this demand had been complied with they would
be informed of the and compensation they would be called upon
fine

to pay. Up to the end of the year the Allaiwals had shown no

 —

86 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

signs of submission, and the Government of India considered that

the difficulty had reached a stage at which it was highly expedient
that effective measures should be taken for the punishment of the
tribe. Owing, however, to the absence of so large a force on
service in Afghanistan, the time was not considered opportune
for an expedition. The blockade was, therefore, ordered to be
continued until it should be convenient to send a punitive force
into Allai.
On 1880, the arrival of the Allai jirga at
the 14th August
Abbottabad, bringing with them the Hindu prisoners, was reported.
Arsala Khan, however, did not accompany the jirga, pleading
as an excuse that he was afraid to do so. In consideration of the
surrender of the Hindu members of the
captives, the twenty-nine
tribe, who had been seized in reprisal, were released, and the
following terms, which the G-overnment demanded, were then
made known to the jirga :

(1) The raiders captured in the attack on Bathal to be released on

the payment of a ransom of Rs. 500.
(2) Payment of a fine of Rs. 5,000 on account of the raid on Bathal.
(3) Payment of Rs. 500 on account of the attack on Mr. Scott's
survey party in 1868.
(4) Submission of Ai'sala Khan.

The was then dismissed.

jirga
On the 16th February 1881, a deputation, with the ransom
money, arrived at Abbottabad, and the eight surviving prisoners
in the jail at Kawal Pindi were sent for and released in the presence
of the jirga, who then
departed. The other conditions, however,
remained and
unfulfilled,in the autumn of 1881 the necessity of

a military expedition was again considered. The Brigadier-General

commanding the Frontier Force was called on to submit pro-
posals for such an expedition but the Government considered that
;

the operations proposed by him would have been on a scale out of

proportion to the results to be obtained, and it was, therefore,
decided to defer the use of military force. The terms imposed
on the tribe remained unfulfilled until 1888.^
On the 4th July 1887, two raids were committed simultane-
ously by the Allaiwals in the northern corner of the Bhogarmang
1 See page 147.
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBES. 87

glen above Jabar, on small grazing camps in our territory. The

claim for the property carried off, together with the outstanding
claim, total sum due from the tribe Rs. 6,500.
made the Arsala
Khan refused to refer the case to a Council of Elders, except on
terms that could not be accepted, and, as no other means of
recovering this amount remained, punitive measures were finally
sanctioned in 1888, but these were more especially directed against
Arsala Khan and his village of Pokal, as will be shown hereafter.

Nandihar.
Nandihar is a valley lying to the south of Allai, and adjoining
the British valleys of Bhogarmang and Konsh on the east.
by a spur of the hills into two long, open glens, and
It is divided
the drainage, after joining that from the adjoining valley of Tikari,
falls into the Indus at Thakot. In Nandihar, water is abundant,
and rice is largely cultivated, as well as Indian corn, wheat and
barley. Up the hillsides every culturable plateau, no matter how
small, is brought under the plough. The area of the valley is about
ninety square miles and
its elevation is about four to five thousand

feet. The inhabitants are Swatis, and are divided into four clans,
namely : —
Khan Khel, Panjmiral, Panjgol, and Dodal.
The total number of families is estimated all, 380, viz. —
Khan Khel .. 326 Panjgol .. ..286
Panjmiral .. 394 Dodal .. .. 374

There are about 1,000 fighting men, each clan supplying 250
men. Their arms are guns, swords, and spears. The greater part
of the guns are matchlocks, with some flintlocks and a few
muskets. About half the fighting men possess guns of one sort or
the other. Aid could be had from Tikari, Deshi, and Thakot, as
they are all Swatis, and their borders join.

The Nandiharis are constantly at feud among themselves, and

cannot even unite against aggression. Supplies are plentiful, but
fuel is scarce. There are routes from the Konsh glen or from
Agror, which are practicable for laden mules.
Nandihar is not dependent at all on British territory, and trade
carried on with us is very small but being so easily acessible, the
;

State is completely at our mercy. Sirdar Hari Singh, during the Sikh
rule, invaded the country and made the inhabitants pay tribute.
88 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Tikari.

Tikari is and between

a valley lying to the soutli of Nandiliar,
that valley and Agror in Britisli territory. about eight miles
It is

in length and five miles in breadth, and is about 4,500 feet above
the sea-level, having good streams of water running through it.
There is a fair amount of rice cultivation, irrigated from the jnain
and small tributary streams, but the principle produce is Indian
corn. The nature of the soil is very fertile, but the valley is
singularly bare of trees. Firewood is a dijQficulty, even brushwood
on the slopes of the hills being deficient. The valley can be
entered either from Konsh or Agror, but the latter is the best and
easiest road, and is the route chiefly used.
The inhabitants are Swatis and could obtain aid in case of
being attacked from the neighbouring Swati tribes, and also from
the Chagarzais, Akazais, and Hassanzais of the Black Mountain.
The population consists of 700 families, divided as fol-

lows :— Malkhel, or Malkals 300, Ashlor Naror 320, and Saujids 80.
There are only 400 fighting men, or, roughly speaking, one
to every two families. Their arms are similar to those of the
Nandiharis.
Supplies within Tikari are plentiful, and water abundant.
A good deal of grain is exported thence by the Black Mountain
tribes. The Tikariwals occasionally bring down grain to British
territory and purchase cloth from us, but they can scarcely be said
to be dependent on us.
Eahim Khan of Chirmang in Tikari, with his following, joined

in the Bagrian raid on the 11th July 1887.^

Deshi.

Deshi is name given to the country to the north of Agror

the
and lying to the west of Nandihar. It comprises a portion of the

eastern slopes of the Black Mountain, and is a succession of bold,

forest-covered spurs, with steep, rugged, intervening watercourses
on the banks which he the hamlets of the tribe. Round each of
of

these hamlets a few acres have been cleared of forest and cultivated.
The streams which drain the valleys of Nandihar and Tikari,
after uniting three miles below the village of Trand, run along the

1 See page 141.

 CIS'INDUS aWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBES. 89

foot of the Black Mountain, dividing

Nandihar from Deshi, and join
said to contain two thousand
the Indus near Thakot, a large village,
houses, including dependent hamlets. Most of the principal villages

of Deshi are situated along

the banks of this stream, and rice
is carried on to a considerable extent ;
the stream is
cultivation
always fordable except after heavy rain.
famiHes, which
The population of Deshi consists of some 726
apportioned among the six sections into which the tribe is
are
divided as follows :—
Jador .. .. 15^ KhanKhel .. ..108
Kuchelai .. ..100 Warojai .. ..140
RamaKheli .. 120 Palolai .. ..108

The fighting men number about 726, or one man per family.

Their arms are guns, pistols, and swords. About three-fourths

armed with guns
men are and although cis-Indus
of the fiohting ;

Swatis, they bear a good name

among their neighbours for fighting
qualities. They seldom quarrel among
themselves, and never to any

crreat extent, and readily unite

when danger threatens from without.
get aid from the neigh-
In the event of being attacked they could
bouring Swati tribes. The Deshi territory could
be approached by
the Black Mountain, or from Agror
a force moving along the crest of

through Tikari, or thirdly, from Konsh through Nandihar.

The
second route would be most suitable for a force to adopt, and
is

easy throughout.
Supplies of grain, enough for the inhabitants, but would
etc., are

not suffice for even a small force, and these would, therefore,
have
to be taken with the troops. Fuel, grass, and water are plentiful.

The tribe not dependent on British territory ; but, although not

is

immediately on the British border, they are easily accessible and

exposed to attack. They have a standing quarrel with their neigh-
bours, the Saiyids of Pariari, and, in some fighting which took place
in 1871, they had decidedly the best of it. They took part with
the other tribes in the invasion of the Agror valley in 1868, and
were fined Es. 1,000 for their share in the disturbances of that
time. Since then they have given little trouble, though a few

1 Some authorities omit the Rama Khel and Palolai sections and subatitute for them
Sumla Khel and Beror.
Vol. T. N
90 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

are said to have helped Arsala Khan of Allai in some of his

raids.

Tanawal.
Independent Tanawal is, roughly speaking, a square block
of territory in the north-west corner of the Hazara district, south
of the Black Mountain and Agror. It is drained by the Unhar

and Sirhan rivers and consists of 200 square miles of hilly^ country,
which is held as a jagir by the Nawab of Amb. Amb is a fort and
village on the right bank of the Indus opposite the Tanawal jagir,
and it and the other trans-Indus villages of the N'awab are entirely
independent. The Tanawalis are a tribe of whose origin little is
known. They appear to have crossed over from Mahaban, being
expelled by the Pathans.
Black Mountain Tribes.
We now come to the Yusaf zai tribes inhabiting the slopes of
the Black Mountain lying to the east of the Indus, and occupying
the south corner of the angle formed by that river and the British
boundary.
Before describing the tribes which inhabit this tract of country,
it will be well to give a brief description of the Black Mountain itself.

Its total length isabout twenty- five to thirty miles, and its average
hei^^ht about 8,000 feet above the sea. It ascends from the Indus

basin at its southern end near the village of Kiara, and so up to its
watershed by Baradar thence it runs north-east by north to the
;

point on the crest known as Chitabat. From Chitabat the range

runs due north, finally descending by two large spurs to the Indus.
Thakot lies at the foot of the more eastern of these two. The Indus,
after passingThakot, runs westward along the northern foot of the
mountain till it washes the western of the above two spurs, when it
takes a sharp bend south, and runs below and parallel to the western
foot of the range.
The Black Mountain may be described as a long, narrow ridge
with higher peaks at intervals, and occasional deep passes the ;

general outline of the crest is more rounded than sharp. From the
precipitous and
sides, numerous large spurs project, which are often
rocky, with deep, narrow glens or gorges lying between them,
in which lie some of the smaller villages of the tribes. The larger
 0IS-INDU8 SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 91

villages are as a rule situated on the banks of the Indus. The

whole of the upper portion of the mountain is thickly wooded.
The trees found are varieties of pine, oak, sycamore, horse-chestnut,
and wild cherry. Along the crest frequent open glades occur in
the forest, which, with the exposed slopes of higher peaks, are cover-
ed with short grass.
The following are the most important passes and peaks along
the crest of the mountain from south to north, viz. —
Pabal Gali
 —

92 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

animals, which have to swim over alongside. They are strongly

built and are worked by oars placed iore and aft they are also ;

assisted by ropes when necessary. The natives of the country also

cross the river at nearly every point on inflated skins, and the
rapidity with which this can be done was exemplified in the ex-
pedition of 1852-53, when the enemy, who had collected on the
right of the Indus, crossed over to follow up our troops when they
began to retire.

The routes by which troops can ascend the mountain neces-

sarily lie along one or more of its spurs. From British territory
all routes ascend either from Tanawal or Agror, and are as
follows :

\st, from Tanawal at the southern end of the mountain, by

the Baradar spur, near the village of that name, there
is a path —
used for retirement by the 1852-53 expedi-
—
tion which leads on to the watershed overlooking
the Hassanzais. Near to this, on another spur, is the
Chamberi outpost, a fort of the Nawab of Amb. The
Baradar plateau affords room for encamping a
and water is obtainable.
force,

2nd, from Shingli, which lies in a gorge between two spurs,

a path ascends the southern of these to Pabal Gali.
In 1852 the left column of the expedition used this
route.
^rd, a track goes from Chatta, a village lying on the northern-
most of the above two spurs. Above Chatta it is
joined by the Sambalbat spur from Agror, and then
runs up to Jabai this is one of the best routes for an
;

ascending force. The right column of the force in

1852 moved by this route. On gaining the top, Kain
Gali, a pass leading down to the Hassanzai villages, is

commanded. The watershed of this spur forms the

boundary between Agror and Tanawal.
Uh, there is a small spur lying opposite Shingli between the
two above mentioned, by which the centre column
of the force m
1852 ascended to Panj Gali. It is
steep and difficult, but a mule road was made up it
in 1891.
 OIS~INDVS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 9^

5th, from Agior by the Sambalbat spur there is a path

open and easy of ascent (although rather steep in
parts) which joins the Chatta spur higher up.
Qth, from Chajri there is a steep and exposed road, unfitted
for troops.
1th, from Barchar a path rises steeply from the valley for
about 1,500 feet. The village is situated at the top
of this first rise, and might be held by an enemy,
who however, be dislodged by artillery fire
could,
from below. From the village upwards the slope
is more gradual and open for some distance, where

thin forest commences, and on the right flank the

crround gets a little steeper, with one or two knolls.
The last four or five hundred feet are very steep,
with dense forest on the right flank. The left is
open and exposed to view from the crest. The point
of junction with the top is called Bampur Gali. The
levies went up this route in 1868.
Sth, there is a spur running down eastward from Chitabat
to the village of Kungali; thence it again ascends,
going east, and joins the Khabal mountain,
still

which lies east of Agror. The watershed of this

ridge forms the boundary between Agror and Pariari
and Tikari. The main column of the force ascended
from Kungali in 1868 half-way up, a large hog-
;

backed mound, named Mana-ka-Dana, rises on the

crest of the spur. The ascent to this point is easy.
From Mana-ka-Dana the range dips for about 800
yards, and the forest begins, chiefly on the right
flank ;then the ascent starts again, and passes
upwards over some steep and wooded knolls, which
afford good cover for an enemy. Beyond this point
the hill becomes steeper and more wooded right up
to the knoll of Chitabat. On the crest a determined

enemy could give much trouble. A path leads round

the Agror face of Chitabat among rocks and pine
trees. Mules can pass along, but it is dangerous in
places. The Kungali ridge is the most northern spur
ascending from British territory.
94 FRONTIER A^D OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

From Chitabat the path is practicable for troops and moun-

tain artillery over Doda to the Machai peak, the highest point of
the mountain, distance three and a half miles. A practicable
spur runs from Machai to the Indus, dividing the Akazais from the
Chagarzais on the north.
About two and a half miles beyond Machai is the Dunda peak ;

from it runs rather a difficult spur to the Indus, near the village
of Judba, where some of the Hindustani fanatics crossed during the
operations of 1868. Their encampment was at Bihar, on the other
side of the river Judba is about seven miles from the crest as the
;

crow flies, or fourteen by the path.

From Dunda to the east runs a like practicable spur, ending

at Trand between this spur and the Kungali are the Pariari
;

Saiyids. The distance from Dunda to Trand is about six miles.

Water is found in numerous springs along the slopes and near the
;

crest the hillsides are covered with fields of Indian corn, affording,
in the proper seasons, large quantities of forage. The range is

well wooded on both sides.

The view from Machai is very extensive, embracing as it does
Buner, Mount Ham, the Hindu Kush, the mountains of Kashmir,
and the Murree Hills.
The spur from Mana-ka-Dana to Chirmang, through Bilan-
kot, is very easy, and the distance is five miles. This was the
route taken by Maj or- Greneral Wilde's force in 1868 on its way to
the Tikari valley.
The climate of the Black Mountain is very fine in spring,
summer, and autumn, but the winter is severe, and snow falls in
sufficient quantity to stop communication over the crest. From
the proximity of the mountain to the sultry valley of the
Indus, the heat in summer, even at the highest elevation, is
considerable, and along the bank of the river itself the climate is
nearly as warm as that of the plains. Heavy rain generally falls
in the spring and early autumn, and storms are of frequent

occurrence.
The people who inhabit the western face of the Black
Mountain are the Hassanzais, the Akazais, and the Chagarzais.
On the east face are the Saiyids of Pariari and the Deshiwals.
The latter are Swatis, and have akeady been described.
 Cia-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBE8. %
The Hassanzais are a section of the Isazai clan of Yiisafzai
Pathans. second son of Yusaf, is said to have had three
Isa, the
sons, Hassan, Aka, and Mada, from whom are descended the
Hassanzais, the Akazais and the Mada
The Hassanzais. rr^ mi tt ^
• •
-i
-, -,

ivliels. ihe Hassanzais reside on both

sides of the Indus ; those cis-Indus occupying the most southern
portion of the western slopes of the Black Mountain, those trans-
Indus living immediately opposite to them. The former are
bounded on the north' and east by the Akazais, on the west by
the Indus, and on the south the Hassanzai border adjoins the
territory of the Nawab of Amb.
The Hassanzais are divided into ten sub-sections, which are
as follows :

Khan Khel, Kaka Khel,

Kotwal, Mamu Khel,
Mir Ahmad Khel, Nanu Khel,
Zakaria Khel, Nasrat Khel,
Lukman Khel, Dada Khel,

with a fighting strength in all of 1,895 men.

In addition to these, the Saiyids of Tilli could furnish a con-
tingent of 230 fighting men, making a total of 2,125, of whom
about 1,000 are trans-Indus Hassanzais, the remainder belonging
to the cis-Indus portion of the tribe.
The is not noted for its bravery, and is said to be very
tribe
avaricious. In the event of being attacked, they could depend on
getting aid from the other two sections of the Isazai Yusafzais,
viz., the Akazai and the Mada Khel. The latter have their settle-
ments trans -Indus only. It is said that these three sections can
concentrate their fighting men in one day.
The Hassanzais are constantly at feud among themselves, but
would unite in the presence of a common danger. There are two
parties among them, the Kishardala and Mishardala. The latter
men who were formerly acknowledged as headmen,
consist of all the
but who have now been repudiated by the rest of the tribe (the
Kishardala), because they do not divide among all, as they should,
the annual blackmail paid to them by the Nawab of Amb. Thus
the Kishardala forms the numerical majority the Mishardala ;

consists of the principal maliks and their dependents. This tribe is

96 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

not dependent on British territory, as they procure their require-

ments from Chamla, Buner, Nandihar, Tikari, and Darband. A
blockade would do them no harm. Supplies would have to
accompany a force moving into their country.
There is a Sahib-i-Dastar, :J
who has charge of the affairs of
"
the Khan Khel, and is known by the title of "Khan of thelsazais.
At the beginning of the British rule, Hassan Ali Khan was Sahib-
i-Dastar, then his son Kabul Khan, who was succeeded in turn by
his son, Malik Aman. This chief was murdered by his kinsman,
Firoz Khan, and his cousin Ahmad Ali Khan became Khan, but
he also was murdered by Firoz Khan at the beginning of 1880.
The next Sahib-i-Dastar was Hashim Ali Khan, the brother of
Ahmad Ali Khan. He was succeeded in 1891 by his cousin
Ibrahim Khan, who was driven out of the country by the
Hassanzais in 1906. At the time of writing the Khanship is
vacant. The Khan Khels are the most troublesome of the
Hassanzais.
During the Sikh rule, Sirdar Hari Singh, with two regiments,
made an expedition into the Hassanzai country, via Darband and
Baradar, and burnt some of the villages.
The Akazais, like the Hassanzais, are a section of the Isazai
clan of Yusafzais, and inhabit a portion
of the crest and western slopes of the
Black Mountain to the north of the Hassanzais, having on their
east a part of Agror and the Pariari Saiyids, to the north
the Chagarzais, and on the west the Indus. They have no
territory trans-Indus, with the exception of part of one village,

which they share with the Hassanzais. Their principal villages are
Kand, Bimbal, and Biliani. The first two belong to the Painda
Khel sub-section, and are the nearest to the crest of the Black
Mountain. They are situated on flat, open ground, but the
approaches are difficult. The descent from Kand to Bimbal is
very steep and rocky. The Akazais are divided into four sub-
sections, as follows : —
Painda Khel, Barat Khel, Aziz Khel, and
Tasan Khel.
They can muster about 1,110 fighting men, in addition to

which it probable that the members of other tribes now

is

settled in the Akazai territory would be able to furnish a con-

tingent of about 270 more, giving a total of 1,380. Their
 GIS'INDUS 8WATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 97

characteristics are very similar to those of the Hassanzais, from

whom they could get aid, as well as from the Mada Khels, in
( ase of necessity.
Their territory could not furnish supplies for troops advancing
into their country,and these would, therefore, have to accompany
the force. They are not dependent on British territory. Since
1875 the jirga comes in when summoned, and on their return takes
with them cloth pm-chased at Abbottabad. The principal hold
we have over this tribe is two-fold the power to attack them,
;

and the knowledge we have gained of the valuable and accessible

rice, wheat, and other crops cultivated by them in the Tikari

valley they hold one or two entire villages there, and shares in
;

several others, all acquired by Pathan encroachment on the

un warlike Swatis.
During the Sikh rule they held the village of Shatut in the
Agror valley, and they continued to occupy it until the expedition
of 1868.
The Akazais have only in the last twenty -five years begun to
give trouble. In the expedition against the Hassanzais in 1852 they
afforded their neighbours but little assistance, nor did they appear
openly against us in the Ambela campaign. They, however, took
part in the attack on the Oghi tliana in Agror in July 1868. They
seem to have been chiefly incited to break with us by the insidious
counsel of Ata Muhammad Khan of Agror, who represented that
the location of a thana in Agror was but the forerunner of their
independent village of Shatut being assessed highly like all the
Agror villages.
The Chagarzais are a section of the Malizai clan of the Yusaf-

^, ^,
zai tribe of Pathans, beino; supposed to
The Chagarzais. , ,-, iic r^^ -,

be descended from Chagar, the son of Mali,

who was one of the sons of Yusaf. They occupy the country on
both sides of the river, those cis-Indus being located on the western
slopes of the Black Mountain immediately to the north of the
Akazais. They are divided into the three sub-sections of Nasrat Khel,
Basi Khel, and Firozais. Of these the two
mentioned are found first

on both banks of the river and are again subdivided as follows :—

Basi Khel into Daud Khel, Shahu Khel, Khwaja Khel, Kalandar
Khel, Kasan Khel and Babujan Khel ; and Nasrat Khel into
Vol. I.
 —
9g FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Hanju Khel, Haidar Khel, Lukman Khel, and Badha Khel.^ The
Firozai are entirely trans-Indus, and occupy the slopes of the Duma
mountain towards Buner.
The fighting strength of the Chagarzais as follows :
is

Cis-Indus. Trans-Indus.

BasiKhel .. •• 1,^50 460

NasratKhel .. ..620 1,180

Firozai .. .. .... 1,000

In addition to these numbers a religious body, the Akhund

Khel hold lands in the Chagarzai territory and are said to have
about 960 fighting men, while other settlers in the district could
produce about 640. The total fighting strength of the tribe
may be taken as about 6,880 men.
The southern boundary of thecis-Indus Chagarzais is contigu-
ous with the Akazais, and follows the spur of the Black Mountain
which runs from the Machai peak to the Indus. The south face
of this spur belongs to the Akazais, and the north to the Chagar-
zais. On the west and north the Indus forms the boundary,
and on the east the Chagarzais are bounded by the Deshiwals and
the Pariari Salads.
The southern part of the Chagarzai country is occupied by
the Basi Khel sub-division. Their principal villages are Pakban
and Chamang. The best approach to the former is from the
Machai peak. The descent to the Indus from Pakban is about the
easiest descent from the crest beyond Chitabat, and mules could
{TO by that route to Judba on the Indus, opposite to which
was formerly a settlement of the Hindustani fanatics of Malka.
Succeeding Pakban to the north are the villages of Grugiani
and Jalkai, in a small basin similar to that of Pakban, occupied
by a colony of Saiyids. They only occupy the basin of one branch
of a stream and the upper slopes. Below them the Nasrat Khels
occupy Dumail and some lesser hamlets, as well as Judba on the
Indus, and Bihar and the two large villages of Kabalgraon trans-
Indus. Next comes another portion of the Basi Khels, occupying
Kalish, rented from the Akhund Khels, but there are also some

1 These sub-divisions of the Basi Khel on recent information and cannot be

and Nasrat Khel Chagarzais arc not based guaranteed as correct.— (^rfiVor.)
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBES. 99

families of Akluind Khels and Nasrat Khels. The village is on

richly cultivated.
the top of a spur in the middle of a small plateau
that side of the Black
This is about the largest village on
the mountain
Mountain. The descent to Kalish from the crest of
is easy.
characteristics of the Chagarzais are similar to those of
The
the Hassanzais and Akazais already described, but they are con-
sidered braver.
mentioned might
In case of aggression the two sections above
also be obtained from
be expected to afford aid, and help could
Swat and Buner.
The chief wealth of the Chagarzais is in cows, buffaloes, and
Croats. Troops advancing into their country would have to take
supplies with them.
No reliable information is to be had regarding the interior
communications in their territory. The crest of the mountain
up the Kungali
and the Machai peak may be gained by advancing
steep and rugged nature of
spur to Chitabat but owing to the
;

with which the whole of the

the country, and the thick forest
enemy, well acquainted
upper portion *of the hill is clad, an active
every facility for annoying the
with the ground, would have
troops and opposing the advance.
About three miles north of
pass leading from
Machai is the high peak of Ganthar, and the
these two points.
Pariarito Pakban lies on the crest between
broken and precipitous, flanked by
The ground here is

in all probability a strong position, from

thick pine forests, and
is

advancing from Machai on Gan.

of a force
which the passage
this point, which lies in a deep hol-
thar could be disputed. From
Ganthar, though steep in places
low on the crest, the ascent to
not of any great difficulty.
and everywhere flanked by forest, is
Beyond Ganthar the advance along the crest would be easier.
upon British terri-
The Chagarzais are in no way dependent
They purchase cloth, copper and brass vessels, and indigo
tory.
blockade they could obtain
from us, but if they were under
through the intervention of other tribes. They have
these articles
subjects, and there have been some
occasionally quarrelled with our
raids perpetrated by them, but
instances of forays and petty
never came into hostile contact with
them until 1863, when
we 02
 . .. .. ;

100 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

they joined the ranks of the Akhund of Swat at Ambela. They

made one attack there on the " Crag " picquet, but being defeated,
went straight off home again.

Itwas believed at first that they were principally concerned

in the attack on the Oghi thana on the 30th July 1868, but Major
F, E. Pollock, the Commissioner, stated that, as a tribe, they took
no part in it, the Chagarzais who were present being some who were
in the service of the Pariari Saiyids. On the occasion of the advance
of the British troops in October 1868 to theBlack Mountain, they,
on the 4th, in company with other tribes, took part in a noisy de-
monstration of defence of the Mana-ka-Dana peak, but immediate-
ly retreated on the artillery opening fire, and on the 10th they
gave in their submission. They also joined in the hostile demon-
strations in the Indus valley in 1891.
The Pariari Saiyids occupy two glens on the eastern face of the
Black Mountain to the north of the Agror valley, from which they
are separated by the Kungali spur
anan aiyics.
^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ their boundary runs
>

up to the top of the Machai peak 'on the north they are bounded
;

by Deshi, and on the east by Tikari. The whole of the land

orio-inally belonged to Saiyids, who are still the nominal pro-
prietors, but a large number of the villages aie held by Basi Khel
Chagarzais, either by rent or mortgage. Settlers of nearly all the

surrounding Pathan and Swati races are to be found in Pariari,

the maliks of the villages being, however, invariably Saiyids, who,
from their spiritual influence and position as original proprietors,

exercise considerable influence over their tenants.

There are about 400 fighting men, viz. —
Saiyids . . . . . 100
Basi Khel Chagarzais . . . . 200
Gujars, etc. . • • • • • 100

They have no reputation for bravery. They are constantly

embroiler! in internal feuds, but would at once unite to oppose a
common enemy.
Water is plentiful, but a force would have to take supplies
from Agror ; this is, however, only three or four miles distant,
and there is a road practicable for mules, The tribe deals and
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBES. 101

has relations with British territory, and a blockade would

cause them and an attack, via Agror, could easily
serious injury,
be effected. A road from Mana-ka-Dana runs down the spur on
to Bilankot, and so on to Chirmang and Trand. Troops passing
by this route completely dominate the valley and tlie villages
lying in it.

The tribe is most ignorant and intolerant, and has given some
trouble on the border. Major- General Wilde's force
In 1868,
burnt some of their villages for the part they had taken in the
attack on the Oghi tJiana. The leading mcdih at that time was Kud-
rat Shah, who was an active fomenter of disturbance against the
British Government. In 1871, owing to some quarrel, the Saiyids
were attacked by the Deshiwals and had to seek safety in flight,
Kudrat Shah's own village being burnt by the enemy. Subse-
quently, having murdered his uncle and his uncle's children in

the mosque, he was in his turn assassinated by a Chagarzai.

As the foregoing estimates of the fighting strengths of the
various tribes include every able-bodied man from fifteen to fifty
years of age, it is not to be supposed that the clans have been able
to collect the numbers here given to oppose the various expeditions
which have been despatched against them also, most of these esti-
;

mates are of recent date and, as some of the clans have increased
their numbers of late years, it is possible that their actual strength
was on former occasions less than here given. With regard to
armament, at the time of the earlier expeditions described in this
work, the weapons of the tribes were swords, shields, spears, and
matchlocks. In 1891 it was ascertained that they possessed
a certain number of muskets with percussion caps and since that ;

date they are known to have acquired a few breech-loaders.

Expedition against the Kassanzais of the Black Mountain, by a

force under Lieut.-Colonel F. Mackeson, C.B., in 1852-53.

The time the Hassanzai tribe came into notice was on the
first

occasion of the murder of Messrs. Carne and Tapp, officers of the

Customs Department. Up to this time no one (except perhaps
Major J. Abbott, the Deputy Commissioner) had ever heard of
their existence, but this act at once raised them to the first rank
of border scoundrels.
102 FBONTIEE AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Shortly after annexation, a preventive line was established

along the left bank of the Indus, as far as British jurisdiction
extended, to prevent trans -Indus salt being brought into the
Punjab. In 1851 this line extended five miles beyond Torbela to a
point on the Indus, where the cis-Indus territory of the Khan of

Amb (Jehandad Khan) commenced.

During the autumn of that year, Mr. Carne, head of the
Customs Department, desired to visit this border, with a view to
any eventual extension of the line. The Board of Administration
objected to the measure, and directed him not to go there.
During November, however, Mr. Carne, accompanied by one of
his ofiicers, Mr. Tapp, proceeded, against the advice of the district

officer, Major Abbott, to reconnoitre the frontier. Having

J.

marched up the border, and returning towards Torbela, Mr. Carne

dismissed all attendants, except a few of the men belonging to his
own department. Shortly afterwards, the two officers, near the
Hassanzai limits, but still mur-
within Jehandad's bounds, were
dered by a band of armed Hassanzais. These Hassanzais had
no concern whatever in Mr. Carne's views, and even if the line had
been extended, it would not have affected them. Afterwards,
when called to account for the deed, they never pretended that
they ever entertained any apprehension in regard to the salt line.
The Hassanzais may have entertained some unjust suspicions
regarding Mr. Carne's intention, but neither their bounds nor their
rights were infringed, and they crossed into British territory for
the purpose of murdering British officers in cold blood, because
they were Englishmen, infidels, and defenceless travellers, with
a little property about them.
As the murder happened in his fief, Jehandad Khan was called
to account, and he at once delivered up such Hassanzais as he could
find in his territory as hostages to the British authorities. The
Hassanzais immediately made war upon him, and laid waste his
border villages, seized his forts of Chamberi and Shingli, stirred up
his subjects to rebel, and at last reduced him to considerable straits.

It was evident that the whole tribe approved of themurder and

sheltered the murderers. British interference became at last
necessary, both to vindicate ourselves and to support Jehandad
Khan, who had failed in his attempts to recover the forts of
Chamberi and Shingli,
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 103

Orders were therefore given for the assembling of a force to

punish the Hassanzais and in December ;
5th Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse lomxi, x
Artillery (4 guns). per margm, were con-
ic552 tile troops, as
Movmt^un Train Battery (G centrated at Shergarh, under tlie com-
i()th Irregular Cavalry.! mand of Lieut.-Colouel F. Mackcson,
^'^^''' '"'^ Commissioner
'^^Miner^''"^^'
C.B., of Peshawar.
3rd Native Infantry .2 The force was formed into three
Kelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment .3 «^1„^^^o, mi ,

Corps of Guides (leonipanies).

^olumns and a i
reserve. The
.

right
1st Sikh Infantry. column was placed under the command
Rawal Pindi Police (17G men). f T '
n } IT)
i. at •
-r-.

Two regiments of Dogras ^^ i^ieut.-Loloncl K. JNapier, Bengal

(Kashmir) Engineers (afterwards Lord Napier
i- of
^^
Levies (1,760 men). tit i i \ -, .
Magdala), and consisted of 2 guns.
Mountain Train Battery 350 bayonets, Corps of Guides, under
;

Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson 300 bayonets, 1st Sikh Infantry,

;

under Captain G. Gordon 176 bayonets, Eawal Pindi Police, under

;

Lieutenant S. B. Cookson. The centre column, under Mai or J

Abbott, Deputy Commissioner, consisted of 2 companies of Police
2 companies of Dogras and about 1,400 levies, with 5 zamburaks *
and 6 wall-pieces. The left column, under Captain W. W. Davidson
16th Irregular Cavalr}^ consisted of four guns, Mountain Train
Battery, and the two regiments of Dogras, of the Kashmir
Army.
The remainder of the troops formed the reserve under Lieut.-
Colonel J. Butler, 3rd Native Infantry.
On
the 19th, a reconnaissance of Shingli was made, and
on the
20th that fort was recovered without loss, and the next few days
were spent in rendering it defensible ; no attempt was made to
hinder the work by the enemy, who occupied the heights above.
Lieutr- Colonel Napier was at Chatta, Major Abbott at -Shingli*
Captain Davidson, at Shoshni, and the reserve at Shergarh.
Diu-ing the rebuilding of the fort an advance might
at any
time have been forced upon the troops, for the posts
of the
Hassanzais and Akazais occupied the crest of the Black
Mountain
and their picquets approached to within a few hundred yards
of
our posts at Chatta, whilst they waved their flags and flourished
their swords in defiance, sometimes at Panj Gali,
sometimes in
front of Chatta, and sometimes at Pabal ; and on the 21st a

1 The present 12th Pioneers. 3 Disbanded in 1882.

2 Disbanded in 1861. 4 Native wall-pieces.
104 FWNTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

reconnoitring party under Lieutenant Hodson was fired upon by

tlie enemy's picquets near Chatta.

On the occupation of Shingli, Hasan Aii Khan, the chief of

the Hassanzais, who had harboured the murderers of Messrs. Carne

and Tapp, and had been the instigator of the attacks on Jehandad
Khan's territory, sent in to say he had no objection to our re-
buildin^y Shingli,but that the troops must at once be withdrawn.
In reply he was informed that the force, after repairing Shingli,
would march along the crest of the Black Mountain, over ground
that was common both to the Hassanzais and Jehandad Khan,
to the fort of Chamberi, and that
on this march the troops would
molest no one, unless they were molested and mxct with opposi-
tion at the same time he was invited to send in a jirga to
;

arrange amicably his hostilities with Jehandad Khan, which kept

the British border in a state of disquiet,
and which we were con-
sequently very anxious to arrange, particularly as the cause of
quarrel appeared to be Jehandad Khan having seized certain
Hassanzais on our requisition. Hasan Ali Khan's answer was a
refusal to send any jirga, and a warning
that he could not restrain
and Akazais, who had joined
the thousands of allies, Chagarzais
him, if the force moved as stated.
It w^as a Oj^uestion how the regular troops could be used as a

support to most advantage. The orders of the Board of Adminis-

tration were, that these troops were not
Plan of operations.
employed ou the mountain top at
^^ ^^

that late season, and at Shergarh

they were in a confined, narrow
valley, encumbered with
impedimenta, double-poled tents, doolies,
in short, the column was equip-
palkies,' s^nd hundreds of camels ;

march and not for mountain warfare, and

ped as if for an ordinary
yet it had passed through mountain
defiles to its present position

such defiles again, whatever direction it

and must pass through
took. Lieut. -Colonel Mackeson determined, therefore, to throw
off this support from
his rear, and endeavour to pass it as

quickly ab possible into the valley of the Indus, more especially

as could there be used to turn the enemy's position on the crest
it

of the mountain.
The heights the attacking columns would have to climb were
difficult that a hundred resolute m^en,
not afraid to face disci-
so
plined troops, could have effectually
stopped the bravest assailants.
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 105

To have attacked such heights in front without an effort to turn

them would have savoured of rashness, and Lieut.-Colonel
Mackeson preferred, therefore, to move the support round to the
banks of the Indus, behind the Black Mountain, and thus to turn
the position on the heights and to let each column of attack trust
;

to a small reserve of its own, and to the fort of Shergarh in the

rear, if all were beaten back. Such was the plan proposed by
Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson at this period of the operations. ,
Lieut.-Colonel Butler's column accordingly marched on the
24th and 25th December from Shergarh. Owing to the nar-
rowness of the road through the defile to Darband, and the im-
mense amount of baggage with the column, three instead of two
marches had to be made from Shergarh to Darband, and it was
fortunate that the points occupied by the irregular portion of the
force at Chatta, Shingli, and Shoshni formed, with the assistance
of intermediate posts, a complete screen, behind whicli the en-
cumbered regular column laboriously, but securely, threaded its
way through the mountain defile.
As already stated, Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson had determined
not to ascend the Black Mountain till the re^^ular brigade
had been placed between the Black Mountain and the Indus, in
sight of the Hassanzai villages in the plain, thereby threatening
the rear of the parties who might oppose the columns on the
mountain top. The weather had been very favourable snow had ;

not fallen and the nights were bright moonlight.

On the 27th, Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson made a reconnais-
sance, and from a height was enabled to obtain a view of the
Hassanzai country. As a result of this he decided to alter his plans
somewhat. The main force of the regular troops were to be placed
at Baradar, with four companies in Chamberi, to make demon-
strations on the heights in front of the latter place. It was con-
sidered that the enemy's hold of his position on the mountain
would be sufficiently shaken by this disposition of the regular
troops, and all idea of their movement, lightly equipped, up the
banks of the Indus to a point in the rear of the enemy's position,
was abandoned, as such a move would have entangled them in
difficult ground ;for the reconnaissance had shown that there
was, with the exception of one spot below Kotkai, little plain
between the Black Mountain and the Indus.
Vol. I.
p
106 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the 28tli Decembec tliese dispositions of Lieut, -Colonel

Butler's force were effected, and orders given for the advance of
the three other columns on the 29th, Panj Gali being the point
where they were ultimately to unite.
The columns were told they had nothing to fall back upon,
and that the word must be " forward" but that, in the event of
;

a repulse, the right column should make good its retreat by

Shingli towards the left column, and that all would then endeavour
to reach Chamberi by keeping the road on the crest or, failing ;

that, to reach Baradar by the Nikapani road. The view Lieut.-

Colonel Mackeson had of the Hassanzai country had convinc-
ed him that danger from a snovz-storm was not insurmountable.
The elevated plateau of Tilli, midway between the crest of the
Black Mountain and the river Indus, would afford a resting-place,
even for a month, free from snow, and nothing could have pre-
vented supplies and reinforcements reaching that place from the
plains, via Cham.beri, so long as the force chose to remain there ;

further, the force in possession of that elevated plain could beat

off all the tribes that could be collected against it.

On the 29th, the repair of the Shingli fort having been finished,
the force advanced. The right column, under Lieut. -Colonel
R. Napier, marched in the following order —
The advanced guard,
:

consisting of three companies of the Guides, under Lieutenant

W. S. R. Hodson, as skirmishers, with
The right column. t\ ^
•
tit /^ t-i
one company under Jinsign Jb. McC.
Turner as a support the main body, consisting of 2 guns.
;

Mountain Train Battery, and 300 bayonets, 1st Sikh Infantry,

under Captain G. Gordon the rear-guard, consisting of 176
;

bayonets, Bawal Pindi Police, under Lieutenant S. B. Cookson.

The ground which the column had to traverse consisted of a rocky
ridge rising for about a mile, and terminating in a small wooded
hill which lay at the foot of the first steep ascent on which the

enemy (apparently about 300 in number) were posted shortly ;

before daybreak a company of the Guides was sent to reconnoitre

and to occupy, if undefended, the small wooded hill. This was
successfully done, and proved a great advantage, as it enabled
the column to advance from its position, through some difficult
ground, without opposition.
 CIS'INDUS 8WATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TJRIBES. 107

The first position held by the enemy was a steep and thickly-
wooded shoulder of the mountain, rising abruptly for nearly a
thousand feet, with some open ground near the summit. Tlie
enemy had made an abatis at the bottom of the ascent, from which
they opened a matchlock fire whilst the guns were being brouf^ht
into position. About 8 o'clock the guns opened with good effect,
and, considerable impression having been made on the enemy,
Lieut. -Colonel Napier gave tlie order to advance, whereupon
the Guides rapidly ascended in skirmishing order, supported by
the 1st Sikh Infantry, and cleared nearly the whole of the ascent.
At this point the enemy, finding themselves unable to answer the
fire, boldly charged the advanced skirmishers, whose eagerness
had carried them a little too far beyond their supports, and drove
them back in some confusion. Order was, however, quickly res-
tored, and a firm advance up the hill drove the enemy from
their point step by step. A bold attempt to make a second
charge was checked by the guns and the leading companies of the
Gruides.
On
the summit of the ascent was a fine piece of open table-
land, upv/ards of a mile long and several hundred yards broad,
beyond which the enemy retreated to the second steep ascent.
After a short rest, the guns having closed up, tlie column advanced
to the second hill, between v/hich and the tableland was
a hollow, studded with locks and pme trees the lower part
;

of the ascent was similar to the previous one, but of a more

rugged character, broken by inaccessible cliffs on one side and a
dense wall of pine trees on the other, which confined the opera-
tions to a very narrov/ front. The enemy had felled a number of
trees at the foot of the ascent to retain their assailants
under fire
keeping themselves to the upper and more open ground. The
skirmishers of the Guides were posted in the broken ground at the
foot of the ascent, whilst the guns were being put in position ;

when they were ready to open, the advance was again made, cover-
ed by their fire. The skirmishers of the Guides, supported by a
company of Sikhs, under Lieutenant C. H. Brownlow, on the left,
and a party of Guides, under Ensign F. McC. Turner, on the rights
crowned the heights. TJie enemy made several bold attempts
to charge, coming within twenty paces of the skirmishers, but were
unable to face the close fire of the rifles and the excellent practice
P2
 ;

108 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

and at length abandoned their position, carrying

of the Artillery,
with them their wounded.
The column had thus arrived near the summit of the Black
Mountain, at a point where a broad spur, forming the top of the
range occupied by the Akazais, branched oif at an elevation of some
9,000 feet. By this ridge the enemy retreated. No further defence
of the hill was made a small party followed up the rear-guard, but
;

were easily dispersed by Lieutenant. Cookson. Shortly before

gunset the advanced party of the Gruides under Lieutenant Hodson
arrived at the shoulder of the mountain above Panj Grali, where
the main body of the enemy still held their position, but at the
first appearance of the Guides they commenced a rapid retreat,

pursued by the Kashmir troops. The main body of the right

column did not reach this point till dark, when, it being too late to
descend to Pan] Grali, it bivouacked for the night. There was
snow on the ground but the troops behaved with the utmost
cheerfulness, and not a complaint was heard.
To turn now to the centre column. Major J. Abbott com-
menced his operations by sending on 500 men of the levies at
3 A.M. on the 29th to seize a hill which
The centre column. , . ,. ., t <•

commanded his proposed line oi advance

and, having given them three hours start, he marched about sun-
rise with two companies of Dogras, two Police companies, and
about 900 levies, with the fi.ve zamburaks and the six wall-pieces.
Having ascended about half-way to Panj Gali, the force came
suddenly upon the main body of the Hassanzais, strongly posted
upon a steep eminence in the centre of the main ravine. They
formed what seemed to be a solid square of 600 matchlock men,
their skirmishers lining the ravine, which could not be attacked
from the front, as the forest and brushwood were so dense that
the men had to cut their way at every step. Major Abbott there-
fore formed his line on a spur running from the hill above men-
tioned to the main ravine, when, after some skirmishing, he
succeeded in turning the enemy's flank. The Hassanzais then
fell back on a strong position at the head of the pass, followed by

Major Abbott, who had been joined by the Gandghar matchlock

men. At about 2 p.m., the left column, under Captain Davidson,
effected a junction with this column, but the position of the
enemy was so strong that Lieut. -Colonel Mackeson determined
 CIS^INDUS SWATI AND BLAOK MOUNTAIN TBIBES. 1C9

Colonel Napier's
to await being taken in reverse by Lieut.-
its
head of which column the
column on tbe appearance of the
;

Dogras, as already related.

Hassanzais retreated, followed by the
left column, which was under
the command of Captain
The
W. W. Davidson, was accompanied by
The left column.
Licut.-Colonel Mackcsou. At 3 A.M.
the
it commenced march on reaching the village of Agror as
its ;

detained by the guns, Captain

second regiment of Dogras had been
regiment, and, turmng Paba
Davidson pushed on with the first
overlooking Tilli. Here a small
found himself close upon a hill
head of the column they
picquet of the enemy fired upon the
;

dislodged, and a strong party posted

on the
were immediately
column halted until the
summit of the hill. At this place the
About 2 p.m., the column,
guns and the other regiment came
up.
with the centre one under
now complete, made good its junction
Major Abbott, Panj Gali, when, as stated above, the arrival
close to

of Lieut.-Colonel Napier's
column was awaited to turn the enemy s
position.
levies, with two companies
Onthe 30th, the whole of the
in destroying the Hassanzai
villages.
of Dogras, were employed
columns received orders to move
In the afternoon the different
coming on, the columns bivouack-
to the plateau of Tilli, but, night
for Tilli the following morning
ed on the hillside, and marched
in a light fall of snow the
Rawal Pindi Police being left to hold
;

the crest of the mountain.

continued ; and the
On the 31st, the work of destruction was
the deep glens between Abu and
Tilli
villages and hamlets in
other villages between Kotkai and
were destroyed. Shingri and
Indus, were burnt on the same
Baradar, along the banks of the
Tanawalis, who had crossed over
day by Jehandad Khan and his
from Amb.
daybreak. Major Abbott, being
On the 1st January 1853, at
ioined by Jehandad Khan
and his people from Shmgn, destroyed
trans-Indus allies, following up the
Kotkai the enemy, aided by
;

a.m., the whole force marched

from
column as it retired. At 11
the following day the retirement
Chamberi, via Panj Gali. On
where the reserve under Lieut.-
was continued to Baradar,
Colonel Butler was encamped.
110 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The losses of the attacking columns were about fifteen killed

and wounded. The enemy lost from fifteen to twenty killed, but
the number of their wounded was not ascertained.

Lieut. -Colonel Mackeson, in his despatchon the above opera-

tions, said the hardships from exposure to cold and fatigue
and from long fasting, were shared cheerfully and pretty equally
by all the troops. He remarked that the fact of the highest sum-
mits of the Black Mountain having, when clad with snow, been
climbed by British and Kashmir troops in the face of all the oppo-
sition that its mountain defenders could bring against them, needed
no amplification, but would carry the conviction that those troops
were resolute, and that their leaders were not easily appalled by
difficulties. He particularly alluded to the Dogra regiment's equip-
ment for mountain warfare and their mode of carrying mountain
;

guns, he said, was w^orthy of adoption. The men were ready to

move at a moment's notice, and their blanket tents, which
afforded sufficient protection for native troops during a few day's
exposure, moved with them on the heads of coolies w^ithout causing
any delay or obstruction.
The Indian Medal, with a clasp for the " North- West Frontier,"
was granted in 1869 to all survivors of troops engaged in the opera-
tions against the Hassanzais. -^

It being considered that the destruction of the Hassanzai vil-

lages, with all their grain, etc., had been sufficient punishment
for themurder of the two British officers, the hostages in our hands,
who had been seized by the Khan of Amb, were then sent back,
"
and the tribe was informed that the British Government did not
covet their possessions, nor those of other neighbouring tribes,
with whom it desired to be at peace but that it expected the
;

tribes would restrain individual members from committing un-

provoked outrages on British subjects, and afiord redress when
they are committed that when a whole tribe, instead of affording
;

redress, seeks to screen the individual offenders, the British Govern-

ment has no alternative but to hold the whole tribe responsible."
After this lesson the Hassanzais for a time remained quiet, and
no overt act of hostility was committed by them. In April 1855
they had a dispute with the people of Agror relative to a marriage.
 J
mountain tribes. Ill
Gia-imvs swATi and black

tract but a message waB sent

and threatened to ravage that
;

1852, and they desisted.

reminding them o£ the lesson of to the
out in 1863, which led
On the disturbances breaking agam
complications with the Hassanza.s
expedition to Ambela,' by
instigated, it >s supposed
arose In August oi that year,
Sitana but some do -*
Tistariesoi the Hindustanis of -as h"^*;^ ^-
to say, incited to the
movement by the Agror Chief , who
to the Khan of Amb, they
made a raid force (600 tom 600) on
v alky on
than villages, in the ShingU
a nest of hamlets, rather
t\reastern face of the Black
Mountain, which the m
Seven ^^^^^^l^^'
hamlets were
situated.
ed outDost of Amb territorv is
were
was killed, and some cattle
burnt on man who resisted",
the midst of these
c rri k rr
The fort of Shingli, which is in
it was useless for
the purpose of
vWages. was not molested, but
a grrrison of only five
men
protecting them, as it hcd
^ appeared at one time to threaten an
After this the Hassanzais
a portion of the MadaKhels
crossed
attack on Chamberi, and frontier line
intention of assisting ; but
the
the Indus with the
by the Amb authorities, the
havinrbcen greatly strengthened
Khels re-crcssed the river^
Sefing bike up! and the Mada
the Hassanzais on the Amb
lot after an attack was made by and seven
troops on the Black
Mountain border, and one jemadar
reported killed and six
wounded.
men were
operations, proposec in October 1863,
In the first plan of
the Hindustani fanatics
from Malka it was
for the expulsion of Mahaban
should afterwards cross the
"tended That the force Blad.
punish the Hassanzais of the
"ountain to the Indus, and
but, owing to the
unexpected course of events, this
fountain ;

Deputy Commis-
^'^%reHrsl:z:irsle<iuently waited on the
which
sioner of Hazara Darband, and entered into engagenaents
at

were adhered to till 1868,

when they were induced by AtaMuham-
Agror, to join in the attack
on the Oghi tkan...
Tad Khan of
Mountain Tribes by a force under
Expedition against the Black
C.S.I., in i868.
Major-General A. T. Wilde, C.B.,
determined to establish a body
of
In November 1867 it was in
valley, and they were
temporarily located
police in the Agror
I See Chapter VI.
 -

112 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the village of Oghi, until a fortified police post could be built. At

daylight on the morning of the 30th July 1868, this body of police,
numbering 22 men, was attacked by some 500 men belonging to
the Chagarzai, Akazai, and Hassanzai tribes. The Saiyids of Pariari
also took part in the raid. The enemy were, after a hand-to-
hand fight, driven off, leaving six dead bodies in the hands of the
police our casualties were, three policemen wounded, two horses
;

killed, four carried off, besides other property plundered.

Troops were immediately called for from Abbottabad, and

a force consisting of the Peshawar Mountain Battery and 350 men
of the 5th Gurkhas, under Lieut. -Colonel 0. E. Rothney of

that regiment, marching from Abbottabad four hours after the

receipt of the intelligence, reached Oghi before midnight on the
31st, having marched forty-two miles in twenty-five hours. Captain
E. L. Ommanney, the Deputy Commissioner, was with Lieut.
Colonel Rothney's camp at Oghi, and on the 2nd of August he was
joined by Akram Khan, the Chief of Amb, and a body of his
levies. The cause of the raid was considered to be the intrigues
of Ata Muhammad Khan, the Khan of Agror. This chief held a
Agror valley, which had been given to him by the Sikhs
jagir in the
in 1841, and had been continued by the British Government on
annexation. He was, however, discontented, and wanted to occupy
a more independent position, like his neighbour the Khan of Amb.
He had not disguised his dissatisfaction at the location of the police
post in the valley, the establishment of which would have the effect
of lessening his dignity, diminishing his influence, and repressing
his unlawful exactions. He was, therefore, strongly suspected
of having incited the independent tribes beyond the border to
make the raid on Oghi, in order to procure the removal of the post.
He was consequently seized by order of the Commissioner, and
sent off under military escort to Abbottabad. His cousin, Aladad
Khan, also a jagirdar in the Agror valley, being suspected of com-
plicity, was likewise made a prisoner.

On the 4th August, orders were sent for the march of a squad-

ron of the Guides Cavalry from Mardan to Abbottabad, and on

the 5th the Commissioner and Brigadier- General Wilde, command-
ing the Punjab Frontier Force, recommended a native regiment
being sent up from Rawal Pindi, and the working- parties of the
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 113

British regiments on tlie Murree and Abbottabad road being warn-

ed for service.
The following day a was made for 200 of the men
requisition
of the working-parties to be at once sent to Abbottabad, and three
troops of the native cavalry regiment were asked for from Rawal
Pindi. A wing of the 2nd Punjab Infantry was sent from Abbotta-
bad to Agror, to reinforce Lieut. -Colonel Rothney, and the
services of the Kashmir regiments at Muzaffarabad were
also
applied for.
In the meanwhile the following events had been passing in
the Agror valley. On the 2nd August, as the enemy threatened the
village of Dilbori, a small fort in the villagewas occupied by the
Khan Amb's men. The Akazais, Hassanzais, Tilli Saiyids,
of
and the Swati clans had been ordered to send in deputations to
the Deputy Commissioner, but the Akazais refused to come in,
saying they had never done so to the Sikhs the others replied
;

they would do so, if all came in, and demanded the release of Ata
Muhammad Khan. The following day Dilbori was again threat-
ened, and the Agror and Swati levies, being sent out to support the
Tanawalis, were led into a trap, and suffered rather severely.
On the 5th August, another attack was made on the villat^e,
when one or two houses were set on fire, but the enemy were driven
off by the Tanawalis with some loss. On the 6th, DilboTi was
again attacked, when, according to orders, the Tanawalis retired,
settingfire to the fort, —
their letirement being covered by
Lieut.-
Colonel Rothney's detachment, which had moved out from
Oghi for the purpose. The enemy meantime fired six villages in
the valley.
During these days the relations of the Khan of Agror had
all
left the valley, with the exception of his eldest son,
who, on the
night of the 6th, went over to the enemy, setting fire to
his villao-e
before doing so. His flight was assisted by the Akazais
of Shatut
and others.
^
On the 7th, a general advance of the enemy took
place, the
Pariari Saiyids and Chagarzais acting in the centre of the valley,
the Swati clans, who had now freely joined, acting along the
Khabal hill, the Akazais and Khan Khel section of the Hassanzais
acting on the Black Mountain. The Agror and Swati levies were,
with very few exceptions, disorganized and untrustworthy,
and
114 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Rothney again moved out and withdrew the

Lieut. -Colonel
Tanawalis from a ridge in front of liis camp (to wliicli they had
been withdrawn on the 6th), to the Manchura ridge, still nearer
Oghi.
The whole of the Swati tribes beyond the border, except
AUai, werenow up and rapidly joining the ranks of enemy, the
and our own Swati levies were deserting in numbers to their

homes some of the headmen of the villages had already gone off,
;

whilst those that remained were not to be trusted. Six more

villages close to Manchura had been burnt, and the rear of the

position was threatened.

On the 8th, Lieut. -Colonel Eothney again moved out to
cover the withdrawal of some advanced Tanaw^ali pickets to Man-
chura and to the ridge to the north of Oghi, which had been shame-
fully abandoned by the Mansehra levies the night before. In the
afternoon, when the Man-
troops, after locating the Tanawalis in
chura, were returning to camp, the enemy moved down the hill
in great numbers, and with yells charged down on the former
place. The Tanawali horse made a most gallant charge up the
hill, but were eventually driven out of Manchura, which was fired,

as well as two other villages.

On the 9th, the force at Oghi was reinforced by a wing of the
2nd Punjab Infantry 200 men of the working-parties (1-1 9th
;

Regiment) having come down to Abbottabad. On the lOthj the

villages at the foot of the Susal pass were burnt by the enemy.
Lieut.- Colonel Rothney had no cavalry in his camp, and he
could do little more than act on the defensive ; but his great anxiety
was in regard to his communications with Pakli, as the Susal pass
was only held by levies, on whom no reliance could be placed. On
the 11th, however, on the arrival of fresh reinforcements at Oghi,
the pass was occupied by the 2nd Gurkhas from Rawal Pindi.
On the 12th Lieut.-Colonel Rothney, hearing that the enemy
had determined to make a combined attack upon his camp, resolv-

ed to take the initiative. Accordingly, early on the morning of

the 12th, he moved out with the mountain battery, 50 sabres
of the 16th Bengal Cavalry, and 350 Infantry, in the direction
of Banda, where the enemy were in strength. Two mountain guns
and detachments of cavalry and infantry were left as a guard for
the camp, a detachment of 50 sabres of the 16th Bengal Cavalry
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 115

under Captain G. C. Ross sweeping round the valley. The enemy

were in large clusters at Banda, and all along the base of the Khabal
hill, and along the spur running down to Manchura. Lieut,-
Colonel Rothney, having driven them from their position near
Banda, forced them ta retire up a spur of the Khabal mountain,
where they made a stand in force on a small mound thickly covered
with brushwood. He then ordered a rush to be made on this mound
by two companies of the 5th Gurkhas, and one company, 2nd Pun-
jab Infantry, supported by some Tanawali horse, and covered by
the fire of the mountain guns under Major Hughes. From this posi-
tion the enemy were driven with scarcely any resistance, and
fled in all directions over the Khabal spur, followed by Akram
Khan, the Amb Chief, with a body of his sowars. By 3 p.m.,

not a an enemy was to be seen in the valley, although their

flag or
numbers had previously been estimated at 3,000 or more. The
troops were then withdrawn to camp without any molestation
on the part of the enemy, and from this time no further attempts
were made in the Agror valley.
The casualties in this affair had been six wounded, including
Lieut.-Colonel 0. E. Rothney and Major T. E. Hughes (the latter
by an accident), besides six men and two horses of the levies
wounded. The enemy had some thirty killed and wounded.
A few days before these events, the Deputy Commissioner had
given permission to the Chief of Amb to hold communications
with his partisans amongst the Hassanzais, which not only had
the effect of creating suspicion of that tribe in the minds of the
rest of the enemy, but caused the Hassanzais to refrain from taking
any active part in the affair of the 12th.
The effects of this engagement, the arrival of British troops at
Abbottabad, further reinforcements at Oghi, and the Kashmir
regiments in the Pakli valley, enabled Brigadier-General Wilde on
the 16th August to report that the safety of the Hazara district
was secured, and that he only awaited the arrival of reinforcements
to carry out any punitive measures that might be ordered.
Up to this date, twenty-one British villages, which for the most
part lay in the irrigated part of the valley, had been burnt, and our
total casualties had been sixty-four.
The Commissioner of the Division then recommended that
a punitive expedition should be sent against the tribes of the Black
Q2
116 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FRO 31 INDIA.

Mountain, and this proposal was strongly supported by the Lieu-

tenant- Grovernor, who said that it was absolutely necessary for the
security of the frontier and the vindication of the British character
that the clans engaged in this outrage should be suitably punished
for their invasion of British territory and their attack upon Oghi.
A feeling of uneasiness was at this time perceptible amongst the
tribes trans-Indus, and news-writers from Kabul, Peshawar, and
Swat agreed in prophesying coming disturbances, instigated from
Swat along the Peshawar border, where for many months the
Salarzai section of the Bunerwals had been blockaded for having,
in February 1867, had the audacity to attack and burn the British
village of Pirsai. The Commander-in-Chief therefore determined,
instead of weakening the garrison of Peshawar, or drawing
troops from the posts along the border, to supply the force for
operations from the rear stations in the Punjab, and from the
North- West Provinces ; whilst the whole front of the border
stations, which was held by the regular troops in Peshawar and
by the Frontier Force along the border, was preserved intact.
D-F Royal Horse Artillery. The troops, as per margin, had been
E-mh Royal Artillery. already ordered from Kawalpindi to
'

H. M. 6tii Foot. Hazara, and some of these had arrived to

reinforce Lieut.-Coloncl Rothney before
Two companies, 77th Foot,
16th Bengal Cavalry. the skirmish ou the 12th August took
24th Punjab ^sSve infan- place. On the march to Abbottabad the
try- 6th Foot had thirty-eight men struck
down by heat apoplexy, eight of whom died.
The troops, as per margin, were now ordered to march to
38th Foot
Hazara. The 20th Punjab Native In-
2nd and 7th Companies, fantry marched a distance to 232 miles
^Ts^Gurkha^Regi'ient. ^I'om Lahore to Abbottabad, in ten days,
4th Gurkha Regiment. in the month of August. The 38th Foot
20th Punjab Native Infan- n-
moved m like manner from bialkot,
. .^ ,-, ,
-,

try. and
3lBt Punjab Native Infantry, finally reached Darband. The 1st and
4th Gurkhas coming from the distant hill stations of Bakloh and
Dharmsala emulated the exertions of the above corps and joined
Brigadier-General Wilde in a wonderfully short space of time,
considering the distance traversed. The 31st Punjab Native
Infantry marched a distance of 422 miles, and the two companies
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 117

of Sappers and Miners actually covered nearly 600 miles, by

forced marches, in twenty-nine days.
Other regiments, as per margin, left their several stations of
20th Hussars.
Campbcllpur, Lahore, Aligarh, Amritsar,
9th Bengal Cavalry. and Cawnporc, and took post at Eawal
19th PuniaB Native Infan- -n. t .i t
• , 'o-t,

^
•
Pmdi as the immediate reserve, with
23rd Punjab Native Infan- ^i^q exception of the 9th Bengal Cavalry,
which was moved on to Darband. A
^"""^
30th Punjab Native Infan-
^^y-
line of telegraph was in the meantime
ordered to be laid down to connect Abbottabad and Oghi with
the general system of India.
The movement of these troops towards the frontier, and their
gradual concentration in Hazara, had, even before any ofien-
sive movements had taken place, begun to affect most happily
our political relations trans-Indus. The Akhund of Swat, con-
scious of past misdeeds deserving of retribution, evidently con-
ceived that we had other objects beyond the punishment of the
immediate offenders in the Black Mountain. As the direction of
our objective seemed rather to threaten the valley of Swat, the
Akhund immediately took action against the Wahabi Hindu-
stanis, so long located on the slopes of the Mahaban, and headed by
a chief generally stated to be Firoz Shah, son of the last king of
Delhi. The expulsion of this colony, then located at Sitana
on the Indus, was the cause of the expedition of 1S58 under
Major- General Sir Sydney Cotton {see Chapter V), and also, on its
removal to Malka on the opposite slopes of the mountain, of the
Ambela Campaign in 1863 {see Chapter VI) consequently it was but
;

natural for the Akhund to look upon this hornets' nest as the
possible object of further punishment. On the 26th of August a
large force of the Akhund's Swat followers therefore attacked and
defeated the Wahabi Hindustanis, and drove them from place to
place until they sought refuge in the country of the Chagarzais
trans-Indus. At the same time, at the dictum of the same high
sacerdotal authority, the Salarzai Bunerwals, already referred
to as under blockade for the burning of Pirsai, came in and
sought terms of forgiveness from the British civil authorities in
Yusafzai.
The territory of our ally, the Chief of Amb, had been frequently
threatened by the trans-Indus clansmen of the hostile portion
 —
118 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

of the Hassanzai tribe, and on the 17th September the Mada Khels
attacked the Khan in force, but were repulsed ; it consequently
became necessary to immediate support to this chief on
afford
the left flank of our front of operations. The 38th Poot, with
the 9th Bengal Cavalry and the 31st Punjab Native Infantry,
were therefore directed on Darband for this purpose, the whole
under the command of Colonel F. A. Willis, c.b., 38th Foot.
On the 24th September the two companies of Sappers and Miners
.
Agror — arrived at. Abbottabad and
D-F Royal Horse Artillery. Completed the trOOpS for the
E-19th Royal Artillery. ,.,.
2-24th ,
expedition, ine xforce actual-
rri, x. ^

Peshawar Mountain Battery. \j employed, which, exclusive

1st Battalion, 6th Foot! of the reserve numbered 9,500
'' " ,
^^^^ " of all ranks, was disposed as
.
,
Guides Cavalry. ^,
shewn m the margm and
.

16th Bengal Cavalry.

2nd & 7th Companies, Sappers and [Miners. rlivirlpri mtO two bri-
in+n tWO
Detachment, Telegraph Sappers. ^^^ aiViaea Dll
1st Gurkha Regiment. gades, under the command
3?dSikh"lnfantry. of ColonelE. 0. Bright, Isfc
2nd Punjab Infantry. Battalion, 19th Foot, and
4th Gurkha Regiment. ^ , ^ -,
20th Punjab Native Infantry. toionel J.Ij. Vauglian, C.B.,
Bengal Staff Corps, with the
^^^K :\ T. " .
5th Gurkha Regunent.
Darband—
• " °
temporary rank of Brigadier-
^ .

Sng^i cavalry. G'^'ierals. The whole expedi-

31st Punjab Native Infantry. was under the command
tion
of Brigadier-General A. T. Wilde, with the temporary
c.b., c.s.i.,

rank of Major- General. The Maharaja oi Kashmir also offered

the services of 1,200 troops, and these were moved on to the Hazara
Border, but did not take part in the operations on the Black Moun-
tain.

to the plan of operations, on the 25th August

With regard
Major-General Wilde had submitted the following recommenda-
tions. The enemy, he said, were thus divided

(1) — Hassanzais, Akazais, and Mada Khels.

(2) —Pariari Saiyids, Chagarzais.
(3)—Swatis.

With regard to the Hassanzais, they had not been as hostile

(with the exception of the Khan Khel section) as the rest of the
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBES. 119

enemy. They had been defeated and the good influence

in 1852,

of the Khan of Amb having been brought to bear on them, they

were already sending in to the Commissioner, saying they desired
to treat. The Swatis, too, were also petitioning to be allowed to
tribes beyond
treat, and with the punishment of the independent
the border. Major- General Wilde considered quiet would again
of Agror
be brought about. He proposed that, making the valley
of the
the base of his operations, a force should ascend to the crest
Black Mountain which dominates all the spurs runnmg north and
west towards the river Indus, on which the lands of the Akazais
and Chagarzais are situated the Hassanzai territory being situat-
;

ed on the m^ore southern slopes. At the same time, a corps of

observation was to be placed at Darband as a moral support to the
Khan of Amb, to distract the attention of the enemy, and to cut
possible, the retreat of the trans-Indus tribes if they cross-
off, if

ed the river to aid their brethren on this side.

Major F. R. Pollock, the Commissioner, in his letter to Govern-
ment recommending an expedition, had said that it would be
difficult to explain how slowly the tribes accepted the fact that
our long-suffering Government was really bent on coercing the
border and calling them to account and there seems no room to
;

doubt but that the Khan of Agror had continuously led the tribes
to believe that nothing would induce the Government to sanction
a punitive expedition. When, however, our preparations and the
formal declaration of our intentions altered their views, the people
of Tikari and Nandihar spontaneously proffered payment of fines
to expiate their offence, and even commenced to apportion amongst
the members of their tribes, according to the means of each, the
sums which they were led to suppose would be required of them ;

and by the time the force was prepared to advance, the representa-
tives of these two tribes had come in and engaged to hold aloof,
sending hostages to accompany our troops during their ascent
of the Black Mountain.
The Hassanzais, who had, as already stated, entered into
friendly communication with the Tanawali Chief as far back as
the 10th or 11th of August, and had consequently held aloof from
the affair on the 12th of that month, similarly sent in represen-
tatives, with apologies for those of their tribe who had offended,
and with the assurance of their willingness to abide by the terms
120 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

of their engagement entered into with Major H. W. H. Coxe at

Darband at the close of the AmbeLa campaign [see Chapter VI).
It was true that they had not acted against us as a tribe, and
there was force in what they urged, that in August they actually
prevented their trans-Indus brethren, Mada Khels and others,
from crossing to the Hazara bank and joining in the attack on the
Af^ror detachment that this was the case Major Pollock had
;

ascertained reliably from other independent sources. Although

the tribe was not, as it endeavoured to make out, free from blame,
Major Pollock felt justified, looking to the importance of detach-
ing them from the other tribes, in dealing leniently with them.
They were directed, if sincere in their professions of friendship and
submission, to tell off representatives to accompany the force
through their country, and warned that, in the event of resistance
being offered to our troops, they would be liable to the destruction

of their villages and crops, and their representatives would be

detained in custody.
Another significant proof of the overawing effect of the force
assembling in Agror was afforded by the gradual return into British
territory of the families and relations of the deported Khans —
Ata Muhammad and Aladad Khan. The adjacent hills no longer
afforded them safe asylum, and they preferred surrendering them-
selves to seeking shelter trans-Indus.
The troops Hazara had, however, still to deal with the
in
large Chagarzai and Akazai tribes with the Deshi and Thakot
;

Swatis with the Pariari Saiyids and their followers and not im-
; ;

probably with the Hindustani fanatics and large bodies of trans-

Indus Pathans.
By the end of September the preparations for an advance
were completed the sick and weakly men were to be left at Oghi,
;

where the camp remained standing, under the command of

Lieut. -Colonel Rothney. The two Dogra regiments moved into
the valley of Agror, to hold the following posts during the expedi-
tion, viz., the Jalgali pass, the Susal pass, and the camp at Oghi.
Preparatory to the advance of the troops into the mountains,
proclamations were issued by the Commissioner, both to the cis-
Indus and trans-Indus tribes, informing them that the object of
Government was only to punish those guilty of committing out-
rages in British territory.
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 121

On the 1st October the Wahabi Hindustanis were reported

to have crossed to the Hazcira side of the Indus, to the viUage of
Jiidba. On the same date Major- General Wilde reported that
the presence of the brigade of troops at Amb,
support of the
in
Khan of that place, had produced the effect of causing the Amazai
and Mada Khel tribes to express a desire to make peace with that
chief.

On 3i'd October the force marched out from the camp

the
at Oghi. One day's cooked rations were carried in their haver-
sacks by the troops, and seven days' supplies for the whole force
were carried on mules.
The object was to occupy the'Jal-
of the first day's operations
gali pass, leading from the valley of Agror into those of Tikari and
Nandihar, belonging to the independent Swatis, so as to secure
through the Kungali village a line of communication with Oghi.
The village of Kungali is situaied a short distance up a spur of that
name, by which it was intended one of the columns should ascend
the Black Mountain. To effect these objects it was essential to
carry the hills on both sides of the pass. Moreover, the movement
would at once test the sincerity of the professions of neutrality
which had lately been made by the Swatis of Tikari and Nandi-
har, as, since the commencement of hostilities, the enemy had
always defiantly shown themselves on these hills.
Brigadier-General J. L. Vaughan, c.b., commanding the 2nd
Peshawar Mountain Bat- Brigade, with the troops marginally
tf^ry. noted, advanced by the direct road
H.M. 6th Foot.
2nd Gurkha Regiment. i^om Ughi as ttar as ^x. -u
the Village ^
of
3rd Sikh Infantry. Bagrian, situated at the foot of one of
mountam, and the l-6th Eegiment and Peshawar
the spurs of the
Mountain Battery were there halted, whilst the 2nd Gurkhas, in
skirmishing order, supported by the 3rd Sikh Infantry, advanced
up the Kiarkot mountain, the crest of which was reached at
11-30 A.M., a few long shots only being fired by the enemy. Inthe
course of the afternoon the Kiarkot mountain was occupied by
the levies, and the troops then bivouacked for the night, prepara-
tory to the ascent of the Black Mountain by the Sambalbat spur.
The remainder of the 2nd Brigade joined Brigadier-General
Vaughan at Kilagai.
Vol. I.
jj
122 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Brigadier-General R. 0. Bright moved with the marginally

TT ^r
Hazara Mountain
,•
f T^.tf
,.,.
Battery. ^ on the village of Kungali,
named troops
^ . .

H. M. I9tli Foot. UT) to which point no opposition was

^l^pSiL^Itr'lnfan. offered.On arrival at Kungali, however,

try. the enemy began to collect on a height
above it. Although Brigadier-General Bright had received no
instructions to proceed further than this place, he now determined
advance, to prevent the enemy collecting in large
CO continue his
numbers, and to disperse them. He consequently pushed on
to Mana-ka-Dana, where he determined to spend the night.
Mana-ka-Dana is a shoulder of the Kungali spur, rising to a
point in the centre, from which the ground descends to a small
plateau, and then dips again at a steep angle until it joins a narrow
and nearly level edge connecting it with the continuation of the
ascent. The right of the ridge was very steep and broken, and
thickly wooded. The high point in the centre was occupied by
the 20th Punjab Native Infantry under Lieut.-Colonel C. H.
Brownlow, c.b., and the small plateau beneath was held by
strong picquets from that regiment. The Hazara Mountain
Battery was on the ridge in rear, facing the village of Shatut. On
the right rear of the peak the Bilankot spur joins the Kungali spur.
This approach was held by the 1st Gurkhas under Major J. S.
Rawlins, with the 19tli Foot in support of them and of the guns.
The troops had not been long halted before the enemy began to
fire upon the advanced picquets from the wooded and broken ground

on the right flank. Some marksmen of the 19th under Lieutenant

W. Bennett, Musketry Instructor, were sent to assist in dislodging
them, the superior range of the Enfields and the good jDractice of the
men having a telling effect. As dusk approached, the enemy again
opened fire, and a little before nightfall made a really deter-
mined attack on the advanced picquets, but it was gallantly
repulsed.
As the Brigade pressed on to Mana-ka-Dana, the reserve and
1 st

head-quarters moved forward and occupied the village of Kungali,

with the 5th Gurkha Regiment posted in advance to maintain tho
communications with that brigade at the same time 400 of the
;

Kashmir troops, with some wall-pieces, moved out from Oghi to

hold the Jalgali pass.
 CIS-INDUS SWAT I AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 123

From the increasing boldness of the enemy, Brigadier-General

Bright supposed that, having now ascertained our line of approach,
they were collecting in numbers, and really intended to dispute our
advance in earnest he accordingly applied for reinforcements,
;

and the 5th Gurkhas under Major H. P. Close were pushed for-
ward, reaching Mana-ka-Dana about midnight. In the mean-
while, Lieut. -Colonel Brownlow, who was with the advanced
picquets, had been reinforced by two guns from the Hazara
Mountain Battery, and was supported by four companies, 19th
Foot. The guns did good service, as by shelling the ridge in front
of the picquet the enemy were prevented from forming in force;
and, although some demonstrations of renewed attacks were made,
none of a really determined character took place. Our loss during
the day had been two killed and six wounded.
On the 5th Gurkhas being sent forward, their place was taken
by the 2nd Punjab Infantry, 200 of the Kashmir troops being
brought up at the same time to Kungali.
Major-General Wilde had originally intended to ascend the
crest of the mountain in three columns, the 1st Brigade advancing
by the Kungali, while the 2nd Brigade and levies moved up the
Sambalbat and Barchar spurs respectively, as a diversion. But
the 1st Brigade having already gained the very advanced position
of Mana-ka-Dana, the necessity for carrying out this operation
in its entirety passed away moreover, Mana-ka-Dana afforded
;

an excellent temporary base for operations against the Chitabat

and Machai peaks. The 2nd Brigade was therefore ordered to
abandon the line of advance up the Sambalbat spur and support
the 1st Brigade, leaving the levies to carry out their part in the origi-
nal plan of moving up the Barchar spur.
At 2 A.M. on the 4th, the 2nd Brigade moved on to Mana-ka-
Dana. As the day dawned, the enemy were observed to draw off
from Brigadier-General Bright's vicinity to their own position,
which was on a high grassy knoll, some 800 yards in front
of Mana-ka-Dana. The approach to this knoll was along a narrow
ridge connecting it with the Mana plateau, and below this
ridge to the right, as well as round the knoll, was a dense forest
of fir. Arrangements were made at once by Major-General Wilde
to carry this position.
R2
124 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Covered by the fire of D Battery, F Brigade, Royal Horse

Artillery, whicli had come up on ele-
IstGurkha Regiment. i , , i
phants, the 1st Brigade under
, , n •
i i -r»
Briga-
•

5th Gurkha Regiment.

Hazara Mountain Battery. dier-Geueral Bright Hioved out in the
Peshawar Mountain Battery. •
n i a i-

20th Punjab Infantry. order marginally noted. Alter advanc-

ist Battalion, 19th Foot. [^„ gQ^^e mountain
distance, the
2nd Punjab Infantry. '^
,

batteries came on the into action

ridge ; a heavy artillery fire was thus directed on the enemy's
position, and, as the 1st and 5th Gurkhas ascended the knoll and
entered the abatis, few of its defenders remained to contest it.

Continuing his advance Brigadier-General Bright reached Chitabat

about 3-30 p.m. The last part of the road was nearly impracti-
cable, and two mules belonging to the mountain batteries were
killedby falling down the kJiucl.
The casualties in the 1st Brigade were^ 1st Gurkhas, three men — ;

20th Punjab Native Infantry, two men and 5th Gurkhas, two ;

men, wounded.
The ground on the summit of the Chitabat peak was surrounded
by thickly-wooded ravines, and breastworks were at once thrown
up to resist an attack, in whicli work the two companies of
sappers afforded material assistance.
Whilst these operations were going on, the levies under Shah-
zada Ibrahim Saduzai were ascending the Barchar spur. Near
its summit they met with a faint resistance on the part of the enemy,

from which five casualties occurred but, the enemy retiring, the ;

levies joined the 1st Brigade at Chitabat, and bivouacked there

for the night.
On the evening of the 4th, the head-quarters and the 2nd Brigade
(with the exception of the Peshawar Mountain Battery, temporarily
attached to the 1st Brigade) bivouacked at Mana-ka-Dana, the
2nd Gurkha Regiment and 3rd Sikh Infantry being thrown forward
to occupy the breastworks from which the enemy had been driven
in the morning, and to keep open communication with the 1st

Brigade.
the 5th, the 1st Brigade, reinforced by the
On the morning of
2nd Gurkhas, and with both the mountain batteries, was ordered
to advance from Chitabat, along the crest of the mountain, for the
capture of the Machai peak.
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBES. 125

at Chitabat,
There had been great difficulty in procuring water
owing to
and the rations for the British troops had been dcLayed
breakfast,
the badness of the roads so, until the men could get their
;

Native Infantry
Brigadier-General Bright detached the 20th Punjab
Doda, which
and 5th Gurkhas to take possession of a hill, called
intervened between Chitabat and Machai, and
from which the
At noon
enemy had fired upon the troops the preceding evening.
joining these two
the remainder of the brigade marched off, and,
regiments, proceeded towards Machai, the 2nd
Punjab Infantiy
being baggage and rear-guard.
left as
flanked on
From Doda the road descends to the Machai Gali,
After descending
each side by wooded ravines and broken ground.
divided by a low
about a mile, it opens out into a small level space,
The ravines
rocky ridge from the base of the Machai mountain.
and broken ground about the descent and plateau were
held m
a fire upon the
considerable force by the enemy, who opened
which came into
advancing troops but the fire of the mountain guns,
;

rush of the 20th

action by alternate batteries, and the determined
Gurkhas, soon drove
Punjab Native Infantry, supported by the 5th
them off.
these
Onreaching the rocky ridge at the end of the plateau,
arrangements were
two regiments were halted under cover, whilst
being made for carrying the Machai peak.
border
Major-General Wilde stated that he had never, in the
position as this
hills,seen such a naturally strong and defensible
steep and rugged in the
peak. The ascent of the mountain was
a narrow front, as the
extreme. It could only be ascended with
the right thickly wooded.
crround on the left was precipitous, and on
Bright's arrangements for its
The following were Brigadier-General
were brought into action in
attack -.—The two mountain batteries
rear of the ridge where the
two leading regiments were halted.
The 20th Punjab Native Infantry was to lead the advance, closely
1st Gurkhas one hundred
supported by the 5th Gurkhas, with the
yards in rear, and the 19th Foot in
reserve.

by a most accurate and effective fire from the mountain

Covered
the enem.y retired as they came
batteries, the troops advanced, but
casualties the position was taken, the enemy
on, and with only eight
valley bordering the Indus.
flying down the spurs into the
126 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

this assault was going on, the enemy, who had been
Whilst
dislodged from the Machai Gali, crept round the ravines to the rear,
and began firing into a company of the 5th GurkLas left in support
of the guns but these, being reinforced by four companies of the
;

19th, soon drove them off.

Brigadier- General Bright then made the following dispositions

for the night: — The 5th Gurkhas to hold an advanced position
on the Machai peak somewhat lower than the peak itself. The
20th Punjab Native Infantry, the 5th Gurkhas, and the Hazara
Mountain Battery, in the centre of the position on Machai, with
the 19th on a shoulder of the hill about 100 yards in rear, the
plateau below being held by the 2nd Punjab Infantry and Peshawar
Mountain Battery.
The whole of the troops were employed, whilst daylight lasted,
in improving the defences.
The losses during the day had been —5th Gurkhas, one killed
and two wounded 20th Punjab Native Infantry, five wounded.
;

The remainder of the Hazara Field Force was echeloned as

follows : —
At Chitabat, the 2nd Gurkhas (which had been sent up
there from the 2nd Brigade) and 800 levies below Chitabat, ;

3rd Sikh Infantry and at Mana-ka-Dana, the head- quarters of

;

the force, the remainder of the 2nd Brigade, D-F Koyal Horse Ar-
tillery, 2-24th Royal Artillery, and the Commissariat stores.

The night passed off annoyance from the enemy.

with but little

Below, rain fell ; but on the Machai peak the night was bitterly
cold, with snow as well as rain, and for the troops, who were without
tents, it was one of great discomfort.
On the preceding evening only a scanty supply of water had
been found on the Machai peak, but a good spring was discovered
on the morning of tlie 6th on the eastern slope beneath the shoulder
occupied by the 19th Foot. The supply was increased by opening
fresh springs at the same spot, and by forming tanks, and eventually
an ample supply for the whole force was obtained. Water was
also found, but in small Quantities, near the ground occupied by
the 5th Gurkhas. A supply of good spring water had been obtained
at Chitabat, and also at Doda, and Major-General Wilde, whose head-
quarters had been moved up to Machai, was now in possession of
the most commanding plateau of the range, and, with seven days'
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. ^
127

food and abundance of water, and with tlie line of communications

with Agror secure, he was in a position to carry out any measures

that might be necessary. Beyond the mere fact of our prestige
among the hill-men having been considerably raised by the late
events, the Major-General had in his hands the power of inflicting
considerable damage and loss on all the villages of the Pathan tribes
situated on the slopes near the top of the mountain ; and while the
troops held the ridge and upper spurs,it was easy to let loose the

—
Hazara levies men as Hght footed as the hill-men themselves for —
this work of destruction.

The 6th was passed in making a road and up the

to the water,
crest of the mountain, to enable supplies and ammunition to be
moved up the 1st Gurkhas were also moved to reinforce the posi-
;

tion held by the 5th Gurkhas. On the same day the Deshi jirga
had come in to the Commissioner and submitted to the terms already
given to their Tikari and Nandihar brethren, when they repeated
what they had formerly asserted, that their country being so close
to that of the Pathans, they had not dared to act in opposition to
them until we had shown ourselves in a commanding position
in the Pathan country.

On the 7th, the enemy having made no

signs of submission,
Major-General Wilde, with the concurrence of the Commissioner,
ordered the 24th Punjab J^ative Infantry, under Lieut.-Colonel
G. N. Cave, to move down the Bilankot spur from the camp at
Mana-ka-Dana, to protect a large body of levies, who had been
sent down to burn some villages of the Pariari Saiyids this was ;

accomphshed with but little opposition, the troops and levies being
back at their bivouacs before night
On the 8th and 9th October, the Pariari, Chagarzai and Akazai
headmen waited on the Commissioner, leaving no tribe unrepresented,
except the Thakot section of the Swatis and the Allaiwals the ;

however, as a tribe, had held aloof from the attack on Agror.

latter,

On the 10th, assembhng the jirgas, Major F. R. Pollock, the

Commissioner, accepted their submission, and explained to the
Akazais, who had taken
a leading part against us, that the village
of Shatut, within the British border, would in future be held by
them as British subjects and assessed ; hitherto, they had been
allowed, as in the time of the Sikhs, to hold this rent-free and as an
128 FRONTIEB AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

independent villages ; which they had been uniformly

in return for
insolent in their tone towards us, and had for years past readily
afforded an asylum to bad characters of the Hazara district. He
also required their jirga, with the others, to accompany our force
in token of submission, and good behaviour
as hostages for their
during our march through their country to the Agror valley, via

the independent Swati tracts of Tikari and Nandihar.

With regard to more stringent conditions not having been
imposed upon the tribes, Major Pollock was of opinion that the objects
of Government had been fully attained when our troops, at a slight
loss in killed and wounded to themselves, had gained the most
commanding position in the country, and had thereby caused the
enemy to submit. The pardah having been lifted, he thought
that it was unnecessary to inflict further punishment, as so doing
would only have prolonged the operations and in the end would
have left the tribes sullen and discontented.
During the progress of the negotiations, a few flags belonging
to the Swatis of Thakot were visible on a distant point of the
mountain, and their presence gave the troops high hopes of a future
encounter. The flags, however, disappeared as soon as the Swatis
found that, consequent on their powerful allies, the Pathans, having
concluded terms with us, the chance of opposing our troops with
success was destroyed.
From Machai peak
the time of the first occupation of the
until its evacuation, the force remained undisturbed by the enemy,
except by small parties of two or three creeping up under cover
and firing at the picquets and sentries at night. The position of
the 2nd Punjab Infantry on the plateau below the hill was, from
the nature of the ground, most exposed to these attacks, and scarcely
a night passed in which they had not a man killed or wounded.
During this time the troops were continually employed in improving
the defences and making roads to the other positions. The experience
gained by the 19th making hill roads during the summer
in
months^ here came into play, and the way in which the regiment
hutted themselves gave a further proof of the benefit they had
derived from being so employed.

I They had been employed with the working-parties on the Murree and Abbott-
abad road.
 OIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 120

Terms having been made with the Black Mountain tribes,

the 11th and 12th were passed in the withdrawal of the troops
nd commissariat stores to Mana-ka-Dana. On the 12th the Machai
i\

peak was finally evacuated. Not a shot was fired, nor was any loss
incurred as long as the force was moving in Pathan lands. The
deputation of the tribes accompanied the troops and remained,
from that time to the end, faithful and true to their engagements.
On approaching however, to within a mile of the bivouac at Mana-
,

ka-Dana, an attack was made on the rear-guard, consisting of

a party of the 2nd Gurkhas Regiment under Lieutenant A. Battye,
by some of the followers of the Pariari Saiyids, and the enemy suffer-
ed a two killed and several wounded, without any casualty
loss of
on our side. Except this incident, and the cowardly wounding, by
the same miscreants, of a servant of the Commissariat, in the forests
below Chitabat, nothing occurred to interrupt the evacuation of
the Black Mountain.
It was at one time hoped by the Major- General and the
Commissioner that during the course of the operations on the
Black Mountain some blow might bo inflicted on the Hindustani
fanatics, who were known to number some 600 or 700, and were
occupying the village of Bihar, on the right bank of the Indus
opposite to the Chagarzai village of Judba, whither they had moved
after their expulsion from Buner. But after seeing the country
on the western slopes of the Black Mountain, any such enterprise
was not, in Major- General
Wilde's opinion, feasible. Had the
Hindustanis combined with the Pathan tribes (as there was a fair
chance at one time of their doing) to resist our troops, an oppor-
tunity of defeating them would have occurred. They could not
however, come to any agreement with the tribes. To have sent
a column against them was impossible, owing to the inaccessible
nature of the country near the Indus where they were encamped
and, when terms had been given to the other tribes, to have attempt-
ed an attack would have been a breach of our engagement. When
the Chagarzai jirga waited on the Commissioner, they voluntarily
began by saying they would not give asylum to the fanatics
and to have made their expulsion one of the terms of peace with that
tribe would have resulted in prolonging the war without any
advantage, since there were no means of cutting off the retreat of
these men.
You I ^
 ;

130 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

During the ISth October the force halted at Mana-ka-Dana,

and the Saiyids were called upon to make reparation for the attack
on the rear-guard, and the wounding of the Commissariat servant
but without avail.
On the 14th, therefore, when the head-quarters and the rest
1st Gurkha Regiment. of the foice (with the exception of four
2nd Punjab Infantry. which were sent
24th Punjab Native Infantry.
resjiments,
& ' r margin,
as per & '

5th Gurkha Eegiment. Under Lieut.-Colone] C. H. Brownlow,

C.B., tO OCCUpy the village of Kungali
Peshawar M^u'^tain Battery.
Hazara Mountain Battery. and the Jalgali paSS) moVcd dowU tO
3rd SMi'infantry. Chirmang in Tikari, a flying column from
4th Gurkha Regiment. the 2nd Brigade under Brigadier- Greneral
Vaughan, consisting of the troops noted in the margin, with a body
of levies, and accompanied by Captain Ommanney as Political
Officer, was detached for the purpose of punishing the Pariari

villages.
From the villages of Bilandkot there was a descent into a deep
intervening ravine, crossing which, the crest of the Pariari spur
was gained by Brigadier- General Vaughan's detachment, without
opposition, after a very laborious ascent. The crest was held
by the troops (with the exception of a portion of the 6th Foot
and the Hazara Mountain Battery, which had been left below
Bilandkot to cover the retirement), whilst the police and levies
were employed burning the Pariari village of Garhi this was;

effected with very slight opposition, after which the troops were
withdrawn to the camp at Chirmang without any attempt at
molestation by the enemy.
On the 15th, the force under Major- General Wilde marched to
the village of Tikari, where it was joined by two squadrons, 16th
Bengal Cavalry, from Jalgali. The following day was spent in
making a road over the Shabora spur, which divides Tikari from
Nandihar. The troops at the Jalgali pass were employed in improv-
ing the road through it, and the 1st Gurkhas from Jalgali, and
a squadron 16th Bengal Cavalry from Tikari, were sent to Chirmang
to keep open the line of communications.
On the 17th, the force marched to Maidan, in the Nandihar
valley,which was found to be highly cultivated, even high up on the
ranges dividing Nandihar from AUai. In Tikari some little difficulty
was at first experienced in reassuring the people, but as the
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 131

of oppression or
march through it had been attended with no act
spoHation, the Nandiharis
remained quietly in their villages, and
freely brought into camp In
his des-
firewood, forage, etc., were
specially adverted to the excellent
patch Maior-General Wilde
British and Native, on this occasion:
conduct of the troops, both
Swatis
the valleys of the independent
he said that, on entering
they had submitted as suppliants, and
he had announced that as
as a fine of Rs. 12,000
had been imposed upon them, all supplies
could be
of food and forage
were to be paid for, and no plundering
transition from war to peace themfeel-
allowed and although the
;

soldier is no easy process, yet

not a complaint
inffs of the native

was made, nor a single

man punished in the ^orce from the time
19th, the force moved
it left the camp
at Oghi till its return. On the

to Pha-ora at the
head of the Nandihar valley, and a shot having
hillside after dark as the rear regiment
ap-
been fired from the
of the neighbouring villages were arrest^
Droached camp, the maliks
subsequently released at Oghi on payment of
ed and taken on, and
of Rs. 500, as a
punishment for the outrage.
a fine
re-entered British territory, crossing
The following day the force
valley, and on the 22nd Oghi was
a low range into the Konsh
having been absent from their baggage since
reached, the troops
the 3rd' of October. . . . . xt n
side amounted to five Non- Commis-
The total casualties on our
sioned Officers and
men killed; one British officer (Lieutenant
Non-Commissioned Officers and
W H. Unwin) and twenty-eight
men wounded.
24th October, a durbar was held in Agror
by the Lieu-
On the
Naivah was
tenant-Governor of the Punjab, when
the title of
on the following
conferred on the young Tanawali Khan, and
day the jirgas were dismissed to their homes and the prisoners
Tpl eased.
"
a clasp for the "
North-West Frontier
The Indian Medal with
all those who actually took part in
was granted in 1870 to
Major-General Wilde, including the force under
the advance under
of Lieut. -Colonel Rothney, which was
previously
the command
Oghi.
engaged with the enemy at
of Agror, at the beginning of the disturbances,
The Khan
into Rawal Pindi, that his conduct might be
had been sent
 ,

132 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

investigated, and had been declared forfeited on account

his jagir

of his treasonable conduct, and he was banished to Lahore.

In spite of the expedition narrated above, the raids in the val-
ley did not cease. In July 1869, two hamlets in Agror— Barchar
and Gulderi—were burnt by a party of raiders, consisting of
Hassanzais, Pariari Saiyids, and Akazais, partisans of Ata Muham-
mad Khan, and four of the villagers were killed and seventeen
wounded. The raiders were, however, gallantly repulsed by the
men of Jaskot, a neighbouring village. In August, Jaskot itself was
attacked, and several of the villagers and a police constable killed.
In consequence of these outrages, a force, as per margin, under
the command of Colonel
Half Hazara Mountain Battery . . 72 men. ^ t, t, ,

4th Punjab Cavalry .. 27 „ 0. E. Kothney, C.S.I., waS

3rd Punjab Infantry 282 „ jjlOVed OUt from Abbottabad,
.
.

5th Gurkha Regiment .

.

—
296 „ , ^ , ^ p xi
a detachment oi the 23rd
^o i
Total 677 „ Pioneers were ordered to
march to the Susal pass to improve the road, and a blockade
was established against the offending tribes.
On the 7th October 1869, Colonel Eothney, moving out
from Oghi with the greatest secrecy at half-past two in the
morning, destroyed the village of Shatut, belonging to the Akazais.
The troops were delayed between Jaskot and the base of the hills by
watercourses and rice cultivation, and Shatut was only reached at
6 A.M. Most of the cattle had been driven off, but a few, with a large
amount of property, fell into the hands of the troops. No resist-
ance was attempted, and the troops retired without molestation.
The lands of Shatut were then declared confiscated, and a
formal proclamation was issued prohibiting the Akazais from
occupying it again.
It was now determined that a force should be permanently
stationed in the valley of Agror, sufficient to meet all attacks, and,
if possible, to follow up raiders beyond the British border and an :

order was passed by the Supreme Government removing the Agror

valley from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and the opera-
tions of the general laws.
During the winter of 1869-70 the valley was unmolested, but
as soon as the snow melted on the Black Mountain, raids recom-
menced. The first was on the 9th April, when Barchar was attack-
ed by a party of Akazais, and the headman killed. On the 15th, the
 CIS'INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 133

Sambalbat was burnt by Akazais and Khan Khel

Hassan-
village of
the same fate.
zais and on the 23rd the village of Bholii shared
Mountain,
Astiievillacres were all situated onthe slopes of the Black
the valley, were powerless
our troops," who were encamped in
they avenge them without
to prevent these outrages, nor could
the Government to the prob-
crossing the border, and committing
ability of a frontier expedition
but the presence of the troops
;

outrages, and secured

undoubtedly prevented more extensive
The force in Agror con-
the safety of the villages in the valley.
sisted now detachments of the 3rd Punjab Infantry and 5th
of

Gurkhas, and two mountain under Colonel Rothney.

guns,
were destroyed by
On the 25th April, the crops around Shatut
him.
Meanwhile, Captain E. G. Wace, the settlement in
officer

of the "record of
Hazara, had been engaged in the preparation
" for the Agror valley, and had instituted a close enquiry
rif^hts
rights of Ata Muhammad
in^o the nature and history of the landed
the ex-Khan of Agror the result of these enquiries being
Khan, ;

that Ata Muhammad Khan was shown to have received but scant
at the hands of the British Government
with regard to his
iustice
rights in Agror. He was accordingly pardoned and allowed to
return.

special responsibility for the peace of the border had de-

No
volved upon the Khan by his restoration ; his responsibility was
merely that of a proprietor of seven-tenths of the valley, bound to
as far as lay in his power,
act with the utmost loyalty, and support,
the and military authorities. The general feeling in Agror,
civil

and even beyond the border, was one of satisfaction at the restora-
justified the with-
tion of the Khan, and the state of the valley
drawal of the troops late in the autumn.
the restoration of the Agror Chief, the Akazais hoped to
On
be admitted to a share in his property, and these hopes were in all
probability encouraged by Ata Muhammad Khan. The decided
action of the Government, however, in absolutely refusing to per-
mit them to rebuild Shatut, or to cultivate the land belonging
to it, proved to them that their expectations were never to be
realised ;while the evident fear which Ata Muhammad Khan had
of them encouraged them to commit raids in British territory.
134 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The first hostile action was taken by another, though a friendly,

tribe — Firoz Khan, a leading malih of the Hassanzais, attacking
several of the Agror villages. The demonstration was, however,
premature, and completely failed.
On the 4th June 1871, about 2 a.m., a raid was made on the
villages of Kongu, Gulderi, and Bholu, in Agror, by a party of
Akazais, numbering in all about 180 men. The raiders came down
in two parties, one of which, numbering about eighty men, under
a malih named Zarif Khan, partially burnt the village of Kongu,
which is situated under the Chitabat ridge. After setting fire

to this village, these raiders moved off to j oin the other body. This
second body, numbering probably about 100 men, came down the
Barchar spur and attacked Gulderi. From this village they met
with little or no opposition. The men who were garrisoning the
towers in the village, after having fired two or three shots, beat
a hasty retreat on Jaskot. One of them was, however, wounded
by the These latter then burnt the whole of Gulderi,
raiders.
except the musjid, and then proceeded to Bholu, which they also
set on fire.
The raid was the act of the Akazais alone, and did not appear
to excite the sympathy of the neighbouring tribes. Matters were,
however, complicated by the Khan of Agror, who, without any
authority, and indeed in direct opposition to the reiterated orders
of Government, sent 300 men across the border to attack a small
village called Ali Khan, which the Akazais
in the Tikari country,

held on a sort of service-tenure. This village, with two hamlets

belonging to it, Ata Muhammad Khan burnt, and returned to
Agror without loss.

This violent and mischievous act on the part of the Khan,

who had been prohibited from carrying his quarrels across the
border line, brought down upon him the grave displeasure of Gov-
ernment. He was well aware that bhere was no intention on the
part of the Government to move troops across the border, yet he
deliberately circulated a story to the effect that such an expedition
was in preparation while, by his attack on Ali Khan, he hoped
;

to force the Government to adopt active measures against his

enemies.
In spite of this outbreak on the part of the Agror Chief, his
conduct gradually became more reasonable and more in accordance
 CIS-INDUS SWATI AND BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 135

with what was hoped would be the result of his restoration to

his jagir. His position on the border, however, was a difficult
one. He was not able to put many fighting men into the
field, and, on his first restoration, found it difficult to establish

his authority in such a manner as to enforce proper obedience

to his calls on his tenants for service. The character of the inhab-
itants of Agror is such that it is difficult for any chief to use them

for the defence of the border. In this favoured valley it may

be truly said " man alone is vile," for a more gaunt, hungry, mean
lot can scarcely be seen anywhere. Their physique is described
as wretched, and their moral attributes are no better. They do
not care to fight even in defence of their own villages, and, on the
approach of an enemy, prefer to drive off their cattle, leaving
their houses, or rather their huts, to be burnt.
During the year 1872, several offences were committed on the
Agror border by the Akazais, but none of these were of a serious
nature, although they showed the spirit of disafi'ection in the tribe
on account of Shatut.
At the beginning of 1873 a section of the Hassanzais made
a raid upon Nikapani (a village in the territory of the Nawab of
Amb), in which four villagers were killed and six wounded. The
raid was the result of inter-tribal disputes, with which the
Nawab,
part of whose territory beyond our border, was mixed up.
lies

The aggressors were punished by a retaliatory attack. On the

30th August another raid was made on the village of Harian, also
in the territory of the Nawab of Amb. The raiders were Khan
Khel Hassanzais, and the result was the death of one man and the
plunder of a few cattle.
On the 1st July of the same year an attack was made by the
Akazais, aided by the Nasrat Khel Chagarzais, on the village of
Barchar, in the Agror valley the raid was planned in revenge for
;

the confiscation of the village of Shatut.

During 1874 the differences between the Nawab of Amb and
the Khan Khel section of the Hassanzais, aided by the Tilli Saiyids
continued, and raids were made by both parties, but with insignifi-
cant results. During this year the Akazais continued to give
trouble on the Agror border. They threatened Agror through-
out the summer, and harrassed the valley by keeping up a con-
stant fear of raids ; they carried off cattle from Ghanian, and burnt
136 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

houses, and carried off property in Gulderi and Kungali, British

hamlets on the slopes of the Black Mountain. On the 23rd
of May, 1875, the Akazais, Khan Khels and Nasrat Khels made
a combined attack upon the village of Ghanian; the village was de-
fended by a small body of police and by Ghulam Haidar Khan
(son of Ata Muhammad Khan) and some followers from Jaskot,
and they succeeded eventually in beating off the enemy. On our
side two villagers were killed, and two mounted men and four
horses belonging to the Khan of Agror were wounded. The
—
enemy were said to have had ten men wounded six severely and
four slightly.
After this, resort to military coercion appeared inevitable, but
in September of this year (1875) the Akazai jirga came into the
Deputy Commissioner and made a complete and unreserved sub-
mission. They renounced ail claims to the disputed lands of Sha-
tut, expressed regret for the past, and pledged their faith to res-
pect in future British territory and British subjects. In Decem-
ber the Hassanzais also came in to the Deputy Commissioner at
Haripur, one party through the instrumentality of the Nawab of
Amb, and the other and more important body of their own free
will. Both parties agreed to respect British territory in future.
Accidental circumstances favoured the submission of both these
tribes. An attack of the Hassanzais upon the Akazais induced the
latter to come in, while the inconvenience of their consequent
isolation compelled the submission of the Hassanzais themselves.
The year 1875 saw the submission to the British Government
of the Black Mountain and other tribes (Chagarzais, Hassanzais,
Akazais, Tikariwals, Allaiwals, and the Saiyids of Pariari) who,
since 1868, had set the Government at defiance ; and the arrange-
ments made on this border received the special commendation of
Her Majesty's Secretary of State. Towards the end of the year,
Ata Muhammad Khan, Khan of Agror, owing to w^hose intrigues
many of the Hazara complications had arisen, died, and was suc-
ceed by his son, then a minor.
Our further dealings with the Black Mountain tribes, subse-
quent to this date, will be dealt with in the next chapter.
 APPENDIX A.

Hazara Field Force, 1868.

Maior-General A. T. Wilde, c.b., c.s.i., commanding.

Sta§.

Major C. C. Jolmson, Assistant Quarter-Master General.

J. Morland, Assistant Adjutant- General.
of the Survey.
Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Johnstone, in charge
Adjutant- General.
Captain W. K. Elles, 38th Foot, Deputy
Assistant
Officer, Punjab Frontier Force.
F. J. N. Mackenzie, Staff
Cavaky, Aide-de-Camp.
Major W. H. Paget, 5th Punjab
Lancers, Orderly Officer.
W. Pane, 19th Bengal
Campbell, 19th Foot, Orderly Officer.
Lieutenant L. R. H. D.
W. B. Holmes, Field Engineer.
Armstrong, Assistant Field Engineer, in charge of Telegraph.
J. A.
of Hospitals G. E. Morton, Principal Medical
Deputy Inspector-General
Officer.
Commissariat Department.
Lieut.-Colonel A. D. Dickens,
Artillery.

Colonel E. Atlay, commanding.

Major T. E. Hughes, Orderly Officer.
Adjutant.
Lieutenant R. McG. Stewart,
1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General R. 0. Bright,
commanding.
Foot, Brigade Major.
Cap'tain E. W. Evans, 19th
D. A. Q. M. G.
Lieutenant J. E. BuHer, 91st Foot,
S. Brind, 19th Foot,
Orderly Officer.
F. S.
2nd Infantry Brigade.
Bri-adier-General J. L. Vaiighan, C.B.,
Commanding.
J. G. Cockbuin, 6th
Foot, Brigade Major.
Captein
Lieutenant W. A. Lockhart, D. A. Q. M. G.
S.

J. D. Macpherson, 3rd
Punjab Cavaky, Orderly Officer.

( 137 )

Vol. I.
 CHAPTER IV.

BLACK MOUNTAIN TiJ/^iJ-S'.— (Continued.)

In discussing our dealings with the various Black Mountain tribes

subsequent to 1875, it will be convenient to begin by detailing
the history of each tribe individually up to the time of General
McQueen's expedition in 1888.
In 1884, the Pariari Saiyids, with their Chagarzai tenants,
began to cause disturbances, and
Chagarzais and Pariari Saiyids. .
t , i
• ,
i
several raids were undertaken in the
cause of Abdulla Khan of Dilbori. It is necessary to explain
that Abdulla Khan's Aladad Khan, had been selected to
father,
manage part of Agror during the troubles which preceded the Ex-
pedition of 1868, and in the subsequent settlement of the valley
had received from the Khan of Agror six villages on a lease, the
terms of which appear to have been very disadvantageous to the
latter. This arrangement, combined with other matters, event-
ually led to a quarrel between the successors of the two chiefs,
and in April 1884 Abdulla Khan left Dilbori and crossed the border
into the territory of the Pariari Saiyids, who, together with other
Black Mountain clansmen, espoused his cause. On the 9th and
loth May a large body of these raided into the valley and were
encountered by a force of levies. In the fighting the Khan of Agror
had one man killed and four wounded, and the raiders were dis-
persed with three men wounded.
It was now decided in consultation between the military and
the civil authorities :
—
(1) To leave the defence of the Agror border

for the present to the Agror levies, supported by troops (2) to ;

occupy the Susal pass leading into Agror by levies from Mansehra,
so as to set free the Khan of Agror's men; and (3) to call on
Samandar Khan, jagirdar of Garhi HabibuUa, to take measures to
protect Konsli from attack. The district authorities at the same time
reported that the Khan's levies were untrustworthy, and that most of
the inhabitants of Agror preferred Abdulla Khan to the Agror Chief.
( 138 )
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 139

Other outrages were committed, and on the night of the 12th

May 1884 the village of Belai (or Belian), in Agror, at the foot of
the Barchar spur, was unsuccessfully attacked by a party
of Ab-
dulla Khan's supporters, including a few Akazais. On the 1 9tli June,
the Pariari Saiyids and Chagarzais made an attack on Dilbori, while
the Akazais and Khan Khel Hassanzais attacked Belai, a second
time, {see page 143). The attack on Dilbori was badly managed
and ill- sustained, and the raiding party, under Abdulla Khan
himself, was driven back over Mana-ka-Dana and out of British
territory. No casualties were reported on either side.
In consequence of these repeated outrages on the Agror border
orders were issued in July 1884 for the confiscation of the allow-
ance (Rs. 592) granted to Abdulla Khan, and he was at the same
time proclaimed an outlaw.
At the same time the Pariari Saiyids with their Chagarzai ten-
ants were ordered to be placed under blockade. At the beginning
of September 1884, reports were received of the arrival of a large
body of Chagarzais in the Pariari country. They belonged to the
Basi Khel section of the tribe and their numbers were estimated
at between 300 and 400 men. In consequence of these reports
advantage was taken of the relief of the Oghi post, to detain the
old garrison, thus raising the strength of the post from 100 to 200
rifles.

This year and the one following 885) witnessed an advance

it (1

in the internal defence of theAgror valley, and at the end of the

latter year the Khan had a body of 100 men, armed with Enfields,
who were dressed in uniform and well disciplined. The thirty police
stationed at Oghi had also been armed with Enfields and seventy of
these rifles had been distributed to the villagers. All the
principal villages had been walled and provided with loopholed
towers, the roads had been repaired, and the villagers taught to
relyupon themselves.
On the 12th September 1884 some 1,000 Chagarzais, joined
by Akazais and others, with standards, collected on the spurs of the
Black Mountain above the villages of Ghanian and Dilbori, about
Rifles, four miles distant from Oc^hi. Accord-
2nd Sikh Infantry . . xi75 x •
i x i i .
5tii Gurkha Regiment ^^Sv *he detachment, strength as per
75
Police •• •• 25 margin, under the command of Lieu-
tenant A. A. Barrett, 5th Gurkhas, moved out from the Oghi post
140 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

and drove back the Chagarzais, with a few volleys, when they
descended from their position about 5 p.m. The approach of
darkness obliged the troops to return to Oghi for the night and ;

after dark the Chagarzais made an attack on Ghanian, but were

repulsed by the inhabitants, this village having been lately forti-
fied for self-defence.
At 5 A.M. on the i3th, Lieutenant Barrett, with the same force
as before, returned to Ghanian, accompanied by the Deputy Com-
missioner, and finding that the enemy had failed in their attack,
determined to assault their position. Leaving thirty rifles in the
village as a reserve, and detaching the police to a hamlet on his left
flank. Lieutenant Barrett, with 120 rifles, advanced towards the
spur in front of the village. In moving forward he was obliged
first to descend into an intervening ravine, and, seeing this, the

enemy mistook his intention and imagined he was retreating.

They, accordingly, advanced down another spur, but were met
by the fire of the police detachment, who had been joined by the
men of Ghanian. Meanwhile the Deputy Commissioner had direct-
ed the Khan of Agror's men to advance from Dilbori towards the
Kungali pass on which were a large number of standards.
On reaching the crest of the ridge. Lieutenant Barrett came
in sight of theenemy but at his first volley they dispersed, and,
;

seeing the simultaneous advance of the Agror levies and the police,
they abandoned their whole position, and eventually disappear-
ed from the hills, making for their own homes.
Thus, before 11 a.m., the whole force of 2,000 men were cleared
off the hills by the determined conduct of the small detachment of

troops, aided by the police and levies. There were no casualties

on our side, and, beyond a few houses partially burnt in Ghanian,
no injury was inflicted on Agror by this raid. The enemy's loss
was estimated at six killed and twenty wounded.
In consequence of this raid the Chagarzais as a tribe were in-
cluded in the existing blockade of the Akazais and Pariari Saiyids.
On the night of the 5th November, Dilbori was attacked, but the
defenders succeeded in repelling their assailants, and when the
Oghi garrison and the police turned out at daylight to proceed to
the assistance of the village, the raiders had disappeared. The
enemy left behind them four men dead, and are said to have carried
off two corpses and four wounded men. On our Bide four were
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 141

killedand one severely wounded. The attacking party consisted of

some two or three hundred Chagarzais and Pariari Saiyids, and
included Abdulla Khan and his brothers.
In October 1884 full jirgas of the Chagarzais and Pariari Saiyids
came Abbottabad and made their submission. A fine of Es. 800
to
was imposed on the Chagarzais and Es. 600 on tlie Pariari Saiyids.
These fines were paid on the 13th January 1886, and the thirty mem-
bers of the two tribes, who had been detained, under the blockade,
at Eawal Pindi since March 1885, were released. Both tribes gave
hostages for their future good behaviour, and were at the sam.e time
informed that they would be held responsible for the good conduct
of Abdulla Khan and his brothers across the border. The blockade
against the Chagarzais was successful mainly owing to the co-oper-
ation of the Nawab of Amb.
Towards the end became apparent that the lenient
of 1886 it

treatment adopted in the settlement of 1885 had failed, and the

Chagarzais, when they reaUzed that Abdulla Khan and his family
would obtain nothing from Government, sent insulting and
menacing letters to the Deputy Commissioner.
On the 11th July 1887, a raid was made on the village of Bag-
rian, and some which were being carried off, were killed to
cattle,

avoid pursuit. The loss of the cattle was estimated at Es. 400,
and blood-money for lives lost at Es. 600. In consequence of this
raid, a haramta ^ was announced against the persons or property

of the Pariari Saiyids and their Chagarzai tenants.

With reoard to the Hassanzais, after the year 1875 they began
to give less trouble on the border. In
1880 their chief, Ahmad Ali Khan, was
murdered ; a conflict then arose between Hashim Ali, his younger
brother, supported by the Mada Khels and part of the Akazais,
and Firoz Khan, the rival and murderer of the deceased chief, sup-
ported by a part of the Akazai tribe. The latter, however, was forced
to seek refuge in the territory of the Nawab of Amb. In March 1882,
Hashim Kulakka, near Oghi, at night,
Ali surprised the village of
and took the fort of one Muzaffar Khan, and his brother Samandar
Khan, who were both charged by the Hassanzai Khan with complicity

1 Baramta means reprisals, or forcible seizure of persons or property in retaliation for

» wrong done to anyone.
142 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

in the murder of Ahmad Ali Khan. After a determined resistance,

Muzaffar, Samandar, and one of their servants were killed, the
attacking party returning unmolested to the hills. For this raid
a fine of Ks. 2,000 was imposed on Hashim Ali and the Hassan-
zais were informed that they were responsible, as a tribe, for their
chief's futuregood conduct. During the disturbances on the Agror
border in 1884 a few of the Khan Khel section joined in the
second attack on Belai (see next page), but the remainder of the tribe
was actively hostile to this party, and up to the year 1887 their

general conduct gave little cause for complaint.

the 9th January 1889, however, a serious raid was com-

On
mitted by followers of Hashim Ali on Udigraon, a hamlet in
the Agror valley. Two British and two
subjects were killed

kidnapped. The unconditional surrender of the two latter was at

once demanded by Government, and the tribe was reminded of their
joint responsibility. To this message some of the Hassanzai mrdiks
sent a defiant answer, while Hashim Ali himself ignored it.

Evidence was subsequently forthcoming, which seemed to implicate

the Khan of Agror and his Agent, Fazil Ali Khan, in this raid.
The charges against these two men were investigated, and as a
result thelatter was arrested, and the former summoned to
Abbottabad, whence he was sent to Lahore.
As the Hassanzais, as a tribe, showed no intention of compelling
Hashim Ali to surrender the men carried off, orders were passed
on the 10th April for the whole tribe to be blockaded, and it was
directed that the PariariSaiyids and their Chagarzai tenants
should also be included. The Akazais had already been under
blockade since 1884. On the 1st June the Oghi garrison was
reduced to 100 rifles.

After the settlement in 1875, the conduct of the Akazais

became more satisfactory. ./
The jirqa
/ o*
at
Akazais. .

that time consented not only to a relin-

quishment of Shatut, but to its occupation and cultivation by others,

our own subjects, amongst whom it was proposed to divide it.

Action, however, was deferred in the first instance at the request

of the Akazais, and the scheme was subsequently allowed to fall out
of sight. It was felt that although the suggestion had been accepted
by the tribe at the moment when they were inclined to submit, yet
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBES. 143

its occupation should be

thev were still likely to give trouble
if

allowed to lie uncultivated

attempted. The lands were consequently
uninhabited. This state of
and the site of the village remained
thincTS was considered undesirable and unsatisfactory, and
1882 m
the Commissioner of Peshawar
recommended that on certain con-
should consent to the re-occupa-
ditions, the British Government
Akazais.
tion of 'the Shatut lands by the

preliminary to any agreement, the tribe

was required to
Asa
crops, which, in contravention of
arrancre for the destruction of the
been cultivated on a portion of the
the a'^reement of 1875, had
of the Painda Khel section of
Shatut lands by Zarif Khan, malik
the tribe. This condition
was fulfilled, and the crops were cut
and handed over to the British
authorities. A small party of the
Zarif Khan, refused to accept the agreement,
tribe, however, under
consequently held in abeyance.
and the offer to restore Shatut was
1884,.this party joined the Pariari Saiyids in the
attack on
Later, in
mentioned and on the morning
Belai'on the 12th May, as already ;

of the 19th June 400

Akazais and 40 Khan Khel Hassanzais des-
Belai a second time. The
cended the Barchar spur to attack
villacrers however, came out
to meet them and, after a fierce hand-

to- hand 'fight,

them back up the hill. The Swatis lost four
drove
left three of their
and fourteen wounded, while the raiders
killed
of these raids the
number dead on the ground. In consequence
common with the
whole tribe were placed under blockade
in

Chagarzais and Pariari Saiyids.

on Ghanian
The Akazais aided the former tribe in their attack
in the fight on the foUow-
on the 12th September 1884, and took part
ino- day in which the iiillmen
were driven back and dispersed by the
small detachment under Lieutenant A. A. Barrett further, when
;

the Chagarzais made their submission in

the Pariari Saiyids and
Akazais, who, on the
October 1885, they were not joined by the
1885, committed raids on
3rd November and the 4th December
outlying hamlets on the slopes of the
Black Mountain.
in force, but
The blockade imposed upon this tribe continued
the case of the Chagarzais
did not press on them so heavily as in
having been detained,
and Pariari Saiyids, no members of their tribe
They were
and none of their property having been
confiscated.
•

obtain their supplies through the Hassanzais

and Mada Khels,
able to
144 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

and the blockade really did not injure them, excepting that they
had to pay a little more for salt and other supplies.
During 1886 and 1887 the Akazais continued under blockade,
but did not give trouble as a tribe.
On the 18th June 1888, however, a serious affair occurred on
the Agror frontier, which resulted in the death of two British
officers and four men of the 5th Gurkhas. Early on the morning
of the 18th June, Major Battye, 5th Gurkhas, with sixty men
^f his regiment and nineteen police,
Affair on the Agror frontier,
18th June 1888. accompanied by Captain Urmston, 6th
Punjab Infantry, left Oghi fort and ascended the Baichar spur, to
make himself acquainted with the features of the surrounding
country, the water-supply, etc. Shortly before reaching the crest
and while still within British territory, the party was fired on by
some Gujar graziers who were tenants of the Akazais. The fire was
not returned, and Major Battye pushed on towards Chitabat keep-
ing within our own territory but, finding the enemy were becom-
;

ing more numerous and their fire heavier, he decided to retreat,

and accordingly the retirement of the party was ordered, covered
by a small rear-guard. A havildar in the rear-guard having been
wounded, the two British officers went back to his assistance
with a stretcher. While they were putting the wounded man
into it, the enemy charged, and in the hand-to-hand fight which
ensued Major Battye and Captain Urmston were killed. The main
body in the meanwhile, unaware of what had happened, continued
their retirement down the mountain side. Subadar Kishenbir,
who had been with the officers, though himself wounded, succeeded
in escaping, and, rejoining the main body at the village of Atir,
led them back and recovered the bodies of the two officers. Four
of the Gurkhas were left dead on the field and six rifles were lost.
Of the enemy six were killed.
The Khan Khel Hassanzais and the Pariari Saiyids, on hearing
the firing, turned out and joined in the attack on the detachment
as they were retiring. The latter Mana-ka-Dana and fired
came to

at long ranges at our men, retiring down the Chorkalam spur. Of

the former, Hashim Ali with a party of some sixty men took
up a position to cut oi! the retreat of the troops, if they should
come down the Barchar spur. He was here attacked by the
Jaskot villagers and driven back with a loss of two killed
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 145

one Ms own nephew. On our side one of

being the Jaskot
men was killed. The Khan of Agror's levies, who occupied a
tower on the Sambalbat spur, do not appear to have given
any assistance.
After this affair, a large body of the Hassanzais, of nearly
all sections, collected with Hashim Ali on the crest of the Black
Mountain, between the Sambalbat and Chajri spurs ; the Akazais
assembled in force above the Barchar ridge and at Chapra, and
a contingent came from Pariari. Plans were daily discussed as
to how and where to attack Agror. On the 27th June, the aged
Maulvi Abdulla with 120 Hindustanis from Maidan joined the
Hassanzais on the crest, and it was then decided that no action
should for the present be taken by the tribes and on the 28th
;

and 29th June the gathering dispersed. On the 7th July, the
garrison of Oghi was again reduced to 100 rifles.
The Punjab Government now urged very strongly the neces-
sity of sending a military expedition to the Black Mountain. The
Lieutenant-Governor pointed out that the occurrence of the 18th of
June formed a strong casus belli against the Akazais, and expressed
his opinion that the fact that two British ofhcers having been
killed and stripped in a savage and disgraceful manner constituted
an incident which must be regarded, considering our position on
the border, as gravely aggravating the importance and urgency of
the case. Sir James Lyall was, further, stiongly of opinion that
until military action had proved to the Khan Khel Hassanzais and
the Akazais that their country was not beyond our reach, and
that we had the power to punish them, negotiations would not
lead to any satisfactory settlement with the tribes. Under these
circumstances the Government of India once more took into
consideration the question of punitive measures against the Black
Mountain tribes, and on the 29th August an expedition was
decided on.

Expedition against the Black Mountain tribes by a force under

Brigadier- General J. W. McQueen, C.B., A.D.C., in l888.

The above punitive expedition to the Black Mountain was form-

ed on the 7th September 1888, and was officially styled the "Hazara
Field Force. " Brigadier- General J. W. McQueen, c.b., a.d.c '' was
Vol. I
y
146 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

placed in command, with the temporary rank of Major- General,

and the force consisted of
2 Mountain Batteries, Britiah. n
•
i

1 Mountain Battery, Native.

the marginally named ,

troops,
1 Company Sappers and Miners. makins a total strength of
4 Bns. British Infantry.
including of 2/2
^
OHlcers and
i ^ ,
9,144 men.
t a

9 Bns. Native Infantry, 1

Pioneers. rp]^^
troops were organized
in two brigades under the command of Brigadier- Generals G. N.
Channer, v.C, and W. Galbraith respectively, and each brigade was
subdivided into two columns. In addition to the above a field reserve
was formed, consisting of one regiment of cavalry, and two bat-
taUons of infantry.* A detail of the staff is given in Appendix A.
Head-quarters and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Columns were directed
to concentrate at Oghi in the Agror valley by the 1st October and
the 4th Column at Darband on the Indus by the same date. The
Nowshera Brigade was at the same time ordered to be held in
immediate readiness for held service. Infantry battalions were to
take the field 600 strong. For baggage, staff officers were allowed
half,and regimental officers one-third, of a and native
mule. British

non-commissioned officers and men were allowed 16lb of baggage

and followers lOfb each, and no tents were taken. Seventy rounds
of ammunition per rifle were carried in the pouch and thirty on mules
per rifle with corps the 4th Column taking sixty rounds with
;

it on mules instead of thirty. A reserve of 100 rounds per rifle

was established at the base. Artillery reserve ammunition was

taken in full. With regard to supplies, five days', with two days'
grain for all accompany the 1st, 2nd and
animals, were ordered to
3rd Columns, and seven days' to accompany the 4th Column. All
equipment and supplies beyond Oghi and Darband was to be carried
on mules.
The Maharaja of Kashmir having oflered the services of his

troops to the Government of India, two battalions of these, with

two guns, under the command of General Indar Singh, were ordered
to join the expeditionary force.
Similarly the Khaibar having volunteered to take part
Rifles

in the operations, a detachment 300 strong, under

Major Muham-
mad Aslam Khan, Sirdar Bahadur, c.i.e., were directed to proceed
to Oghi to join head- quarters.

89 officers and 3,138 men, including the Kashmir Contingent.

 — —

BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. I47

By the 1st October the Hazara Field Force was concentrated

at Oghi and Darband as ordered.
The instructions of the Government of India for the conduct
of the operations may be summarized as follows :

(1) To coerce into submission the Akazais and tlie Khan Khel Hassan-
zais.

(2) All other tribes and sections upon tlie Black Mountain not to be
molested if they remained quiet.
(3) The punishment to be inflicted upon any other tribes or sections,
which might join against us, to be for the consideration of the
General Commanding.
(4) The march to Thakot to be reserved for further orders.

(5) When once the operations had begun, the General Commanding,
while governing his operations as far as possible in accordance
with the above, to have authority to act (in communication
with the Chief Political Officer accompanying the force)
according to his own judgment, in dealing with any development
of the situation which might arise.

Subsequently, authority was received by Major-General McQueen

to march on Thakot, and to visit the Allai country with the object
of settling the outstanding demands against the Allai wals,^
Previous to the advance, proclamations were issued to the
several tribes, informing those whom the operations were
against
intended that their submission would be accepted up to midday on
the 2nd October, while the others were told that, so lono- as thev
refrained from interfering with our columns, no damage would be
done to them.
The period of grace allowed having expired on the 2nd Octo-
ber and the tribes not having submitted, orders were issued for
the advance of the whole force ; but owing to the equipment of
some of the corps not being complete it was found necessary to

postpone the commencement of operations for twenty-four hours.

The final orders for the advance of the different columns were
as follows :

No. 1 Column to move on the 4th to Mana-ka-Dana, and the following day
.„,
to Chitabat, leaving a sufficient force at Mana-
.

Plan of, campaign. i t\ . j. 1 •

i- p
ka-JJana to protect their Jme of communications

1 See page 86.

U2
 ;

148 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

No, 2 Column to advance up the Barcliar spur on the 4th, occupying

Barchar thence moving on 5th to the crest of the ridge
;
one regiment ;

to be at once detached to the left to meet No. 3 Column.

No. 3 Column to advance up the Sambalbat spur to the village of
the same name, which was to be occupied on the 4th. The advance to be
continued to the crest on the 5th. The 24th Punjab Infantry and two guns
Derajat Mountain Battery to move up the Chatta spur, meeting the remainder
ofNo. 3 Column on the morning of the 5th at the junction of the Sambalbat
and Chatta spurs. The Khaibar Rifles to advance up the Chajri spur between
Nos. 2 and 3 Columns on the 5th.
The 4th Column to advance on the 4th to the neighbourhood of Kotkai
on the Indus.

To begin with the operations of the 4th Column under

Colonel A. C. W. Crookshank, c.b. on the morning of the 3rd
:

October the enemy in large numbers attempted to occupy a ridge

about 1,000 yards to the north of Chamb, but were anticipated
by the 4th Punjab Infantry and were driven back with a loss of
two killed and four wounded, there being no casualties on our side.
The road down to Bela on the Indus was on this day made practi-
cable for baggage animals.
On the morning of the 4th, the whole column crossed the frontier
uh Column. and advanced to the Indus by the road
Action of Kotkai. which had been made the previous day
the right of the advance bemg covered by three companies of the
4th Punjab Infantry, who occupied the ridge to the north, with
orders to move over it and rejoin the column at the village of
Shingri, leaving a strong picquet on the crest till the baggage
2 companies, Eoyal Irish Regiment. and rear-guard had passed.
Brigade head-quarters. ^ The column advanced at
.„ , .
2 guns, 2-1 Scottish Division, Royal Artillery.
3 companies, 34th Pioneers. 6-30 A.M. m the order
Head-quarters, 4th Column.
^^^^^^ ^^ ^^le margin, fol-
Royal Irish Regiment. *^ '

2 guns, 2-1 Scottish Division, Royal Artil- lowed by the wholc of the

^^Gatlings.
baggage, including
^
seven
3 companies, 4th Punjab Infantry. days' Supplies in regimental
3 companies, 29th Punjab Infantry. i j. i i

Regimental reserve ammunition. charge, CSCOrted by i-

four
1 company, 29th Punjab Infantry.
companies of the 29th
Field Hospital. -n v t £ x x o •

Telegraph. runjab Iniantry, two of

Total strength 51 officers, 2,400 men.
which formed the rear-guard.
At 8 A.M. the head of the column reached the river bank, and
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 1^
a halt was made to allow the troops in rear to form up on the
open ground.
At 9 A.M. the advance was continued to Shingri, about a mile
distant, which was found to be occupied by a few of the enemy.
The advanced guard was accordingly halted and extended, two
companies of the Royal Irish to the left of the village and two com-
panies of the 34th Pioneers on a spur to the right, and the village
was then carried with trifling opposition. A few of the enemy
firedfrom the rocks and jungle above the village, but were driven
off by a com.pany of the 34th Pioneers, gallantly led by Subadar-

Major Chattar Singh Bahadur, who was here mortally wounded.

At 10 A.M. the troops were again formed up in column of route
and continued the advance across a sandy plain for a distance of
about a mile, when large num.bers of the enemy with many stand-
ards were discovered in position, their front line being across the
open ground between the hamlet of Towara and the river, their
main body holding a rocky ridge one mile long extending to the
village of Kotkai, while numerous skirmishers lined the ravines
and ridges of the hills on the right of the advance. At many com-
manding points strong sangars had been constructed, and similar
defences on the opposite bank of the Indus were held by sharp-
shooters, supported by some useless guns of a reported calibre of
four inches.
Having reconnoitred the enemy's position, Brigadier- Gen-
eral Galbraith, who was with this column, directed Colonel Crook-
shank to prepare for the attack by clearing his flanks. This was
accordingly done ; the 34th Pioneers searching the wide belt of
jungle and boulders between our left and the river, while the 4th
Punjab Infantry scaled the difficult heights on our right and drove
the enemy from every point of vantage. In this operation Captain
0. C. Radford, 4th Punjab Infantry, was severely wounded, but
continued to lead his men until ordered to desist.
The advance was necessarily very slow, but at 1 p.m. the
guns came into action against a wood held by the enemy some
600 yards to the front. The Royal Irish Regiment had lined a
low wall, one company on the left, the remainder on the rio-ht
front of the battery and machine guns.
At 1-30, the enemy's position having been well searched by
artillery and machine gun fire, and the flanking parties being
150 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

abreast of the line, the Royal Irish advanced, without firing a shot,
and charged the enemy, Lieutenant W. Gloster distinguishing
himselfby rushing to the front and capturing a standard.
At this moment a body of ghazis, who had been concealed in
a masked nala running diagonally towards our left front, made
a desperate attempt to break through our line. All were at once
shot down by the Royal Irish and the gatlings, except thirteen,
who were followed and accounted for by two companies of the
29th Punjab Infantry and 34th Pioneers in the jungle near the
river.

Eighty-eight dead were subsequently counted at this spot,

among whom forty- eight were identified as Hindustanis.

During the advance of the Royal Irish, Brigadier- General

Galbraith and his staff were between them and the leading com-
pany of the Pioneers the latter were firing in the direction of
;

Kotkai, and while Major J. A. Barlow, D. A. A. G., conveyed an

order to the Royal Irish to fix bayonets, the Brigadier-General sent
Captain C. H. H. Beley, d.s.o., D. A. Q. M. G., to direct the Pioneers
to enfilade the position attacked. In pointing out what was
required this officer unfortunately rode a front of the party,
little in

while they were emerging from a nala. He

thus became the first
object of the ghazi rush, and, his horse being cut down, he was
overpowered by num.bers and fell mortally wounded.
The enemy in and around Kotkai now began to show signs of
wavering, and the guns having advanced and taken up a new position
opened fire on the rocky ridge in front of Kotkai, the village itself,
and the sangars on the both banks of river the gatlings, meanwhile,
;

swept the crest of the hills in front of the 4th Punjab Infantry, and,
as the defenders streamed downwards, followed them with a
galling fire. The enemy made little reply except from the right
bank of the river, whence the Hindustani guns and sharpshooters
kept up a fairly constant but ineffectual fire until nightfall.
At 3-30 P.M., the enemy was in full flight towards Kanar and
four companies 29th Punjab Infantry, supported by a wing of the
Royal Irish Regiment and $wo guns, occupied the village at
4-30 P.M. without opposition. The village is perched on the top of
a high conical peak of rocks on the left
bank of the river and
completely closes the valley at this point.
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 151

At 5 P.M. Colonel Crookshank returned to Towara, where the re-

maining troops and baggage bivouacked, brigade head-quarters
being established at Kotkai.
The casualties on our side during the day were five killed and
ten wounded, while the enemy's loss was estimated at about two
hundred.
We will now turn to the operations of the Agror columns. On
1st Column. ^^^ morning of the 4th
Hazaia Mountain Battery. October, the 1st Column '
Half 3rd Company, Sappers and Miners. , .

2nd Battalion, NOTthumberland Fusiliers. trOOpS as per margm, under

3rd Sikh Infantry. Colonel J. M. Sym, oth
1st Battalion, oth (Jurkhas.
n a t
(jurkhas, advanced at 6 a.m.
Jrum Dilbori in accordance with the plan of operations already
detailed, and reached Mana-ka-Dana as 10-30 a.m., having only
met with slight opposition. As soon as it was dark, parties of
the enemy commenced firing into the bivouac, and this continued
in a desultory sort of way throughout the night and caused a few
casualties. At 11 p.m. an attack was made on that part of the
bivouac where commissariat estabHshments were located,
the
and five were
followers severely wounded with swords before
the enemy were beaten off. Seventeen mules were also reported
to have been stolen during the night.
The 2nd Column, troops as per margin, under Colonel
^- ^' O'C^^ady Haly, accom-
•lU Column.
3-1 South Irish, R.A. (4 guns).
pauicd by Brigadier-General
1st Battalion, Suffolk Regiment. Chauuer, v.c, and the head-
Wing, 34th Pioneers. , „ , , _^ .

40th Bengal infantiy. quarters ol the 1st Brigade,

advanced up the Barchar spur
2^Gatl^^s
from the camp at Kulakka on
the morning of the 4th and reached the position assigned to them
near the village of Barchar without meeting with any opposition.
The 3rd Column troops as per margin (with the exception
3rd Column. of two guns, Derajat
the
Mountain Battery, and the
't^i;;t^l^^S-Ltf^U,.
Half 3rd Company, Sappers and Miners. 24th Punjab Infantry)
''"'^'' '""" '''''""'•
utilfkhl!" ^^^^^ Lieut-Colonel M. S. J.'

24th Punjab Infantry. Sunderland,

from moved
camp at Kulakka up the Sambalbat spur and bivouacked above
152 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the village of that name. No opposition was met with during the
advance. Major- General McQueen and the head- quarters accom-
panied this column.
The two guns, Derajat Mountain Battery, and the 24th Punjab
Infantry, under Major Young, moved up the Chatta spur on the
same date, and there bivouacked.
The Khaibar Rifles remained at the foot of the Sambalbat
spur ready to advance up the Chajri spur the next day, their
baggage accompanying the 3rd Column.
On the evening of the 4th all the columns had thus reached
their appointed positions. During the early part of the night
heavy rain fell, which caused considerable discomfort to the
troops in bivouac.
On the 5th October, the 1st Column, leaving two companies
of the Northumberland Fusiliers and two companies of the 3rd
Sikhs to garrison Mana-ka-Dana, advanced at 6-30 a.m., and
occupied the crest at Chitabat at 9-30 a.m., but the rear- guard did
not reach camp till 7 p.m. the path which ran along the northern
;

side of the spur having to be made practicable for baggage animals,

while the working- parties were exposed to fire from the enemy
concealed among the trees. After dark the enemy continued to
fire into the picquets, but without effect. Very little water was
found on this day in the neighbourhood of Chitabat.
The 2nd Column continued its advance on the 5th up the
Barchur spur, and, having met with but slight opposition, bivou-
acked on the crest to the south of Bampm- Gali.

The 3rd Column moved at 6-30 a.m. on the same date from
the village of Sambalbat and continued its advance up the spur.
The ascent was very steep and two battery mules rolled down the
hill and were killed. At the junction of the Sambalbat and Chatta
spurs, the column was joined by the 24th Punjab Infantry and
the two guns Derajat Mountain Battery. At 8 a.m., the Sussex
advanced on a steep bluff in front, which was occupied by the
enemy, and covered by the fire of the guns, took possession of
it with slight loss. Pushing on, the column eventually reached
the crest of the main spur at Nimal, where it was joined by the
Khaibar Rifles, and where it was decided to bivouac for the night.
The Chajri spur, by which the latter had ascended, proved to be
Bteep and precipitous.
 BLACK 3I0UNTAIN TRIBES. 153

On the 6tli October, the difficulty of obtaining water

o-^^dng to
and fodder for animals at Chitabat, all the baggage mules of the
1st Column were sent down to Dilbori under escort of six com-
panies of the 5th Gurkhas, and arrived there without any mishap.
Two guns of the Hazara Mountain Battery were sent back
as a reinforcement to the four companies of infantry left at
Northumborlancl Fusiliers, 2 companies. Mana-ka-Dana. At the
3rd Sikhs, 3 companies.
Same time a small column,
strength as per margin, under the command of Lieut. -Colonel
Vincent, Northumberland FusiHers, was despatched in the direc-
tion of Do da to search for water and forage. This movement
was also calculated indirectly to secure the safety of the con-
voy. A plentiful supply of water was discovered in the naJa
to the north of the bivouac about 450 feet below it, and some
forage was found near the village of Landa. To secure both it
was necessary that the Doda should be cleared of the enemy,
hill

who were annoying the parties at the water-supply. This was

accordingly done by the two companies of the Northumberland
FusiUers, supported by the 3rd Sikhs. The former then advanced
over the crest and down the other towards Machai, leav-
side
ing the 3rd Sikhs on the crest. Before the Fusiliers had returned
to the crest, about thirty or forty of the enemy coming throuf^h the
forest opened fire at close range on the 3rd Sikhs, who quickly ad-
vanced and drove them down the hill, and the FusiHers, coming
round, took them in flank and killed several of their number. The
advance was then continued down the spur to the east by the 3rd
Sikhs, supported by the Northumberland FusiHers, as far as the
viUage of Landa, which was burned. The crops about the viHacye
were cut and sent back to camp, and the water-supply was thoroughly
opened up. The total loss to the enemy was estimated at thirty
and wounded. A quiet night was the result.
killed

The 2nd Column, on the 6th October, moved along the crest to
Nimal and occupied the bivouac vacated by the 3rd Column, which
advanced from Nimal towards Seri, the 14th Sikhs leading.
The road lay along the crest for about miles and then U
turned abruptly to the right down a steep spur. It had to be
made by the Sappers and working-parties nearly the whole way,
and consequently progress was extremely slow. The path lay
Vol. I. ^ ^
154 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

tLrougli thickly wooded forest, in which the enemy carried on

guerilla warfare, but did not appear in any large numbers.
The 14th with Major-General McQueen and the head-
Sikhs,
quarters staff, reached the hamlet of Kaima at midday, and, as
it was impossible for the baggage to get further than this point

before darkness set in, it was decided to bivouac here for the night.

Kaima consisted of two small plateaux with The

a few huts.
map of this part of the country, which had been compiled from
native information, was found to be altogether incorrect, and the
country in front to be far more difficult than had been supposed.
From Kaima smoke could be seen ascending from the Seri villages,
which had been set on fire by the Khan Khel Chief, Hashim Ali
Khan, and his people, probably in the hope of thus avoiding
a visit from our troops and also to save himself from the disgrace of
having his villages burnt by us. Our casualties during the day
were one killed and eight wounded.
On the following day, the 7th, having found that the nature
of the country rendered it difficult to move a large body of trans-
port animals till the roads had been improved, and the water-
supply at Kaima being scanty and difficult of access. Major- Gen-
eral McQueen decided to return to the crest of the Black Mountain ;

the 3rd Column was accordingly withdrawn. The enemy embolden-

ed by our retirement followed up the rear-guard of the column and
we lost three men killed and one severely wounded. The column
bivouacked on the northern slopes of Akhund Baba, the General
and head- quarters being at Kain Gali, close to the 2nd Column.
During the 7th, the 1st and 2nd Columns remained at Chita-
bat and Nimal.
To return now to the doings of the 4th Column on the Indus.
From the 5th to the 10th October, daily reconnaissances were
made from Kotkai but no forward movement was possible,
;

the road from Towara to Kotkai being so bad that it was neces-
sarv to bring up supplies by hand. On the afternoon of the 5th
a party under Colonel Crookshank, consisting of the 29th Punjab

Infantry, and two guns, reconnoitred in the direction of Kanar,

but, after advancing along the left bank of the river for one and
a half miles, it was found impracticable to proceed further, owing
to the fire kept up by the enemy from the opposite bank of the
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBES. 155

river, which itwas impossible to silence; the party accord-

ingly returned to camp. During this reconnaissance Colonel
Crookshank received a wound, from the effects of which ho
subsequently died. Colonel Beddy, 29th l^unjab Infantry, as
next senior officer, now assumed command of the 4th Column.
Tilli, Kunari, and Garhi, were also visited by reconnoitring

parties, and during the retirement from the latter place, which is on
the right bank of the Indus, a determined attack was made at dusk
on the rear-guard of the 4th Punjab Infantry under Captain
Gray. This was beaten off with some loss to the enemy, our
casualties being two men wounded. The column then advanced
on the 11th to Kanar, and on the 12th to Ghazikot, the Royal
Irish with brigade head-quarters remaining at the former place.
The rate of progress was necessarily slow, owing to the bad
^

state of the road, which had to be improved as the column

advanced.
On the 11th signalling communication was opened with the
Oghi force at Panj Gali.
On the 13th Brigadier-General Galbraith crossed the river
with a force of 1,450 rifles and 3 guns and destroyed the settle-
ment and fort ofHindustani fanatics at Maidan. A gatherin<T,
on the hills above the fort watched the proceedings of the column,
but with the exception of a few stray shots no opposition was
offered by the enemy.
On this date Brigadier- General Channer and staff with an
escort of some 300 rifles arrived at Kanar from Betband, and thus
joined hands with the 4th Column.
The fact that the Hindustanis offered no resistance to the
destruction of their stronghold seems to show that the losses
they sustained in the affair near Kotkai on the 4th October had
completely broken their spirits. Maulvi Abdulla and his follow-
ing subsequent to their defeat had dispersed among the Chaf^ar-
zais and neighbouring tribes, wherever they could find a refuf^e.
The destruction of Maidan may be considered to have brought
to a close the active operations of the 4th Column, as its subsequent
operations, which included reconnaissances to places on both banks
of the river, were entirely unopposed. Later on in the month, in
order to bring pressure to bear on the Hassanzais, a hamlet on the
right bank of the river opposite Kanar was destroyed on the 24th,
X2
 —

156 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Garliiand Bakrai were burnt on the 25tli, and on the 29th October
Kotkai was also destroyed. The following day the tribe gave up
the remaining prisoner in the hands of Hashim Ali Khan, (the
other had previously made his escape), and paid their outstand-
ing fine of Rs. 7,500. Orders were accordingly given to cease
destroying the villages and cutting the crops of this clan, and
their jirga was then sent to Oghi, where it arrived on the 2nd
November.
The operations of the Agror columns, which have been des-
cribed up to the 7th October, will now be continued up to the end
of the first phase of the operations.
During this period the three columns remained in occupation
of the crest of the Black Mountain above the Hassanzai and
Akazai territories, and numerous reconnaissances were made to
explore the country or destroy the villages of the offending clans.
The Hassanzais as a tribe were informed that their fine had
been increased on account of the opposition they had ofiered to our
columns, and they were given a certain period of grace in which
to submit, with the result which has been shown above.
A message was also sent to Hashim Ali Khan, that if he did
not deliver up himself and his three relatives, Sheikh Ali Muham-
mad, Turabaz, and Sikandar Khan, unconditionally, the remaining
Khan Khel would be destroyed. The only assurance
villages

given was that their lives would be spared.

The Akazais were at the same time informed that it was pro-
posed on the following day to destroy certain of their villages,
unless they submitted in the meantime and in accordance with
;

this notification a force of 500 men and 2 guns from the 1st
Column proceeded from Chitabat on the morning of the 10th
and burnt Biran, an Akazai village concerned in the attack on Major
Batty e's party.
The following were also destroyed by various small

columns :

Akazai villages : Kan, Meraband, Maira and Darai Khan Khel

;

Hassanzai villages : Selle, (or Tsil), Karwai, Sabc, and Ril Pariari villages
; :

Kangan, BafEa, Siada, and Saidra.

This punishment had the desired effect as regards thje Akazais;

and their jirgay having arrived at head-quarters on the 19th,
 1^7
BLACK 2I0UNTAIN TBIDES.

that had been imposed, and

accepted unconditionally all the terms
fine, leaving five
weredven seven days in which to collect the
selected hostages in our hands.
Orders were accordingly issued

that no more Akazai villages were to

be destroyed during the period

of srace thus allowed.

these operations
The opposition offered by the enemy during
were proportionately
was almost a negligeable factor, and our losses
occasioned by parties ot t^e
small, but some casualties were
them at night In
enemy creeping up to the picquets and sniping m
that all fires and lights
consequence of this, orders were issued
sunset, and that trees should
bivouac should be extinguished at
be fired at a distance of from 50
to 100 yards m
front ot the
approach of the enemy.
bivouac, so as to prevent the unseen
AVith the submission of the Akazais
and the cessation ot hostili-
Hassanzais, the first phase of the operations
ties on the part of the
we will now turn to the
may be said to have been completed, and
considered to have begun on the
second phase. This may be
coerce
^
•
21st October, the object being to
^^^""'L^dpTsf into submission the Pariari Saiyids
and
of the operations was
subsequently
the Tikariwals. The scope
permission was received for a
extended ; on the 23rd October
of a force into
movement on Thakot, and on the 31st, the despatch
sanctioned.
the AUai country was
troops of the Hazara
On the evening of the 20th October, the
as follows :~
Field Force were distributed

Divisional head-quarters
^ Mana-ka-Dana.
Head-quarters, 1st Brigade )
,^ t^ i
Mana-ka-Dana.
by a wing, 34th Pioneers.
No iCokmm, reinforced
occupied Chitabat, having relieved
Xo. 1 Column.
No 2 Column,
No. 3 Column, distributed between Karun, Akhund Baba, Nimal and
Tilh.
Darband.
No. 4 Column. Ledh, Kanar, Kotkai, Shingri, and

composed South Irish Division,

of four guns, 3-1
A fifth column
and wing of the Seaforth High-
Roval Artillery, Head-quarters
Infantry, the Khaibar Eifles and two
Innders wing, 40th Bengal
the command of Colonel A.
Murray, Seaforth
gatS; unL
Dilbori with a view to taking
Highlanders, was moved up to
Column in the ensuing operations. On the 21st,
part with No. 1

the iBt Column moved on Trand.

158 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The 5th Column moved forward from Dilbori and bivouacked

at night about a mile short of Chirmang. This village had been
found deserted by the troops in the morning, and in the evening
Eahim Khan, the headman, and chief of the Malkal section of
the Tikariwals, came into camp and agreed to pay up the share
of the fine demanded from him. The other two leading men of
Tikari, viz., Ghafar Khan of Trand and Nawab Khan of Darian,
had made their submission before their country was entered and
thus the whole fine of Rs. 1,000 imposed on the Tikariwals had
been realized. As, however, Rahim Khan had delayed his pay-
ment and attendance, he was further punished by having forage
for the force for one day taken from his lands, and wood taken
from his village.
On the 22nd, Major- General McQueen reconnoitred the
Pariari glens from the Bilandkot spur, to arrange his plan for attack-
ing the villages of the Pariari Saiyids. Brigadier- General Channer
at the same time made a reconnaissance in the direction of
Maidan over the Shabora spur, and strong working- parties were
ordered out to improve the road. In the evening a jirga of the
Pariariwals came in, but the principal men were not present. An
ultunatum was accordingly sent to the tribe warning them that if
these men did not attend by the following evening their villages
would be destroyed. On the 23rd, the 5th Column moved forward
two miles in advance of the 1st Column to Sufian, at the foot of
the Shabora spur. The Pariari headmen not having come in, the
incomplete jirga was dismissed, and orders were issued for punitive
measures to be carried out on the following day.
Sanction having been received on the 23rd for the force to
visit Thakot, letters were sent to the Thakoti malihs giving them

notice of this and stating that our intentions were friendly, as long as
no opposition was offered, and inviting them to send in their jirga.
At 8 A.M. on the morning of the 24th, a force moved into the
Pariari country. On the left 2 guns, 3-1 South Irish, with an escort
of 100 infantry, took up a position on the spur under Bilandkot, to
cover the advance. In the centre a column, composed of 300 men
of the 3rd Sikhs, advanced up the Machai spur and destroyed the
village of Kopra with slight opposition, while a small force of 200
men and 2 guns from Chitabat co-operated down the spur from the
direction of the Machai peak. On the right the main column,
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBBS. 159

consisting of 800 and 2 guns, moved up the principal Pariari

rifles

glen, past the villages of Machai and Pariari direct on Garhi, which
the Khaibar Kifles, supported by the Seaforth Highlanders, des-
troyed after some opposition from the enemy. There were no
casualties on our side.
On and 26th Brigadier- General Channer, with the
the 25th
5th Column, moved
to Dabrai, making the road as he advanced ;

and the 1st Column, with Major- General McQueen and the head-
quarters staff, moved to Maidan, leaving a detachment at Chir-
mang. Messengers arrived from Arsala Khan of Allai to beg that
the force might not visit his country, and a reply was sent, stating
the terms on which the Government was prepared to accept the
submission of the tribe.
On the 27th Brigadier-General Channer advanced from Dabrai
via Paimal and Serai to Chanjal — about two and a half miles. The
road just beyond Dabrai and also between Serai and Chanjal w^as
very steep and difficult, and strong working-parties, assisted bv
the corps of coolies, were employed during the day in improving
it. The Major-General moved from Maidan to Serai with a portion
of the 1stColumn, leaving detachments to hold Maidan and Dabrai.
Up to this point there had been no opposition, but the
attitude of the Thakotis was uncertain and their jirga had not come
in. It was, moreover, reported that their women and cattle had
been sent away, and that their lower villages were deserted ; and
on the 27th a message was received by the Chief Political Officer
asking for twenty days in w^hich to collect their jirga.
Under these circumstances the General Officer Commanding
decided to make an immediate advance so as not to allow time for
any combinations of the tribes to oppose the advance.
Orders
were accordingly issued for a lightly equipped force to proceed to
Thakot the following day.
At 6-30 A.M. on the 28th, a force under Brigadier-General
G. N". Channer, v.c, ha vino-
' o
Visit to Thakot.
left all baggage behind under
a guard, and taking only one
blanket per man, great coats,
and one day's rations, march-
ed to Thakot.
160 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The path led down from Chanjal to the Nandihar (or Thakot)
stream, whence it ascended the opposite spur to Karg, from which
hamlet there was a descent of about 1,500 feet to Thakot. The
path was steep and bad, and had to be improved as the troops
advanced. The force reached Karg at 8-30 a.m., and Brigadier-
General Channer, leaving here a small detachment with the
two guns, descended by a steep path to Thakot, which was
reached without opposition soon after noon. The village proved
to be an insignificant place,and from its position at the bottom
of a valley surrounded by hills it was of no military importance.
The distance from Chanjal was somewhat over five miles. Thakot
had not been visited by the force in 1868, owing chiefly to the
difficulties of the country, and this had given an exaggerated
importance to the place, and had caused the inhabitants to regard
it as inaccessible to our troops. After marching the whole force
through the village. Brigadier- General Channer returned to the
village of Lora on the left bank of theNandihar stream. During
the afternoon the inhabitants of the village of Daut, across the
Indus, opened fire upon our troops, and shots were
from also fired

the heights to the south, in rear of the bivouac, but a few rounds
from the gatling guns cleared the ground in front, and the Khaibar
Eifles and 34th Pioneers, gaining possession of the heights to the
south soon cleared those parts of the enemy. The casualties on our
side were two men wounded.
Owing to the opposition which had been offered, and which was
traced to the headmen of Lora, that village with its tower was des-
troyed before the force retired on the morning of the 29th. Thakot
itself was spared, as its inhabitants had not opposed our troops.

The two guns, which had been brought down from Karg, shelled the
village of Daut on the other side of the river, whence the enemy
had opened fire the previous afternoon. The tower of this vil-
lage was destroyed by the guns, and the village itself set on fire.
The force then returned to Serai which was reached the same
evening.
Colonel Gatacre, with a detachment of the 3rd Sikhs and
Khaibar Rifles, withdrew from Thakot by a path running along the
right bank of the Nandihar stream, and some opposition was
experienced by this party during their return near the small village of
Mirazai, the inhabitants of which rolled down stones on the troops.
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBES. 161

Colonel Gatacre accordingly ordered the few houses composing the

hamlet to be destroyed. On the 30th October the whole force
returned to Maidan.
The period of grace given to Arsala Khan of AUai to come in
and make his submission having expired on the 30th, and there
being no signs of any intention on his part to accept the terms
offered by the Government, orders were issued by Major-General
McQueen for an advance towards the AUai country on the following
day.
Accordingly, on the morning of the 31st, a force composed
Advance into Allai. of the troops of the 1st and
5th Columns, as per margin,
under Colonels J. M. Sym
and A. Murray respectively,
marched towards the Ghora-
pher pass. The other troops
of these columns remained at
Maidan.
Brigadier-General Channer
accompanied the 1st Column
and the whole force bivou-
acked at Mazrai ' for the night.

At Mazrai, which was over 7,000 feet, little water was obtain-
able, and there was no forage to be had except from a distance.
During the day Brigadier- General Channer reconnoitred towards the
Ghorapher pass which was found to be occupied by the enemy.
A detachment of Kashmir troops had in the meantime moved
into Nandihar from the Chattar plain.

On the 1st November the advance on the Ghorapher pass, lead-

n ing
° into Allai,' was continued bvthe 1st
,
Capture off+i
the r<i 1
Chaila rulgp.
I
"^J ^^^ ^^^
Column, supported by the 5th Column.
The path led along a gentle spur, rising some 1,000 feet in about
3J miles, to the foot of a precipitous ascent, very much broken
with rocks and cliffs. The enemy held the crest and the forest
162 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

on the left of the advance, and the position they occupied was
naturally so strong that, if it had been held by a determined
opponent, it would have been almost impregnable.
The crest of the Chaila mountain is here protected by immense
masses of precipitous granite slates, behind which, as the force

ascended the spur, clusters of men could be seen. The first shots
were fired in the thick forest at the foot of the ascent at 10-30 a.m.,
and as the advance progressed, with the Northumberland Fusiliers
and Khaibar Kifles leading, the firing was for a short time very
brisk. The guns, at a range of 2,000 yards, covered the advance,
throwing shells amongst the granite crags and into the thick forest.
The enemy at first beat drums, played their pipes, and yelled in
defiance, but these sounds soon died away as our men pushed up
the steep slopes and scrambled over the crags. Before noon the
position was taken, the Fusiliers and Khaibaris reaching the crest
almost simultaneously. Our loss was only one man killed and one
wounded. A few bodies of the enemy were found on the crest,
and also some blankets, food bags, etc., shewing they had gone off
in a hurry.

Onthe crest being gained Brigadier-General Channer pushed

on with the Northumberland Fusiliers, 5th Gurkhas, and Khaibar
Rifles to Kage Oba,^ two and a half miles further on, the total
distance from Mazrai being six and a half miles. Here a plenti-
ful supply of water was found and a good camping-ground,
and there was a track fit for mules leading to it along the crest.
The path up to the crest, however, for the last 500 feet was found
to be quite impracticable for mules. The Pioneers and the
Sappers and Miners, assisted by the coolie corps, which had been
brought up from the rear, were employed all day .in trying to
improve it, but it was not till dusk that it was reported prac-
ticable. Only a very few mules could be got up this day, and the
night was one of great discomfort for the troops, who were for the
most part without food or blankets. There was, moreover, a hard
frost during the night, the elevation being over 9,000 feet.
Fortunately wood was plentiful, the bivouac being in partially
cleared forest. The baggage was massed, as far as possible, at
the foot of the ascent to the Chaila crest, with the guns ; and the

1 This means " the wmding stream."

 .

163
BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES.

Sikhs held the line of the crest

Seaforth Highlanders with the 3rd
Kashmir troops moved
with picquets. Five hundred men of the
place of the force that had
from Batgraon to Mazrai to take the
communications. A letter was
advanced, and to keep open the
point of which was con-
received this day from Arsala Khan, the
" kindly wait and stay a little." Hls
tained in the last sentence
object was evidently to gain time,
being aware that owing to the
lateness of the season operations
might at any time be stopped
by snow.
commenced to ascend
At daylight on the 2nd, the baggage
bivouac below. In places the
the steep part of the road from the
mules did not reach the crest
road was very difficult. The last
arrive in camp till 9 p.m.
tilldark, and the rear-guard did not
imagined from the fact that the
The difficulty of the road may be
the ascent— about one mile in
bacrgage took twelve hours to make
length! During this ascent
some fourteen mules were killed by
falling over the precipice.
The enemy fired occcasional shots from
the forest and caused a few casualties
among our troops.
During the morning Brigadier-General Channer made a re-
head-quarters of Arsala
connaissance in the direction of Pokal, the
p.m. The reconnoitring
Khan, returning to camp about 3
and three of the enemy
party met with some slight opposition
were killed and two wounded. A
report was now brought that m
Indus, but that his eldest son
Arsala Khan had fled across the
following. Orders were accord-
Ghazi Khan was holding out with a
under Brigadier-General Channer
ingly issued for a small force
to proceed to Pokal the
following day, and after destroying it to
During the day slight snow
return to- the bivouac on the crest.
was falling.
proceeded to Pokal.
On the 3rd, the force, as per margin,
The path ran with a gentle
, . .
PA 9 anns
2 guns.
gradient till withm two miles
South Irish Division, R. A.
.
T^.
3-1
, .. &^ ^ ^ ^ „
^
,,
Northumberland Fusiliers .. K.O rifles. q{ Pokal, from whcnCC the
Suffolk Regiment .
•• 40 „
^g^ent was stecp and ovcr
Royal Sussex Regiment '
' *!^ "
rm. ,
Seaforth Highlanders •• 160 „ Qp^n ground. 1 he enemy
'"'""! .'.
offered some opposition to
5th GuSs 200 :
Kl.aibar Rifles . • •
i>'>0
» the advaucc and suffered
loss. On reaching the village the detachments
considerable
164 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

of Suffolkand Eoyal Sussex Regiments (all picked marks-

men) fired volleys on the retreating bodies of the enemy at
long ranges with great effect. The village of Pokal was en-
tirely destroyed, with the exception of the mosque, and the
force at 1 p.m. began to retire, detachments of the Seaforth
:

Highlanders and Khaibar Rifles forming the rear- guard. The

enemy followed up most persistently, to the number of about
300, to v/ithin a mile of the camp, but were driven off by the
steady fire of the troops. One company of the Northumberland
Fusiliers occupied a knoll, and, waiting for the enemy to collect

in groups, soon had an opportunity of pouring in a volley,

which drove them back, leaving a good number
effectually
killed. Our loss during the day had been one killed and four
wounded. Brigadier-General Channer in his despatch estimated
the enemy's loss at from 80 to 100 killed, and he considered
that the small number of casualties on our side was largely due
to the admirable manner in which the troops skirmished during
the advance and performed rear- guard duties during the retire-
ment. The troops all returned to camp before dark after a very
heavy day's work. The distance to Pokal was seven miles and
the descent 4,300 feet. The Allai valley was found to be
open, highly cultivated, and dotted about with numerous large
villages.
Late on the evening of the 3rd, an Allai jirga, representing
five out of the eight sections, and comprising the faction opposed
to Arsala Khan, arrived in camp, and on the 4th November the
whole force withdrew from the Allai country to Mazrai. The
Pioneers, Sappers and Miners, and Hazara Mountain Battery
moved back the same day to Maidan, and the Kashmir troops
returned to Batgraon.
It be mentioned that on the 28th the Chitabat peak had
may
been evacuated, and the head-quarters of the 2nd Column had been
transferred to Chirmang, in order to bring pressure to bear on
the Pariari Saiyids by taking grain, forage, and wood from their

country.
This had the desired effect and their jirga came into Maidan
on the evening of the 4th, paid up Rs. 479, and gave five headmen
as hostages. They were then dismissed, being allowed two days to
collect the remainder of the fine of Rs. 1,500 imposed upon them.
 165
BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES.

in to the Major- General at Chir-

This they subsequently brought
man^ on the 7th November.
Channer's force was withdrawn
On the 5th Brigadier-General
Allai jirga which had
accompamed
from Mazrai to Maidan. The considered
day dismissed, as it was
the force to Maidan was this
a full yzV^a, or one brmging
m
impossible to deal withany but
prepared
present deputation was ^ot
the whole fine, which the
to them that all Allai
would be held
to do. It was explained
action of anyofits inhabitants,
and that
responsible for the hostile
within a reasonable time, m
cash or
the whole fine must be paid
would be re-imposed It was also point-
cattle, otherwise a blockade
the
ed out to them that we
had punished Arsala Khan, had seen
again if we
Allai country, and could
at any future time visit it
visit were forced on us, our
stay would
wished; moreover, if such a
live on the country.
be a longer one, and we should
withdrawn to British
From Maidan the troops were gradually
exception of
territory and on the
10th the whole force (with the
riverside, and the Kashmir
Contingent,
the 4th Column on the
plain), was
which had been withdrawn on the 8th to the Chattar
concentrated in the Agror valley.
The head- quarters of the 2nd
Chirmang to Kulakka on the
Column had been withdrawn from
5th November, and the 3rd
Column from Karun had reached the
rejoined there by the 14th Sikhs and
same camp on the 4th, being
Tilh on the 7th Nov-
company of Sappers and Miners from
the half
Orders were received on the
11th for the force the m
ember
necessary instructions
valley to be broken up, and
the
Agror
were at once issued.
Brigadier- General
On the same date orders were received by
his force to British territory.
This was
Galbraith to withdraw
fired, and on the 13th the whole
carried out without a shot being
concentrated at Darband, whence they
of the 4th Column was
destinations.
were dispersed to their several
immediate results of the expedition may here be
briefly
The
The Khan Khel section
recapitulated.
Results of expedition.
^^ ^^^ Hassanzais had been severely
principal villages burnt The
punished and had had all their
completely destroyed. The Parian
Hindustani settlement had been
heavy punishment on themselves, had even-
Saiyids after bringing
 —

166 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

tually submitted the Government terms and Arsala

and fulfilled ;

Khan of AUai had been punished by having his village and tower
destroyed. The fines imposed were all duly paid, for the most part
in cattle. Of the two British subjects carried off into captivity
by Hashim Ali Khan, one escaped and the other was released. The
Akazais and Hassanzais gave hostages for future good behaviour, and
admitted their responsibility for the conduct of the hhan of the
Khan Khels, who is the chief of all the three divisions of the Isazais,
the clan to which they both belong. They undertook that in
future the troops, or servants, of the British Government should
not be molested if they marched on the Black Mountain anywhere
mountain on the
within British territory, or along the crest of the
boundary between British and independent territory. The Aka-
zais promised for the future to lay no claim to the Shatut lands,
to make no buildings, and to graze no cattle to the east of the
watershed of the Black Mountain on the Agror side. The Hassan-
zais undertook not to injure any roads which had been made within
their territory during the operations, and a similar promise was
made by the Tikariwal and the Nandihar jirgas.
Major- General McQueen, in his despatch on the operations of
the Hazara Field Force, noted in addition to the above political
results of the campaign, the opening up of the Thakot and Allai
countries by the formationgood mule roads into the heart of
of

these tracts the completion of a thoroughly good camel road

;

from Oghi to Dabrai and a mule track from Darband to Kanar ;

and the detailed survey of 177 square miles of unknown country.

The measures permanent kind which should be taken to
of a
facilitate intercourse with the Black Mountain tribes, to give us
a better and quicker command of the approaches to that region,
were postponed for subsequent consideration and settlement but ;

Major- General McQueen recommended

(1) The construction of a good camel road between Agror and Dar-
band down the valley of the Unhar stream.
(2) The maintenance of a good road from Darband along the Indus
to our frontier, and if possible beyond, as far as Kanar.

(3) The maintenance of the camel road from Oghi via the Jal pass
and Chirmang to Maidan in Nandihar, and if practicable to
Paimal.
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 167

(4) The construction of a good camel road from tlic Chattar plain
via Pliagora and Batgraon to Maidan.
(5) The establishment of a post on the Jal Gali to be held by men
of the Agror valley who have done good service for Govern-
ment.

The casualties sustained by our troops during the operations

were two officers (Colonel A. C. W. Crookshank, c.b., Command-
:

ing 4th Column, and Captain C. H. H. Beley, d.s.o., d.a.q.m.g.,)

died of wounds three officers (Captain 0. C. Radford, and Lieu-
;

tenants F. J. S. Cleeve and C. F. 8. Ewart) wounded twenty- ;

three men killed, and fifty- four wounded. It is difficult to give

the enemy's losses with any approach to accuracy, owing to their
custom of carrying away their dead, but they were estimated to
be about 400 killed and wounded. The losses from disease on the
side of the British were slight, as the health of the troops
remained
good throughout, in spite of, or perhaps in consequence of, the
hard work and hardships undergone.
One peculiar feature of this expedition was the large num-
ber of British subjects who went from Hazara, and, it is said,

even from the Rawal Pindi and Jhelum districts, and fought against
us, many being killed and wounded ; the greater number no doubt
went from the first named district and especially from the Tana-
wali tract. The fact of the Hindustanis being engaged against
us may be accepted as the cause that led to the rising of this
wave of religious feeling. No other reason has been put forward,
and no other can be suggested as at all likely to have induced
men thus to sacrifice their lives. Such being the motive, it may
be assumed that the continued residence of the Hindustanis ab
Maidan, so close to our border, had led to the spread of their
doctrines in the neighbourhood. The expedition, therefore, on
this ground,was not a day too soon to show the people on this
border our power, capabifity, and determination to punish when
necessary.
During the year subsequent to the Hazara expedition of 1888
^^^^'^ ^^ ^^^^ ^g^or border remained
Events on the Hazara border
subsequent to the expedition of quiet. By the removal of the Khan of
^'
Agror a salutary warning had been
given to other Khans within our frontier, whose intrigues and
 168 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

machiiiations had been the fertile cause of trouble with the clans
on this border. Police control over Agror was strengthened, and
several criminals who had fled from justice in past years were
arrested, brought to trial, and punished.
After the submission of the tribes and withdrawal of the troops,
the Government of India took into consideration measures to
secure control for the future over these clans and to give easy access
to their country. Among these measures the Supreme Govern-
ment, in March 1890, ordered the construction of several roads
leading from Agror up to the crest of the Black Mountain, and at
the same time called for the opinion of the Punjab Government,
whether, in order to reap the full benefit of these roads, troops
should not use them and visit the border periodically. After some
correspondence it was decided to send a small force to make
a route march in a peaceabb manner along the crest of the range
during the autumn of 1890.

In the meanwhile, as the roads near the crest could not be

safely made without the co-operation of the neighbouring tribes,
the Hassanzais, Akazais, and Pariari Saiyids were invited to send
in their jirgas to arrange for the peaceable completion of the
work on the upper slopes of the mountain. They replied object-
ing to the construction of the roads and refusing, or evading, the
invitation and when they were subsequently ordered to send
;

in deputations to accompany troops on their march along the crest,

and were warned at the same time that opposition would be
severely punished, they returned evasive replies. The column
detailed to march along the crest was placed under the command
of Brigadier- General Sir J. W." McQueen, k.c.b., a.d.c, com-
manding the Punjab Frontier Force, to whom the object of the
operation was notified in the following terms by the Quarter
Master General in India in a telegram, dated the 10th October
1890 :—
His Excellency wishes to impress on you that the operations this autumn
are merely intended to prove our right under the treaty to march along the
crest, and are not intended to develop under any circumstances into a

larc^e expedition. Should the tribes oppose the promenade this autumn
vou should not push forward, but, having clearly put upon the tribes the
odium of not having carried out their obligations, reserve their punishment
 BLACK MOUJtfTAIN TRIBES. 169

for an expedition in the spring, whicli they will be told will be sent against
them.

Accordingly the marginally noted force marched from

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Abbottabad, and arrived at Oghi on the
l^''^*t^ry-
19th October, on which date Brigadier-
500 rifles, 4th Sikh Infantry. ^, i a- t itit r\ i
350 „ 1 -5th Gurkhas. Orcneral feir John McCjueen took over
350 2-5th
„ „ command. The attitude of the tribes,
except the Pariari Saiyids who had sent in their jirga, was doubtful,
and numerous gatherings of tribesmen were reported at Nimal,
Kain Gali, and other places, where they had been induced to collect
by Hashim Ali, the Khan of the Isazais, a man who has been con-
sistently hostile to Government since he first came into notice as
successor to Ahmad Ali Khan.
Heavy and snow on the crest of the hill prevented an
rain
advance for some days, and it was not until the 23rd October that
8ir J. McQueen moved up the Barchar spiu- with a column of 1,000
rifles and 4 guns, bivouacking above the village of Barchar, with

picquets about a mile below the crest. There was a considerable

amount of firing at the bivouac that night, but owing to its posi-
tion on the reverse of the slope no damage was done.
On the morning of the
24th information arrived that the
Akazais as well as the Hassanzais had determined to join Hashim
Ali in opposing our advance, and at daylight large numbers of
tribesmen were seen to be assembling on the crest of the hill.
Under these circumstances Sir J. McQueen withdrew his troops in
accordance with his instructions.

Expedition against the Hassanzai and Akazai Clans of the Black

Mountain by a Force under Major-General W. K. Elles,
C.B., in 1891.

In consequence of the opposition offered to out troops, it

was now decided by the Governor- General in Council to despatch
a force into the Hassanzai and Akazai territories, and the Com-
mander-in-Chief was called upon to submit proposals for carrying
out the necessary operations.
The objects of the expedition were stated in the Government
letter to be, first, to carry out the purpose for which the movement
Vol. I. z
 ;

170 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

of troops in October had been made, namely, —to assert our right
to move along the crest of the Black Mountain without molesta-
tion ; and next, and more particularly, to punishment on the
inflict

on that occasion. The

tribes concerned for the hostility practised
occupation of the country to be entered was to be prolonged until
the tribes concerned had made complete submission and had
carried out whatever conditions had been imposed upon them.
The whole of the Hassanzai and Akazai clans were held to be res-
ponsible for the hostility displayed towards our troops.
was decided that the expedition should take place whether
It
or no the tribes in the meanwhile offered submission and the ;

Punjab Government was authorized to inform the tribes of this

decision, and also that the Government of India demanded their
unconditional submission ; they were further to be informed that,
if they submitted, not only would Government be disposed to treat

them leniently, but would undertake to settle all outstanding cases

by tribal jirqa in accordance with the custom of the country, and
would be prepared to discuss with them in the same fashion the
future mangement of their country.

In consequence of the experience gained during the 1888 ex-

pedition, it was decided that the advance should be made only by
the Indus The reasons which led to this decision were that the
line.

large villages and most valuable lands of the Hassanzai and Akazai
clans are situated along the Indus, or at no great distance from
it, and could be easily reached by an advance up the left bank

of the river, while, on the other hand, the ascent of the mountain
from the east and south-east is difficult that the crest line is our
;

boundary, and for some way down the western side there are no
villages or property the destruction of which would be much felt
and finally, that in the forest which clothes the upper part of the
mountain the conditions of fighting are in favour of an active enemy
well acquainted with the ground, while the superior armament
and discipline of our troops might be partially neutralized. It was
accordingly decided that while Oghi should be occupied by a small
force,this should be merely placed there as a precautionary
measure, and not in view to an advance from that side of the
Black Mountain, except as far as the occupation of Pabal Gali
and Tilli.
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 171

The force was directed to advance from Darband into the

Left or River Column, at Darhand. enemy's country in two
No. 1 IVl Battery R. A 3 guns. columnS, one niovincr vid o "^
No. 2 (Derajat) M. Battery, 3 guns.
2nd Bn., Seaforth Highlanders. Baradar and Pailam to Tilli,
H. qrs^and wmg, 32nd Pioneers. ^^
•

37tn (Dogra) Bengal Infantry.

^^^ ^-^^ ^^-^ j
& ^

Guides Infantry.. loute Via Kotkai and Kanar ;

^^^'
l^fpil'fr'^TSuCoiumn, at Darhand. ^nd the troops were Ordered
No. 9 M. Battery, R. A. to Concentrate at Darband
1st Bn., Royal Welsh Fusiliers. ^r
^nd r\ i ,^ ^ • ^ -, ,
Ughi by the Ist March
,

11th Bengal Infantry.

Wing of 32nd Pioneers. 1 891 as shown in the margin.
,
2nd Bn., 5th Gurkhas. rpv + x .i •
+ i i
Khaibar Rifles. -Liie total Strength, exclusive
Troops ai Darhand.
,, . ^^f«'^««^ ^f ^]^q Ecserve Brigade,
® was
11th B. L. (one squadron). '

No. 4 Coy., Bengal Fappers and Miners. 169 OniCerS, 7,120 native offi-

iith B. L. ioI:^T- '=»^' non-commissioned offi-

No. 2 (Derajat) M. Battery, 3 guns. cers and men (British and
28th Bengal Infantry. ,
, -
•
mi
^ i
Reserve Brigade at Rawal Pindi.
natlVCS), and 15 gUnS. There
11th B. L. (one squadron). was also with the forcc a
1st Bn., King's Royal Rifle Corps. n ^' n ^/^
19th Bengal Infantry. Coolie Lorps,
200 strong, for
2"^*^ „ road-making,
„ under the
charge of Lieutenant Bird wood, E.E. The detail of commands
and staff will be found in Appendix B. Full political authority was
conferred on the General Officer Commanding the Expeditionary
Force, and Mr. F. D. Cunningham, was appointed Chief
c.i.e., c.s.,

Political Officer under his orders. Direct communication between

the General Officer Commanding and the Foreign Office was sanc-
tioned on matters connected with that Department.
all

The advance was delayed by bad weather, but on the 11th

March Major-General Elles reported that the force was assembled
and ready to move forward on the following day. In the mean-
while good roads had been completed on the Tilli line to near the
and on the river Hne to Bel a. Phaldar and Bela were
frontier,
both occupied by our troops, the telegraph hne being completed
to these points. On the 11th the boats for a bridge, which had
been brought up from Attock, arrived at Bela. On the same
date four days' supplies for the right column had been collected
at Phaldar, and four days' for the left column at Bela. A few
shots had been from the opposite side of the river at work-
fired
ing-parties, but beyond this, there were no signs of opposition.
The news received of the intentions of the tribes was conflicting,
Z2
172 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

but was reported that the Hassanzai and Akazai were both pressing
it

Hashim Ali Khan, the nominal chief of both clans, to submit and
jointhem in a deputation to the British authorities. On the 10th
March it was notified to the Hassanzais that, if they remained
peaceably in their villages when the force advanced into their
country, they would not be injured in person, and their villages

would be protected from harm. The terms of submission would

be made known after the country had been occupied.

On the 11th March a Bunerwal y^Vgra arrived at Amb, and a
native official Ibrahim Khan, Khan Bahadur, was sent by the
General to assure them that the Government had no quarrel with
them, and no intention of interfering with them or their country. A
Mada Khel jirga, which had also gone to Amb, were at the same
time informed that we had no quarrel with them, if they behaved
peaceably and neither offered opposition to our troops nc.r

permitted others to attempt hostility from their country. They

were further told that their jirga would be received at Kanar, or at
some convenient place in the Hassanzai country.
In view of the attitude of the Bunerwals, the garrison of Mardan
was increased, so that pressure might be brought to bear on the
tribe from the Peshawar side, if necessary.
The plan of operations proposed by Major-General Elles wan,
after the occupation of Kanar and Tilli as
opera
.
push forward both columns
directed, to ;

the left column to occupy the lower Hassanzai country on both

banks and the Diliarai peninsula of the Akazai country, and the
right column to pass through the middle levels of the mountain by
Eil and Kungar and occupy the Khan Khel country. Thereafter
the two columns to work up and down on the north of the Slial
Nala, through the Akazai country, till they met. On a junction
being effected, the occupation of the whole country of the two

tribes would be completed. As regards punishment, the Hassanzais,

who had submitted, were in the event of their return to their
villages to be mulcted in one-fourth of their standing crops. In
other cases the troops would subsist on the country, as far as their
requirements could be met, until submission took place.
On the morning of the 12th March the TiUi Column marched
from Darband at 8 a.m., and the River Column (accompanied by
the General Officer Commanding and the divisional head-quarters)
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TBI BBS. I73

at 8-30' A.M. The former occupied Pailam and the latter Kotkai
without opposition. There was some desultory firing at the
River Column from the opposite side of the Indus, from a point
where the Hassanzai and Mada Khel boundaries meet and ;

when the boats were coming up the river, shots were fired from
this point at the boats' escort. A company of the Guides
crossed over the river and dislodged the men who were firing,
without any casualties on our side. Villages along the river bank
passed en route were found deserted, and all property and grain
had been carried off.
The River Column bivouacked for the night at Towara, on the
site where the action of Kotkai had been fought in 1888.

At daybreak on the morning of the 13th, two companies of

the Guides, who had been sent over to tli£ right bank the night
before, moved to take up fresh ground, and found the village of
Nadrai occupied. A brisk fire was opened by the enemy, and the
Guides rushed the village, which was carried with a loss to the
enemy of three killed and three wounded, there being no casual-
ties on our side. The same morning, a reconnoitring force, con-
sisting of a half battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders and a half
battalion of the Guides, crossed to the right bank of the river at
the Marer ferry, and proceeded to Doshkand, and thence to the
Palosi plain, visiting Garhi, Nawekili, and Palosi, which were
found deserted. Maidan, the Hindustani settlement which had
been destroyed in 1888, was still in ruins. At Garhi the force was met
by two companies of the Guides, who had marched direct to that
place along the right bank of the river. Under cover of this move-
ment the road between Kotkai and Kanar was examined, and it
was ascertained that it could not be made practicable until the
evening of the following day, and it was therefore decided that the
column should remain at Towara. All the villages visited during
the day (except Nadrai, which had been fired by the Guides after
its capture) were left untouched. On this date the boats were
all collected at Kotkai.
The right column, which had marched to Tilli, remained halted
at that place.
On the 15th, a reconnaissance was, made to the Palosi plain,
for the purpose of selecting ground for a bivouac, and also to
ascertain the nature of a tribal gathering reported at the western
174 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

end of the plain. On nearing Palosi the party was fired on from
both sides of the river, but the enemy were driven off, and the
reconnaissance was then pushed about a mile beyond the
ruins ^f Maidan, where a considerable gathering of armed men
was seen on both sides of the river on the surrounding hills. The
party then returned to Towara. On the same day a detachment
of the 4th Sikhs, proceeding along the left bank of the river from
Kanar, surprised the enemy under the cliffs beyond Ghazikot,
and inflicted some loss on them. Brigadier- General Hammond, who
commanded the right column, now reported to the General Officer
Commanding that he was experiencing great difficulties at Tilli on
account of lack of forage. General Elles was consequently obliged to
chano-e the original plan of operations, as is shown in the sub-
joined telegram from him to Army Head-quarters.

I find that the difficulty in supporting the transport of the Tilli Column
at that level very great at this early time of the year. Fodder would
is

either have to be taken up fromhere^ or brought in from Phaldar. The crops

at Tilli are only just above ground. Seri was reported under snow. I

therefore decided on the spot to make other dispositions for the present ;

first, to open out Tilli -Kanar road"; second, to establish permanent posts at
Tilli, Ril, and Malo-anai ;
third, to bring down Tilli Column with all its

transport to join River Column at Palosi fourth, to establish one ad-

;

vanced depot at Kotkai and supply the whole force from this. The circuit
round upper posts will be completed by a track from Makranai to Kanar,
which can be made practicable for laden mules. Before transferring his
brigade to Palosi, General Hammond will probably make a flying advance
to Seri, stay one night, and blow up any defences there. As for this,
I am now awaiting his report.
I expect to have all the above dispositions completed in four days
at latest. As to the column to operate via Bakrai
future, I intend right

upwards through Akazai country, and left column through Trans-Indus

Hassanzai.

During the 14th and 15th, reports were received by the

Chief Political Officer of armed men and flags crossing over the
Baio range to Karnar and Kamach, and on the 15th it was re-
ported that the aged Maulvi Abdulla, the leader of the Hindus-
tani fanatics, had reached Kamach.

J Namely, the Indus valley.

 JBLACK MOVNTAIN TRIBES. 175

On the 1 6th Kanar was strengthened by a wing of the 4th

Sikhs to facilitate work on the road to from that place. The
Tilli

bridge- of- boats at Kotkai was completed, span 110 yards, with
easy approaches and a camel road to Palosi opened out.
;

The Hassanzais and Akazais were now reported to be anxious

to submit, and notice was sent to them that, if they returned peace-
ably to their homes, no harm would be done to them, and that
not more than one- quarter of their crops would be taken for the
supplies of the army. The surrender of Hashim Ali and his family
was demanded.
On this day was ascertained that the Hindus-
(the 16th) it

tanis under Maulvi AbduUa were

collecting at Didal and that there
were a number of Chagarzais at Kamach. It was also reported
that Hashim Ali, Khan of Seri, had been travelling about exciting
the people, and had then gone off to Swat to ask Mian Gul to join and
lead a holy war. A small gathering, 400- men or so, was reported
in villages about Darbanai, Surmal, etc., but it appeared that the
tribeswere assembling for the most part in the Trans-Indus
Chagarzai country.
Early in the morning of the 19th March the outpost at Ghazikot,
a small straggling village on the left bank of the Indus, about three-
quarters of a mile north of Kanar, was attacked. A narrow street
ran up the middle of the village ; a small musjid was at its south-
.,, ^ -1 6^st corner; while north and south of it,
Attack,
on r.1
Ghazikot. . ^ '

at a distance of about 200 yards, were two

narrow nalas running at right angles into the river. The outpost
consisted of the Dogra company of the 4th Sikhs, under Subadar
Dheru, and was composed of two native officers and sixty-seven men.
The picquet was placed behind some stone walls half-way between
the northern nala and the village, while the remainder of the com-
pany bivouacked in rear of the musjid.
On the evening of the 18th some shots were fired by the
enemy at the picquet, and at about on the 19th, the
3 a.m.
havildar in charge of this picquet reported to Subadar Dheru that
the enemy were'collecting in force in the nala to his front. When
they arrived close enough to be seen, the picquet fired four volleys
at them, on which the swordsmen of the enemy, with shouts,
rushed past the right of the picquet straight for the musjid in the
south-east corner of the village. The enemy being in this way
 176 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INblA.

and joined the main body

in rear of the picqiiet, the hitter retired
of the company. A hot fire was then commenced on both sides,
the enemy firing from the roofs of the houses and charging with
swords out of the ^nusjid. At about 3-20 a.m., reinforcements,
consisting of a company of the 4th Sikhs under Lieutenant Maconchy,
followed by a second company of the same regiment under
Lieutenant Manning, arrived on the scene. Closely following on
these, under Colonel Sir B. Bromhead, c.b., cam^e two companies
of the 32nd Pioneers.
At that time a very hot fire was going on, the enemy being
in the 7nusjid and on the roofs of the houses. Half a company of
the 4th Sikhs, under Lieutenant Maconchy, rushed through the
centre of the village and occupied the right front of it, but
in getting through the narrow street. Lieutenant Maconchy
and three sepoys were w^ounded. Colonel Bromhead with the
Pioneers now joined this party, having swept round the right
flank of the village, while a company of the 4th Sikhs at the
same time went round the left flank. Under orders of Colonel
Bromhead, all firing was then stopped, and orders given to rely
on sword and bayonet only. By that time the main body of
the enemy had evidently retired, but gliazis kept creeping from
various places, firing and using their knives in the dark. When
day broke the Pioneers and 4th Sikhs cleared the village, and
Captain DeBrath, with one company of the former regiment,
advanced about a mile along the path on the left bank of the
river in the track of the enemy's line of retreat, when four men
were seen crossing to the right bank on a raft, and about eighty
returnins to Bakrai at the mouth of the Shal Nala. The ravines
and caves in the vicinity of Ghazikot were searched, but no more
of the enemy were discovered.
Lieutenant Maconchy was subsequently awarded the D. S. 0.
and Subadar Dheru, Havildar Waziru, Naik Ganesha Singh, Lance-
Naik Alam Khan and Hospital Assistant Ahmadulla Khan received
the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit for their gallantry on this
occasion.
The number and enemy, who were reported to
loss of the

have consisted almost entirely of Hindustani fanatics, could

not be estimated, but they left twenty-five bodies in and near
the village. Of these, twenty-two were Hindustanis, two were
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 177

Pathans, and the remaining body was that of a Hindu baniah,

who had been for some days previously at Kanar, and was prob-
ably made to act as guide to the attacking party. Our casualties
were four killed and twenty-one wounded.
During the night of the 19th there was some firing at Kanar,
and two companies of the Guides were sent from Towara to reinforce
the detachment there. Two companies of the Seaforth Highlanders
were also sent to reinforce the wing of the 37th Dogras at the
bridge head. In this fighting the enemy lost three killed, and our
casualties were three sepoys of the 32nd Pioneers wounded and
one mule-driver found dead in a ravine to the south of the
village.
The River Column, accompanied by divisional head-quarters,
moved on the 20th from Towara The enemy
to Pirzada Bela.
was seen in considerable numbers on the surrounding hills, and
Bakrai and Makranai were shelled.
(3n the 21st the Eiver Column marched from Pirzada Bela
to Palosi, w^here a defensive position was formed so as to include
the village. On this day the Right Column occupied Ril, and
liaving destroyed Seri on the 22nd, it returned to Tilli.

On the 23rd March, a flying bri-dge was established at Bakrai

^.,..
XT •
v,^
under cover of a partv
^ "
of the 4th Sikhs,'
Aftair on Dilian Heights.
who were sent across the river to occupy
that place. This led to a large gathering of the enemy on the
Diliari hill overlooking Bakrai, who shortly after advanced down
the spur towards the position. The Sikh picquet was now
thrown forward to check this advance, and a wing of the Guides
was sent across the river by the General Officer Commanding,
who had observed the enemy's movement, to act as a support.
By about 5-30 p.m., the Sikhs had succeeded in driving the
enemy from the hill and had occupied the crest, where they were
joined by the Guides. Shortly after, however, orders were given
for the whole party to withdraw to a breastwork which had
been built about half-way up the slope from Bakrai.
In order to understand the position of affairs at this juncture
it isnecessary to explain that the hill on which Diliari stands is
situated about one mile to the north-west of, and some 1,800 feet
above, Bakrai, and is an offshoot of the large spur that bounds
the Shal Nala on the north and north-west. The top of the hill is
 178 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

terraced and, although commanded at about 800 yards by the main

spur, forms a good position for a strong picquet.
Immediately the rear party of the 4th Sikhs quitted the
crest of this hill, the enemy, in Pathan fashion, began to collect
again and press upon them, so that it was necessary to bring
up supports and hold on to a ridge that afforded a good defensive
position. It was now about 6-45 p.m. The enemy, who appeared
to number about 50 or 60 men with firearms and 200 swordsmen,
were receiving reinforcements every minute, so that not only
would it have been very difficult to retire, but the position of the
4th Sikhs at Bakrai would have become more or less untenable
at night. Under these circumstances Lieut. -Colonel Gaselee,
commanding the regiment, decided to re-occupy Diliari, and,
posting one company to a flank, fire on the crest, he advanced
to

with the other two companies which were at hand, and cleared
the hill. The enemy at once evacuated the position, which was
then occupied for the night by one company of the 4th Sikhs and
two companies of the Guides, the remaining two companies of this
regiment being sent back to camp at Palosi.

Thus was driven home the lesson that, even with the tribal
firearms of those days, it was necessary to occupy all command-
ing ground within range, and that a position for a picquet on the
not to be thought of, unless it is absolutely impos-
slope of a hill is

sible to hold the crest. The forwardness of a Pathan enemy

during a retirement from an awkward position and the rapid
collapse of their opposition before an energetic advance are
characteristics that are too well known to need comment.
The enemy were Chagarzais and Hindustanis, and they owned
to having lost twelve killed and sixteen wounded. Our losses were
one officer (Lieutenant Harman) and four men wounded, mostly in
hand-to-hand fighting.
On the 24th March, Brigadier- General Hammond, with the
No. 9 Mountain Battery, troops as per margin, marched from Tilli
R.A. (2 guns). , to Palosi, leaving a detachment of
1st Battalion, Royal ,xr 1.
Welsh
1
,
^ /,
the (iurkhas
,
at the former place and
, i

Fusiliers.
Half Battalion, 2-5th Gurkha detachment of that regiment and
^^^^ ^
Regiment, i c
•
c •

Khaibar Rifles. the left Wing of the 32nd Pioneers at

Ril and Makranai, On arrival at Palosi the Khaibar Rifles were
 —

BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 179

sent across the river to Bakrai, while the remainder of the troops
joined the River Column.
The occupation of the Diliarai heights at nightfall on the
23rd by the 4th Sikhs had been followed by the retirement of the
enemy, and no attempt had been made on the picquets during the
night. On the morning of the 24th, ground to the north-west was
occupied up to a point overlooking Didal and Kamach on the
right bank of the Indus, and three guns of No. 2 (Derajat)
Mountain Battery were sent from Palosi to join the 4th Sikhs.
A movement of the enemy southwards along the Indus valley
from Kamach and was observed, about ten standards
Didal
crossing to Darbanai and the same number proceeding towards
Karnar and Baio.
On this date the General Officer commanding reported that
the political situation was as follows :

The lower Hassanzai, including all the clans except the KhanKhel, have
submitted. They have offered no opposition to our advance, and they are
anxious to be allowed to return to their villages. The Akazai would
probably submit on the occupation of Darbanai, but are intimidated by
mullas and others from Chagarzai territory. With regard to the Chagarzai
themselves, their country is overrun by a horde of mullas, talibs, and such
like from Kohistan, Batkul, Kana, Ghorband, Chakesar, etc. and they are ;

unable, even if willing, to maintain a peaceable attitude. The Bunerwals,

who have been some days at Baio, appear to be maintaining a watchful
for

attitude, but there is up to this time no general gathering of the tribe. Mr.
Cunningham reports from information received by him, that the armed
gathering at Baio is composed of men brought there by Mulla Faizi of
Bajkatta, in upper Buner, and the Akhund Khel of Kuria, in the Chamla
valley.

On the morning of the 2oth March the force, as shown in the

margin, under Brigadier-General Hammond, advanced up the Shal
Nala, covered by the 4th Sikhs and the
^No.9l\ln. Battery, K. A., 4
^^^^ ^j ^^^ 2 (Derajat) Mountain
^^v,^^
1st Bn., Roy. Welsh Fus. Battery on the Diliarai spur. The objec-
^^ ^^'
movement was Darbanai,
companies.^'^^^ " *^^® ^^ *^^^ a
2-5th Gurkhas wing. on a knoll jutting out
village situatcd
Khaibar Rifles. , -
t n . •
i . i i
from the main spur into the Indus valley.
It is about 1,500 feet above the Indus and is a most commanding
position, dominating the course of the river northwards as well as
A2
 180 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the northern slopes of the main spur, and the whole of the right bank
of the Indus from below Didal to above Kamach. A hotal on the
same level as the village connects the Diliarai heights with the
upper portion of the spur. The track up the Shal Nala was a most
difficult one, but at 1 p.m. Brigadier- General Hammond was in
possession of the hotal. Before attacking, however, he waited for
his guns, which had ascended the bed of the nala through a very
rough track. Directly the advance began the enemy opened lire
from the village and from the spur above Ledh. The Khaibar
Rifles ascended the hill on tlte right, the Gurkhas advanced on the
left, and the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 11th Bengal Infantry in

the centre. The enemy abandoned the village before it was reached,
and made off down the slope of the hill towards lower Surmal, the
Royal Welsh Fusiliers following them closely. The Khaibar Rifles
meanwhile had cleared the hills on the right for a long distance, doing
a hard day's work. The troops bivouacked for the night in and
about Darbanai. Our losses during the day had been Lieutenant
Doughty, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and one man of the Khaibaris
wounded. The enemy's losses were estimated at about forty.
The water-supply at Darbanai, which was brought by a channel
from a ravine about a mile distant and 800 or 900 feet above the
village, having been cut by the enemy, Brigadier -General Hammond
sent word to the village of upper Surmal, where a number of armed
men were collected, that, if the fixing into camp did not cease, and
the water was not turned on, he would attack and destroy their
village.
On the 27th, as the enemy in the neighbourhood of Darbanai had
taken no notice of the warning sent to them, and a force had collect-

ed at lower Surmal in a threatening attitude, Brigadier -General

Hammond, having posted No. 9 Mountain Battery in a position
commanding that advanced down the spur towards it,
village,
sending the Khaibar Rifles up the hills on the right. The guns
of No. 9 Mountain Battery were ordered to open fire on Surmal
and the spurs above it, and the 2-5th Gurkhas were directed to
make a flanking movement to the right ; whilst the Royal Welsh
Fusiher 8, with the 11th Bengal Infantry in reserve, dropped down
into the nala, and then ascended on the other side. There were
400 or 500 of the enemy in and about the village, and they had
almost perfect cover from the guns under the brow of the spur*
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBES. 181

The (jrurkhas and Royal Welsh about the Bame

FusilierB arrived

time, and the enemy at once bolted under a heavy fire from both
these regiments. As orders had been received not to advance
further than necessary into Chagarzai territory, the troops were
not allowed to go beyond the ferry, and only two houses in lower
Surmal were burnt as a warning to the Chagarzais. The Khaibar
Rifles and a company which had gone up the hill,
of the Gurkhas,

had in the meanwliile met and dispersed an almost equally large

number of the enemy, who in the same way had not attempted
to come to close quarters. Our loss was 3 men wounded, while
that of the enemy, most of whom were Chagarzais, was estimated
at 120.
On the 29th, the number of armed men at Baio increased, and
the village of Wale was occupied by their advanced picquets. The
o-atherinc^ was being swelled from various quarters from Buner, —
Chamla, and from the Amazai and Gadun country.
On this date, ovWng to the threatening attitude of Buner, the
9th Bengal Lancers and the 22nd Bengal Infantry were ordered
to move from Nowshera to Mardan to strengthen the garrison of
that place, which consisted of the Northumberland Fusiliers and the
Guides Cavalry. These troops were to be held in readiness ior
service towards the Buner frontier, and Brigadier- General F. J.

Keen, C.B., was ordered to proceed from Peshawar to Mardan and

assume command.
Three guns of No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery were ordered
to march on the following day from Oghi to Darband, and a wing of
the 28th Bengal Infantry to move to Pabal Gab. Orders were also
ffiven for the road from Pabal Gali to Tilh to be constructed as

Boon as possible by civil labour.

On the 31st the whole of the Reserve Brigade, troops as per

margin, under the command of Brigadier-
^^^'
^ °' * '^ '
General Sir William Lockhart, were con-
3 gana.
No. 2 (Derajat) Mn. Battery, centrated at Darband.
Srsn., King's Roy. Rifles. The designations of the Brigades
19th Bengal Infantry. ^^^e now altered to 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
Brigades, commanded respectively by
Brigadier- Generals Wilhamson, Hammond, and Lockhart.
On this date the Chief Political Officer reported that there

were in the neighbourhood of Baio, or in the Chagarzai country

 ;

i82 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

to the north, a coalition against us of all the clans from the Pesha-
war border to Thakot, and the General Officer Commanding wired
to the Government to know whether, in the event of the lashkar
not dispersing, he might be allowed to make them do so by force.
On the 1st April Brigadier- Generals Lockhart and Hammond
came to Palosi for a conference with the General Officer Command-
ing, but no instructions were issued for any movements pending
the final orders of Government.
Mian Gul was reported to have arrived at Baio, but there
was no ostentatious display of standards. The gathering at that
place was now a large one and included all sections of the Bunerwals.
A letter was sent to Mian Gul and the Buner jirga by the
Commissioner of Peshawar, under the orders of the Punjab Govern-
ment, who had been in communication with the Commander-in-
Chief, to the effect that we had no intention of invading the
Chagarzai country, and that we wished for peace with the Buner-
wals but that we should consider ourselves at liberty to attack
;

them from both sides in their own country of Buner if after this
explanation their lashkar did not retire.
This communication, together with other correspondence that
took place between the Government and Mian Gul had the desired
effect and on the 4th April it was reported by an old sepoy of the
5th Punjab Infantry (a Bunerwal) that the lasJikar was disjpev&mg,
A reconnaissance was now made along the right bank of the Indus,
as far as the Hmits of Hassanzai territory.
There was no opposition from Baio, near which only a small
gathering was seen. A
few standards with a collection of armed
men were observed on the spur dividing the Hassanzai from the
Chagarzai territory, but these moved off as the troops approached,
and their movements were hastened by a few shells from the left
bank below Diliarai. The right bank south of Karnar was found
to be quite impracticable for animals and difficult for foot men
and any improvement would have required much time and labour,
as the road ran over solid rock.
The village of Bimbal was burnt this day as a reminder to
the Akazai that they had not made their submission.

On the 7th April, owing to a sudden outbreak on the Miranzai

border, the troops of the Reserve, or 3rd, Brigade were with-
drawn from the Hazara Field Force, and marched from Darband fox
 —

BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBE8. 188

Kohat with transport complete. Brigadier-General Sir William

Lockhart and stafi had started for the same destination on the
preceding day.
On this date the Mada Khel and Hassanzai jirga deputed to Baio
returned and reported that the place was absolutely deserted, not
even the usual inhabitants being there. Steps were at once taken,
in accordance with orders received from Army Head-quarters, to
withdraw all troops to the left bank of the Indus. It was reported
that Mian Gul had advised Hasiiim Ali to surrender, but that
the latter had refused to accept this advice, and had gone off
to Teri in the Makki Khel country.^ At 6-30 a.m. on the 8th the
Guides Infantry, accompanied by the divisional head-quarters,
marched from Palosi to Ril via the flying bridge at Bakrai, and
thence by the road through Makranai. This road was very steep and
caused delay to the mules, the rear-guard not arriving at Bil
till 7-30 P.M.
The Seaforth Highlanders with three guns of No. 1 Mountain
Battery and the head-quarters of the 1st Brigade moved to Tilh, en
route to Seri, via the bridge-of-boats at Kotkai, and the detachment of
the 11th Bengal Infantry joined the head-quarters of the regiment at
Lashora. By noon Palosi and Nawckili were entirely evacuated, and
the inhabitants were seen returning to their villages. The only
troops remaining on the right bank of the river were the 37th Dogras
at the Kotkai bridge head.
Arrangements were now made for a change of base from Dar-
band to Oghi^ the abandonment of all river posts except Bakrai, the
dismantUng of the bridge and return of the boats down river. Orders
were issued for various moves, and from about this date until the
termination of the expedition in June, the troops remained in occu-
pation of the Black Mountain in the following positions :

Divisional and 1st Brigade Head-quarters at Seri, with detach-

ments at Kan, Abu Kotal, Eil, Kungar, Karun, Maira, and Pabal
Gali. 2nd Brigade at Darbanai with detachments at Dihari, Peza,
Tilli, China, Abu Kotal, and Panj Gali. A road connecting the two

brigades through Maira was taken in hand, and opened on the 17th
April.

I The Makki Khel are a small clan suppos- the western side of the Duma range, be-
ed to be descendants of Akliund Salak tween the Hassanzai, Chagarzai, and Buner
Babft by a slave girl. They are settled on borders.
184 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Active operations were now practically over. The Hassanzais,

with the exception of the Khan Khel section, had long ago sub-
mitted and in fact had never really opposed us, but certain further
punitive measures were necessary to bring the Akazais to reason.
On the 16th of April the village of Moratta was destroyed for
and a little later a similar treat-
havinf^ resisted a foraging party,
ment was meted out to Darai and Larai for being concerned in a
raid on the commissariat enclosure at Seri.
On the 24th April the whole of the Akazai country was visit-
ed by a combined movement from Seri and Kan. One party pro-
ceeded from Kan to the crest of the ridge dividing Akazai from
Chagarzai territory another party proceeded from Seri to the
;

crest of this ridge via Kan, Sokar, and Tor am a third party visit-
;

ed Doda and Machai from Saudagara and Biran. The

Seri via

whole of the country was found deserted, but sixty- five head of
cattle were captured, and a large amount of grain was found
concealed in some of the villages.
On this date Darband was evacuated, and the transfer of the
base to O^lii was completed. Communication was then estab-
lished across the Pabal Gali pass, and through Tilli and Eil.
Pabal Gali had been occupied, as soon as the state of the snow
permitted, by a detachment of the 28th Bengal Infantry from
Oghi. The new route proved unsatisfactory owing to its length
and the difficulty of the sections of road passing under and around
the cliffs of Abu. Accordingly, as soon as the snow cleared, a
shorter and much more convenient line was opened through Panj
Gali. This route was made practicable by the 1st May and opened
for regular traffic on the 7th, and the distance between Oghi and
Seri was reduced from thirty to seventeen miles. As this is in
every respect the best line of route across the mountain from
Oghi to Seri, considerable labour was expended on the road. It
is probable that in ordinary winters it could be kept clear of snow

by working-parties.
On the 30th party went out from Darbanai and
April a
Diliari and, crossing the Indus on a raft, captured some sheep
belonging to Akazais. Bilianai was destroyed on the return march.
On the 13th May the villages of Biran and Zanlui were destroy-
ed by a party from the camp at Seri for a raid made by Gujars
from those villages on a convoy.
 —

BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 186

On May the Hassanzai and Akazai jirgas, who had

the 26th
arrived camp, were interviewed at Seri and the latter,
in ;

influenced by the fear of losing their autnmn crops as well as the

spring harvests already forfeited, tendered the unconditional sub-
mission of the tribe. They were thereupon given permission to
re-occupy their lands and villages on the same terms as had been
accorded to the Hassanzai at the commencement of the expedition.
On the first condition to be imposed on the tribes, namely, the
surrender of Hashim Ali, being brought up, the united jirgas declared
their inability in th^s respect, and the matter was referred to Govern-
Agreements made with the ^^^nt, the Conference being suspended.
Hassanzai and Akazai on theOn the 28tli the approval of Government
was received to terms of settlement pro-
posed by the General Officer Commanding, and on the 29th the jirgas
of the Hassanzai and Akazai agreed to these terms, which were
subsequently also accepted by the Mada Khels and the Pariari jirga.
The text of the agreement may be summarized as follows :

The three Isazai sections — Hassanzai, Akazai, and Mada Khel—

and the Saiyids and Chagarzai of Pariari bound themselves to the
perpetual exclusion and banishment of Hashim Ali and his
family to be of good behaviour to be responsible for all offences
; ;

by their clansmen in British territory; to protect our subjects

in their country to refer claims against them to the Deputy Com-
;

missioner ; and to refrain from the time-honoured custom of

harartita, by which a clansman, having a fancied claim against one
British subject, seizes the person or property ofany other he
can lay hands on. They also bound themselves not to permit any
settlement of Hindustani fanatics in their country.
The Hassanzai, Akazai, and Pariariwals further promised to
accompany troops marching on their borders, and, with due notice
given, to escort and arrange for the safety of officials and British
subjects who may visit their country. The three Isazai clans
admitted their joint responsibility for the conduct of any Khan of
Seri whom they might elect.

Failing the actual surrender of Hashim Ali, which, as he ran

away before our troops advanced, these clans could not effect, the
next best arrangement which could be secured was his perpetual
banishment.
Vol. I. 2 B
186 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The were also informed that a force would be kept In

maliJcs
their country, until Government was satisfied that they were strong
enough to prevent the return of Hashim Ali, and to preserve
order.
the 9th June sanction was received from Army Head-
On
quarters for the return to India of all troops except those named
the margin, who were to remain
No. 9 Mn. Battery, R. A.
Royal Welsh Fus.
1st Bn.,
in
.

occupation
% •

01
.

the
i
crest
.

OTf
+t.
the -ri
Black
in
i

No. 4 Coy., Bengal s. and M. j^/[oujitain, and at Scri and Oehi, under
l-lst Gurkhas. i
"
r -n j- n
•
1
4th Sikh Infantry. the command 01 i5rigaaier-LTeneral
28th Bengaiinfantry.
Hammond, V.C., D.S.O., with Captain
Bradshaw, 35th Sikhs, as Brigade-Major.
Our losses during the expedition were nine killed and thirty-nine
i-^'^.— Second-Lieu-
wounded, the latter including three officers,

tenant C. H. M. Doughty, Lieutenant E. W. S. K. Maconchy, and

Lieutenant R. Harman.
The widespread coalition against us, which led to the hostile
gathering at Baio and to actual oppcsi-
Cause of the hostue coalition
of Yusafzai clans in 1891. tion to our columns on several occa-
sions by tribes with whom we were not at war, is almost withe ut
a precedent on this border, and can only be compared to the
Ambela outbreak in 1863, although it did not lead, as on that
occasion, to serious fighting.
The political officer was of opinion that this hostile demrn-
stration was due to the fact that all the Yusafzai clans of the
Indus valley believed that it was intended that the force should
march through Chagarzai territory to Thakot. To quote from his
report :
— '

There no doubt that Hashim Ali Khan and his friends spread rumours
is

among the tribes between Palosi and Thakot which made them dread the
same treatment. ^ In order to realize this, it must be remembered that these
people are fanatical, ignorant, and suspicious to a degree which those who
have no personal experience will not readily conceive. Intensely jealous
of their independence, they dread the visit of an army as possibly preluding
subjugation and certamly involvmg a risk of general punishment if some
misguided men fire at a camp or cut a telegraph wire. Such prejudices have,
of course, no right to survive in face of a forward policy and the necessity

1 Namely, the same treatment as that meted out to the clans who had offepded us.
 BLACK MOUNTAIN TBIBES. 1^7

of extending our influence beyond our border. All that seems advisable is

that it should be understood that they exist hi a form which makes it difficult

for us, in the absence of special arrangements, to make friendly marches in

a peaceful way among some of these clans, or to get them to co-operate for
the management of their country upon Imes which they dislike. When they
have been well beaten, they will be more malleable, and, once annexed, they
would soon make peaceable subjects.

To make this account of the 1891 Hazara expedition com-

plete, a brief record
necessary of the events subsequent to the
is

withdrawal of the main portion of the Hazara Field Force in June

1891. As already mentioned, a brigade under Brigadier-General
Hammond remained at Seri and at Kimal in order to main-
tain quiet and ensure the banishment of Hashim Ali. On the
13th July a fully representative jirga oi the Akazai came to Seri
and elected Ibrahim Khan, the cousin and rival of Hashim Ali
as their chief, tying the turban on his head with all due formality.
In August the two other Isazai clans, the Hassanzai and Mada
Khel, followed this example, and formally elected Ibrahim Khan
as their chief.
With a view to increase our control over the clans on this
border, to assist in the maintenance of peace, and to secure the
continued expulsion of Hashim Ali, the levy of a small force of 200
Border Police, to be recruited from the independent clans and
posted at suitable places on the frontier, was sanctioned. The Swatis
of Nandihar, Tikari, and Deshi, and the Saiyids and mixed popu-
lation of Pariari freely accepted service in this force. The Hassan-
zai and Akazai at first refused the offer of allowances and of ser-
vice in the police, but finally agreed, in order to shorten the occu-
pation of their hills by our troops.
In addition to the Border Pohce, for which (including the old
Agror Police) a sum of Es. 29,000 was allotted yearly, Government
sanctioned allowances for leading men of the clans
on this border
to the Hassanzai, Akazai, and Mada
Khel, on condition of main-
taining the compacts made by them in 1891 to the others on con-
;

dition of general friendship, good behaviour, and assistance in

preserving peace on this part of the frontier.
By the end of November the evacuation of the Black Mountain
by our troops was complete.
aB2
188 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Expedition against the Isazai clans by a force under Major-

General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I. in 1892. ,

At the endMarch 1892 Hashim Ali, the ex- Chief ot the

of

Isazai clan, visited Baio, and later on his supporters and sym-
pathizers among the trans-Indus Hassanzai^ and Mada Khels
agreed to his family settling at Baio and Doha. Baio is a Hassan-
zai and Doha a Mada Khel village. On the Stli April he brought
his family to the former place, escorted by a following of Makki
Khel and Sundar Khel sections of the trans -Indus Chagarzai, who
live on the slopes of the Duma range and here his supporters built
;

him a house.
In thus allowing Hashim Ali to return to Baio, the Hassanzais
and Mada Khels were guilty of a breach of the agreement,
to which they had subscribed at Seri in 1891. The clans were
warned of the consequences of their action, and efTorts w^ere also
made, but without avail, to induce Hashim Ali to surrender himself,
a place of residence with a monthly allowance being ofiered him in
British territory. Finally in September orders were issued for the
assembly of a Field Force to expel the ex-chieftain and to punish
the villages which had harboured him. In accordance with these
orders a force of two brigades, numbering with divisional troops
6,250 of all ranks and 24 guns, advanced from Darband on the 2nd
October under the command of Major-General Sir W. S. A. Lock-
hart, K.C.B., O.S.I., with Brevet-Major A. R. Martin as Assistant
Adjutant-General.
As the tribes on this occasion offered no resistance to the march
of troops through their territory, the operations of the Isazai
Field Force will be very briefly described.
Crossing the Indus at Marer, Sir W. Lockhart ordered the
1st Brigade and divisional troops, with one maxim gun,^ to assemble
at Palosi on the 5tli October, and to move on to Wale the same
night the 2nd Brigade was ordered to Manja Kot.
;

At daybreak on the 6th October the divisional artillery moved

into position on the ridge in front of Wale, within range of Baio ;

—
and the advance of tl^e two brigades the 1st from Wale and the
—
2nd from Manja Kot was then carried out. The crest was reached
This gun had been sent up from
1 at Darband on the ,'>rd October. This is the
Bombay in charge of a small party of the record of a maxim having been sent
first

Yorkshire Light Infantry, and had arrived with troops on field service in India.
 —

BLACK MOUNTAIN TRIBES. 189

almost at the same time on the right and left by the advanced
parties of each brigade at 7-30 a.m. and on approaching Baio the
;

place was found to be deserted. The toweis and defences were

then destroyed, the former being blown up.
Before the demolition of the Baio defences was carried out,
the troops which had not reached the crest were ordered to retire
those of the 1st Brigade and the divisional troops to Palosi, and those
of the 2nd Brigade to Manja Kot. On the demolitions being com-
pleted, tlie whole of the troops were withdrawn. The 2nd Brigade,
before retiring, destroyed the village of Doba. This brigade was
ordered to march back to Towara on the following day (the 7th)
after carrying out certain demolitions in the villages of Manja Kot
and Karor, in accordance with the suggestions of the Chief Political
Officer.
The defences of the villages of Garhi and Nawekili were des-
troyed on the 8th, and orders having been received for the return
of the expedition, the force was marched back to Darband on the
11th and there broken up.
The health of the troops, which on former expeditions in the
Black Mountain area had been good, was on this occasion in-
different. This w^as chiefly due to the prevalence of malarial fever
and to an outbreak of cholera, which resulted in twenty-four deaths
out of fifty-five cases.

Subsequent events.

Since the expedition in 1892 the Black Mountain tribes and

their neighbours have given no serious trouble and the arrange-
;

ments sanctioned in 1891, i.e., the granting of certain allowances

and the establishment of the Border Police, have been found to be
efficacious in keeping the Hazara border quiet.
In 1899 it was found necessary to divert a portion of Ibrahim
Khan's allowance for direct payment to the headmen of the various
sections of the clan, owing to the chief's parsimonious habits.
On the 9tli November 1901 Hazara was included in the North-
West Frontier Province which was then formed.
In 1902 a dispute about some debatable land led to a raid
being made by the Saiyids of Tilli into Tanawal. This dispute
had not been settled in 1905 when the last report was received.
190 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Hashim Ali has still a considerable number of sympathizers

among his clansmen, and in 1902 an abortive attempt was made
to get up an a'gitation on his behalf ; the Hassanzais continued
to sulk until 1903, when they apologized for their behaviour and
are now again in receipt of their allowances.
In 1904, for some unexplained reason, the Akazais refused to
accept their allowances.
In November 1905 Ibrahim Khan's brother, by name Isa Khan,
was murdered at Seri. The latter had formerly been a subadar
in the Border Military Police but had been dismissed for mis-
conduct, and he was at this time, under the orders of Government,
in receipt of an allowance from Ibrahim Khan, with whom he had
always been on the worst of terms.
This crime, which the Isazais believed to be the work of
Ibrahim Khan and his son, put the finishing touch to the former's
unpopularity, and in April of the following year the Hassanzais
drove him out of Seri and stated, in jirga before the Deputy Com-
missioner of Hazara, that they disowned him and would only
recognize as their Khan a son of Hashim Ali.

Ibrahim Khan's faction was, however, at the time, strong

enough to bring him back to Seri and partially rebuild the village,
which had been burnt down but within a month or two he was
;

again forced to fly for his life, and this time he took refuge in Agror,
his crops having been destroyed and his tower dismantled. It
would have been better for him if he had remained there, for,
having returned to tribal territory, he and some of his retainers
were killed in a musjid near Karun, on the 4th November 1906,
by a band of Hassanzais led by Sikandar Khan and Torabaz Khan,
brothers of Hashim Ali. The Hassanzais acted against their agree-
ments with Govermnent in admitting these proscribed persons into
their territory.
At present, 1907, the Isazais are without a Khan, but it is

probable that they will try to bring in Hashim All's elder son, a
youth seventeen years of age, named SlierKhan, who was a mere
Ali
child in 1891, when the agreement excluding Hashim Ali from the
Khanshif was made. No mention was made in this agreement
of any son of Hashim Ali. The latter is still living and has another
son aged five years.
 .. . . ...

APPENDIX A.

Command and Staff, Hazara Field Force, 1888.

A. D.C, McQueen, Major-General J. W., c.b., S.C. . Commanding.

Western, Lieutenant J. S. E., 1st Punjab Cavalry . Aide-de-Camp.

Gatacre, Colonel W. F. D. A. Q.-M. G.

Egerton, Major C. C, 3rd Punjab Cavalry A. A. G.

EUes, Major E. R., Royal Artillery A. Q.-M. G.

Mason, Captain A. H., Royal Engineers . D. A. Q.-M. G. (Intelli-

gence.)

Lovett, Colonel B., c.s.i., Royal Engineers Commanding Engineer.

Goold- Adams, Captain W. R., 1st Dragoon Guards . Superintendent, Army
Signalling.

Thornton, Deputy Surgeon-General J. H., c.b., m.b.

I.M.S P. M. 0.

Keighley, Major C. M., StafE Corps Chief Commissariat

Officer.

Yielding, Captain W. R., Staff Corps Divisional Transport

Officer.

Wahab, Captain R. A., Royal Engineers . Survey Officer.

ArtiUertj.

Deshon, Lieut. -Colonel C. J., Royal Artillery . . Commanding.

First Brigade.

V.C, Channer, Brigadier- General G. N., S.C. . . Commanding.

0' Gorman, Major N. P., Lincolnshire Regiment . . D. A. A.-G.
Money, Major E» E., 11th Bengal Lancers . . D. A. Q.-M. G.
Second Brigade.

Galbraith, Brigadier-General W. . . . Commanding.

Barlow, Major J. A., Manchester Regiment . . D. A. A.-G,
Beley, Captain C. H. H., d.s.o., 25th Bengal Infantry D. A. Q.-M. G. to 4th
October 1888.
Orierson, Captain J. M., Royal Artillery . . . D. A. Q.-M. G. from
9th October 1888.'

( 191 )
 . . .. . .. . .

APPENDIX B.

Command and Staff, BJach Mountain Expedition, 1891.

Elles, Major-General W. K., c.b., British Service . . Commanding.

Shakespear, Colonel G. R. J., lOth Bengal Lancers . . A. A.-G. ^

Carter, Captain F.C, Northumberland Fusiliers . . D. A. A.-G.

Mason, Captain A. H.,R.E. D. A. Q.-M. G.

Keith, Lieut.-Colonel J., R.A. . . . . C. R. A.

Greenstreet, Major W. L., R.E. . . . . C. R. E.

Hamilton, Captain E. 0. F., Royal West Surrey Regi-
ment . . • • • • Superintendent,
Army Signalling.

Bradshaw, Deputy Surgeon-General A. F. M. S. . . P. M. 0.

Lyons-Montgomery, Captain H. F., B. S. C. . . Chief Commissariat

Officer.

Tulloch, Lieutenant J. W. G., B. S. C. . . . Divisional Trans-

port Officer.

Wahab, Captain R. A., R.E. . . - • • Survey Officer.

Left or River Column.

Williamson, Brigadier -General R. F., Royal Welsh

Fusiliers .. .. .. •• Commanding.
Bradshaw, Captain L. J. E., 35th Bengal Infantry . .
Brigade Major.

Right or Tilli Column.

V.C., A.D.C., Hammond, Brigadier-General A. G., d.s.o.,

3rd Sikh Infantry .. .. •• •• Commanding.

Colleton, Captain Sir R. A. W., Bart, Royal Welsh Fusi-
liers .. •• •• •• •• Brigade Major

OgJii Column.

Hills, Colc>nel G. S., 28th Bengal Infantry . . . Commanding.

( 192 )
 CHAPTER V.

YU8AFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES BETWEEN THE BLACK MOUNTAIN

AND SWAT.

The tribes occupying the British border from the Black Moun-
tain to the Utman Khel territory belong, with the exception of
the Graduns, to the important tribe of Yusafzai Pathans, of which
the Hassanzis, Akazais, and Chagarzais, occupying the western
slopes of the Black Mountain, and described in the previous
chapter, are also branches.
The Yusafzais inhabit the division of that name in the Pesha-

war district, as well as independent territory beyond the border.

They are descended from one Mandai, who had two sons, Umar
and Yusaf. Umar died, leaving one son, Mandan and from ;

Mandan and Yusaf are the two primary divisions of the Yusaf-
zais, from which are sprung all the sub-divisions. The relations of
the different branches of the Yusafzai tribe will be understood
by referring to the table given in Appendix A. at the end of the

chapter.
First in order of the independent tribes on the British border
between the Black Mountain and the Utman Khel territory, come
the Mada Khels and Amazais, adjoining the territory of our feuda-
tory the Nawab of Amb to the south of the Amazais lie the Ut-
;

manzais, to their west the Gaduns, and beyond them the Khudu
Khels. To the north of the Khudu Khel territory is the Chamla
valley, inhabited by members of different tribes, and separated
from Buner by the Guru range of mountains. Next come the
Nurizai and Salarzai tribes of Buner, which march with our border.
Between Buner and the Utman Khel limits is the district of Swat,
and the p.)rtion adjoining British territory is inhabited by members
of the Baizai and Ranizai tribes of Swat.

Before describing these tribes, a few words are necessary

with regard to the position of the Nawab of Amb on this border, as
( 193 )

Vol, I, ac
194 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

it is, in some His territory may be des-

respects, a peculiar one.
cribed roughly as a square block in the north-west corner of the dis-
trict of Hazara, separated on its west from the independent Pathan
country by the Indus, and having the Black Mountain and Agror
to the north. The Tanawal Chief has also two or three villages
beyond the Indus, the largest of which is Amb, which contains 300
houses, flat-roofed and built of stone and mud, but ill-adapted for
defence. The Nawab Amb
holds his cis-Indus territory as a
of

jagir from the British Government on a perpetuity tenure. His

villages trans-Indus are independent, but the Nawah is respons-
ible that he does not misuse his power. He administers the jagir
himself, subject to no interference from us, except in heinous crimi-
nal cases, which are comparatively few. The existence of this
little principality is in many ways convenient and the jagir, ;

while really no expense to the Government, forms a stronghold

upon the loyalty of the chief. Tanawal lies between Hazara and
some of the more turbulent independent tribes of the frontier,
with which the Tanawalis have old feuds that render coalition with
them scarcely possible moreover, his trans-Indus villages,
;

formerly the property of the wild tribes of the Mahaban, keep the
chief ever in hot water with them, and his only safe policy, there-
fore, is to be faithful to British interests. At the same time, he
is more than a match for any of the tribes on his border, and is
consequently able to keep them in order. Muhammad Akram
Khan, the present chief, is a very old man who has shown his
loyalty on more than one occasion, and did good service in 1868, for
which he was granted the title of Nawah as already stated, and
was also made a Companion of the Order of the Star of India. He
is one of the most reliable chiefs on the border.

The Mada Khels are a section of the Isazai Yusafzais, and

occupy the northern slopes of the Maha-
*
' * * ^ ban mountain down to the right bank of
the Indus. They are bounded on the north by the Hassanzais, on
the east and south by Amb territory, and on the west by the
Amazais. Their country may be described as lying between the
Indus on the east, and the watershed of the northern portion of the

Mahaban on the west, the eastern slopes of the range being Mada
Khel, and the western Amazai.
"
 —
. .

7USAFZAI AND OADFN TRIBES. 195

The Mada Khel arc divided into three principal sub-sections,

with 1,460 fighting men
Mada Nama . . . . 750 fighting men.
Hasan Khel .. .. . . 340 „
BazidKhel .. .. . . 370 „

In addition to these, the Dilazaks, Gujars, etc., who live within

the Mada Khel limits, could furnish a contingent of 565 men,
making the total fighting strength of the Mada Khel 2,025 men.
They are armed with guns and swords. The guns are matchlocks
and flintlocks, for the most part the former. They purchase their
powder and their lead from Chamla, Buner, and British Yusafzai.
The Mada Khels have no great name for bravery. In the
event of being attacked they could obtain aid from the Hassanzais
and Akazais, as they all belong to the Isazai clan, and their bor-
ders join.
A blockade would give them trouble, as they are not
little

dependent on British territory. Their country is poor and barren

and supplies would have to accompany a force entering their hills.
The majority of their villages are situated in the Mahaban range,
and only two or three are on the banks of the Indus. The easiest
approaches to the Mada Khel through the Hassanzai
territory lie

country, and this tribe would, therefore, have to be coerced and

the Nawab of Amb would have to give assistance. There is
however, a route which avoids the Hassanzai country, and crosses
the river lower down, but this is hilly and impracticable for
laden animals.
The Mada Khels can scarcely be said to be on our border as
the territory of the Nawab of Amb intervenes, and their dealino-s
are for the most part with him. The Nawab is, as a rule, left to
manage his own affairs with them. Their grand ^^V^a has, however
twice been summoned, in 1863 and 1868, on both occasions in
matters connected with Amb.
The Amazais are a section of the Usmanzai Yusafzais. About
^^^^ °^ ^^^^"^ country is settled within,
Amazai.
and the
beyond, the British border.
rest
The section has two sub-sections 1. Daulatzai 2. Ismailzai. — ;

Within British territory the Daulatzai inhabit the Sudum valley,

and their chief villages are Chargolai and Rustam. The Ismailzai
2C2
196 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

occupy a strip of country in the sub-division of Yusafzai, in

the Peshawar district, south of the Karamar range, and on the
road from Mardan, east. Their chief village is Kapur-ka-garhi.
The Amazais beyond the border are divided into the Saiyid Khel
and Mobarak Khel, two sections constantly at feud with one
another. They are bounded on the south by the trans-Indus
territory of the Nawab of Amb, and by the Gaduns on the west ;

by the Khudu Khels and the Chamla valley; on the north

by Buner and on the east by the Mada Khels. From the
;

village of Birgalai, where the Amazai meets the Gadun territory

the border runs parallel with the Indus to Betgali, including
the village of Faruza in its course. From Betgali it takes
a north-west direction to the main north spur of the Mahaban
mountain ; it runs down this to the Barandu river, and follows
that stream as far as its junction with the Chamla. Thence it
follows the course of the about four miles, after which
Chamla for
it runs in a generally south-east direction back to Birgalai.
The Amazai country is divided into two districts by a northern
spur from the Mahaban. All the villages lying to the east of
this spur, and between and the Indus, are called Pitao Amazai,
it

and all to the west. Sural Amazai. The first belongs to the Saiyid
Khel, and the second to both sections. The Amazai country is
narrow and rough, and is drained by many mountain torrents, all
of which, except the Ashera stream, drain to the Barandu, and are
perennial. It contains about thirty villages, situated along the
courses of the different hill streams. Cherorai is the chief village.
The whole of this district is well wooded with pines ; cultivation
is consequently scanty. Cattle are plentiful, and gJii is the
product of the country.
The strength of the trans-border Amazais is about 1,500
fighting men. They are considered one of the best fighting clans
of all the Yusafzais. They still intermarry and communicate
with their brethren under British rule, but in matters of inter-
nal government are quite distinct from them. In matters affect-
ing the politics of the tribe, in connection with their neighbours,
they side with the Bunerwals, the authority of whose chiefs they
acknowledge to some slight degree.
The Amazais are not dependent on British territory, and
like the Mada Khels, they can hardly be said to be on our border,
 .

7USAFZAI AND OADUN TBIBES. 197.

as all their dealings are with the Nawab of Amb. Their relations
with this chief have generally been of a friendly nature, though
there is a party in the tribe who are hostile to him. The nearest
approach to the Amazai country from British territory is through
Amb, but there is another road starting from Panjman on the
Gadun border to Nagrai in Amazai territory (a distance of twenty-
seven miles), which is well supplied with water, and is practicable
for laden camels. This road, however, passes through the in-
dependent territory of the Gaduns and of the Khudu Khels.
The only occasion on which we have come into direct con-
tact with the Amazais was in the Ambela campaign of 1863, and
our dealings with them at that time will be described in the
account of that expedition in the next chapter.
The Utmanzais are a clan of the Mandan Yusafzais. They
are divided into four sections, viz.^
Alazai, Kanazai, Akazai, and Saduzai.
The first three are beyond the British border, and occupy the
eastern slopes of the southern portion of the Mahaban mountain
on the right bank of the Indus. The Saduzai section consists
of five sub-divisions, viz., — Aba Khel, Umar Khel, Mir Ahmad
Khel, Bihzad Khel, and Khudu Khel. The first four of these are
located within British territory, and occupy the south-eastern
corner of the Peshawar district. The Khudu Khels are beyond
the border, and occupy the western slopes of the Mahaban be-
tween the Gaduns on one side and the Chamlawals on the other.
They will be described separately further on.
The Utmanama division of Yusafzai takes its name from
this tribe. A considerable portion of the original Utmanzai ter-
ritory, is now occupied by the Gaduns, who were
about two-thirds,
in former times invited to come over from across the Indus as mili-
tary mercenaries, and in reward for their services were granted
the lands they now hold on the western and southern slopes of the
Mahaban mountain. The Utmanzais are considered better sol-
diers than the Gaduns, but they are numerically weak, and cannot
muster more than 400 fighting men.

Alazais .
 —

198 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

About two-thirds of the fighting men are armed with guns, of which
the greater part are matchlocks. They also possess one piece of

ordnance.
There are several routes into the Utmanzai country, and owing
to the fact that members of the tribe are settled in Yusafzai and
Ilaripur, and own lands within our border, they may be said
to be dependent upon us. This tribe harbours outlaws from our
territory, and Government has not insisted on their surrender,
possibly because they could easily send them further beyond

the border. The principal villages of the Utmanzais are Kaya

and Kabal. The village of Sitana was also within their terri-
tory, but was given by them as a muafi grant to the Saiyids of
Tiringi on their first arrival. These Saiyids are related to the
Saiyids of Khagan and Swabi, as well as to those of Jumla and
Buner.
The Gaduns are a tribe of Pathans who reside partly on the
southern slopes of the Mahaban, and partly in the Hazara district.
Their origin is not very clear, but they are not Yusafzais, like the
tribes around them. By some they
Gaduns.
are supposed to be a branch oi the
Kakar tribe, which was in the first instance driven to take refuge
in the Safed Koh, and afterwards in Hazara and Chach in the
Rawal Pindi district. The divisions of the Gaduns are :

{i) Salar, sub-divided into Mathkhwazai, Utazai, and Sulimanzai.

(m) Mansur, sub-divided into Khadrzai, Daulatzai, and Musazai.
The whole of these clans, but especially those of the Salar
division, are settled along the banks of the river Dor in the

Hazara district, as far as the Urash plain ; and own a fertile

prosperous tract, which they gradually possessed themselves

of Dilazaks,-^ when the
from the latter threw off their allegiance
to the Emperor Jehangir.

Another portion of the tribe is settled trans-Indus, and owns ter-

ritory on the southern and western slopes of the Mahaban moun-
tain. They are bounded on the east by the Utmanzais, on the
north by the Amazais, on the west by the Khudu Khels, and on
the south by British territory.

1 A people of Scythic origin who them are found in Hazara and the Rawal
inhabited the Peshawar valley before the Pindi district.
Pathan invasion. Scattered families of
 YUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 199

Of the clans into which the tribe is divided, the Matkhwazai

live in Babinai, in Yusafzai, in British territory. The Utazai
principally inhabit Gandap. The Sulimanzai are a small clan,
and are scattered about Mahaban ; their principal villages are
Bada, Kalagar, and Atchailai. The Khadrzai own Malka Kadi,
Kadura, and Thakail. The Daulatzai own Dawal, Kaghbanai,
Gadjai, and half of Bisak. The last is the principal village of the
Mansur division. The Musazai own the other half of Bisak, Sukai-
lai, and several smaller hamlets.

The villages near the foot of the hills, such as Ganda, Bisak,
Malka Kadi, are chiefly dependent on rain for their cultivation,
and their land is indifferent in quality. The land, however, belong-
ing to the villages in the hills is more fertile and wheat and ;

rice are grown in large quantities on the slopes of Mahaban. The

tribes are all cultivators or cattle-owners, and their buffaloes
are celebrated. Considerable quantities of ghi and timber are
exported by them to Yusafzai, and, cloth, indigo, and salt taken
in return. The only level ground in the Gadun country is in front
of Gandap, Bisak, and Malka Kadi.
The trans-Indus Gaduns number about 2,000 fighting men.
They are not, however, considered a fighting tribe.
There are two ways of coercing the trans-Indus portion of
this tribe — (1) by blockade; as their cultivation is carried on in

a great measure by our permission, and they depend much on their

trade with the plains, this would soon render them quite help-
less; (2) by invasion if this was chosen, an expedition should
;

start on the 1st September or 1st October, when their cattle are
collected and their autumn crops cut, or early in April, when their
spring crops are ready. At these seasons they could be punished by
the loss of property to the value of Rs. 80,000, viz., crops Rs. 30,000,
cattle Rs. 25,000, houses and property Rs. 25,000. Unless
they were surprised, however, they could send their cattle into
Amazai territory. Their country could be overrun without other
tribes being molested or approached too nearly. The hill portion
would, of course, be the more difficult, as they have a retreat open
to them. Two days would sufiice fox an expedition to surprise
their villages and return. A blockade has on several occasions
proved Buccessful against this tribe, and a seizure can always be
200 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

made. They cannot cultivate their lands in the open plain when
blockaded, and they fear attack.
The Gaduns do not appear to have given any trouble on the
border till 1861, when they failed to act up to their engagementg
to pievent the Hindustani fanatics from returning to Sitana,
and were inconsequence subjected to a blockade. Our subse-
quent dealings with the tribe will be related in their proper place.
The Khudu Khels are a sub -division of the Saduzai section
of the Utmanzai Mandan Yusafzais.
Their territory bounded on the north
is

by Chamla, a spur from the Sarpatai peak of the Mahaban

intervening, on the west by Yusafzai, on the south by Utmanama,
and on the east by the territory of the Gaduns and Amazais.
Its greatest length from the Sarpatai spur to Panjman is twenty-
two miles, and its breadth from Narinji to Dargalai fifteen
miles.
Their country is drained by the Badrai Nala, which is dry,
except after rain in the hills, when it rushes down with great
violence. It rises in the Sarpatai range, and at Dandar it receives
a branch from the east, and a little lower another branch from
Chinglai joins from the west; it then passes the site of Panjtar,
it

the villages of Gurgushti, Khalai Kala, and Jehangir Dara, and

issues into the plains north-east of Salim Khan, and thence passes
through British territory, and joins the Indus near Hund.
The Khudu Khels are divided into Usman Khel and Bam
Khel. The former own half the village of Chinglai, as well as Dagi,
Totalai, Sanarwai, and minor hamlets, and the latter inhabit the
other half of Chinglai, Bam Khel Totalai, Dargalai, and other
villages. Mangal Thana is occupied by a colony of Saiyids. Baja
and Bam Khel, in British territory, also belong to this tribe.

The Khudu Khel are now divided among themselves, and there-
fore are easy to manage but, if united, they could give a good
;

deal of trouble. In former times, when united under Fateh Khan,

and aided by the Hindustani fanatics, they "were able to bring 3,000
men into the field but at the present time, probably, they could
;

not furnish more than 1,600 fighting men. They are not a martial
people, and are dependent on British territory for their supplies
and wants.
 TUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 201

The crops are, for the spring time, wheat, barley, and mustard ;

for the autumn, Indian corn, hajra, mash, Jcangani, beans, and moth.
The dress of the residents, their food, marriage, and other customs
are in no way different from those of Utmanama. Adultery is
much more stringently dealt with than in Yusafzai. Hindus are
obliged to pay Es. 20 at each marriage, and they are charged three
rupees annually for protection by the malik of the kandi. The
inferior class pay one rupee, and have to turn out, in case of a
feud, to the aid of their respective malihs.
A blockade would inconvenience them very much, more
especially as they have intimate relations with the people in our
territories. The villages are, moreover, for the most part in the
open, and exposed to attack, which gives us a greater hold over
them than even the fear of a blockade. A good seizure could
always be made.
Our connection with this tribe dates as far back as 1847, and
in July of that year a detachment of Guides Cavalry, with
a troop of Sikh Regular Cavalry, marched from Yusafzai to
surprise the village of Moghdara, in Khudu Khei territory. Half
an hour before daybreak they arrived at the mouth of a narrow
defile,three-quarters of a mile long, leading to the village, and
along which only one horseman could go at a time. The Guides,
under Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, pushed rapidly through the
defile;but the Sikhs, for some unaccountable reason, did not
follow. The village, however, was surprised, the inhabitants
disarmed, and the headmen and 300 head of cattle were brought
away by the Guides.
Again, on the 26th June 1849, a detachment of the Guides
(69 sabres and 177 bayonets), under Ressaldar Fateh Khan,
marched during the night from Peshawar to Yar Husain in Yusaf-
zai, and the next morning attacked and destroyed the
Khudu
Khel village of Bagh and returned to Yar Husain by noon.
On the whole, however, the tribe has given little trouble. We
perhaps owe this good conduct to its openness to attack from our
territory and there can be no doubt, should it be necessary to
;

punish them, it would be very simple to do so, as the approaches

to the country are easy.
From the year 1820, the history of the Khudu Khels has been
mixed up with, and comprises the vicissitudes which have befallen
Vol. I.
2D
202 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Fateh Khan of Panjtar and his no less remarkable son, Mukarrab

Khan, who for years bas been an exile and a wanderer from his
tribe, but who still is an important political factor on this part of
the border. Mukarrab Khan is the representative of a family which
is acknowledged to be the foremost amongst the different sections

of the Mandan clan, which inhabit this part of the frontier,

and more will be said of him later on.
The Chamlawals are a mixture of Mandan clans, and inhabit
the small valley of Chamla, to the south-
east of Buner. This valley is bounded
on the north by Buner, on the west by Yusaf zai, on the south by

Khudu Khel territory, and on the east by the lands of the Amazais.
The valley runs east and west, its extreme length from Ambela
to Garhi being ten miles, and its greatest breadth two-and-a-half
miles. A spur of the Guru mountain separates it from Buner,
another from the Sarpatai peak of the Mahaban range intervenes
between it and Khudu Khel territory, whilst a somewhat similar
spur fromthe same range divides it fromthe country of the Amazais.
In former years, when, after subjugating the country, the Yusaf
and Mandan clans began to quarrel amongst themselves for their
possessions, the latter located their families in the Chamla valley
pending the settlement of the disturbances. The contest terminated
in the Yusaf clans occupying Swat and Buner, whilst the Mandan
race appropriated the plains of the Peshawar district. Chamla,
though nominally a daftar of the Mandans, is completely subser-
vient to itspowerful neighbour Buner.
The political importance of Chamla is very small, and as
soldiers the inhabitants are held in the lowest estimation.
A stream with a firm bottom runs down the
middle of the valley,
the water flowing on a level with the surface of the ground as far
as Kuria, but beyond that the ravine deepens gradually, and the
valley ceases to be open and easy. Between Ambela and Kuria,
cavalry and horse artillery could manoeuvre, as there are no ob-

stacles except the stream,which could be crossed without difficulty.

The is little over 2,000 feet.
elevation of the valley The country
produces during the spring crops, wheat, barley, peas and masur ;
during the autumn, mash, moth, rice, Indian corn, dal, and Jcangani.
The soil is good, water abundant, and the country generally most
favourable for agricultural purposes. The customs of the people
 TUSAFZAI AND OADUN TBIBES. 208

are similar to those of other Pathan races ; the Khudu Khels,

Amazais, etc., all conforming more or less to their own peculiar
tribal customs.
There are about twenty villages in the valley, of which the
largest is Koga, followed probably by Sura and Garai. These
villages are all built with the houses joining, so as to leave few
entrances, and most, if not all of them, have towers also, for
musketry. The Chamlawals could probably muster about 1,300
fighting men.
The Chamla valley can be approached from the north from
Buner by several passes ; the easiest of these is said to be the Buner
pass, which leads from Bar Kilai to Ambela its length is only
;

about two miles through the Guru range, and, according to native
reports, is practicable for laden camels. The valley can also
be approached from the east by the valley of the Barandu river •

through the Khudu Khel country by Chinglai to Koga and ;

from British territory by the Ambela, Sherdara, and Narinji

passes, the first mentioned being the easiest.
During the campaign of 1863 the Chamlawals were at first
but were afterwards forced to join against us by pressure
friendly,
from the other tribes.
The Bunerwals inhabit the Buner valley, which is bounded
Bunerwais.
^^ *^^ uorth-west by Swat north-east ;

by the Puran valley south-east by ;

the Mada Khel, and Amazai territory; south by the Chamla

valley and south-west by Yusafzai.
; It is a small mountain
valley, dotted with villages and divided into seven sub-divisions.
The Morah hills and the Ham range divide it from Swat, the Sinawar
range from Yusafzai, the Guru mountain from the Chamla valley,
and the Duma range from the Puran valley. From these ranges
run smaller spurs, meeting one another and forming a small nucleus
of inferior valleys, richly cultivated and well populated. The
valley is drained by the Barandu, a perennial stream which falls
into the Indus above Mahabara, after receiving the drainage of
Chamla and the country of the Amazais. Its general width is
about sixty feet, and has, in summer and winter, water to a depth
of three or four feet, and is never less than two feet. There are
about a dozen villages on its right bank, but the left bank is mostly
covered with jungle, having a few hamlets at a distance. Buner
2J)2
 ^

204 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

is inhabited by the Iliaszai and Malizai clans of the Yusafzais,^

which are sub-divided into seven sections as follows Salarzai, : —
Nasozai, Ashazai, Gadaizai, Nurizai, Daulatzai, and Chagarzai.
There is no on the north-west frontier of India than
finer race

the Bunerwals. Simple and austere in their habits, religious and

truthful in their ways, hospitable to all who seek shelter amongst
them, free from secret assassinations, they are bright examples
of what good materials a Pathan tribe can be developed into,
clinging with the fondest affection to their country and ancient
customs handed down to them by their forefathers. Ignorant by
nature, they hold trade in the very lowest estimation excessively ;

under the control of mullas and others of the priestly class, they
are often deluded with precepts and orders said to emanate from
some high religious authority, such as the late Akliund of Swat.
They are still perfectly upright in their dealings with enemies and
strangers. Their word once given through the general council
of the tribe, may be depended on with greater certainty than that
of any other border race, even when unaccompanied with the
usual security for the fulfilment of the contract. Though poor,
they are free from those thievish propensities which disgrace nearly
every other tribe on the Peshawar border. This is a curious and,
at the same time, a most exemplary trait in their character.
The Bunerwals have always been inimical towards us, and
stand aloof, generally speaking, from intercourse with British
officers but they do not allow bands of robbers to come into
;

our limits for the purpose of annoying the British border village
nearest to them and though they harbour outlaws from our terri-
;

tory, they never join with them in committing depredations. We

seldom hear of a raid in which they are participators, and when
they are, it is generally found that they were instigated to it by
men in our limits, receiving grants from Government and holding
influential positions in Yusafzai. Men from British territory used
sometimes to be seized and detained because of some debt due
by another in our limits, but they were immediately released on
the amount being liquidated, or security given for payment.
The Bunerwals, if well united and prompted by a common

1 The term Bunerwal strictly only bordering on Buner proper, frequently

includes these two clans ; but it should callthemselves Bunerwals.
be pointed out that all trans-border tribes,
 TUSAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 205

cause, could bring 7,000 fighting men against us in the field,

independent of those which other tribes could send to their assist-
ance in case of need.
The climate of Buner is said to be very severe in winter, snow
falling to a considerable extent on the surrounding hills and con-
tinuing for some time, but in the valleys it seldom remains longer
than a week or ten days. The hot weather sets in later than in
the plains, but is more oppressive and continuous, owing to the
confined nature of the valley. The frequent storms that burst
over these hills do not cool the air, but on the contrary produce
a hot, steamy atmosphere in the valley below. It is said to be
unhealthy in summer, from the coarse, gravelly soil becoming heat-
ed and radiating its heat during the night, making the air very close
and oppressive. In the spring and autumn malarious exhalations
rise from the porous soil, and fevers become rife during both these
seasons.
The autumn crops consist of Indian corn, rice, and mash the ;

spring crops of wheat and barley. The grain cultivated is not,

however, sufficient to meet the wants of the inhabitants of the
valley, and has to be imported from other quarters. A force would,
therefore, have to bring its own supplies if it entered Buner. The
inhabitants are rich in cattle, especially buffaloes, and are almost
entirely occupied in the tending of their herds and the cultivation
of the soil.

The betrothal and marriage ceremonies are similar throughout

all the sub-divisions, varied in some places, with reference
to the
lower classes, at the will of some malik, whose authority may be
more arbitrary and oppressive than that of his neighbours. A poor
man has generally to pay Rs. 50 to Rs. 60 for his bride, the middle
Rs. 120, the others from Rs. 200 to Rs. 300, the man being
further bound to feed the relations of the girl, both at the betrothal
and the marriage, with rice, ghi, and sugar. The musician receives
a fee of Rs. 2 the betrothal and Rs. 5 at the marriage,
at
the shortest interval between the two events being two months
and the longest two years. The age of the bridegroom usually
ranges from twenty to twenty-two, that of the girl being fifteen
to seventeen. This seems a move in the right direction, the girl
being older than custom usually permits in Muhammadan countries
where parents allow their daughters of twelve or thirteen to marry
206 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA

and cohabit with their husbands. The punishment for adultery with
the higher classes is death, and nothing short of this will satisfy
them. The lower orders, if poor, are sometimes satisfied, after
a period pf two or three years, with a surra. This means that the
man who has enticed away the daughter or wife of another gives
a sister or other female relation to the aggrieved party in exchange.
There is no fixed rule as to what the father is to give on the birth
of a child.
All hamsayas, such as Gujars,have to pay Rs. 5 annually ;

but of this number, those who are not artisans, have to take up
arms in time of necessity, and fight for their maliks, being fed by
them as long as the feud lasts.
With regard to the communications between Buner and the
surrounding countries, there are three passes leading from Buner
into Swat, the Kalel, the Jowarai, and the Karakar. Of these the
last named is the only one practicable for mule transport. On
the east, the Indus being crossed at Mahabara, Buner can be
entered, but with difficulty, by the defile of the Barandu. From
and the Ambela pass lead into
British territory, the Malandri pass
Buner, and are both practicable for laden animals. There arc
several other routes from Yusafzai, but they are difficult.
The trade of the country is principally in the hands of the
Hindus of Rustam and Bazar in British territory, with agencies
at the principal villages in Buner. GM is exported in large
quantities, also honey, timber, etc., the imports being chiefly
cotton fabrics and salt. Goats, sheep, and cattle are annually
purchased in Buner for the Peshawar market.
The Bunerwals are independent of us for the necessaries
of life, and fear a blockade less than any of the other tribes. For
villages adjoining our border a blockade has been found to be
successful ; but for others it is impossible.
Having discussed the country, customs, etc., of the Bunerwals,
it is now necessary to notice briefly the different sections of the
tribe. The two which border on British territory, and therefore
most nearly affect us, are the Salarzais and the Nurizais.
The Salarzais are a powerful section, and are said to be able
to bring 1,600 men into the field. Sub-divided into the Mali Khel
and the Aib Khel, they have fourteen villages, of which Jowar is

the largest and most important. The residents of this village

 TVSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 207

belong to both ''sub-divisions. The Salarzais have more com-

munications with our subjects than any other section of the
Bunerwals.
The Nurizais adjoin British territory to the south-east of the
Salarzais, and are separated from the Chamla valley by the Guru
range. They communicate with British territory by the Malandri
and Ambela which lead direct to their country. They are
passes,
divided into two sub- sections, the Panjpai and the Ali Sher Khel.
The former have always been favourably disposed towards the
British. Their maliks have invariably attended to the summons of
the Assistant Commissioner of Yusafzai, when called upon to do
so, and have done their best to smooth any
difficulties that might

arise between them and us. The Ali Sher Khel maliks, on the
contrary, are the most troublesome people we have to deal with in
Buner. The Nurizais were not implicated as a whole in the attacks
on the Malakand and Chakdara in July 1897. The principal villages
of the Panjpai section are Kharappa and Nawa Kala, and of the
Ali Sher Khel, Kega, and Bar Kala. The maliks of the last two
places have the greatest influence in the Nurizai coimtry. The
section is said to be able to turn out 1,100 fighting men.
The Ashazais are located at the base of the isolated Jafir hill,
having the Salarzais on their west and the Nurizais on the south.
They are the most warlike men in Buner, and owing to their central
position play a prominent part in the politics of the country. They
are divided into four sub- sections, the Khadin Khel, Aya Khel,
Musara Khel, and the Khakizai. The first live in Anghafur the ;

Aya Khel and Musara Khel divide Tursak, which is the largest
village of the Ashazai and the Khakizai are settled in Ilai. The
;

section numbers about 1,000 fighting men.

The Gadaizais occupy the southern slopes of the Ham and
Dosiri mountains, and are too far located from our border for their
chiefs ever to bebrought into political contact with our officers.
They are divided into four sub-sections, Ibrahim Khel, Hasan
Khel, Ali Sher Khel, and Seni Khel.
The Nasozais occupy the western slopes of the Duma mountains
to the south-east of the Gadaizais. They are divided into two
sub- sections, the Panjpai and the Makhozai. Their most important
village is Bagra, and, during the Ambela campaign, the Khan of

that place and the Khan of Daggar, also belonging to the Panjpai
208 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

sub- section of the Nasozais, were considered the most important

chiefs in Buner.
The Daulatzais occupy a portion of the valley on both banks
of the Barandu stream to the north of the Chamla valley. They are
divided into three sub-sections, Ismailzai, Mandazai, and Barkazai.
The principal village of the first is Kalpani of the Mandizai,
;

Bajkatta ; and of the Barkazai, Shal Bandai. Some of their

villages are flourishing places, and have an extensive trade through
Hindus with Sudum, more especially Bajkatta and Kalpani. The
maliks of this section, in case of any dissensions among the Chamla-
wals and Chagarzais, obtain large sums of money for helping and
assisting the rival pretenders to power.
The Chagarzais have already been described under the heading
of the Black Mountain tribes. Of the three sections into which
they are divided, viz., Nasrat Khel, Firozai, and Basi Khel, the

second only is located in the Buner valley, and inhabits the western
slopes of the Duma mountains ; its principal villages being Tangora

and Batora. This section numbers about 1,000 fighting men.

Affair with the Hindustani fanatics at Kotla in January 1853.

About the year 1823, there arrived on the Yusafzai frontier
one of those famous saintly adventurers, who have at all times
managed to beguile the credulous and simple Pathan race for
their own ends, and have been the means of creating discord,
upheaving society, and fomenting rebellions, which have been
checked and crushed with the utmost difficulty. This man was
Saiyid Ahmad Shah of Bareilly. At one period of his life he was
the companion-in-arms of the celebrated Amir Khan Pindari,
who was himself a Pathan, born in the valley of Buner. Saiyid
Ahmad studied Arabic at Delhi, and then proceeded to Mecca by
way of Calcutta. It was during this journey that his doctrines
obtained the ascendancy over the minds of the Muhammadans
of Bengal, which has ever since led them to supply this colony with
fresh recruits. Although the Saiyid in after life attempted to dis-
guise the fact, his doctrines were essentially those of the Wahabi
sect, inculcating the original tenets of Islam, and repudiating
commentaries on the Koran, the adoration of relics, etc.
It was in 1824 that the adventurer arrived by way of Kand-
ahar and Kabul amongst the Yusafzai tribes of the Peshawar
 YVSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 209

border, with about forty Hindustani followers. This was an oppor-

tune moment to raise the spirits of the Yusafzais
and other Pathans
(which had been lowered by the crushing defeat they and the
Peshawar Sirdars had received from Eanjit Singh at the battle of
Xowshera), by religious exhortation. Saiyid Ahmad gave out that
he was a man of superior sanctity, and divinely commissioned to
wage a war of extermination, with the aid of all true believers,
against the infidel. Amongst a race so simple and superstitious,
the mission of all enthusiasts, such as Saiyid Ahmad, is eminently
successful. Animated by a spirit of fanaticism, and with the desire
of freeing themselves from their Sikh oppressors, a numerous,
although ill-disciplined, army was soon at his disposal. His own
Hindustani followers had been increased by recruits till they now
numbered 900 men. In addition to this, the Peshawar Sirdars,
feeling the influence of the movement, and hoping to break the
Sikh rule, joined in the crusade.
Collecting his army
together, and strengthened by the contin-
gents of Khadi Khan of Hund, Ashraf Khan of Zaida, and the
followers of the Peshawar Sirdars, the Saiyid proceeded to Nowshera
with the intention of laying siege to the fort of Attock. He, how-
ever, found Ranjit Singh forewarned. Hari Singh with a large
army awaited him on the Indus, and Budh Singh was sent across
the river with a considerable force. Moving up to Saidu to meet
Budh Singh entrenched his army, who were thereupon
the fanatics,
surrounded by the fanatics and in time reduced to great distress.
Budh Singh at length determined to fight; and warning the
Peshawar Sirdars of the near
approach of Eanjit Singh and the fate
that awaited them ifthey acted with Saiyid Ahmad, he commenced
the battle. The Sirdars, with Yar Muhammad at their
head,
accepting the warning, fled immediately. This act of treachery had
the desired and the Muhammadans were routed with great
effect,

slaughter by the Sikh soldiery. Yar Muhammad, however,

derived little benefit from his act, for Ranjit Singh doubled
the
amount of the Peshawar tribute, desecrated the mosques, despoiled
the country, and ultimately retired, taking Yar Muhammad
Khan's
son as hostage. It subsequently transpired that the Saii/id's
attempt
on Attock had been a failure owing to the treachery of Kadi Khan
of Hund, who had disclosed his intentions to Ranjit Sin^^h
""
VOL. I. '

2E
210 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Saiyid Alimad, after this defeat, which occurred in the spring

of 1827, escaped with a few followers, via Lundkhwar, to Swat.
Thence he proceeded to Buner, and ultimately, at the invitation of
some of the Khans, returned to Yusafzai. The Pathans, who still

believed in his miraculous powers, swarmed in thousands round

his standard, and being joined by Mir Baba the Sudum chief, and
others, he determined to chastise the Khan of Hund for his mis-

conduct. The no decisive result but by an act

parties met, with ;

of treachery, in which he was aided by the late Akhund of Swat,

the Saiyid induced Khadi Khan to visit him in a friendly way, and
instantly had him seized and slain. After this he proceeded to
Panjtar, and was heartily welcomed by Fateh Khan, the chief of
the Khudu Khels, a connection which strengthened his position
among the Pathans. Aided by Fateh Khan and his own bands
of Hindustanis, the Saiyid now commenced a series of exploits
which eventually placed the whole of Yusafzai and Peshawar
under his control. He subdued the Khans of Hund and Hoti,
and levied tithes from the Yusafzai clans. In 1828, by a night
attack he defeated the Barakzai force, which had advanced against
him as far as Zaida, and subsequently he took possession of Amb.
In 1829, having again defeated the Barakzais at Hoti, he occupied
Peshawar. But his successful career was now brought to a close.
His exactions had become oppressive to the Pathans, and an
attempt on his part to put a stop to their taking money on the
betrothal of their daughters was still more distasteful There was
a general insurrection against him, and many of his followers,

including the deputy left at Peshawar, were massacred. Fateh

Khan also, having derived every advantage from the Saiyid's
presence at Panjtar, was now desirous of getting rid of his

obnoxious ally. He therefore joined heartily in the scheme for the

assassination of his followers but when the beacon was lighted on
;

the top of Karamar, which was the arranged signal of slaughter,

he found that Saiyid Ahmad and his compact little army of
1,600 Hindustanis under Mulla Ismail, was a force which he dared
not attack openly. Finding the Mahaban no longer a safe asylum,
the Hindustanis now crossed the Indus and proceeded to Balakot.
Here the followers of the Saiyid again rallied round him, and an
army under Sher Singh marched against him. In spite of the dis-
parity of numbers, and the warning of his friends, the Saiyid
 TUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 211

determined to fight. Three times did his small band of Hindustanis

beat back the Sikh regiments, but at last, overpowered by numbers,
they were defeated and destroyed, only three hundred of their
number escaping and the Saiyid himself being amongst the slain.
Of his disciples who escaped with their lives a portion found
their way to Sitana. This village, as already stated, had been
given as a mwa^ grant by the Utmanzais to the Saiyids of Tiringi on
their first arrival, and belonged to one Saiyid Akbar Shah, a man
who was held in great veneration by the Utmanzais, Gaduns, and
neighbouring tribes, and who was a declared enemy of the Sikhs.
It was at that time the refuge for outlaws and offenders from Yusaf-
zai and Hazara, and was the rendezvous of all the discontented
Khans and their followers. Saiyid Akbar had served as a treasurer
and counsellor to Saiyid All mad, and on this account he willingly
allowed the Hindustanis to gather round him. Here they settled,
and established a colony, and also constructed a fort near Sitana,
which they called Mandi. After the British annexation of the
Peshawar valley, Abdul Ghafur, the well-known Akhund of Swat,
prevailed on the people of Swat to receive Saiyid Akbar as their
king, and he was accordingly proclaimed King of Swat.
The first occasion of our coming into collision with this Hin-
dustani colony, occurred in 1853, after the expedition against the
Hassanzais, related in a previous chapter. The Hindustani fanatics
had co-operated with the Hassanzais against Jehandad Khan of Amb,
and had actually seized a small fort of his, named Kotla, in the
Amb territory, on the right bank of the Indus, and it was necessary
that it should be recovered and restored to the Amb chief. Accord-
ingly, after the conclusion of the operation in December 1852 and
January 1853, under Lieut. -Colonel Mackeson, c.b., a force was
moved down to the left bank of the Indus, opposite Kotla.
None of the tribes around, the Amazais, MadaKhels, or Gaduns
had joined the Hindustani fanatics but the latter, in answer
;

to the warning to them to withdraw from Kotla to their own

settlements, gave no written reply, and according to some verbal
reports, sent a defiance— Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan, the leader of the
Hindustanis, declaring he had come to die.
Feeling confident, after seeing the ground, that the crossing and
re-crossing could be well protected, and the garrison reduced to
extremity if they offered opposition, Lieut. -Colonel Mackeson
2E2
212 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

determined to send a force across, though there were only two boats
available for the passage, each capable of carrying 100 men at a time.
On the 6th January, the troops, as per margin, were crossed
^ ^ ^,
.
o over from Kirpilian under the com-
Mountam Train Battery, 2 . , -^. t a i^T,-
^i- x x i xi,
guns. mand oi Major J. Abbott, to retake the
1st Sikh Infantiy.i
^^^^^ j^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ doubts if the moim-
3rd ,, „ - .
1 1 rv" T r
Two regiments of Dogras of tain guns would sumce to reduce the
^^^g^^asiamir Army.
stronghold, two Horsc
Artillery guns
6 Zamburaks. wcre held ready to be sent across in
addition ; the other two guns were kept on the left bank to cover
the crossing and retirement.
The village of Ashera is on a spur of the mountain about 200
feet above the Indus and the fort of Kotla is higher up on the
same spur, at an elevation of 1,000 feet or more from the river.
It was known that there was no spring or well in the fort, and
it was intended that Jehandad Khan's men should assault the vil-

lage under cover of the Horse Artillery guns on the left bank of the
river, whilst Major Abbott's column should move round and gain
possession of the heights above it, the crossing opposite Sitana
being threatened by the regular troops from their encampment
at Kargarh. Directly the two Sikh regiments and mountain
guns began to ascend the hill, the Hindustanis fled incontinently
from the fort of Kotla and village of Ashera, and, being pursued
by Jehandad Khan's people, some thirty or forty were cut up.
The troops bivouacked for the night at Ashera, and re-crossed
the Indus the following day.
Affairs at Shekh J ana and Narinji under Major J. L. Vaughan,
in July and August 1857.

The only portion of the Peshawar district in which advantage

of the Sepoy Mutiny was taken by the people to disturb the country
was on the Yusaf zai frontier, and this was principally due to the
presence of the Hindustani frnatics, who were supported by contri-
butions of men and money from traitorous princes and private
individuals in Hindustan.
The Yusafzai country was controlled by the fort of Mardan,
which was usually garrisoned by the Corps of Guides ; but in tlic

1 Now the 51st Sikhs (Frontier Force).

2 Now the 53rd Sikhs (Frontier Force).
 7USAFZAI AND OADUN TBIBES. 213

middle of May 1857, this regiment moved down to form a portion

of thePunjab Moveable Column, its place being taken by the 55th

Native Infantry
Native Infantry. At the end of May the 55th
put to the sword,
broke into mutiny, when about 100 sepoys were
and 150 taken prisoners by a column which had moved cut from
Peshawar under Lieut.-Colonel John Nicholson, some 600
sepoys

of the regim.cnt making good their escape

to Swat.

Two powers had hitherto reigned in Swat— the AJchnnd, or

and the Badshah or king, whom the ABund had set

up for
priest,
carrying on the temporal government. Had
these two been united
Infantry, and at that moment
in harbouring the 55th "^Native
that it would
proclaimed a ~jeJiad against us, there can be no doubt
have set fire to the valley of Peshawar, and placed us in considerable
difficulties. But Saiyid Akbar, the king, had just died. He had
long survived his popularity, and
had he then been ahve, would
chiefs of Swat to
not\ave been allowed by the AJchund and
entertain a disciplined army of Hindustani
sepoys. The crisis roused
their liberties, and they first
these chiefs to the preservation of
Saiyid Mubarak Shah, the son of the late king, and
lastly,
expelled
Infantry, who were conducted
the refugees of the 55th Native
mountain paths to the river
by disciples of the AJchund through
far above our territory, with
Indus, which they crossed at a point
their way to Kashmir and seeking
the desperate design of making
an asylum with Maharajah Golab Singh. They were, however, des-
destination.
troyed before they arrived at their
the 55th Eegiment had, however, shrunk
A few of the sepoys of
journey to Kashmir, and had
from encountering the perils of the
Shah, who had taken up his abode
joined the young Saiyid Mubarak
at the village of Panjtar.
Not far from this village, at a place
settlement of Hindustanis under some
called Mangal Thana, a
maulvisoi the WahaU sect had sprung up, being a branch of the
parent colony at Sitana.
of Panjtar, was also hostile to us. In
Mukarrab Khan, Chief
the cause of his hostility it is necessary to refer
order to understand
since the death of his father, Fateh Khan, in
briefly to hie history
to the position of Khan. For the first eight
1S41, when he succeeded
years he seems to have
managed the Khudu Khels well, and the
tribe remained quiet and contented. Dissensions did now and then
appeased, at last Mukarrab Khan
break out, but the parties were
till
214 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

seized, deprived of his siglit, and slew Sirkar, 7nalih of Bam Khel
Totalai, a man wlio liad been his father's, Fateh Khan's, agent.
This act seems to have been the beginning of all the troubles
which afterwards overtook him. It was about this time that he
rendered himself useful to Major James Abbott, who was then
holding Hazara and on the annexation of the Punjab he presented
;

himself to our officers. Even then his oppression had made him at

variance with his subjects, and the object of his visit w^as to obtain

British aid against them, which it is needless to remark was refused.

Nothing particular was done by him for several years after this,
but in 1855 he made a petition claiming our aid against the Hindus-
tani fanatics at Mangal Thana who had assembled there to the
number of 420 men under Saiyid Abbas, with the intention of attack-
ing the Khan's villages. The sincerity of Mukarrab Khan was con-
sidered doubtful, and appeared probable that the agitation was
it

got up by the Khan himself, who was at variance with his subjects,
the Totalaiwals, and wanted the fanatics to help him against them.
The cause of this difference was that the Khan claimed a house
and tithe tax at the rate of Es. 2 per harvest, whilst the Totalai-
wals declined to pay anything beyond Ks. 2 a house per annum.
The dispute was referred to the British authorities, and
a decision was given against Mukarrab Khan, and he was informed
at the same time by the Chief Commissioner that he would be held
responsible for the good conduct of the Hindustani colony at Man-
gal Thana. This so displeased him that from that time he did not
hide his Matters continued in an un-
hostility to the British.
satisfactory state, and it was apprehended that there would be an
armed movement into British territory. In October 1856 sanc-
tion was given by the Supreme Government for a force to be em-
ployed against the Khan should necessity warrant such a measure.
On the 30th August 1856, previous to the receipt of the above
sanction, a raid on Swabi and Salim Khan being expected, a detach-
ment of Guide Cavalry and 200 Infantry, under command of Major
H. B. Lumsden, moved out to protect the threatened callages.
But the force soon returned, as it appeared that the fanatics were
to be used against the Totalaiwals and not against the British
villages.
On the 5th October 1856 the maliks of Totalai and Mobaraz
Khan of Chinglai, cousin of Mukarrab Khan, having joined together,
 YUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 215

determined to raise the whole of the Khudu Khels against Mukarrab

Khan, if he did not instantly dismiss the fanatics. On the 7th Octo-
ber 1856 the Khan wrote to the Assistant Commissioner at Mardan,
informing him that the Hindustanis had been dismissed, and he
had made peace with his subjects. During the troubles of 1857
Mobaraz Khan invited the Hindustani fanatics under Maulvi Ina-
Khan
yat Ali to his village without consulting his cousin ; the
Khudu Khels joined him, and Mukarrab Khan found himself
isolated at Panjtar.
It was at this time that some of the western villages began to give
way to the influences by which they were tempted to disaffection,
and, having refused to pay their revenue, they appealed to Mobaraz
Khan of Chinsiilai and to the Hindustanis to come down and beo-in a
war The defaulting village of Shekh Jana was accord-
for Islam.
ingly occupied by 200 men from Chinglai under Baz Khan, the
nephew of Mobaraz Khan, and by 50 horsemen under a partisan
soldier, named Jan Muhammad, besides men from the neighbouring
villages.
fort of Mardan, after the mutiny of the 55th Native
The In-
fantry, had been garrisoned by the 5th Punjab Infantry and
two guns of the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, the whole
under Major J. L. Vaughan, 5th Punjab Infantry. The Assistant
Commissioner, Lieutenant J. C. Horne, having called upon that
officer to act, he moved out on the afternoon of the 1st July with the

-D ,
TVT
Mountain •„ m . detachment as per margin,
& and
^ the next
"^^ jj.c^u
Peshawar <•
irain _
sr >

Battery, 2 guns. moming attacked Shekh Jana. A con-

^'"'''^''^'
^""^"^ '^ siderable number Of matchlock men, with
sabrl
5th Punjab Infantry, 270 the horse, were drawn up along the
'^•^^^^'''
the eastern bank of the nala on which
the village is built. A few rounds from the guns speedily threw
them into disorder ; when the skirmishers of the 5th Punjab Infantry
cleared the village, and the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, pursuing the
fugitives over the open plain in its rear, drove them into the

adjoining village of Spinkana.

This village was then attacked and carried, and the enemy'pur-
sued to the hills by the cavalry and some levies, under Lieutenant
G. A. Graham, when several were cut up and some twenty-
five taken prisoners. The only casualties on our side were two
sowars, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and three of the levies, wounded.
216 FEONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Major Vaiighan stated that the conduct of the troops had been
admirable, and the pursuit by the cavalry very spirited, Baz Khan was
amongst the slain, and Jan Muhammad, having been taken prisoner,
was triedand executed, as were, subsequently, seven of the villagers.
A fortnight after the affair of Shekh Jana, the Hindustani
fanatics, under the leadership of Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan, crossed
the border and raised the standard of religious war at the mountain
village of Narinji. Narinji is on the extreme border, and, being very
difficult of access, had become an asylum for bad characters, and

had several times defied the authorities in Yusafzai at the last ;

moment, however, the maliks had always hitherto saved the place
from destruction by submission and reparation. The villagers were
proud that the place had more than once been attacked by a Sikh
force without success.
The number of Hindustani followers with the maulvi was
about 150, and he had also some 30 or 40 of the men of the
late 55th liTative Infantry. The fighting men of Narinji were
about 400, and 40 horsemen had joined the party from Panj-
tar, under the brother of Mukarrab Khan. A few horsemen had
also come down from Swat, and several of the fugitives from
Shekh Jana were with the maulvi. Mobaraz Khan of Chinglai
remained aloof, and refused to give assistance.
On the night of the 18th July, a force, as per margin, marched
^ , i>T ^•
rr • from Mardan under the command of
Peshawar Mountain irain
Battery, 4 guns. Majcr J. L. Vaughan, 5th Punjab In-
^'^^""^ ^'''''^'^'
^ :?antry, and accompanied by Captain
tro^o"p^
4tii Punjab Infantry, 400 H. E. Jamcs, the Deputy Commis-
^Tounted Police, 40 sowars. sioncr, to Yar Husain, thirteen miles.
Mui tan Levy, 100 „ The 4th Punjab Infantry, under Cap-
tain A. T. Wilde, had marched from Nowshera on the 18th,
but had been so much delayed in crossing the Kabul river that
it was necessary to halt on the 20th to give them a rest.

This route was adopted in order to conceal the object of the

movement, which was further effected by the laying in of supplies
at Salim Khan, as if the troops were proceeding to Panjtar, the
people in the vicinity of which commenced to remove their prop-
erty. On the night of the 20th the troops marched to Parmali,
nine miles, and, after a short halt, advanced towards Narinji, five
1 Now the 57th Wilde's Rifles Frontier Force.
 ;

7U8AFZAI AND GADUN TBIBES. 217

miles, which was sighted at daylight. The surprise was complete

though the enemy made such hasty preparations as were possible
after the troops were seen.
The position of the village was very strong. It was built in
terraces, and situated at the foot of a precipitous hill, the rocky

spurs of which surrounded it on three sides but in the front the

;

ground was open and practicable for cavalry. A broad sandy

nala ran along- the foot of the hill, on the other side of which nala,
facing Narinji, was another range of heights. The slopes of the
hill above Narinji were very steep, though practicable for infantry.

Major Vaughan's force was not strong enough to enable him

to crown the heights above the village before attacking it in front
moreover, the men had had a long night's march, the season of the
year was very trying, and it was unadvisable to attempt such
a laborious operation, or, whilst the enemy's strength was undeve-
loped, to divide the force. Consequently a position favourable for
artillery fire was seized upon, from which the mountain guns began
to bombard the village.

The nialiks had been previously called upon to give up the

maulvi, but as in their reply they ignored his presence, the infantry
advanced in skirmishing order, and after a tenacious resistance
on the part of the enemy, made themselves masters of the lower
part of the village, and of the rocks which flanked it. There were
several strong breastworks in the upper part of the village, and
the enemy, who were very numerous, then pressed down to try
and drive the infantry out of the position they had won but ;

though they fought with great bravery, they were driven back
with loss, and the village was then destroyed.
About 8 A.M., Major Vaughan determined on retiring, as it
was not probable that further injury could be inflicted that day.
The troops had been severely worked, and would soon have become
exhausted from the almost intolerable heat.^ The supply of water,
too, would have become scarce, as it had to be brought from the
villages in rear, on donkeys.
The retirement was effected without the slightest opposition
on the part of the enemy, although the ground was most favourable
for them, and the troops reached their camp at 10 a.m.

1 Forty men, of whom \\\w siiocuml)cd, had beoi s( ruck down by t lie sun the pre-
vious day.
Vol. L 2?
 a

218 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The losses of the enemy had been very severe. Independently

of those who must have been killed or wounded by the guns

on the higher slopes above the village, which the infantry did not
reach, fifty of the enemy fell in the lower village alone ; many
of these were Hindustanis. The wounded were estimated at about
fifty more. Our loss had been five killed and twenty-one v/ounded.
The people of Narinji, nevertheless, remained stubborn, and
would not expel the m.aulvi. Soon afterwards a raid was made
on cattle in British territory, and nothing remained but to renew
the attack on the refractory village. It was known that Mobaraz
Khan of Chinglai, and Alam Khan, brother of Mukarrab Khan of
Panjtar, had taken money from the maulvi, and succeeded in
purchasing the aid of the chief men of Buner, who promised to
bring assistance three days after the festival of the Eed. Cham!
had already sent seven standards (probably 200 men), and other
parties were daily arriving. Promises had been made from Swat, and
reinforcements of Hindustanis had arrived from Mangal Thana
and Sitana.
Major Vaughan's camp had been established at Parmali after
the affair at Narinji, but on the 31st it was moved to Shewa, as
affording better shelter for the European troops, and partly to con-
ceal our intentions. On the morning of the 2nd August, reinforce-
ments were received from Peshawar, but the force had been pre-
viously weakened by the departure of the 4th Punjab Infantry.
At 1 A.M. on the 3rd August, a column of the strength mar-
24.pr. Howitzers (2 guns).
gii^aHy uoted marched from Shewa,
Peshawar Mountain Train Bat- -u^^er Major J. L. Vaughan, with Captain

H. M. 27th Foot, 50 bayonets. H. R. Jamcs as Political Officer, on

„ 70th „ 50 „ Narinji. Captain James had informa-
„ 87th „ 50 „ . , ,

2nd Punjab Cavalry, 150 sabres, tion that there was a bye-road branch-
"^^^SjZTT
6ih3 „ „ 200 „
ing off about one mile and a ],alf before
reaching Narinji, by which a cokimn

PoUce and levies,' 225 inounted, could asccnd to the icar of the village.
100 foot. A force of 300 bayonets, 5th Punjab
Infantry, and 50 bayonets, 87th Royal Irish Fusiliers, was there-
fore detached under the command of Lieutenant W. D. Hoste, 5th

iTbe pre-'ent 1st Brahmans. 3 The present 50lh Scinde Ritics (Fron-
2 The present 58th Vaughan's Rifle (Fioii- tier Force).
tier Force). * The present 24th Pimjaltis,
 YUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 219

Punjab Infantry, to take the enemy in flank and rear. The exist-
ence of this road was known when the first attack was made, but
the force was then too weak to detach any portion of it.
main body came in sight of Narinjisoon after sunrise.
Tlie
Kumours which had exaggerated our weakness now turned our
hundreds into thousands, and as the force approached many of
tlio auxiliaries fled. Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan was among the
first to leave the village.

As soon as the main body had come into position opposite

the village, fire was opened upon it, and upon the clusters of men
observed upon different parts of the mountain. This was feebly
replied to by a matchlock fire from the sangars above the village
and along the heights.
After about half an hour, the column which had been detached
to ascend the hill made its appearance far away on the right. Its
jDrogresswas vigorously opposed by the enemy, but the latter were
dislodged from every point where they attempted to make a stand,
and the column passed on in the most brilliant manner, and with-
out a check, until the rear of the village was gained. The upper
portion of the village, which is very strong and commanding, was
then rapidly taken possession of at the point of the bayonet by
a portion of Lieutenant Hoste's. men, whilst the remainder con-
tinued their advance in pursuit of the enemy.
As soon column was no
as the success of Lieutenant Hoste's
longer doubtful, a detachment of the Punjab Infantry, under
6tli

Lieutenant G. N. Saunders, was sent to ascend the heights which

enclose the village to the left, and intercept the retreat of the
fugitives. This service was well performed, and twenty-five or
thirty of the enemy were killed. Amongst the slain were several
'purbeahs,' believed from their arms and accoutrements to be men
of the late ootli Native Infantry. Simultaneously with the move-
ments last described, the 16th Punjab Infantry and fifty bayonets
ofHer Majesty's 70th Regiment entered the village from the front
and found it deserted.
The work of destruction then began, and not a house was spared.
The towers were blown up under the direction of Lieutenant F. S.
Taylor of the Engineers, and the village was soon a mass of ruins.
The troops were then withdrawn. Three prisoners were taken—
2F2
220 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

one a Bareilly maulvi, the second a Chamla standard-hearer, and

the third a vagrant of Charouda they were all subsequently
:

executed.
Though not actively engaged, the large force of cavalry gave
security to the movements of the guns and infantry in the bed of
the nala, and the foot levies were useful in occupying the heights
opposite the village, from which possible annoyance was anticipated.
Our losses were one killed and eight wounded.

Expedition against the Khudu Khels and Hindustani fanatics

by a force under Major-General Sir Sydney J. Cotton, K.C.B.,
April-May 1858.

At the end of October following the destruction of Narinji

related above. Lieutenant J. C. Home,
Assistant Commissioner
of Yusafzai, whilst encamped Shekh Jana with a small escort,
at
was attacked by the Hindustanis and Chinglai Khudu Khels,
aided by the Narinji and Shekh Jana people. Lieutenant Home
was forced to take refuge in a ravine, and being favoured by the
darkness, he saved his life. All his baggage was, however, taken,
and five of his servants were killed. There is no doubt that
Mukarrab Khan, Mobaraz Khan, and nearly all the malihs of Shekh
Jana were in league with the fanatics.
To punish this outrage, Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Edwardes,
the Commissioner of Peshawar, strongly urged that as soon as
troops were available, due punishment should be inflicted for
these wanton and unprovoked hostilities. Accordingly, on the
22nd April 1858, a numbering 4,877 men
force, ranks,
of all

assembled on the left bank of the Kabul river, opposite Nowshera,

under the immediate command of Major-General Sir Sydney
J. Cotton, K.C.B., where it was joined by Lieut.-Colonel H. B.
Edwardes, c.b., the Commissioner. The force was divided into
two brigades, commanded respectively by Lieut.-Colonel H.
Kenny and Major A. T. Allan, both of Her Majesty's 81sfc Regi-
ment.
On the 25th of April, the frontier village of Salim Khan was
reached, and reconnoitring parties, one under Captain T. Wright,
and the other under Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, c.b., were
at once sent forward.
 TUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 221

The approaches to Paiijtar were held by the people of Totalai,

who had for several years been resisting the payment of tithes
demanded by Mukarrab Khan, as
\st Column.
Peshawar Lt. Fd. By.,i 4 guns. already stated. When, therefore, the
Peshawar Mt. Trn By., 2 „ Totalai people saw the reconnoitring
H. M. OStli Foot, 2G0 bayonets.
7th Irregular Cavah'y,2 100 raen. parties approaching, they not only
CJuicles Cavalry, 200 sabres.
turned out to welcome them, but
Peshawar Light Horse,3 30 men.
Sappers and Miners, 100 men. rushed ahead with all their men to try
21st Native Infantry,* .300 men.
and seize Mukarrab Khan. That chief,
Guides Infantrj^ 300 men.
yth Punjab Infantry, 6 400 men. imagining that the reconnoitring parties
18th „ » 6 400 „
2nd Column.
were followed by a column of attack,
81st Fort, 200 bayonets. abandoned his position, and fled with
ISth Irreg. Cav.7"l00 men. seeing
Sappers and Miners, 47 men.
about sixty horsemen to Chinglai ;

Kelat-i-Ghilzai Reg.8 200 „ which, the people of Totalai dashed

Sth Punjab Infantry ,9 450 men. our
in and set fire to Panjtar before
3rd Column.
81st Regiment, 105 bayonets. troops had come up. Our first object
98th „ 10
was thus unexpectedly and easily
7th Irregular Cavalry, 25 men.
18th „ „ 25 „ attained.
Guide Cavalry, 60 sabres.
Kelat-i-Ghilzai Regt., 254 men,
Before crossing the frontier the force
21st Native Infantry, 155 men.
was divided into three columns, as per
Guide Infantry, 76 bayonets.
margin. Salim Khan was made the
8th Punjab Infantry, 54 men.
9lh „ „ 137 base of operations, where the camp
„
ISth „ „ 185 „
remained standing. The Major- General
was to proceed, accompanied by Lieut. -Colonel Edwardes, with
the first column, with two days' provisions, so as to enter the
Khudu Khel territory by the Daran (or Darhan) pass, whilst
Lieut. -ColonelH. Renny, 81st Regiment, proceeded in command
of the second column direct to Panjtar the third column, under
;

Major A. T. Allan, 81sb Regiment, remained in charge of the

1 The Pesha^^^ar Light Field Battery was 3rd June 1857, Avas formed of men from
raised on the 5th June 1857. It was manned His Majesty's 27th, 70th, and 87th
by the 4th Company, 2nd Battalion, Bengal Foot, mounted on horses taken away from
Foot Artillery (now the 35th Field Battery the disarmed native cavalry. Captain
R. A.) and had a company of European drivers F. Fane, 87th Foot, was commandant, and
composed of volunteers from the companies the strength was 2 ofi&cers, 4 sergeants
of Foot Artillery at Peshawar. The horses and 84 men.
and syces A\ere taken from the Sth Bengal 4 Now the 1st Brahmans.
Light Cavalry which had been dismounted 5 Now the 21st Punjabis.
and disarmed. This was one of the Regular 6 Now the 26th Punjabis.

Cavalry Regiments, and the horses were the 7 Now the Sth Cavalry.

property of Government. 8 Now the 12th Pioneers.

2 Now the 5th Cavalry. 9 Now the 20th Duke of Cambridge's

3. The Peshawar Light Horse, raised on Own Infantry (Brownlow's Punjabis).

222 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

standing camp at Salim Khan. No tents were taken by the advanc-

ing columns.
At one o'clock on the morning of the 26tli April, the first
column left camp for Chinglai, and at daylight entered the Daran
pass, a remarkably narrow defile, of about two miles in length, but
with heights on either side easily crowned to cover the passage of
troops. The enemy made no attempt to dispute the passage of this
pass.
Near the entrance of the Chinglai valley, in a wooded nook
Bagh, inhabited by Saiyids. A
of .the hills, stood the village of
stream of water ran through its shady groves of mulberry trees,
and it was a favourite halting-place for marauders when making
raids on our territories. The Major- General and the Commissioner
visited the Saiyids to call them to account, but on their pleading
their real inability to refuse a shelter to the robbers, their village
was not destroyed a fine ; of one rupee a house was taken from
them, with an injunction in future to give information of any
raids that were contemplated.
The column, after reaching the top of the Daran pass, proceeded
at once to the village of Chinglai, which was a large village and
contained about 1,000 houses, very substantially built. Here
resided Mobaraz Khan, who had a substantial little fort of wood
and stone. No resistance, however, was attempted.
During the day was observed that some of the village people
it

with their property had endeavoured to secrete themselves in ravines

on the mountain side, overlooking the village of Chinglai and the ;

9th Punjab Infantry, under Captain J. B. Thelwall, was accordingly

ordered to ascend the mountain by a circuitous route, with a view
to cutting off their retreat into the Chamla valley ; whilst a party
of the 98th Eegiment, under Captain L. S. Cotton, proceeded straight
up the hill to dislodge them from their position. A few shots only
were exchanged, and then the enemy hastily retired, leaving several
killed on the ground. During the day the troops were employed,
under the direction of Captain H. Hyde, of the Engineers, in
destroying the fort, village, and crops, and at night they bivouacked
on a ridge near Chinglai.
On the 27th April, the force, having completed its work at
Chinglai, returned to Salim Khan, via Panjtar and the Jehangirra
 TUSAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 223

Darra. As an approach to Chinglai this route proved to be much

more than the Daran Pass route. The track is chiefly
difficult

through broken country, and at one point passes through a rocky

defile called Taralai, a very formidable obstacle if disputed.
Mukarrab Khan's horsemen and footmen were seen lurking
about our line of march during the day, but apparently only in
hopes of preying on stragglers from the force. Nothing, in fact,
could more strongly mark the badness and unpopularity of the
Khan's character than his total inability to work up his own clan
to defend what had hitherto been considered a strong country.
The second column meanwhile had thoroughly destroyed
Panjtar, and returned to Salim Khan.
It was now. necessary to destroy Mangal Thana, a strono-hold
of Mukarrab Khan's, on one of the chief spurs of the Mahaban
mountain, whither he had removed his property on the approach of
the troops to Chinglai, and whither he himself was in the habit
of resorting in the last extremity. It had also been the resort of
Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan, who had so perse veringly endeavoured
at Narinji and other places, to raise Yusafzai in rebelhon in 1857
The road from Panjtar to Mangal Thana was reported to be
practicable, though difficult, and the people of Totahi expressed
their willingness to act as guides to the- troops.
The T\^as again divided into three columns
force the first :

to act against Mangal Thana, the second to proceed to Panjtar as

a support, and the third to remain in reserve at Salim Khan.
istcou^mn. On the 28th
April, the 1st column,
Peshawar Lt. rd. By. 2 guns. ^^ ^
c^-^r^-^r^X. ^^ •
t ,
strength as per margin, under the com-
Peshawar Mt. Tn. By. 2 .,
81st Regiment, 200 men. maud of the Major -General, left camn at
Guide Cavalry. 50 men. a^T^^ m. i i -,
" *^

and pushcd OU by moou-

-.

Sappers and Miners, 50 men. '^^^'"^ -Klian,

Keiat-i-Ghiizai Regt. 400 light towards Mangal Thana. The
Guide Tnfantrv, 400 bayonets. » , .,,
,
ascent
^^'^j-lv

8th Pur.vib infy. 400 men. 01 the liills was vcry arduous, and half
18th Punjab infy. 400 „ thecolumn had to be left at Dukarai.
The advance' guard reached the heights about 11 a.m. Not a
shot
had been fired at the troops, and on entering Mangal Thana
the
fort was found to have been recently abandoned.
Mangal Thana consisted of two villages, upper
and lower.
The lower comprised thirty or forty houses, and was
occupied by
peaceful Scmjuls, while the upper part consisted
of strong forti-
fications made of large stones and timber. In this part stood the
224 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

citadel of Saiyid Abbas, the leader of the fanatics, with enclosures for
his Hindustani followers. The position was about 5,000 feet above
sea leveland the neighbourhood was densely wooded.
The advanced troops bivouacked at Mangal Thana for the
night, and the next day the fort was blown up by the Sappers and
Miners.
30th April, the troops returned to their
On the camp at Salim

Khan, and halted there on the 1st May.

It only remained to deal with the colony of fanatics at
now
Sitana, for which purpose the force marched towards Khabal,
distant from Sitana about four miles, where it encamped on the
morning of the 3rd May.
Between Amb, on the right bank of the Indus, and our frontier
village of Topi, lies a narrow strip of land which forms part of the
Utmanzai territory. It contains, in addition to the two or three
small hamlets of Topi, the villages of Upper and Lower Khabal
(exactly opposite Torbela), Upper and Lower Kai, and Sitana,
Mandi, and Upper Sitana. The Utmanzais of this strip had, previous
to this date, had feuds with the Saiyids and Hindustanis of Sitana,
and consequently welcomed our troops as allies against a common
foe.
By previous arrangements Major J. R.
Peshawar ^iouutain Train t> n
Battery, 2 guns.
i
Becher,
-r\
j.1
Deputy
the Comm ssioner of
i. • <•

Hazara Mountpin Train Bat- Hazara, movcd to the left bank of the
2nd Sikh infantry, 300 men. ludus with the marginally noted troops
6th Punjab Infantry, 4o0 ^-^j^ ^ vicw to crossiug the river SO as to
men.
'in. .

12th Punjab Infantry, 300 co-opcratc With General Cottoii in the

°^^"'
attack on Sitana.
The Major- General having, on the evening of the 3rd May,
reconnoitred the hills and villages of the enemy, determined the fol-
lowing morning to make a general attack. Major Becher, there-
fore, crossed the Indus early on the morning of the 4th, and
advanced against the villages from the east, while the main column
moved against them from the south. At the same time, the Chief
of Amb, Jehandad Khan, who was our ally, occupied the hills to
the north.
As the main force approached Lower Sitana, skirmishers were
thrown forward and the 2nd Sikhs and the 6fch Punjab Infantry
 YU8AFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 225

were detached from Major Becher's column to move up tlie moun-

tain in rear of Sitana. The 18th Punjab Infantry, under Lieu-
tenant J. Williamson, supported by the 9th Punjab Infantry, under
Captain J. B. Thelwall, were the first to gain contact with the enemy,
and drove them from their main position with considerable loss.
The enemy now retreated to their second position, but were met by
the 6th Punjab Infantry who drove them back on to the bayonets
of the 18th. A hand-to-hand struggle now ensued till every Hindus-
The fanatics
tani in the position was either killed or taken prisoner.
had Pathan allies from the neighbouring Gadun' tribe, but their
heart was not in the business, and they fled precipitately.
Whilst these operations were going on, Upper Sitana was held
by a wing of the 81st, under Lieut. -Colonel H. Renny, and the
Sappers and Miners, under Captain H. Hyde, were employed in
destroying the village.
The position of the enemy having been carried at all points,
and their villages destroyed, the Major- General determined to
retire. In the afternoon, the enemy, chiefly Pathans, rallied again
upon another height but it was determined to adhere only to the
;

object in hand,and not advance further into the hills, where the
troops would have come into collision with the Gadun and other
independent tribes.
As the troops withdrew, the enemy followed up butclosely,

were kept in check by a detachment of the 98th Poot, the Guide

Infantry, and two 5 J- inch mortars. This was the first time that
the Enfield had been used in the hills ; its fire was most effective,
and evidently made a great impression on the minds of the enemy
and on the native chiefs who accompanied the force.
also
It was dusk before all the troops had descended the hiU, and
the force encamped for the night on the Sitana plain by the bank
of the Indus, whence they proceeded next day to Khabal. The
British losses amounted to six killed and twenty- nine wounded,
while the enemy lost sixty killed, including fifty Hindustanis.
The number of their wounded was not ascertained.
The Hindustanis, expelled from Sitana by the Utmanzais,
had taken refuge with the Upper Gaduns, and it was feared that on
our retiring the Gaduns would come down and compel the Utmanzais
to re-admit the fanatics. To prevent this, a force was sent
to surround the Gadun villages of Gandap and Bisak, which are
VOL.L 2Q
226 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

close to the Yusafzai border. The headmen came in at once, but

declared their inability to coerce the Upper Gaduns they were
;

therefore sent to them to say that, unless our terms were agreed to,
coercive measures would be adopted. This threat took immediate
effect.^ and on the night of the 8th May, the Upper and Lower Gaduns

sent in their representatives, and signed an agreement, in full

conclave of Utmanzais and Gaduns, by which both sides bound
themselves to unite in expelling and keeping out the Saiyids and
Hindustanis, and in resisting any third tribe which should endea-
vour to bring them back.
The objects for which the troops had taken the field being now
fully accomplished, the force marched back to Nowshera, where
itwas broken up.
The Indian Medal, with a clasp for the " North- West Frontier,"
was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the
above operations under Major- General Sir S. J. Cotton.
 APPENDIX A.

Table showing tJie relationsMps of the different branches of the Yusafzai

Pathans.
f jMisliranzai.
^Kamalzai
X Kishranzai.
^Usmanzai
f Daulatzai.
.Amazai
X Ismailzai.
/"Alazai.
\Kanazai. I'
Aba Khel.
1Akazai. \ Tinar Khel.
MANDiN TJtmanzai Mir Abmad Khel.
vSaduzai ,
\
i Bibzad Khel.
(.Khudii Khel.

'Ako Khel.
Malikzai.
Bazar Khidrzai.
Mamuzai.
. Manizai.

Hassanzai.
AIsazai Akazai.
MadaKhel.
( Mali Khel.
Salarzai
I Aib Khel.

/•Ibrahim Khel.
\Hassan Khel.
Gadaizai
i Ali Sher Khel.
(^Seni Khel.
Iliaszai
rKhadin Khel.
3 Aya Khel.
Ashazai
I
Musara Khel.
YUSAP .. V Khakizai.

C Panjpai.
.Nasozai
X Makhozai.

{Ismailzai.
Daulatzai Mandizai.
Barkazai.

Malizai f Nasrat Khel.

Chagarzai \ Ferozai.
CBasi Khel.

UNurizai < Panjpai.

^Ali Sher Khel.

( 227 )
2G2
 —

228 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

r Kuz Sulizai.
/Baizai < Babuzai.
(.Bar Sulizai.

Khel.
Utmanzai.
IAli
Khawazo Khel.
Banizai
YxrJAF contd. . . Akozai Bahram Khan Khel,
Usman Khel.
Sultan Khan Khel.
Khadakzai.
Abazai.

iAdinzai.
Shamozai.
^ Khwazazai Nikbi Khel.
Sibujni.
Shamizai.
Malizai.
 APPENDIX B.

Sitana Field Force, 1858.

Major-General Sir Sydney J. Cotton, k.c.b., Commanding.
Staif.

Captain T. Wright, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant G. K. Greaves, Acting Deputy Assistant Adjutant-
General.
Captain W. Cooper, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
,, L. S. Cotton, Aide-de-Camp.
„ H. Hyde, Bengal Engineers, Field Engineer.
Artillery.

Captain T. Brougham, Commariding.

Lieutenant E. Tierney, Staff Officer.

Cavalry.
Lieut.-Colonel W. E. Mulcaster, Commanding.
Lieutenant H. R. Osborn, Staft' Officer.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel H. Renny, Commanding.
Captain V. Tonnochy, Brigade Major.
Ind Infantry Brigade.
Major A. T. Allan, Commanding.
Captain E. J. Ellerman, Brigade Major.
Hazara Column.
Major J. R. Becher, Commanding.
Lieutenant M. J. White, 12th Punjab Infantry, Staff Officer.

( 229 )
 CHAPTER VI.

YUSAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES BETWEEN THE BLACK MOUNTAIN

AND SWAT.— {Contimied.)

The Ambela Expedition, 1863.

The Hindustani fanatics, being prevented, by tlie agree-

after

ment mentioned in the last chapter, from re-occupying Sitana,

settled at Malka on the north side of the Mahaban mountain.
In 1861, however, they came down to a place named Siri, just
overhanging their old haunt at Sitana, and commenced sending
robbers into Hazara to carry off Hindu traders. The Gaduns,
in contravention of their agreement, allowed free
passage to the
Hindustanis through their territory when proceeding on and
returning from these kidnapping and marauding expeditions.
The nature of these outrages was thus described by Lieut.-
Colonel R. G. Taylor, the Commissioner of Peshawar
:—
*

A traderloads his mules at one of our chief towns, and starts across
country to a village he hopes to reach by nightfall. On the road, in some
jungle, and there
lonely spot, he is seized, gagged, and taken aside into the
kept close till dark, when the whole party starts by well-known, but un-
frequented, tracks to the mountainous river bank, where he is ferried
across the Indus, and is detained tUl his relations pay
up the required
ransom. His chief danger lies in the day dawning, or other obstruction
occurring, before the kidnapping party reach the Indus, in which case the
encumbrance, in the shape of a gagged idolator, must be got rid of. The
robbers might, perhaps, let him go if they could afford it, but the locality
and route would be described by him, and individuals perhaps recognised,
and so he is knocked on the head, and thrown into a mountain crevice.

Owing to the mountainous nature of the country it was found

impossible to deal with these crimes merely by protective police
measures, and the Commissioner urged that the only way to check
tribes who sent out the
their occurrence was to punish both the
brigands, and those who gave them passage through their lands.
( 230 )
 YVSAFZAl AND GADUN TRIBES, 231

their responsibilities,
In order therefore to bring them to a sense
of

now placed under blockade, and

the Utmanzais and Gadims were
on the 2nd October 1861 they came in and
made their submission,
to exclude the
and consented to enter into fresh engagements
Sail/ids and Hindustanis.
During the winter of 1862, there was a marked
absence of
spring of 1863 two murders
these kidnapping practices but in the
;

to Mubarak Shah's
were committed, which were generally attributed
the Saiyids and
men, and on the 5th July it was reported that
Hindustanis had suddenly re-occupied Sitana. No
attempt to pre-
or Utmanzai tribe,
vent their doing so was made by the Gadun
These tribes,
and some of their members actually invited them.
thus broken their
being called upon for their reasons for having
engagements, only afforded evasive replies ;and as the Hindus-
tanis were sending threatening
messages to our feudatory, the
Chief of Amb, a blockade of the Gadun
and Utmanzai tribes was
for the defence of the
again imposed, and militia were entertained
territory of the Amb Chief.
Sitana in
Itshould here be stated that after the expedition to
1858, a somewhat remarkable man, named Amir Shah, who had
king of
for years been the chief counsellor of Saiyid Akbar, the late
B. Edwardes, (then
Swat, had waited on Lieut. -Colonel H.
should be given
Commissioner) soliciting that some employment
If a jagir could be given
to the remaining Saiyids and Hindustanis.
" he and his
to Mubarak Shah, the son of the late Saiyid Akbar,
and peaceably withm the British
people could come in settle
told him that it was im-
dominions." Lieut. -Colonel Edwardes
as such, but offered to give
possible to bestow lands on Saiyids
Mubarak Shah militaryservice. This contingency had, however,

been already discussed between them, and Mubarak Shah had

instructed Amir Shah to decline such
an offer on his own part, but
Amran, and about sixty horse-
to accept it for his uncle, Saiyid
means of subsistence.
men for whom there was no longer any
accordingly given these men service to
The 'commissioner had
the reduction of the troops, this
the extent of one troop. On
this time (July 1863) Colonel
party was disbanded, and about
heard that they had returned
E. G. Taylor, C.B., the Commissioner,
to Sitana.
 .

232 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The dispositions for the blockade were as follows :-

Shergarh
On the Hassanzai border of the
Shingli
Amb territory held by Amb Left bank ot Indus.
Chamberi
troop B.
Chamba
50 Police and mounted levies .

Darband >5 >' "

100 Foot levies
Hazara Mountain Train
Battery.
Kirpilian 50 sabres, 5th Punjab Cavalry jj >'

1st Punjab Infantry

50 Police over the boats
Naogiran 85 Foot levies
Tawi 37 Police and levies
Khanpiir 55 Levies >> >> »»

Torbela One company, 5th Gurkhas

Dalmohat 20 Police over the boats
/• 100 Amb mounted levies
Amb < 300 Amb foot levies Right bank.
^135 Hazara levies
r 150 Cavalry of the Guides
Topi >5 >J
1 300 Infantry of the Guides
\ 2 9-pounders from Kohat
Swabi and Maneri )J 3J
(, Head-quarters of the Guides

The 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers^ were also ordered to Hazara.

The Saiyids and Maulvi AbduUa were now acting with their
Hindustani followers in the bitterest spirit against the British
Government the leaders of the colony expressly declared they
;

were embarked in determined opposition to the and called infidel,

upon all good Muhanimadans to quit the friendship of the unbeliev-

ing, and join the would-be martyrs of the faith. A letter to this
effect was sent to the Chief of Amb.

On the night of the 3rd September, Maulvi Abdulla, with his

Hindustanis, and accompanied, by Malik Esau, Gadun,
it was said,
attempted to attack the cam.p The attack*
of the Guides at Topi.
ing force had arrived within a short distance of the camp, when
they came upon a cavalry patrol of one duffadar and four sowars,

1 Now the 1st Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers.

 rXJSAFZAl AND OADVN TBIBE8. 233

of the Guide Corps. The duffadar had been previously warned

of the neighbourhood of a body of men, and on coming on an
advanced party he immediately attacked them. Two of the enemy
were cut down, and the rest, rushing back on the main body, com-
municated a panic, which ended in a general flight. The Hindus-
tanis then erected a breastwork on the right bank of the Indus,
from which they continued' to annoy the picquet held by the levies
at Naogiran.
x\bout the middle of September, the Hassanzai tribe, instigated,
itwas supposed, by the Maulvi of Sitana, made an unprovoked
attack on the hamlets in the little Shingli valley of the Black
Mountain, in which the most advanced outpost of the Amb terri-
tory is situated. The fort was not molested, but some six or seven
hamlets were destroyed, and one man, who resisted, was killed.
The Hassanzais then threatened an attack on Chamber!,
and a portion of the Mada Khels crossed the Indus with the inten-
tion of assisting but the frontier line having been greatly streng-
;

thened by the Amb authorities, the gathering broke up, and the
Mada Khels recrossed the river. Shortly afterwards, the Hassan-
zais made an attack on the Amb levies on the Black Mountain
border,' in which one jemadar and seven men were killed, and
several of the levies wounded.
It was now considered absolutely necessary to have recourse
to military operations. Hitherto the hostilities and provocations
had been offered by detached tribes, but now, for the first time,

the majority, if not the whole, of the Hazara border tribes were
arrayed against the British Government. In the opinion of the
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, it was perhaps possible,
though very doubtful, to avert a campaign by making use of the
feuds and factions of the different tribes to sow discord in their
councils but this could only put off the day of reckoning a little
;

further. Delay, which with these tribes is little understood, might

encourage other tribes to action, and a favourable opportunity
might thus be lost for putting an end to the chronic frontier irrita-
tion which existed. That an expedition against these tribes would
be forced on the British Government sooner or later appeared
inevitable, and condonation without chastisement would only be
an inducement for them to repeat their offences.
Vol. I. 2H
234 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

An expedition was accordingly sanctioned by the Supreme

Government, the first object of which was effectually to rid the
frontier of the chronic cause of disturbance, —the Hindus-
tani fanatics. Their mere expulsion from the right bank of the
Indus back upon their old posts at Malka and on the south bank
of the Barandu, was not considered enough nor was it thought ;

advisable that they should find shelter in Swat, and make that
powerful tribe the future focus of disturbance on the frontier.
If possible, the line of retreat of the fanatics towards the Barandu
was to be cut off ; and although their extirpation might not be
possible, yet if the co-operation of the well-disposed sections of the
tribes could be obtained, their dispersion would be on lines of di-
rection favourable to their capture. The punishment of the Gaduns
was to be a secondary consideration to the primary one of crush-
ing effectually the small, but troublesome, horde of fanatics.
In a memorandum drawn up by Lieut. -Colonel A. T.
commanding the Corps
Plan of operations.
Wilde, C.B.,
rn • ^ •

was stated that the expedi-

Guides, it
t tit of

tion of 1858, although successful, had not been conclusive as to its

results. The Gadun tribe had not felt the power of the British
Government and although the Hindustanis had been turned out
;

of Mangal Thana and driven from Sitana, they had retreated on

Malka, more from the pressure put upon them by the Gadun tribe
than from the defeats they had sustained from our troops. For
the future peace of the border, Lieut. -Colonel AVilde said the
destruction of this colony of priests and fanatics was a neces-
sity, and that they must be removed by death or capture from the
hills,and a treaty made with the hill tribes not to allow them to
reside in their territories. The force to be employed would have
to be a strong one, and it would be necessary to occupy temporarily
the country to the north of the Mahaban the military object ;

in view being to attack the Hindustanis from the north, and force
them to fight with their backs to the plains operating, in fact, :

on their line of retreat, instead of, as in previous expeditions,

advancing from the plains, driving them out of Mangal Thana and
Sitana, and allowing them a safe retreat and passage into the hills.
To effect this, two columns would have to be employed, the base
of operations of one column being in the Peshawar valley, and
 —

YVSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 235

that of the other in Hazara. The detailed movements proposed

for thesetwo forces was as follows :

The Peshawar column was to be assembled at Nawa Kala

and Swabi, with the avowed object, as in 1858, of moving on
Mangal Thana (which would be naturally expected) but, when ;

ready to march, the column was to pass through the Ambela

or Surkhabi pass and occupy the village of Koga, in the Chamla
valley, thirteen miles by a camel road chiefly over our own
land and stated then to be " easy in the extreme." The next day
the force was to march to Chirori, sixteen miles, an open plain
near the river Barandu, when, simultaneous with the occupation
of that place, the Hazara column was to drop down the Indus
and drive the enemy out of Sitana, the Peshawar column moving
on the third day to Malka.
No hostilities were anticipated from the Bunerwals, as, hold-
ing different tenets, and forming part of the religious constituency
of the Akhund of Swat, they were known to have no sympathy
as body with the Hindustani party. Further, they had, for
a
fifteen years, given us no trouble, and were generally judged to be
peaceable. Secrecy regarding the line of proposed operations was of
the utmost importance, and it was consequently considered inadvis-
able to communicate our intentions to the Buner jirga, or to ques-
tion them or the Chief of the Sudum valley about the country on our
line of advance.^ With regard to the Chamla valley, it was known
to be inhabited by mixed clans, some of them settlers from our own
Yusafzai plains, some from Buner, others belonging to the Khudu
Khel tribe, who were known to be desirous of remaining friendly
with us, and the rest being Amazais, who were in some measure
implicated as enemies, from the fact of the Hindustani colony
at Malka being in their territory. The valley was not claimed by,
or considered as under, the protection of any large clan, and it was
known to be divided from Buner by a mountains
lofty range of

called the Guru. Of its advantages as a military position, it was

said that a force would be here able to take its stand in open ground,
in rear of the whole of the enemy's tract, which it would fully

1 This precaution, tliough unavoidable, into their country was raised, and they
was most unfortunate, as, on the approach ultimately joined iu a coalition of other
of our troops to border, the suspicion
th*:' tribes against us.
of the Bunerwals of an intended invasion
2H2
 —

236 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

command, and from which, by rapid excursions, it would be able to

do all its work and deal with all difficulties, returning, when conve-
nient, to its standing camp such a position would render the tribes
;

on the southern slopes of the Mahaban mountain well-nigh power-

less, as they would be surrounded, and would be at the mercy of

an army which could descend upon their strongholds, and carry

out its ends with irresistible advantage.

Brigadier- General B. Chamberlain, Commanding

Sir Neville

the Punjab Irregular Force, who had been selected by the Command-
er-in-Chief for the command of the expedition, decided upon adopt-
ing this plan of operations, with the exception that the Hazara
column was not to take any active part in the movements against
the Hindustanis, but simply to remain stationary at Darband,
with the sole object of overawing the Hassanzais and other tribes
on both banks of the Indus, and protecting the Hazara frontier
from attack the active operations against Sitana being confined
;

entirely to the column under his personal command.

The following troops were to hold the line of the Indus, Hazara,
and Yusafzai :

r 3 guns.
Darband . •
\ 350 European infantry {51st Kegiment).
V. 250 native infantry.

(1 squadron of native cavalry.

Torbela . •

| pg^aiig of native infantry.

r 2 guns.
Topi . . < 150 native cavalry.
V.250 native infantry.

f 3 guns.
\ One company of European infantry {93rd High-
Abbottabad . . \ landers).
/ 50 Native cavalry.
t Depots of two regiments of native infantry.

r 300 native cavalry.

Rustam Bazar * •
) Details of native infantry.

Mardan . . Depot of the Guide Corps.

To form the expeditionary force, all the northern stations

had been considerably weakened, and there was no reserve nearer
than Lahore.
 YUSAFZAI AND OADUN TBIBES. 237

On the 13th October, Brigadier- General Sir Neville Chamber-

lain arrived at Swabi, the place at which it had been arranged
that the troops proceeding from Hazara were to assemble, and
on the 18th October a marched to the mouth
force, as per margin,

-D , AT + •
rn • of the Darhan pass.
^ This is the pass by
Peshawar Mountain I ram .

Battery. which the column under Major-General

^^''''''**'"
BaUe'r
'^''''''
^^**^^ entered the hills in 1858
^^^ ^- J- ;

1st Punjab Infantry. 1 and the impression was, of course, con-

5th Gurkha Regiment. i-ii.tj- i^xx
veyed that the force was about to enter
x.

the hills by the same route as before. The other troops of the
expedition moved up at the same time to Nawa Kala from their
camps in the rear.
On the afternoon of the 19th, when
was too late for the it

Chamla or other tribes to make any preparations on a large scale

for impeding the march of the troops through the Ambela pass,
a proclamation was forwarded by the Commissioner to the ChamUi,
Khudu Khel, Gadun, Amazai, Mada Khel, and Buner tribes,
stating the object for which the force was about to enter the
Chamla valley, and assuring them that it was with no intention
of injuring them or of interfering with their independence, but
solely because it was the most convenient route by which to reach
the Hindustani fanatics, and to effect their expulsion from the
Mahaban.
At 9 P.M., on the 19th October, the troops marginally noted, '

100 sabres, Guide Cavalry. marching from Nawa Kala, effected a

100 „ nth B. c. junction at Parmalao with the troops
5th Punjab infantry.2 wliich had been scnt on before to the
20th „ N. 1.3
mouth of the Darhan pass, and the unit-
ed detachments, under Lieut. -Colonel A. T. Wilde, c.b., moved upon
the Ambela pass, which they reached at sum^ise the following day.
The maliks of our own village of Surkhabi were then taken on by
the force, and told Colonel Taylor, the Commissioner, who was
accompanying the column, that opposition was to be expected
in the pass the following day. About 9 a.m., the baggage being
left atthe entrance of the pass, under an escort of the 11th Bengal
Cavalry, the troops advanced, the Guide Infantry and the 1st

1 Now 55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force). 3 Now "iOth D. C. 0. Infantry (Brown-
2 Now 58th Vaughan's Rifles (Frontier low's Punjabis).
Force).
238 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Punjab Infantry leading, supported, respectively, by the 20th

Punjab Native Infantry and the 5th Punjab Infantry. The 5th
Gurkhas remained as an escort to the two mountain batteries.
When about a third of the defile had^been traversed, informa-
would be
tion was received to the effect that our further progress
disputed, and that the head of the pass was being held by the
people of Buner. At 12 o'clock the enemy opened fire from the
rocks in the vicinity of the road, but were gradually dislodged by
the advanced guard in this manner two -thirds of the pass was
;

traversed, when the end of the defile, called the Ambela Kandao,
appeared in sight. The hills on both sides were high, covered
with low brushwood and^ jutting rocks, but perfectly practicable
for good light troops. On many of the most prominent rocks small
parties of the enemy showed themselves, and fired occasional

shots.
The infantry of the Corps of Guides, under Lieutenant F. H.
Jenkins, were directed to take the crest of the hills to the right,
and the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Major C. P. Keyes, to 'move
up the valley slowly and it was left to Major Keyes to act as
;

his judgment directed. Lieut. -Colonel J. L. Vaughan, with his

regiment, the 5th Punjab Infantry, protected the flank of the
column, which some parties of the enemy threatened. By 2 p.m.
the top of the pass was secured. The number of the enemy was
estimated at from 200 to 250 men, and their loss amounted to
two killed and three wounded, besides one captured. On the side
of the troops there were no casualties.
One of the malihs ofAmbela had been made prisoner while
opposing the advance, and informed us that the slight opposition met
with in the pass was made by the people of his own village (situated
at the mouth of the pass in the Chamla valley, and therefore belonging
geographically to Chamla, but paying tribute to one of the Buner
tribes), and by a few of the Chamla villagers. He was sent to his
people by the Commissioner, together with a wounded man, and
they were allowed to take away the bodies of their men who had
been killed. The malih was charged with a verbal message cor-
responding with the terms of the proclamxation, and informing
the Chamla people that if they would bring supphes they would
be liberally paid for them.
 YUSAFZAT AND OADUN TPTBES. 239

The main column, composed of the troops as per margin,

marched from Nawa Kala at 1 a.m. on
Half C Battery, i9tii Bri-
^^^^ gOth Octobci, and reached Eustam

TistH.'L. I. (550). at 7 A.M. The road was a mere village

loist Roy. Bengal Fus. (500). ^^^ ^g
^^^^. attempt
^
to improve it
Coy. of sappers and miners. ' •'

j j •

3rd Punjab Infantry. 1 earlier would have revealed our mtended

32nd :: Nath'e Infantry.^ ^o^^^^* i^ ^^^ ^^ly received such repairs

as the sappers could hastily give it.

Late in the afternoon of the 19th, when concealment was no

longer necessary or practicable, the civil authorities aided in
removing obstructions by employing large parties of villagers, who
worked at the road by torchlight and a line ; of fires further
helped to mark the route. After a short halt at Eustam the
advance was again resumed. From that place to Surkhabi, the
track was tolerably good but in the Ambela pass it again
;

deteriorated, often lying in the bed of a stream, and at other

times being overgrown with jungle and low trees. The hills on
either side of the pass rise to some height, but for the most part
with a gradual slope, so that infantry can ascend them without
difficulty, except for the obstacle presented by thick, thorny

jungle. The guns were drawn by horses as far as possible, and

then transferred to elephants. The progress of the force was, of
course, extremely slow, as in most parts it was only practicable
to move in single file, and it was not till late in the afternoon that
the rear of Lieut. -Colonel Wilde's column was reached.
The last named force had not been strong enough to post
flanking parties at more than a few of the most important points
in the pass. Detachments were, therefore, posted from the main
column wherever it seemed necessary, and the entire 5th Gurkha
Eegiment, which had advanced with the main body, was left about
three-quarters of a mile from the crest of the pass in a commanding
position, where it served as a support to the small flanking parties,
and also protected the baggage. The 32nd Punjab Native Infantry
formed the rear-guard, but did not get beyond Surkhabi on the
night of the 20th.
Lieut. -Colonel Wilde had encamped the advanced column,
on and beyond the crest of the pass, on tolerably open and level

1 Disbanded in 18S2. Force).

9 Now the 59th Soinde Rifles (Frontier « Now the 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
 —

240 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

ground, which afltorded sufficient room

main column also to
for the

bivouac as it came up. The whole had been sent on

of the cavalry

with the advanced column, under the idea that the pass was much
easier and shorter than it proved to be, with the idea of pushing them
forward, supported by some infantry and mountain guns, to recon-
noitre the road down the pass and the head of the Chamla valley.
But when it was found what difficulties the pass presented even to
the march of the troops, and how long it would necessarily be before
the whole of the baggage could come up, it was thought prudent
to make no further movement in advance. The ammunition
mules of the infantry had with difficulty managed to keep up
with the rear of their respective regiments, but with this exception
not a single baggage animal reached the camp during the night
of the 20th.
The position which the troops occupied on that night was thus
described by Brigadier- General Chamberlain :

On the left the position was enclosed by the Guru mountain, which
divides the Ambela pass from Buner. This mountain, which is estimated

roughly to be 6,000 feet, rises in a succession of ridges, steep but not pre-

cipitous,running generally parallel to the pass occasional plateaux and knolls

;

are found on its sides, which afforded convenient and safe situations for our
picquets and about 1,000 feet above the camp was a very remarkable heap of
;

enormous oranite rocks, which formed a conspicuous object from the entrance
and throughout the pass, and marked the point at which the crest or water-
shed is reached, which separates Yusafzai from Chamla. The sides of the
Guru mountain were clothed with fir trees of large growth, interspersed on
the lower slopes with the wild fig and the date trees : a remarkable mixture

of the vegetation of a cold and of a tropical climate. To the front of the camp
the pass widened as it descended, and opened out into little plateaux, which

at last met the plain of Chamla. The latter was distant about three miles
from the camp, and had the appearance of being well cultivated, with a stream
flowing through the middle of it, the head of which gave water to the camp.
A ranwe of hills, much lower than the Guru, was on the right, and was crowned
by our picquets. To the rear, but far beloAv, was seen the plain of Yusafzai.

Up to the evening of the 21st, only a small portion of the

baggage had reached the camp, partly in consequence of the
difficulties of the road, and partly from the inferior nature of much

of the transport and the incompetence of the drivers. Time had

not sufficed, a^ter the assembly of the troops, for the arrangement
 TU8AFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 241

of all details, such as the careful distribution of loads according to

the strength and efficiency of the cattle, and the large amount of
mule and pony transport necessary had resulted in the presence
of a good many animals very little fitted for their work. Loads
had been thrown of! all along the line, and the attempts, as night
fell, to push on necessary stores for the European troops, increased

the existing difficulties in narrow places to such an extent that the

result was a stoppage of the whole train.
The Ambela inalik, who had been allowed to go back to his
village the day before, returned the following day with the other
maliks of Ambela and Koga, who were earnest in their professions
of a full intention to assist the force. Later in the day other head-
men from the principal Chamla villages came into camp with
supplies and promises of assistance but all these friendly sym-
;

pathies subsequently received a check when Buner threw itself

into opposition.
has already been stated that on the 19th a proclamation
It
had been sent to the Buner and other tribes to this a reply was ;

received by the Commissioner from the two chief Buner maliks^

saying that the force was at liberty to follow its own enemies, and
that the Buner people would only be prepared to defend their
own country should it be attacked ; in retm^n, an agent was sent
to them by Colonel R. G. Taylor to explain fully our intentions.
the morning of the 22nd, the rear-guard being then at no
On
great distance from the camp, it was considered that the prehminary
steps might be taken for moving the force forward, and a detach-
ment was accordingly set to work to improve the descent
of sappers

of the pass. The road was fair, and the pass, about two miles in
length, was unoccupied by the enemy. The sappers were sup-
ported by the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, under Major C. H.
Brownlow, and, as soon as the road was
Guide Cavalry, 50 sabres. Reported tolerably good, were followed
nth Bengal Cavalry, 100 ^j cavalry shown in the margin
^^le
sabres.
±/ o
under Lieut.-Colonel D. M. Probyn, v.c,
c.B. The sappers were then back to camp, and the cavalry
sent
proceeded to reconnoitre, supported by the 20th Punjab Infantry.
the foot of the pass there were two roads through tho
From
Chamla valley one passed by the village of Ambela, and lay
:

VOL,L 21
24:2 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

under tte hills whicli divided Chamla from Buner on the north side
of the valley ; by Koga and along the south side
the other road was
of the valley and as Ambela, though actually in Chamla, was
;

regarded by the Buner people as one of their own villages, the orders
to Lieut. -Colonel A. Taylor, commanding the reconnoitring party,
were to proceed by the Koga route, to guard in every possible
way against giving offence to the Buner people, and to prove to
them our desire to hold entirely aloof from them and their country.
As the cavalry passed the koial leadiQg into Buner, which
was on their left, distant about two-and-a-half miles, it was seen
that it was occupied in force by the Bunerwals but from all that
;

could be learned, none had descended into the valley. On arrival

at Koga (foiu' miles from camp), the reports that the valley was
quite unoccupied were confirmed, and Colonel Taylor consequently
pushed on for seven miles to Kuria, returning to Koga camp the
same afternoon. From Ambela to Kuria the surface of the valley
was level, free from obstructions, and quite practicable for field
artillery. The nala banks were all low, water was abundant, and
the land highly cultivated. Fuel, however, had to be supplied
from the hills, as there was no jungle in the valley. Beyond Kuria
the country was rugged and difficult.

On regaining the foot of the Ambela pass, it was found that

the Bunerwals had been, and were still, descending in considerable
numbers, with the view of preventing the return of the reconnoitring
party. They now attempted to gain possession of a patch of very
broken ground at the extreme end of the valley through which the
road lay, but were driven back by a spirited charge by the cavalry.
Major Brownlow then occupied the broken ground with two com-
panies, and the cavalry returned to camp.
The rear-guard duties now devolved on Major Brownlow.
Emboldened by the continued retreat of the party, the enemy
recovered from the effects of the cavalry charge, and, by the time
the pass was fairly entered, had assembled in great numbers, and
had surrounded a picquet under Lieutenant G. M. Eichmond, which
it took some time to withdraw. By this time daylight had quite
gone, and the remainder of the retirement was effected in dim
moonlight. The enemy pressed Major Brownlow very closely,
and several times came in amongst his men sword iu hand. Even-
tually, as the troops drew into camp, the picquets became engaged,
 7USAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 243

and there was a general attack upon them in the front and on the
flanks of the camp, which continued at intervals until midnight.
The loss on the British side was however trifling, and only one
officer. Lieutenant W. A. Gillies, K.A., was Idlled. The enemy
lost about fifty killed including some men of influence.
At this time a very remarkable paper fell into the hands of
he Commissioner, viz., a letter from Maulvi AbduUa, the military
leader of the Hindustani fanatics, and Saiyid Amran, an uncle of
Sai3dd Mubarak Shah, to the Buner chiefs, warning them that,
with reference to the assembly of troops in Yusafzai, we might
probably assert it was to punish the Hindustanis, but it was in
reality to lay waste and annex Chamla, Buner, and Swat. The
letter was not dated, but had evidently been written before the
proclamation, and must have roused the worst suspicions of the
Buner people, as the predictions contained in it anticipated, almost
word for word, portions of the proclamation.
That the Buner people should thus have taken a decidedly
hostile part against us was extremely serious, and not only altered
our position in the hills, but required a change in the plan of opera-
tions. The security of the communications of the force with the
rear had first to be arranged for the wing of the 14th Native In-
;

fantry was consequently ordered up from Nawa Kala to Rustam,

^

and application made for another native infantry regiment to be

sent from Peshawar. Sir Neville Chamberlain requested the Commis-
sioner to arrange for the occupation of the lower portion of the pass
with his footlevies, and thought it probable that he would have to

ask for more native infantry before the communications with the
rear could be considered secure, even while the force occupied its
position on tlie crest of the Anibela pass.
The plan of operations, as already shown, was to use the Chamla
valley as a route to reach the Hindustani settlement on the Maha-
ban, but it now became doubtful if it could be adhered to. With
a powerful tribe like the people of Buner in declared hostility on
the left flank of the proposed line of march, and in a position to
which they could always return, even though once dislodged and
beaten, it would perhaps be impossible to persevere in this plan
of operations. Moreover, as information had been received that

1 Now the 14th (P. W. 0.) Sikhs.

244 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA

the Biiner people had summoned the Hindustanis to their aid,

and that at least a portion of them had obeyed the summons, it
was probable the fanatics would either be encountered in our
present position, fighting with the people of Buner, or have to be
sought elsewhere than on the spurs of the Mahaban.
On the 23rd October the strength of the Yusafzai Field Force
was about 6,000 men, of whom about 450 were sick. On the
morning of the 24th, the sick, both British and Native, all baggage
except that absolutely necessary for efficiency, and all transport
rendered spare by this arrangement, were sent to the rear under a
strong escort ; whilst an infantry regiment occupied a spur of the
Guru mountain, thereby preventing any attack by the Bunerwals
on the convoy as it filed down the pass. At the same time, parties
from the camp were employed in improving the road and in re-
moving the worst of the obstacles. The enemy remained quiet,
but large bodies of Hassanzais, Chagarzais, Mada Khels, and Hindus-
tanis, with numerous standards, were observed approaching the
mouth of the pass.
On the night of the 24th, the 1st Punjab Infantry, under the
command of Major C. P. Keyes, occupied the advanced picquets
of the right defence. A little morning of the
after daylight on tlie

25th, the enemy showed on a ridge of hills opposite, and close to,
these picquets and Major Keyes advanced to dislodge them.
;

Of the 200 troops under his command, he sent 100 to take

the enemy in fiank, while with the remainder he made a frontal
attack. The enemy quickly retired, and Major Keyes took up
a position on a ridge commanding the plain over which they had
retreated. On the other side of this plain was a conical hill, the
summit which commanded the ridge at a range of 700 yards.
of
On this the enemy were collecting from the plain by the villages
of Lalu and Koga. As they appeared to be coming in considerable
force (eventually between 2,000 and 3,000 men), Major Keyes
asked for reinforcements of a mountain battery and another regi-
ment, and ordered the 1st Punjab Infantry to keep under cover,
and not to return the fire of the enemy.
Owing to the distance from camp and the nature of the ground,
these reinforcements did not arrive till 2 p.m. ; 150 men of the 71st

Highland Light Infantry and 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers being the
fiiTBt to arrive. The marksmen of this party were selected and placed
 7USAFZAI AND OADUN TBIBES. 245

along the ridge, the men of the

Punjab Infantry being recalled and
1st
drawn up out of sight of the enemy, as also the 5th Gurkha Eegi-
ment, which joined shortly afterwards. As soon as the Peshawar
Mountain Train Battery arrived, they were brought up as near the
ridge as possible without showdng themselves to the enemy. The
guns were then man-handled into position, and immediately opened
fire with shrapnel at a distance of 600 yards, the marksmen open-
ing at the same time.
fire

The " Conical " hill was rocky and very precipitous, but essen-
tially a weak position, having a line of retreat that would expose
the retiring enemy to great loss if closely pursued.
After the guns had fired two rounds, the 1st Punjab Infantry
were advanced at the double, supported by the 5th Gurkha Regi-
ment, the whole of the British troops keeping up the fixe from
the ridge. The enemy did not stop to defend their position, but,
after firing a few shots, retreated at their utmost speed. To the
admirable practice of the guns, and the withering fire of the marks-
men, may be attributed our obtaining the hill without any loss.
The enemy left several bodies on the ground, and their total loss was
afterwards ascertained to have been thirty-three killed and upwards
of forty wounded.^ Our loss was only one sepoy, 1st Punjab
Infantry, wounded on the first advance from the picquets. As soon
as the enemy were seen to have repassed the village of Lalu on
their way to the plains, the troops were dismissed to their quarters.
Whilst this affair was being conducted by Major Keyes on
the right, the heights above the left flank picquets were crowned

by enemy, and it afterwards became known

large bodies of the
that a simultaneous attack on both flanks of the camp had been
arranged; but the Buner people who were to have attacked the
left flank failed to keep their agreement. This gave great offence
to the tribes engaged in the right attack and the Mahaban tribes
;

were so disgusted by this reverse that they trooped off the same
day down the valley to their homes, and did not rejoin the enemy
for some weeks.
The camp arrangements at this time were as follows {see Sketcli
of British position). The front picquets were under command of Colo-
nel W. Hope, C.B., 71st Highland Light Infantry, those on the right
1 Amongst the killed was the brother of a Saiyid of some note, residing in
Chamla,
although this tribe had sent in a deputation to the Commissioner.
246 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

under Lieut. -Colonel A. T. Wilde, c.b., Corps of Guides, and those on

the left under Lieut. -Colonel J. L. Vaughan, 5tli Punjab Infantry.
The heights which commanded the camp were occupied by strong
parties of infantry and stockaded picquets. The approach to the
camp from the gorge was defended by a breastwork and guns
in position, and the rear was also secured from attack.

The defences consisted of loopholed stone walls, abatis, and

branches of trees pointing upwards. As will be afterwards seen,
the enemy generally singled out one position at a time for attack ;

and, owing to the nature of the ground, which was broken and
wooded, they were enabled to get close up and attack in such large
numbers, and with such boldness, that in some instances they pull-
ed down the stone walls and threw the stones at the defenders.
Reports were now rife that the Buner people had solicited

the aid of the Akhund of Swat. If he joined

in the war, bringing,

as he would doubtless do, an immense accession of material as well

as moral strength, an advance by the Chamla valley would become

still more difficult but Sir Neville Chamberlain considered that
;

in the meantime the halt of the force at the crest of the pass was
not without its advantages. The situation was a menacing one ;

it obliged the enemy to keep a large body of men together whom

they found and it made it indispensable for them
it difficult to feed,
to become the attacking party, when all the advantage was on
our side.
It has been mentioned above that a simultaneous attack
upon both the right and left flanks of the camp had been arranged
by the enemy to come off on the 25th, but that the Buner men failed
in their agreement to carry out the attack on our left. But as large
bodies of men had then been seen collected upon the Guru mountain,
it was necessary to provide against the threatened attack on that
flank, and also against the possibility of the enemy making an
attempt from the spurs of the Guru upon
^Haz.^ra Mountain Train
^ conVOy of sick, baggage, CtC, which
30 marksmen, 71st and 101st was about to be Sent to the rear. Ac-
"l^Lt; 71st Regiment. cordingly, On the morning of the 26th,
5tli Punjab Infantry. the left picqucts, uudcr Licut.-Colouel
"
^ ^
" J. L. Vaughan, were reinforced with the
troops noted in the margin.
 ^Ajribelo'

SKETCH
0¥
BRITISH POSITION
ABOVE
PANJ DARA OR AMBELA PASS

Reference
Willoge site .

Rouzs

/. 8. Topo. Di/. No. 6.700.

Scale. 1 inch/ to a- nxHr
Exd. C. J. A., Ftbruary 1907 FuHofvqs 8 765A5ZI0 I

i
mile

No. 4,060-L, 1907.

 7U8AFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 247

" Eagle's
The troops proceeded the neighbourhood of the
to
the top of a very steep,
Nest " picquet. This picquet occupied
southern face, of the Guru,
rocky knoU, which rises out of the
mountain which overlook-
and was the apex of that portion of the
ed the left flank of the camp.
this position with a picquet by day
It was necessary to hold
the grasscutters, etc., of the camp
in order to give security to
;

of
but its from camp, and the consequent difficulty
distance
unadvisable to hold it by mght
reinforcing it quickly, had made it
securely occupied, and the picquet
until the ground below had been
sunset to a lower position.
had been consequently withdrawn at
for defence, the preceding
The knoll had been hastily prepared
afternoon, by the erection of a
breastwork of stones on high ground,
about ninety feet. In front
showing a semi-circular front of
level, and commanded by the work, but
of this the ground was
was well wooded and studded
beyond the plateau, the hill, which
crest (distant about 500 yards from
with rocks, rose again, and its
our breastwork) was protected by a simHar work of the enemy.
Lieut. -Colonel Vaughannow made the following dispositions.
thirty marksmen of the 71st
The "Eagle's Nest" was held by
Lieutenant G. V. Fosbery, 104th
Foot and 101st FusiUers, under
of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry,
Fusiliers and eighty marksmen
the whole being under the command of Major C. H. Brownlow,
20th Punjab Native Infantry.
capable of holdmg about 110
As the picquet itself was only
knoll were made to shelter
men some large rocks at the base of the
3rd Pimjab Infantry, and seventy
120 men, viz., fifty men of the
The rest of the force
men of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry.
yards west of the
wasdrawn up on and about a small knoll, 400
" Eagle's Nest " picquet, in the following order from right to left :—
under Major A. C. Parker,
Detachment 71st Highland Light Infantry
Captain W. D. Hoste, Hazara Moun-
the 6th Punjab Infantry under
tain Train Battery under
Captain F. K. DeBude, and the 5th Punjab
Stewart. The last regiment in
Infantry under Lieutenant C. E.
extended order Uned the crest of the
knoll, with three companies m
support of the guns. The 71st
Highland Light Infantry was in con-
" Eagle's Nest " picquet.
nection with the
opposite the picquet
The breastwork on the crest of the hill
of the enemy, and at about noon on
was occupied by about 2,000
248 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the 26tli the Bunerwals, who had hitherto fired only an occasional
shot, began to move down fromtheir position by the different
spurs, and with loud shouts attacked the picquet. The steady fire,
however, with which they were received, rendered their very gallant
efforts to enter the defences unavailing. In attacking the picquet,
the matchlock men of the enemy posted themselves most advantage-
ously in the wood, and opened a galling fire, while their swordsmen
and others advanced boldly to the attack, charging across the plateau
in front in themost determined manner. The nature of the ground
prevented the guns from being brought to bear at first upon those
who assailed the picquet, and they were thus able to swarm up the
steep sides of the knoll, and to plant their standard close under the
breastwork. All the efforts of the garrison failed to dislodge the
enemy from this position for some time, notwithstanding that the
from the breastwork was aided by a flanking fire from the
direct fire
mountain guns and from the Enfield rifles of the 71st Highland Light
Infantry. The enemy were ultimately driven back, leaving the ground
covered with their dead ; their matchlock men only maintaining the
fight, and continuing to harass the picquet.
Whilst this was occurring at the "Eagle's Nest," an attack
was also being made on the on the Guru mountain.
rest of the troops

The mountain guns, opening fire with shrapnel, common shell, and
round shot, soon checked those of the enemy who were advancing
against them, though not those moving against the " Eagle's

Nest " picquet. This check of the enemy by the Hazara Mountain
Train Battery affording a favourable opportunity, the 6th Punjab
Infantry, which was in reserve, made a very bold charge upon the
tribesmen, headed by their commander, Captain Hoste but unfor- ;

tunately, carried too far in the ardour of pursuit, this regiment

lost heavily in its retirement, viz., four native officers and forty
sepoys wounded, and two non-commissioned officers and nine sepoys
killed.

On the advance of the 6th Punjab Infantry, the enemy had

again come down the and with loud yells rushed, sword in
hill,
"
hand, to the assault of the Eagle's Nest," but were again finally
repulsed.
During the course of the action, Lieut. -Colonel Vaughan,
seeing how desperate were the attacks on the " Eagle's Nest," and
how hardly pressed was its garrison, sent one company of the
 YUSAFZAl AND GADUN TRIBES. 249

71st Regiment and one company of the 5th Punjab Infantry to

reinforce the picquet. In one of the sallies made by the troops who
were holding the rocks below the " Eagle's Nest," Lieutenant R.
Clifford, Adjutant of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, who was on leave

when the force was formed, and joined it as a volunteer with the
3rd Punjab Infantry, was idlled whilst gaUantly leading his mei^
After the repulse of the enemy's second attack on the " Eagle's
Nest," no further attempt was made on Vaughan's
Lieut. -Colonel
position. During the day they kept up a heavy fire from
rest of the
the low hills and broken ground in front of the troops, but the
ground affording excellent cover, little damage was done to our
men.
While this attack was going on at the left defences of the
camp, a demonstration was also made by the enemy in the front,
when Lieutenant T. H. T. Drake of the 32nd Punjab Native
Infantry was wounded.
The determined attack on the " Eagle's Nest " had, of course,
been productive of severe losses, our casualties amounting to two
officers, one native officer, and twenty- six men killed, and one officer,

seven native officers and eighty-four men wounded. The enemy

lost about 250 killed, whilst numbers of the wounded had been
carried to their homes, or crawled to the nearest Buner villages.
The attacks had been made by the Hindustanis and the Buner-
wals, and as amongst the killed were large numbers of the Salarzai,
Daulatzai, and Gadaizai sections of the Bunerwals, it was apparent
how general was the combination of that tribe against us.
It had been originally intended to bring the troops back to
camp by sunset, and to withdraw the " Eagle's Nest " picquet at
the same time but the enemy were in such force on the mountains,
;

and the importance of continuing to hold the position was so appa-

rent, that Lieut.-Colonel Vaughan determined to stay there during
the night. The troops under him, therefore, bivouacked on the
ground they had held during the day, the Bunerwals, who had
evidently suffered severely, making no further hostile demon-
strations of any kind, although there was some firing by Hindus-
tanis and others.
On the
following day, the 27th, the " Eagle's Nest " picquet
was strengthened, and another, called " Vaughan's " picquet, on
an adjoining eminence, which supported the " Eagle's Nest," was
Voii. L as
250 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

erected,and it was determined that these positions should be

held permanently,—the "Eagle's Nest" by 40 British infantry
and 300 native infantry " Vaughan's " picquet by the Hazara
;

Mountain Train Battery, 60 British and 300 native infantry.

When, on our invitation, the Bunerwals came down to carry
off tjieir dead who had fallen the previous day, opportunity was
taken to try and reason with them as to the unnecessary loss they
were causing to their tribe, but with little effect. Their demeanour
was courteous, and they conversed unreservedly with Sir N. B.
Chamberlain and the Commissioner, Colonel B. G. Taylor but ;

it was evident from their manner that they were not in the least

humbled.
Upwards of thirty bodies of the Hindustanis were counted
upon the ground during the short truce. It was observed that
both the wounded and dead bodies of the Hindustanis on this
and subsequent occasions were left by their alhes, who seemed
to look upon the Hindustanis as they might upon earthen vessels,
to be thrown at our heads in the day of battle, when no doubt
their utility was appreciated, but of which it was quite superfluous
to think of picking up the fragments if they happened to get
broken in the fray. But what their allies would not do was per-
formed by the British soldiers, for, under the orders to Sir Neville

Chamberlain, these mutilated rebels of om^ own territories, together

with some wounded Bunerwals, were taken into our hospitals and
carefully and tenderly treated. wounded Hindustanis
Tv/o of the
were apparently soldiers of the late 55th Native Infantry, and
•

many of them young men, apparently from Bengal they used ;

the old pattern musket and Government ammunition.

The duty was now very heavy, the effective
of the troops
strength of the regiments having been considerably reduced by
casualties and by sickness. The camp was this day, the 27th,
however, reinforced by the arrival of the 14tli Native Infantry
under Major C. C. G. Boss.
News was now received that the Akhund Swat had actually
of

joined the Bunerwals, and that he had brought with him from Swat
120 horsemen and upwards of 100 standards, each standard
representing probably from thirty to forty footmen. Besides the
tribe with which he was more immediately connected, viz., the
 251
TVSAFZAI ASD OADVN THIBES.

Yasafzais of Swat, he had

summoned the people of Bajaur.the
Ghazan Khan and other distant
Ma a of Dir under their Chief, except to
tribes whose names at
that time were hardly known,

officers who had served

long on the frontier.
country of Swat and its inhabitants
In chapter YIH the
account will then be ^.en of
theme
will be described, and some Suffice
man, known as the Akhund of
Swat.
of this remarkable
originally a Saiyid of Buner, he
had passecl his
it here to say that
must have been
and'asceticism, and at this time
life In close study

about seventy years of age.

He had gained an immense ascendancy _

over the minds of

Muhammadans in general, and more particularly
towards
Peshawar frontier, and his position
over the tribes on the
illustrated by comparing it with
them at this time can best be

that of the Pope of

Rome.
^^ ,u A
time the Alliwd
It is remarkable that up to the present
the people of
exception of forcing a king upon
with the solitary
worldly afiairs, and had,
^at had always held himself aloof from to him
peace to his disciples, who flocked
^ven'iJ 1857, counselled
tenets of the
for advice He also was ostensibly opposed to the
been un-
previous year, it was said, he had
Sitana fanatics. The m
views held
to refute some rebgious
usually busy in attempting
to his own. For the time
however
Peshalar which were opposed and
alT sectarian differences
were now forgotten the
;
^
/<««<«

ternis, and
the Sitana were said to be on the most friendly
MauU
were either at,
it was known that
the whole Hindustani colony
Taylor believed (and
o.rthrwayto, Ambela. Colonel R. G. who
chiefs best able to judge,
Ms was shared by the native
belief
time) that the Mhund had moved m fear
iere in thi camp at the
sympathy with Buner on the occasion, he
that if he did not show natural con-
with the tribe, who were his
iniaht lose influence
anxiety lest Mubarak
sAuents- and possibly to this was added
of Kmg of
aspirant to his father's position
stah wlio was an
the war with the H.ndustams, gain
Swat might, by having joined
ABuni, would lose. It was
Ime'oTfhe influence tvhioh he, the
people had
known adjurations of the Buner Chiefs and
that the
also
the mvllas of the couirtry, with many of
been most passionate, all their
deputed to beseech him to adopt
the w^men having been
cause, 2K2
252 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The AJcJiund was accompanied by the two Chiefs of Swat,

Sobat Khan and Sherdil Khan, usually at bitter feud with each
other, but now, for the time being, the best of friends.

The Hindustani fanatics were under the leadership of Maulvi

Abdulla. They numbered at the beginning about 900 men, most
of whom had been wrought up to a pitch of fanaticism, and
were all prepared to lay down their lives. It is, indeed, only men
animated by this spirit who can be found willing to leave their homes
in India, and to take up their residence in these rugged mountains.
Widely separated in language, manners, and interests from the
people amongst whom they dwelt, receiving only a bare subsistence
from the Maulvi, who entertained them, and paying exorbitantly
for all the supplies they consumed, their was passed in a manner
life

by no means congenial to natives of Hindustan. They were drilled

on our system, and some were clothed like the sepoys of the old
Indian army. Three of their jemadars had been non-commissioned
officers in the late 55th Native Infantry. The Maulvi himself
had been about four years in these parts. He was the nephew
of that Maulvi Inayat Ali Khan who gave so much trouble in 1857
at Narinji, and was a man of good ability. He it was who
appropriated the contributions received from India for the
all

colony, from which he derived a rich income.

With these Hindustanis were associated the family of the
Sitana Saiyids. The only one, however, who took a prominent
part against us was Saiyid Muhammad Shah, who had been in our
service for some time. For, after the expedition of 1858, the eldest
representative of the family, Mubarak Shah, took no active part
in the proceedings.
An account of the Bunerwals has been given in the previous
chapter. Their chiefs at this time were Zaidulla Khan, Ahmad
Khan, and Nawab Khan, the two first named being closely allied
by marriage to our own chiefs of the Sudum valley, Ajab Khan,
of Chargulai, and his brother Aziz Khan. They were said to be
able to bring 12,000 to 15,000 men into the field, but this was
probably an exaggeration.
The village of Chamla likewise sent their quota —the Amazais
of Chirori being well represented — and the Mada Khels also came
in force.
 TUSAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 255

In addition to these, there were small parties of men from other

tribes who had joined the enemy. In fact, there was a general
combination of almost all the tribes from the Indus to the boundary
of Kabul ;and the total number of men in arms against the force
at this time was computed at about 15,000. Old animosities were
for the time in abeyance, and, under the influence of fanaticism,
tribes usually hostile to each other had joined, or were hastening
to join the Akhund's standard, and to fight for the sake of their
common faith.

Independently of these, however, was a mischievous gathering

of our own subjects, who associated with bands of the enemy in

infesting our lines of communication. Chief amongst these were

the Utman Khels, an Afridi clan, long settled in the upper parts of
of the Lundkhwar valley, but who had retained all the wild habits
and plundering propensities of their race. They were joined by
men from Narinji, and by bigots and malcontents, who, individually,
or in parties of two and three, slipped away from a great number of
our villages. They numbered only a few hundreds in all, but
were of great use to the enemy in harassing our rear.
Such being the state of affairs, it is easy to understand how
entirely the situation had altered since the force entered the Ambela
pass. Instead of having to deal with the Mahaban tribes, with
a view to the expulsion of the Hindustanis from that tract, the force
was now engaged enormous coalition above
in a contest with the
mentioned. Brigadier- General Chamberlain felt certain that it

would not be advisable to make any advance into the Chamla

valley with his present force against such numbers. He could
only do so by giving up the Ambela pass. If the force moved into
the valley; with a view to continue its advance towards the Maha-
ban, to cany out the original views of Government, it would be
exposed to the enemy's incessant attacks, both by day and night,
in flank and rear, and it would be impossible, in the face of such
numbers, to protect adequately a long line of laden animals, to
which would be daily added an ever-increasing number of sick and
wounded. On the other hand, if the force merely moved into
the valley, with a view to take up a position in open ground, it
would still lose its communications with the rear, and whenever
it required fresh supplies of provisions or ammunition, or to clear

the camp by sending sick and wounded to the rear, it would have
 —

254 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

to retake the pass, and to re -occupy, at great sacrifice of life, tlie

very ground from wliicli it had advanced. Further, if the force
was seriously compromised by a hazardous movement in advance,

there were not, within a reasonable distance, the troops necessary

to meet any difiiculty which would under such an eventuality be
certain immediately to arise, either within or beyond the border.
In fact. Sir Neville Chamberlain considered that, with the present
numbers, the only way to uphold the honour of our arms and
the interests of the Government was to act on the defensive in the
position the force now held, and trust to the efiect of time and of
the discouragement which repeated unsuccessful attacks were likely
to produce upon the enemy, to weaken their numbers, and to break
up their combination.

To continue now the narrative of the operations. During the

27th a demonstration was made by the enemy in front of the camp,
but without any result, and news was received that the Maulvi
had sent for more Hindustanis.
On the 28th the sick and wounded v/ere sent back to Rustam,
and the breastworks were stengthened to enable the force to move
out to attack the enemy below. Many of the enemy's skirmishers
who endeavom-ed annoy the picquets were killed daily by the
to
British marksmen. News was received in camp that some 280
Hindustanis, with treasure and more men from Swat, had joined
the enemy, and that the ynaliks of Buner and Swat had elected
the Maulvi to command the united force. There was little firing
during the day, but a night attack was threatened.
On the 29th was reported that the AJiJiund had called upon
it

the Utmanzais, Ranizais, Mohmands, and people of Bajaur, for

support. The 4th Gurkhas and two guns of No. 3 Punjab Light
Field Battery^ joined the camp on tliis day. This was a Thursday
the Muhammadan day commences at sunset and an attack in —
force by the enemy was reported as intended either during the night
or the next morning. From the nature of the ground, the position
held by the troops was both extensive and difficult, and required
half the native troops to guard it.

1 This battery bolonged to the Punjab Horse Light Field Batteries, one garrison
Irregular Force. The artillery attached company of artillery, and the Peshawar
to the force at this time consisted of three; and the Hazara Mountain Train Batteries.
 YVSAFZAI AND GADVN TRIBES. 255

On the 30tli October the first result of the combination between

the Akhund and the Maulvi showed itself. The advanced picquets
of the right defence were held by the 1st Punjab Infantry and
a company of the Guide Corps, and were under the command of
Major C. P. Keyes. Above the main picquets was a high rock,
subsequently always known as the " Crag." The ascent to this was
most precipitous, the path leading to its top narrow and difficult,
and when the summit was reached there was but little level
First capture of the Crag ground to Stand upon it w^as, however,
;

Picquet by the enemy.

necessary to occupy it, as it commanded
the lower picquets, and Major Keyes placed a small party of
twelve men in it, which was as much as it would conveniently
hold. About half an hour before daylight heavy firing commenced
on the " Crag," and it soon appeared that the picquet was hard-
pressed by the enemy. All the men from the lower picquets that
could be spared were immediately detached in support, and
accompanied by Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, Adjutant of the 1st
Punjab Infantry, Major Keyes himself, with about twenty picked
men, advanced to their assistance but before the top of the
;

" Crag " was reached, the small party holding it had been over-
powered and driven off the rock, though they were still holding
the ground lower down the hill.
Finding this important position lost, the men were ordered
to take cover from the enemy's fire beneath the overhanging rocks,
about twenty paces from the summit, and Major Keyes determined
to wait till him to distinguish friends from
daylight should enable
foes,and reinforcements should arrive from Lieut. -Colonel Wilde,
who was commanding the right defences.
As the day broke, the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, under
Major C. H. Brownlow, entered the main picquet, and Major
Brownlow became the senior officer on the ground. Major Keyes
now, feeling convinced of the danger of allowing the " Crag " to
remain even for a short time in the hands of the enemy, and fore-
seeing that, should the enemy (many hundreds of whom were in
the rear) once understand that their advanced party had o-ained
an advantage over our troops, they would quickly occupy the
position in force,and render the lower picquets untenable from
their raking fire, suggested to Major Brownlow that he should
advance by a ridge which ran to the right of the " Crag," and
256 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

threaten the enemy in rear, while he (Major Keyes) attacked the

position in front. To this Major Brownlow at once assented, and
there no doubt that this flank movement most materially aided
is

the success of Major Keyes' s attack, though it deprived Major

Brownlow of the opportunity of sharing in the actual conflict at
the "Crag."
From the nature of the approach to the top of the " Crag,"
owing to the large rocks, one or two men only could advance at
a time. Ordering his men to fix bayonets, Major Keyes ascended
with his party by one path, while Lieutenants G. V. Fosbery and
H. W. Pitcher were directed to push up different paths, each at
the head of a few men. The party under Major Keyes was led to
the assault with a perseverance and intrepidity seldom surpassed,
and Major Keyes spoke in equally laudatory terms of the way in
which Lieutenants Fosbery and Pitcher led their respective parties.
Lieutenant Fosbery, 104th Bengal Fusiliers, was the first man to gain
the top of the " Crag." Lieutenant Pitcher had led his men up to the
last rock, when he was knocked down and stunned by a large stone.
As soon as our men had reached the top, a most exciting hand-to-
hand fight ensued, in which Major Keyes was wounded the enemy,;

however, were driven out at the point of the bayonet, the position
"
recovered, and three standards taken. No sooner had the " Crag
been recaptured than a panic seized the remainder of the enemy
who were attacking on the right, and they quickly disappeared down
the mountain.
This attack had been made by the Hindustani fanatics, who
lost fifty-four killed on the spot, and seven wounded.
Lieutenants Fosbery and Pitcher subsequently received the
Victoria Cross for their gallantry on this occasion.
Almost simultaneously with the attack by the Hindustanis
on the right defences, an attack was made on the front of the camp
by the Sv/at contingent, which was repulsed without difficulty,
under the personal superintendence of the Brigadier- General, by the
good practice of the artillery under Captain J. S. Tulloh, and the
fire of the 71st Highland Light Infantry and the 101st Eoyal Bengal

Fusiliers under Colonel W. Hope, c.b., and Lieut. -Colonel F. 0.

Salusbury, respectively. Some of the enemy behaved with con-
siderable boldness, making an attempt to assault the 9-pounder
battery in the gorge. This afforded the 5th Gurkha Kegiment
 YU8AFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 257

an opportunity of making a spirited charge, and they quickly drove

the assailants do^vn the slope.
The enemy dead bodies on the ground, which
left forty-five

were recognised as men from Swat and Eanizai, and they must have
lost heavily in addition though, according to custom, they carried
;

off as many of their dead as they coukl.

At the same time a demonstration was made against the upper
left flank picquets, where the 5th Punjab Infantry lost tliree killed.

By 10 A.M. the enemy had been driven off at all points, and
the effect of their defeat was so great that they proceeded at once
to the village of Ambela, and from thence fled with the AJchund
to the other side of the Buner pass. The Akhund was, in fact,
in full retreat to Swat when he was overtaken by the Buner chiefs
and induced to retui'n, as they represented that, if he deserted
them, their country would be lost.

Our losses during the day had been fifty-five killed and
wounded.
Between the 31st October and the 5th November, the enemy
attempted nothing more serious than firing as usual at our exposed
breastworks and picquets, and advancing from time to time with
standards, as if to attack the camp these demonstrations were met
;

with alacrity by the marksmen and the field guns in position,

with some loss to the enemy, and little or none to the troops. In
the meanwhile, the inactivity of the enemy enabled the troops to
improve the breastworks and defences generally, as well as the
interior communications of the camp, and a 24-pounder howitzer
was sent up to strengthen the "Eagle's Nest" picquet.
During this time communications were entered into with the
Buner tribe by means of the Sudum chiefs, and by the agency
of two Buner malihs, residents of the Malandri pass in our own
territory.
From the moment that the Buner tribe had declared hostilities,
it was evident that the line of communi-
X ew ine o communica ions.
pg^^JQj^g \^y ^]^g Ambela defile could no
longer be depended upon, and it became indispensable to seek some

new line further removed from the Guru mountain, thereby

enabling communications to be kept up with British territory
beyond the reach of the Buner tribe. A line of road between the
villages of Khanpur and Sherdara had accordingly been selected
Vol. I. 2 L
2^8 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

by Lieut. -Colonel A. Taylor, the Commanding Eoyal Engineer,

for this purpose, and its construction was begun. The base of
operations was changed, after its completion, from Rustam to
Parmalao, the nearest village in the plains where water was obtain-
able. AYorldng-parties had also been employed for some days in
making a road Ambela along the western slopes
in the direction of

of the right ridge. This road was to supersede that by the gorge,
which was extremely bad, and commanded on both sides, and would
enable the troops, whenever the time came, to march forward
without coming under fire from the Guru mountain.
On the 28th October the march of the 93rd Highlanders from
Sialkot, and of the 23rd and 24th Punjab Native Infantry from
Lahore, was ordered. The last two regiments were on escort duty
with the Viceroy's camp at that place. On the 5th November
the 7th Fusiliers, which also formed part of the escort, marched
towards the frontier.
Foreseeing the demand that would arise for transport suitable
to the hills, the Punjab Government at this time ordered its col-
lection, and during November and the beginning of December
4,200 camels and 2,100 mules were assembled from all parts of the
Punjab at Nowshera.
In the absence of regular troops, a party of police, 200 foot and
75 horse, were sent to Nawa Kala to aid in protecting the rear
communications which had been threatened.
On the morning of the 6th November Sir Neville Chamberlain
had gone down with the troops covering the working-parties on the
road which was being made towards Ambela on his return to ;

camp he placed this covering party under command of his orderly

officer, Major G. W. Harding, 2nd Sikh Infantry, whose conduct
on previous occasions had led the Brigadier-General to place entire
confidence in his coolness and judgment. Major Brownlow, who
was commanding the advanced picquets on the right, had de-
tached 100 men of the 20tli Punjab Native Infantry, under Lieu-
tenant J. Bartleman, to cover the immediate front of the working-
parties, and had posted a similar number of the 1st Punjab Infantry,
imder Lieutenant W. H. Unwin, on the head of the ridge beyond
that at the foot of which the parties were at work. Lieutenant
Unwin was instructed to send patrols down the ridge as far as he
could with regard to their safety, and Lieutenant Bartleman's
 7778 A FZ A I AND HA DUN TBIBBS. 259

orders were to keep two or three hundred yards in front of the

working-parties.
About eleven o'clock Lieutenant Bartleman's party had been
pushed forward to a spot low down the ridge, the top of which
was in possession of Lieutenant Un win's party. At half -past twelve,
hearing that Major Harding was anxious lest the enemy should
get above him, and wished the party of the 1st Punjab Infantry
strengthened. Major Brownlow sent a company of the Guides,
under Lieutenant ^Y. Battye, to join Lieutenant Unwin. About
the same time instructions were received from Lieut. -Colonel A. T.
Wilde, commanding the right defences, for the working-parties to
be withdrawn, and the covering parties to retire up the hill. These
instructions were forwarded at once to Major Harding, who
was
at the time on the top of the hill with a detachment of the
1st Punjab
Infantry, he having gone up to see the positions of the
detachments
holding his line of retreat. The working- parties were at
once with-
drawn but why the lower covering parties were not withdrawn
;

at the same time can never be known. Major Harding having

been
subsequently killed. There
appears no doubt, however, that he
found it difficult to bring away some of his party who had
been
v^^ounded, and that consequently, remaining too long,
he permitted
himself to be surrounded probably on his return from the top
;

of the hill he found his lowest detachment involved

with their
assailants, and encumbered with killed and wounded.
At about two o'clock Major Brownlow, observing that
the
enemy were moving in considerable numbers, sent all the available
men he had as reinforcements for Major Harding, viz., two com-
panies of the Guide Corps, under Lieutenant P. H.
Jenkins, and
eighty bayonets of the 1st Punjab Infantry, under
Lieutenant
J. P. Davidson.

At about half-past three, Lieut. -Colonel Wilde,

receiving in-
formation that Major Harding was being attacked
in force by
the enemy, proceeded to the advanced picquets, sending
to head-
quarters for reinforcements. In about an hour the Peshawar Moun-
tain Train Battery and 350 bayonets of the
4th and 5th Gurkha
Regiments arrived at the main (Major Keyes's)
picquet
Only one hour of daylight remained, and it
became necessarr
to endeavour to cover Major Harding's
retreat by the shortest
route accordmgly Captain C. W. R, Chester,
;
commanding the
2L2
260 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

across the lower

4tli Gurkha Eegiment, was ordered to proceed
spurs in the direction of the
beleagured picquet, whilst the guns

of the mountain battery,

protected by the 5th Gurkhas, took up
lower spurs, checking the advance of the
a position on one of the
Captain Chester's advance
enemy on the picquet, and covering
to its assistance.
Whatever errorMajor Harding may have committed in too
lono- delaying his retirement, when he found himself overmatched

and* in difficulty, he behaved like a gallant soldier, and probably

his coolness and determination. Colonel
saved his detachment by
"It was on seeing the approach of the 4th
-p
Q Taylor writes :

I saw
Gurkhas that Major Harding finally resolved on
retiring.

myself the detachments fall in very steadily for retirement and

off, a portion being
engaged all the time with an enemy
move
we could not Major Harding was the last man to leave the
see."

Dicquet. "After the detachment had passed out of our sight, the
enemy appear by a rush to have broken in between two of the
detachments. Major Harding had been previously shot through the
a Gurkha sepoy, and it was at this
neck and was being carried by
Lieutenant T. B. Dougal, of the 79th Regiment,
time that he and
officer had left the advanced breast-
were killed." The latter
works without leave, and accompanied by a single sepoy had gone
down During this time Captain Chester,
to join the covering party.
with the 4th Gurkhas, had advanced as far as the nature of the

ground and light permitted, and some of his men had reached the
spur upon which Major Harding's detachment were fighting a ;

movement which enabled the remainder of the covering party,

which was fighting its way up the ridge, to reach the crest, and the
troops to get back to camp, though not
till after dark.

The losses in this afiair were seventy-eight officers and men

killed and wounded.

As already stated, night had come on before the covering
party got back to camp, and it had been
Peshawar Mountain Train . -i i - xi i, j- p , i

g,^^^^.
impossible to recover the bodies oi the
loist Fusiliers. killed Oil the previous evening. Accord-
4th^Gurkhas. inglv, early on the morning of the 7th,
32nd Punjab Native Infantry, ^^ie troops, as per margin, moved out
under the command of Lieut. -Colonel A. T. Wilde, c.b., for this

purpose. Small parties of the enemy appeared on that portion of the

 7VSAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 261

ground where Major Harding's picquet had been situated; these

were quickly dispersed and driven into the plain, and, having
collected the bodies of seven British and twenty-eight native officers
and men, the force returned to camp without any casualty. It
appeared that the enemy had suffered severely the day before, as
they were seen by this column removing many of their slain, and
they showed no inclination to meet the troops, although they had
displayed great boldness on the previous day, charging sword in
hand. They consisted of the Ranizais of Swat, under Sobat Khan,
—
assisted by some of the Mahaban tribes the chief 7nalik of the
Mada Khels being amongst the killed.
On the 8th, the new road to the rear being reported practicable,
and easier than the Ambela pass, it was decided to cease usincr
the latter and the supplies and supports were moved to
route,
Parmalao. At the same time, as it was intended shortly to concen-
trate the whole force on the south side of the pass, which would
save much picquet duty, and give a stronger position, preparations
were made to move the commissariat stores to the new site.

The nights w^ere getting colder, and Sir Neville Chamberlain

considered it necessary to sanction a moderate issue of meat, rice,
and rum, at fair prices, to the native troops, to keep away sickness.
Tvato more roads had been opened up to the ridge on the right

of the camp, and the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery, the 5th
Gurkha Regiment, and the 14th Native Infantry, had been moved
up to strengthen that flank.
At this time, as uneasiness w^as felt, owing to sympathy evinced
by the border villages of the Lundkhwar valley for the Akhund's
cause, the Uth Bengal Cavalry, then at Parmalao, was ordered
to Mardan, so as to hold a more central position in Yusafzai.
On the 11th the enemy showed in large numbers about Ambela
whence considerable bodies ascended the hills in the direction
of Lalu, on our right front, evidently with the intention of attack-
ing the picquets on that flank of the camp. These picquets were
accordingly reinforced, and their breastworks and defences streno--
thened. The " Crag " picquet in particular had been much enlaro-ed
and strengthened since the occasion of its being attacked on the
30th October, and was now capable of containing a garrison of
160
men. It was also supported by the guns of the Peshawar Mountain
Tram Battery, which were placed in position in the main
picquet.
262 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

'*
Major H. Brownlow assumed command of the " Crag
C.
picquet at 4 p.m. on the I2th the garrison then consisted of 160
;

marksmen of the following regiments, — 15 men of the 101st Fusi-

liers, 30 of the 14th Native Infantry,, and 115 of the 20th Punjab
Native Infantry.
Two of the four guns of the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery
which w^ere in the main picquet had been placed in position to
shoulder of the hill on which was the " Crag
"
command the left
picquet, as well as the front of the " Centre " picquet below.

The enemy occupied a level ridge, about 250 yards in front of the
" Crag " picquet, and their position extended more than half a mile
in a direction facing our own. Between the two positions lay a
smooth hollow intersected by a ravine. The ground on the right
and rear of the " Crag " was precipitous, and alm.ost unassailable
in any force. The left face of the post was its weak point, rocks
and trees affording shelter to an attacking party till within a few
yards of it.

Anticipating an attack, Major Brownlow had urged Lieutenant

J. Bartleman, Punjab Native Infantry, who comm.anded
20th
the picquet during the day, to use his utmost exertions in im-
proving the position as m.uch as he could, by heightening tlie breast-
work, constructing an abatis, etc. a duty which was admirably
;

performed by that officer.

Before dark every man was in his place for the night, with
strict orders as to the nature of his duties, and the direction of his
fire in case of attack. About 10 p.m. the enemy's watch-fires
showed that they were in movement, and descending in great
numbers to the hollow in front of the picquet, which in half an
hour was full of them. Their suppressed voices soon broke into
yells of defiance, and they advanced in masses to the attack, their
numbers being, as far as could be judged, at least 2,000. They
were allowed to approach within a hundred yards of the picquet,
when a rapid and well -sustained fire was opened upon them from
the front face, which did great execution, and soon silenced their
shouts and drove them under cover, som.e to the broken and wooded
grovmd on the left, and the remainder into the ravine below. In
half an hour they rallied, and, assem.bling in increased numbers,
rnshed to the attack, this time assaulting both the front and left
 26^
7U8AFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES.

They were received withtlie great steadiness, and

of the picquet.
acrain recoiled before our fire. These attacks continued until 4 a.m.,
many of them being mere
erch becoming weaker than the last,

feints to enable them to carry of! their dead and wounded.

The post was at one time in great danger of being forced at
its left front angle, wliich,
from its position, was badly protected
assailing its occupants
by our fire. The enemy clambered up, and
with stones from the breastwork, stunned
and drove tliem back ;

at this criticalmoment the gallantry of five men of the 20th Punjab

Native Infantry, saved the post. Answering
Major Brownlow's call
and hurlmg
when others wavered, they followed him into the corner,
stones on the enemy, who were close
under the wall, and sheltered
rebuilt the parapet,
from musketry, they drove them back, and
holding that point for the rest of the night. .

Major Brown-
The Peshawar Mountain Train Battery rendered
low very valuable assistance during the night.
From its position,
the " Crag," it made
about 250 yards below and in the right rear of
direction and range
most successful practice, being guided as to
by it into the
by voice from the picquet. Two shells were
pitched

the enemy before the attack began, and

must have
watch-fire of
done considerable damage.
of the enemy were
In the morning not more than eight or ten
The British casualties in the attack were only
slight,
in sight.
the enemy's fire had been
as owing to the darkness of the night
ineffective.
hours on picquet
Major Brownlow's men having been forty-eight
all day and watched all
duty, during which time they had worked
nicrht, were completely worn out,
while their muskets were so foul
therefore, relieved at
that 'they could scarcely load they were,;

of the 1st Punjab Infantry

8 A.M. on the 13th by a detachment
under Lieutenant J. P. Davidson.
A short time after Lieutenant Davidson had taken over the
.. "Crao-"
,•
o picquet from Major Brownlow,
2nd capture of the " Crag ,, i,r- n T> yr
Picquets. he sent a note to Major C. P. Keyes,
Punjab Infantry, asking for reinforcements, as
commanding the 1st

he did not consider the ninety men he had with him enough for
its

defence. At this time Major Keyes was

on the "Standard" hill
Peshawar Mountain Train
with Lieutenant E. K. Conolly of the
for his guns on the side
Battery, who was preparing a platform
264 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FRO 31 INDIA.

of the hill. Constant firing had been heard at the " Crag," but

itdid not attract any particular attention, as heavy firing had been
kept up there all night, and was continued at intervals after the
relief of the picquet. On Lieutenant Davidson's requisition being
received, Major Keyes immediately sent him up a reinforcement of

thirty bayonets under a native ofiicer, being that could be spared,

all
" "
as a serious attack was expected on the Centre " and " Cliff
picquets.
Shortly after this reinforcement reached the " Crag " picquet.
Major Keyes observed, as he was descending the " Standard " hill,
the men of the " Crag " picquet rushing down in confusion. He
did not see the beginning of the retreat, as the position was
not visible from the platform where he was at the time. Proceeding
immediately to the breastwork across the road by which the main
230st was approached from the " Crag," he rallied all the men that
could be got together, and kept up a heavy fire, which was taken
up by the guns of the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery. This
checked the advance of the enemy but, as many wounded soldiers
;

and others who had been garrisoning the " Crag " rushed past the
breastwork and could not be stojDped, a panic was communicated
to the camp followers, who tookto fhghtand increased the confusion.
These men retreating had a visible effect upon all, and Major Keyes
felt the necessity for an advance to reassure those that were waver-

ing, and further to check the enemy until reinforcements should

arrive he therefore directed a few men to remain in the breast-
;

work, and ordered the rest to charge. Considering that his presence
at the breastwork was absolutely necessary to keep the men to-
gether, the duty of leading the charge devolved upon Lieutenant
H. W. Pitcher, Punjab Infantry, who was accompanied by
1st

Lieutenant H. R. Young of the same regiment. The assaulting

party were supported by a small detachment of the Corps of Guides,
under Lieutenant W. J. Forlong of that regiment but in spite ;

of the coolness and daring with which the assault had been con-
ducted (in which Lieutenant Pitcher had been severely wounded),
the detachments were too weak to be able to retake the "Crag,"
and they had to fail back upon the rocks beneath it.
Major C. C. G. Ross, commanding the advanced picquets, on
seeing that the " Crag " had been carried by the enemy, who were
pouring a heavy fire into the camp, which was in great confusion
 TUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES.
265

collected asmany men of the Utli Native Infantry and the other
regiments as possible, and advanced in front of the camp,
.

where
he was joined by Lieutenant A. D. C. Inglis, 14th Native
Infantry,
and Lieutenant H. R. Young, 1st Punjab Infantry, who assisted
liim in getting men together to try to retake the lest position.
Owing to the confusion this was not immediately possible, but
on Major Ross reaching the steep rocks of the picquet itself, a
heavy
fire, which was taken up by the mountain guns,
was opened on the
top of the rock until reinforcements could arrive.
On
receiving the news of the disaster which had occurred
at
the"Ci-ag," Lieut. -Colonel A. T. Wilde, commanding
the right
defences, asked for the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, and
proceeded
immediately from his camp with three companies of the Guide
Corps
towards the " Crag," meeting on his way the head of the
101st,
which the Brigadier- General had already ordered to move
at once
to the advanced picquets.
Sir Neville Chamberlain was in the camp below when the " Crag "
fell into the hands of the enemy, and his attention had been
acci-
dentally drawn and confusion caused by the unusual
to the dust
rush of camp .
and animals down the hill. Feeling con-
followers
vinced that some reverse had occurred, he immediately
ordered
the 101st, which was fortunately under arms for another
purpose,
to move towards the " Crag "
and, shortly afterwards receiving
;

information from Lieut. -Colonel Wilde of what had occmred,

he
gave orders to Lieut. -Colonel F. 0. Salusbury to move his regiment
up the hill as fast as possible, and retake the position at any sacri-
fice.

The " Crag " from locality was the key of the whole
its
position,
and its rendered the lower picquets untenable. On
loss
Lieut.-
Colonel Wilde's arrival at the advanced picquets the state of
affairs
was as follows —Major Ross was half-way up the " Crag " hill
gallantly holding the enemy in check, but unable, with the few
men he had rallied round him, to advance and retake the
lost
picquet. Parties of the enemy were attacking the lower picquets,
but were kept back by the steadiness of the fire of Captain
T. E*
Hughes's mountain guns. The 1st Punjab Infantry, 20th
Punjab
Native Infantry, and two companies of the Corps of Guides
still
held the breastworks, but numerically the garrison was
too weak to
resist the numbers of the enemy advancing to its capture
 .

266 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Lieut. -Colonel Wilde then directed Lieut. -Colonel Salusbury

^ , , ^, to assault the " Crao;
o
" with his regiment.
Crag jjicquet retaken by the ^
^
_

101st Fusiliers. leaving One company as a support in the

main Fatigued as they were by their rapid march to the
position.
relief of the troops in advance, the 101st never halted nor broke till

they had gallantly stormed the height and secured the picquet,
driving the enemy over the hills beyond. Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins,
commanding three companies of the Guide Corps, leading his men
up the " Crag " hill, drove the enemy back from the right of the
position, whilst the detachments of the 14th Native Infantry and
1st Punjab Infantry, which, Mdth some of the Guides, had held
their ground until the arrival of the 101st, joined in with the British

regiment in the attack. With this success on the part of the

Fusiliers all opposition ceased, and order was as quickly restored
as it had been previously disturbed by the suddenness and force

of the enemy's attack.

In their retreat, the enemy, who chiefly consisted of Bunerwals,
under ZaiduUa Khan, with men of Swat and some of the Hindus-
tanis suffered so much that they desisted from all further at-
tempts that day along the whole line of defences. Their loss was
57 killed and left on the ground, 32 killed and carried off, and
140 wounded; amongst the first was a Bajauri malik of conse-
quence.
Whilst the attack was going on on the right, the enemy made
demonstrations both against the front and left defences of the
camp but these were not of a serious nature, and were only made
;

as diversions.
The defenders Crag " appear to have been seized with
of the "

an unaccountable panic, but the nature of the ground and the

thickness of the brushwood enabled the enemy to concentrate
upon the weak picquet, unobserved Lieutenant J. P.
a lar^e force ;

Davidson, who commanded, behaved in a most heroic manner,

and, after endeavouring in every way to recall his men to a sense

of their duty, was killed at his post.

From the 14th to the 17th November no serious attempts were
made by the enemy, and in anticipation of the change of position
already alluded to, by which the whole force was to be concentrated
on the south side of the pass, the commissariat stores, reserve
ammunition, etc., were gradually removed to the eastern ridge.
 YUSAFZAi AND GADUN TRIBES. 26t

On the 15th the defences were strengthened, and the 101st

Fusiliers were ordered up to the ridge on the right flank. The
enemy had sent marauders to harass the line of communications
to the rear ; it was therefore unsafe, except for strong, armed
parties. A demonstration was made by the enemy in front of the
camp, but they soon withdrew. Half the Bajauris were said to
have returned to their homes after the action of the 13th, but the
Akhund was reported to be trying to stop these desertions. The
enemy were also said to be much depressed at their losses and
want of success.
On Akhund was on the top of the Buner pass to
the 16th the
prevent his followers going home. Owing to the communications
with the rear being unsafe, the mules, which had come up with
a convoy the day before, were sent back by the Ambela pass, getting
down unmolested, the enemy not expecting this movement. The
Sappers and Miners, Pioneers, and fatigue parties were employed
daily, under engineer officers, in strengthening the defences, but
the tools were deficient in number and of bad quality.
On Akhund was still on the summit of the Buner
the 17th, the
pass, where he had built a temporary mosque for shelter. News
was received that the Haji Sahib of Kunar, a valley to the north-
east of Jalalabad, had been sent for.' He was reputed to be very
holy, and gifted with the power of counteracting the effect of bullets.
Intimation was received that a party of the Utman Khels of the
Lundkhwar valley had been told off to intercept convoys between
the camp and Sherdara. Battery horses, being in the way and con-
suming the camp supplies of grain and forage, were on this day sent
to the rear. An attempt to impede their march resulted in loss
to the marauders only. Late on the evening of the 17th, the guns
of Captain Grifhn's battery (C-19th E. A.) were removed from
the advanced breastworks in front of the camp to a new position,
to cover the withdrawal of the picquets from the Guru mountain,
two guns of the Hazara Mountain Train Battery being sent down
from the Guru temporarily to take their place.
At daylight on the morning of the 18th, the whole of the troops
on the Guru mountain, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel J. L.
Vaughan, consisting of the Hazara Mountain Train Battery, and the
3rd, 5th, and 6th Punjab Infantry, were withdrawn, and the entire
camp and troops transferred to the heights on the south of the
2M2
268 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

pass. Every precaution had been taken to prevent the enemy

from suspecting the intended movement, and the troops both
on the Guru and in the front line of defence continued to strengthen
up to the last moment their breastworks and defences. These pre-
cautions were successful, and though the enemy's picquet on the
Guru was not 400 yards distant, the withdrawal was effected
without their knowledge, and in the most perfect order.

The concentration of the whole of the troops on the eastern

heights made it necessary to extend the position, and particularly
to secure the full command of the water, on which the whole force
was now dependent. With this view, the
Peshawar Jlountain Tram
j j-Qops, as per margin, m.ovcd out undcT
Wing, 101st Fusiliers. the personal command of Sir Neville
1st un3a3 n an ly.
bth „
Chamberlain, as soon as the chanoe
' c3
of
,, _
_

position was completed, to drive the

enemy from what was afterwards known as the " Water " ridge.
This was very quickly effected by the advance of the 1st and 6th
Punjab Infantry, with a loss on our side of three m.en wounded,
whilst some of the enemy were The troops were then
killed.

placed in position to protect the 5th Punjab Infantry and S2nd

Punjab Native Infantry, employed as a working -party under
the direction of Lieut. -Colonel A. Taylor, c.b., Commanding Royal
Engineer, in stockading a picquet to command the water. These
troops were withdrawn to camp in the evening under the direction of
Lieut. -Colonel Vaughan, 5th Punjab Infantry, the new work having
been completed and occupied.
On discovering the camp and picquets on the Guru to have
been vacated by the troops, the enemy seem.ed
to have supposed
that the force was and with this idea came into the gorge
in retreat,
in great numbers, both from Ambela and from the Guru, and thence,
about 11 A.M., began an attack upon what had now becomxC the
left front of the position. The defences at the point principally
attacked consisted of some small breastworks thrown up on the
side of the hill to cover the picquets connecting the advanced
right picquets with the camp was not intend-
in the gorge below. It

ed to hold these breastworks permanently after thecamp had been

removed from the gorge but it was necessary to hold them this
;

day to prevent the enemy from pressing upon the camp and firing
 YUSAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 269

into it before the troops were thoroughly established in their new

position. These picqucts were rather advanced and exposed to
be taken in flank, and they were, from natural features, not easily
defensible.
Major Ross commanded at this point, and the breastworks
Two conipanips. 71st High- ^""'^^^ ^^^^^ ^J 1^0 men of the 14th Native
land Ligiit Infantry. Infantry, who being greatly outnumbered
One company, 101st Eoyal , . „
Bengal Fusilier^. by the enemy, were, m
.

the nrst instance,

, .

"'^^' ^'""^''^
'^''^P'""^'' compelled to give way, but being rein-
infinh-
Three companies, oth Curkha forced by the troops as per margin, re-
Regimcnt. ^^^^j. ^^^ p^g^ ^^^^ drove back the enemy.
The enemy, however, being reinforced, again attacked the picquels,
when it became necessary for the two lowest down on the hill to fall
back on the third, which was nearer the camp breastvv^orks. The
picquet upon which the lower picquets had retired was withdrawn
after dark. On its withdrawal the enemy pressed on, and some
few of them endeavoured to annoy the camp until a late hour
of the night, but without making any serious attack.
Our loss on this occasion was 43 killed and 75 wounded,
while the enemy were known to have lost 130 killed and upwards
of 200 wounded.
Among the killed were Captain C. F. Smith, of the 71st High-
land Light Infantry, Lieutenant T. S. G. Jones, attached to that
regiment, Lieutenant H. H. Chapman, Adjutant of the 101st Fusi-
liers, and Lieutenant W. F. Mosley, of the 14th Native Infantry.
Among the wounded was Lieutenant A. D. C. Inglis, of the 14th
Native Infantry.
On the 19th, was found that the picquet posted the day
it

before to command the water, was more advanced than necessary,

and it was therefore abandoned, and a new position chosen and
stockaded about 300 yards to the rear.
During the day the enemy kept up a fire upon the "Crag " and
" Water " picquets, when Captain E. B. Aldridge, 71st
Highland
Light Infantry, was killed at the latter, and Ensign C. M. Stockiey
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, severely wounded at the former
post.
The troops had now been very hard- worked, day and ni<^ht,
for a month. Having continually to meet fresh enemies, it v/as
difficult to repel the attacks and at the same time to
provide
270 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

convoys for supplies and wounded sent to the rear. There were at
this time 166 wounded and 286 sick men in the camp, and every
animal not urgently needed had been sent to Parmalao.
The Akhund about this time issued a proclamation that any
deserter from his camp should have his property confiscated.
He was averse to the proposal of the Buner tribe to treat, and
said he would not be bound by any engagemxent they might make ;

he also abused the tribes for want of success. At this time some
men were reported to have joined him from Kabul.
Major li. R. James, C.B., Commissioner of Peshawar, having
returned from furlough, took over political charge from Colonel
R. G. Taylor, c.b., on this day, the 19th; but Colonel Taylor,
at his own request, remained with the force, to be of any use
he could.
On the 20th November the garrison of the " Crag " and
" Water " picquets were as marginally noted. About 9 a.m. the
enemy began to collect in great numbers
"Cmry" Vicquet.
the un
/i
•
^i " '

101st Fusiliers, 100 bayo-

,
near these picquets, Crag "kbeing, as
^^^^-
-^
, T,T .-
.
T X
,
before, the point
^ principally
-^
threatened.
20th Punjab Native Infan-
They Were, however, checked m some de-
.

try, 100 bayonets.

" vicquct.
IWater''
71st Regiment, 100 bayonets. fe J the fire of the Peshawar Moun-
gree by
_

3rd Punjab Infantry, 100 tain Train Battery ; Captain T. E.

ayonets.
Hughes, from previous experience and
his acquaintance with the ground, knowing exactly on what
points to bring his fire with most effect, even though the enemy
were not visible from, the battery. The " Crag " and "Water"
picquets also mutually supported one another by their cross-fire

at 450 yards.
Up to a late period of the afternoon the enemy had made no
3rd capture of the Crag
impression upon the " Crag " picquet,
though numerous standards had been
Picquet.

gradually advanced under cover to within a few yards of the breast-

works but about 3 p.m. the unaccountable conduct of an officer on
;

the left of the picquet, who suddenly ordered the troops in his part
of the position to retire, gave the enemy possession of the post.
This was not, however, accomplished without affording the officers
and men who held the lower portion of the picquet the oppor-
tunity of distinguishing themselves by the resolute way in which
they endeavoured to hold their portion of the post under very
 7VSAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 271

discouraging circumstances, abandoning it only wlien it was no

longer tenable. These officers were Major H. G. Delafosse^ of the
101st Fusiliers, who commanded the picquet, Captain R. G. Rogers,
of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, and Ensign A. R. Sanderson
and Assistant Surgeon AY. Pile, both of the 101st Fusiliers. The
last two officers were killed at the breastwork whilst endeavourintr
to rally their men. The above officers were well supported by some
men of the 101st Fusilier^:, and by some of the 20th Punjab Native
Infantry.
On the fall of the " Crag " coming to the notice of Sir Neville
Chamberlain, he imm.ediately ordered the 71st Highland Light
Infantry and the 5th Giu-klia Regiment to be got under arms
and
proceed to the upper camp and at the same time directed Captain
;

Griffin's half battery (C-19th R.A.), and the two

24-pr. howit-
zers 01 No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, under Captain
Salt,
to open fire upon the " Crag " this they did in so efficient a manner
;

(joined to the fire of Captain Hughes's mountain guns) that

they
effectually prevented the enemy from attempting to occupy the
post in anything like large numbers.
On the 71st and 5th Gurkha Regiments reaching tlie upper
Crag Picquet retaken by the dcfcUCeS, Colouel W. Hope, C.B,, coni-
7UtHighiai.d Light Infantry.
manding the former, was ordered to
storm the " Crag " in front, and Lieut.-Colonel J. L. Vaughan,
with the 5th Gurkhas and 5th Punjab Infantry, to go round
the
hill, so as to take the lower pcrtion of it in flank. The 71st
discharged their duty in the most steady and soldier-like manner
and the work was retaken without much loss on our side. The
5th Gurkhas, with detachments of the 5th and 6th Punjab Infantry
supported on the left.
Thus for the third time the " Crag " picquet was lost and won—
a spot which, from the heavy losses sustained there on both
sides
had become known in the country as katlgar or the place of
(•laughter. Vaughan and Major J. P. W. Camp-
Lieut.-Colonel J. L.
bell, commanding the 5th Gmkhas, were both wounded.
Brigadier-General Chamberlain accompanied the
stornuno-
column, and when near the crest of the slope received a
severe
wound, which, though it did not prevent him pressing on and entering

1 One of the two British officerswho furvived the massacre of the Ca\^•npore
garrison in 1S57.
272 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the work at the time, subsequently obliged him to relinquish the

command of the force ; Lieutenant W. C. Anderson, 3rd Punjab
Cavalry, his orderly officer, was also wounded.
Colonel Hope then pushed forward in pursuit of the enemy,

having been joined by Lieut. -Colonel Vaughan's column, and drove

them for some distance over the heights in the direction of Lalu.
After continuing the pursuit as far as seemed prudent, Colonel
Hope withdrew the troops towards the " Crag," and was severely
wounded whilst superintending the re- occupation of the picquet,
which, at his special request, was garrisoned for the night by 200
men of his own regiment.
The British casualties on this day amounted to 2 officers
and 25 men killed, and 5 officers, 1 native officer and 104
men wounded, while the enemy's losses weie reported to be
120 killed 'and 200 wounded. Large reinforcements were stated to
have joined the AlJmnd this day.
The action of the 20th seemed to have had a depressing eilect
upon the enemy, notwithstanding that they had gained a temporary
success, and had wounded the Brigadier- General, which last injury
it would have been natural for them to make and think a great

deal of. From the 20th November to the 15th December, how-
ever, they made no further attack in force, and at one time their
gathering had dwindled down so much that there appeared
a possibility of their giving up the war altogether.
Early on the morning of the 21st, Lieut. -Colonel Vaughan,
commanding the advanced picquets, moving out, drove off a few
of the enemy and recovered without any casualty
in the vicinity,

all the bodies of our menon the 18th. Twelve of the enemy
slain

were killed. The " Crag " picquet defences had been improved,
and the troops were in the same position they occupied before the
previous day's attack.
On the 22nd the enemy came, at the invitation of the Com-
missioner, and removed their dead. The sick and wounded officers
and men were safely escorted to Parmalao.The defences of the
" Crag " picquet being now completed, that post was occupied by
200 bayonets of a British regiment, held on alternate days by the
71st and 101st Regiments. The health of the troops was good,
and the weather mild.
 ;

YU8AFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 273

On the 23rd, 24tli, and 25th, the enemy still remained quiet,
but on the last of these dates large
numbers appeared in the plain
near the village of Ambela, and an attack was expected either on
the 26th or 27th. The defences of the " Crag " and "Water"
picquets had been much strengthened by Lieut. -Colonel A. Taylor,
Royal Engineers. Communication with the rear had also been
greatly improved by the completion of a second line of road to
Khanpui, by a low ridge of hills easily occupied by our troops.
The men were hutting themselves, and as the nights were getting
very cold, arrangements were being made forgetting up tents.
Sh: Neville Chamberlain's wound proved more serious
than
he had expected, and it was with the greatest regret he had
to request to be relieved of the command of the force, which
devolved temporarily on Lieut. -Colonel A. T. Wilde, c.b., who
had been in charge of the camp since the Brigadier- General was
first wounded.
On the 26th November the enemy assembled in small parties
on the ridge above the advanced picquets, and reinforcements
were sent to the upper camp, with orders to attack, should the
enemy attempt to descend. No colHsion, however, took place,
and the day passed off quietly. This day was Friday, a day on
which, owing to the superstitious reverence of the enemy (it being
the Muhammadan Sabbath), it had hitherto been customary
with them to attack in force.
Although, since the 20th, there had not occurred anything
of
importance in the field, the work of the poHtical officers had
been
steadily going on. Major H. R. James had done all that
was
possible by negotiations to weaken the enemy, and met with con-
siderable success, due in some degree to the losses they had sus-
tained. He had succeeded
drawing off Ahmad Khan with
in
the greater portion of the Ashazai and Salarzai sections
of the
Buner tribe ; the Ranizais of Swat were also induced to return
to
their homes, to the number of 2,000 ; Sobat Khan sent
home his
immediate followers ; minor personages acted in a similar
manner
and amongst those who remained a mutual mistrust prevailed!
These desertions were becoming so numerous that the Akhund
issued denunciations, as already stated, against all
who should
leave the field, and the Maulvi redoubled his efforts
to bring
back the wavering.
Vol. L
2N
274 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On tlie
25th a deputation liad been received from the Buner
jirga and both from conversation with those composing it, and
;

with men who arrived at intervals by permission to take away

their slain, it was evident that the main body of the Bunerwals
were really inclined for peace. It was hoped that the jirga would
now come to terms, and agree to a brigade passing up the Chamla
valley to Malka. The greater portion of them were certainly in-
clined to do so but the negotiations were broken off by Zaidulla
;

Khan, who was informed by the Maulvi that his rival, Ahmad
Khan, had received large sums of money from the Commissioner.
However,'^ ^'the negotiations resulted in the retirement of Ahmad
Khan, with two important sections of the tribe.
Meanwhile, the above desertions were more than counter-
balanced by the arrival of large reinforcements to the enemy. Some
3,000 men arrived at intervals from Bajaur, under Faiztalab Khan,
the chief of that country. The Haji of Kunar arrived with about
500 men and his repute for sanctity rendered his advent a matter
;

of great rejoicing to the war party. Still it was noted that, not-

withstanding these accessions, the enemy were so divided and mis-

trustful of each other, that they were unable to resume the attack,
even on a Friday, as previously stated.
On the 30th November, Major-General J. Garvock arrived in
camp, and assumed command of the force, which was now organized
into two brigades, the details of which are given in Appendix B.
Some time previous to thisit had been in contemplation to

create a diversion on the Swat border, and for this purpose the
T, ,,
Battery „ , -„ .

Royal Horse Artillery.

,.„ Commander-in-Chief,' Sir Hugh
o Rose,?
A-i9th Royal Artillery. Ordered a column under Colonel R. Y.

7th Meiers."
Shipley, consisting of the troops as per
Guide Cavalry. margin, to advaucc to Shergarh on the
Swat frontier, and threaten the Malakand
pass. But Major James had meanwhile, unknown to Major-General
Garvock, promised the Swat chiefs that no British troops should
enter their country, and he now wished this force to be used to
punish the villages of British Baizai for their recent misconduct.
This use of the force was, however, not considered advisable by the
military authorities, as the object was considered inadequate.

1 Now the 53rd Sikhs (Frontier Force).

 7V8AFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 275

Major James
Owing, therefore, to the misunderstanding caused by
secret from
having kept his negotiations with the Swat leaders
theGeneral Officer Commanding, the arrival at Ambela of the 7th
reinforce Major-
FusiUers and the 3rd Sikhs, which were destined to
General Garvock's force, was much delayed. The other
reinforce-

ments which arrived to strengthen the Yusafzai Field Force con-

sisted of the 93rd Highlanders and the 23rd Punjab Native Infantry
Pioneers.^
Although the enemy had been so disheartened by their de-
feats that after the 20th November they had made further ^-
attempts on the camp, and the Bunerwals were really desirous
for peace, the reinforcements which they had
received made them

believe they could successfully oppose our advance ; and as

the
still

93rd Highlanders, the last of our reinforcements, marched into the

camp, the bands playing them in, the plains below and around
Ambela were covered with formidable masses of armed men, evi-
dently as a counter-display to ours.
The force had at this time two parties in its front to deal with—

(1) The Buner and Chamla tribes, originally fighting for their country,

but now crediting our repeated assertions that we had no

intention to invade them weary of the war, divided amongst
;

themselves, and subject to innumerable vexations and incon-

veniencesby the presence amongst them of so large a host.
(2) The Maulvi and his fanatics, with the AJchund and his allies,
a mixed assemblage of men from far and near, whose ranks
had been reinforced by Ghazan Khan, the chief of Dir, with
6,000 men, and who imagined they were beginning to realise
their dream of years, viz., the expulsion of the British from
the country trans-Indus.

Major James's communications with the tribes were now

be<^inning to have effect. On the afternoon of the 10th December
a deputation from the Buner tribe had come into camp, where they
remained all that night. Every chief of influence was there , and
after several lengthy discussions they had agreed—

1st. — That they would accompany the Commissioner with a force

and destroy Malka.
2w^.— That they would expel the Hindustanis from their country.

1 Now the 23rd Sikh Pioneers.

 -

276 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

They on the morning of the 11th, to obtain the sanction

left

of the Akliund and his allies to these arrangements.

At first, by the complete silence of the enemy, the withdrawal
of some of their picquets and other indications, a pacific reply was
anticipated but on the 13th, the day fixed for a decision, repeated
;

firing of musketry, welcoming fresh arrivals, and the reports of

proclamations issued by the AJcliund, fulminating anathemas against
anyone who spoke of peace, prepared the Commissioner for the
message which arrived early in the morning of the 14th, to the
effect that the jirga had been overruled by Ghazan Khan and other
newcomers, and that they were therefore unable to return to the
camp. It was further intimated that a general attack on the camp
was to be made on the and they advised om- taking the ini-
16th,
tiative, when they, the Bunerwals, would take no prominent part
in the action.
day were, therefore, at once
Offensive measures for the next
decided on by the Major-General, in communication with the
Commissioner, in order to anticipate further reinforcements expected
by the enemy.
At this timethere was a force of some 4,000 of the enemy at
Lalu, including some 300 Hindustanis and as no attack could
;

well be made on Ambela with that force on its flank, it was deter-
mined to attack the former place.
After the arrival of the 7th Fusiliers, 93rd Highlanders, 3rd
First Coium7i. Sikhs, and 23rd Punjab Native Infantry,
ft^Roya? FuIuSs.^'"''^" the force consisted of about 9,000 men.
1 Co. Sappers and Miners. Qn the 14th, orderS WCrC isSUCd foT

4th Gurkha Re^hnent. the attack on Lalu to be carried out on

23rd Punjab Native Infantry. j^]^q following day. The attacking trOOpS
"
Second Column. wcre to be formed into two columns, as
Peshawar Mn. Train Battery. margin, and Were uudcr the command
101st Royal Bengal Fusihers.
1 Co. Sappers and Miners.
-f ^ .\.r m
of Coloucl W. W. Turner,
w C.B.,
r.^^.
97th
?7o-?l^T^'f';
3rd Sikh Infantry.
Eedment,
& and of Lieut. -Colonel A. T.
r^ .
^ •
i
6th Gurkha Regiment. Wilde, C.B., Guide Corps respectively.
Kations for two days were served out to the troops. Lieut.
Colonel J. L. Vaughan was to be left in camp with 2,900 men.
At daybreak on the 15th December the attacking force, con-
sisting of 4,800 men, unencumbered by tents
or baggage, was

ready to move.
 "

TVSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 277

" " picquet,

The column assembled at tlie base of tlie Crag
first
and on receiving tbe order to advance, it
Advance Gvard. ^^ t , •
i
ofi m the margmally-named order-
.

4^,^ Gurhhas. ^ovcd

3rd Punjab Infantry. TJ^e advance was made from the right
"
Main Body.
^^^^ ^f .j-j^g " Water picquet on reach- ;

7th Eoyai rusiiiors.

^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ heights Overlooking
Sappers and JM'.neis. * & % •
j.

Hazara ]\iountaia Battery. ^-^^^t position, the enemy s picquets were

isnd^'T''" encountered, and driven with some loss

to the " Conical " hill.

From the
" Conical " hill the first column was separated by
Colonel Turner therefore direct-
a valley about 200 yards wide, and
heights overlooking it from
ed the troops to line the crest of the
of the mountain guns, which,
our own side, and to await the arrival
into action. Under cover
on coming up, were forthwith brought
the 23rd Pioneers, supported by the 32nd
Pioneers,
of their fire,
right, and secured a height
were moved up into a valley on the
to be turned.
which enabled the left of the enemy's position
out of the main position
As soon as the first column had passed
of the u^per camp, the
second column was formed as noted
in the margin, the rear being brought up
5th Gurkiia Regiment. "j^y ^ detachment of the 3rd Sikh Infantry.
lOlst Eoval Bengal Fusihers. -f -,
-r^ n m ^
•
i T '
„4-
PeshaAvar Mountain Train Coloucl E. G. Taylor aCCOmpaUlcd LlCUt.-
Battery. Coloucl Wilde throughout the operations.
Sappers and Miners. r^, • ^ i j 4--U <'n^^«"
Corps of Guides.
i
This column advanced under the trag
3rd Sikh Infantry. -nicQuet, the skirmishers of the 5th Guikha
Artillery reserve ammuni- I' M. '
^i i
•
i
•
i
tion.
'
Regiment quickly reachmg the low ridge
Infantry reserve ammuni-
^^ immediately in front of the
^^^j^^
tion. ^
enemy's position, which was neld
1 , . -1 1
m
•

strength behind stone breastworks. The following

dispositions

were made for the assault the Peshawar Moimtain Train Battery
:

moved up and opened sufficient fire to keep down the matchlock

fire from the heights the 101st Royal Bengal Fusihers and Corps
;

of Guides were formed in line of quarter columns out of fire beyond

the ridge the other two regiments being held in reserve, in
;

column of sections, to protect the left flank during the coming

attack.
"
Both columns were now ready to assault the Conical
hill, which was a most formidable position. The hillsides were
278 FRONTIBR AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

rocky, precipitous, and scarped by and the summit,

nature,
strongly occupied, was strengthened by
Assault on the Conical Hill. t, rv- i t •

stone breastworks onermg no ordmary

obstacle. The ascent would have been a matter of consider-
able difficulty under any circumstances. Below it, and to its
proper left, was the hamlet of Banda, strongly protected by arti-
ficial defences. Beyond it stretched a narrow ridge, terminating
in a hill of lesser elevation and then came a small, picturesque level,
;

backed by a lofty range containing the village of Lalu.

On the bugle sounding for the assault, under cover of the

mountain guns, which were admirably served, the two columns ad-
vanced to the assault. The first column advanced down the hill,
across the valley, and in ten minutes was driving the enemy down
the opposite side of the heights. At the same time the 101st
Fusiliers, the leading regiment of Wilde's column, without even
loading their rifles, dashed straight for the almost perpendicular
sides of the highest peak, a strong work crowded with the Hindustani
fanatics and their Pathan allies. The Corps of Guides made for
a point a little below, with the object of taking the pressure of!
the 101st, to whom the most difficult part of the assault had been
safely assigned. The Fusiliers, leaping into the breastwork amidst
a shower of bullets and huge stones, bayoneted some thirty of its
defenders, and the Corps of Guides, turning the position, shot and
cut down numbers as they retreated while the reserve, under the
;

personal direction of Lieut. -Colonel Wilde, secured the line of hills on

the left overlooking the Chamla valley, and drove small parties
of the enemy before it.
The enemy, some 2,000 number, were now in full flight
in

towards the hamlet of Banda, and were rapidly pursued by the men
of both columns the Guides and the 23rd Pioneers having the
;

honour of reaching the hamlet at the same time.

The village of Lalu now appeared about a mile and a half on
the right flank of the first column. Colonel Turner therefore pressed
the pursuit in that direction, leaving five companies to guard and
bring up the guns, and followed the enemy so closely that they
retreated in the utmost confusion down the hills towards Ambela.
As soon as the main position of the enemy had been gained
by the second column, Lieut. -Colonel Wilde moved the Peshawar
 TUSAFZAI AND OADVN TBIBS8. 278

Mountain Train Battery to the end of the ridge, and placed

the two regiments which were in reserve in position to watch the
spurs of the mountain leading up from the Ambela plain. The
enemy, evidently under the impression that the force had pressed
on too far, leaving its left unguarded, came out in large numbers
from the village of Ambela, and threatened both the left of the
camp and the communications of the second column. Ascending
the spurs of the heights, they then commenced a vigorous assault on
Lieut.-Colonel Wilde's position.
In the meanwhile, having secured possession of the village of
Lalu, Colonel Turner found himself on a line of heights flanking
the approach to the " Conical " hill, and seeing the attack which was
now being made on the second column, he directed the fire of
the guns of the Hazara Mountain Train Battery on to the flank of
the enemy.
As soon as the enemy's attack was developed, Lieut.-Colonel
Wilde sent for reinforcements. The Major-General had already
despatched two companies, 7th Fusiliers, to support the second
column, and, on receiving this requisition, the 101st Fusiliers,
with the exception of four companies left at the " Conical " hill and
on the ridge beyond it, were sent back to Lieut.-Colonel Wilde's
support, who was at this time rejoined by the Corps of Guides.
Passing these troops along the rear, Lieut.-Colonel Wilde
re-occupied all the ground close up to the " Crag " picquet, and
thus received the enemy's attack. A gallant attempt to force the
line ofcommunications with the camp was made at the point held
by the 3rd Sikhs, under Lieut.-Colonel E. Eenny, but was
successfully beaten back by that regiment.
Shortly afterwards, Major-General Garvock directed a for-
ward movement to be made, and the Guides, and a portion of the
5th Gurkhas and of the 3rd Sikhs, charged down one of the spurs^
and the 101st down another, when the enemy were driven off with
great slaughter, leaving a standard in the hands of the Gurkhas,
and in their flight coming under the fire of the guns of Colonel
Turner's column.
Whilst these operations were being carried on at the front,
a desultory attack was made by a considerable number of the enemy
upon the front and left flank of the upper camp. Being met by
the fire of the only one of Captain Griffin's guns {C-19th R.A.)
280 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the " Standard

''
wliicli could be brought to bear upon them from
picquet, and by the musketry fire from the breastworks, the
enemy were reduced to taking cover amongst the rocks and broken
ground, from which they caused, from time to time, considerable
annoyance to the upper camp, also to C-19th Eoyal Artillery, and
to the adjoining breastworks.
Later in the forenoon, successive bodies of the enemy en-
deavoured to approach the camp by the gorge from the direction of
Ambela, but coming under the are of the guns of C Battery, in
the lower camp, they broke a^ay to the left, and, ascending the
ravines and spurs to the front of the position, joined in the attack
upon the upper camp. The advanced picquet upon the ridge below
and in front of the " Crag" (consisting on this day of fifty men, 1st
Punjab Infantry) had been threatened from early morning by
a constantly increasing body of the enemy. The ground
occupied by the advanced picquet, from which the whole of the
centre of our position could be commanded, and on which the
" Crag " picquet could not, from the nature of the ground, maintain
an effective fire, was the point the enemy strove to gain. This
point was so important to the safety of the main position that
Lieutenant W. H. Unwin, 1st Punjab Infantry, was instructed by
Major C. P. Keyes, commanding that regiment, to hold it as long

as he could with any degree of safety. The enemy repeatedly crept

up under cover of the rocks, within a few yards of the picquet,
having driven in a small party placed there for observation. Lieu-
tenant Unwin was then reinforced, and subsequently had 200
bayonets at his disposal, including sixty men of the 5th Punjab
Infantry, —
under Lieutenant E. S. Fox, all that could be
spared from the reduced force. The enemy made two vigorous
attempts, in considerable strength, to take the position, but were
repulsed on each occasion by the picquet, who charged down upon
them, and inflicted a loss of forty killed.
At this time (about 2 p.m.) Major C. H. Brownlow, 20th Pun-
jab Infantry, who had command of the right defences of the upper
camp, observing that the enemy seemed much dispirited by the ill-
success against Lieutenant Unwin's picquet, determined to assume
the offensivB from the camp, and accordingly about 100 men of the
1st Punjab Infantry, led by Major Keyes, advanced from the
breastworks and by a succession of well-executed charges upon the
 TUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 281

different occupied by the enemy, completely cleared the

points
whole front and left flank of the defences, driving the enemy in
great confusion into the plain below, leaving their dead on all sides.
All opposition having now ceased in every part of the field, and
the enemy being in full retreat, arrangements were made for
bivouacking for the night. Colonel Turner occupied the ground he
had gained in the vicinity of Lain, and Lieut.-Colonel AVilde that
between the camp and the " Conical " hill. Not a shot was fired
during the night. Our losses were 16 men killed, and 2 officers,
5 native officers, and 60 men wounded. Those of the enemy were
400 killed and wounded.
Early on the morning of the 16th, 400 sabres of the 11th
Bengal Cavalry and Guide Corps, under the command of Lieut.-
Colonel D. M. Probyn, v.c, c.b., were brought from camp, and the
order was given to advance towards the plain.
Lieut.-Colonel Wilde's column, which was accompanied by
Major-General Garvock, passed down by the spurs in its immediate
front, the mountain guns attached to it descending with the cavalry
by a steep path, which ran down a hollow on the right. The
Advanced guard. V^^^^ was reached about midday, and
One company Guide Corps, the column having been formed as per
Main cohmn. margin, Lieut.-Colonel Wilde advanced
Guide Corps. n i , -r.
i
101 St Royal Bengal Fusiliers, across the Valley towards the Buner pass,
Mountain Train the troops in high spirits confidently
bS^'''''
Sappers and Miners. hoping for an
engagement on ground
3^ Sik^JIntorlr"*- comparatively easy to what they had
Ammunition dandies. been previously accustomed.
Bear-guard.
^s the column debouchcd into the
1 coy., 3rd Sikh Infantr3\
open country, the enemy appeared
, i -,

m.

great force on a low ridge of hills, which completely covered the

approach to Ambela, and numerous gay standards of all colours
were visible on the prominent hillocks. Major-General Garvock
determined, after a careful examination of the ground, on attack-
ing the enemy's position, and turning their right.
The occupied by the enemy was singularly well
position
chosen was of great strength, and peculiarly capable of defence.
; it

The enemy, however, seeing that his left would be effectually turn-
ed by Colonel Turner's column, which was now advancing, and
Vol. L 2
282 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

by the cavalry, abandoned this position, and, almost without firing

a shot, retreated slowly towards the pass leading to Buner.

As soon as the second column had begun to descend from
the " Conical " hill, the first column, having the shortest line to
pass over, had moved from the left. The
in echelon of regiments
3rd Punjab Infantry passed down the spur which ran parallel to that
by which Lieut. -Colonel Wilde's column was descending, and
protected the right flank of that column the 4th Gurkhas marched;

down the next parallel ridge, and the main body, consisting of the
23rd Pioneers in advance, left wing Royal Fusiliers, Hazara Mountain
Train Battery, Sappers and Miners, and right wing. Royal Fusiliers,
proceeded down the gorge leading from the village of Lalu to that
of Ambela and Chamla valley while the 32nd Pioneers
to the ;

crowned the heights and effected a parallel movement, covering the

right flank. The pathway was steep, and in parts precipitous and
rocky, and it was with great difficulty that the mountain guns could
be brought down but Captain F. R. DeBude, by his energy and
;

perseverance, overcame all obstacles, a company of Sappers and

Miners, under Lieutenant L. H. E. Tucker, rendering most valuable
service. At 2-30 p.m.. Colonel Turner found himself able to de-
bouch into the plain with the leading regiments, and the left wing
of the Royal Fusiliers.
The 3rd Punjab Infantry and the 4th Gurkhas had now effect-
ed their junction with the right of Lieut. -Colonel Wilde's column,
and with it were in possession of the extreme right of the enemy's
position, which was about a mile and a half from, and facing the
entrance to, the Buner pass.
Up to this time the cavalry had remained concealed behind
a projecting spur they were now ordered to advance, and passing
;

on at a gallop, under Lieut. -Colonel D. M. Probyn, and Captain

C. W. Hawes of the Guides, passed round the left of the enemy's
position, now in our possession, swept into the valley beyond, and
halted to the eastward of Ambela. The village, which had been pre-
viously abandoned, was immediately fibred, large stores of grain
falling into our hands.
The main portion of the second column had deployed imme-
diately opposite the village of Ambela, and Colonel Turner
was now ordered to try and cut off the rear of the enemy from the
pass as they were retreating before Lieut.-Colonel Wilde, but at the
 YU8AFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 283

same time not to compromise himself in the pass. He there-

fore formed a line of the 23rd Pioneers and left wing of the 32nd
Pioneers, with the right wing of that regiment in support, and direct-
ed their advance along the south-western face of the village of Am-
bela, the left wing Royal Fusiliers forming the reserve,
of the 7th
in quarter column, in rear of the centre of the line. After passing
the village, which was in flames, the right wing of the 32nd was
brought up in prolongation of the line to the right, thus bringing
the right near the base of the hill which shut in the mouth of the

pass. The advance was steadily continued in the same order to with-
in about 800 yards of the mouth of the pass, when the enemy opened
a furious fire of matchlocks and zamburaJcs, which was returned by
the line as it continued to advance. As a large body of the enemy
were observed moving to their right and beyond the left flank,
Colonel Turner moved two companies from the reserve of the Royal
Fusiliers, and placed them in an oblique position covering the left,
whilst at thesame time Lieut.-Colonel Probyn moved a body of his
men into a position which still further covered the left flank.
Seeing these movements, the enemy made a sword
furious onset,
in hand, upon the left flank which was now in broken
of the line,
ground covered with jungle. The 23rd and 32nd Punjab Native
Infantry were staggered for the moment by the suddenness of
the onslaught, but turning quickly on their assailants, they destroy-
ed the whole of them, not allowing one to escape. Upwards of
200 upon the field, 40 of whom were Hindustanis.
of their bodies lay
Lieutenant G. Alexander, of the 23rd, was killed, and Captain
C. F. F. Chamberlain and Lieutenant C. D. P. Nott, of the 23rd,
and Major T. Wheeler and Lieutenant F. H. B. Marsh, of the 32nd,
were wounded.
Flushed with success, the Pioneer regiments now pushed for-
w^ard into the pass, driving the enemy before them. But the day
was far spent, the hostile position was occupied in great force, and
Major-General Garvock was moreover aware that the Government
did not desire to invade Buner. The withdrawal of the troops
was therefore ordered. This was effected in echelon of regiments
from the right under cover of the fire of the guns of the Hazara
Mountain Train Battery, and C-19th R. A. The guns of the latter
battery had been brought on elephants from the camp, and were
308
284 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

now fully horsed. No molestation whatever was offered by the

enemy, who, in immense numbers and in sullen silence, lined

the heights above.

The number of the enemy in the field during these two days,
viz.f the 15th and 16th, was 15,000.
The Bunerwals gave signal
proof of their sincerity by taking no prominent part in the action,

the men who fought having been chiefly Hindustanis, Bajauris,

and the men of Swat and Dir. Thus the punishment inflicted fell,
as the Commissioner had hoped, on those who had in such an un-
provoked manner j oined in the contest, and overruled the Bunerwals
in their desire for peace.
the night of the 16th the columns bivouacked in the neigh-
On
bourhood of Ambela. During the night Faiztalab Khan and the
Bajauris, Ghazan Khan and his clansmen from Dir, with the
miscellaneous gatherings from more distant parts, were all in rapid

flighttowards their homes. The Ahhund, with the khans and

people of Swat, alone remained on the crest of the Buner pass,
not as before, with flaunting standards, but behind the hill, out
of sight,and all prepared to run in the event of the troops ad-
vancing. Thus enabled to act independently, the Buner jirga
returned to Major James on the morning of the 17th, not even talk-
ing of terms, but simply asking for orders.
There were two plans, either of which could be adopted. The
first was to send a strong brigade to Malka to destroy and to it,

return by the Chamla valley to Ambela. But in this case it would

be necessary to call up another convoy from Parmalao, and this
would necessitate a delay of seven days in the advance of this
brigade, during which time the Ahhund and
Maulvi would have
time to collect their scattered forces and to
receive reinforcements

fresh men on their way to join them this;

delay also would give
of
the Amazais, Mada Khels, Hassanzais, and other northern tribes,
and, moreover, on the
time to collect and organise resistance ;

retirement of the brigade there would be no

guarantee that the

Hindustanis would not be allowed to return to Malka by the neigh-

This plan was not
bouring tribes stirred up by these proceedings.
therefore approved.
The second plan was to require the Buner men to destroy
Malka without any aid from our troops. Its advantages were.
 YUBAFIAI AND OADUN TBJBBS. 285

that the success already gained would be at once completed, colli-

sion with distant tribes in a rugged country would be avoided,
and
the Hindustanis would be cut off from every hope of a resettlement
on the spurs of the Mahaban for the Buner men would be
;

obliged to associate with themselves the Amazais, and Mada Khels

;

and if these tribes committed themselves thus openly against the

fanatics, it would be a sure giiarantee that they would not re-admit
them.
The destruction, however, was to be real, not nominal and ;

it would be necessary that some British officers should accompany

the jirga to see the work carried out. This would necessitate the
sending of an escort with them sufficient to protect them from
any individual or factious acts of treachery of more extended
:
faith-
lessnessMajor James had not the slightest anxiety. Half the jirga
were to remain with the Commissioner. The force was in possession
of the Chamla valley, and Buner itself was at our mercy.
At the
same time it was known that Malka was deserted, and that there
could be no opposition which the Buner tribes would be unable
to
overcome. Major-General Garvock concurring in the Commis-
sioner's views, the following requisitions were made on the Buner
jirga, to which they unanimously consented :

(i) To dismiss the army of all kinds on the Buner pass.

(ii) To send a party to destroy Malka completely, to be accompanied
by British officers and such escort as might be
considered
necessary,
(iii) To expel the Hindustanis from the Buner, Chamla, and Amazai
lands,
(iv) To leave as hostages the whole of their chief men the
till above
requirements should be fully carried out.

Leaving the greater part of theirnumber with the Commis-

sioner, a few returned to the pass, and by the next
morning the
army on its crest, including the Swat khans and people,
were
hastening to their homes.
Colonel E. G. Taylor, from the first, had been
unremitting in
his inquiries regarding the nature of the country, and to no safer
hands could the important and delicate duty about to be undertaken
have been entrusted. He was, therefore, deputed to proceed
with
the Buner jirga. Escorted by the Corps of Guides, under
Lieutenant
286 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

F. H. Jenkins, and a body of levies, under the Sudnni chief, Aziz

Khan, and accompanied by the officers
Col. J. M. Aciye,i cB., R.A.,
jjiarginally noted, the party advanced from
Lieut. -Col. A. Taylor, c.b., ,f ,
'^
,
' |
,
"^
^^^ ^
.

RE Ambela on the 19th, and reached Kuria,

RlSslit Quttt mJsS; at the upper end of the Chamla valley,
General. that evening. Here they were detained
^''^'''^°''^'
Revenue Survey.
on the 20th by heavy rain, and it then
Major T. Wright, A.A.G. became apparent, from the diminished
number of the Bunerwals, that the jirga

intended rather to carry out their engagements by friendly over-

tures to the Amazais than by coercion. Colonel R. G. Taylor,
fully appreciating the policy which had been adopted, and, sup-
ported by the evident frank determination of the Buner maliks
to fulfil their engagements, determined to acquiesce in this plan
of operations.

On the morning of the 21st, the weather having cleared, the

march was continued. On turning to the southward, the party
entered Amazai territory. From Kuria to Nagrai is seven miles.
Soon after leaving the former place, a narrow defile, which could
be easily rendered defensible, was entered. The road, for about
a mile, followed the stony bed of the 7iala, and then turned up over
a spur of the ridge, which, though not a very stiff one, would have
been a good place to offer opposition to an advance. On arrival
at Nagrai, a party of the Amazais appeared on a hill commanding
the onward march, under their chief, Mouza Khan, in full warlike
array, with standards and drums, and it became known that they
had been joined by parties of the Mada Khels.
To those unacquainted with the real nature of the case, it
must have seemed a critical moment, and undoubtedly it was one
requiring the utmost tact and firmness on the part of the political
officer but Colonel E. G. Taylor, fortunately, was an officer who
;

eminently possessed those qualities. It appeared that the Mada

Khels were either marching to join the war, and had only heard,
on reaching the Mahaban complete collapse of the
tract, of the
tribes, or that Mouza Khan, having heard that the Bunerwals
had given in, and were going to force the burning of Malka on the

1 Afterwards General Sir John Adyo. g.c.b.

* Now Lord Roberts.
 TUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBEB. 287

Mahaban tribes, had called them up to see what aid they could
afford to mitigate the evils.

The Buner chiefs, advancing, held council with those of the

Amazais, and, after a long conference, the lashkar of the latter
withdrew. Mouza Khan and their other headmen now joined
Colonel R. G. Taylor, and with this accession of strength, the
party proceeded to Malka, where it arrived late in the afternoon,
and where, owing to the delay caused by the above interruption, it
took up its quarters for the night.
Malka was situated on an elevated plateau, on a northern spur
of the Mahaban range. It was a much larger and more substantial
place than any known in those hills, containing several large edifices,
among which the Maulvi^s hall of audience, barracks for the soldiers,
stabling, and a powder manufactory, formed conspicuous objects.
There were no regular fortifications, but the outer walls of the houses
were connected, and formed a continuous line of defence with
posterns. There was also a tower at the gateway.
The place was found deserted, and on the morning of the
22nd December the Bunerwals and Amazais began to burn and
destroy it. An effort was at first made by the Amazais, and after-
wards by the Buner khakis, to save a large portion of the place,
on the plea that it had been occupied by men of their tribe, and
not by the Hindustanis but Colonel R. G. Taylor was firm, and
;

determined to destroy the whole town, which was completely

done by noon. The escort witnessed the burning, but were in no
way employed in the work of destruction. Whilst this was going
on, information was brought that the Amazais were going down
the valley to join the Mada Khels, who had remained at Nagiai.
This, of course, caused Colonel R. G. Taylor much anxiety.
The Shergarh pass, by which the column had to return, was a
difiicult one,and if the smouldering sparks in the minds of the
hillmen had blown up into a flame, the position would have been
most critical but Colonel R. G. Taylor never wavered in his de-
;

termination. Shortly afterwards, Aziz Khan, the Sudum chief,

who was in a manner in general charge of the proceedings, sent
word that he wished for leave to go down the valley to look after
what was going on, and Colonel Taylor agreed at once, putting
full trust in the honest intentions of the Bunerwals to carry out
their engagements. Matters were speedily arranged by Aziz Khan,
 ;

288 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDI'TlONS FROM INDIA.

who ordered the baggage, which had begun moving towards Kuria,
but had been stopped on the above untoward report, to continue
its march.
Colonel R. Gr. Taylor spoke to the Amazais who were present,
but they were sullen, and not inclined to answer in good spirit
they were, however, saved the trouble by Zaidulla Khan, one of
the Buner chiefs, who stepped in front of them, and, grasping
his beard with his one remaining hand, said
—
" I am answerable
for these men, both for their conduct now, and for their excluding
the Hindustanis in future." This incident illustrates the fact that
the Mahaban tribes, though strong, and not to be despised with
their stiff country, are yet powerless to resist the will of Buner.
If things at times looked a little lowering and uncertain, it

was but the natural result of the position in which this force was
placed ; their task had taken them through a narrow defile into
a cup of wild, mountainous country, never previously visited by
our troops. The force found themselves in the presence of strong
tribes, certainly not over well pleased with their visitors, or the
errand on which they had come but from the first. Colonel E.
; C
Taylor felt confident that the representatives of the stronger tribe
that accompanied him could carry out their engagements, and
overcome the would-be recusants.
Colonel Taylor said the spectacle of a tribe like the Bunerwals
doing our bidding and destroying the stronghold of their own
allies in the war, at a distant spot, naturally under the protection

of other tribes ofweU-known prowess and strength, with British

witnesses looking on, must have been a thoroughly convincing
proof to the surrounding country of the reality of our success, and
of the indubitable prostration felt by the powerful Buner tribe,
which had been the foremost in opposing us.
The party returned to Kuria that evening, and on the morning
of the 23rd marched to the camp in the Ambela pass, accompanied
by some of the Amazai nialiks.
On the departure of Colonel R. G. Taylor's party, the troops
had returned to their former position in the pass and the 1st, 5th,
;

and 6th Punjab Infantry and the 20th Pimjab Native Infantry,
had begun their march towards their different cantonments. The
remainder of the force now began its return to the plains, all being
assembled at Nawa Kala on the 25th December,
 -

YUSAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 289

The British loss during the whole oi the above operations

had been 15 British and 4 native officers, 34 British and 185
native rank and file—total 238, killed 21 British and 27 native;

officers, and 118 British and 504 native rank and file total 670, —
wounded grand total
;
908. The total loss of the enemy was esti-
mated at 3,000.
The Indian Medal, with a clasp inscribed " Umbeyla," was
granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the opera-
tions of the Yusafzai Field Force.
The attitude of the Gaduns during the campaign had been, on
the whole, satisfactory. Most of their chiefs were present in camp
with the political officers, and there was no general collection
^f any part of the tribe against us.
Coercion of the Gaduns and
Utmanzais after the Ambcla Individuals, undoubtedly, joined the
Expedition.
enemy, but not nearly to such an extent
as did our own subjects in Yusafzai. Only two men of the tribe
Pesliawar Mountain Train ^cre killed Or WOUnded. One of the
Battery. headmen, Malik Isa, of the Mansur sec-
Hazara Mountain Train Bat- .. -, -,. -,
^ i • ,
'^10^' however, did not present himself
,

tery.
101 St Royal Bengal Fusiliers, the whole time, and it being considered
One company of Sappers and . . • r.

:\liners. neccssary to require security from the

Corps of Guides. Gaduns generally after the Ambela cam-
3rd Sikh Infantry. . .

3rd Punjab Infantry. paigu was over, a brigade, consisting of

5th Gurkha Regiment. the troops noted in the margin, under
thecommand of Lieut. -Colonel A. T. Wilde, c.b., marched from
Nawa Kala to Meni on the 28th December 1863, being accom-
panied by Major H. R. James, c.b., as Political Officer.

Ten days' supplies were carried with the force, with ammunition
at 200 rounds per native soldier, and 140 rounds per British soldier.
The remainder of the troops of the Yusafzai Field Force march-
ed back to their respective cantonments.
The Gadun tribe, as already stated, is divided into two chief
clans, the Mansur and the Salar. The former had generally
formed the recusant party in dealings with us, under the leadership
of Isa Khan but associated with him had been Jehangir Khan,
;

of the Salar clan.

On
the 30th December the troops arrived at Meni, and on
the following day all the chiefs of the tribe had assembled in the

villages of Bisak and Gandap, the head-quarters of the Mansur

Vol. I.
2P
290 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

and and both situated about four miles

Salar clans respectively,
distant. Isa Khan was with them, but, actuated by fear, he
did not come in to the Commissioner with the rest, though he
counselled them to perfect submission. However, on Major James
again sending for him, he came in and joined the jirga.
On the 1st of January the Commissioner had a discussion
with them on the subject of their offences, which they admitted,
at the same time pleading certain things in extenuation it only
;

remained, therefore, to take guarantees for the future.

When the Saiyids and Hindustanis had returned in the pre-
vious July, they had occupied Mandi, a place adjacent to Sit ana,
and had built there a kind of fort of loose stones. The village
itself belonged to Saiyids not connected with Mubarak Shah's family,

and it had been spared in 1858, as they were considered to be blame-

less for what had then happened. As the Hindustanis had, how-
ever, again found the place ready to their hand, and occupied it,
it became as necessary to remove a powerless as a disloyal colony.

By requiring the Gaduns and Utmanzais to perform this work,

a guarantee in their case would be obtained similar to the security
we had in regard to the Bunerwals and Amazais at Malka. Believ-
ing this to be a more complete and satisfactory termination than
the taking of hostages, regarding which there were several difficul-

ties, Major James made a demand on them for its execution, to

which they expressed their consent.
During the night, however, worked on by interested parties,
and at the instigation of Jehangir Khan, the men of Gandap left the
camp, and declined to be parties to the agreement. The ostensible
cause was declared to be that it was proposed to take the force
via Gandap, the direct road to Khabal, which portended mischief
to the village. It was a case to be promptly met, and Lieut. -Colonel
Wilde, therefore, moved out on the morning of the 2nd, and occu-
pied the low hills in rear of, and over, the village of Gandap. The
ascent was steep and difficult. The village was a strong one,
situated among low hills, and consisting of about a thousand houses
full of cotton and other property. The place was completely at
our mercy but being most anxious not to be forced to extremities,
;

the Commissioner sent men of the Gadun jirga (all of whom, together
with those of the Utmanzai jirga, had accompanied him) to reason
with the Gandap people, with the result that they all came in, and
 -

291
TVSAFZAI AUD OADVN TBIBEH.
returned
work. The troops .accordingly
agreed to join In the .allotted
a shot having been fired.
to camp at sunset without
proceeded to Khabal where the
The following day the force
with the G.aduns Leaving the
UtmanzaiB were formally associated
on the 4th to M.and. accom-
camp there, Major James proceeded The
and a portion of the troops
„anied by Lieut.-Colonel Wilde some
much improved and contained
XTe viUage, which had been and burnt by the nm^.
destroyed
substantial houses, was then
denominated a ort, was <i_^*;^^
and the walled enclosure, '^^f Cotton m
it had been left by Sir J. S-
was found still a ruin, as
Pihur, where the Gaduns
TssS On the 5th the troops returned to
fresh agreements, individually
and collec-
and Utmanzais executed pardoned
intcrcessi6n, the Gandap men were
tively and at their
foolish conduct on the
2nd of January.
for tbeir
expedition trans-Indus havmg been thus
the objects of the
411
being too far advanced for any active
accomplished, and the season
Hassanz.ais of the Black Mountain,
Lieut
meas-es against the to
Colonel Wilde's force
was broken up, and the troops returned
their respective cantonments.
of the Mada Khels came in
On the 9th January 1864 the jirga was with
to Major Coxe, the
Deputy Commissioner of Haz.ara, who
the Hassanzais and protecting the
Amb
the troops watching
they had entert.ained no hostde feeling to-
territory and assertedthat
but had been compelled by pressure
wards the British Government,
resist, to ]om
tribes, which they were unable to
of the neighbouring
organized by the Bunerwals and the Akhund
the hostile movement
Swat They then executed an agreement to maintain in future
of
friendly relations with
the Tanaw<ali cluef, and on no account to
within the hmits
errant the Hindustanis countenance or habitation
of their country. , , ,, » ^ a not
afterwards, that section of the
Amazais winch
^
had
\. -i-

Two days
Commissioner at Ambela, came m to
previously waited on the
agreement to exclude
MaiorH W
H. Coxe, and also executed an
from their limits. Later on, he also
ihe Hindustanis altogether
of the Hassanzais, ^^^th the exception
of
received the submission
The subsequent misbehaviour
Kabul Khan, the son of the chief.
their misconduct in 1868 has already
been
o/the Hassanzais and
related in Chapter III,
2P2
 APPENDIX A.

YUSAFZAI FIELD FORCE, OCTOBER 1863.

Brigadier-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain, k.c.b. (Commandant, Punjab

Irregular Force), commanding.
Staff.

Major T. Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Lieut. -Colonel G. Allgood, Assistant Quarter-Master General.
Lieutenant F. J. N. Mackenzie, Staff Officer, Punjab Irregular Force.
Lieut.-Colonel A. Taylor, c.b., r.e., Commanding Royal Engineer,

Surgeon W. Simpson, Principal Medical Officer, British Troops.

H.B.Buckie, „ „ „ Native „
Captain J. H. Jenkins, Principal Commissariat Officer.

Artillenj.

Captain J. S. Tulloh, commanding Royal Artillery.

F. C. Griffin, „ half C-19th Royal Artillery.

T. E. Hughes, ,,
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.

F. R. DeBude, „ Hazara Mountain Train Battery.

Cavalry.

Lieut.-Colonel D. M. Probyn, v.c, c.b., commanding 11th Bengal Cavalry

Captain C. W. Hawes, commanding Guide Cavalry.
Engineers.

Lieut. L. H. E. Tucker, commanding Sappers and Miners.

Injantry.

Colonel W. Hope, commanding 71st Highland Light Infantry.

C.B.,

Lieut.-Colonel F. 0. Salusbury, commanding 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.

A. T. Wilde, c.b., commanding Guide Corps.
Major C. P. Keyes, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry.
P. F. Gardiner, commanding 3rd Punjab Infantry.
Lieut. -ColonelJ. L. Vaughan, commanding 5th Punjab Infantry.
Captain D. Hoste, commanding 6th Punjab Infantry.
W.
Major C. C. G. Ross, commanding 14th Native Infantry.
C. H. Brownlow, commanding 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

W. D. Morgan, commanding 32nd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers).

Captain C. W. R. Chester, commanding 4th Gurkha Regiment.

Major J. P. W. Campbell, commanding 5th Gurkha Regiment,
( 292 )
 APPENDICES. 293

Political Officers.

Colonel R. G. Taylor, c.b., Commissioner.

Captain A. A. Munro, Deputy Commissioner.
Lieut. R. G. Sandeman, Assistant Commissioner.
Survey Officers.

Major H. C. Johnstone, Survey Department.

Lieutenant W. Barron, Survey Department.
With the troops u'hich suhseqiiently joined.

Captain T. H. commanding No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery.

Salt,

Colonel R. Y. Shipley, commanding 7th Fusiliers.

Major F. W. Burroughs, commanding 93rd Highlanders.
Lieut. -Colonel R. Renny, commanding 3rd Sikhs.
Captain C. F. F. Chamberlain, commanding 23rd Punjab Native Infantry
(Pioneers).
 APPENDIX B.

Disposition of the Yusafzai Field Force at Ambela on Major- General

J. Garvock assuming the command, 30th November 1863.
First Brigade.

ColonelW. W. Turner, c.b., 97th Foot, commanding.

Lieutenant J. H, Campbell, 71st Highland Light Infantry, Brigade-Major.
Half C-19th Royal Artillery.
Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
71st Highland Light Infantry.
1st Punjab Infantry.
3rd „ ,,

. 5th „ ,,

20th „ Native Infantry.

32nd „ „ „ (Pioneers).

5th Gurkha Regiment.

Second Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Wilde, c.b., Guide Corps, commanding.
Captain C. W. R. Chester, 4th Gurkhas, Brigade-Major.
Half No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery.
Hazara Mountain Train Battery.
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
14th Native Infantry.
Guide Infantry.
6th Punjab Infantry.
4th Gurkha Regiment.
23rd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers.)

( 294 )
 CHAPTER VII.

THE BLACK MOINTAIN

YUSAFZAl AND GADVN TRIBES BETWEEN
AND sn^^T.— (Contimied.)
to 1864.
Dealings with the tribes subsequent
fanatics subsequent to the Ambela
The history of the Hindustani
but it appears that after
campaign is not very easy to follow,
the greater numb%r of them led
by
their expulsion from Malka,
Chagarzai country, north ot the
Maulvi Abdulla, retreated into the
After a time they obtained from
the Chagarzais
Barandu river.
grants of the villages of Tangora and
Tho Hindustani fanatics.
jg^^^^,^^ ^l^^re they made permanent
settlements, and remained
undisturbed up to the commencement
Their position was, however, by
no means comfort-
of 1868.
made them pay
The people amongst whom they
dwelt
able
afforded them, and for the supphes
dearly for the protection
that their
they received and it was only by the greatest efforts
;

acrents in Hindustan were

enabled to forward to them enough
moreover, frequently threa-
money for their support. They were,
tened with expulsion by their hosts,
who forcibly prevented the
Maulvi had commenced to
completion of two towers which the
erect in Batora. The Akhund also looked upon them with no
to him, and
friendly eye their Wahahi inclinations were abhorrent
:

their position in the country

was a standing menace for their ;

were
leaders maintained their position only by intrigue, and
ready tools in the hands of the
rival faction m Buner and else-
^
where, followers of the Kota
Mulla.

It is not surprising that,

with this constant pressure on them,

both at home and abroad, the

community was several times on the
autuimi of 1866, Muhammad Isak
point of dissolution. During the
made several attempts
and Muhammad Yakub, two of their leaders,

one of th(^ rivals of the Akhund in the re

1 Koti a village in the south-west
is
^
Saiyid Amir, better ligious world,
corner of Yus'afzai.
known a3 the Kota Mulla, was at this tune
( 295 )
296 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

to open communications with Colonel J. R. Beclier, c.b., the Com-

missioner of Peshawar, through the instrumentality of Saiyid
Muhammad (formerly in our service) ; their letters were received and
messages sent to them, but their plans were entirely frustrated by
the vigilance of Maulvi Abdulla, who appears to have gained an
entire ascendancy over all the other leaders.
s
Matters remained
thus until the beginning of 1868, the fanatics being too much engaged
with their own quarrels and annoy us or continue the
intrigues to

system of highway robbery in our which at first led to

territories,

the recommendation by the Punjab Government for punitive

expeditions in 1858 and 1863.
In February 1 868 news was received that the fighting men of the
Hindustanis, numbering 400 or 500, had moved from Tangora and
Batora to Bajkatta, in Buner, on the invitation of Azim Khan of
Bajkatta, an opponent of the AkJiund and firm supporter of his
rival, the Kota Mulla. Azim Khan offered to give the Hindus-

tanis houses and lands in they would bring over their

his village if

families and settle there permanently his offer was accepted,

;

and the fanatics accordingly abandoned Tangora and Batora.

Nothing more was heard of them until the 18th of April, when the
arrival of Feroz Shah, the son of the last King of Delhi, at Bajkatta
was reported by Azim Khan himself, who wrote to the Commissioner
of Peshawar to make his excuses for harbouring men whom he
knew to be mortal enemies of the British Grovernment. Feroz Shah
had arrived some months before at Saidu, the residence of the
Akhund, in great poverty, and with only four attendants he was ;

well received, and reported to be in high favour, until the evil news
of the arrival in Buner of his countrymen reached the Akhund.
The movement of the fanatics into Buner was fatal to them ;

at a distance they might have been tolerated, and in time possibly

have regained their prestige. The Akhund now lost no time in
exerting all his influence to get rid of what he well knew would be a
fruitful source of trouble to him. By skilful management he was
enabled to conciliate and bring over all the Buner tribes of the
opposite faction Azim Khan, Zaidulla Khan, Nawab Khan, and
;

a few other chiefs alone holding aloof. On the 25th of May, at

a large meeting of all the Buner tribes convened by Mirji Khan, the
most trusted of the itinerant >S/ie7i7is of the Akhund, it was deter-
mined that the Hindustanis should be expelled from Buner, their
 YU8AFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 297

presence being displeasing to the Akhund and contrary to the terms

of the treaty made with the British Government. In consequence
of this resolve, the fanatics, to the number of about 700 fighting
men, accompanied by Feroz Shah and Azim Khan, made a
precipitate retreat towhere they commenced to rebuild
Malka,
their houses, and made arrangements with the Amazais for supplies.
In the meantime Maulvi Abdulla in person visited the Akhundy
and found means to turn away his anger, for Mirji Khan was
recalled, and permission given to the Hindustanis to resettle in
Buner ; the greater portion of them returned to Bajkatta, but had
not been there very long before the intrigues of their leaders
again brought them into trouble. Maulvi Abdulla was induced
to join a league that had been founded by Azim Khan and other
Bimer chiefs, together with the Amazais and Mukarrab Khan,
ex -chief of the Khudu Khels, to oppose the influence of the
Akhund, and obtain for Mukarrab Khan recovery of his
former possessions and reinstatement at Panjtar. Mukarrab Khan,
who, after his expulsion from the Totalai villages and the destruction
of Panjtar and Mangal Thana by our troops, had come in to the
Commissioner of Peshaw^ar, and been allowed to reside in British
territory, was the prime mover in this plot, by which he souo-ht
to regain his former position his money cemented the various
;

alliances and purchased the neutrality of some of the Buner chiefs.

On the 2nd of August Zaidulla Khan committed the first overt act
of hostility by seizing a number of Swat traders passing through
his lands. The Akhund immediately mustered his followers, and
directed the Buner tribes to break up the league by expelhno- the
Hindustanis and putting to death the refractory chiefs. In pursuance
of his orders, Zaidulla Khan was treacherously assassinated in liis own
house. On
the 12th they arrived, together with the AkhuiuVs
followers, before Bajkatta, and sent a message to the Maulvi,
giving him one day to remove all his followers, women, and
children.
The fanatics at first thought and exchanged a few
of resistance,
shots with the Salarzais, but were induced by Azim Khan to give in
and commence preparations for a retreat. The next day the whole
body evacuated Bajkatta, the women and children being sent on
ahead, and the rear brought up by a guard of fifty or sixty men
armed with rifles. For the first few miles all went weU, the Buner
Vol. L 2 Q
298 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

men being occupied in plundering and burning the deserted

settlement but as the fugitives neared the pass between Bajkatta
;

and Batora they saw that the hills on both sides were held by
the Akhund's followers. The mass of the fugitives, including
Maulvi AbduUa, Azim Khan, and the Buner chiefs, pushed on
through the pass, and made their escape with slight loss, but the
rear-guard was cut oif, and, after a gallant stand, entirely destroyed.
From Batora the fugitives fled to Gulima Bori, in Chagarzai territory ;

here they obtained a short respite, and even conceived hopes of

being able to establish themselves permanently, being promised
support, in the event of an attack, by the Amazais and one section

of the Chagarzais.
The power of the Akhund, increased by his complete triumph
over the rival faction in Buner, was, however, too great for them.
The Chagarzais, in obedience to his orders, expelled the fanatics, who
continued their flight through Tangora to Bihar, on the right bank
of the Indus, where they arrived about the 18th of September,
with some twenty or thirty wounded men. Later accounts of
them are very conflicting, but it is certain that the Maulvi, with some
hundreds of followers, came over to Judba, and that many of them
remained there till the British force arrived on the crest of the Black
Mountain in 1868. The fanatics were welcomed and given the
grant of a hamlet in Judba, and were enabled to purchase several
rafts, thus getting the command of the river, and making them-
selves independent of the extortionate Pathan ferrymen whilst at
that place. The Maulvi, it is said, received letters in 1868, from
the Tikari chief, who offered to give the whole body an
of fugitives

asylum in his fort, and land in the Tikari valley, and also from
the Allai jirga and the chief of Thakot, who promised to come to
Judba to hold a great council and discuss measures of resistance
against the British. Mubarak Shah was also summoned, and the war
party, cis-Indus, was daily increasing. It seems probable that a

month later, the force under Major- General Wilde would have found
a powerful coalition and some organised plan of defence, but our
rapid approach disconcerting them, the fanatics hastily recrossed
the river, deserting their Chagarzai hosts, thereby departing from
their profession as soldiers of the faith, and destroying the last
remnant of their former prestige, already injured by the treatment
they had met with at the hand of the Akhund and his disciples.
 YUSAFZAI AND OADUN TBJBES. 299

The main body them then went to Palosi, a village of the trans-
of
Indus Hassanzais, who refused, however, to allow them a perma-
nent settlement. From Palosi, they went to Thakot, but, finding
no resting-place there, moved up the river to Bihar and Judba
of the Chagarzais, and beinp; obliged to abandon this refuge also,
they at threw themselves on the mercy of the Hassanzais.
last
Here they received some land called Maidan, near the village of
Palosi, and remained there till 1888, paying a rent of Es. 800 per
annum for the buildings and land they occupied.
In 1880, with the permission of the Mada Khels, they estab-
lished a small outpost at Smatsai, a cave village of Gujars,
dependent on the Mada Khels, their object apparently being to
use this as a stepping-stone towards obtaining a position again in
Malka, or on the Mahaban but the Amazais, acting up to their
;

agreement with the British Government at the conclusion of the

Arabela campaign, refused to give shelter to them and the colony
was withdrawn in 1881, the garrison retiring to Palosi. During
1882, an internal dispute arose, which resulted in some of them
leaving the settlement for a time, and in the following year they
vainly negotiated with the JSTurizai Bunerwals for a settlement
within their territory. In their letter to the Nurizai leaders,
they stated that their wish was to raise a religious war, but their
real reason appears to be that they wanted to avoid the high rent
which the Hassanzais charged them.
During the Buner complications in 1885,^ the Hindustani colony
was not actually hostile, but their missionaries \\ere very active,
and it is probable that, had an expedition been sent into Buner
they would have joined the Bunerwals against the Government,
and they made the probability of such an expedition a reason
for asking for contributions from their supporters throughout
India. In May 1885, Maulvi Abdulla sent a letter to the
Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, complaining that there was
a debt due the colony of Rs. 8,000 from two men residing in British
territory, requesting that the claims
might be settled by the Gov-
ernment, and threatening that, were not done, reprisals
if this
would be undertaken. As it appeared on enquiry that there was
no ground for this claim, the Commissioner was directed, if he

1 See page 309.

2Q2
300 FBONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FBOM INDIA.

considered it necessary to reply at all to the Maulvi's 'communi-

cation, to inform liim that letters accompanied by threats could
not receive attention.
A contingent from Palosi joined Hashim Ali in a defiant de-
monstration on the Black Mountain in 1888^, and from 100 to
200 of the fanatics took part against us in the fight at Kotkai
in the autumn of the same year. After this they allowed their
fort and settlements to be demolished without offering any
resistance, and then sought refuge among the Chagarzais and
Akhund Khels, amongst whom they were still residing during
the Black Mountain Expedition of 1891. The night attack on our
'

picquet at Ghazikot on the 10th March, which has already been

described in the account of that expedition, was the work of
some sixty followers of Maulvi Abdulla, backed up by an equal
number of clansmen from the neighbourhood and the loss they ;

sustained on this occasion is said to have greatly disheartened

the community. Soon after this they sought and found asylum
among the Amazais, where they remain up to the present time,
in spite of the agreement entered into by the Amazais in 1884
to exclude the fanatics altogether from their limits.
The most recent reports place the number of men in the
colony at 900. Although residing among the Amazais, they do
not appear to take any active part in the feuds of their hosts, nor
have they been shown to be implicated in recent disturbances,
although considerable pressure was brought to bear on them by the
Amazais to induce them to do so.
Maulvi Abdulla died in 1902 and was succeeded by his son
Abdul Quddus.
The Gaduns entirely failed to act up to the engagements
_, ^ ,
into which they entered in 1864. In
The Gaduns. .
-^

1866 a meeting was held, with their

sanction and in their country, to consider whether the fanatics
should be permitted to re-occupy Sitana. In January 1867,
they permitted one of the leaders of the fanatics to occupy Siri,
and in April they made a request that he might be permitted to
remain. Being refused, they reiterated their request, but with
no better success. They then, on the 27th of April, came down and

1 See Chapter IV,

 7USAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 301

attempted to build a tower near our border, but, being attacked by

the Utmanzais, were worsted, and obliged to desist, having lost
thirteen killed and fourteen wounded.
Their conduct continued to be so unsatisfactory that, on the
15th of June 1870, a blockade was declared against them. There-
upon, they began raiding in our territory, attacldng the vil-
lages of Bara, Gazai, and Pihur. They were, however, in every
case, driven off by the men of Topi and Meni. On the 14th of
July it was reported that they had sent for aid to the Hindustanis

at Palosi.
On the
16th of July 1870 they assembled in considerable force
in a ravine called the Kondel,and erected a high and stong barri-
cade apparently for the purpose of shelter, in the event of their
being driven back in any attack on Panjman, Jhanda, and Boka.
At this barricade 300 men were stationed. In the course of two
or three days, however, it was swept away by heavy rain, and was
not rebuilt.
On the 17th of July 1870, a party of Gaduns made a feint of
anight attack on Panjman. Shots were exchanged, but with-
out loss on either side and the Gaduns retired at noon of the same
;

day. Four or five Gaduns, headed by Mirbaz, an outlawed British

subject, made an attempt to drive off by stealth a herd of cattle
belonging to the village of Jhanda. The manoeuvre was dis-
covered in time, and the plunderers got away to the hills, but
without their booty.
On the18th July a night attack was made on Meni by some
fifty Gaduns, but the villagers, being on the alert, drove off the
assailants without loss.
On the 19th July one Akhtarai, a chain-carrier employed in
the settlement, was met, as he was going in the evening from Topi
to Bara, by band of Gaduns, and murdered, his body
a roving
being afterwards blown up with powder.
On the 20th July some zamindars of Meni, out ploughinf',
were threatened by fifty Gaduns, who made a descent on them.
The armed escort of the zcmiindars accompanying them fired on
the Gaduns, who returned the shots, but fled as the villagers
came moving out to the rescue. Later in the day, the watchmen
ofDatugrah were fired at by a small band of Gaduns, who retired
before they could be attacked. The Gadun head- quarters were
302 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

now moved from Giidjai to Malka Kadi, and preparations were

made for a grand assault on Meni, Topi, and Panjman.
On tlie 22nd July an attempt was made during the night to
surprise and do some damage to Pihur, but failed, as the police
were on the look-out. The outlying picquets of Jhanda and
Boka were fired at by straggling parties, but without effect.
On the 25th July it was reported that, notwithstanding these
numerous petty attacks, no large force had entered British ter-
ritory, but they were collected in large numbers at the village of
Gudjai in a threatening attitude. Their application for assistance
to the Bunerwals, Swatis, Amazais, and Hindustanis was said to
have met with a promise of compliance in case they should be
attacked.
On the 26th the Deputy Commissioner visited the border to
see the arrangements made for the defence of the villages. Two
towers were built at Panjman, and were constantly manned with
a force of 125 men.
On the afternoon of the 28th, about 4 p.m., some 300 Gaduns
came down and established themselves in a strong position on
a mound near Meni, and thence began firing at long ranges.
The and went out to attack them, but
villagers got together,
they were largely reinforced, and it was not until near 10 p.m.
that the Meni men, reinforced by reliefs from Topi, were able
to attack. Four men of the attacking party were wounded the ;

Gaduns fleeing at once. Their loss is not known. One of the

wounded, Saidulla Khan, a ynalik of Meni, afterwards died. His
death caused a great sensation amongst the Utmanzais, to the
family of whose khans he belonged.
On the 4th September 100 Gaduns came to Bara, in British
territory, on pretence of taking part in the funeral obsequies
of Aslam Ali Khan, a man of some influence, who had died there.
After the fatiha, they made a feint of attacking Pihur, but, after
firing a number of shots without harm, retired. On the'same
date Shahdad Khan of Hund and Ibrahim Khan of Zeyda, both of
whom with their levies were guarding Panjman, at the desire of
tjieGaduns, met their jirga on the boundary, they having been
authorised by the Deputy Commissioner to open communica-
tions with them. The Gaduns expressed their desire for peace,
and readiness to come in and hear on what terms they could again
 YUSAFZAl AND GADVN TRIBES. 303

be admitted to our friendship. At the same time they expressed

their readiness to return cattle and other property taken from any
British subjects, except Utmanzais, and did, in fact, in several
cases return such As to the exceptions, it is to be
property.
remarked that, owing to the position of the Utmanzais immediately
on the Gadun frontier, the collisions that had taken place had
been, so far as British subjects were concerned, almost entirely
with Utmanzais, and the deaths that had taken place on either
side had caused a bitter feeling between the two ; to which may
be added that Khabal, with which the Gaduns had long had a feud,
was Utmanzai. It being deemed desirable to get in the jirga,.i[iQ
two khans were directed to encourage their attendance, if they
were in reality disposed to come to terms. A guarantee of safe
conduct was with the same view forwarded, and the Utmanzais were
strictly prohibited from hostile demonstrations of any kind at ;

the same time careful v/atch was enjoined, lest all this should
be a mere feint to throw us off our guard, and enable them to
make a damaging attack on some of our frontier villages a not —
uncommon The Deputy Commissioner was
trick of these people.
at once informed of the aspect of affairs, and instructions requested
as to the terms that should be offered in case the jirga came in.
It was suggested that —
1^^ — A fine of at least Rs. 1,000 should be imposed, in addit'ou to the
Ks. 1,000 forfeited on account of violated engagements, the refusal to pay
which had caused the present complications.
'Ind.—hM property destroyed should be compensated for, and all carried
away returned,
orcZ.— Fresh engagements taken from the principal men, binding them,
under a fine, to respect British territory, and not enter it at any time with
an armed force.

On the 9th August a great number (reported as 6,000 or 7,000,

but no doubt greatly exaggerated) of Gaduns came into the Meni
lands with flags, etc., and remained some hours, expecting the vil-
lagers tocome out and attack themj a body of some 500 advanced
to within a few hundred paces of the village and fixed upon it.
The villagers, interpreting too strictly the orders prohibiting
them from aggressive hostilities, remained in their village, and
after a time the assailants withdrew. No injury was inflicted.
304 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the 15th August CaptainW. G. Waterfield, Deputy Com-

missioner, reported that the Gadun council desired to make terms.

They were ordered to pay Es. 3,285, and give security for Es. 500
more, and also to bind themselves for Es. 1,000 not to violate British
territory.
On the 22nd August the Assistant Commissioner of Yusafzai
reported that Shadad Khan of Hund and Ibrahim Khan of Zeyda
had brought in the jirga, 115 in number, fully representing every
section and interest in the tribe ; and on the 10th September it

was finally reported that the above terms had been accepted.
After the settlement thus effected, the tribe continued to be-
have well. In December 18-73, however, several robberies were
committed in British territory by the Salar Gaduns of Gandap, and
a baramta was therefore ordered, the tribe being placed under block-
ade until they paid a fine of Es. 500, which they did at once. In
1881 they were again fined Es. 200 for a raid on the village of
Salim Khan, from Vv^hich they carried off some cattle, which were
subsequently returned, and the fine was paid without demur.
In September 1888 some Gaduns made an impudent attack
on Mr. Hastings, Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was
traveUing between Topi and Meni. The Gaduns jirga admitted
responsibility and paid a fine of Es. 1,000. In 1897 the Gaduns
were implicated in the attacks on the Malakand and Chakdara
garrisons.^ On the 22nd December their jirga assembled at Swabi,
and stated that they were ready to comply with any terms
which might be imposed and subsequently, at Mardan they paid
;

a fine of Es. 2,500 and surrendered 200 guns and the standards
of Gandap and Bisak.
With regard to the conduct of the Khudu Khels subsequent
to Ambela expedition. Although
the
Khudu Kliels. , . .

they do not seem to nave joined, as a

tribe, against us during that campaign, yet there no doubt that
is

many members of the tribe were opposed to us. Mukarrab Khan,

the chief of the tribe, at the commencement of the operations was
a refugee in British territory, and living at Baja
but during the ;

campaign he was present with the British troops, and remained in

attendance on the Commissioner, receiving a subsistence allowance

1 See pag3 367.

 tUSAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 305

of Rs. 3 a day. On the termination of hostilities he begged for

some provision being granted him, and requested that his daftar
in Baja should be held by him rent free. This was granted on the
understanding that if he left British territory and returned to his
own country, he^ would forfeit the asylum granted him. In 1868,
owing to his disobedience of orders, his lands in British territory
were resumed by the Government. In 1874 he returned to his own
country, and attempted, with the aid of the Amazais, to recover
his Khanship in the tribe and in August of that year he was guilty
;

of a base crime in the assassination of the Khudu Khel jirga, eighty

in number, whom he had entrapped into his power. After vary-
ing fortunes, which it is not necessary here to follow, being desert-
ed by his allies, he had at length to abandon the attempt to recover
the Khanship. In August 1879, however, he succeeded in regain-
ing his power among the Khudu Khels, and for two years his rela-
tions with the tribe seem to have been fairly amicable but ;

in March 1881 he quarrelled with some of the leading men

of the Bam Khel section, and, in the fighting which ensued,
he lost his only son, Akbar Khan. This event led to extra-
ordinary exertions on his part, and, spending money freely,
he called in the Gaduns and Amazais to his assistance, and with
them and a small contingent from Amb, invested, in June 1881, the
village of Bam
Khel Totalai, the stronghold of his opponents, but
without success. His auxiliaries then dispersed, and the Bam
Khels summoned the Nurizai Bunerwals to their aid, and burnt
Panjtar. Fruitless negotiations and desultory skirmishes follow-
ed throughout July and August, in which the Nurizai and
Daulatzai Bunerwals alternately offered to assist the contending
parties,but confined themselves to accepting subsidies without com-
mitting themselves to anything more than promises. Eventually,
with the connivance of a few of the Bam Khels, Mukarrab Khan
and the Gaduns occupied Totalai on the 30th of August, and
immediately burnt the village. The traitors among the Bam Khels
were themselves seized by Mukarrab Khan, and only escaped
with their lives owing to the intercession of a local mulla. The Bam
Khels having now fled to British territory, arrangements were made
to intern them at a safe distance
from the border. In the flush of
this success the Gaduns and Mukarrab Khan were tempted
to
commit excesses. The former carried off some cattle belonging to the
You I. ^
2B
 ;

306 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

British village of Salim Khan, which were grazing near the border,
and detained a messenger despatched to demand their release
but subsequently the messenger was released and the cattle were
returned ; and Mukarrab Khan instigated two attacks, one of which
proved fatal, within British territory, upon Bam Khel refugees
For these offences a fine of Es. 200 was imposed upon the Gaduns,
which was paid, as already stated, without demur, and a fine of Rs.
800 was imposed on Mukarrab Khan, which was also paid. In
January 1882 the Bam Khels left British territory and began to
collect in the villages of Chamla and Buner, contiguous to the Khudu
Khel country, preparatory to an attack on the Khan, with the
explicit understanding that, if would not be per-
unsuccessful, they
mitted to seek refuge again in our territory. The Khan had, how-
ever, failed to learn moderation and prudence from the reverses of
many years, and he had succeeded by his tyrannical and oppressive
behaviour in thoroughly alienating his own party, who began secret-
ly to encourage his enemies. In July the Bam Khels had succeed-
ed in gaining possession of some Khudu Khel villages with the con-
nivance of Mukarrab Khan's faction, and, by the end of the month,
he was again in flight, and seeking protection in British territory.
As he continued to intrigue against the Bam Khels, making arrange-
ments to renew hostilities, he was directed to recross the frontier,
and took up his residence in a Gadun village. Half of that
tribe were inclined to assist him but, by judicious management,
;

the Bam Khels contrived to neutralise their influence. Unable

to procure help from the Gaduns, Mukarrab Khan next turned to
the Bunerwals. By liberal gifts of money and promises he induced
a body of Ashazai, Daulatzai, and Nurizai Bunerwals to move in
March 1882 on the village of Chinglai. The Bam Khels in turn
bribed the men of Buner to retire, which they were not loath to do,
after fleecing both parties among the Khudu Khels and Mukar-
;

rab Khan, after an eventful feud with his tribe, which had extended
over a period of thirty years, found himself an exile in his old age.
Major H. R. James and Sir H. B. Edwardes placed on record their
opinion regarding the character he bore in days gone by and in his
;

—
declining years one might say on the brink of the grave —
oppress-
,

ed with caresand want, the old septuagenarian did not belie the evil
reputation which clung to him, and which his own race attributed
to him twenty-eight years before, i.e., that he was a man whom
 TUSAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 307

no would bind, and on whose word no reliance could be

ties
placed. In 1897 the Khudu Khels participated with the Gaduns,
Bunerwals, Chanilawals, and Amazais in the attacks on the Malakand
and Chakdara garrisons, see page 367, and in the fight at Landakai,
see page 383. They subsequently consented to the Government's
demand for complete submission, and on 15th December paid a fine
of Ks. 2,000 and surrendered 150 fire-arms, 200 swords, and the
standards of Dogi, lalate, and Chinglai.
It now remains to notice the conduct of the Bunerwals sub-
sequent to the Ambela campaign. In
un rwa .

March 1868 a party of the Salarzais

came down and burnt the village of Pirsai, in the Sudum
valley, in British territory, in the prosecution of a private feud.
A blockade was established, but in April 1869 they came to terms,
rebuilt the destroyed village, and paid a fine to the British Govern-
ment. During, the above complications it was proposed to try and
surprise Chor Banda and burn it, but the idea was never carried out.
The tribe continued to behave well till 1877, when a serious raid
was committed on the border villages of the Sudum valley in the
month of July. Considerable damage was done, both in burning vil-
lages and property and killing several of the peasants. The raiders,
however, were so severely punished by the villagers themselves,
supported by the British police post, that they retired, with the
loss of twenty-one killed, thirty wounded, and fourteen prisoners.

The cause was traced to Ajab Khan of Chargulai,

of the raid
the chief, who, with his brother Aziz Khan, had done us such good
service, as already shown, during the Ambela campaign. Through
this chief all matters connected with the Buncr frontier had been
managed, but, finding that his personal importance had become
much lessened in the eyes of the political authorities, in
consequence of his intriguing conduct across the border, he deter-
mined to create complications which should have the effect of
bringing himself to notice, as he fully expected that he would be
employed in restoring order, and would acquire credit for so doing.
It was with this object that he incited the Bunerwals to send a
raiding party against the Sudum villages, but in doing this it is
probable that he never intended that more than a demonstration
should take place, accompanied with the burning of a few huts and
2B2
308 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

stacks in the outlying hamlet of Baringan. The results which fol-

lowed, ending in much loss of life and property, could only be viewed
as the natural consequences of the incitement given, and Ajab Khan
was therefore tried on the criminal charge of abetm.ent of dakaiti,
accompanied with murder. He was convicted and sentenced to
death, and was publicly executed in front of the Peshawar jail on
the 27th of June 1878. With regard to the Bunerwals, they were
placed under blockade but, in consideration of the powerful
;

instigation under which they had acted, and also in consequence

of the severe punishment they had met with during the raid, the
Government was pleased to sanction that no further demand should
be made from the tribebeyond requiring the restoration of the prop-
erty carried off. Towards the end of September, the Nurizai and
Daulatzai sections made their submission ; but the third section
implicated in the outrage, the Ashazai, continued contumacious,
and a fine of Rs. 700 was accordingly imposed upon them. At
length, in consequence of the military punitive measures adopted
on other parts of the border of the Peshawar district at this time,

the Ashazais discovered that it was to their interest to submit to the

terms ordered by the Government, and accordingly they came in
to the Assistant Commissioner of Yusafzai in April 1878, and a final
settlement with The execution of
the Bunerwals was effected.
Ajab Khan is have produced
said to a very marked impression
on the tribe, who never for a moment expected that a khan of
such local importance would be hanged as a common malefactor.
During December 1878 and January 1879 the excitement was
very great in Buner, owing to the fanatical preaching of certain
mullas, who were trying to create a jehad. At one time it was fear-
ed that nothing could prevent a disturbance on our border, and the
Gadaizais and Salarzais had actually sent their quota to Tursak
for a move by the Malandri pass. The friendly attitude of certain
Buner chiefs, however, and the resolute behaviour of the Sudum
villagers, prevented a rupture.
In January 1880 reports were received that a raid on Sudum
was being organised by one faction of the Bunerwals. Their in-
tention, however, was frustrated by the opposition of their enemies
at home, and by the prompt measures taken to reinforce the border
by the movement of some native cavalry from Mardan to Rustam,
 TUSAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 300

The action taken by the Nurizai and Daulatzai clans in the Khudu
Khel troubles has been noticed above. The proceedings in connec-
tion with the decennial vesh, or redistribution by lot of holdings
among the Ashazai, Salarzai, and Gadaizai clans of the Bunerwals
absorbed the attention of the tribe about 1883.
On the 16th May 1884, a party of Salarzai Bunerwals raided
and burned the frontier village of Pirsai, carrying off twenty-six
Government rifles, thirty-five muskets and some cattle and other
property. One villager was killed and another wounded in the
affray. Reparation was demanded from the section, but to no pur-
pose. Subsequently the Ashazai and Nurizai sections also committed
acts of hostility, raiding the villages of Barock and Surkhabi. In
October a blockade of the Salarzai was ordered, which was shortly
afterwards extended to the other sections of the Bunerwals. The
duties involved by this blockade were performed by the inhabitants
who were supplied with Government arms for
of the frontier villages,
their own They
defence. were assisted by a few men of the border
mihtia, and on one or two occasions, when the Bunerwals, who
constantly attempted reprisals, became particularly aggressive, they
were supported by a detachment of regular troops at Eustam.
The blockade was maintained throughout the year 1885,
In January 1887 a small column, consisting of 10 sabres, 12th
Bengal Cavabry, and 450 rifles, Guides
Attack on Bunerwals at Sural -j- » ,

Maiandri by a column under -Lntantry, was scnt to attack Sural

Colonel Broome in January Maiandri, in order to put a stop
to the incursions of raiding parties
from the Maiandri pass. Colonel Broome, 12th Bengal Cavalry,
who was in command, marched his troops from Rustam
and Mardan on the night of the 7th- 8th January, intending to sur-
prise the village at dawn. But about 4 a.m., while the force was
halted some tliree miles beyond Baringan, a raiding party of the
enemy suddenly fired a volley from close range, and charged down
upon the head of the column. Lieut.-Colonel Hutchinson ^
Commanding the Guides Infantry, fell mortally wounded, a havildar
was killed, and three men were wounded. The Guides speedily
dispersed the tribesmen, who disappeared in the darkness. All
hopes of a surprise were now at an end, but Colonel Broome pushed
1 Lieut.-Colonel Hutchinson and one sepoy died of their wounds the next day.
310 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

on at daylight and cleared the village of Surai Malandri, driving

the enemy into the hills with considerable loss. This village was
then burned, but the hamlet of Patao Malandri, which lay some
two miles beyond, and was also held by considerable numbers of the
enemy, was not attacked. The troops now returned to Kustam,
which they reached at 2 p.m. on the 8th the Guides Infantry, who
;

had come from Mardan, having marched thirty-four miles in

twenty- one hours. The gathering of the Bunerwals present at this
affair was estimated to be between 4,000 and 5,000 strong and,
;

although the village of Patao was not dealt with, the punishment
received by the tribesmen at Surai was sufficient to make a lasting
impression on them, and they were careful in future to avoid
exposing themselves to our attacks.
The Bunerwal jirgas, however, were still recalcitrant, and
insolently refused to comply with the demands of the Punjab Gov-

ernment. In the spring the Government of India considered the

advisability of despatching an expedition to coerce the tribe but ;

at that time was not deemed convenient to undertake miUtary

it

operations in Buner, and accordingly the question was deferred.

Small raids continued, and in August three murders were
committed but the border villagers were on the alert, and with the
;

assistance of the border militia succeeded in inflicting some loss

on the enemy. Meanwhile the blockade was maintained as strictly
as possible, and finally the Bunerwals decided to submit. A
representative jirga attended at Mardan, where they surrendered all

the arms captured by the Salarzai tribesmen at Pirsai, and paid a fine

of Es. 1,500 all the property captured from the tribesmen during
;

the blockade was also confiscated. A few days later some sixty
leading men of the jirga proceeded to Peshawar and tendered formal
submission to the Commissioner, on behalf of the tribe.
During the Black Mountain Expedition of 1888 there was con-
siderable unrest in Buner, but no actual disturbance resulted. In
1891, while operations were in progress against the Hassanzai and
Akazai tribes of the Black Mountain, a number of Bunerwals and
men of the neighbouring clans collected at Baio, in the hills above
the British camp at Palosi. They dispersed, however, as soon as
they were assured that no invasion of their country was intended.
On the advance of the Chitral Eelief Force in 1895, the
Bunerwals sent a contingent to assist their neighbours in the
 YU8AFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 311

defence of the passes leading into the Swat valley. They arrived
too late, however, to take part in the fighting at the Malakand,
and on hearing of the defeat of the Swatis, they returned to their
own country. Later in the year some excitement was caused by
the Kabuli Mulla Haji Ahmad Ali, who endeavoured to persuade
the people of Buner that the British meant to annex their country.
The Bunerwals were so fac impressed by the mulla s harangues
that they sent away their women and and
children, collected to
defend the passes which give access to their territory. Major
Deane, however, forwarded a letter explaining that no interference
with their country was intended, and the gathering dispersed.
In consequence of the doubtful attitude of the Bunerwals, the
Reserve Brigade of the Chitral Relief Force had been moved from
Rawalpindi to Mardan early in April. No serious trouble, how-
ever, was given by the tribe throughout the operations of 1895.
The events which culminated two years later in a sudden out-
break Swat, and led to a general uprising of most
of fanaticism in
of the Pathan tribes on the North-West Frontier, will be found
related in Chapter IX. During that rising the following tribes
participated in the on the Malakand and Chakdara
attacks
garrisons, and in the fight at Landakai in Upper Swat viz., the ;

Bunerwals, Chamlawals, Gaduns, Khudu Khels, and Amazais. The

Government accordingly demanded the complete submission of
each of these tribes.

The Gaduns and Khudu Khels, been related,

as has already

and also the Amazais, at once testified their willingness to submit,

but the Bunerwals and Chamlawals made no move to comply with
the demands of Government- The Mian Guls, in order to prove
the sincerity of their own submission, had volunteered to induce
the former tribe to sue for peace but their efforts met with no
;

success. Accordingly an ultimatum was sent to each of these

tribes informing them of the terms imposed, and allowing seven
days for compliance. This period of grace expired in the case of
the Chamlawals on the 5th January 1898, and in the case of the
Bunerwals on the following day. The Chamlawals made no
reply but defiant answers on behalf of the Nasozai and Daulatzai
;

Bunerwals were sent by Hukmat Khan of Dagar and Mubaras

Khan of Shalbandai, and reached Mr. Bunbury, the Political
Ofiicer on the 3rd January.
312 FBONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Two days the Ashazai section came

later, a representative of

to Rustam, and stated that this people were willing to submit,

and requested an extension of the period of grace for another week
order that they might persuade the rest of the tribe to
follow
in
suit. As however there was no reason to suppose that the other
this request was refused.
sections were inclined to agree,
Meanwhile Major- General Sir Bindon Blood, Commanding
the Malakand Field Force, had
been engaged in preparations for
an advance into Buner, and an expedition into the country at once
took place.
Expedition against the Bunerwals and
Chamlawals, by a force
under Sir B. Blood, in January 1898.
Bindon Blood was placed in command of the Buner
Sir
full political charge, while Mr. Bun-
Field Force, and was given
of Peshawar, and Lieutenant
bury, I.O.S., Deputy Commissioner
Assistant Political Officers. The troops
C. P.'dowu were appointed
in the margin.
forming the expedition are shown
On the 6th January, the disposition of the force was as
Guides Infantry
follows:— At Pirsai, the 31st Punjab
Infantry,
„ , , . , and a section of No. 4 Com-
\st Brigade.
(Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn,
c.b., pany, Bengal Sappers and
^^-^'\. iw +
Kent Regimem;.
West -ir^r^f-Rpai-mPTit
Miners. At Eustam, three '
1stBn. Royal
16th Bengailnfantry.i squadrons, 10th Bengal
20th Punjab Infantry.^
Lancers, and two squadrons,
2nd Brigade. Guides Cavalry. The Head-
(Brigadier-General p. D. Jeffreys, C.B.)
In. East Kent Regiment (The
Buffs). quarters and the remainder
1st
21st Punjab Infantry. of Forcc Concentrated at
-^Jie
n
^^^yy.-^^.^^^^ Troops. Saughao. The Base Supply
lOth Field Battery, Royal Artillery Depot Was at Nowshcra and
if
No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery. a Staging godOWU, With niteen
10th Bengal Lancers (1 squadron). ^ lescrve SUpplieS, WaS
,

Guides Cavalry. •'

tit
tormed at Mardan.
i. m
I en
i
2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry.
3rd Bombay Light Infantry, 6 companies.3 aays SUppiieS
RUDDlieS lOr the wholp
for inc wnOle
Miners. 4
No. 4Company, Bengal Sappers and
No. 5 ,, Madras „ „ „ ^ force Were forwarded to an

advance depot at Sanghao. The first Brigade and the Pirsai

iNow UUC 16th

1 i\UVV the Rajputs
XV/l/11 o-voij v-^"" Lucknow
jJiAi/o (The -" • 4Now the 1st P. W. 0. Sappers and
Regiment).
jgiment). Miners.
a Now the 31st Punjabis. ^
6 Now
Nov the 2nd Queen's Own Sappers and
S Now the 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry. Miners.
 7USAFZAI AND OADUN TBIBE8. 313

column were equipped entirely with mule transport, and carried

seven and tkree days' supplies respectively. The second Brigade
had five days' supplies and was furnished with camel transport.
The plan of operations was as follows Sir Bindon Blood, :

with the troops at Sanghao, intended to force the Tanga pass,

about a mile to the northward, while the Pirsai column was to
capture the pass of that name. The cavalry from Rustam were
then to move over the Pirsai pass, and cut across the enemy's line
of retreat from the Tanga.
The various passes leading into Buner had been previously
reconnoitred, and the Tanga was selected as affording the most
suitable route for the main advance. The ground on the Buner
side of the pass was most unfavourable to troops retiring from
it before a successful attack, as there «was practically no cover
whatever in the valley below the pass, or on the spurs of the hills
on either side, for a distance from it considerably exceeding dis-
tant rifle range. On the 6th January it was ascertained that this
pass was held by about a thousand of the enemy, and twenty-
seven standards were counted on their position. The Ambela
and Malandri passes were each guarded by about the same num-
ber of tribesmen, but only some forty or fifty men had collected
to defend the Pirsai pass.
During the night a few harmless shots were fired into the
One Squadron, lOth B. L. camp at Saughao. At about 8-30 A.M.,
loth Field Battery, R. A. on the following morniug the advanced
No! s'stngrm^B.
'
'
troops and artillery, under Brigadier-
ist Bn., East Kent Regt. General Jeffreys, moved ofi in the direc-
^
3rd Boibay Light Infantry, tion of the Tanga gorge. Half an hour
(5 companies). previously, the 20th Punjab Infantry
had started to ascend a steep spur further to the east, which led
to a high peak overlooking the position. From here they were
to deliver an assault on the enemy's right flank and rear, as soon
as the frontal attack was sufficiently advanced.
At 9 A.M. the Field Battery came into action on a knoll
near the mouth of the gorge leading to the pass, and opened fiie

at 2,200 yards' range on the Icotal ridge. This position was now
seen to be defended by at least 2,000 tribesmen with eome thirty
standards. Under cover of the artillery fire the Buffs, after
Vol. I. 2S
314: FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

a difficult climb, ascended a parallel spur facing the ridge held by

the enemy, and some 250 feet below it. From this position the
Buffs fired volleys at an average range of 1,500 yards, and shortly
afterwards the two mountain batteries came into action on the
same spur. During this bombardment the Sappers and Miners
were sent forward to improve the track through the defile.
Meanwhile the remainder of the troops,
1st Bn., Ri. West Kent Rogt. ^^^ per mar in, under the command of
of
2nd Bn., Highland Light In- 5 ,. ^ 'l A1 •

fantry. Brigadier- General i

i
Meiklejohn pushed
I.
Tv/r

16th Bengal Infantry. forward through the ravine in front of

21st Punjab „ , i -n- i i t. ^^
the Field Battery.

By noon the 20th Punjab Infantry were seen to be nearing

their objective, and a few minutes later Brigadier- General
Meiklejohn was ordered to commence the frontal attack. The
Koyal West Kent Regiment and 16th Bengal Infantry, preced-
ed by a detachment of the Bengal Sappers and Miners, moved up
the pass by the track. The 21st Punjab Infantry ascended
two very difficult spurs on their left, while the Highland Light

Infantry climbed another spur still further to the left. As the

assaulting troops made their way up the steep slopes, the enemy
opened fire with matchlocks and a few rifles, and tried to check
the advance by rolling rocks down the hillsides. But they were
demoralized by the artillery fire and the long range volleys of
the supporting infantry, which forced them to keep under shelter.
About 1-30 P.M., the 20th Punjab Infantry, led by Lieut.-
Colonel Woon, captured the peak above the enemy's right flank,
driving the defenders back with a loss of two standards and some
fifteen killed.Half an hour later General Meiklejohn's battalions
crowned the Jwtal ridge within a few minutes of each other.
Before this, however, the tribesmen, finding that they could not
repel the frontal attack without exposing themselves to a
murderous fire from the artillery and infantry on the opposite
ridge, and being pressed by Lieut. -Colonel Woon's battalion on
their right, had begun to abandon their position. Without
waiting for the troops to close with them, they fled in haste
down the valley towards Kingargali and the hills beyond, suffer-
ing some loss during their flight from the rifle fire of the infantry,
who had reached the summit of the pass.
 7USAFZAI AND GADUN TRIBES. 315

Brigadier-General Meiklejolin now pushed onto Kingargali with

the three battalions of the 1st Brigade, and bivouacked there for
the night. This village was found to be deserted, the enemy-
having sought refuge in the hills to the north. The 16th Bengal
Infantry and the Sappers, who were at work on the road till dark,
spent the night on the top of the pass. The remainder of the
troops returned to Sanghao. The track over the pass proved
impracticable for animal transport, but a few mules were brought
over, and the greatcoats and blankets of the troops at Kingargali
and on the ridge were conveyed to them by 500 coolies, who had
been collected at Sanghao to meet this contingency.
The only casualty on our side during this action was one man
of the Highland Light Infantry mortally wounded.
The enemy, who numbered about 2,000, were composed of
Salarzai and Asharzai and men from the villages of Sultanwas,
Kalakhela, Bai, and Ghazi Khan. Considerable reinforcements
were on their way
to help the defenders of the Tanga pass, but
they retired without taking any part in the action. The enemy's
loss was estimated at about fifty killed.
While the operations above described were in progress, the
marginally named troops from Pirsai and
Guides Cavalry (two bquad- Tt .
-, ,-,

rons).
'
Kustam, under the command of Lieut.-
lOthB.L. (three Squadrons). Colonel Adams, had entered
31st Punjab Infantry.
Buner
i. xi t*- •
-r^ ,
Guides Infantry. by the Jr'u'sai pass. Early on the morning
No. 4 Company, Bengal Sap- ^f the 7th, the infantry
persand Miners (one section). '
J Under Lieut-
^^^^ i-/xcui/.
Colonel McRae captured the pass without
loss,meeting with but slight resistance from a party of Salarzai
tribesmen of Kuhai and Chorbanda. The enemy were completely
taken by surprise, and were unable to collect reinforcements from
the other passes in time to offer any serious opposition. At 11 a.m.
the cavalry began to cross the pass, which proved exceedingly
difficult, owing to the extreme roughness of the track, now rendered

slippery and dangerous by ice and hoarfrost. Leading their horses

in single file, the troopers eventually overcame all obstacles, and
Lieut. -Colonel Adams pushed on up the narrow valley between
the Sukara and Ali Sher spurs. Meeting with no opposition, he
reconnoitred the country as far as Kuhai, and then returned to
Chorbanda, two miles north of the Pirsai pass, where the column
bivouacked for the night. The troops were without baggage, as the
2S3
316 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

transport animals could not cross the pass indeed it was not until
;

after three days' very hard work that all of them were brought
over. the 8th the cavalry pushed on to Tursak, where a hostile
On
gathering was seen on the neighbouring hills ; and having recon-
noitred the country to the south-east proceeded to Kingargali. On
the 10th the infantry marched from Chorbanda to Bampokha, where
they joined Brigadier- General Meiklejohn's force.
Commenting on the operations of this column Sir Bindon
Blood remarked in his despatch —
The movement thus successfully carried out by Lieut. -Colonel Adams,
V C. was of very great value, as the sudden appearance of five squadrons
and two battalions in the middle of the Buner country, in addition to the
brigade which came over the Tanga pass, helped most efiectually to prevent
the enemy from being encouraged to make fresh resistance, as they might
otherwise have been, inconsequence of the delay which necessarily took place
before I could bring enough supplies over the pass to enable me to advance.

Onthe 9th the jirgas of the Salarzai and Asharzai sections

came in to Kingargali, and tendered their submission.
Although, as a general rule, it is desirable to deal -y^nth a tribe as
a whole collectively, and not with its various sections separately,
yet in the present instance it was deemed advisable to depart from
this rule, since it was of the greatest importance that, as the troops
marched eastwards through Buner, no section should be left in rear
that had not. made complete submission. It was, moreover, found
that the expression Buner was merely a geographical, and not an
ethnographical, term, and that the distinction, not merely between
the main clans of Iliaszai and Malizai,^ but also between the
various comprised in each clan, was plainly marked.
sections
Accordingly the Salarzai and Ashazai sections were informed that
payment Government demands would
of ther sectional shares of the

be accepted from them, while the force was in their limits and ;

that troops would visit the territory of each section in Buner, and
would live free while in the country, but that no damage would
be done to their villages, provided the tribesmen were not guilty of
hostile behaviour or misconduct. This same announcement was
made to the other sections as the force advanced.

1 It should be noted that the Malizai of valley, though both are divisions of the

Buner and Chamla are distinct from the Yusafzai.

Khwazazai Malizai of Dir and the Panjkora
 7USAFZAI AND GADVN TRIBES. 317

The threat to destroy their property had an excellent effect, and

not a single shot was fired into camps at night while our troops were
in Buner. The force remained at Kingargali till the 10th January,
while a mule road was being constructed over the Tanga pass by
the Sappers and Miners. As there was no prospect that this route
could be made
practicable for camel transport, Brigadier-General
Jeffreys received orders on the 9th to march with a portion of the 2nd
Brigade and the 10th Field Battery from Sanghao to Katlang,
whence he was to proceed by easy stages to the Ambela pass.
On the 10th Brigadier- General Meiklejohn marched with the
small column shown in the margin to

No°7. T^;, iT- J^™^ ™ tl^« Bazargai valley. On the

and M.
Section, Bengal s. next day Bindou Blood and the Head-
Sir

i)'fh pC'jabtfilnt;;'""-
q^^^ter^ «t^ff. ^itli No. 8 Bengal Mountain
Battery and a half company of Bengal
Sappers and Miners, arrived at Kingargali.
Owing to a report that the enemy were collectino- near Tur-
sak to oppose him, Sir Bindon Blood now ordered Brigadier-General
Jeffreys to hasten his march to the Ambela pass, and to make
a demonstration there. The Bunerwals, however, abandoned their
intention of offering further resistance, and on the 12th January
the 10th Bengal Lancers and Guides Infantry were sent to ioin
the 2nd Brigade, ^ as they were no longer required for operations
within Buner limits.
On the same date Sir Bindon Blood, leaving a wmcr of the
West Kent Eegiment to hold Kingargali, marched to Tursak
where he was joined by General Meiklejohn's colunm from Jawar.
On the 13th the marginally-named troops, under Brigadier-
Gleneral Meiklejohn, proceeded to
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Bat- Bai
^^^ ^^^^''^' ^^1^^^' ^^^^^ *W0 miles
'Talf Battalion, H. L. I.
Half Battalion, West Kent
f
iro^^ the tonib of the famous Saint,

"llTtttalion. 20th Punjab ^'''"'' ^™^ ^i^i^d by the

"^^^'^^

Infantry. •
l^
Mussulman The other half bat-
soldiers.
'''' ''"'"''
in?an"ry'"'"""'°'
t^^'"-^ «* t^e West Kent marched to
Half No. 4 Company, Bengal Tursak On this day, cscorting a supply
Sappers and Miners.
.^j^^^ ^^.^^^ Kmgargah, and the latter
post was evacuated. The 1st Brigade being now provisioned

1 Three sections of No. 5 Company, from the Tanga pass on the previous day
Madras Sappers and Miners had been sent to join this Brigade.
318 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

up to the 24 th January, the line of communications via Sanghao

and the Tanga pass was abandoned.^
On the 14th Brigadier Meiklejohn's column marched from
Bai to Hildai, and next day moved to Eega, where the troops
destroyed the house belonging to the Mad Fakir, and demolish-
ed two towers in order to punish the maliks who had given him
shelter there after his retreat from Swat. On this date Sir Bin-
visited Dagar in
the
don Blood, with the remainder of force,

Nasozai territory, where that section and the Daulatzai paid in

their fines. The Asharzai, Salarzai, and Gadaizai had made
their settlement in full on the previous day at Tursak, and Hukmat
Khan of Dagar with other leading men had also come in to
tender their submission.
On the 16th the troops under Brigadier- General Meiklejohn
marched to Barkeli, where they were joined by the Head-quarters
staff. The Nurizai section were settled with at this place, and
on the following day, this portion of the Brigade crossed the
Buner pass to Ambela village in the Chamla valley. The other
column now under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Adams,
marched to Bajkatta on the 16th. The troops halted here for
two days, in order to obtain the surrender of certain rifles
still due from the tribesmen.
Some of these had been taken by
Mubarak Khan, ex- chief of Dagar, who had fled to the Chagarzai
hills. A cash deposit of a thousand rupees and one hostage
were accordingly accepted as security for the missing rifles, and
all outstanding cases were satisfactorily settled. On the 18th
the last of the troops left Buner territory, and marched to Ambela.
To return now to the movements of the 2nd Brigade. On
the 11th January Brigadier- General
Operations
i;
of the o
^1,
2nd1 Ti.;
gade against the Chamlawals.
Bri-
i n
Jenreys reached Kustam.
t, ^ t
Leavmg the

10th Field Battery and two companies of the Buffs at this place, he
proceeded on the following day to Surkhabi, at the foot of the hills
below the Ambela pass. The construction of a road fit for camel
transport was at once begun. Some slight resistance was offer-
ed by a party of tribesmen on the pass, who were driven off with

1 The advanced depot was transferred 16th Bengal Infantry and 5 companies,
toRustam, where 5 days' supplies were Bombay Light Infantry, came on to the
forwarded,' and the staging godown at new line of communication.
Katlang was moved to Kulakhet. The
 7USAFZAI AND OADUN TRIBES. 319

a loss of five men and wounded. The road was complet-

killed
ed by the evening of the 16th, and on the following day the 2nd
Brigade crossed the pass, and occupied the villages of Koga
and Nawagai, while the cavalry reconnoitred the Chamla valley.
On the 18th the Chamla wals complied in full with the terms
imposed, paying a money fine of rupees 1 ,500, and surrendering
a number of arms and the standards of Koga and Nawagai.
The complete submission of the Bunerwals and Chamlawals
having thus been obtained, Sir Bindon Blood re-crossed the Ambela
pass with the whole of his force, and reached Mardan on the 20th
of January. Three days later he relinquished the command of the
Buner Field Force, which was then broken up.
Since the expedition described above the tribes dealt with in
this chapter have given little or no trouble to Government.
 . .

APPENDIX A.

Commands and Staff of the Buner Field Force.

Major-General Commanding Major-General Sir B. Blood, k.c.b.

Assistant Adjutant General Major H. H. Burney, Gordon High-

landers.
Lieut.- Colonel A. Masters, Central
Assistant Quarter Master General .

India Horse.

Deputy Assistant Quarter Master Captain H. E. Stanton, D.S.O., Royal

Artillery.
General (IntelKgence).
Commanding Royal Engineers Lieut.-Colonel W. Peacocke, c.m.g.,
R.E.

Superintendent of Army Signalling . Captain E. V. 0. Hewett, Royal

West Kent Regiment.
Chief Commissariat Officer Major H. Wharry, Assistant Com-
missary-General.
Captain C. G. R. Thackwell, Assistant
Divisional Transport Officer
Commissary- General

Principal Medical Officer Surgeon-Colonel S. C. G. Carmichael,

LM.S.

Senior Veterinary Officer

Veterinary Captain H. T. W. Mann.
Commanding Royal Artillery Colonel W. Aitken, c.b., R.A.

Commandant, Line of Communica- Colonel V. A. Schalch, 11th Bengal

Infantry.
tions.
Brevet-Major L. Herbert, Central India
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General,
Line of Communications. Horse.

Bass Commandant Colonel Bingham, 13th Bengal In-

fantry.
\st Brigade.

Commanding .. •- Brig.-Gen. W. H. Meiklejohn, c. b.,

C.M.G.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant General Major E. A. P. Hobday, R.A.

Deputy Assistant Quarter Master Captain C. F. H. Dillon, dOth Bengal

General. Infantry.
2nd Brigade.
Commanding • • • • Brigadier-General P. D. Jefeeys, c.b.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.. Captain A. B. Dunsterville, East

Surrey Regiment.

Deputy Assistant Quarter Master Major C. H. Powell, 21st Gurkha

I^ifles.
General.
( 320 )
 CHAPTER VIII.

SWAT TRIBES.
The district of Swat proper^ comprises the valley of tlie river
of that name, from its junction with the Panjkora river northwards
to the village of Ain. Above this village the country is known
by the general term of Swat Kohistan.
The upper portion of
the valley from Ain to the Landakai spur, five miles above Chak-
dara, is known as Bar (upper) Swat, while Kuz (lower) Swat com-
prises the country from Landakai downwards to the village of
Kalangai. The average width of the valley, a length of some
seventy miles, is about twelve miles from crest to crest of its water-
sheds, and comprises a continuous series of tracts of rich alluvial
lands of varying extent along the river banks. The river is fed
by and snow, and during the summer months svv^ells to
glaciers
considerable size. During the winter it shrinks considerably, and
in mid- winter is fordable almost anywhere.
It begins to rise about
the middle of April and soon becomes unfordable, commencincr
to fall again in the middle of September. There are no other
rivers of importance in the district, and the only canals are those
for irrigation purposes.
The climate of Swat, though
from that of the Yusafzai
differing
plain, is described as resembling that of Buner in most points.
The hot weather sets in later than in the plains, but it is more
oppressive and continuous, owing to the surrounding mountains
preventing the free circulation of the winds. The frequent storms
that burst over these do not cool the air, but, on the contrary,
hills

produce a hot, steamy atmosphere in the valleys below. The dis-

trict is unhealthy in summer, for, owing to the extensive surface

under cultivation of rice, malaria is exhaled in great abundance.

This circumstance has given the country an unenviable notoriety

iln addition to what U here called Swat border, Mhich are dependent on Swat, and
proper, there are tracts of country to the inhabited by the same tribes, and of vhich
soutli of the Malakand and Morah nioun- more will be said hereafter,
tains, and between them and the British

( 321 )
Vol. I» gT
322 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

for its peculiar and obstinate fevers, which afiect all ages alike.

The malaria, it appears, is of universal distribution throughout the

valley, and very poisonous in its effects. It has impressed its

mark on the people, who, in their general physical condition, are

more or less fever-stricken and unhealthy. In Swat, shut in as
it is by lofty snow-clad mountains, the winter is a milder season
than in the open plain ; for the air is less disturbed by winds, and
the frosts are also less severe. Snow does not always fall at the
lower levels. At intervals of three or four years the valley every-
where receives a coating of snow ; but it seldom remains longer
than a week or ten days.
There are no camels to be found in Swat ; but there are horses,
mules, asses, bullocks, oxen, cows, and buffaloes ; oxen, mules,
and asses are the beasts of burden.
The total population of the valley is estimated at about 96,000.
The bulk husbandmen, who live on the produce
of the people are
of their cattle and fields, and whose domestic wants are supplied
by a minority of merchants, petty traders, mechanics, and artisans.
The Pathan tribes generally have a great respect for the last
resting-places of their own dead, but the inhabitants of Swat seem
to feel little compunction or respect on this head. The strip of
land lying between the villages and the rise of the mountains is

set apart for the cultivation of wheat and barley, and in that land
their burying-grounds are also situated. After a few years they
allow these to lie fallow for some time, plough up all the
fields

burying grounds, and bury the dead in the fallow land. This may
be consequent on the small quantity of land available for purposes of
agriculture, but it nevertheless appears a very unwholesome custom.
In character the people appear to differ but little from other
Pathans. They possess all the vices common to that race, and
are not behind them in pride, cupidity, revengefulness, or treachery.
In the last-named vice, indeed, they may indisputably be given the
first place among Pathan tribes. They do not compare unfavour-
ably with others of their race in manliness, bravery, or hospitality.
It was the custom until recent times to disparage their martial
instincts, but the events of 1895 and 1897 have taught us that
in this respect they have been curiously misjudged. In religion
they are all Sunni Muhammadans. They are by no means individu-
ally fanatical, but owing to an innate spirit of discipline, which they
 ;;

SWAT TRIBES. 323

have in a degree, their leaders are able to rouse a spirit of

marked
in their character.
collective fanaticism which is a remarkable trait
Kohistan,
The language of the country is Pushtu, except in Swat
where Torwali and Garhwi are spoken.
The houses of Swat generally consist of walls built of
mud
on the top of these arc a few rafters with dry grass spread over
them, and over this a layer of plaster is laid, of the same materials

as the walls.
The Swat valley is highly cultivated and densely populated

throughout extent along the course of the river, whilst each

its
collections of shepherd's huts.
glen and gorge has its hamlets or
The general surface of the ground is rough and stony, and there

is a considerable slope
from the foot of the hills to the bed of the
river. Owing to this, the fields are laid out in strips or terraces, one
above the other, the boundary walls being formed of the stones
collected from the surface. By this arrangement the soil is cleared
stones, and made level to retain the
water led on to it for irriga-
of
The chief crops are rice, wheat, barley, lucerne, peas, and beans
tion.
but sugarcane, Indian corn, cotton, and
tobacco are also cultivated.

The spring crop of lliasil, affording excellent fodder for animals,

procurable from March to June, by the end of which

month
is
there is labour to cut and bring
there is abundant grass, provided
it m no grass is stored by the inhabitants. The villages of Thana
;

and Mingaora are the most important trading

centres.

There are few or no trees in the lower parts of the valley, save
right angles to it, but on the moun-
in the smaller glens running at
tains, on either side of the valley, trees are numerous. On the
are mag-
southern range are pines principally, while on the northern
nificent forests of deodar.

The exports from Swat to British territory are, rice in large

quantities, fruits, honey, glue, and timber ; and

the imports are salt,
of Swat are quite
cotton goods, indigo, spices, sugar. The people
independent of British territory for the necessaries of life, but they
trade would suffer.
dread a blockade, on account of the loss their
The best road from the south to Swat is over the Malakand
pass, which is shorter
pass and the next best is by the Shakot
;

than the Malakand route, but the ascent is steeper. There

is also

another by the Morah pass, which is still more difficult.

 — ;

324: FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

In the valley there are roads, tolerably well defined, lead-

ing from village to village on both sides of the river, which, during
the cold season, is fordable almost everywhere, and during the hot
weather is crossed by the natives on rafts of inflated skins. During
the latter season they can flood the whole valley, which is thereby
splendidly irrigated, and is a luxuriant sheet of rice culivation
but owing to the noxious exhalations caused thereby, making the'
country extremely unhealthy, the cold weather is the best season
for military operations.
The valley of Swat is divided into five districts, viz. —
1. Baizai. 3. Khadakzai.
2. Ranizai. 4. Abazai.
5. Khwazazai.

Of these, Baizai and Ranizai are situated to the south, and

Khadakzai, Abazai, and Khwazazai to the north, of the river Swat.
The inhabitants of Swat are the Akozais, a division of the
powerful tribe of Yusafzai Pathans, of which the Bunerwals, Black
Mountain tribes, etc., described in previous chapters, are also
branches (see Appendix A, Chapter V). The five districts above
mentioned receive their names from the five clans of the Akozais by
which they are held. Of these the two clans, the Khadakzais and
Abazais, are far inferior, both in power and extent of territory,
to the other clans.
The Baizais inhabit the country on the left bank of the Swat
river, from the borders of Kohistan as

far as, and including, Thana. The

different sections of the clan are as follows, beginning from the
lower end :

Population. Fighting men.

l.KhanKhel . . 11,800
Kuz Sulizai 2. Musa Khel

3. Aba Khel

4. Barat Khel
5. Aba Khel
Babuza.
6. xA.kamaruf
7. Bami Khel
 — —

SWAT TBIBE8. 325

Population. Fighting men.

S. Maturizai 4,500 1,300
Bar Sulizai 9. Azzi Khel 3,500 900
10. Jinki Khel .. 4,000 1,200

54,300 14,400

In addition to the above there are, beyond the limits of the

Swat valley, in the Ghurban, Kana, Puran, and Chakesar valleys,
the drainage of which finds its way into the Indus, the following :

Population. Fighting men.

Babuzai 2,500 750
Azzi Khel 4,000 1,200
Jinki Khel 11,500 3,000

18,000 4,950

Making the total for the tribe in rough numbers, pojmlation

72,000. Fighting men 19,400.
The principal villages in Baizai are :

Section.
Thaiia Khan Khel.
Abuwa Musa Khel.
Barikot Aba Khel.
Ghalegai Aba Khel.
Mingaora Akamaruf.
Manglaor Bami Khel.
Cliarbagh Maturizai.

Like the rest of the Swat valley the portion occupied by the
Baizai consists of a belt of irrigated ground on the river bank which
is chiefly devoted to the cultivation of rice.
' This portion is much
cut up by irrigation channels and always
difficult and at times
is

impossible for the movement Above this is the harani

of troops.
or lalmi ground, which produces wheat and barley. In the lateral
valleys are hamlets and handas occupied by tenants and servants
belonging to the villages below, while in the hills are numerous
Gujar villages with herds of cattle and buffaloes.
 —

326 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

In addition to the Baizai above described are the Sam Baizai,

who occupy the land from our border to the foot of the hills below
the Morah pass. The villages in this territory formerly belonged
to the Baizai maliks, and were occupied by their tenants and ser-
vants. These, however, have now become independent and among —
them will be found many Utman Khels, Khattaks, etc., who
assisted them to obtain their independence.
The Kanizai tribe occupy the left bank of the Swat river, from
the district of the Khan Khels
(the lowest
The Ranizais. p -t-* mi
• • \ i tt t

section 01 Baizais) at i liana, to the Ut-

man Kliel boundary, which
about three miles above the junction
is

of the Swat with the Panjkora. To the north their territory ex-
tends to the river, and includes the islands between the different
channels. The southern boundary is formed by the watershed
of the hillson that side. The importance of the tribe lies a great
deal in the fact that the Malakand and Shako t passes are in their
territory. The Digar pass, which is further to the wTst also leads
into the Ranizai country, but the pass itself is partly in the hands
of the Utman Khels.
Formerly the whole of the country from the hills to the British
border, which is nowby the Sam Ranizais, belonged to the
held
Ranizai tribe, as the people known as Sam Ranizais, though now
independent, were originally servants and tenants of the various
Ranizai sections. The sections of the Sam Ranizais still correspond
in name with those of the Ranizai tribe.
The Ranizais consist of the following sections :
 SWAT TRIBES. 327

The Kliwazazai, the last of the three powerful clans into which

The Khwazazais. ^.^^* ^^ divided, occupy the valley on the

right bank of the river from Kohistan to
Chakdara.
The following are the different sections of the clan :—
opulation.
Shamizai
Sebujni
Nikbi Khel
Shamozai
Adinzai ^
 1

328 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Panjkora, runs narrow wedge between that river and tlie

down in a
Khadakzai country to banks of the Swat. Probably owing
tlie

to the mountainous nature of tbeir district these people seem to

be more independent than their neighbours, and bear an evil
reputation as marauders and thieves. Communications in Dush
Khel are nothing but mere mountain tracks. The district has now
been made over to the Khan of Dir.

The government of Swat is, like that of all Pathan tribes,

a most complete democracy. The country is split up into almost
as many factions as there are villages. Each sub-division of each
section of each clan has its separate quarrels and supports its own
chief, who is generally at mortal feud with either his own relations

or his neighbours, and who

seldom obeyed one instant longer
is

than is convenient so that nothing short of pressing danger to

;

the whole community from without could ever bring together

all the divisions into which Swat is divided. But that which could

not be effected by ordinary means, has, in a measure, been brought

about by the influence of one individual working on the religious
feelings of a mass of grossly ignorant and proportionally bigoted
people, such as the inhabitants of Swat are ; this man was the
late Akhund of Swat.
The Akhund exerted such a powerful influence, as already
seen in the Ambela expedition, not only over the district of Swat,
but over the whole of the Yusafzai border, that an account of
him somewhat in detail will not be out of place. His original
name was Abdul Ghafur, and he was
The late Akhund of Swat. i . - n ^,^ . i -r -i
•

born about the year 1794 at Jabrai, a

small shepherds' hamlet in Bar Swat. His parents, of whom
nothing certain seems to be known, were poor and obscure
people. His boyhood was passed tending his father's cattle, but
it is related of him, even at that early age, that he was reniarkable

amongst his neighbours as a sober, thoughtful lad, with a decided

predilection for a life As a shepherd-boy,
of religious seclusion.

it is related of him that he refused to drink of the milk of any of

the cows of his herd save his own, which he led daily to pasture
by a halter to prevent its trespassing on the crops of others, and
thereby rendering its milk unlawful. In his later life it is said
that he ordered his goats to be muzzled when driven out to graze,
lest they should take a sly nibble at a neighbour's crop in passing.
 SWAT TRIBES. 329

At the age he proceeded to Barangohi, where he

of eighteen first
learnt to read and write, and became acquainted with the
first
rudiments of his religion.
Thence, after a time, he set out as a talib-ul-ilm or "enquirer
after wisdom," and arrived at Gujar Garhi, a village about three
miles from Mardan. Here he took up his abode in the mosque
of one Abdul Hakim Akhundzada, and, after a few months' stay,
again set out on his travels. At Tordhair he became the disciple
of one Sahibzada Muhammad Shwaib, who was held in high repute
for sanctity in those parts. His tutor was a faUr of the Kadiriya
order, to which most of the Sunni maidvis on the North-West
Frontier belong, and the Akhund there resolved to exchange the
mosque for tlie hermitage, and to become a recluse of the same
order as his master.
Heaccordingly, about the year 1816, retired to a lonely
spot
on the bank of the Indus, below the small village of Beka (some
four miles east of Tordhair),where he led a life of austerity,
religious seclusion, and meditation, according to the rules of
his order, for twelve years. His diet during the wliole of this time is
said to have been confined to —
shamakha a very inferior species
of millet,which grows in rice-fields, and is only eaten by the very
—
lowest classes and water. This grain is said to have been his
chief food for many years after he left Beka, but tlie water
was
replaced by buffalo's milk, and more lately by strong tea, in which
he indulged freely, with the view to keeping himself awake at night,
so that he might duly perform his religious exercises. His first
fame as a saint dates from his sojourn at Beka, for there the people
of the surrounding country first flocked to his cell to soHcit
from
him a blessing or an intercessory prayer, and therefore it is that
he is now known, even in the most distant parts of Persia, as " the
Hermit of Beka," and that some persons erroneously regard it as
the place of his birth.
Owing, however, to his unwise interference in the quarrel
between Khadi Khan of Hund and Saiyid Ahmad, which has
already been referred to,^ he was forced to abandon his
re-
treat at Beka. For some years he wandered about the
country
unknown and uncared for, but at length settled down in a ziarat

1 See page 210.

330 TRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

at Ghulaman, a where he soon recovered

village of British Yusafzai,
his fornier name for sanctity and piety, and was resorted to by
crowds of eager worshippers.
Thence, in time, he, at the invitation of the inhabitants of
Salim Khan,^ removed to their village, and, being regarded by
the people at large as a saint (wali), had the title of AJclmnd
conferred on him by the learned Moslem doctors of the day.
Meanwhile, his fame had reached the ears of Dost Muhammad
Khan, the Amir of Kabul, who, in the year 1835, invited him to
join his camp at Shekhan (near the present fort of Bara, in the
Peshawar district), and bring with him a body of fanatical religious

disciples to attack the This the AUiund promptly

Sikh camp.
did, and his small army
champions
of had one or two smart en-
counters, in conjunction with other gJiazis in the Amir's army,
with the Sikh troops. But the arrival of the Maharaja Ranjit Sing
to command the Sikh force in person soon changed the aspect of
affairs, and the Amir, finding himself surrounded, retreated pre-

cipitately on the nth May 1835, through the Khaibar, the ghazis in
his force being the foremost to plunder the bazaar of his army.
The AJcliund fled panic-stricken to Bajaur, with a few followers,
who also, in a short time, deserted him. He, therefore, once again
resumed his former ascetic and secluded life, and after a while,
settled down in the village of Kaldara, in the Utmanzai canton of
lowland Ranizai.
After a few years' residence there, he removed to the village
of Saidu Mandz, in the Babuzai canton of the Baizai district of
Swat, where he resided till his death, that is, for a period of over
thirty years.
During his residence in Saidu, the Ahhund married a woman
of the Akhund Khel the neighbouring village of Salampur, by
of
whom he had issue two —
sons Abdul Manan, alias Mian Gul, and
—
Abdul Khalik and one daughter.
The Alhund was consulted in but frequently
all difficulties,

(though in his later years such cases became more rare), after his
opinion had been given, a chance of procuring plunder proved
too pov/erful for religious reverence, and led the chiefs to follow
the bent of their inclinations, though opposed to his expressed

1 In the south-east of British Yusafzai, and on the frontier of the Khudu Khel tribe.
 SWAT TRIBES. 331

command. The following are instances of tliis sort When the :

—
inhabitants of Babuzai and Palai in 1847 drove Major Lawrence,
in charge of the Peshawar valley, to destroy those villages, the
Akhund strongly advised the people of Swat not to support the
rebels ; nevertheless, they flocked to Palai in great numbers. Again,
in 1849, the Akhund exerted his utmost influence to persuade the
headmen of and to dis-
Palai to discontinue their depredations,
charge the gangs of professional highwaymen then in their pay ;

this counsel being disregarded, they brought on themselves the

punishment inflicted by Lieut. -Colonel Pradshaw, which will
shortly be narrated.
The Akhund gained such an ascendency over the minds of
Muhammadans in general, that they believed all kinds of stories
about him ; for instance, that he was supplied by supernatural
means w^ith the necessaries of life, and that every morning, on
rising from his prayers, a sum of money sufficient for the day's
expenditure was found under the praying carpet. He was in the
habit of keeping open house for the pilgrims who thronged to con-
sult him, and had never been known to receive a present since his
arrival in Swat.
Up to the year 1895, the only Swatis with whom the British
had any direct dealings were the Baizais and Ranizais who
inhabited the country south of the Morah mountains.
The first time we came into contact with these people was
the occasion mentioned above, in 1847. In October of that year.
Operations Major Georgc St. P. Lawrence, who was
by Major Lawrence
^^ ^^^'^' then holding the Peshawar valley for
the Sikhs, was fired on from the village of Babuzai, when recon-
noitring with Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, of the Guides and ;

as the maliks would not come in to tender their allegiance. Major

LavvTence determined to attack the village. Babuzai contained
about two hundred houses, and was situated in a deep cul-de-sac,
formed by two short, steep, and rugged spurs from the lofty ridge
of hills which divides Lundkhwar from Sudum. The village was
situated at the further extremity of this cul-de-sac, which was about
500 yards long and 300 yards broad. A direct attack was there-
fore unadvisable indeed, the village had the previous year suc-
;

cessfully repulsed a superior force under Sirdar Sher Singh.

2U2
332 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA,

Major Lawrence's force consisted of a brigade, composed of

cavalry and infantry, with six guns. Horse Artillery, of the troops
of the Sikh Durbar, aided by the newly-raised Corps of Guides. A
reconnaissance, made by a duffadar of the Guides, showed that
the heights above the village could be occupied, and it was therefore
determined to turn the position from this direction. Mir Baba,^
the chief of Sudum (whom Major Lawrence had released from cap-
tivity in the fort of Attock), had tendered his services, which were
accepted on account of his expressing great anxiety for an oppor.
tunity of evincing his gratitude.
On the 10th October Major Lawrence detached a small party
(one native officer and thirty bayonets of the Guides), with orders

to join Mir Baba's men in the Sudum valley, under pretence of

collecting cattle, the property of the enemy, and from thence to
ascend the range during the night, so as to gain the heights in time
to co-operate with the main attack at daybreak. This party, as
soon as they saw the main column in position, was to descend the
spurs and clear the village of its defenders.
Major Lawrence struck his camp on the night of the 10th,
and, after placing his baggage in a convenient and defensible posi-
tion under a suitable escort, moved with the main body over an
open country along the base of the hills. At 6 a.m. the troops
advanced to the attack, covered by skirmishers from each of the
regiments under Lieutenant Lumsden, the infantry in two divisions,
—
with the cavalry in reserve the infantry under Colonels Mehtab
Singh and John Holmes, and the cavalry under Khan Singh Rosa.
A detachment was sent to the left to cut off any assistance from the
neighbouring villages.
The action commenced by the enemy opening a sharp fire
from the right on the skirmishers, when the guns opened without
much effect. The skirmishers were then ordered to occupy the spurs
on each side of the defile. In trying to effect this, the left column
was driven back but the head of the rear attack being now seen
;

descending on the village, a general assault was ordered, and the

village was soon carried, —
the Sikhs, under Lieutenant Lumsden,
ascending and clearing the heights, and the Guides pursuing the
discomfited foe.

1 ThiB chief was the father of Ajab Khan of Chargulai, v.ho&e ignominoxii? tiicl was
related in the previous chapter.
 SWAT TRIBES. 333

The village had been deserted, the enemy having previously

removed their families and property and as there was no other
;

means of punishing the villagers of Babiizai, and of deterring others,

Major Lawrence was reluctantly compelled to order it to be fired.
The Guide Corps in this, their first skirmish, did good service,
and JIajor Lawrence advocated their being armed with rifles.
The casualties on our side had been only one kiJJed and thirteen
wounded.
In this affair it appears that the village of Eabuzai was assisted
by the men of Palai, in Sam Baizai, and accordingly, on the
14th, the force under Major La\\Tence proceeded to that village.
The Guides, under Lieutenant Lumsden, crowned the heidits on
the left, while the Sikhs occupied those on the right, and a detach-
ment Guide Cavalry, making a successful charge along the
of the
valley, cut up several of the enemy with the loss to themselves
of only two horses wounded. Having destroyed the \illage, the
force then retired. A few days after this, ten villages made their
submission, several of which had never before tendered allegiance
to the Durani rulers or to the Sikhs.

Expedition against certain refractory villages in Sam Baizai by

a force under Lieut. -Colonel J. Bradshaw, C.B., in Decem-
ber 1849.

After the annexation of the Peshawar district in 1849, the

inhabitants of Swat uniformly proved them.selves bad neighbours to
the British. They seemed to regard the plains of Peshawar,
especially Hashtnagar, as a hunter does his hunting grounds. Plun-
derers and marauders, sometimes on foot, and sometimes mounted,
issued from Swat, passed through Ranizai, and proceeded to the
plains of Hashtnagar and Yusafzai. They would not usually
make regular raids, and they would refrain from m^olesting
Pathans, their fellow clansmen but they would attack persons
;

of all other classes — cultivators, petty traders, cattle-graziers,

wayfarers, and the like. They would carry off Hindus in particular,
for the purpose of putting them to ransom. Again, the inhabitants
of Swat harboured renegades, refugee criminals, internal malcon-
tents,and external enemies, the names of whom are too numerous to
mention. For years the valley was a rendezvous for any and
every person hostile to the British Government ; and among
 -

334 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

them were several persons who had been dismissed from the British
service, and one man in particular, named Mukaram Khan, who
had been dismissed from the Peshawar Police, was received with
great favom", and enjoyed a large landed grant in Swat. Not only
did Swat receive and support enemies of the British, but encouraged
them to commit depredations in British territory. Further, the
people of Swat took every opportunity of inciting British villages
to set authority at nought. They invited their fellow Pathans to
throw off the British yok^ and acknowledge a nominal allegiance to
Swat. For this purpose they would not only assemble troops in
Ranizai or Baizai, but they would even send horsemen into British
villages, partly as emissaries, and partly as representatives of
authority.
In October 1849 it was reported by Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden,
Assistant Commissioner of Yusafzai, that the whole of the Utman
Khel villages of Sam Baizai had positively refused to pay revenue ;
that they had warned the native revenue collector against sending
any Government servants into the country and that the people
;

were all busy preparing for war. In reporting this matter to

Government, and urging the despatch of a military force, Lieut.
Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar,
said the Sikhs were in the habit of sending yearly from 1,200 to
1,500 men, with some guns, to collect the revenue in Yusafzai,
which, though it harassed the country, had a salutary effect and ;

as no troops of ours had up to that time been seen beyond the can-
tonment of Peshawar, an impression had got abroad among the
ignorant hill tribes throughout the frontier that we had either no
force or were afraid to approach their fastnesses.
In sanctioning the employment of such a force, the Governor-
General recorded that in " all ordinary cases the employment of
British troops for the mere collection of revenue is a measure to
be avoided. But the refusal of the villages in Lundkhwar to pay
the little revenue demanded of them is not merely a denial of the
revenue which they owe, but is, in fact, a test and trial of the British
power, and of the authority which is to be exercised over them.
It is, therefore, quite indispensable that the demands of the Govern-
ment shall be fully enforced, and a conspicuous example made of
these men, the first in this newly-conquered province who have
dared to resist the orders of the British officers." It was further
 -

SWAT TRIBES. 335

ordered tliat if attempted, it was to be put

resistance should be
down severely, any
but unnecessary
without harshness but, ;

under any circumstances, the headmen of the villages were to be

brought prisoners to Peshawar, there to await the pleasure of the
Government. It was added, that if any foreigners should aid these
villages in force, they were of course to be dealt with like any other
enemy, and punished with a severity proportioned to the unjusti-
fiable and predatory nature of the attack they might make.
Immediately after Lieut. -Colonel Lawrence had sent in his .

report, two forays on British territory were made by horsemen

from the village of Palai.
On the 3rd December 1849, the force, as per margin, moved
2nd Troop, 2ad Brigade, f^^^^ Peshawar, under the command of
Horse Artillery. Lieut.-Colouel J. Bradshaw, C.B., 60th
200 bayonets, 60th Rifles. _,.^ n j^ •
-n^ ^' i -i , t.
300 „ 61st Foot. Kines ; Captain H. Richards, 3rd Bom-
13th Irregular Cavairy.i ^ ^g^Hye Infantry, acted as Staif Officer
One company, Bombay Sap- i c
pers and Miners. 2 to the forcc ; and Lieutenant P. A. St.
3rd Bombay Native Infantry.s
j^^^^ ^^^^ j^-g^g^ ^^ Orderly Officer tO
Lieut. -Colonel Bradshaw. The force was accompanied by Lieut.
Colonel Gr. Deputy Commissioner, as Political
St. P. Lawrence, the

Officer. Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, with 200 men of the Guides,

was sent on ahead of the troops to lay in supplies, and, on his
approach, nearly all the recusant villages waited on him, and paid
up their revenue.
On the
11th December, Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw, with the whole
of his force, which had been strengthened by the Guides and 100
men of the 1st Punjab Infantry, attacked and destroyed the
insurgent village of Sanghao which had refused to submit. This
village was situated in a very strong position, immediately beneath
an apparently precipitous rock about 2,000 feet high,from which
two spurs projected some 900 yards into the plain, forming a
cul-de-sac.
The position had been reconnoitred the previous day by Lieut.-
Colonel Bradshaw, who determined to attack it on both flanks
and in front simultaneously. The cavalry were to protect the
baggage and the left flank of the operations. The detachment

1 Became the 14th in 1847 and mutinied 3 Now the 103rd Mahratta Lieht Infan-
in 1857. try.
2. Now the 3rd Sappers and I\Iiners.
336 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA,

of the 60th Eifles, supported by four companies of the 3rd Bombay-

Native Infantry, was to crown the spur on the left of the village,
covered by two guns of the Horse Artillery ; while the Guide Corps,
supported by the detachment, 1st Punjab Infantry, were to turn
the spur on the right, with a view of cutting off the only apparent
retreat the enemy possessed.

"Vi^en these arrangements had been partially effected, the

main body, consisting of the detachment, 61st Foot, support-
ed by the remainder of the 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, and
covered by the fire of four guns, charged and took the village. The
left attack was met by a heavy fire and showers of stones, the

precipitous nature of the ground rendering the advance very diffi-

cult ;but the heights were gallantly crowned, and the enemy
driven off.

The enemy, finding on both flanks cut off, retired

his retreat

up the height in rear of the village by a path not noticed by the

reconnoitring party the day before, and whicji was inaccessible
to the troops beyond a certain height.
The strength of the enemy was estimated at 2,500 men. The
villageshad been reinforced by large bodies from tlie Buner country,
and their loss must have been very considerable. The British
casualties amounted to four killed and eighteen wounded.

On the 13th December Lieut. -Colonel Bradshaw moved his

camp to a position at the mouth of the valley of Bazdara, within
three miles of the insurgent village of Palai, and of Zormandai
and Sher Khana, in Sam Baizai.

A reconnaissancebeing made, the villages were found situated

as nearly as possible in echelon —
Palai being the most advanced.
On the right of this village rose a some 1,500 feet, which
hill of

completely commanded it, and was evidently the key of the enemy's
position this was occupied by a mass of not less than 5,000 men,
;

and the hills to the right and to the rear of the other villages were
also occupied by large bodies. The enemy also held the valley
in front of Palai in force, his right resting on the hill first mentioned,
and his left stretching across to a range of hills which bounded
the valley on the left, about a mile distant. From these, hill-spurs
projected at right angles into the valley, which were also strongly
occupied.
 SWAT TB1BE8. 337

Finding that the principal strength of the enemy lay on the

hill to the right of Palai, Lieut. -Colonel Bradshaw determined on
seizing it, and on the 14tli the operations were carried out.

The detachment, 60th Rifles, six companies of the 3rd Bombay

Native Infantry, and a troop of the 13th Irregular Cavalry, were
detached against this hill, and supported by four Horse Artillery
guns, which opened fire on it with great effect. The Guide Infantry
and detachment, 1st Punjab Infantry, supported by three com-
panies of the Bombay Native Infantry, were detached to the right,
to turn the enemy's left. Lieut.-ColonelBradshaw, seeing that the
movement aginst the hill on his left was likely to prove successful,
pushed forward the remaining two guns, supported by the detach-
ment, 61st Foot, and tlue remainder of the 13th Irregular Cavalry
against the left of the enemy's position. The light company of
the 61st moved in extended order to the right of the guns, and the
enemy's left was now completely turned.
Having thus succeeded in turning one flank, and holding the
other in complete subjection, Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw advanced
with four guns up the centre of the valley (the other two being left
in support with the troops, which had now gained, and were holding,
the hill to the right of Palai), carrying and destroying the villages
in detail, and driving off the enemy, who made for the hills in their
rear and on their left. The ground being tolerably favourable,
Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw directed the 13th Irregular Cavalry to
charge, which they did with great effect.
Deputy Commissioner desired having been carried
All that the
out, and the enemy dispersed on all sides, Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw
withdrew from the valley without a shot being fired.
The inhabitants of these villages had been assisted by people
from Swat proper to the extent of from 5,000 to 6,000 men, and
they had literally been driven like sheep across the frontier, leaving
their dead on the field— a great disgrace amongst these tribes—and
there had been nothing to prevent our troops pursuing them into
their own country, if it had been deemed necessary to do so.
Our losses amounted to three killed and twenty-two wounded.
The force, with the exception of the Guides Corps, then returned
to Peshawar, via Hashtnagar and Doaba, crossing the Kabul river
by a pontoon bridge, and reaching Peshawar on the 22nd December.
The Guides remained behind to cover the erection of a fortified
Vol. I.
2 X
338 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEt)ITIONS FROM INDIA.

post, the sanction for which had been accorded. Lieut. -Colonel
Lawrence, in his report, stated that he had been unable to carry
out that part of the Governor- General's instructions requiring
that the headmen should be brought into Peshawar, as the nature
of the country precluded the possibility of surprising them, and
there was no opportunity of seizing them either during or after the
action. He added that a most severe punishment had been in-
flicted on them, not the least of which was the capture of a quantity
of grain, roughly estimated at 3,000 maunds.

Only one prisoner had fallen into our hands a priest from —
—
Bajaur from whom it was ascertained that the combination
against us among the hill-tribes had been very great it ¥/as after- ;

wards known that reinforcements of 15,000 men were en route

to join the insurgents when intelligence was received of their total

defeat.

The Indian Medal, with a clasp for the " North- West Frontier,"
was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the
above operations under Lieut. -Colonel Bradshaw.
After the expedition above described, the villages of Sam
Baizai continued to give trouble. Crime was not to be stopped at
once, and Hindus were carried off, property stolen, and outrages
committed. Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson, then in charge of Yusaf-
zai, demanded security for the future, and one Ghulam Shah Baba,
who seems to have been held in considerable estimation, and who
owned property in our territory and in the Bazdara valley, became
responsible for them.

The arrangement seems to have been successful to a great

extent. No open aggression was offered but occasional affrays and
;

some cases of exaction occurred, when parties who had received

some real or fancied injury would endeavour to right themselves
by seizing the person or property of one of their neighbours. This
was not, however, more than might have been anticipated.
Between the Palaiwals and the people of Kharkai there continued to
be constant disputes about the right of grazing, cutting grass, wood,
etc., on the hill which formed the boundary between the two.
In 1855, the Kuai people gave an asylum to a number of refugees
from Palai, which nearly led to an attack on Kuai by the people
of Sherkhana, Zormandai, etc., assisted by a force from Buner.
 SWAT TRIBES. 339

Arrangements were, however, made by the British authorities, by

which a breach of the peace was avoided, and an amicable settle-
ment effected. The headmen bound themselves by oath to abstain
from all acts of aggression, and, should cause of complaint arise,
to refer the matter for the decision of the British civil authorities
at Mardan.

In the same year the village of Sanghao was fined Rs. 200 on
account of its robberies and molestations of traders from Buner
and, as a further punishment, the village was ordered to be removed
from its hill position. The measureremoval was carried out by
of
a good deal of pressure, and^after a considerable time
but in the ;

confusion of 1857 the villagers crept back again,. and this fact was
only discovered by Lieut. -Colonel H. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner,
in 1858, after the success against Panjtar
and Sitana, when, thinking
there was an opportunity for leniency, he imposed a small fine,
and allowed the old site to be re-occupied. During the operations
at Ambela in 1863, the Utman Khels of British Baizai flocked to
join the combatants, and gave a deal of trouble by cutting up
stragglers between the British position and the rear. Mai or H. R.
James, the Commissioner, recommended that a force, destined by-
Sir Hugh Rose, the Commander-in-Chief, for a diversion against
Swat, should be sent to punish the people but, as stated in ;

chapter VI, this was not considered advisable by the military

authorities. After the campaign, the maliks of this tract were
summxoned, and a fine of Rs. 2,500 was imposed upon them.
appears that the deputation which came in represented
It
only a portion of the tribe, many of the principal men standing
aloof, partly from a sense of their culpability, and partly from a
disagreement among themselves and the jnalih through whom
they were summoned. The fine was paid by all, but it may be
assumed that those who presented themselves were generally
of the party disposed towards our rule.

Soon after their return home, dissensions bi-oke out among them.
There were many latent causes, especially that of the fine
; the party

who stayed away reproaching the party which presented itself.

The spirit of jealousy and faction ran high, the villages being divided
into two parties, and the two villages of Kuai and Pipal, situated
in the plains, comprising the majority of those well disposed
2X2
340 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

towards tlie Government, found themselves opposed to Barmul and

Mian Khan, joined by Sanghao.
Intimation of approaching hostilities was given to the Assistant
Commissioner of Yusafzai at the beginning of July 1864, and he
sent to warn the tribesmen against committing themselves. On
21st August, however, a regular fight with matchlock and sword
occurred betv/een the villages of Kuai and Barmul, in which several
lives were lost on both and several men wounded. In this
sides,

the aid of villages beyond our border was brought in, and a regular
warfare between these villages went on for some time. At the end
of the year attempts made by the civil officers failed to bring matters
to a peaceable solution.
In February of the succeeding year, 1865, a heavy fine was
inflicted, and certain of the malilzs were retained as hostages. These
measures were not, however, successful, as in 1866 quarrels broke
out afresh, and it was evident that this state of lawlessness among
our subjects must be at once suppressed, or it would infect others,
and encourage them to revert to their original Pathan condition,
which had only disappeared under a knowledge of our power to
maintain peace and order. It was therefore determined to move
out a force to compel the attendance of all the principal men, and
to destroy and remove the villages of Barmul and Sanghao to a

more accessible position in the plains, these villages being then

situated in a difficult part of the country. As three of the villages
beyond our border had assisted and fomented all these disturbances,
it might be necessary that they also should be punished the ;

position of these villages was naturally strong, and (though this

was not anticipated by the Commissioner) aid might be furnished,
as it had been in 1849, by Swat and Buner it was necessary,
;

therefore, in determining the strengtli of the force, to be prepared

for all contingencies.

On the 7th January 1866, 100 sabres of the 13th Bengal Cavalry
and 200 bayonets of the 27th Punjab Native Infantry were detached
from Peshawar to Mardan, to enable the Corps of Guides to take the
field. The 20th Punjab Native Infantry had been moved up from
Rawal Pindi, and a mountain battery and the 2nd Punjab Infantry
from Abbottabad, and on the 15th January a force of 4,000 men
and 12 guns was assembled at Nowshera, under the command
 SWAT TBIBES. 34I

of Brigadier-General H. F. Dunsford, c.B., with ColonelJ. R. Becher,

C.B., the Commissioner of Peshawar, as Political Officer.
The native troops had brought with them five days' supplies,
which were to remain intact until their arrival at Mardan the ;

Commissariat carried twelve days' supplies for the British troops.

All were supplied with sepoys' tents, and the baggage was
cut
down as far as possible.
On the 16th the force moved to Mardan, when the Commissioner
reported that, of the four recusant villages, the headmen of Kuai
and Barmul had come in, that the village of Sanghao had been
abandoned, and that it only remained therefore to deal with Mian
Khan and the independent villages. On the 17th the force marched
to Likpani, where it had to halt the following day, owing to heavy
rain. The Khan of Palai then presented himself to the Commissioner,

and agreed to pay certain sums that had been obtained from our
subjects, at the same time binding himself not to interfere with any
British villages, to submit claims against British subjects to the
all

proper authorities, and expressing penitence for the past.

On the 19th the force marched to Mian Khan. No opposition
was met with so, leaving half the force to destroy the place, Brig-
;

adier-General Dunsford proceeded with the remainder to Sanghao,

which was also destroyed. The inhabitants of both villages had been
warned to remove their property, and it had been intended to spare
the wood, that it might be used in building the new villages but, ;

notwithstanding the efforts to prevent it, some houses were burnt.

The Khan of Palai was made to witness this destruction.
As only representatives of the chiefs of the independent villages
of Sher Khana and Zormandai had come in, the chiefs themselves
were summoned, under threat of their villages being burnt where- ;

upon they waited on the Commissioner. On the 21st the camp was
moved to Tanaki, a strong column proceeding to the villages of
Kuai and Barmul. As the former was situated in the plains,
and as the inhabitants sued for pardon, it was not destroyed, but
a fine of two years' revenue was levied instead from the Pathan
inhabitants. Barmul was then destroyed, the inhabitants unroofint'
the houses themselves, and the walls being destroyed by the sappers
and the elephants.
The force halted at Tanaki on the 22nd whilst the Commissioner
made arrangements with the Khans of Palai, Sher Khana, and
 —

342 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Zormandai ; the principal malihs, and those concerned in the late

disti;rbances of our own villages, were placed in confinement for
judicial investigation. On the following day the force was broken
up.
Colonel Becher said, the most favourable feature in the matter
had been the absence of all interference with our right to punish
our subiects, although the tract lay close to the Swat and Buner
borders. The Akhund of Swat, recognizing the justice of the measures
taken from first to last, proclaimed that the duty of subjects was
" to obey their rulers and abstain from internecine strife "
a commendable sentiment, but doubtless prompted to some extent
by a reminiscence of the Ambela campaign.
After the destruction of the three villages of Sanghao, Mian
Khan, and Barmul, the villagers were directed to re-establish them-
selves on certain sites that were fixed at reasonable distances from
the hills, and arrangements were made to expedite the building of
the new villages by making all the inhabitants of British Baizai
assist in the work.
On the 13th of February following, the Assistant Commissioner
visited the new villages which had been erected, the old sites having
been completely levelled by the villagers.
The leniency shown towards these villages had not however
been fully appreciated by them, for, in 1872, disturbances arose
consequent on the settlement operations, when troops were moved
out from Mardan, and the village of Kuai was made over to Afzal
Khan, a Khattak chief, who promused to hold it with levies of his
own tribe. but the position was not
This he did for a short time ;

altogether a pleasant one, and he soon asked to be relieved. The

houses of the ringleaders of the outbreak at Kuai were pulled down,
and the people of the three villages of Kuai, Barmul, and Mian Khan,
who had abandoned their villages, being given to understand tliat

their refusal to return would lead to the confiscation of their lands

and houses, gave in, and afterwards gave little cause for complaint.
After 1866, the villages of independent Baizai also continued
to behave fairly well. In 1871, the Khan of Paiai was fined Es.
.500 for the murder of a British subject, and the following year

had to pay another fine for interfering with men of British territory.
At the end of 1873 reprisals were made on the men of Palai for
 SWAT TRIBES. 343

robbing and wounding our subjects when returning from visiting the
Akhund. After the expedition against the Ranizai village of Shakot
in 1878 (see page 359), the villages of Palai, Sher Khana, etc., in
Baizai became much
alarmed, and feared similar punishment, in
consequence of the outlaws they were harbouring. They accordingly
made overtures to the Assistant Commissioner of Yusafzai, and
entered into satisfactory arrangements for settling all claims that
might be proved against them. Between that date and 1884,
they gave little cause of complaint to the British Government.
We will now turn to an account of our early dealings with
the Ranizais.

Expedition against the Ranizais by a force under Brigadier Sir

Colin Campbell, K.C.B., in March and May 1852.

The rapidity and success of Lieut. -Colonel J. Bradshaw's opera-

tions in 1849 against the Sam
Baizai s opened the eyes of the Swat
chiefs to the possibility of a British force one day visiting their own
valley, and filled all classes with alarm. In this exigency the
oracle was again consulted, and advised that the only chance of
making a stand would be by appointing one chief to command
the whole disposable forces, all other chiefs being sworn on the
Koran to obey him implicitly and that the land tax of one -tenth
;

of the produce, authorised by the Muhammadan

law, should be at
once collected to provide the sinews of war.
This proposal being agreed to, the chiefs commenced a scramble
for the command, which threatened to end in a general melee.
Ghazan Khan of Dir left the council, declaring that he could never
obey any man save the Akhund. To end this broil, the Alhund
proposed that a chief hitherto unconnected with Swat should be
chosen, and, among other nominations, pointed out Saiyid Akbar
of Sitana, as a man of energy and true Muhammadan principles,
qualified for the position, with the advantage of being a saiyid.
Saiyid Akbar was accordingly invited to become King of Swat,
under the patronage of the AHund, and shortly afterwards was
duly installed, with the usual accompaniments of prayers from the
priesthood and nazrana from the chiefs.
This chief was, as already related, a foUow^er of the famous
Hindustani fanatic, Saiyid Ahmad and when the latter held
;
344 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

temporary possession Peshawar, Saiyid Akbar joined him in the

of

double capacity of treasurer and prime minister. He was thus

thrown in constant contact with the Hindustani soldiers in that
chief's camp, and formed a friendship for them which lasted ever
afterwards.
The m.oment was a little established by the
his authority

Al'hund^s good offices over the Swat chiefs, and the first year's
revenue collected, Saiyid Akbar sent for his Hindustani levies ;

but they refused, under some pretext, to join him, when he set
about collecting a standing army and guns, by the aid of which
he hoped to put down any chief who should afterwards dispute
his authority. He so far succeeded as to collect five or six guns of
sizes, 800 sowars, and 3,000 footmen, all receiving pay in grain
direct from himself.
Towards the end of 1851 the Swatis moved bodies of troops,
several thousand strong, to the foot of the Morah mountain, and
into Sam Ranizai, for the purpose of creating disaffection on our
border. On the night of the 6th March 1852, a party of 180 horse-
men, under the leadership of Mukaram Khan, assailed a detach-
ment consisting of thirty sabres of the Guide Corps stationed at the
British village of Gujar Garhi, under Ressaldar Fateh Khan, as
an escort to a party of the Great Trigonometrical Survey. The
attack was very sudden, it being believed that the approach-
ing party were the survey coming into camp, and the
officers

enemy were into camp before the men had time to form. But the
assailants were gallantly repelled, leaving one dead body and six
disabled horses in the camp the Guides losing one sowar killed,
;

and two wounded. The gallant conduct of this detachment

afterwards received the approbation of the Governor- General in
Council.
Mukaram Khan, the leader of the attacking party, as already
mentioned, had been dismissed from the Peshawar Police, and had
been given a jagir in Swat. Half of this grant was on this side of
the Malakand pass, half on the other and, when wishing to plunder,
;

he used to come into British territory, retiring to Swat when danger

threatened. It was therefore determined to treat the Sam Ranizais
as a tribe, and to punisli them m such a way as to make them feel

they could not afford to allow refugees from our territory, or bad
 SWAT TBIBES. 345

characters from their own, to embroil them with the British Govern-

ment.
A force under the command of Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell,

, „ . , „
Horse
was accordingly despatched into
K.C.B.,'
1st Troop, Lst Brigade, ^•^
,t,i • <•
^ t •

Artillery. the vallcy. This lorce, which consisted

bayonets, 32nd Foot.
60.)
loth Irregular Lavalry.i
^ ^^ ^^ -t
^^^^^ -^^
^|^^ margin,
o ^
Wing, 29th Native lnfantry.2 marched from
Peshawar on the 11th
66th Gurkha Regiment.3
^^^^^^ ^^^^ towards Tangi, accompanied
by Lieut. -Colonel F. Mackeson, c.b., the Commissioner of Peshawar.
On the 14th March, the people of Sam Ranizai sent in to Lieu-
tenant H. B. Lumsden, the Deputy Commissioner, offering to submit
to any terms imposed, and to pay revenue the force under Sir ;

Colin Campbell was accordingly halted at Turangzai, and the

malihs of Ranizai summoned. This delay had the advantage of
enabling two heavy howitzers with elephant draught to join Sir
Colin Campbell from Peshawar. But the malihs afterwards refused
to come in, declaring their intention of opposing us, and that they
expected assistance from Swat. It had been now clearly ascertained
that Saiyid Akbar's nephew, accompanied by a following, had been
with the party that had attacked the detachment of the Guides,
and the force therefore moved on towards Ranizai, arriving at our
frontier village of Sherghar, about eight miles from Shakot, on the
21st of March.
On the march to Shergarh horn. Gujar Garhi much rain fell on
the hills around, and, just after the troops and guns had crossed
a very deep nala a body of water like a wall came down it sud-
denly, and for a short time a portion of the baggage and its escort
and the rear-guard were separated from the main body of the

troops.
On Lundkhwar
the evening of the 21st, the malihs of the
valley had brought the intelligence to Lieutenant Lumsden that the
Sam Ranizai malihs wished to tender their submission, when they
were told that the troops would not be halted, but would march
at daybreak to Shakot. It was further intimated to them that if
they came in on the road, and paid the fine originally demanded
of them, and gave satisfactory security for the safety of our frontier

1 Became the 16th in 1847. Disbanded 2 Mutinied in 1857 at Moradabad.

in 1861. 3 Now the 1st (P. W. 0.) Gurkha Rifles.

Vol.!. 2Y
346 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

from the depredations of marauders from Swat, and our own bad
characters who had taken refuge in Swat, their villages would not
be destroyed, nor their crops injured on this occasion by encamping
the force in their valley, but that the troops would, in any
event,
Brigadier
be marched into the valley of Eanizai, to enable the
to see as much of it as was desired.

the morning of the 22nd, Sir Colin Campbell's force marched

On
towards Shakot, of which a reconnaissance had been made the
previous evening. On the road the Eanizai maliks came in, intro-
duced by their neighbours, British subjects of the Lundkhwar valley.
They an abatement of the fine imposed, and on two
tried to obtain
occasions, when it was refused, broke up their council and walked
towards their villages. The force then advanced again, when some
of the party would return to offer to pay their own share if their
particular crops were spared. This farce continued till the force
was drawn up within range of their village, all when they were
sent away, and given half an hour to bring an unanimous submission
to the terms offered, or abide the consequences. In the meantime,
the road across the deep chasm in front of the village was made
practicable for guns.
After a while, the Eanizai maliks returned with a full submission
to the terms, and with ten maliks as hostages for their fulfilment.
They then pointed out a practicable road into the heart of the
—
Eanizai valley indeed, the high road to Swat, which passed to
the right of the drainage chasm, and only crossed a small branch
of it higher up the valley, where it was no obstacle.
It was now about 1 p.m., and Sir Colin Campbell gave orders
for the had remained ready
camp to be pitched at Shergarh, where it

laden, awaiting orders. The ten prisoners, as security for payment

of the fine, were made over to the civil authorities, and the force
moved on, conducted by one of the inaliks of Eanizai. The road
was found to be excellent, although a little narrow, nearly all
the way to Dargai and to reach Dargai, nearly the whole breadth
;

of the valley had to be traveised. This village was situated

at the extreme western end of a spur, which from this point ran
up for a distance of three miles to the foot of the Malakand pass,
forming, with the Malakand range, a narrowing valley. The
ground was covered with cultivation, the whole valley being closely
tilled.
 ;

aWAT TRIBES. 347

On reacHng Dargai,was reported that Mukaram Khan had

it

on turning the spur of the hill, some of

just left that village, and,
our cavalry, seeing two or three horsemen in the distance, galloped
on towards the Malakand pass. Sir Colin Campbell also ordered a
party of the 15th Irregular Cavalry up from the rear and two guns
from the troop of Horse Artillery. Subsequently, five men with
standards were seen skulking away up ravines towards the pass
with about one himdred footmen. From the direction in which
the men were first seen, there is no doubt that they had been at
Dargai all the morning, and had only left when they saw the force
approaching.
The troops might, had they advanced towards the foot of the
Malakand pass, have driven those people off and over the hill,
and looked down into Swat but it was late in the day, and they
;

would have had to encamp in Ranizai, and thereby broken the

eno^agement with the maliks, whose hostages were in our camp.
Sir Colin Campbell would thus also have engaged in hostilities
against the people of- Swat proper without having orders from
Government to prosecute them to an issue. He therefore waited
tillhe saw, with the aid of a telescope, these standards borne on
their way steadily up the pass in open flight, and then returned to
camp, without a shot having been fired during the day.
Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson had fixed, with the sanction of Govern-
ment, the fine to be paid by the Eanizais at Es. 5,000 he might
;

have increased his demar.d, in consequence of the message of

defiance sent by the Bar. izai maWis iA\Q£ they had actually given
LiiHiTtjuaLt Lumsden to understand they would come in, but he
considered their position a difficult one. Tlie Eanizais on the
south of the Malakand range, as has been seen, are only a portion
of the tribe, and the majority live in Bar Eanizai, above the passes.

They wtie, therefore, too weak to control the whole of Swat, when
bent on hostility, although they were strong enough to check parties
of marauders, not exceeding 300 or 400 men, from going through
their country (which is the principal road from Swat) to commit
raids in our territory. Lieut.-Colonel Mackeson might, too, have
kept a larger number of the principal men as hostages, and have
concluded no terms until he heard from the Board at Lahore as
to whether it was desirable to prosecute hostilities into Swat proper
2Y2
348 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

but must have remained out well into April, with an

tlien the force
attendant expense. Great injury would have occurred to the
crops of our own subjects near our encampment the Swat river ;

and the Kabul river were on the rise the one might become un-
;

and the other might carry away our bridge, when the
fordable,
Mohmand tribes would not have neglected to make raids on the
Doaba, seeing the communications of the force with Peshawar
cut off. Under these circumstances the Commissioner thought
it wiser to make a settlement of the question at once.

On the morning of the 23rd, Sir Colin Campbell's force marched

to Jalala, where it remained on the 24th, in consequence of heavy
rain, and resumed its march to Turangzai on the 25th, en route
to Peshawar. The ten prisoners were sent, under a guard of the
15th Irregular Cavalry, towards Peshawar, where they arrived
safely on the 27th of March.
Immediate payment of the fine could not be exacted from the
Kanizais, as the first intimation they had of the demand was on the
morning of the 22nd, and they asked some little time to collect it,
which was accordingly granted them.
In the following month some men of the Ranizai tribe were
implicated in the attack on the village of Charsada,^ and letters,
believed to be genuine, were subsequently taken, which proved
the complicity of Swat. One letter from the AJchund authorised
the leader of the raid, one Ajun Khan, to destroy all Europeans
and Hindus in the Peshawar valley, and all Muhammadans in
the British service but enjoined him to spare all other Muham-
;

madans.
Onthe conclusion of the terms with the Eanizai people, a con-
ciliatory letter had been sent to the King of Swat, to which not
only was no reply received, but it was reported that the killing
of the messenger had been debated, to mark the King's determina-
tion not to hold any intercourse with the infidels.

The Eanizais, moreover, withheld the payment of the fine

which had been imposed upon them, repudiated the hostages, and
expelled their families from their territory, declaring their reliance
on Swat. Further coercion, therefore, became necessary.

iSee Chapter X,
 .

SWAT TRIBES. 349

On the 15th of May, the force, as per margin, consisting of

ist Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse 3,270 of all arms, was assembled at Sher-
ArtiUery, (6 guns). „^^^ under the command of Brigadier
Detachment 3rcl Companv, r^- r^ ^^ i-i ^ ^^
4th Battalion, Artillery, and Sir Colm Campbell, K.C.E.
No. 10 Ligl^t Field Battery
attached, (2 gvin-).
Q^ ^^^ jg^j^ ^^^^ ^.^j^ ^j^^ ^^^^^
H. M.'s 32nd Regiment. halted at Shergarli, and it was reported
*^a^ considerable numbers were flocking
'GuldJ'cfvilrv.^''''''^'^''
1st Punjab Cavalry.2 from Swat and clsewliere to the village
ompany appers anc
Min'er.^
^^ Shakot to defend the Eanizai valley,
28th Native infantry.s and that many gliazis had come over the
G6th Gurkha Regiment. ^ j? i / • . i
•
t •

Guide Infantry. and it was

passes to light in this cause ;

1st Punjab Infantry. evident that the people of Swat proper

regarded an attack on Eanizai as one made on themselves. The
Alxliund and the King were at variance on the subject of the non-
payment of the fine by tlie people of Eanizai, —the one being in
favour of the payment, the other opposing — as
it, his influence
would be diminished by sucli a course.
On the 18th the camp was
and the baggage movedstruck,
two or three miles to the rear, under a strong escort. The force
then marched to dislodge the enemy, who had taken up a position
in the neighbourhood of Shakot, and afterwards to proceed with
the punishment of the Eanizais.
Shakot was situated between a very deep and broad nala on
the east, and some hills on the west. About an hour after day-
break, when two miles had been accomplished, Shakot being then
distant two more, the enemy were discovered on one side of the
nala, stretching away in one continuous line to the \^llage,
which
was the left of their position, the ground they held on the margin
of the nala being about a mile and a half in length.
The troops were now formed in line of quarter columns, the
cavalry being sent to the left to watch the extreme right of the
enemy. The advance then took place in echelon of regiments
from the right, in column. Sir Colin Campbell's design being to
break the enemy's centre with the Horse Artillery, and attack
their left, which was on their line of retreat.
A sharp cannonade was opened by Captain E. H. Baldwin's
troop of Horse Artillery on the centre of the enemy's position, which,
1 Now the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse). Cavalry (Frontier Force).
2 Now 21st Prince Albert Victor's Own 3 Mutinied at Shahjahanpur in 1S57.
350 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

themselves of
however, they stood witli great firmness, availing
leading regiments
the broken ground for protection. The two
on the right, the Guide Corps and 66th Gurkhas, now "left-wheeled
into line " and stormed the nala, covered
by the fire of the
two 9-pounders, and supported by the light company of
Her
under
Majesty's 32nd Eegiment and the 1st Punjab Infantry,
Captain J. Coke. The attack was well executed by the troops, the

first assailants having to encounter

a heavy fire and much resistance.

A company of the 66th Gurkhas were engaged in a hand-to-

hand fight, a party of the enemy having charged into the centre
of them.
The Horse Artillery now rapidly changed position, and
galloped to the edge of the nala, which they enfiladed with great
efiect whenever they could fire without
injuring our own men.

As soon two 9-pounders could be spared, they were moved

as the
rapidly to the right, and brought into action opposite the village,
and a large burial-ground at right angles to it, which M-ere both full
of the enemy. The 32nd Foot covered the guns, and the 28th
Native Infantry were kept in reserve, ready to move on any
required point.
The fire of the guns was sharp and telling, and they were ad-
vanced closer and closer to the enemy as the attack on the nala
showed itself to be successful. The enemy at length broke, a large
body swarming up the hills to the rear of the village, and another
making for the Malakand pass,—the 9-pounders playing on these
retreating up the hills, the Horse Artillery gcing in pursuit rp iLe
valley. Three miles from the scene cf resistance, the Guide Ca\alry,
directed, at Sir Colin Campbell's request, by Lieut. -Colonel

F. Makeson, c.b., the Commissioner (who had accompanied the

force as Political Officer), sabred a considerable crc^d trying to
make their escape. The pursuit had been so rapid that this had
happened before the 9-pounders had succeeded in clearing the face
of the opposite hills, although no time was lost by the fugitives in
that direction.
In addition to the armed villagers, about 4,000 infantry and
500 cavalry, from Swat, had been opposed to the force, and the
all

Kin^y and Alhund had stationed themselves on the crest of the

Malakand pass, overlooking the valley, to view the fight.
 SWAT TBIBES. 351

Great slaughter had been committed on the enemy, with com-

paratively trifling less to our troops,^ and large numbers of dead
bodies were found all over the ground -uiiere the enemy had fought,
and on their line of retreat.
The amount of ammunition expended by tjie troops was 20,613
rounds.
Arrangements were now made for the destruction of Shakot,
a large village numbering some 600 houses, many of which appeared
to be of much pretension. It was thoroughly burnt, as well as the

crops around.
Having echeloned various parties to prevent the possibility of
further annoyance, Sir Colin Campbell proceeded to destroy Dargai,
about three miles higher up the valley. This was also a very con-
siderable place, being full of houses of the better sort, and, according
to rough calculation, having some 400 altogether. No opposi-
tion was offered by the enemy, and the troops returned to Shergarh
about 3 P.M.
A day's rest having been given to the troops on the 19th, the
^y.^^,^^^.
force marched round the Ranizai valley
Dobandi. on the 20th destroying the villages

Kadam Khel. named m the margin, together with much

Harkai. grain.
Usman Khel Garlii. „ ^-i
. ,

Musamena. day 110 Opposition was

^"^ "this
^^^^'^'^^-
encountered, and but few of the inhabit-
ants of the valley were to be seen. The troops were under arms
and in movement from 4 a.m. till 6-30 p.m.
On the 22nd, a detachment, as per margin, marched about
1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse ^^^^ ^^^^ tO destroy the village of Hiro
Artillery, (3 guns). Shall. Tliis place had been represented
200 sabres, 1st Punjab Cav. ,
n itj •
r i
2nd Company, s. & M. ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ opcii valley, it was lound,
-

200 bayonets, 28th N. I. however, to be situated in close ground,

200 ,','
Guide Infantry, witliin niatclilock range of the hills, at
300 1st p.
„ Wyq head of a ravine, some two miles in
1.

extent, up which the troops moved. Besides being so strong by

nature, it was surrounded by a loopholed wall. The inhabitants
had retreated to a distant range of hills, and the troops were not
molested till after the destruction of the village had been effected,

1 Our casualties only amounted to eleven killed and twenly-ninc wounded.

 :

352 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

and they had begun to retire towards camp. They were then
followed by a matchlock fire till quite clear of the hills and ravines.
The retrograde movement having been conducted very slowly and
in perfect order, no loss was sur^tained.

The force then marched back through Lundkhwar to Gujar

Gar hi, where it was broken up.
The Indian Medal, with a clasp for the " North- West Frontier,"
was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the
above operations against the Eanizai villages.
In June, the month following Sir Colin Campbell's operations,
the Ranizai people, finding themselves houseless and unable to re-
build their dismantled villages, made overtures for peace. Shortly
afterwards, they tendered unconditional submission, offered to pay
revenue, to the British, and to allow a fortified post to be erected in
their valley.The supreme Government declined to accept any
tribute or revenue from them, only requiring them to behave as
friendly and peaceable neighbours. They were accordingly excused
from payment of the original fine, and they bound themselves to
permit no marauders from Swat or elsewhere to pass through their
lands to cross the British frontier, and also to live at amity with the
neighbouring British villages, Lundkhwar, and others. These
arrangements were completed in September 1852.
The following is the agreement entered into on this occasion
with the British Government

\st. — If the Government require us to pay revenue, we will do so,

2nd. — If the Government desire to build a fort in Ranizai, they are at

liberty to do so.

'6rd. — If we are left by the Government to re-settle by ourselves, we

will do so.

Uh. —The khans agree that they will always be ready to do service
for the Government, and will not receive in to their country any
person evilly disposed to the Government, nor give such person
a road tlixough their country.
bih. — If any army comes against us too strong for us to cope with, we
will come with our families into British territory.

That Swat had been the fountain head of all this offending
was evident we had never interfered with them, but they had
;
 » ;

SWAT TRIBES. 353

chosen to make war upon Our chief fault in their eyes was
us.

that we were infidels by religion, and that we were the lords of a

fair and fertile valley within reach of plunder. It was at one time
thought that a good opportunity presented itself of dashing up the
Malakand pass and down into the Swat valley. A separate expedi-
tion, on a considerable scale, was also being organized during the

summer of 1852. The military authorities at that time, however,

considered that various difficulties existed in the execution of the
plan, and the Government consented to postpone the expedition
until the cold season of 1852-53, when it was eventually abandon-
ed altogether. Tlie Swat Government seem to have taken to
heart the punishment inliieted on the Ranizais, and to have dread-
ed similar operations in their valley for they subsequently abstain-
;

ed from annoyance or hostility against the British, and the Pesha-

war valley enjoyed immunity from marauders from Swat.
It might naturally have been expected that the King of Swat
would have been at the head of all mischief when the troubles of 1857
overtook us. It is a remarkable fact, however, that he died on
the 11th of May, the very day that the first news of the Mutiny
reached Peshawar, so that Swat itself was simultaneously plunged
into civil war, and entirely j)re- occupied with its own affairs. The
—
question was as to the succession king or no king. Saiyid Mubarak
Shah, son of the deceased Saiyid Akbar, wished to succeed his father
but the people of Swat had grown tired of tithes, and called on
the Akhund to excommimicate the heir- apparent both sides called ;

in their friends and allies, and prepared to settle it with arms.

It was at this jmicture that 500 of the fugitive sepoys of the 55th
Native Infantry, who had escaped from Lieut. -Colonel John Nichol-
son's pursuit, bm"st upon the scene, and were at once taken into the
young king's service
Had the Akhund of Swat at this time, standing forward as the
champion of the faith, preached a holy Avar against us, and, hush-
ing intestine strife, moved across the passes and descended into
the Peshawar valley with all the prestige of the 55th sepoys in his
favour, Lieut. -ColonelH. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner, said he
did not doubt that he would have excited among our subjects
that spirit of religious zeal which may be overlaid for a while,
but which is never extinguished by material prosperity. Instead
of this, he suddenly sided with the popular party, dismissed the
Vol. L 2 25
 ^

354 t'BONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

55tli sepoys, with guides to conduct tliem across

the Indus, and
expelled the young king from Swat.
After this we do not appear to have again come into collision
with the inhabitants of Swat until the Ambela campaign.
The important part played by the Akliund and his followers
in that memorable campaign has been shown in a previous chapter.
On the 27th of October 1863 he joined the ranks of the enemy,
with 100 standards (between 3,000 and 4,000 footmen) and 120
horsemen, under the leadership of Sherdil Khan, the chief of the
Ranizais, and his nephew, Sobat Khan. Later on, the priestly in-
fluence of the Akliund had brought to his standard large bodies of
men from Kunar and Bajaur, the latter under their chief, Faiztalab
Khan and in the beginning of December, 6,000 more men, under
;

Ghazan Khan, the Khan of Dir, had joined the enemy.

The reasons which, in the opinion of Colonel E.G. Taylor, the
Commissioner, may have influenced the Akliund in throwing in his
lot against the British Government have already been given.
It is now well known that, ever since the English
obtained
possession of the Peshawar valley, the Akliund was suspicious and
apprehensive lest the valley of Swat, his adopted home, should
fall into our power.
" It was his policy,'' writes Major James,

"during the whole of the reign of Saiyid Akbar, to keep up, in con-
cert with him, a system of marauding on our frontier, for which pur-
pose they offered maintenance to men of lawless habits and to
influential refugees from our districts, whom they settled in villages
about Ranizai, and incited to constant deeds of depredation and
violence, thus keeping up the fear of our invasion by encouraging
acts which might be expected to lead to it a fear upon which they —
originally founded their authority, and which is their best security
for its preservation."
This policy was, however, much modified, if not entirely revers-
ed, after the Ambela campaign. The Akhund no longer incited the
people of Swat or Buner, or other independent tracts, to raid on
British territory ; but, on the contrary, as far as it is possible to
judge, advised them to behave as good neighbours, and, if they
offended and were called to account by us, to meet such demands
as might be made, and comply with such terms as might be im*
posed.
1 See page 251.
 SWAT TRIBES. 355

This policy was, doubtless, the result of his experience of our

power and of the faintheartedness and want of persistent energy
of his own disciples, as witnessed by himself at Ambela. Feeling
he could not trust to the tribes of Swat or Buner to resist the force
of the British arms, he was not anxious to provoke a second attack
on either country. Not that he openly avowed this. On the con-
trary, he gave out that it was the result of his miraculous power as
a saint, and steadfast maintenance of his position on the crest of the
Buner pass, which prevented the British troops, in the high tide
of success, from advancing on both Buner and Swat, and bringing ,

them under their sway. And these assertions were believed by the
majority of his credulous disciples, who saw in this continuous for-
bearance of ours further and most convincing proof of the buzurgi,
or saintly reputation, of the Akhund.
A very noticeable feature in the Ambela expedition was the
alliance of the Akhund with the Hindustani fanatics of Sitana,
whose tenets he abhorred, and whom he stigmatised as Wahahis.
It is simply to be accounted for by the fact that the Akhund was
really alarmed for the independence of his disciples in Buner and
Swat, and considered it the wiser poHcy to sink, for a time, all
sectarian differences. Hardly, however, had our troops withdrawn
from the Chamla valley, before the religious disputations between
them broke out afresh, and in August 1868 we find the Akhund stir-
ring up the whole of Buner, as already described, against a small
party who had given some of these fanatics an asylum in the villaf^e
of Bajkatta, in the Daulatzai canton, and not only expelling them,
but encompassing the death of the fine old chief, Zaidulla Khan,
who had befriended them, and raising up the Bunerwals to harass
them in their retreat, and prevent their finding a resting-place until
they had reached the banks of the Indus.
There can be little doubt that this expulsion was the result of
the Akhund' s suspecting that our preparations, then being made for
the expedition against the tribes of the Black Mountain, were
intended to be made use of also against the Hindustanis, and he
was most unwilling to be again himself, or have the people of Buner,
embroiled with us on their account.
During the later years of his life the Akhund desired very much
to see his elder son, Mian Gul, elected King of Swat ; for he saw that
2Z2
 '

356 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

after Ms death lie was not likely, owing to his want of force of
character, and the number any
of his enemies, to acquire for himself

position of influence in the country. At the same time he never

directly proposed him for the office, although on two occasions he
attempted indirectly to bring it about by a plebiscite of the people
of Swat. The first occasion was in May 1871, when he suggested
that Saiyid Mubarak Shah, the son of the former King of Swat, who
had died fourteen years before, should be elected king in his father's
place but the suggestion was not received with favour, and nothing
;

came of it. The second occasion was in June 1875, when he ap-
pointed one Ahmad Shah, a saiyid, living in the Nikbi Khel canton
of the Khwazazai district. King of Swat but deposed him again in
;

the following month, giving as an excuse that a gJiaza (holy war) not
being imminent, a king was not required whilst he also asserted
;

that he had doubts as to the integrity, as a ruler and judge, of his

nominee. On both occasions the Akhund hoped that his candidate

would be indignantly rejected by the people, and a unanimous
offer of the crown bo made by them to his son, Mian Gul. He
simply desired, when making the above proposals, to gauge public
opinion, and give the people of Swat an indication of his own
views.
On the January 1877, the Akhund, who was then about
12tli

eighty-three years of age, died. During the last year of his life, in
spite of great pressure from without, urging him to adopt a hostile
attitude towards the British Government, he persistently refused
to depart from the neutral and almost friendly demeanour he had
adopted for some years past.
With regard to the real feelings of this man towards our-
selves, conflicting accounts are given ; but, if he be judged by the
actions and the sentiments expressed by him on certain important
occasions, he will be found to have, as a rule, used his influence more
to support than to frustrate or hamper our action, so long as we
refrained from aggressive measures against any of the tribes in his
neighbourhood, who looked up to him as their spiritual guide. The
best proof of the Akhund'' s wise restraint of the evil spirits of Swat
and Buner is the almost total immunity, for many years previous to
his death, of that portion of our border from raids and other serious
offences.
 —

SWAT TRIB/B8.
35^

The three main objects of the Akhund's policy seem to have

been, in his later years

1st.— To preserve the independence of Swat for at least his own lifetime.
Ind.—lo silence all his religious rivals.
3r(?.— To bring about the election of his son,
Mian Gul, to the Kingshio
^
of Swat.

In the first two he was successful in the last he

;
was not.
AVhen the Ahhund died, there were two great factions
in Swat,
one of which was headed by Sherdil Khan, the chief of
the Ranizais,'
supported by Rahmatulla, the son of Ghazan Khan, who
had suc-
ceeded his father as Khan of Dir the other was headed by Abdul
;

Manan, better known as Mian Gul, the elder son of the

Akliund.
All the principal men of Swat and the surrounding
countries sided
with one or other of these parties. Sherdil Khan, however, had an
opponent in his own district of Ranizai in the person of his
nephew,
Saadat Khan, whom, as might have been expected, Mian
Gul
supported. These men had both, at various times, been
supreme
in, and Khans of, their clan but, at the time of the Akhund's
;

death, Sherdil Khan held that position, and had done so,
with the
exception of a short interval in December 1875, for the
past four
years.

Expedition against the Ranizai village of Shakot in March

1878.
After the death 01 the Ahhund, the Ranizais began again
to give
trouble on our border. Subsequent to the operations of Sir Colin
Campbell's force in 1852, this part of the frontier had remained
un-
disturbed, and the Ranizai people had fulfilled satisfactorily the
en-
gagements then entered into with the British Government.
Our
border was not molested by marauders from that direction, nor
did
any cause for dissatisfaction on our part arise. Indeed, so anxious
were the Ranizai people to maintain peace with us, that afterwards
when some of the leading men, who had brought about their sub-
mission in 1852, were killed in an internal feud, a deputation
came
from Ranizai to the British authorities expressly to explain that
although these men were dead, the tribe still adhered to their agree-
ments. This good behaviour continued during the lifetime of the
Ahhund, but in 1877 the village of Shakot, by harbouring outlaws
and not restraining them from committing offences within the
358 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

British border,had become troublesome, and appeared disinclined to

obey the orders of the Assistant Commissioner of Mardan to attend
and adjust the claims recorded against the village. It was con-
sidered unadvisable to allow this state of things to continue,
and
a proposal was therefore sanctioned to use
the Guides and the

Hazara Mountain Battery at Mardan to coerce the village.

A force, as per margin, under the command of Major E. B.

P. P. Campbell, of the Guides, accord-
Hazara Mountain Battery. . iij! tx/tj o a r r. -k^
mgly marched from Mardan
4.
at 8-45 p.m.
Guide Cavalry-249 men.
„ lnfantry-428 „ ^^ ^he evening of the 13th of March 1878,
to punish the inhabitants of Shakot.
The forcewas accompanied by Captain P. L. N. Cavagnari,
as Political Officer, and by Captain R.
Warburton, as his assistant.
The object was to surprise the village and capture as many of the
fighting men as possible. In order to avoid giving any notice of
the approach of the troops, a
detour was made to avoid the village

Jalala, and the force arrived within two

miles of Shakot about
of
2 A.M. on the morning of the
14th of March.

Shakot, at this time, was a village of about 500 houses, and

was reported to possess about 400 fighting men. It is situated,

right bank of a deep ravine, which,
as already stated, on the
running north and south at this place, is the main drainage
channel of a great portion of the Sam Eanizai country. The
ground between the ravine and the hills on the east is prac-
ticable for cavalry, and to the north-west
there is a small

detached hill which commands the village, which, if held, would

prevent any assistance being given by the independent villages to
the north. The first object being to gain possession of this hill,
Major Campbell sent two companies of infantry, under Major
G. Stewart, against it. This movement was successfully carried

out, and the party reached the crest of the hill without having
alarmed the inhabitants of the village. The main body of the in-
fantry, under Major Campbell, followed about a quarter of an hour
later, and, having crossed the nala took up a position in front of
Shakot just as day was breaking.
The artillery and the cavalry remained on the left bank of the
ravine, at a distance of about two miles from the village, with orders
to wait till daybreak, when the artillery was to take up a suitable
position to the south, and the cavalry, under Captain W. Battye,
 —

SWAT TRIBES. 359

was to move rapidly forward and cut ofE the retreat of the enemy
to the north and east of the village. The first thing which made the
enemy aware of the presence of our troops was hearing the cavalry
trotting past to take up the position assigned them. They then
began beating driuns, and it appeared as if they intended to
offer resistance. At the same time, the inhabitants, chiefly women
and children, began to flee towards the hill to the north-west of the
village,but stopped on seeing that it was occupied by our troops.
Captain Cavagnari then sent forward a man to summon the village
to surrender, or take the consequences. When sufficient time
had been allowed for the messenger to reach the village, the
advance was sounded, and the infantry began to move forward
in skirmishing order.
Seeing that resistance would be hopeless, the headmen came out
and made an unconditional surrender, without a shot having been
fired on either side. The troops then entered the village, and the
following terms were demanded :

— That they should pay a fine of Es.

\st. 500 for past misconduct.
2nd. — That they should at once adjust all claims of British subjects
for compensation for losses inflicted on them within British
territory,

3r<i.— That all outlaws should at once be expelled from Shakot, and
suitable guarantees should be given by the headmen, binding
them to refuse such persons an asylum in future.
^th. — That hostages, or other suitable guarantee for the good be-
haviour of the village in future, should be furnished.

The headmen agreed to these demands without demur, and

thirty-three hostages were selected from the inhabitants, and
accompanied the force on its return. The neighbouring villages had
made no attempt to assist Shakot, and they now sent in their
headmen to pay their respects to the British officers.
The village was occupied till 10 a.m., when the return march
was begun, and the whole force arrived at Mardan the same
evening, having marched nearly fifty miles within twenty-four hours.
In December 1878 the two sons of the late .4 MwwcZ endeavoured
to create a jehad, and mullas were sent in all directions to raise up
the khans and the people. Fortunately, just then the powerful
party of Sherdil Khan had been turned out of power. These
360 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

were persuaded to discourage the fanatical movement in Eani-

zai, and, through their adherents, in Upper Swat also and, in ccn- ;

sequence, the movement was an utter failure. In April 1880,

Sherdil Khan of Aladand, who had been ill for some time, died in
British territory, where he had come for medical treatment. After
his death the chief political power in Swat passed into the hands
of RahmatuUa Khan, the Khan of Dir. During the later months of

the occupation of Afghanistan in 1880, the well-known MuUa Khalil,

with other mullas from the Mohmand hills, worked hard to incite
the tribes of Dir and Swat to commence a holy war, by an attack
on the British line of communications near Jalalabad. Their efforts
were, to a great extent, neutralised by the passive attitude of
RahmatuUa Khan, and ere long the cry for a jehad died away.
In 1883 a desultory contest was carried on between Mian
Gul and the Khan of Dir, for the supremacy in Swat, but in March
1884 these two came to terms. By this agreement, Mian Gul
acknowledged the authority of Dir over Malizai RahmatuUa ;

Khan, on the other hand, pledging himself not to interfere unasked

Swat proper.
in the affairs of
The history of our subsequent dealings with the Swat Tribes
will be reserved for a new chapter.
 CHAPTER IX.

SWAT TRIBES.— {Cont'mned.)

Between the years 1884 and 1890 the Swat valley was kept in
a ferment of intrigues and factional feuds by the ambitious actions
of Umra Khan of Jandol, whose career has been described in the
preceding chapters. The Mian Guls sided now with Muhammad
Sharif, who had succeeded his father RahmatuUah as Khan of Dir,
and now with the Jandol Chief.
In 1887 Abdul Manan, the elder Mian Gul, died, and was succeed-
ed by his brother Abdul Hanaa, also called Abdul Klialik or Shirin.
The Swatis were now still further split up into factions, some
supporting Abdul Hanan while others urged the claims of the two
young sons of the elder brother, aged three and five. In 1888 much
unrest was caused among the Swat clans by the conduct of the Amir
and by persistent rumours that he was aiming at the annexation of
Bajaur, Dir, and Swat. Hitherto the Government of India had
con-
sistently refrained from all interference with the internal affairs of these
countries, but since the policy of the Amir now appeared to threaten
our interests, in that would isolate the iiorthern outposts of Chitral
it

a firm remonstrance was sent to Kabul. On being informed that no

interference on his part in Dir and the adjoining territories
could be
tolerated, the Amir at once acknowledged that Swat was
outside
his sphere of influence, though he asserted claim to the
other coun-
tries. Nevertheless, Afghan intrigues were continued with
more or
less persistence until 1893, when the Durand Mission to Kabul
brought about a better understanding. During the year
1889
number Afghan refugees, headed by General Faiz
o.^
Muhammad
Khan, Ghilzai, came and settled in Swat. Soon after this, the
Swatis
became divided on the question of the administration of their
coun-
try— some advocated the intervention of the Government of India
others wished to call in the headmen of the Hindustani
fanatics at
Palosi, and a third party suggested making the
Afghan General
Faiz Muhammad Khan their chief. All seemed to be agreed as to
( 361 )
^^•^
3A
362 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the necessity of opposing Umra Khan, who had threatened to

attack Thana and might attempt to overrun all Swat.
In 1890 Muhammad Sharif Khan
Dir was finally driven out
of
by Umra Khan, and took refuge in Upper Swat. During the next
few years, the Swatis assisted the ex- chief of Dir in various attempts
to regain his possessions and oust Umra Khan, but their efforts
met with little success.
In 1892 arrangements were made with the Swat Mans and
maliks for the opening of a postal service through the Swab valley,
which was continued through Umra Khan's territories in Dir to
Ghitral.
In 1893 the Mian Grul Abdul Hanan died, and after some debate
itwas decided that the succession should remain in abeyance for
a few years, after which Saiyid Badshah, son of Abdul Manan, should
be recognized as the senior Mian Gul. In this year Umra Khan,
after a successful attack on the Dusha Khel, moved into Swat and
compelled the submission of Barangola and Badiyan, two villages
belonging to the Khan of Aladand. Having taken a heavy fine he
expelled the chief, and installed his own nominee, Saadat Khan, in
his place.
For the next two years there was continual faction-fighting in
Swat, and at one time considerable pressure was put upon the khans
of Thana to induce them to forego the allowances which they received
for the postal service, and to break off all relations with G-overn-
ment. The khans, however, strove their utmost to remain loyal
to their engagements.
It may not be
out of place to add a word of explanation as to
the attitude of the mullas and other religious leaders during the
period which preceded the establishment of direct relations between
the Government of India and the Swat clans.
After the Afghan war of 1878-80, the mullas of Swat and the
adjacent countries were for some years openly hostile to the Amir,
and sedulously denounced him as a friend of the British and there-
They also fostered the opposition
fore not a true follower of Islam.
to his intrigues and advances Swat and the countries on its
in
borders. In 1889, however, the Amir issued a proclamation to the
inhabitants of Swat and other neighbouring tribes calling on all
MussulmanB to acknowledge him as King of Islam, and to obey him
 SWAT TRIBES. 363

as leader of the Muhammadan religion. Some years later, in

1896, he published several religious books, in which he impressed
upon all Muhammadans the duty of jehad in defence of their
country against invasion by an who were
infidel. The mullas,
by this time incensed at the increasing influence of Umra Khan
throughout Dir and Swat, now directed their energies against him
and in turn denounced him for his supposed reliance on British
support. At the same time they agreed to recognize the Amir's
claims to be the leader of their religion; and, henceforward pro-
claiming themselves his emissaries, they quoted his authority in
their mischievous preachings against the British.
The first occasion on which British troops entered the Swat
valley was in 1895. The events which led to the despatch of a force
through the valley in that year for the relief of Chitral, and the oper-
ations undertaken by Sir R. Low for the coercion of Umra Khan of
Jandol will be described in a subsequent chapter.^
Notwithstandingthe assurances of the Government that, in
demanding a free passage for our troops through Swat no interference
with their country was intended, and in spite of the efforts of
their maliks and klians to restrain them, the Swatis allowed their
fanaticism to carry them away and opposed our entrance
to the
valley. After the advance of the troops beyond Chakdara, however,
the Swat clans remained quiet, and, after tlie withdrawal of the
force in September 1895, they raised no objections to the presence
of our garrisons at the Malakand and Chakdara, which were estab-
lished to guard the commimications with Chitral.
Anagency was instituted, with head- quarters at the Malakand,
to conduct the political business between the Government and the
tribes, but interference in the internal affairs of the country was as
far as possible avoided. The postal service to Chitral was reopened,
and a levy^ system established, and increased allowances were
granted to the khans of Swat and Ranizai, a special sum being
added in lieu of tolls, which were henceforth to cease.
After the defeat and flight of Umra Khan in 1895 Hhe Khan of
Dir regained possession of the territories which he had lost five years

1 See Chapter XII. and they are composed of Sam and Bar
2 The Swat leviesguard the road from Ranizai with a small percentage of other
Dargai to the Chakdara bridge ; their mixed Pathans.
strength is 281 infantry and 36 tovjart, * See page 541.

8A2
S64 FROyTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

previously and took over practically all the conquests of the exiled
chief of Jandol. His southern boundary was now the Swat river,
and consequentl}" he claimed as his subjects the following Swat
sections who inhabit the right bank, viz., Adinzai, Shamozai,
•Nikbi Khel, Sebujni and Shamizai, belong to the
all of whom
Khwazazai branch of Akozai-Yusafzai. These sections, however,
are essentially Swatis and have therefore been dealt with in this
chapter, instead of being included in the Dir tribes mentioned in
Chapters XII and XIII.
The new arrangements appeared to be entirely satisfactory,
trade increased rapidly, and all signs of hostility on the part of the
people quickly disappeared.
In 1896 continual faction- fights took place in Upper Swat,
and some unrest was caused by the interference of the Khan of Dir
with the subject clans on the right bank of the river. The mullas
and other religious leaders attempted to stir the fanaticism of the
people, but no serious disturbance resulted and the condition of ;

the valley was on the whole satisfactory. The increase of trade

along the Chitral road was very noticeable :
—
Value of imports and exports through Swat.
Imports. Exports.
Rs. Rs.
April-September 1894 . . . . 2,91,929 2,22,744
1896 .. .. 16,]5,892 10,43,424
October 1896 to March 1897 . . 20,10,669 7,70,684

and Thana, who had

Early" in 1897, the khans of Aladand, Palai
grown and prosperous, began to oppress their poor neighbours
rich ;

but the ringleader Sharif Khan of Aladand was punished, and

matters finally quieted down. In June the rivalry between the
Mian Guls and the Khan of Dir was causing much friction, and the
latter was permitted to put a stop to the intrigues of the fanatical
faction by coercing the tribes on the right bank of the river over
whom he claimed authority. Early in the following month, the
combined jirgas representing the clans of Upper Swat met Major
Deane at Chakdara, and requested that he would " settle matters
between them and the khan.'' Between 1,400 and 1,500 maliks
attended the meeting, representing the four Khwazazai clans on
the right bank, and the Musa Khel, Babuzai, and Jinki Khel on the
other side of the river.
 ;

SWAT TRIBES. 355

Major Deane reported that the jirgas accepted the fact of

their being under Government influence in a good spirit, and looked
to us now to have their country on the same footing as that already
under us. They said that they wanted peace, they were ready to
perform service if required, undertook to furnish fighting-men for
Government, if called on to do so, and declared that the friends of
the Government should be their friends and the enemies of Govern-
ment their foes. Their principal petition was that they might not
be called on to perform unpaid labour, and that exiles, convicted
by them of murder, might not be put back on the land against
the wish oitlie jirgas. Major Deane explained to them that Gov-
ernment had no desire to interfere with their internal administra-
tion, but would assist them in settling their disputes if they brought
them before the Political Agent
that Government did not intend
;

to impose revenue on them, and that all that Government wanted

was to secure peace and order in Upper Swat, as had been done in
Lower Swat and Ranizai. The main regret expressed by the tribes-
men was that they had not entered into friendly relations with us
before, so as to have excluded any interference by the Khan of Dir.
The authority of the Khan of Dir over the tribes on the right
bank was now acknowledged the power of the Mian Guls was broken
;

and their mischievous intrigues with the Hadda Mulla^ and Palam
MuUa received a severe check.
Throughout the early part of this year the Swat tribes had been
to some extent affected by the general spirit of unrest which had
spread throughout the Pathan tribes on the north-west frontier.
This had been due in a great measure to the exertions of the
Hadda Mulla and other priests, in Mohmand territory and in Dir
and Bajaur, who had everywhere been spreading false reports and
trying in every possible way to inflame the people against the
British. After the settlement with the Swat jirgas, however,
the valley seemed to have quieted down, and it appeared
affairs in
not unreasonable to accept the assertion of the Swatis themselves
that "they had made up their minds to lay hold of the skirt of
Government for good and all."
The progress made in the settlement of the Swat valley, since
the establishment there of the Political Agency, and the apparently

I See page 471*

3«6 FRONTIER AND OVaRBEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Batisfactory attitude of the Swat tribes, have been alluded

to at some length, in order to emphasize the very unexpect-
ed nature of the sudden outbreak of fanaticism which now
occurred.
About the middle of July some strangers arrived in Upper
Swat from Buner, where they were known to have lately been in-
triguing against the Government. Although it was not feared that
any serious trouble would result from the presence of these men
in the valley, a close watch was nevertheless kept on their
actions.
At about the same time, some excitement was caused in Lower
Swat by the appearance of a faJcir named SaduUah (also called
Mulla Mastan or Fakir Sartor) who took up his abode at Landakai.
This man, who came to be known as the 'Mad Fakir,' was a Bunerwal,
and was said to have been mad since the death of his son, who was
accidentally killed some fifteen years previously. Having failed in
his endeavours to incite the people of Buner to join in a jehad
against the British, he now set himself to work to arouse the fana-
ticism of the Swat tribes. He distributed copies of the Amir's
book 1 on the righteousness of jehad, promised heavenly rewards to
all who would join, and assured his
superstitious listeners of all

kinds of miraculous assistance. At first he seems to have been

regarded as a mere harmless lunatic, but news of his preaching
soon spread, and began to attract large numbers of people from
all parts of the country.
On the 25th July, Major Deane, the Political Agent, had an
interview with the khans of Thana, who had asked him to prohibit
the fakir's assemblies. Major Deane had, however, declined to in-
terfere, and the khans, who were accompanied by the headmen
of Khar and Keh, now stated that there was no cause for alarm.
They also produced a letter from the Pisani Mulla, the chief adviser
of the Mian would expel the madman
Guls, stating that the latter
should he continue to cause any trouble. It was reported later
that the Mian Guls had actually ordered the fakir's removal, and
as was believed that the Swatis themselves were prepared to
it

prevent the fakir from causing any disturbance, interference on

the part of the Government officials appeared to be inadvisable.
X The Takvim-Qd-Diu.
 SWAT TRIBES. 367

Attack on the Malakand and Chakdara posts, by a fanatical

gathering under the Mad Fakir.
On
the afternoon of the 26th July the officers from the
Malakand and Chakdara posts played polo on the ground near
Khar village, without being in any way interfered with by the
people, whose attitude was apparently quite friendly. Towards
evening, however, disquieting reports of the Mad Fakir's proceed-
ings reached the Political Agent at Malakand, and he accordingly
requested Colonel Meiklejohn to hold the troops in readiness for
immediate action in case of necessity. At the same time the
Officer Commanding the Queen's Own Corps of Guides at Mardan
was requested by telegram at once to reinforce the Malakand gar-
rison with all available men.
Lieutenant Minchin, the Assistant Political Officer, was sent to
Chakdara to report on the situation there, and to reassure the
levies, who were thought to be unrehable. Shortly after his
arrival there, this officer telegraphed to Major Deane that the
fakir had been joined by the people of Thana, and was moving
down the valley with a following of 400 or 500 men.
About? P.M., Major Deane informed the officer commanding
the troops at the Malakand that the Mad Fakir had reached
Aladand with a large gathering, and that the intervention of
the troops would be necessary. Accordingly Colonel Meiklejohn
arranged to despatch a column under Lieut. -Colonel McRae,
at midnight, to seize the Amandara pass, while he himself pro-
posed to follow three hours later with the remainder of the troops.
But shortly before 10 p.m., news was received from Chakdara
that the fakir had already passed Khar, and was on his way to the
Malakand. Almost immediately after this, a Jemadar of Levies
arrived, and reported that the fakir had been joined by the people
from the villages through which he had passed, and was
all
now
close at hand with a large force.
The Malakand Brigade under the command of Colonel W. H.
Meiklejohn, c.b., c.m.g., was distributed as follows :—

Malakand.
FoH,— 200 rifles, 24th Punjab Infantry.
Crater Camp.— 6 companies, 24th Punjab Infantry.
6 companies, 45th Sikh Infantry.
No. 6 Company, Madras Sappers and
Miners.
368 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA,

North Camp. — 1 squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers (less 20 sabres).

No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery.
6 companies, 31st Punjab Infantry.
Chakdaka.
20 sabres, lltb Bengal Lancers.
180 rifles, 45th Sikh Infantry.
Dargai.
200 rifles, 31st Punjab Infantry.

The Malakand position was somewhat extended (see plan).

The was built on a spur running down from Guides Hill on the
fort
south-west to the kotal north of this, in an irregular hollow known
;

as " the crater " were the camps of the 24th Punjab Infantry, 45th
Sikhs, and Sappers and Miners, with the Engineer park and Com-
missariat ofi&ce and stores. The various enclosures were surrounded
by abatis and wire entanglements, and picquets were posted on the
high ground to the north. About three-quarters of a mile to the
north-west was a second camp, called North camp, which was
situated on a piece of flat open ground, and protected by a breast-
work and obstacles. The two camps were connected by a
well-made road. From the kotal, the newly made Chitral road,
(known as the graded road) ran through the Crater Camp, and
passing between the Castle Eock spur and Gibraltar Hill, led
down to the Swat valley. Further east, the old Buddhist road,
of which only a rough track remained, ran in a more or less parallel
direction through a succession of narrow gorges.
About 10 P.M., on the receipt of Major Deane's report of the
near approach of the fanatical gathering. Colonel Meiklejohn
ordered the alarm to be sounded the troops had hardly reached
;

their posts when the enemy began an attack on the camp,

advancing along the graded and Buddhist roads. Lieut.-Colonel
McEae and Major Taylor, having promptly collected a few men
of the 45th Sikhs, hurried the gorge through which
ofi to seize
the old Buddhist road descends from the Jcotal. This party was
only just in time to check the rush of a large body of tribesmen,
who an entrance to the camp through the defile.
tried to force
Driven back from the gorge by the steady fire of this handful of
Sikhs, the enemy now climbed the rocky hills on either side.
Colonel McEae being now reinforced by a second party under
 ;

SWAT TEIBE9. 369

Lieutenant Barff, responded by withdrawing his men to more

commanding ground a little further back, where he was joined by
the remainder of the regiment. Here he took up a position and
held the enemy oS till 2 a.m., when the tribesmen, foiled in their

attempt to reach the camp on that side, beat a retreat, leaving

many of their dead behind.
Just before the retirement of the Sikhs from the gorge, Major
Taylor fell mortally wounded.
In his report on this affair Colonel Meiklejohn said—" There is
no doubt that the gallant resistance made by this small body in
the gorge against vastly superior numbers, till the arrival of the
rest of the regiment, saved the camp from being rushed on that
side, and cannot speak too highly of the behaviour of Lieut.-
I
Colonel McRae and Major Taylor on this occasion."
As soon as the alarm sounded, the picquets in front of the
Crater camp had been doubled one company 24th Punjab Infantry
;

held the walls of the enclosure on either side of the entrance from
the north camp road, while another under Lieutenant Climo,
manned the wall of the bazaar facing the gorge through which the
graded Chitral road passes. The remaining companies of this regi-
ment were held in readiness to support any part of the line when
required, and the central portion of the camp was defended by the
Madras Sappers and Miners.
The enemy, advancing in large numbers along the graded road,
drove back the picquets and spread out over the ground surrounding
the camp. The serai, which was held by levies, was quickly rushed
the civil treasurer was killed, and all the property in the enclosure
was looted or burned. A Nikbi Khel prisoner, who had been arrest-
ed a short time previously as a suspicious character, and who was
undoubtedly implicated in the rising, was found here and liberated
by his kinsmen. TLa enemy next attacked the bazaar, and some
of them, getting on to the high ground behind the commissariat
enclosure, kept np a heavy fire on the defenders while a number
;

of the tribesmei- forced their way into the store godown, where
they killed Lieutenant Manle}^ Colonel Meiklejohn, who had taken
up his position in the central enclosure, now recalled the company
from the bazaar, and sent for another company from the reserve ro
reinforce this portion of th defences. The tribesmen repeatedly
charged the position held by the Sapper^ and Mineis, ai.d twice
Voi. I, SB
370 Frontier and overseas expeditions from indiA.

succeeded in forcing their way through the abatis which surrounded

it. In one of these rushes, they captured the guard tent and a quan-
tity of ammunition, which had been loaded up on mules for removal
to the fort. After a sharp hand-to-hand struggle, in which Captain
Holland was wounded and several men killed, the enemy were
eventually driven out of this enclosure.
At about 2-30 a.m., Lieutenant Rawlins succeeded in making
his way to the fort, and brought down 100 men to reinforce the Crater
camp, which was now being hard pressed.
The enemy kept up the attack with great vigour till 4-30 a.m.,
when they retired, carrying off most of their dead and wounded.
During the attack. Lieutenant E. W. Costello had crossed the
ground in front of the defences under heavy fire and, with the assist-
ance of two sepoys, brought in a non-commissioned officer who was
lying wounded about sixty yards away. For this gallant action,
Lieutenant Costello was awarded the Victoria Cross.
The casualties in the Malakand garrison during this night attack
were one officer and twenty-two non-commissioned officers and men
killed five^ officers and thirty- one men wounded.
;

Next morning the troops North camp, which had not been
in
seriously attacked, were despatched in pursuit of the enemy. The
cavalry advanced along the Chakdara road, but when the infantry
reached a small knoll called Bedford Hill, opposite Khar village, a
large hostile force was seen on the surrounding hills, and in the valley
beyond. The guns and infantry were accordingly ordered to retire,
covered by a wing of the 24th Punjab Infantry, which had been
sent out to support them. As some of the enemy on the hills to the
east of the Buddhist road threatened to cut off the retreat. Lieu-
tenant Climo boldly attacked them with two companies, and drove
them off, capturing a standard and infficting heavy loss.
Meanwhile the squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers ^ under
Captain Wright had reached the Amandara defile. Finding the
heights on either side strongly occupied, the cavalry skirted the
hill on their left, and, fording the river v/ith great difficulty, reached

a small island in midstream. Pushing forward along this they soon

1 Lieut. -Colonel J. Lamb, 24th Punjab 2 Captain D. Baker, Brigade Transport

Infantry, and Major W. W. Taylor, Officer, accompanied the cavalry to Chak-
45th Sikhs, subsequently died of their dara.
•wounds.
 THE MALAKAND POSITION.

Scale 1 Inch =-1600 Feet.

:-o(' iH\' fiLi.) soi. IOC ' Ytin/s
I ' L_l I 1 L I I 1

North Camp !"^

\ Gorge first held by

^ 45'th 'Sihhs 26 7-97

Roekn A preclftitoys

^* \ 45th .9/ft/ia

/ 2nd Positiun 26-7-97.

t^The Matakand Kotal

REFERENCE
1 Central Enclosure
2 Conimst
SAM Caniu
3 Abbott Road
Piquet
4 No. 1 Piquet
6 No. 2 Piquet
6 No. 8 Piquet
7 Camp
24th Punj^ Infy.
8 45th Sikhs

NOTE.— The line of the enclosures at htrt shown is only approximately correct as it was
altered from time to time.

I. 8. Topo. Dy. No. 6,698.

Exd. C. J. A., February 1907
No. 4,058-1, 1907.
 SWAT TRIBES. 37 ^

again came to the river, and re-crossed to the left bank. Here two
men were wounded and some of the horses were hit, so Captain
Wrip;ht dismounted a few of his troopers to hold the enemy in check
until the rest of his party had forded the stream. He then con-
tinued his march to Chakdara, where he took over command from
Lieutenant Rattray.
was now plainly seen that the enemy were receiving reinforce-
It
ments from various directions, and it was evident that the rising
was not confmed to the Swat tribesmen. Instead of being a merely
local disturbance it appeared indeed to be a combined attempt
on
the part of the neighbouring clans to drive the British troops out of
the valley. Information as to the state of affairs was telegraphed
to the Government, and steps were taken to improve the defensive
arrangements in preparation for a renewal of the attack.
Colonel Meiklejohn having decided to concentrate all his troops
in the Crater and on the Malakand kotal, issued orders for the evacu-
ation of North camp. Stores and baggage were sent up early on
the 27th, but it was found impossible to move the large E.
P. tents
with the transport available, so these, together with a quantity
of heavy baggage, had to be abandoned, and fell into the hands of
the enem.y. During this withdrawal, the troops were harassed by
the tribesmen, about 1,000 of whom eventually charged down
from the w^estern heights, and tried to rush the Crater camp.
They were however driven off by two companies under Lieutenant
Climo, and the retirement was completed just before dark, when the
last of the North camp troops reached the Crater, covered by the
fire of the supports.
On day the force at Colonel Meiklejohn's disposal was
this
strengthened by the arrival of the Corps of Guides. ^ The cavalry
had started from Mardan at 12-30 a.m. and reached the Malakand
eight hours later, while the infantry, who left their station at 2 a.m.,
arrived at 7-30 p.m., having covered the distance of thirty-two miles
in seventeen and a half hours. The Officer Commanding the Corps
had only received his orders at 9 p.m. on the 26th, and the promptness
wath which the Guides responded to the call, and the forced march
in the intense heat, reflected the greatest credit on the regiment.
1 Guides Cavalry, 160 sabres under Lieut.- tenant P.C. Elliot Lockhart.
Colonel Adams. Guides Infantry, 50 rifles remained to
Guides Infantry, 250 rifles undgr Lieu- reinforce Dargai post.
3B2
372 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the night of tlie 27tli-28tli July, tlie disposition of the

troops was as follows : — On the right flank, holding a position about
fifty yards in rear of that finally occupied on the previous night,
were the 45th Sikhs, 100 rifles of the Guides, and 2 guns. In the
centre the 31st Punjab Infantry, the Guides, No. 5 Company,
Madras Sappers and Miners, and two guns defended the enclosures
containing the Sappers' camp, and the commissariat and engineer
stores. The 24th Punjab Infantry and the remaining two guns held
the hill on the (marked No. 2 picquet in the plan).
left

At 8-30 P.M., the enemy began a fresh attack, which was

maintained tliroughout the night all along the line. The serai, over-
looking the graded road, which was held by twenty-five men of the
31st Punjab Infantry under Subadar Saiyid Ahmad Shah, was most
gallantly defended against tremendous odds until 3 a.m. The enemy
then succeeded in partially demolishing the building and set it on fire,

whereupon the survivors of the little garrison retreated to the

enclosure in their rear, carrying their wounded with them. During
their defence of the serai this party had lost nine men killed and ten
wounded. Owing to the darkness and the noise of the firing all
round, their need for assistance had not been realized by the troops
in rear and consequently no reinforcement had been sent to them.
Just about dawn. Lieutenant Climo with two companies of the
24th Punjab Infantry, supported by the fire of the two guns on
the left, made a counter-attack on the enem}^, who were closely
pressing that flank from the high ground on the west. The tribesmen,
many of whom were armed with Martini rifles, at first made a
determined stand, but were resolutely driven back by Lieutenant
Climo's men, losing forty killed and as many more wounded. The
enemy had also closely pressed their assault on the centre and
right of the position, but had everywhere been repulsed with
heavy U)ss.
The casualties during the night amounted to eleven men killed,
one British officer and forty-five men wounded.
Though the enemy had again been repulsed with considerable
loss, they were by no means discouraged, and the news of the pil-

lage of North camp, which was accepted as evidence of a defeat

of the British troops, attracted large numbers of the tribesmen to
come forward and join in the ri:Jng. Prompt m.easures, however,

had aheady been taken to reinforce the beleaguered garrison.

 SWAT THI BEa. 373

Orders were issued on the 27th July for the immediate despatch of
the marginally noted tioops to the Mak-
1 squadron, 11th Bengal
Lancers. kaud, two squadrons, 10th Bengal
wliile
'''""'''
Ro^'yai Artii^rr'"" ^auccrs and the 22nd Punjab Infantry
35th Sikhs. were ordered from Jhelum to Mardan, and
^^'^^^'
the Eoyal West Kent Regiment was held
in readiness at Peshawar.
During daylight on the 28th, the enemy kept up a desultory
fire on the camp. As any attempt to assume the offensive or to
undertake the relief of Chakdara was out of the question until the
arrival of reinforcements,
the troops were employed throughout
the day in strengthening the defences. At 10 p.m., the enemy
renewed their attack on the camp with great energy but, being ;

repulsed at all points, they withdrew shortly before daybreak in the

direction of Khar. As tlie day broke, they could be seen on the
neighbouring hills, carrying off numbers of killed and wounded men
;

pursuit, however, was impossible, owing to the exhausted condition

of the troops. On our side the casualties were two men killed, tliree
British officers and thirteen men wounded.
On the 29th the defences were further improved, and the
ground in front cleared. Bonfires were also prepared, to illuminate
portions of the ground over which the enemy would have to advance.
Signalling communication was reopened with Chakdara, which
was reported to be successfully holding out against continual
attacks. During the afternoon one squadron, 11th Bengal Lancers,
arrived at the Malakand, escorting a supply of 12,000 rounds of
ammunition. The same evening the 35th Sikhs, 38th Dogras, and
some men of the Guides, all under command of Colonel A. J. Eeid
reached Dargai. The troops were greatly exhausted by their try-
ing march in the intense heat and the 35th Sikhs, who had pushed
;

forward as quickly as possible from Nowshera, lost twenty- one men

from heat apoplexy. Brigadier- General Meiklejohn accordingly
ordered Colonel Reid to halt at Dargai the next day in order to rest
his troops.
Onthe night of the 29th-30th, the enemy again attacked the
camp, and avoiding the centre, where they were exposed to the
light of the bonfires and the fire of the 9-pounder guns in the fort,
they directed their main efforts on the flanks. A fierce assault was
made on the water picquet in rear of the position held by the 24th
S74 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Punjab Infantry, and several of tlie enemy were bayoneted inside

tbe sangar. At 2 a.m., the tribesmen made a final desperate effort

to break through the defence, and even succeeded in cutting through
the wire entanglement, and tearing down portions of the sangars ;
but their attack was everywhere repulsed with great loss, and half
an hour later they suddenly abandoned the attempt and dispersed.
It was afterwards reported that the Mad Fakir, who personally led
the last assault, had retired to Landakai, having been wounded in
the hand. His chief companion and second-in-command was found
dead outside the line. This man was identified as a native of India,
and it was said that the fakir had intended to crown him King of
Delhi, when he had completed the overthrow of British rule in India.
The casualties on our side during the night had been two Britisii
officers severely wounded, one man killed, and seventeen of the

native ranks wounded.

Early on the morning of the 30th, 200 rifles of the 31st Punjab
Infantry, who had formed the garrison of Dargai, were sent up
to the Malakand camp. Here the troops were again employed in
repairing the damage done during the previous night, and further
improving the defensive arrangements. There was less interfer-
ence than usual on the part of the enemy, who were apparently dis-
couraged by the non-success which had hitherto attended their
determined and costly attacks. During the afternoon, however, it
was observed that they were being largely reinforced, which tended
to confirm a report received from Chakdara that the Mian Guls had
joined the enemy, and had obtained the assistance of a contingent
from Buner.
At night the tribesmen renewed their attack, and kept up
a continual fire till daybreak, but the garrison, being well pro-
tected behind their improved defences, suffered little loss. The
enemy did not show the sam.e reckless spirit that they had displayed
in their former attacks ; one party, however, taking advantage of
a sharp thunderstorm which broke over the camp, tried to rush the
east flank held by the 45th Sikhs, but were repulsed with the
bayonet.
On the next morning Colonel Reid, having left a garrison of 400
men and some cavalry at Dargai, reached the Malakand unopposed
with the remainder of his reinforcements, numbering in all 707
rifles. Large numbers of the enemy occupied the surrounding hills,
 -

SWAT TRIBES. 375

and kept up a desultory fire during the day but no night attack
;

followed, though a few shots were fired into the camp.

On the 1st August, Brigadier- General Meiklejohn decided to
despatch a portion of his troops to relieve the garrison at Chakdara,
which was known to be running short of ammunition and supplies.
Accordingly at 11 a.m., the Guides Cavalry under Lieut.
Colonel Adams were sent off by the North camp road with orders
to reconnoitre the Amandara defile, and if possible seize the pass.
The enemy however promptly detected the General's intentions,
and hastily collected in large numbers to oppose the advance of
the troops. As they reached the plain, the cavalry charged a con-
siderable body of the tribesmen and killed at least a hundred of them,
but the broken ground, which was very rocky and much cut up by
nalas, greatly impeded their progress. In this skirmish the Guides
lost one man killed, two officers and twelve men wounded. Brigadier-
General Meiklejohn now realised that, owing to the lateness of the
start, there was small prospect of being able to push through to
Chakdara that day, in face of the opposition which was certain to be
encountered. He accordingly decided to postpone the attempt till the
next morning, and directed the troops to withdraw to camp.
On this date Major- General Sir Bindon Blood arrived at the Mala-
kand and assumed command. Brigadier- General Meikle John's pro-

2 squadrons, Guides Cavalry. po^als f or the immediate relief

2 „ 11th Bengal Lancers. Chakdara having been
of
4 gun, No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery. ^<. ,
by hlT t>'
-, i
iNo. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and approved BmdoU
Miners. Blood, a column consisting of
^
. , ,
400 Kifles, 24tli Punjab Infantry. n . • -,

400 „ 45th Sikhs. the margmally noted troops,

200 „ Guides Infantry.
bivouackcd on Gretna Green,
preparatory to moving out at daybreak. The enemy meanwhile
remained collected in large numbers on the hills to the north, and
firing was kept up all day and throughout the night. Several parties
of tribesmen advanced to within a few hundred yards of our
picquets, and shortly before midnight the column on Gretna Green
got under arms in expectation of a determined attack. The enemy
however declined the attempt, and at 3 a.m. firing ceased.
At 5 A.M. on the 2nd, Brigadier- General Meiklejohn moved off
^'^^ *^^ relieving column, and Sir Bindon
The relief of Chakdara.
Blood, who directed the operations from
Castle rock, at the same time ordered Lieutenant- Colonel Goldney
3t6 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

with a detachment of the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras to advance

and seize a spur^ about half a mile further north. This party-
approached to within a hundred yards of the position without being
perceived, and suddenly rushing forward captured the hill without
loss. The tribesmen, who had been completely taken by surprise,
dispersed in all directions, leaving seven dead bodies on the ground.
The infantry now took up their position on Goldney's hill, and with
two mountain guns in action on Castle rock covered the advance
of the column for some distance along the graded road.
As the colunm reached the open ground and deployed, a num-
ber of the enemy hurriedly occupied a position on high ground near
the junction of the main road with that leading from North camp,
and opened a heavy but inaccurate fixe on the troops. The Guides
Infantry and 45th Sikhs were at once ordered to attack, and, carry-
ing this position with s^.ight loss, drove the defenders ofi at the
point of the bayonet before they could be reinforced. Abandoning
sixty or seventy dead, the enemy now fell back to a second position
on a cluster of knolls known as Bedford hill, on which is the village
of Malakot. Here they were again speedily attacked by the 24th
Punjab Infantry and 45th Sikhs, who advanced on the left and
centre, while the Guides carried the heights on the east. Driven
back a second time with considerable loss, the tribesmen were now
thoroughly disheartened, and large numbers of them took to flight
across the Khar plain. Here they were intercepted by the cavalry,
who vigorously pursued them, spearing and cutting them down in
all directions.

As soon as the squadrons had reformed, Lieut. -Colonel Adams,

who was in command of the cavalry, pushed on to Amandara
and seized the pass. Meanwhile the infantry, after a short halt,
continued their advance. and on arrival at Bat-Khela, the 45th
;

Sikhs drove out a number of the enemy who had just before fired on
the cavalry. These men made a stubborn resistance, and eighty
of them were bayoneted in the village. The cavalry now pushed
forward to Chakdara whence the sound of heavy firing could be
heard, and reached the bridge over the Swat river at 9 a.m. On
the advance of the relieving troops the enemy who were collected
round Chakdara abandoned their attempt to capture the fort and

1 Afterwards called Goldney's hill— see plan.

 ;

SWAT TBIBES. 377

Thereupon Lieutenant Rattray, collecting a few

began to retire.
made a sortie, drove o£E 'about thirty of
men of the garrison,
hospital, and shot them
the assailants who were holding the Civil
Some more
down as they tried to escape along the river bank.
Baker, and the
men were now collected from the fort by Captain
river, cleared
combined party ascending the hill overlooking the
a number of sangars whence the
enemy were trying to oppose the
advance of the cavaby.
Meanwhile the cavalry, having crossed the river, started in pur-
suit of the fugitives, who fled in several parties up the Adinzai valley
by their exer-
but as the nTen and horses were akeady
fatigued

tions and the excessive heat, they

were soon recalled.
The remainder of the column reached the fort at 10 a.m., when
village of Chakdara was destroyed and
the hills surrounding the
the
post occupied without opposition.
The garrison of the fort were
six days' siege, and
found in excellent health and spirits after their
had only lost three men killed and nine wounded throughout their

spirited defence.

The casualties of the relieving column amounted to five men

while the cavalry lost twenty
killed and twenty-eight wounded,
horses killed and wounded.
fortified post was
It has previously been mentioned that a
constructed at Chakdara in 1895 for
The defence of Chakdara.
^^^^ protection of the SUSpcnsioU
This fort, which was built of
bridge across the Swat river.
small rocky knoll on the right
stone, was situated on a
bank'of the river, and about 150 yards
from the end of a spur
which descends from the high hills on the west. On the north-
barracks with rows of
west and west faces were double-storeyed
loopholes and arrangements for
flanking fire. The north-east
side of the knoll was steeply
scarped and protected by a wall and
small hornwork,
barbed wire fence, while on the south was a
enclosed by a stone wall and surrounded
by wire entanglement.
About 500 yards away, on the spur to the west, was a small one-
tower, from which com-
storeyed blockhouse, used as a signalling
munication was maintained with the Malakand. On the left
bank of the river the entrance to the bridge was guarded by a
loopholed iron gate with a blockhouse on either side.
Vol. I.
3C
378 FEONTIER AND OVEBSEAS EXPEDITIONS FBOM INDIA.

When the occurred in July 1897 the Chakdara

outbreak
garrison was under the command of Lieutenant H. B, Rattray,
45th Sikhs. On the afternoon of the 26th July this officer was
playing polo at Khar, when he received an urgent message from
2nd- Lieutenant Wheatley, at Chakdara, stating that large num-
bers of tribesmen with standards were approaching along both
Bides of the river.Lieutenant Eattray at once rode back to his
post, without being in any way interiered with by the people
along the road, and having ascertained that the information as
to the hostile gathering was correct he promptly telegraphed
the news to the Malakand. ISTews of the rising was first

brought to Chakdara by a Sikh havildar who was employed

on survey work, and who reported that he had been robbed
by a party of tribesmen, and prevented from sketching. Shortly
afterwards Inayat Khan of Thana arrived at the fort, with a few
personal followers, and stated that the rest of the people of his
village had joined the Mad Fakir,
A little was lighted on a neigh-
after 10 p.m., a signal fire
bouring hill by a man of the Dir Levies, who had arranged to give
warning of the enemy's approach. The alarm was instantly
sounded and, almost immediately after, the attack ^ began. The
enemy, who consisted chiefly of men from the Adinzai valley
and Khwazazai-Shamozai, made their first assault on the west
face, and when that failed tried to scale the east side by means
of ladders procured from the civil hospital. They next attempted
to force an entrance to the hornwork, but were everywhere
repulsed, and withdrew shortly before dawn to Chakdara village
and the hills on the north and north-west. From these heights,
which completely commanded the fort at ranges varying from
500 to 1,000 yards, the tribesmen opened a desultory but harassing
fire. Early on the morning of the 27th, Captains Wright and
Baker, with forty lances of the 11th Bengal Lancers, reached the
fort from Malakand as already described. Captain Wright now

1 It maybe interesting to note here that to rise. As such a signal was quite different
at 2 A.M. after the attacks had been made to the usual tribal custom of signalling by
on the Malakand position, the troops at means of lighting fires on the hilltops,
Chakdara saw a fire balloon with a scintil- and as moreover the balloon must have
lating ball of intensely white light sent up been an imported article, this strange
from the top of a hill, about four miles off, occurrence is a proof that the idea of a
adjoining the Swat valley. This was of rising did not orisinato in the Pwat vallej'^
voarse a pre-arranged signal for the tribes itself, but was instigated elsewhere.
 *""
SWAT TRIBES.

and the sowars were detailed to

assumed command of the post,
been held on the previous mght
defend the hornwork, which had men ot
of cavalry, assisted by a few
by the original detachment
was renewed with great
the Sikhs In the forenoon the attack
from their riflemen snccessive
energy-under cover of a heavy fire
carrying standards charged
reckk^ly
partfe's and even single men
hail of
be mown down by the
up to the very walls, only to
When at last the assailants fell back
to
bullets from the fort.
to strengthen their defences
the hi the garrison set to work
and
the walls were not loopholed,
improvising headcover where somewhat
gun detachments, who had been
eTect^g cover for the

was now interrupted the

'^''Totmunication with the Malakand
;
.

built sangars aU
telegrap" wire had
been cut, and the enemy had
unTthe signalling tower, and
kept up anincessant f- J>-^P-
The party _m
vented the signallers
from carrymg on their ^o k
rem-
whlh ten men of the 45th Sikhs, was
consisted of
Ihe tower up under
by 'six more and supplies and water were sent
rifles,
to .be sent up daily m
orced
Zlv ol fire from the fort. Water hadin the tower had not been
Ms manner, -
unfortunately the tank
their water-skms up he
hMsties, who had to carry
ept fiUed. The from the
where they could get no cover
steepf ee of the ridge, the unflinching
this dangerous duty with
enemy's fire, performed Indian m
displayed
this caste have so often
cSewh^rne- oi

tribesmen made two and attempt-

attacks,
'"'"'^Bmina the night the
off with heavy loss.
face, but were driven
scale the north-east
0,-i to
and throughout the mght the enemy,
On the evening of the next day the Abazai, Khadak-
lo haHow been joined by contingents from fruitless attacks, but were
clans, continued their
Tatatl Musi Khel
invariablv beaten of!.
29th a determined attempt was made
On the afternoon of the settmg m
but the enemy only succeeded
tn ranture the signal tower,
wall, and retreated at dusk,
fire to a
tbatched shed outside the
severely from the fire of
the troops the form
h'vin^ suffered unable
so heavy that they were
T^r rlosses on this occasion were
I ea rTfi" 1 *^-^- -^-^ ^"™^ *"^
"'«'*' '""^ °"
t fr"'
380 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the 30tli July the besiegers were reinforced by some men from
Bajaur, but they only made a somewhat half-hearted attack in the
evening, and were easily defeated ; the assault however was renewed
on the following night, but with no better success, for the tribesmen
fire of the maxim and 9-pr.
affain lost very heavily from the effective
guns. During this night too, the enemy occupied the civil hospital,

the hornwork, manned them

and, having loopholed the walls facing
with a number of riflemen. Other parties of tribesmen had also
built sangars on the west spur between the signal tower and the
of the defenders in the former post.
fort but defiladed from the fire
From this position they were able to bring a close rifle fire to bear

on the fort.

On the 1st August it w^as evident that the numbers of the

enemy were rapidly increasing, and they were believed to have been
ioined by men from the Malakand, and
by a number of Malizai
clansmen. The increased numbers of the enemy, and the cautious
manner in which they were now pushing forward under cover of
entrenchments, in contrast to the frenzied recklessness of their
former open attacks, greatly augmented the difficulties of the gar-
rison. Matters looked so serious that Captain Wright decided to
send an ur^^ent message to the
Malakand asking for assistance.
Signalling was difficult, as the men had
to come outside the tower

and expose themselves to from close range they however suc-

fire ;

'
containing only the words
ceeded in sending a short message help '

'
but the reply, stating that
' relief would be sent the next day,
us
were kept continually
was not received. Meanwhile the garrison
the day and the following night. On the
at their post throughout
2nd August the enemy, whose strength was now estimated at about
8 000 men, advanced
to the attack in a most determined manner.

They carried ladders and bundles of grass, and evidently intended

the post at all costs. A very heavy
to make a last effort to capture
on both sides but, though large numbers
fusilade was m^aintained
to fall, the combined fire of the small
of the tribesmen were seen
arms and the maxim and 9-pr. gun was barely sufficient to check
position of the defenders was becom-
the onward rush. Just as the
critical, the cavalry of
the relieving column appeared on
ing
the Amandara The enemy continued to press their attack
ridge.
at hand, when they beat a hasty
until the sc^uadrons were near
 is WAT TRIBES. 381

retreat, their
rearmost detachments being severely handled by the
gallant band from the fort, which made the dashing sortie
little

already mentioned.
The casualties among the garrison during the siege and final
sortie amounted to five men killed, one officer and
ten men wounded.
This comparatively slight loss was in a great measure due to
the
excellence of the defensive arrangements and to the
effective cover
which had been provided under the superintendence of
Captain
Baker. Sir B. Blood concluded his report in the following :— terms
During the fighting above described, the conduct of the whole of the
garrison, whether fighting-men, departmental details, or followers, is reported
to have been most gallant. Not the least marked display of courage and
constancy was that made by the small detachment in the Signal Tower who
were without water for the last 18 hours of the siege. The signallers, under
Lance-Naick Vir Singh, 45th Sikhs, who set a brilHant example, behaved
throughout in a most courageous manner one of them, Sepoy Prem Sin^h,
;

cHmbing several times out of the window in the Tower with a heliograph,
and signalling outside to the Malakand under a hot fire from sangars in
every direction.

On the 3rd August Brigadier-General Meiklejohn's column

marched back to Amandara, where they were joined by a column
under Colonel Keid, who was conveying supplies and ammunition
to Chakdara. The two columns, accompanied by Sir Bindon Blood
visited Aladand and Thana, and thoroughly searched the villages,
meeting w^ith no opposition. On the following day Sir Bindon Blood
returned with Colonel Eeid's column to the Malakand, while the
troops under Brigadier- General Meiklejohn remained at Amandara,
where the 1st Brigade of the Field Force was to be formed.
Operations of the Malakand Field Force under Major-General
Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B.

In order to crush the and to punish the Swatis and

rising,
other clans who had joined them in the attacks on our posts, which
have just been described, the Government of India sanctioned the
despatch of a force under the command of Major-General Sir
Bindon Blood, k.c.b. This force which was known as the
Malakand Field Force, included the troops which originally formed
the garrisons of the Swat posts, and the units which had been
sent to reinforce them on the first outbreak of hostilities.
 —

38^ FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The composition of the force is given in Appendix A.

An advanced supply depot was established at Khar on the 9th
August and subsequently reserve supplies were arranged for as fol-
lows :

At Malakand 30 days' supplies for the 1st and 2nd Brigades.

„ Rustam 15 ,, „ ,, ,, 3rd (Reserve) Brigade.
,, 1 f30 "
,, ,, ,, ,, 1st and 2nd Brigades.
„ Nowshera] o i -r • j
^4o ,, ,, ,, „ 3rd Brigade.

The 1st Brigade was ordered to concentrate at Amandara,

the 2nd Brigade at Khar and Malakand, while the Reserve troops
were to be held in readiness at Rawalpindi and Mardan.
The divisional troops, with of detachments
the exception
detailed to hold posts communication
on the hne at Jalala
of

and Dargai, were also to concentrate in the Swat valley, and

were attached to brigades as required. Concentration was com-
pleted on the 8th August, but meanwhile the punishment of the
Lower Swatis had already been begun by the force then in the
valley, and cavalry reconnaissances had been made for some distance
into Upper Swat.
On the 7th August, Brigadier- General Jeffreys with a force
of two battalions and four guns visited Jalalkot, Dherai, Jola-
gram, and some other villages to the west of Khar. These were
all found to be deserted, and their defences were demolished

without opposition. On the following day, in consequence of a

report that some Bunerwals and Hindustani fanatics were mov-
ing into the valley, the Shakot, Morah, and Charat passes were
reconnoitred. Only a few of the enemy were met with, and these
were easily dispersed by the cavalry.
On the 9th the Ranizai and Khan Khel jirgas came in, and
tendered their submission, which was accepted on the following
terms ^ :
—Payment of a fine of Rs. 47,000 ; surrender of all

arms, and Government properly in their possession forfei-

all ;

ture of mcdiJci allovv^ancesand compensation in lieu of tolls. The

destruction of their villages and the prospect of losing their rice
crops, the value of which was estimated at a lakh and a half of

1 Additional penalties were imposed in included in tlie general terms arranged with
the case of Sharif Khan of Aladand and the jirgas.
certain other leading men who were not
 SWAT TRIBES. 303

rupees, doubtless convinced these clans of the folly of further

resistance. The terms having been agreed to, the inhabitants were
permitted to return to their villages.
On
the 12th August the Khwazazai clans (Shamozai,
Nikbi
Khel, Sebujni and Shamizai) on the right bank of the Swat
river,
who are nominally subject to the Khan of Dir, sent in their
jirgas to Chakdara to sue for peace. Their submission was also
accepted on terms similar to those imposed on the Lower Swatis,
and in addition they agreed to the passage of troops through
their country whenever the Government should consider
it
necessary.
Bindon Blood now decided to .advance along the left bank of
Sir

Advance into Upper Swat and "the river into Upper Swat, and
in order
action of Landakai. to guard his force against a flank attack
^

from Buner, the Reserve Brigade under Brigadier-General Wode-

house was ordered to remain in observation at Mardan and Rustam
This latter place situated at the foot of the passes leading from
is

the Yusafzai plain into Buner, and consequently the troops

which concentrated there were in a position to hold the Buner-
wals in check.
Sir Bindon Blood's movement had been delayed by bad
Weather, but ou the 16th he marched with
Guides Cavalry.
11th Bengal Lancers. the troops notcd in the mareln from
Roval West Kent Regiment. Av^^„^j
Auiaudara x mi
to Thaua.
mi P^ •

This force was

24tii Punjab Infantry.
" Without tents twelve days' supphes for
;
45th Sikiis
10th Field Battery, R. A. ^^^' ^^^^ two days' grain for animals
No. 7 Mountain Battery, R. A. were Carried. The ^civcaiy,
cavalrv who
wno were
wptp
No. 8 Bengal Mountain Bat- , , .
scnt lorward to reconnoitre
tery. towards
""''"" "''" Landakai, obtained
peJI'nd M^r"' information that a
large force of the enemy was holding the
hills above that village.

The position at Landakai, which is one of great natural strength

is locally known as "the gate of Swat."
Here, just west of the
rocky spur runs down from the mountains
village, a steep
on the
south and ends abruptly at the river's edge,
where it commands
the road from Thana, which is the only entrance
to the upper valley
The road through the gorge- leads for about a mile
along a narrow
stone-paved causeway, only wide enough for men
to advance in
384 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

single file. enemy's main position lay along the crest of the
Tlie
Landakai ridge, which was fortified with sangars. About a mile or
more to the west another ridge, descending from a peak which over-
looks the Landakai spur, ends at the village of Jalala. Between
this village and Landakai is an open valley about half a mile
across, with a nala running through it, and then another spur
divided off from the Landakai ridge by a deep ravine.
At daybreak on the 17th August, some excess baggage was
sent back to Khar under escort of a squadron of the 11th Bengal
Lancers. The remainder of the baggage and stores was left at Thana,
guarded by two squadrons, 11th Bengal Lancers, two companies,
^
45th Sikhs, and 400 rifles, 35th Sikhs.
The advanced guard, headed by the Guides Cavalry under
Lieut.-Colonel Adams, marched from Thana at 6-30 a.m., and
on reaching Jalala found the enemy's scouts holding some Buddhist
ruins on the spur above the village. Two companies of the West
Kent Begiment at once engaged them, and on the arrival of the main
body they fell back.
A few minutes before 9 a.m. the 10th Field Battery and No. 7
Mountain Battery came into action on the Jalala ridge, along which
the West Kent Regiment was already extended, and opened fire on the
Landakai spur, where some two or three thousand tribesmen were
strongly posted in an ancient Buddhist fort and numerous sangars.
Meanwhile Brigadier- General Meiklejohn, with the remainder of

the infantry and No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, moved to his right
along the rear of this position, and ascended a spur leading up to the
crest of the main ridge, which commanded the enemy's left flank.
The enemy had evidently prepared to meet a frontal attack, and had
posted their main force and reserves along the northern end of the
position to defend the causeway. But as soon as they realised that a
turning movement was in progress, which not only endangered their
weakly-held left, but also menaced the line of retreat towards the
Morah pass, they made an effort to reinforce the threatened flank
from their right and centre. This move however was frustrated by
the fire of the artillery and the long range volleys of the West Kent
Regiment, which held the defenders in check and drove them under
cover behind the ridge.

1 This detachment of the 35th Sikhs was seut from Khar for this duty.
 -

aw AT TRIBES. 386

The enemy now began to waver, and before the flanking

column could intercept them a considerable number made off
towards the Morah pass. On the summit of the ridge, a few of the
bolder spirits covered the retreat of their comrades, and checked
the leading infantry until they were dispersed by the shrapnel
fire of the supporting guns. The ascent at last accompUshed,
the flanking troops turned left-handed and pushed forward
along the crest, clearing the enemy out of a cluster of ruined
buildings in their front, and gaining touch witli the West Kent
companies, which had moved further up the Jalala spur. The
(.me my were now everywhere retiring, and at 11 o'clock the left

wing of the West Kent moved forward, and, seizing the Landakai
ridge, drove the defenders from their last sangars. As soon as the
sappers and miners had repaired the causeway, and removed the
obstructions placed there by the enemy, the cavalry were launched in
pursuit. The track along the causeway was so rough and narrow
that the troopers had to advance in single file leading their horses.
As the leading files debouched into tlie open. Captain Palmer
hastily collected a few men and dashed on in pursuit.
He
was followed at no great distance by Lieut. -Colonel Adams and
another troop in loose formation, while the other squadrons came
on in succession as quickly as they could. The majority of
the enemy had meanwhile reached the foot hills above
Nawaldla
a village lying about a mile and a half to the eastward of
Landakai. Seeing that it was too late to char ere, Lieut.
Colonel Adams ordered his sowars to hold a small ziarat close
to the village and open fire. Unfortunately this order was not
heard by Captain Palmer or by Lieutenant Greaves,^ who
was
riding beside him, and the two officers galloped on. Coming up
with a few stragglers. Captain Palmer cut down one of
the
enemy, but, immediately after, his horse was shot under him
and
he himself was disabled by a wound, and was with
difiicultv
rescued by two of his men. At the same moment Lieutenant
Greaves
was struck by a bullet, and losing control of his horse was
carried
on to the foot of the slope, where he fell to the gromid
and was
instantly suiTounded by the enemy's swordsmen.
Seeing this,

1 Lieutenant R. T. Greavos, Lanoashire count Fincastle, 16th Lancers, was

present
f » "«
Fusiliers,accompamed tho force as a news- in the same capacity.
paper correspondent, and Lieutenant Vis-
386 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Lieut. -Colonel Adams and Lieutenant

Viscount Fincastle, fol-
lowed by Lieutenant Maclean with a few of the Guides Cavalry,
immediately dashed forward under a hot fire from the tribesmen
on the hill, and, scattering the swordsmen, saved the wounded officer
from their clutches. As he was being
on to a horse, however.
lifted

Greaves was shot dead, and an instant later Maclean was killed at his
side. Under cover of the fire of the dismounted cavalry the rest
of the little party reached the shelter of the ziarat, carrying with
them the bodies of their comrades.
For this gallant Adams and Viscount
action Lieut. -Colonel
Jamadar Bahadur Singh
Fincastle received the Victoria Cross,^ while
and four men of the Guides Cavalry were awarded the Order of Merit.
While the cavalry pursuit was taking place, the infantry and
mountain batteries, continuing their advance, descended from
the Landakai spur and pushed forward through the Kota ham-
lets towards the hills. On their appearance, the tribesmen moved
off into the higher hills, firing a few shots at impossible ranges
as they retreated. When the main body came up, Lieut.-
Colonel Adams remounted his men and continued the pursuit
about a mile further up the valley to Abuwa, on the Barikot road.
Here about 150 of the enemy who were holding the village were
driven them being killed, and the cavalry returned to
off, 8 of
camp near Landakai, which they reached at 6-30 p.m.
While these operations were going on a number of the
tribesmen, who had retreated in the direction of the Morah pass,
came down towards Thana with the intention of cutting off the
baggage. But, seeing the camp well guarded, they did nOt press
the attack and were easily dispersed, losing some twenty men killed.
The British casualties during the day were two officers killed,
two officers and seven men wounded. The enemy's losses were
subsequently ascertained to have exceeded 300.
The small loss incurred by the troops, and the comparative
ease with which the enemy were dislodged from their strong posi-
tion at Landakai, was in a great measure due to the skilful dis-
positions of the General Officer Commanding and the discomfiture
;

of the enemy was completed by the admirably executed

lA recent announcement (1907) in ihr Viotoria Cross had hf survived, and the
Londov Oazeite states that Lieutenant decoration has been handed to his rela-
Maclean would also have received the tivcs.
 8WA'^.' TRIBES. 337

turning movement, and by the effective fire of the artillery—

especially of the 12.pr. B.L. field guns, wliich this year made their
first appearance ^ in Indian frontier warfare.

On the 18th August the column marched along the left bank
of the Swat to Ghalegai. No opposition was met with, and all
the villages along the road were found to be deserted. At Ghalegai,
liowever, the maliks and other inhabitants had remained in their
village,and on the arrival of the troops they promptly complied
with the General's demands, and surrendered all arms and Govern-
ment property in their possession, und furnished supplies and
transport. On
the following day the troops moved on by a fairly
good road to Mingaora. Many of the inhabitants had returned
and the people everywhere seemed to have aban-
to their villages,
doned all ideas of further resistance, and were evidently anxious
to propitiate the troops by offering supplies. A few shots were fired
into the camp during the night, but the villagers themselves turned
out and quickly dispersed the snipers.
The force remained at Mingaora until tlie 24t]i August, during
which time Major Deane was engaged in enforcing the terms of
submission on the various sections of the tribes implicated in the
rising. Eeconnaissances were made up the valley to Man^^laor,
Charbagh, and Gulibagh, and eastward as far as the Kotkai pass,
which gives access to the Jinki Khel valley of Ghurband.
Steps were taken to disarm the country up to the limits of
Kohistan, and forty-one breech-loading and some 800 other fire-
rifles

arms wf.re collected ; a number and some Govern-

of standards,
ment property, including transport animals and equipment, were
also surrendered. A considerable quantity of grain, fodder, and
fuel was taken without payment and the tribesmen were com-
;

pelled to demolish the defensive towers in their villages.

They
were also required to protect the post service between Thana and
Mingaora.
On the 22nd August, the Upper Swati jirgas agreed to
uncon-
Submission of the Upper ditional Surrender, and signed a docu-
^'''''^'^-
ni^ent to that effect. They were assured
that Government had no desire to interfere with them or
their
country, but that peace must be maintained on the border.
In
1 The FieldBattery equipped with 12-pr. relief expedition of 1S95 did not come into
P.L. guns, which took part in the Chitral action.

3D2
388 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

his interviews with the tribesmen, Major Deane had persistently

endeavoured to ascertain the true reasons for the outbreak, and from
the replies received to his questions it appeared that, in the case
of the Swatis at any rate, fanaticism was the sole motive. They
had no complaint to make against the action of the Government,
or the conduct of the officials, and when asked direct why they
had attacked our post on the Malakand, they naively replied that
they were "not aware that Government had issued any orders
forbidding them to do so."
The Mian Guls had sent letters some days previously in which
they expressed their desire for peace and willingness to submit,
but they had not ventured to attend in person, and they now with-
drew to Ham on the border of Buner. As they were already dis-
credited in Swat, it was not considered worth while to take any
further steps to procure their surrender. The Mad Fakir was at
this time reported to be at Mahaban in Buner, but he too had com-
pletely lost the extraordinary influence he had so rapidly acquired
over the Swatis, and they now bitterly reproached him for the mis-
fortunes which he had brought upon them.
the 24th August the force under Sir Bindon Blood marched
On
back to Barikot, where a halt was made in order to reconnoitre
the Karakar pass leading into Buner. The column continued its
return march to Thana on the 26th, and on the following day the
troops moved on Khar and Malakand.
to
During the operations in Upper Swat, the 2nd Brigade under
Movements of the troops in Brigadier- General Jeffreys had remained
Lower Swat. g^^ Khar to cuforcc the submission of

the Lower Swatis. With a view to an advance into Utman Khel

country, a passable road had been made by a difficult route via
Jolagram to Matkanai, and on the 24th August Brigadier- General
Jeffreys visited the latter place with a portion of the 2nd Brigade.
Thence he reconnoitred the Mekhban valley belonging to the Sultan
Khel, and advanced as far as Pir Khel, in the direction of the
Digar pass a reconnaissance was also made up to the junction of
;

the Swat and Panjkora rivers. The inhabitants were everywhere

submissive, and were evidently much disturbed by the presence

of the troops.
On the 27th August the 2nd Brigade marched to Thana,
whence Sir Bindon Blood intended that Brigadier- General Jeffreys
 SWAT TRIBES. 389

should advance into Bimer by the Karakar pass. But the con-
and the extension of
dition of affairs in other parts of the frontier,
the rising to the Afridis and Orakzais^ induced the Government to
postpone the coercion of the Bunerwals to a more favourable time.
Sir Bindon Blood was however authorised to proceed at once with
the punishment of the Utman Khel on the left bank of the Swat
river if he considered such action desirable. Accordingly the 2nd
Brigade returned tt) Jolagram on the 28th, and two days later
moved on through Kalangai, the last village in Swat, and encamp-
ed at the foot of the Inzargai pass. On the following day however
the orders for the operations against the Utman Khel were suddenlj^
countermanded and the 2nd Brigade was recalled to Khar.
On the 30th Colonel A. J. Reid with the marginally noted
2 squadrons. 11th Bengal t^oops, moved from Chakdara to Uch,
Lancers. in Order to support the Nawab of Dir in
loth Field Battery R. A. . ,.
vi. A, AJ- xi •
rri
38th Dogras. dealmg With the Admzai andi the Khwa-
22nd Punjab Infantry. zazai clans of Upper Swat on the right
i No. 5 Company, Madras • ^
bank ot ^i r^,
i i <• ,

Sappers and Miners. tlic rivcr. 1 hcsc people Were

^''^"^ nominally subjects of this
KorllT^'''^^^''^''^'
chief, and he
Section No. 35 Native Field had accordingly been deputed to collect
^^^P'^^'*'
money and rifles which had
the fines in
been inflicted on them.
The Government of India now decided to despatch two brigades
under Sir Bindon Blood through Dir and Bajaur in order to co-
operate from Nawagai with the Mohmand Field Force, and com-
pletely crush the Hadda MuUa's gathering. The 2nd and 3rd
Brigades were selected for these operations ^ and the 1st Brigade
remained in the Swat valley.
On the 24th September Major Deane had a satisfactory in-
terview with the Upper Swat jirga, which was accompanied by
the younger Mian Gul, Gul Badshah, son of the late Abdul Hanan.
On the 2nd October the Mian Gul Amir Badshah, younger son
of Abdul Manan, also came to visit Major Deane at Malakand,
and was attended by several mcdiJcs, mullas, and sheikhs. The
senior Mian Gul, Saiyid Badshah, elder son of Abdul Manan, had
written to say that he, too, was on his way to attend the meeting,

1 See Volume II. September. The further operations of these

2 Sir Bindon Blood, with 2nd and 3rd brigades being against the Mohmand tribes,
Brigades, advanced from Chakdara, on 6th will be dealt with in Chapter XI.
390 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

hut was prevented by illness from completing his journey, and

would come on as soon as he recovered. He kept his promise
on the 30th October, when he came in with his brother and the
Pisani Mulla to attend an important meeting at which some 600
maliks and representative men from Upper Swat were present.
The attendance of the Mian Guls was significant, and proved that
the religious leaders, as well as the tribal representatives, were
sincere in their expressed willingness to submit to the terms im-
posed and complete the settlement. The jirga raised the ques-

tion of the future administration of their country, and a large

majority of the trijbesmen expressed themselves in favour of direct
control by the Government of India, stating that by no other
means could they obtain justice or settle their interminable disputes.
About a fortnight later Major Deane was able to report that
the fanatical feeling in the country generally had subsided, and that
the people were engaged in repairing damage done to villages, and
in their ordinary occupations.
On the 27th October all Malakand Field
the troops of the
Force (with the exception of the 3rd Brigade which had remained
with the Mohmand Field Force) were again concentrated in the Swat
valley. A few days later the 2nd Brigade moved into the old North
camp, while the remainder of the troops were withdrawn to Jalala.
The Indian Medal, 1895, with clasp and medal inscribed " Pun-
jab Frontier, 1897-98 " was granted to the troops which proceeded
beyond Jalala and took part in the operations above described.
An additional clasp inscribed "Malakand, 1897" was awarded to
those who took part in the defence and relief of Malakand and
Chakdara between the 26th July and the 2nd August inclusive.
In November 1897 and January 1898, the Malakand Field Force
was employed in operations against the cis-Swat Utman Khel and
against the Bunerwals, a description of which will be found in the
chapters dealing with those tribes. On the conclusion of the latter
expedition, the force was broken up, but a moveable column (con-

sisting of three squadrons, one mountain battery, two companies of

Sappers and Miners, and remained in the Swat valley.
six battalions)

In February 1898 some unrest was caused in the valley by

, .
o . u +u. the mullas, who tried to rekindle the
Events in Swat after the ^^ '

operations of 1897-98. fanticism of the tribesmen. The latter,

however, showed little enthusiasm, and were easily restrained by

 SWAT TRIBES. 391

their headmen. Towards the end of the year more trouble was
caused by the action of the Mad Fakir, and the moveable column
was sent up from Khar towards Landakai but the fakir\s attempt
;

failed, and his gathering, which had moved into Dir territory, was
dispersed by the Nawah's lashkar.
For the next three years nothing occurred to disturb the peace
in the Swat valley, and trade was continually on the increase. In
January 1901 the light railway from Nowshera to Dargai was opened
for traffic. In 1902 some excitement was caused on the Yusafzal
border, owing to mischievous reports which were circulated regard-
ing the concentration of troops for the Yusafzai manoeuvres. The
apprehensions of the tribesmen were however soon allayed, and the
moveable column at Khar was broken up.
In 1903 Saiyid Badshah, the eldest Mian Gul, was murdered,
and a faction fight ensued between his brother Amir Badshah and
his cousin Gul Badshah, who disputed the succession but the;

quarrel led to no serious disturbance. In the following year the

clans on the right bank of the Swat river became greatly incensed
at the tyranny and oppression of the Nawab of Dir, and it was
feared that they might be provoked to call upon the Mad Fakir
and their kinsmen on the other side of the valley to assist them
in throwing off their allegiance to their hated ruler. Had this dis-
turbance come to a head, it might have entirely upset the arrange-
ments made by Government to preserve our communication with
Chitral, but fortunately Maj or Deane was able to effect a settlement
and to restrain the Nawab from taking aggressive action against
his Swati subjects.
In April 1905 the Mian Guls and chief men of the Upper
Swatis attended a durbar held by the Chief Commissioner of the
North-West Frontier Province, at which Badshah Khan was for-
mally installed as Khan of Dir, in succession to his father, who had
died in December of the previous year.
In May 1905 the Political Agent at the Malakand accepted an
invitation from the Upper Swat jirgas to visit their country. Tra-
velling viaThana and Kota, he visited the Akhund'^s grave at Sadu,
and then proceeded to Minglaor and Charbagh. The good result
of our political influence in Upper Swat was demonstrated by the
cordial reception given to the British representative on this occa-
sion ; and the extraordinary sense of discipline prevailing, and the
592 FRONTIER AND OVSRSBAS EXPEDITIONS EROM INDIA.

power of the tribal parliaments over the masses, was exemplified

by the attitude of the tribesmen, the cessation of all tribal feuds
during the tour, and the arrangements which were made for the
safety of the visitor.
Although for the moment the prospects of peace and pros-
perity are bright, there is nevertheless one matter which deserves

attention, and that is the acquisition by these tribes of arms of

precision. This arming of the tribes with long range rifles is a most
serious question. Under our benign influence the trade and general
prosperity of the country has in recent years increased by leaps
and bounds, and large sums are disbursed annually as allowances
and compensation. In spite of this, however, there are no indications
that the tribes are attempting to apply their increased affluence to
improving their country or themselves according to western ideas,
and they still continue to live in the same primitive way as they
have done for hundreds of years. One can only think, therefore,
that the bulk of the money which finds its way into the country is
expended in the purchase of arms and ammunition.
 APPENDIX A.

COMPOSITION OF TEE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE^ 1897.

In Command. —Major -General Sir Bindon Blood, k.c.b.

1st Brigade (Brigadier-General W. H. Meiklejohn, c.b., c.m.g.).

1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Eegiment.

24tli (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
OlSt ( ,, ) ,, ,J M )l

45tli (Rattray's Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

2nd Brigade (Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, c.b.).

1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment (The BufTs).

35th (Sikh) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
38th (Dogra)
Guides Infantry.
Divisional Troops.
1 squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers.
11th Bengal Lancers.
Guides Cavalry.
No. 1 Mountain Battery, R. A.
No. 7
No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
22nd (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
2 companies, 21st (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No. 5 „ Madras „

Reserve (3rd) Brigade (Brigadier- General J. H. Wode-

house, c.b., c.m.g.)

1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment (The

Queen's).
2nd „ Highland Light Infantry.
6 companies, 21st (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal
Infantry.
39th (Garhwal Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
Rifles)
No. 10 Field Battery, Royal Artillery, i
No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.

1 The 10th Field] Battery joined Divisional Troops at Khar on 6tii August.

( 393 )
Vol. I.
3B
 APPENDIX B.

Commands and Staff of the Malakand Field Force.

General Officer Commanding the Brigadier-General Sir B. Blood, k.c.b.

Force {"mth the temporary rank

of Major-General).
Aide-de-Camp Captain A. B. Dunsterville, East Surrey
Regiment.
(Replaced by Lieutenant Viscount Fin-
castle, 16th Lancers.)

Assistant Adjutant- General Major H, H. Burney, 1st Battahon,

Gordon Highlanders.
Assistant Quarter Master General Lieut. -Colonel A. Masters, Central India
Horse.

Deputy Assistant Quarter Master Captain H. E. Stanton, d.s.c, r.a.

General (IntelUgence)
Field IntelUgence Officer Captain H. I\ Walters, 24th Bombay
Infantry.
(Replaced by Captain J. K. Tod, 7th
Bengal Cavalry, 2nd October 1897.)
Superintendent, Army SignalHng. Captain E. W. M. Norie, 2nd Battahon,
Middlesex Regiment.
(Replacedby Captain E. V. 0. Hewett,
Royal West Kent Regiment.)
Principal Medical Officer Surgeon-Colonel G. Thomson, c.b., i.m.s,

(Replaced by Surgon- Colonel J. C. G.

Carmichael, M.D., i.m.s.)

Commanding Royal Artillery Lieut-Colonel W. Aitken, c.b., r.a.

Ensfineer Colonel J. E. Broadbent, r.e.
(Replaced by Lieut. -Colonel W. Peacocke,
R.E., 17th October 1897.)

Adjutant, Royal Artillery Captain H. D. Grier, r.a.

(Replaced by Captain H. Rouse, r.a.)

Adjutant, Royal Engineers Captain H. J. Sherwood, r.e.

Major E. Blunt, r.e.
Field Engineer
Ordnance Officer Captain W. W. Cookson, r.a.
(Replaced by Captain L, G. Watkins,
R.A,, 26th December 1897.)
( 394 )
 .. .

APPENDICES. 395

Chief Commissariat Officer •• Major H. Wharry.

Divisional Transport Officer . . Captain C. R. J. Thackwell.
Inspecting Veterinary Officer .. Veterinary Captain H. T. W. Mann.
Commissariat Officer, Advance Captain A. R. Burlton, i.s.c.

Depot.

1st Brigade Staff.

Commanding (with the tempo- Colonel W. H. Meiklcjohn, c.B., cm.G.

rary rank of Brigadier-Gen-
eral).

Orderly Officer .. .. Lieutenant C. R. Gaunt, 4th Dragoon

Guards.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant Major E. A. P. Hobday, r.a.

General.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master Captain G. F. H. Dillon, 40th Patlians.
General.
Brigade Commissariat Officer . . Captain C. H. Seville
Transport Officer . . Captain J. M. Camilleri, 13th Bengal
Infantry.

Veterinary Officer .» .. Veterinary Captain W. R. Walker.

2nd Brigade Staff.

Commanding .. .. Brigadier- General P. D. Jeffreys, c.B.

Orderly Officer . . . Lieutenant J. B;yTon, r.a.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant Major E. 0. F. Hamilton, Royal West

General. Surrey Regiment.
(Replaced by Captain A. B. Dunsterville,
East Surrey Regiment.)
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master Major C. H. Powell, 2nd Battalion, 1st
General. Gurkhas.
Brigade Commissariat Officer . . Captain G. A. Hawkins.
„ Transport Officer . . Captain D. Baker, 2nd Bombay Grena-
diers.

Veterinary Officer . . . Veterinary Lieutenant G. M. Williams.

For Base and Line of Communication.

Base Commandant . . Lieut. -Colonel V. A. Schalch, 11th Bengal

Infantry.

Stafi Officer at the Base . . Captain H. Scott, 2nd BattaHon, The

Royal Sussex Regiment.
(Replaced by Brevet-Major A. Cadell,'38th
Dogras, 30th November 1897.)
3E2
 . ...

396 APPENDICES.

Section Commandant Captain 0. B. S. F. Shore, 18th Bengal

Lancers.
(Replaced by Captain C. E. BeUi-Bivar,
7th Bombay Lancers, 5th October 1897.)

Base Commissariat Officer Captain W. S. Lincoln.

Commandant, Depot, British Captain H. d'E. Vallancey, 2nd Battahon,
Troops. Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

Adjutant and Quarter Master . Captain A. F. Burdock, 2nd Battalion,

South Lancashire Regiment.
Commandant, Depot, Native Captain R. R. Renton, 18th Bengal In-
Troops. fantry.

Adjutant and Quarter Master . Lieutenant H. L. Tomkins, 28th Punjab

Infantry (appointed 7th January 1898).
Engineer Field Park Major M. C. Barton, r.e.

Ordnance ,, ,,
Lieutenant J, Henry u.a.

Veterinary Officer Veterinary-Lieutenant W. A. McDougal.

Command and Staff, ?>rd [Reserve) Brigade

Commanding Brigadier-General J. H. Wodehouse, c.b.,

C.M.G., R.A.

Orderly Officer Captain R. I. C. Elkington, e.a.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant- Captain A. H. Gr. Kemball, 5th Gurkhas.

General.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master Captain H. R. B. Donne, Norfolk Regi
General. ment.
Field Intelligence Officer (attach- Captain J. K. Tod, 7th Bengal Cavalry.
ed to Divisional Head-Quar- (Replaced by Lieutenant A. C. M. Water-
ters). field, 11th Bengal Lancers, 11th October
1897.)

Veterinary Officer . Veterinary-Lieutenant T. W. Rudd.

Brigade Commissariat Officer . Captain A. Mullaly.

„ Transport Officer Captain E. deV. Wintle, IGth Bengal

Lancers.
 — (1) Sultan Kha Kiel
$ hi •« —(2) Usmani Khel
^
—(3) Bahrain Kha Khel
[Lower Swat,
— (4) Utmanzai r left bank.
P5

I
— (5) Khawaza Khel
I— (6) Ali Khel

XI s

p-i
 CHAPTER X.

THE UTMAN KHEL TRIBE.

The Utman Khel are a tribe of Patlians who occupy the hills
to the north of Peshawar, between the Mohmands and Rani-
zais of Swat. They appear to be Kodai branch of the
of the
Kalanri, who attached themselves and Mandanar
to the Yusafzai
tribes during the migration of the latter from their earlier homes
north-west of the Suleiman range, and have in course of time found
themselves in possession of their present country, which they
occupied about the same time as the Yusafzais conquered Swat
and the Tarkanris took possession of Bajaur. The tribe is a large
one, numbering some 40,000 persons and being able to muster
some 9,300 fighting men. They have always maintained complete
independence and pay tribute to no one.
Their country, which is, with the exception of a small tract in
the north, barren and unfertile, lies on both banks of the Swat river
until the limits of the Mohmand territory is reached ; here the
river bends to the south and forms the boundary between the
two tribes.

The country to the north of the river, which is the larger por-
tion, consists of a series of between spurs of the hills
valleys
radiating from the lofty Koh-i-Mohr, a mountain 8,200 feet high.
To the south and south-east of this peak are the important divisions
of Barang, andAmbahar, while to the north-east lies that of
Arang. South of the Swat river again, and between it and British
territory, lies the narrow hilly tract known as the Laman,i which
is traversed by the Sulala range, rising to its highest point in Mount

Khanora, north of the village of Pranghar. This portion is under the

political administration of the Peshawar district.

1 The word Laman strictly denotes only intprcepted between that and the river has
the country between the watershed of the no special name.
Sulala range and the plain. The portion

( 398 )
 —

THE UTMAN KEEL TRIBE. 399

The chief divisions of the tribe, a detailed table of which is

given in the Appendix, are :

1. Ismailzai. 5. Gorai.
2. Mandal. 6. Peghozai.
3. Alizai. 7. Bimmarai.
4. Mutakkai. 8. Sinazai.

Of these the most important, both from their numbers,

their
situation, and their consequent connection with the British
Govern-
ment, are the Ismailzais, who aie divided into three
principal
branches— Shamozais, Asils, and But Khels. The Shamozais
in-
habit Arang, and the Asils Barang, while the But Khels
live in the
valley of Ambahar. Colonies of Uhe Asils have also settled
in the
Laman.
Of the other the
Mandal, Alizai, and Mutakkai Hve
clans,
on the northern slopes of the-Koh-i-Mohr mountains none of
these ;

have much intercourse with British territory. The Sinazai,

Pegho-
zai, and Bimmarai live in Total, a district included
in Sam'^anizai
and separated from the Laman by the valley of the Jhindai, a small
perennial stream.
The Laman proper is held by a variety of tribes,
Utman
Khel and others. The Shahdad and Pakhai sections of the
Umar
Khels live in Prangarh, Rangmiana, and Nasir and the
Dini ;

Khel in Nawadan. Besides these there are a few non-Utman

Khel
tribes— the Zirak, who are said to be the original inhabitants of
the
country, in Tarakai and Bucha and the Mullagoris, in
;
Sapri and
Nawakili. This settlement of the Mullagoris ^ is an offshoot of the
Mullagoris of Tartara, who inhabit a tract of country to the north
of the Khaibar pass, and who will be described in another chapter
The men of the Laman
being our immediate neighbours, have con-
tinual intercourse with British territory.In ordinary times thev
may be seen in numbers in Abazai and Tangi with grass and firewood
for sale, and they cultivate a large portion of the land
of these
two villages north of the road from Abazai to Gandera.
The intercourse of the people of the Laman with British terri-
tory, and the fact of so many of their villages cultivating land
and
rearing valuable crops far within the British border, make'^a
haramta,

1 Generally kno\\Ti as the Eastern Mixllagorls, to distinguish

them.
400 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

or reprisals, on them easy, and the existence of these crops is, until

the end of the harvest, a kind of security for their good behaviour.
The roads leading into the Utman Khel country from British
territory There are three roads, or rather tracks,
are difficult.
leadino- through the Laman and across the river to Ambahar and
Barang, but these are all difficult and impracticable for horsemen.
There is a road to Arang through Total, by the Agra pass^, which is

practicable for laden animals.

In the whole course of the Swat river through Utman Khel
territory there are only five rope or swing bridges ordinarily kept
up. There are no other means of crossing the river, which is a swift,
deep torrent, between high, precipitous banks. By going through
Mohmand territory the difficulty of crossing the river could be
avoided. The road from Matta, on the Mohmand border, through
Pandiali to Ambahar is a good one, and practicable for laden
animals.
During the hfetime of the Akhund of Swat, the Utman Khels
did not recognise his influence to any great extent, and he had
not so much power among them among other Pathan tribes.
as

The Utman Khels are in no way connected with any of the

Afcrhan tribes which surround them, such as the Mohmands,
Eanizais, Bajauris, etc., but look upon the Sinn wans as their best
friends. Taking into consideration the geographical position of
each, however, and the fact of the Mohmands having been originally
their enemies, it is difficult to understand how this friendly inter-
course could have been estabHshed and maintained.
The Utman Ehels have twice waged war with the Mohmands,
once in 1827, and the second time at the commencement of 1850, on
both which occasions the Mohmands showed proof of their superi-
of
ority. They are now on terms of peace, and the people of the
one tribe mix with the other but there is no great friendship
;

between them.

Expedition against the Independent ^ Utman Khels by a force

under Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., in May 1852.
During the few years after the annexation of the Pesha-
first

war valley the Utman Khels gave a great deal of trouble on the
I So designated to distinguish them from the Utman Khels of Sam Baizai, mentioned
in the previous chapter.
 THE UTMAN KEEL TBIBE. 401

border, by constant raids in the Hashtnagar division, and on tlie

maira to the south of their hills, and at last, in 1852, they capped
their misdeeds by giving an asylum to, and aiding, Ajun Khan, the
fugitive Khan of Tangi. This chief was a young man of a restless,
proud, and bigoted character, and, at the beginning of the British
rule,was residing at Tangi, a large and important village in the
Peshawar district.
A larg^ part of the village was held by him rent-free, but he de-
sired the whole of it, and also exemption from personal attendance
at our courts, and from the interference
of our revenue and police
Finding that these demands were not likely
officials in his village.

to be complied with, he adopted the course, not unfrequent during

the Durani and Sikh rule, of removing to the hills, calling around him

a band and leading them in acts of aggression upon

of adventurers,
British villages, in the hope that the Government would be induced
to yield to such pressure, and grant him the privileges he sought.
A native officer of the Guide Corps was sent to induce him to return,
but he refused to do so unless his.villages were given to him rent-
free and he was exempted from attendance at any of our courts.
This step led him to believe that we feared him, and ever after
he caused annoyance to the Government. To do this most effec-
tually, he aimed at striking fear into our villagers, and causinf^ them
to leave their lands uncultivated, by which not only a loss of revenue
was to be anticipated, but a general feeling of disaffection and dis-
quietude, leading to internal disturbances. He took up his quarters
in the Utman Khel villages, to the north of the district, and re-
ceived some villages in jagir from Saiyid Akbar, the King of Swat,
who was himself anticipating the advent of the British, and will-
ingly received such fugitives, locating them in his border villages to
act as an advanced guard.
On
the night of the 20th April 1852, Ajun Khan, with a band
of 200 horsemen, attacked the large village of Charsada, which was
the head-quarters of the Hastnagar division.
The party came from the Utman Khel villages of the Laman,
and were aided by men from Ranizai (see page 348).
The revenue buildings had not then been constructed, and
the establishments were located in native houses, with mud
enclosures, which could offer but slight resistance. The tehsildar,
himself a saiijid, was murdered and cut to pieces. Several other
Vol. I.
3 J,
402 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

officials were similarly treated, and the tehsil treasury was plun-

dered. On the following day, in furtherance of his plans, Ajun

Khan came down and occupied the village of Abazai, where he
remained twenty-four hours. He then desired the maliks to leave
the village with their cattle, and killed one man who refused to do
so. Ajun Khan next proceeded to Pranghar and Nawadan, where
he took up his quarters.
On the receipt of the report of this outrage, orders were at once
given for a punitive expedition to be carried out against the Utman
Khel villages, and on the 28th of April 1852 troops began to move
out from Peshawar.
The force was under the command of Brigadier Sir Colin ,

Campbell, k.C.b., who established his head-quarters at Abazai.

Lieut. -Colonel F. Mackeson, c.b., the Commissioner, and Captain
H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, accompanied the force. On
the 2nd of May a picquet of twenty men of the Guide Cavalry,
under Lieutenant G. N. Hardinge, in advance of the line of outposts,
observed the enemy advancing in force. They were at once ordered
to charge, which they did with great gallantry, checking the advance
of the enemy. The latter had many of their number cut up, be-

sides losing a standard. On our side. Lieutenant Hardinge and

two sowars were wounded.
On the 11th May, the Commissioner having called on Sir Colin

1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Campbell to destroy the Nawadan group
Artillery. of villages, the Brigadier moved out with
"Detachment, 2rnl Company,
4th Battalion, Artillery (two
, , ,

the troops uotcd

^ i xi
the margm. m •

8-mch hoxvitzers). Nawadan was about four miles from

Her Majesty's 32nd Foot, ;)00 • .-, i ^ -i . xi
bayonets. Abazai, the last mile oi the approach to
Ono squadron, 2nd Irregular -^ leading ovcr hilly and broken ground.
One squadron, Guide Cavalry. On the arrival of the force the villages
^''^^''' ^""'^
MhTet.^"'^^'''''^'
^^^^ ^^^^^ deserted, but many of the
28th Native Infantry, 300 hillmen were scen on the neighbouring

^YeTGurkhas, 300 bayonets. heights. As the burning proceeded, the

Guide Infantry. enemy gradually gathered at different
points, and began skirmishing with the advanced picquets of
the Guides. This lasted whilst the work of destruction went
on, the Guides having one jemadar and four men wounded. The
ground was too broken to admit of the guns being brought up
near the village.
 tHE UTMAiJ KHEL TRIBE. 403

As the troops withdrew, the numbers of the enemy appeared

slightly to increase,but the retirement was conducted without loss,
the village and large quantities of grain having been destroyed.
During the operations, the Isfc Punjab Infantry, under Captain
J. Coke, and two squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, under
Lieutenant W.
Hughes, joined Sir Colin Campbell.
T.
These troops had made an extraordinary march. The letter
from the Commissioner, sent by express to Captain Coke at
Kohat, calling for his services, had miscarried, and that officer
•only got his orders letter sent by post.
in a secondThe 1st
Punjab Infantry, and the two squadrons of the 1st Punjab Cavalry,
marched from Kohat at 2 a.m. on the 8th, and reached Pesha-
war, forty miles, the same day. On arriving at the bridge-of-boats
over the Kabul river, Captain Coke found it had been swept away,

and the boats carried down stream. On the evening of the ICth
the troops had got across, and on that night marched for Abazai,
halting for two hours under the Shabkadar fort and when, on ;

reaching Abazai at daybreak, it was found the force under Sir Colin
Campbell had gone out to attack Nawadan, Captain Coke pushed
on, joining the force as the attack was begun, having march-
ed more than forty miles when Abazai w^as reached after the opera-
tions.
On the
12th the force under Sir Colin Campbell moved about
seven miles to Gandera, with a view to attacking Pranghar which
was generally looked on in the country as the stronghold of the
Utman Khel tribe.
Dt;:c3;,,'.1nd"&, «hV., .
^". ^'^VSth, a force, of the strongt^h
Artillery (two s-inch howitzers), given m
the margin^ marched a little
*"^f°^« daybreak about five miles to the
Artirr»nd'of 'No^'.i'ught
Field Battery attached, (2 guns), foot of the liills, which Were broken and
'""' ''"'•
SO^lySr'' ^^^y ^t'^'iy- but iiot inaccessible to artil-
One s.juadron, 1st P. c.i lery. Pranghar was a large village, with
28t1i2^N^i.,loo^blyonets. ^*^ ^^^^ resting ou high hills, and flanked
66th Gurkha Regiment, 300 by spurs and lower heights. Prepara-
"GurdVinfantry, 300 bayonets, ^^o^s had been made for defence, and
Six coy.s. 1st P. 1.3 both the place, which was surrounded by
good walls, and the adjacent eminences, were crowded with men.

1 Now 21st Prince Albert Victor's Own t :\Iiitinied at Shahjahanpur in 1857.

Cavalry. t Now 55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force).
'
3F2
404 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The enemy quickly opened fire on tlie advanced guard, whicli

was then halted until the guns were in position.

The guns having opened fire, cleared the road, and the men of
the 1st Punjab Infantry, the 66th Gurkha Regiment, and the Guide
Corps immediately advanced to the attack, Her Majesty's 32nd
and the 28th Native Infantry remaining with the guns as a reserve.
The only fault committed was the too great impetuosity of the
men, which caused the artillery fire to be stopped sooner than Sir
Colin Campbell desired.
The was carried at a run, the enem.y retreating to the
village
hills behind, whence the skirmishers drove them from rock to rock,

far up the side of the high mountain, rendering the destruction of

village easy and safe. The artillery made good practice, eflectually
aiding the skiimishcis. A desultory fight was then carried on,
until the object for which the Brigadier had received the Com^mission-
er's requisition was eifected, viz., the destruction of the village and

grain. Of the latter, a large quantity, which had been stacked in

a supposed place of security, high up the mountain, was destroyed
by our skirmishers. The troops then retired.
Considering that no less than ten pieces of a,rtillery opened on
their devoted village, it must be owned that its inhabitants made a
gallant defence. But for our guns we should have sustained heavy
loss, the walls and flanking defences above alluded to being formid-

As it was, the number of our casualties was small.

^
able.
The enemy, who numbered perhaps 1,000 matchlock men, were
led by Ajun Khan and his father, Hamid, and were assisted by the
Utman Khels of the Totai villages. They only left three dead on
the ground, but it was believed that they had many casualties.
Three prisoners were taken one was a servant of Ajun Khan,
;

who was concerned in the murder of the telisildar, and another

was a student from our OAvn village of Tangi.

Some Persian letters were found in the village by a sepoy of

the Guides, one from the Akltund, and one from the King of Swat
to Ajun Khan, promising him assistance, assigning to him all the
property of the Hindus and servants of the British in Hashtnagar
as lawful prey, and desiring him not to spare them, but to keep
his hands from Muhammadans not in our service.

i Three killed and fifteen wounded.

 THE VTMAN KEEL TRIBE. 405

the 14tli the force halted at Gandera to make various

On
arrangements, and to allow of more crops being destroyed.
Indian Medal, with a clasp for the " North- West Frontier,"
The
was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the
above operations.
The result ol the chastisement of the Utman Khels was to

restore order and security to the Hashtnagar division, and to put

border.
a stop to the flight of the chiefs on the
At the end of 1852, for the better security of this part of the

border, the fort of Abazai was erected.

After the destruction of the village of Pranghar,Ajun Khan fled
about from place to
from Utman Khel territory, and wandered
place,— Kabul, Jalalabad, Lalpura, Swat, etc. In 1857 he was at
Prano-har, threatening to attack British territory, but
was checked
accompanied by Lieut.-
by a force moving out from Peshawar,
In 1872 he suddenly
Colonel J. Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner.
returned, and, with the aid of the men of Total and some of the
several houses at a place
Ranizai villages, built two towers and
and a half north of C4andera. On
called Spankhara, five miles
sent a warning to the Council of the
this the Deputy Commissioner
Ranizais, and to the various men of influence in proximity to our
when a hundred men of Pranghar, moving out suddenly,
territory',

surprised Spankhara, killing six men, and burning the hamlet.

Ajun Khan died in 1877.

Operations against the Independent

Utman Khels in February
and March 1878.

the Independent Utman Khels

After the expedition against
Sir Colin Campbell in 1852,
the conduct of the tribe had been
under
the outstanding
for manyyears uniformly good, and in June 1875
all of a minor character, were settled.
cases against them,
On the 9th of December 1876, however, an offence of the
gravest

description was committed

by this tribe, a number of the ill-disposed
of influence in British terri-
members of which, instigated by persons
of unarmed coolies engaged in the preliminary
tory attacked a body
of the canal about to be
taken from the Swat river
oper'ations
consisting of about 100
at Abazai. It appears that the party,
of Sapri, at about
men under the leadership of Mian Rakan-ud-din
405 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

2 A.M. on the morning of the 9th December, surrounded the tents in

which the coolies were sleeping, and, at a given signal, having cut
the ropes of the tents, threw them down simultaneously. The un-
fortunate men were caught like birds in a net, and, as
inside
each cried for mercy or help, he was slashed at through the tent-
cloth. After the butchery, the camp was robbed of almost every-
thing it contained. Some of the dead and wounded were stripped
of the very clothes on their backs. Of the sixty-five men in the
tents, six were killed and twenty-seven wounded, some danger-
ously. After plundering the camp, the raiders successfully effected
their escape to the hills before any assistance from the Abazai fort
could reach the spot.
The party consisted principally of the But Khels of Ambahar,
in concert with the people of the Laman. The former were induced
tocome down by hopes of the plunder of the treasure in the camp,
which was given out to be very great but with the ; latter there'

were several other causes at work, the principal of which was the
suspicion and dislike of the people on this part of border to the pro-
ject of the new canal, and especially to the taking up of land for

that purpose. The land near the villages of Abazai and Tangi was
cultivated by men of independent territory. The people of Sapri,
headed by Mian Rakan, cultivated the land near Abazai which
had been taken up for the canal. The Mians of Sapri had a
bitter feud with the Mians of Abazai, and, at the time of the
outrage, the state of factions on this border was on the one hand
Sapri, with the adjoining hamlet of Nawakili, aided by Mir Hassan,
the Khan of Tangi, in British territory, and, on the other, Nawadan,
Pranghar, and the Micms of Abazai. The reason why the last gave
no warning of the raid, which they must have loiown was going to
take place, is not very clear, but they probably hoped by their silence
to compromise their enemies, the men of Sapri, with the Govern-
ment.
After the occurrence of the raid, the maliks of Abazai, and also
Mir Hassan of Tangi, who was suspected of complicity, were ap-
prehended, and sent into Peshawar under a military escort. It is
probable that this raid would never have taken place at all if proper
care had been taken for the protection of the workmen employed on
the canal works, and it cannot be denied that sufficient precautions
were not taken by the officers responsible, to prevent an attack of
 THE VTMAN KEEL TRIBE. 407

this sort, when the work was being carried on so near the frontier.
It could not, however, have been anticipated that a Muhammadan
tribe would, without provocation or without quarrel with the British
Government, attack and an unarmed band of Muhammadan
kill

—
workmen a dastardly outrage, which brought down on them the
virtual excommunication of the aged Akhund of Swat.
In consequence of the Swat canal outrage, the Utman Khel
tribe was excluded from British territory, but, owing to the exigencies
of other Imperial considerations, it was not possible at that time
to take more active measures against them.
At the beginning of 1878 the sanction of the Government of
India was asked for an attempt being made to surprise the village
of Sapri, in which it was Imown that Micin Takan was residing. It
was felt that while this man, who was the instigator of the outrage,
was still at large, any satisfactory settlement with the tribe would be
next to impossible and with the object of Lis capture the proposal
;

was sanctioned.
The village was situated close to our border, and thus offered
great facilities to an operation of this kind. The success of the ex-
pedition depended on the correctness of the information obtained by
the Deputy Commissioner, the secrecy of the preparations made by
the officer in command, and the rapidity of the march of the troops
to a distant point.
At seven o'clock on the evening of the 14th of February 1878,
Camirij.
^^^ troops, as per margin, belonging to
4 British Officers. the Corps of Guides, marched from

Lstabies.
" Mardan. The infantry were mounted
infantr'/. on ponics, and each man carried sixty
I Native Officer, rounds of ammunition. Captain Wigram
II Bayonets. t* j., e .i r^ •
n .

-Battye, oi the b-uides, was in command,

and Captain P. L. N. Cavagnari, the Deputy Commissioner of
Peshawar, accompanied the troops as Political Officer.
The route taken was by the main road to Tangi and Abazai,
skirting the village of Jalala. On arriving within a short distance
of che village of Tangi, the column
the main road and passed
left

through ;iome low detached hills to the north, and then, after cross-
ing the line of the Swat canal, proceeded to within about two
miles of Abazai, and there dismounted, the horses being left in
charge of sixty-three men of the party, with orders to take them
408 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

to Abazai fort at daybreak. The distance traversed to this point

was about thirty-two miles. The object of making this detour, and
avoiding the villages of Tangi and Abazai, was to prevent the
chance of the news of the approach of the troops being conveyed
across the border.
After dismounting, the force proceeded on foot through some
very heavy ploughed land for about two miles to the Swat river,
and thence along its left bank for four miles to Mada Baba Ziarat,
where a mountain torrent joins the river. Here the party ascend-
ed a narrow, steep path by the side of the torrent for about a mile,
till they arrived at the kotal leading to the village of Sapri. The
kotal was reached about 4 a.m., and from this point the village lay
within easy rifle range. An attempt was made to reconnoitre the
village, but the village dogs becoming alarmed, began to bark,
and itwas thought best to wait till daylight. From informa-
tion received, the Political Officer was of opinion that Mian Rakan
would be found either in the village mosque, or in his own tower,
which was in the centre of the village, and which could be com-
manded from a spur of the on the west overlooking Sapri.
hill

Captain Battye, therefore, arranged to post a picquet on this spur,

and with the remainder to attack the village.
Immediately daylight broke, the assault was made, and our
men, rushing into the village, seized the mosque. The surprise was
a complete success, and the inmates awoke to find soldiers with
drawn swords standing over them. Having secured the mosque,
the party proceeded to the tower, which was, however, found
deserted. Hearing that the Mian had taken refuge in a small build-
ing behind the mosque, the party returned there, and called upon
the people inside to surrender, threatening at the same time to
burn the roof and force them to come out if they refused. A duff a-
dar of the Guides, named Turabaz, here distinguished himself
by his gallantry,and succeeded in shooting Mian Rakan' s nephew
and wounding another man, when the door of the building was par-
tially opened for a moment. The Mian was now called upon to sur-
render quietly, or he would have to take the consequences. There-
upon the door was opened, and he stepped out, apparently with the
intention of surrendering himself ; but probably the sight of his
GhulamMohi-ud-Din (through whom this misfor-
enemy, Tehsildar
tune had come upon him, and who had accompanied the troops),
 THE UTMAN KEEL TRIBE. 409

was too much and he made an attempt to stab him with

for him,

a dagger the attempt failed, and the next moment he was shot
;

down by om- men. The others inside the house, seeing the fate of
MianRakan, surrendered quietly.
The object of the Government having been thus obtained,
arrangements were made to retire. It had been intended to
blow up

the tower, but the powder unfortunately

did not come up in time.
village was not burnt.
At the request of the Political Officer the
The men who had made good their escape from the \dllage had,
in the meanwhile, ascended
the heights above, and kept up a desul-

tory fire on our troops. A party

of them having taken up a position
village, commanding the Hue
on a high hill to the south-east of the
of our retirement, were
attacked by Captain Battye, and driven off
bodies were left on the ground.
with a loss of three killed, whose
effected without any hurry or
The movement to the rear was then
confusion, the enemy making
no further attempt to harass the retir-
ing column. The number of the enemy opposed to our troops was
(the number of wounded
estimated at 300. Their loss was seven killed
six taken prisoners, three of whom
could not be ascertained), and
were relatives of the Mian.
Om* casualties were eight wounded.
The troops reached Fort Abazai at 11 a.m., on the morning
of the 15th.
Brigadier-General C. C. G. Ross, C.B., commanding

at Peshawar, had previously sent secret orders to the officer com-

the garrison at Abazai in
manding the Doaba outposts to have
readiness to afford the Guides
any assistance that might be requir-
seen, there had been no occasion to ask for aid.
ed, but, as has been
After the successful attack
upon Sapri, the representatives
Utman Khel were summoned to hear the terms the
tribe
of the
punishment for their conduct
Government required from them as a
These terms were as follows :—
in the Abazai outrage.

—Rs. 200 blood-money for each coolie killed, and Rs. 100 wound-
Igl
money each coolie injured and recovered.
for

Restitution of, or compensation for, property plundered by

2nd.—
raiders.

3fd —A fine of Rs. 1,000.

to border rule of all recent pending cases.
4t/i.— Settlement according
Hostages to be given for one year as a guarantee for the good
^Ij^
to
conduct of the tribe generally, but especially with reference
the canal works.
3G
 THE UTMAN KHEL TRIBE. 411

being occupied by the Pakhai

the Zirak villages of Buclia, the other
villages of Rangmiana and Nasir.

been left to look after Tarakai, the main

A small party having
sent on to this
body pushed on to Bucha. Messengers had been
place to inform the inhabitants that if
no resistance were offered,
the villages would be spared. This allowed time for the women

and children to escape, and, as our troops approached, the inhabit-

The first
ants were seen driving off their cattle into the interior.
th(^ Ouide Infantry, under
village was deserted, but a company of
to the eastern vil-
Captain A. G. Hammond, which had gone round
dangerously Wounded. At the same
lage, was fired on, and one man
themselves in the third village,
time parties of the enemy showed
Captam Ham-
and in the broken ground beyond and on our
left.

cleared the eastern village

mond, advancing with his party, at once
to the tops of the Sulala
and drove the enemy off the ground on
a party of
range At the same time, Lieutenant F. D. Battye, with
village. The operations against
Guide Infantry, cleared the third
materially assisted by the fire of the
the Bucha villages were
mountain guns, which was directed on the
enemy whenever they
of the mfantry.
triedto assemble to oppose the advance
position, Lieut. -Colonel
Leaving the cavalry to secure the
hill with four companies of infan-
Jenkins now^'ascended the Tor Tam
try and the mountain guns.
The enemy offered little opposition, and
the force, on gaining the ridge,
marched along it to a point abreast
our
of Rangmiana. This placed the remaining villages entirely at
sent to summon the Zirak and
mercy, and Captain Cavagnari now
was no desire on our part to
Pakhai headmen to submit, as there
villages and crops. This summons, after some delay,
destroy their
agreed to pay the fine of Rs. 2,000
they obeyed, and they then
after twenty days, and in
the meantime to give good security for

the amount.
been captured during the
The cattle (about 150 head) which had
restored— a piece of moderation on
attack on the \dllages were then
hardly expected. The demands of
our part which the tribesmen had
the objects of the expedi-
Government having thus been obtained, and
tion fulfilled, the troops
were ordered to retire, which they did, entire-

ly unmolested, and
bivouacked for the night at the Jhinda outpost
of the Swat canal-works,
having marched over forty miles since noon
412 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

of the previous day. The day following the force returned to Mar-
dan. The enemy could not be ascertained, but twelve
loss of the
bodies were left on the ground about Bucha and the Tor Tarn hill,
and two men severely wounded were brought into the village while
our troops were there, after the engagement. Our casualties had been
only one man wounded.
The rupture on account of the Swat canal outrage having been
brought to a satisfactory termination, the head-works of the canal,
which had been stopped pending the submission of the Utman Khel
villages, were continued.
During 1882 the men of Sapri committed a series of thefts of
cattle employed on the head-works of the canal, and in order to
check their misconduct, it was necessary in December 1882 to levy a
fine of Bs. 300 on the village, and to enforce the restoration of

the stolen property.

After the payment of this fine, the Utman Khel caused no
Berious trouble until 1895. In that year, some sections of the
tribe, particularly the Shamozai, joined the neighbouring clans
of Swat, Dir, and Bajaur in opposing the passage of the Swat river
at Chakdara by the troops of the Chitral Relief Expedition. They
also fired on our baggage columns on the march through the
Talash valley to Sado ; and some of their fighting-men took part
in the actions of the 13th and 17th of April.

No special punitive measures were, however, taken against

the tribe for their hostility on this occasion.
In 1897 large numbers of the Cis-Swat and Laman Utman Khel
were implicated in the attack on the
of the tribe m
. ^.. .1, + i,^ :„
.
Jr
Participation
the Swat rising, 1897. Malakand post. Many of them also join-
the leadership of the Hadda Mulla, in
ed the Mohmands, under
the raid on Shankargarh,
and took part in the subsequent fight
August), which will be found described
at Shabkadar (on the 9th
(trans-Swat) were also
in chapter XI. The Shamozai section
valley, and joined in the assault
implicated in the rising in the Swat
on Chakdara ; and later they made a move to seize the Panjkora
advance of our troops into Bajaur.
bridge in order to oppose the
frustrated by the prompt action of
Their intention was, however,
at the bridge with a brigade of
General Meiklejohn, who arrived
the 4th September.
tke Malakand Field Force on
 THE UTMAN KHEL TRIBE, 413

On the arrival of Sir Bindon Blood (with the 2nd Brigade of

Punishment of the trans-Swat the above-mentioned force) at Ghosam
amozai sec ion.
g^^ days later, the Shamozai Utman
Khel jirga came
and sued for peace. ^ The tribesmen at once
in
agreed to the terms imposed, but by the following day had only
surrendered a few of the arms demanded from them. There was
then no time available for coercive measures against these people,
to enforce full compliance with the terms of submission, as Sir
Bindon Blood was obliged to continue his advance into Bajaur.
About 100 tribesmen of the Shamozai joined the Mamunds
in the attack on Brigadier-General Jeffreys' camp at Markhanai
on the 14th September.^ A few men of the But Khel sub-section
of the Ismailzai were also supposed to have been present on this
occasion, but no special action was taken against them. Supplies
were, however, taken from Markhanai village belonging to the
Mandol Utman Khel who were also implicated in the fighting in
Swat, but who had hitherto not submitted.
With the exception of this outbreak at Markhanai, the Shamo-
zai Utman Khel kept the peace during all the time that our troops
were employed in Bajaur and they even assisted to protect the
;

line of communication along the border of their territory. In con-

sideration of this latter service a portion of the fine of arms origin-
ally imposed was remitted ; and on the return of Sir Bindon
Blood's force on the 2 1st October, the Shamozai jirga came to
Jhar, and surrendered the balance of the rifles and guns still'due.
been mentioned in chapter IX that Sir Bindon Blood
It has
intended to despatch a brigade under General Jeffreys from Lower
Swat, which was to enter Utman Khel country by the Inzargai
pass. But as these troops were required for the operations in
Bajaur at the end of August, the coercion of the Utman Khel had
to be postponed. Meanwhile the Government imposed terms on
the various sections who had been implicated in acts of hostility,
and demanded the complete submission of the tribe.

Expedition against the Cis-Swat Utman Khel in 1897.

Up to the 21st November the only Cis-Swat Utman Khel who

had submitted were the inhabitants of the Kuz Totai villages of

1 See Chapter XIII. 2 gee page 571.

 — ; ;

414 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Kot, Myana, and Bar. Three hundred fire-arms were due from
the 'villages of Bar-Totai and;Agra and the
Laman Utman Khel
;

was accordingly
had made no move to comply with the terms. It
decided to send a portion of the
Malakand field force to compel
their submission.
On the 22nd November 1897 the marginally noted troops,
under the command of Colonel A. J. F.
10th Bengal
1 squadron, -p^^-^^ concentrated at Usman-Khel
^Na'^s Bengal Mountain
Bat- Garhi near Dargai. The ;i6th Bengal
fpiy- Infantry, under Lieut. -Colonel A. Mon-
Company, M,rir««^.ni
,,
\o 5 Madras r^ap- j » •
i *

pers and Miners. tauaro, was scut to Abazai to protect

1st Battalion. East
Kent Re- ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^

21st Punjab Infantry. strengthen the hands of the political

35th Sikhs.
officers who were to deal with the
Laman Utman Khel. On the 23rd November Colonel Reid's

column marched to Hariankot at the foot of the Bar-Totai

pass, which was crossed the next day, when the troops advanced
to

Kot. Here the combined jirgas of Agra, Bar-Totai and Khanauri,

with the maliks of Bar and Myana, came in and were interviewed
by Colonel Reid, who had been given full political charge.
The jirgas were most anxious to make peace, and agreed to
comply with the following terms :

the surrender of 300 guns, and every rifle in their possession, (50 from
Khanauri, 100 from Bar-Totai, and 150 from Agra) ;

to be responsible, within their own limits, that our troops were not
opposed when traversing the country;
to permit a complete survey of their country
to provide supplies for the transport animals, and wood,
etc., for the

troops while in the Hmits of their country

to permit the troops to make such roads as might be found necessary.

On the 24th and 25th November reconnaissances were pushed

forward in the direction of the Agra and Kelo passes. On the
following day, the column marched up the Jhindai stream to Siloi-
patai ;
and the neighbouring hamlet of
the people of this village
Badami were perfectly friendly and furnished all the supplies
demanded. On the 27th the troops moved on four and half miles
by a very difficult track to Bargholai. Thence Colonel Reid pushed
forward with four companies, two mountain guns and a party of
 ; —

THB UTMAN KHBL TRIBE. 415

sappers and miners to reconnoitre the Agra pass, and improve the
track which led up to the kotal As this route proved to be
impracticable for camels. Colonel Eeid crossed the pass on the
28th with a portion of his brigade, equipped with mule transport.
On the next day a reconnaissance was made to the Inzargai,
Yardiali,and Ormullo passes ; the people were everywhere sub-
missive, and during the stay Agra the villagers
of the troops at
picqueted the approaches to the camp in order to prevent any
interference on the part of their trans-Swat kinsmen. On both
days a party of Shamozai clansmen, with a few standards, were
seen on the hills on the opposite bank of the river but they ;

abstained from any act of open hostility. Having collected tlie

arms due from the Agra people, and surveyed the country up to the
Swat-Panjkora junction, Colonel Reid returned on the 29th to
Bargholai.
By December the Bar-Totai people had surrendered
the 1st
all the arms due, and the force marched back to Kot. Here some
representatives of the Asil sub-section of Ismailzai from Khanauri
informed Colonel Reid that one Gujar Khan, malik of the Umar
Khel sub-section in their village, had fled the country in order to
avoid his share of the penalty, and had thus prevented them from
complying in full with the terms imposed. They, however, brought
in some of thearms demanded, and next day a detached column
visited Khanauri and obtained the balance, and destroyed Gujar
Khan's house.
On the 4th December all the terms having been fully complied
with, and the survey work completed. Colonel Reid's force evacuat-
ed the Cis-Swat Utman Khel country, returning by the Bar-Totai
and Kaga passes to Hariankot and Hiro Shah, and was broken up on
the following day. The Bar-Totai and Agra jirgas proceeded to
the Malakand, and there made their formal submission to the
Political Agent.
On the 27th NovemDer,the Laman Utman Khel jirga assembl-
Submission of the Lamau cd at Gandcra, whcre they were met by
utman Kbd. December 1897.
Mr. C. Bunbury. I.C.S., and Mr. Stuart
Water field. The following terms were imposed :

payment of a money fine of Rs. 2,000

surrender of 300 fire-arms, 300 swords, and all rifles in their posses-
sion
 ;

4i6 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

assistance to British officials in making a survey of their country

free forage and fuel for troops visiting their country, should it be
found necessary to employ them to enforce compliance with the
terms.

By the 4th December the Laman Utman Khel had complied

in full with theabove conditions, except that they surrendered no
rifles. The sworn statement of each headman of every village
or quarter to the effect that they had no rifles in their possession
was accepted, and that portion of the penalty was remitted. Within
the next few days the whole of Laman Utman Khel country was
thoroughly reconnoitred and surveyed, the inhabitants abiding by
their agreement to render assistance in this operation.
Certain Utman Khel villages within the British border, whose
inhabitants had taken part in the fighting against our troops, were
also punished by fines and the forfeiture of allowances.

Since the disturbances in 1897 this tribe has caused no serious

trouble to the Government.
APPENDICES. ill
 . ..

APPENDIX B.

Composition of tJic TJtman Kliel column under Command of Colonel A. J. F.

Reid, 22nd November 1897.

Officers. Other ranks.

1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment,—Lieut.-Colonel

A. E. Ommanne}^ . . . . 19 534

One squadron, lOth Bengal Lancers,— Captain W. L.

Maxwell .. .. •• ..2 121

No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery, — Captain A. H. C.

Birch, Royal Artillery .. « ..4 253

The 21st Punjab Infantry, —Lieut.-Colonel W. C.

Faithful .. .. .. ..9 688

The 35th Sikhs,— Colonel T. H. Goldney . • • H 635

No. 5 Company, Queen's Own Madras Sappers and

Miners, Captain E. P. Johnson . . . 4 130

Staff.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General,— Captain A. B. Dunsterville, East

Surrey Regiment.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General,—Major L. Herbert, Central India

Horse.
Orderly Officer,— Lieutenant H. A. Vallings, 29th Punjab Infantry.
Intelhgence Officer and Assistant Political Officer, Lieutenant A. — C. M.
Waterfield, 11th Bengal Lancers.
Commissariat Officer,— Captain A. R. Burlton, Staff Corps.
Transport Officer,—Lieutenant R. S. Weston, Manchester Regiment.
Senior Medical Officer,— Surgeon-Lieut.-Colonel P. F. O'Connor, Indian
Medical Service.
Senior Veterinary Officer, —Veterinary-Lieutenant G. M. Williams, Army
Veterinary Department.

( ^18)
 CHAPTER XI.

THE MOHMAND TRIBE.

The Mohmands are a tribe of Pathans who

reside, partly in
the Afghan province of Ningrahar, partly in the Peshawar district,
and partly in the hills between the Peshawar plain and the Kunar
valley.
This work has no concern with the first-named section, and but
little with the second, though, as will be seen, they were involved

in some of the disturbances that have occurred on that part of the

border.
The Mohmands are closely allied, in dress, language and cus-
toms, to the Yusaizais.
The independent, or hill, Mohmands are divided into eight
clans, namely the Khwaezai, Baezai, Halimzai, Tarakzai, Isa Khel,
Burhan Khel, Dawezai, and Utmanzai. The last two of these are
lisually considered " affiliated clans," and not true Mohmands.
The Safis, a clan residing in the northern portion of the
Mohmand country, are vassals of the Mohmands.
The boundaries of the independent Mohmand country are,
roughly, as follows : —
On the east, the Peshawar district from near
Jamrud to Abazai, and the Utman Khel country on the north ;

Bajaur on the west, Kunar and on the south, the Kabul river. ^
; ;

This whole tract consists of rows of rocky hills, scantily clothed

with coarse grass and dwarf palm, and broad dry ravines. In
summer the heat is intense, and water is everywhere scarce.
Springs are infrequent, and the water-supply of many of the villages
consists of rain water collected in tanks.
From the days of Ahmad Shah
the Mohmands as a whole
were more or the Kabul rulers until 1893, when
less subject to

theDurand agreement divided their country between the British

and Afghan Governments. The boundary drawn on the map
1 The Mohmands of Sliilman, south of the Kabul river, and also the
MuUagoris, who
are claimed as vassals by the Mohmands, will be referred to in Volume II
( 419 )

3 53
 —

420 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

attached to that agreement runs through the centre of the Mohmand

hills, but this boundary has never been demarcated, and has, on

various occasions,been disputed.

There are numerous roads through the Mohmand country, as
the hills, though rugged and rocky, are nowhere impassable. The
clans residino- on the bank of the Kabul river have from time im-
memorial, enjoyed the right to levy tolls on rafts of timber, etc.,
coming down the river.
The Mohmands do not enjoy a great reputation for bravery,
and do not possess very many modern fire-arms. The Baezai are
the most warlike clan, and also the best armed. The fighting
strength of the various clans was in 1906, as follows :

Clan. Fighting men. Clan. Fighting men.

Khwaezai 2,000 Halimzai 3,500
Baezai (excluding Musa Khel) 9,000 Biirhan Khel . . . . 700
Baezai Musa Khel .. .. 3,000 Isa Khel 700
Tarakzai 1,600 Dawezai „ 700
Utmanzai . . ... . . 350

Operations against the Mohmands by a force under Brigadier

Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., in 1851-52.

The first occasion on which the British Government came into

contact with the Mohmand tribe was during the first war in
Afghanistan, in 1838-42. At that time, Saadat Khan was chief
of Lalpura. On the news of the approach of the British army,
Turabaz Khan, his cousin, and enemy, immediately started off
to meet the army at Jhelum. Saadat Khan thereupon espoused
the cause of the Barakzais, and Turabaz Khan was installed as
Khan of Lalpura by Colonel Wade. He seems to have done loyal
service for Mackeson while we held Afghanistan. After the dis-
asters at Kabul, the whole country rose, and Turabaz Khan, at
risk to himself, saved an English lady and her. child from the Pesh
Bolak garrison, and took her down the river on a raft to Peshawar.
The officers of the jazailchis stationed at Pesh Bolak escaped over
the Tartara hills, and Turabaz Khan himself took refuge in British
territory. He returned with General Pollock's force, but was
ousted by Saadat Khan on the withdrawal of our troops. He
subsequently made his peace with the Amir, and received a jagir
in Kama.
 THE MOBMAND TRIBE. 421

The Mohmands, during the early years of British rule in the

Peshawar valley, gave more trouble than almost any other tribe.
The Michni Mohmands, after annexation, were allowed to
hold a fief Doaba (the fertile triangle near the junction of
in the
the Swat and Kabul rivers) from the British Government, of which
they collected the revenue. A portion of the lands they cultivated
themselves, the remainder they farmed out to other tribes of the
plains as tenants. Many of their clansmen dwelt in the plains of
Michni, and some in the neighbouring hills, and they traded largely
in the Peshawar valley. The Halimzai Mohmands also held Panj-
pao in British Doaba as a fief, chiefly cultivated by tenants. A
few of their men lived in the plains, but the majority in the hills.
These also traded in the valley. The Pandiali Mohmands at a former
period had held a similar jagir in the Doaba, but not since British
rule. They had few relations, either with the Government or the
people of the Peshawar valley, and inhabited a very strong locality
in the hills. The fiefs were originally granted by preceding Govern-
ments to the Mohmands, as blackmail, to buy off depredations.
The first inroad of the Mohmands occurred in December 1850
in an unprovoked attack on the village of Shabkadar, organised
by
Fateh Khan, the son of Saadat Khan, who was still the chief of
Lalpura, and who was naturally not well disposed towards us, and
did his best to incite the tribe to hostilities.
In March 1851, Lieutenant H. R. James, Deputy Commissioner
reported an intended raid on the Doaba by Saadat Khan of Lalpura
from Pandiali, and in March and April two attacks were actuallv
made on Matta by Nawab Khan, the chief of Pandiali but both ;

were gallantly repulsed by detachments of the Guide Corps, under

Lieutenant H. N. Miller and Ressaldar Fateh Khan, respectively.
In the first affair, hearing of the intended raid. Lieutenant
Miller placed two companies of the Guides, under Lieutenant
H. J. Hawes, in ambush, when the enemy were attacked on their
way back, Lieutenanjb Miller coming up with the few cavalry he
had with him. The enemy lost five killed and six wounded, and
the Guides had one man killed.

In the second affair, the Guides had three men wounded,

the Mohmands losing three killed and several wounded.
To these attacks minor depredations succeeded in July 1851,
headed by one Nur Gul of Panjpao.
422 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

In August 1851, Eahimdad, a headman of Miclini, deserted,

and collecting 600 matchlock men, sent them to dam up the water
of a \ailage on the border, but they were
driven off by the villagers,

with some loss.

Mohmands of Michni made a more serious
In October 1851, the
attack on several British villages, and,
though opposed by the
villagers, they succeeded in
destroying many of the crops. At

length, on the 15th of October, the Suprem^e

Government deemed it
in the Doaba should
necessary to direct that the Mohmand fiefs
be strengthened, and
be confiscated, that the defensive posts should
that British troops should operate against the offending
Mohmands,
and destroy their chief villages.
Accordingly, on the 25tli of October
Detachment, 3rd Co. 1st Bn., 1851, a foice, as per margin, numbering
Artillerv, with No. l7 Light ^ c m i tip
1,593 of all ranks, marched from Pesha-
-r. i

Field B;ttery attached.

2 companies, 61st Foot. ^^^j. under the command of Brigadier
"
2 98th „
2nd Irregular Cavalry. Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., towards the
2nd C'o.,''sappers and Miners, i^joj^niaiid frontier. H. W.
Lieutenant
G6th Gurkha Regiment. i T,r x
•
t •

Wing, 71st Native Infantry. Norman was Brigade -Major and Lieu-
tenant H. B. Lumsden accompanied the force, as Political Ofiicer.
The first day's march was to a village, eight miles, where a"
bridge-of-boats had already been constructed over the Kabul river
by Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, at Sir Colin Campbell's suggestion,
in anticipation of orders for these operations here the force was
;

joined by Lieutenant Lumsden, with four companies of the Guides,

about 250 bayonets.

The next day the force continued its march to Mian Khel,
close to the border, having crossed the Adizai branch of the Kabul
river by a ford. Sir Colin Campbell might with ease have pushed

on to where he intended to operate, but it appeared to him more

advantageous to allow time for the Deputy Commissioner to com-
municate with the influential people of the country, and for the
moral efiect of the expedition to be felt, rather than to advance with
greater haste. On the following day the force halted, and Sir CoKn
Cam-pbell reconnoitred the villages of Dab, the inhabitants of which
had been most active in causing annoyance.
The villages were flanked by mud towers, commanding the
river and the surrounding country. The approach to them was over
a succession of low, stony hills, which increased in height and
 —

THE MOEMAND TBIBE. 423

precipitousness in their immediate The villages were

vicinity.

found deserted. On the 28th the camp was moved to within two

miles of the villages, when news was received that a considerable

body of hillmen were collecting in the hills in front of Matta.
Captain Gr. Jackson was therefore detached with the 2nd
Irregular Cavalry to Matta, to protect our villages in the plains
a measure which had the desired effect, as no attempt was made
by the enemy to advance into the open.
During the 28th and 29th, the Dab villages were destroyed by
a fatigue party of the. Guides, and the towers, some ten in number,
blown up, under the direction of Captain J. R. Oldfield, Bengal
Engineers. The fatigue party was covered by the remainder of
the force, and, both in advancing and retiring, each range of hills
was successively occupied. A desultory matchlock fire was kept up
by the enemy during these two days, to which Sir Colin Campbell
did not think it worth while to reply the retirement on both
;

days was unmolested, and the villages were destroyed without any
casualty on our side.
The force now remained in the position that it had taken up,
in order that Sir Colin Campbell might fix the site of the present
fort of Michni, and to cover the workmen engaged in its erection.
The 2nd Irregular Cavalry was posted at Shabkadar and Matta.
For the first tw^o nights after the demolition of the villages the
picquets were molested, and on the second the hill people seemed
to have increased in number ; but arrangements had been made
for their reception, and, after being driven off, they were followed
for some distance by the Guides, without any loss to us.
Annoyance then ceased the people of the newly-annexed
;

valley of Michni seemed to be returning to their homes, and matters

to be taking a pacific turn.
But on the 23rd November Sir CoHn Campbell reported that,
although the picquets had been unmolested, which he attributed
to the fact that the ground for some distance round the camp had
been cleared and levelled, the people had not really returned to
their villages ; those that had come down having done so merely
to pluck the heads of their Indian corn, and having then gone off
again to the hills.

On the 22nd, a party murdered four of the

of IVIohmands
contractor's butchers in the Peshawar cantonment, wounding three
424 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Others, and carrying of! some bullocks and on the following night
;

they set fire to a Government building and killed a man. These out-
rages had been planned by Saadat Khan, the chief of Lalpura, who
was then about six miles from the camp, in the Tartara hills, on the
right bank of the Kabul river, where he had been joined by
eighty jazailcMs, and by Daria Khan, the partisan leader who had
conducted the operations against us in the Kohat pass the year
before (see Vol. II, Chap. III). He had also sent a threatening
letter to Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden.
As an attempt by the Mohmands from the hills on some of our
villages seemed probable, 120 sabres of the 15th Irregular Cavalry,
under Major S. Fisher, were ordered out from Peshawar, and posted
at Mian Khel, four miles to the east of the camp, to which place
two companies of the Guides were also sent, and the bridge-of-boats
over the Kabul river was protected by the throwing up of bridge
heads.
The chief, Saadat Khan, had been busily engaged in arranging
differenceswhich had existed amongst the Mohmands. On the 26th
he had moved to Gandab, twenty miles north-west of Shabkadar,
where a meeting took place to decide on the plan of operations, and
on the 30th of November he was joined by the chief of Bajaur, with
a large follo^ving.

On the nights of the 28th and 29th November, eluding our

cavalry patrols, the Mohmands attacked respectively the villages
of —
Uchwala and Marozai at the former only carrying off some
bullocks, but killing two men at the latter, wounding others,
;

besides carrying off some property and on the 29th November

they burnt a village in the Khalil district, between Peshawar and
the hills.

On the 27th a number of the enemy, creeping down from the

hills, got into the sugarcane around Matta, but were quickly driven
out by two companies of the Guides, under Lieutenant H. N. Miller.
At this time heavy patrols of cavalry were nightly on the move
from Mian Khel, Shabkadar, and Matta along the frontier, but the
numerous 7ialas and the broken nature of the ground rendered
it impossible to prevent parties passing through to our villages along
such an extended line of hills, throughout which were numerous
bodies of Mohmands. Besides, the people of the hills were so
similar in dress, appearance, and language to those of the plains
 :

THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 425

that they could at all times resort to the plains whilst no party
;

could at any time leave our camps without information being im-
mediately given in the hills.

Strong fatigue parties of the troops were at this time employed

carrying on the heavy work necessary for the construction of the
fort.
At the beginning of December the gatherings of the Mohmands
had increased so considerably, that Sir Colin Campbell deemed
it right to draw in Major S. Fisher's detachment, which had been

reinforced by two guns and two companies of infantry, from Mian

Khel, keeping up his communications with Shabkadar by strong
cavalry patrols. At the same time. Captain G. Jackson at Matta
was reinforced by three companies of Gurkhas and two of the
Guides, having in all 415 bayonets, 320 sabres, and 2 guns.
On the 7th, without any previous information having been
received, Saadat Khan suddenly moved out of a gorge in the hills
to the right front of camp, quickly occupying a range of hills in
front with 4,000 foot and 80 or 100 horse. Sir Colin Campbell
at once moved out with a troop of the Guide Cavalry, two guns, and
two companies of infantry, to cover the return of Major Fisher,
who was guarding the camels at graze.
Having seen Major Fisher safely in with his charge, Sir Colin
Campbell waited till sunset, and then retired very slowly, to prevent
the enemy taking up his ground with the advantage of daylight
During this time the hills to
the latter, however, declined to follow.
the westward, in the neighbourhood of Dab, had also been strongly
occupied by the enemy and a party of 200 men came down to
;

the bank of the Kabul river, immediately in rear of the camp.

left

The Brigadier had, on seeing the force displayed, sent orders

to Lieut. -Colonel W. E. Mansfield, Her Majesty's 53rd Regiment
(who was to be at Peshawar the next day), to march on in the
afternoon with the 2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery, imder
Major R. Waller, and six companies, 53rd Regiment, and to
advance to the bridge -of -boats on the Kabul river.
On the night of the 7th December a patrol of one native officer
and thirty sabres of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry, from Matta, fell
in with upwards of 500 horse and foot close to the village of Banda.
After a short skirmish the enemy retreated to the hills, followed
by the patrol two sowars were killed and two wounded.
;

Vol. I. 31
426 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA,

At noon the following day, the Mohmands, numbering from

4,000 to 5,000, under Saadat Khan, advanced in line on Matta.
On the enemy coming within 900 yards, the artillery opened, when
the Mohmands, inclining to the left, tried to get to the rear of Captain
Jackson's position, but were well stopped by the Guides, under
Lieutenant H. N. Miller. A company of the 66th Gurkhas and one
of the Guides then advanced in skirmishing order, supported by
two squadrons of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry, and the enemy fell back
to his original position on the low hills. The two guns at Matta
were in position, and the enemy in heavy masses on the hills, with
a nala in their front, and Captain Jackson could not therefore
attack them. All endeavours to draw them on to the plain again
proved useless, and nothing further occurred. There were no
casualties on our side, but the enemy suffered from the artillery fire.
Sir Colin Campbell, in reporting this affair, especially alluded
to the conduct of Sikandar Khan, the headman of Matta, who
turned out with 300 matchlock men, and rendered the most efficient
assistance, thereby thoroughly compromising himself on our side.
All this day reports were rife that the chief of Bajaur was
collecting men in Pandiali in great numbers, and orders were there-
fore sent to Lieut. -Colonel Mansfield to collect what troops he could
to meet this, and to send in to Peshawar for a detachment of Her
Majesty's 61st Foot. His force accordingly bivouacked for a few
hours, and then marched at 4 a.m., to Shabkadar, on which the
enemy altered their intentions, and the point of attack was to be
Sir Colin Campbell's camp, near Dab.
Orders were now sent to Lieut. -Colonel Mansfield to detach a
company to Matta, and to march with the remaining five companies,
53rd, and Major Waller's troop, Horse Artillery, and take the
enemy in flank, while Sir Colin Campbell engaged them till his
arrival. Lieut. -Colonel Mansfield joined at 3 p.m. on the 9th,
the 53rd having marched forty-two miles in thirty hours, and the
Horse Artillery thirty miles in twenty-four hours. This accession
of strength at once told on the enemy, and after much consultation,
instead of attacking, the gathering broke up, Saadat Khan decamp-
ing to Gandab and then to Lalpura.
After this, nothing of moment occurred the enemy appeared
;

to have entirely dispersed, and the only offences were some cases
of robbery with violence in the neighbourhood of the camp.
 1

THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 427

On the 25th of December the Guide Corps was detached to

Yusafzai, as liostilities were threatening in the direction of Swat,
and as the fort was now completed. On the 28th of December
the detachment, 61st Foot, with four guns of the field battery,
returned to Peshawar, followed on the 2nd of January by the
remaining two guns and detachment 98th Foot.
On the 1st of January Sir Colin Campbell established his head-
quarters at Mian Khel, leaving the marginally-named garrison of
12 European gunners. the fort under Captain R. H. Hicks, 15th
Irregular n
50 sabres, loth Trregul'U- t -i
r\ ^^
Cava'ry.i
Cavalry. On the
^ i.i i
2nd the
-

2nd Company, Sappers and Brigadier moved

to Panjpao, where the
'
Three companies, 7ist Native Were engaged in settling
civil authorities
lnfantry.2 various poiuts couuected with the lands
around belonging to individuals of the Mohmand tribe, and the
presence of the force had a good effect in hastening the desired
settlement.
On
the 3rd of January the detachment 15th Irregular Cavalry
returned to Peshawar. Matta was at this time held by the head-
quarters 2nd Irregular Cavalry, and a company of Her Majesty's
53rd and of the 66th Gurkhas.
On this date (3rd) a picquet of twenty-three sabres, 2nd
Irregular Cavalry, were posted about a mile beyond the village of
Panjpao, when the enemy showed in considerable force, driving
in two of the videttes. Lieutenant W. T. Hughes, second-in-com-
mand of that regiment, therefore proceeded at once to the picquet
with twenty more sabres. Advancing to reconnoitre, he came
suddenly upon a party of som.e fifty of the enemy, who, from the
cover of rocks and brushwood, opened a matchlock fire upon his
party.
Lieutenant Hughes displayed great decision and gallantry, and,
setting an example which was well followed by his men, immediate-
ly charged and pursued the enemy to the foot of the first range of
hills, not fewer than fifteen of their number being left dead on the
ground, many more creeping away badly wounded, and one being
taken prisoner. The 2nd Irregular Cavalry lost one man killed and
three wounded.

1 Became the IGth in 1847. Disbanded in 1861.

3 ^lutinied in 1857 at Lucknow,
312
428 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The ground over which the charge has been made was ill-suited
to the operations of cavalry, being much broken and intersected
by ravines and, as the enemy was mustering in masses on the
;

heights above, Lieutenant Hughes did not think it advisable to

attempt a further pursuit.
On the 15th of January, Lieutenant A. Boulnois, Bengal En-
gineers, in command of the 2nd Company, Sappers and Miners,
was
killed near Michni. It appears that he had ridden out in com-
pany with other officers of the garrison to a considerable distance,
and, leaving them, incautiously cantered up to a tower near the
entrance of a gorge into the hills, nearly three miles from the fort.
Upon his approaching the tower, some men, who had been previously
concealed, fired a volley and killed him. His body was carried
off, but was recovered through the instrumentality of the TJmnadar

ofMian Khel, and was interred in one of the bastions of the fort.

The murderers were never punished.

On the 3rd of February Sir Colin Campbell returned to Mian
Khel, to blow up some eleven or twelve towers and several forti-
fied enclosures, the safety of the road to Michni requiring their
destruction.
On the 7th. the force changed ground to Shabkadar, to be pre-
sent whilst the villages of Panjpao, close to the hills, were being
levelled, as the inhabitants had been made by the civil authorities
toremove to a site nearer the fort of Shabkadar, and consequently
—
more under our control, these villages having been generally the
point of rendezvous of the parties who from time to time had started
on plundering expeditions into the plains.
A police post had now been established at Matta, and the
troops were therefore withdrawn from that place.
It was said that Saadat Khan was at a village a few miles from
Pandiali, but that he had failed to obtain assistance from the chief
of that tract, who had kept quite aloof from him and that the
;

Halimzais, who had entered into terms with Captain H. E. James,

the Deputy Commissioner, early in the previous month, had also
refrained from assisting him.
With the additional police arrangements that had been com-
pleted, and with the military posts at Shabkadar and Michni, the
civil authorities considered
there was no longer any necessity for
 THE MOHiMAND TRIBE. 409

the force remaining out, and it accordingly returned on the 14th of

February to Peshawar.

Affair at Panjpao under Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B.,

in April 1852.

On the 30th of March news was received at Fort Shabkadar that

the Molimands had collected in the hills in front, and detachments
were held ready to turn out at a moment's warning. About 3-30
A.M. on the 31st, a shot being fired at the village of
Shabkadar,
Captain J. L. Walker, of the 71st Native Infantry, commanding
the outpost, immediately moved out with sixty bayonets, but the
enemy were in retreat before he could come up with them.
Lieutenant F. E. Tottenham, commanding a troop of the 7th
Bengal Light Cavalry, had at once detached a division (forty sabres)
of the troop, under Subadar ^ Bulwant Singh, to cut off the
retreat
of the enemy, whilst he followed with the remainder.
The position taken up by this division was most favourable
for the purpose, and as 250 of the enemy were advancing
on it
with a brisk matchlock fire. Lieutenant Tottenham, who had join-
ed it with eight men, after posting the second division to cut
off the enemy's another direction, advanced to charcrc
retreat in
but, with the exception of the subadar, and a havildar, Shekh Husain
Baksh, and a trumpeter, Karram Ali, not a man followed him.
Riding back, he entreated his men to follow him as the enemy
passed their flank, but in vain and although Lieutenant Tottenham
;

subsequently induced this detachment to follow the enemy to the

foot of the hills, no order, no entreaty, no example, could get them
to charge. Both the subadar and the trumpeter had their horses
wounded. The second division appear to have behaved well, killing
one man and having themselves several horses wounded.
The enemy, who numbered 400 foot and 60 horse, had two killed
and several wounded, and left several stands of arms on the ground,
with two prisoners. Two of their horses were killed one was recog- ;

nized as belonging to Nauroz Khan, a son of Saadat Khan. Nothing

was carried oif by the Mohmands from the \allage, but a police-
man was wounded.
llii the old Bengal Light Cavalry regi- Irregular Cavalry this was not the case,
rnents, the native and non-commis-
officers and the ranks were tJie same as at
sioned officers held the same ranks as in the present in the cavalry, viz.,' ressajdar '
infantry, viz., subadar, havildar, etc. In the duffadar, etc.
430 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Our had been two horses killed, and two sowars

casualties
and eighteen horses wounded.
From the end of the month of March, reports had been rife
that Saadat Khan had been making great efforts to conciliate
differences among the various Mohmand tribes, in view of again
attempting the recovery of the lands we had annexed and about the ;

middle of April it was said that he had succeeded in his endeavours,

and that large bodies of men had collected for the purpose. But
the Commissioner, Lieut.-Colonel F. Mackeson, c.b., doubted the
truth of these reports, and was averse to the display of force unless
actually required, under the apprehension of investing hostile chiefs
with notions of importance as to their power to draw troops out
and give trouble.
However, as Captain H. E,. James, the Deputy Commissioner,
who was at Shabkadar collecting information, believed the inten-
tions of the hillmen were serious, Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell,
Commanding at Peshawar, bearing in mind his responsibility for

the posts held by detachments of regular troops, determined to

streno"then Shabkadar, but not to any great extent, in deference
to the Commissioner's views. Two Horse Artillery guns and 150
sabres were accordingly sent out, and Sir Colin Campbell proceed-
ed to Shabkadar, to judge for himself of the intentions of Saadat
Khan.
On Mohmands debouched
the 15th of April, about 3 p.m., the
from the hills, in numbers certainly not less than 6,000 matchlock
men, with about 80 sowars. They moved along the foot of the
first range of hills, in front of Shabkadar, in very fair order, their

cavalry and a crowd of matchlock men coming across a tableland,

the summit of which overhung the ruined villages of Panjpao. The
direction of the movement of the main body was towards Matta.
The troops at the disposal of Sir Colin Campbell numbered only
600 of all ranks. Before displaying a
*"' ^^""^
Ar^ilferyT^'guns)."^'^
siuglc soldicr, the Brigadier allowed this
7th Light Cavalry, 87 sabres, movement to bccome quitc pronounced.
15th Irregular Cavalry, 179 .
^
gg^l^rej^
the xfort with
He then issued from xi, -^i ^i
the
troops, as per margin.
The enemy's cavalry, with a crowd of matchlock men, occu-
pied the edge of the tableland, thus screening the movement towards
Matta. Having dispersed this party with a few rounds from the
 THE MOHMAND TBI BE. 43 ^

guns, Colin Campbell crowned the low hills at a gallop, and

Sir
established the guns in rear of the enemy. He was confident that
this was the most certain method of averting mischief from Matta.
The practice of the two guns was excellent, and the enemy soon began
to shake in their purpose, and to forsake the tableland. The Brig-
adier followed them, but they showed great dexterity in availing
themselves of the ground to avoid the artillery fire. Their masses
were now broken and the pursuit lasted for about a mile and a half,
being brought to a termination by some low ravines near the foot
of the hills, which were strongly held.
The gallantry and determination shown by the enemy, when
on account of approaching darkness it was deemed prudent
for the force to retire, were admirable. The g-uns were hardly lim-
bered up, the gunners had actually not mounted, when a sliout
ran down their whole line, and swarms rushed forward, taking
advantage of every accident of ground, and evidently thinking
their turn was now come. But the guns were instantly unlim-
bered, and double charges of grape checked the wild, but gallant,
attack. It must be remembered that these mountaineers had
been for two hours exposed to a cannonade to which they had no
means of replying.
The force then retreated across the tableland at a foot's pace,
the guns taking up successive positions at every 300 yards, and
keeping up a fire of grape loss was thus avoided, and the most
;

perfect order preserved, while the casualties suffered by the enemy

were considerable.
The infantry from the fort had been sent for by Sir Colin
Campbell, thinking they might be useful in passing the ruined
villages of Panjpao, but they were not found necessary.
The losses of the British in this affair only amounted to two
killed and eight wounded. The action had, on our side, been
entirely one of artillery, the duties of the cavalry having been
restricted to covering the guns in the face of the very large bodies
of the enemy opposed to the force.
For some days previously, 500 bayonets of Her Majesty's
53rd Foot had been held in readiness at Peshawar to move at
an hour's notice. The Deputy Commissioner having made earnest
representation of the fear pervading the country in consequence
of the paucity of the troops, and the number of armed enemies
 ;

432 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

in the immediate neighbourliood, six companies of that regiment

and four guns, 2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery, were order-
ed out on the 16th. The enemy, however, had been so disheartened
by their defeat on the 15th, that on the 17th news was received
of their having dispersed, and on the 18th the troops which had
been sent for, returned to Peshawar.
The approbation of the Governor- General in Counci], and the
sense entertained by the Government of the political value of

striking such a blow, were subsequently conveyed to Sir Colin

Campbell and the officers and troops which were under his command,
" when the combined Mohmand tribe had been defeated by so

small a British force."

The Indian Medal, with a clasp for the " North- West Frontier,"
was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the
above affair at Panjpao.

Expedition against the Michni Mohmands by a force under

Colonel Sydney J. Cotton, in 1854.

In the month of July following the affair at Panjpao, the

Michni and Panjpao Mohmands, exiled from house and lands, and
cut off from trade, and such like relations in the plains, tendered
their submission, and prayed for restoration to their fiefs. They were
restored on condition of paying a yearly tribute of Es. 600 for Michni,
and Es. 200 for Panjpao. The amounts fixed were merely nominal
but, for example's sake, it was necessary to demand some payment,
lest immunity in this respect should encourage our own subjects
to misbehave, in the hope of avoiding the just dues of Government,
or should embolden our neighbours to harass the border in the hope
of extorting landed grants. On this, as on other occasions con-
nected with the independent tribes, the Punjab Government de-

clared that revenue was not wanted, but only a quiet frontier.
The Halimzai Mohmands of Panjpao, after this, did not give
any cause for dissatisfaction, and remained in the enjoyment of

their fief. Their good behaviour may, however, have been due
to the fact that they were within range of the guns at the Shabkadar
fort.
The conduct Michni Mohmands was not so good. In
of the

the autumn of 1854 two years tribute was due, and the chief,
Bahimdad, fled from Peshawar, whither he had been summoned.
 ;

THE MO EM AND TRIBE. "

4^5

Under such circumstances flight was tantamount to rebelUon.

The greatest patience and forbearance had been shown by-
Captain H. R. James, the Deputy Commissioner, in regard to the
payment of these arrears but it was now evident that there re-
;

mained nothing but attaching their property to the amount of the

tribute due, with the addition of a fine for giving so much trouble.
The Commissioner, Major H. B. Edwardes, C.B., therefore request-
ed that a force might be sent out to Michni, to support the Deputy
Commissioner in case the Mohmand should resist the civil power
that a company of infantry might be placed in Mian Khel for its
protection ; and that patrols might be sent to seize all cattle moving
off to the hills.

On the evening of the 22nd of August, a column, of the strength

1st Troop, 3rd Brigade, Horse
detailed in the margin, moved out from
Artillery, (4 guns). Peshawar Under the command of Mai or
Una squadron, 1st Irregular ^ ^r ni i i
•
t
Cavalry. 1 ^- Oliamberlain, 1st Irregular Cavalry.
-L-

^''°'^''''''^' ^''^^^'' """"^

Miners ^^ *^e orders reaching the fort of
Three companies, 1st Native Michni for the Capture of Cattle, Lieu-
^''^^''^'y-
tenant C. H. Brownlow, 1st Sikh Infantry,
who was in command there, succeeded in capturing 1,100 head
in the act of being driven off across the frontier.
On the 23rd, as it w^as known that some 200 armed men had
come down to the village of Sadin at the invitation of Rahimdad
Khan, Major Chamberlain moved out with the artillery and
cavalry, and, the guns opening on them, they dispersed.
The capture of Rahmidad's cattle secured a much larger amount
than the tribute — —
Rs. 600 due to Government. But it was neces-
sary to make arrangements for the lapsed shares of the Michni
jagir. The zatnindars of the plain, our own subjects, were quite
willing to become responsible for the revenue, provided that they
were secured from the constant raids from the independent border
villages of the fugitive hill chiefs, viz., Dab, Sadin, and Shahmansur
Khel. The two former belonged to Rahimdad and Dab, as ;

already related, had been destroyed by Sir Colin Campbell's force in

1851. Shahmansur Khel was just beyond them, on the left bank of
the Kabul river, five miles from the Michni fort, and beyond it there
was no other Mohmand village for many miles. If these villao-es

iNow 1st Duke of York's 0^^^l Lancers (Skinner's Horse).

Vol. I.
3 j^
 .

434 '
FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

were left close to our border, in the hands of hostile Mohmands,

they would become nests of robbers, and convenient depositories
for plunder. Major Edwardes, the Commissioner, concurred in the
Deputy Commissioner's opinion that the villages should be destroy-
ed, and never allowed to be re- occupied. The extra military mea-
sures to effect this were therefore ordered, it being necessary that
the force should be strong enough to meet any resistance the Lal-
pura chief might send to Rahimdad.
^ ,,
2ndi
„
Company,
talion, Artillery,
^ 1
2ncl
with Mountain
T. ^
Bat-
gin.
_
On the 27th, the troops, as per mar-
Commenced to move on
'
...
Miclini. This

lwL?l74 *'
*»=«' «hich was to co-operate with that
t^t'-
Two companies, 42nd Foot, already at Michni, was commanded by
^'^'^'
Ca?alV^"^'°"'
'''''
^^^^^^^ ^>'^^^>^ J- ^^**^^' 22ncl Foot.
9th Native Infantry. The fort of Abazai was temporarily
1st Sikh Infantry. •
i j 1,
•
nc, ^
occupied 1
by three companies, 62nd
Native Infantry, and one squadron, 14tli Irregular Cavalry ; that
of Shabkadar by three companies, 4th Native Infantry, and
one squadron, 16th Irregular Cavalry. Sixty bayonets were
detached to the tliana at Mian Khel, three companies of the
1st Native Infantry relieving them at Michni.
Mountain Train Battery. At daylight on the morning of the 31st
Two companies, 22nd Foot.
One troop, 10th Light Cav. August
.

a force, as per margin, under the

, (• -1,1
2nd Company, s. and M. command of Colonel S. J. Cotton, moved
1st Sikh lnfantry.2 from Michni along the left bank of the
river in the direction of Shahmansur Khel.
1st Troop, 3rd Brigade, Horse Major Chamberlain's column, con-

^tKalTtd Battalion, ^^^ "^ ^^e troops detailed in the

Artillery, (two 24-pr. howit- margin, had been previously encamped
"'one squadron, 1st Irreg. Cav.
O^ ^he right of the river, ready to CO-
Three companies, 1st N.I. operate with the Peshawar column.
The 1st Sikh Infantry, under the command of Major G. Gordon,
in skirmishing order, formed the advance of Colonel Cotton's
column but no opposition was offered at the villages of Sadin or
;

Dab, the enemy falling back on Shahmansur Khel.

Major Chamberlain had now advanced his guns, under Major J.
Brind, to an elevated plateau commanding the village of, and

1 The Mountain Train Battery at this talion, Artillery, at Peshawar, Avilh four
time was drawn by mules, and was attach- 3-pr. guns and four 12-pr. howitzers,
ed to the 2nd Company of the 2nd Bat. 2 Now the 51st Sikhs.
 TEE MOHMAND TRIBE. 435

approaclies to, Shahmansiir Kliel, and their fire had partially cleared
the village but this necessarily ceased as the head of the other
;

column approached it, and the 1st Sikh Infantry were met by a sharp
matchlock fire from the towers, walls, and houses however, they
:

quickly cleared the village, driving the enemy to the heights

above.
Before the destruction of the village and towers could be
started, it was necessary to seize all the commanding
positions ;

for which purpose a strong party of skirmishers of the 9th Native

Infantry, under the command of Captain J. Murray, together
with two companies of the ist Sikh Infantry, under Lieutenant
C. H. Brownlow, w^ere ordered to drive the enemy from their
several
positions, and to crown the heights. In carrying out this order
the infantry were ably assisted by a well-directed fire from the
mountain guns, under Captain T. Brougham. The hills to the
north-east of the village were occupied and held by some companies
of the 1st Sikh Infantry, under Major G. Gordon.
The village and towers were now completely destroyed, under
the direction of Lieutenant H. Hyde, of the Engineers, and Ensif^n
A. U. F. Ruxton, commanding the Sappers and Miners about 500;

maunds of grain were either carried away or destroyed, the houses

were levelled by elephants, and all the timber work burnt.
Although the enemy only numbered some 200, the heights
had not been occupied without a struggle, and the troops holding
them were, during the whole time, exposed to an unceasing and
galling firefrom the neighbouring ridges, causing a loss of one killed
and sixteen wounded, including Lieutenant C. H. Brownlow, of
the 1st Sikh Infantry, and Lieutenant C. A. McDougall, Adjutant
9th Native Infantry, who were both dangerously wounded,
and
whose gallantry in holding the heights had been most conspicuous.
As soon as the village had been completely destroyed, these coverino-
parties were withdrawn, under cover of the mountain
guns.
The force then retired from Shahmansur Khel, covered
by
the guns on the right bank of the river, and the camp was reached
at 4-30 P.M.
As far as could
be ascertained, the loss of the enemy had
been
four killed and twelve wounded.
On the 2nd September, the troops, under Colonel S. J. Cotton,
advanced on Dab and Sadin, supported by Major Chamberlain's
3K3
436 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

detacliment on the right bank of the river. No opposition was offer-

ed by the Mohmands, although they were in as great force as at
Shahmansur Khel, the guns on the right bank keeping them in
check. The total destruction of these villages having been effected
by 2 P.M., the troops returned to Peshawar.
Colonel Cotton, in his despatch, reported most favourably
of the conduct of the troops, who had shown throughout the great-
est activity, gallantry, and zeal. The heat had been at times exces-

sive, and the exposure great.

The Indian Medal, with a clasp for the " North- West Frontier,"

was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in the

above operations.
Immediately Moh-
after these operations, the well affected

mands of Michni, who had remained on the jagir when Rahimdad

fled, deposited their quota of tribute with the Deputy Commis-

sioner, as a proof of their adherence to the original terms pending

the final orders of Government.
A settlement of the Michni The faithful
fief was then made.
Mohmands, who stood by their lands, continued to pay their share
of the tribute. The lands of those who fled were farmed out and
assessed with revenue. Rahimdad was not restored, and he con-
tinued to give trouble on this part of the border. Towards the close
of 1854 he appeared at Peshawar,, under a safe conduct, to pray
for restoration to his fief but as he did not, and indeed could not,
;

offer any security for good conduct, he was sent back across the
frontier, and forbidden to re-enter British territory.

After the expedition above narrated, under Colonel Sydney

Cotton, the Mohmands continued to commit outrages on our terri-
tory, and on the 24th March 1855, a party, numbering 300, came
down and carried off seventy-seven

!«JhJi*u£rcl;';;hy.i l^^Uo^ks- Troops, consisting of detach-

meuts
62nd Native infc\ntry.2 of the regiments as per margin,
n an ry.
under the command of Major Gordon, C
1st Sikh Infantry, were moved out, and a skirmish ensued, in which
one duifadar of police and one villager were killed, and Ensign
G. S. Bradford and four sepoys of the 62nd Native Infantry were
wounded.

1 Now the 7th Hariana Lancers. 2 Mutinied in Mooltan in 1858.

 THE MOHMAND TRIBE. '

437

On the Mav
400 Mohmands issued from tlie hills, but
Sth
were met by the troops and driven back with the loss of two sepoys
killed on our side. Between this date and the 16th of September
1855, ten outrages werecommitted on this border. On the latter
date a party of Mohmands came
out, but were driven back, with
the loss on our side of two sowars and one sepoy wounded. In
these outrages the offenders had been, for the most part, Moh-
mands of Pandiali. At last, Lieut. -Colonel H. B. Edwardes, c.b.,
the Commissioner, brought this persistent misconduct to the notice
of Government, and recommended that, instead of restoring to
them we should endeavour to punish them.
their allowances,
He recommended that the Amir of Kabul should be called upon
either to inflict summary punishment on the Pandiali Mohmands
for the past, and restrain them for the future, or else to intimate
that he left them to be dealt with as we thought proper. With this
report he submitted a memorandum, showing how he would propose
tc carry out these operations in the Pandiali valley. In this memo-
randum he said that nothing less than the complete destruction of
every village of the Pandiali Mohmands would be sufficient to
meet the and for this purpose he considered a force of 5,000
case,
effective men would be required.
Sir John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, supported the
recommendations of Lieut. -Colonel Edwardes but the Government
;

of India, while recognising the necessity of punitive measures, con-

sidered that the time was inopportune, and that immediate action
should be postponed.
Nothing further was therefore done except remonstrating stronf^-
ly with the Amir on the indifference shown by his government to
these raids and annoyances. These remonstrances, however, had no
effect, and raids on our border continued as before, and between
September 1855 and July 1857, no less than twenty-four serious
outrages were committed, with the object of plunder and murder.
This continued misconduct was made the subject of conver-
sation by Sir John Lawrence with the Amir Dost Muhammad,
during his visit to Peshawar in January 1857, but no satisfactory
result followed.
It was evident that the Mohmand chiefs hoped that the British
Government would at last be driven, by perpetual annoyances on
its border, to grant them some rich fiefs. Preliminary arrangements
438 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

were under discussion for the advance of a punitive force to

Pandiali, when the Mutiny broke out in India, and our attention
was more pressingly directed to other quarters.
Although the sepoy outbreak gave the Mohmands an excellent
opportunity of increasing their annoyances, yet they showed no
signs of profiting by it their raids continued, it is true, but they
;

were not of a more formidable nature.

In the middle of August,
however, a fanatical Kunar saiyid, named Saiyid Amir, after vainly
endeavouring to raise the Khaibar tribes against us, betook him-
self to the Mohmands of Michni. The}' received him with open
arms, and gave him protection, while he sent incendiary letters and
arms to the troops at Peshawar.
On the 9th of September, with the aid of the Shahmansur Khel
Mohmands and forty or fifty rebel sepoys, he made a night attack on
the fort of Michni, but the garrison, being composed of a party of
the Kelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment, were staunch, and beat them off.
The Mohmands were now in a state of the highest excitement,

and sent the " fiery cross " to all their neighbours, being evidently
determined to strike a blow for the recovery of their fiefs.

As there were no troops to move out against them, Lieut. -Colo-

nel Edward es had to yield with as good grace as possible. He sent
them word that they were going the wrong way to work, and that if
they wanted to regain their confiscated privileges, they must render
some marked service to Government, instead of adding to the em-
barrassments of a passing crisis. For instance, if they sent the Saiyid
away and gave hostages for good conduct till the war was over,
Lieut. -Colonel- Edwardes said he would gladly ask Government to
consider their case, but not on such favourable terms as formerly.
The Mohmands then sent in their hostages to Peshawar, packed of!
the Saiyid unceremoniously, and sat down quietly to wait for the
return of peace in Hindustan. A few days after, the news of the
capture of Delhi having arrived, the crisis passed over without any
further serious danger. Nevertheless, in spite of their professions,
the Mohmands evidently did not consider themselves bound to
refrain from raiding, and this went on as before.

From September 1857 to March 1860, 39

the beginning of
serious outrages were committed by members of this tribe,
and the question of a punitive expedition was again submitted for
 — -

THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 439

the consideration of the Government. Within five years there had

been 85 raids committed by parties of an average strength of
75 men, in which 14 British subjects had been killed, 27 wounded,
and 55 carried ofi, and over 1,200 head of cattle plundered. This
was exclusive of 40 minor raids, in which 35 British subjects had
been killed or wounded, and 267 head of cattle plundered. The
Government still refused, however, to sanction an expedition, and
determined to wait and see what would be the result of resolutely
refusing to restore the confiscated jagirs of the Tarakzais, the cause
of these complications.
About the 20th of March, the first really hopeful sign of a
satisfactory issue to this policy occurred, when Nauroz Khan, the
son and adopted heir of Saadat Khan of Lalpura, sent in, asking
for permission to come into Peshawar, and stating that he had
been engaged punishing the Shinwaris for an attempt made by one
of that tribe on the life of Fateh Khan, Khattak, when carrying
despat(-hes from Peshawar to Kabul. Nauroz Khan was accordingly
invited to come in.

In seeking to make peace with Nauroz Khan's great aim us,

was to get back the forfeited jagirs but, finding that Lieut. ;

Colonel Edwardes was firmly opposed to this ever being brought

about, and knowing that the Kabul Government had signified their
intention of interfering to stop the misconduct of the tribe, the
young Khan only asked that mortgages on lands held by some of
the Michni Mohmands Peshawar district, who were in rebellion,
in the
might hold good if peace was made, and that prisoners might be
released this was promised in regard to political prisoners, but not
;

in regard to criminals, who, it was declared, must be dealt with

according to law.
The result of this conference was the granting of the followinf^
terms to the Mohmands :

Is^.—That Government should accept the assurances of Saadat Khan,

chief of Lalpura, and his son, Nauroz Khan, of their desire to
live on good terms with the British Government, and to be res-
ponsible for the peace of the frontier, and overlook all past causes
of hostility.

Ind. — That the blockade against the Mohmands should be raised, and
the tribe he free to resort to our territory, individual notorious
criminals bemg, of course, responsible to the tribunals.
 —

440 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

3y(^_
—^That Nawab Khan, chief of Pandiali, and all Ms branch of the

tribe, be included in the amnesty.

Uh. —That such the Mohmands as went out with Eahimdad Khan
of

be also included on the same terms.

5^^_
—^That no confiscated land or jagir be given to any one.
6i7i.— That all Mohmands who may have been apprehended during the
blockade merely because they belonged to a hostile tribe, but
not taken in the commission of crimes or raids, be released on
payment of the reward given for their capture,

Lieut. -Colonel Edwardes's letter to Saadat Khan regarding

these terms is given in full, and was as follows :

Ihave received your letter, and, as I have no desire to injure you in

any way, I can assure you that the coming in of your son, Nauroz Khan,
was a great pleasure to me. From all he said, and from all you write, I believe
you sincerely desire to put an end to the disturbances on the Mohmand
frontier, and to come to friendly terms, I have this day addressed my own
Government in your favour, and asked that your past offences may be
forgiven, and bygones be bygones and as 3'our son, Nauroz Khan,
;

undertakes to be responsible for the rest of the Mohmand maliks, such

as Nawab Khan of Pandiali, and others, I have recommended that the
pardon be extended to all other Mohmands (except such individuals as
may be known to have committed a murder or other serious crimes, of which
justice must take notice), and that the blockade be taken off, and the
Mohmands be admitted to come and go, and trade in the Peshawar valley.
For I conceive it is beyond my discretion to forgive and condone an old-

standing enmity like this, though I have every hope that Government will
listen to my representations.
As to any jagirs that have been confiscated, I do not think it at all
advisable that they should be released ; for they will only be a future bone
of contention. Whoever sits on a barren hillside and enjoys a fine estate

in the plain below for doing nothing, must necessarily get wind in his head.
He thinks he owes it to his own strength, and the fears, not the generosity,
of Government. So after a year or two he gets full and proud, and rebels ;
and then the whole fight comes over again, and the tribe is plunged
into war to please him, and many lives are lost. In short, jagirs in the plain
are not good for the men on the hills, and they will never be given with my
consent. Don't think I say this for the sake of the money. To a great
Government the sum is of no consequence but it is bad ; for the administration.
If there be any Mohmand mortgages in the hands of cur subjects, the
Mohm.ands will be free to sue in om' courts, where every justice will be dene
them. And as to the prisoners in our jails, to please you I will release every
 THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 441

Mohmand who has been seized

merely because he was a Mohmand, on
consideration that he pays whatever reward was given for his owti
seizure.
But no highwayman, or murderer, or other criminal, will be released ;
justice
must take its course with such oft'euders.
My friend, I have spoken my mind out, for it is best to be plain. For
the rest, I desire the honour, and welfare, and strength of you and your
family,and I conceive that they will be better served by the friendship than
by the enmity of the British Government.

Soon after this, Saadat Khan of Lalpura and Nawab Khan of

Pandiali came in to Peshawar in person, and made their submis-
sion to the Commissioner.

Affairs with the Mohmands, near Shabkadar, December

and
January 1863-64.
After the submission of their chiefs, the Mohmands desisted
from troubling our border until the occasion Ambela expedi-
of the
tion in 1863, when the emissaries of the Akhund of
Swat were sent
all over the hills bordering on the Peshawar
valley, but were only
successful in exciting disturbances among the
Mohmands. Sultan
Muhammad Khan, son of Saadat Khan, owned the Akiiund's
religious supremacy, and was, moreover, ill disposed
towards us.
He was a man of bad character altogether he began life by ;

murdering his eldest brother, and was often at feud, even

with his
own father. Collecting a body of Mohmands, who were
joined
by a miscellaneous rabble of Safis, Bajauris, and the like,
lie came
down to the British frontier on the 5th December 1863.
Captain J. M. Earle, who was commanding the fort
of Shab-
kadar, hearing firing on the Abazai road, moved out
with fifty- five
sabres, 6th Bengal Cavalry, ^ and ninety-six
bayonets, Native In-
fantry. The enemy were estimated at about
500, of whom 300 were
posted on the summit of a slight eminence. Captain
Earle advanced
against them with his infantry in skirmishing order,
and the cavaby
on the flanks. On nearing the enemy, the cavalry charged from
both
and succeeded in killing seven or eight of their
flanks,
number
and wounding some twenty. Lieutenant St. G. M.
Bishop, 6th
Bengal Cavalry, who was gallantly leading the division
on the' left,
was mortally wounded, and a sowar was also
wounded durin^
^
the charge.

I Now the 6th King Edwaicrs Own Cavalry

Vol. L „
31,
 -

442 FBONTIEB AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Before the infantry could come up, the enemy had gained the
crest of one of the hills in the first range, when Captain Earle,
having accomplished his object by driving the enemy beyond our
frontier, retired leisurely towards the fort. The enemy made no
attempt to follow up, but came down immediately afterwards to
collect their killed and wounded.
The Shabkadar garrison was then reinforced by troops from
Peshawar, under Lieut. -Colonel G. Jackson, 2nd Bengal Cavaby.
On the 7th of December, the enemy having advanced from the hills
and taken up a position on the ridge in front of Shabkadar, Lieut.
Colonel Jackson moved out with his force. As he gained the ridge,
the enemy fell back, and were driven in half an hour to the end of
the plateau into the ravines and broken ground at the foot of the
hills, from the sides of which they kept up a heavy
fire Lieutenant
;

A. FitzHugh, with a detachment of the 4th Sikhs, was closely en-

gaged on the left front of the line, and kept the enemy at bay for
some time. Evening setting in, Lieut. -Colonel Jackson recalled that
officer, and retired the force. As it fell back, the enemy followed,
keeping up a fire the whole way, but at a long distance it was;

dark when the troops reached the fort, and a party of the enemy
having got into the village about 800 yards from the fort, they were
shelled out.
Our loss was, two sepoys of the 4th Sikhs killed, one jemadar
and one sepoy of the 4th Sikhs and tv/o sepoys of the 8th Native
Infantry, wounded.
Towards the end of December, Sultan Muhammad Khan took
np a menacing position at Regmiana, a small village in the hills
about five or six miles distant from Shabkadar. Nauroz Khan,
son of Saadat Khan, had recently joined his brother, but Saadat
Khan himself remained in the hills to the westward of Michni,
pretending inability to restrain his sons, but really affording them
countenance by his presence in the neighbourhood.
When Sultan Muhammad Khan arrived at Regmiana, the
number of his followers did not exceed 400 men. Nauroz Khan
brouf^ht an accession of 300 more,and occupied the Mohmand
village of Chingai, north-east of Regmiana.
Sultan Muhammad Khan was accompanied by a band of
mtdlas from Ningrahar and other parts of Afghanistan, who assist-
ed him in collecting the tribes, with the avowed object of carrying
 .

THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 443

on a religious war. Their success in stirring up the Mohmands after

the affairs of the oth and 7th December was not great at first.

Occasional accessions of small bodies under Muhammadan priests,

and a few absconded leaders of robbers from Government territory,
were received but it was not until tlie 31st of December that the
;

importunities of the priests and the efforts of Sultan Muhammad

Khan, had collected a miscellaneous assemblage, estimated at 3,800
Mohmands of the Baczai clan 600 men. men, as per margin.
., Khwaezai clan 1,000 On the evening of the
,, Halimzai ,, 1,500
,, ,. Tarakzai 1st January these 200
Ghilzais, etc. 500
Safi.s, .
numbers were aug-
Totai ..3,800 mcntcd by the arrival ..

of 800 more Baezais,

under Sultan Muhammad Khan, 500 lialimzais, and 500 others
under Nauroz Khan, making the total strength of the enemy 5,600.
Having thus assembled this force. Sultan Muhammad Khan,
after consultation with his brother and other leaders, and more
particularly at the pressing instigatioji of the priests, resolved to
move out to meet the British force stationed at Shabkadar.
^'^^-'°^^^^^- This force had been
Offi( sioned Officers
and men. Considerably increas-
D Battery, Brigade, Roj'al
5tli
Horse Artiller}', (3 guns) .)

7th Hussars
3rd Battalion .Rifle Brigade
2nd Bengal Cavalrv 1

6th .. .,
"

2nd Gurkha R(>ginient 2 . .

4th Sikh Infantry 3

444 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Macdonell, with a view to tempt them down, occupied with two

companies of riflemen the village of Badi Shamberi in front of his
Brigade,
centre, posting a squadron on the Michni
One company, Rifle
'

road to attract their skirmishers to the

ind Gurkhas,

plain, which partly succeeded in drawing forward the enemy's

right.
On tliis, the cavalry dashed forward, turning and gradually
folding the enemy's right on the centre. Simultaneously the
three guns of the Royal Horse Artillery, having taken up a posi-
tion in front of Badi Shamberi, raked the retiring wing of the enemy
with some effect.
The cavalry continued the turning movement (three times were
the Mohmands charged by the 7th Hussars), and Colonel Macdonell
then advanced the 3rd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade in skirmishing
order, when the enemy were driven beyond the border, and the
troops returned after sunset, unmolested.
Our loss was two killed and seventeen wounded, while the
enemy were believed to have sustained about eighty casualties.
Many Mohmands of the Tarazkai section proceeded straight
to their homes after their defeat, and a defection of at least 1,000
men took place the next morning, on the plea of scarcity of provi-
sions, and the necessity of burying the dead at the usual places of
interment. The result of the action also had the most dispiriting
effect on the leaders, and, notwithstanding the endeavours of the

priests, the gathering gradually dispersed.

The Indian Medal, with a clasp for the " North- West Frontier,"
was granted in 1876 to all survivors of the troops who took part
in the above aif air.
On the requisition of the Commissioner of Peshawar, the Amir
of Kabul now interfered in Mohmand affairs, and Sher Ali Khan
sent his son. Sirdar Muhammad Ali Khan, to eject Saadat Khan,
and to replace him by Riza Khan, the son of his former rival, Tura-

baz Khan. Saadat Khan and his son, Nauroz Khan, were carried
off prisoners to Kabul. The old Khan was subsequently released
and died soon afterwards.
Riza Khan, having taken possession of Lalpura, considerably
strengtJiened it. He was attacked by Sultan Muhammad Khan,
son of Saadat Khan, and a large gathering but he repulsed them
;

with heavy loss, and Sultan Muhammad Khan then wandered

 THE MOHMAND TBI BE. 445

to invite them either to

about amongst the Mohmands, trying
assemble and retake Lalpura, or to
commit raids upon the British
of the chiets ot the
border In August 1866 he was joined by some
friends in the former
Khwaezai and Baezai sections, who had lost
attack on Lalpura. Their object in
coming together appears to have
been twofold; 1st, to retake Lalpura;
and, 2ndly, the event of m
failure, to punish some of the
Mohmand Tarakzai villages above
Michni, and close the caravan routes
by Kharappa and Tartara to
Peshawar. When some 4,000 or 5,000 men had collected, dissensions
broke out, fomented by our ally, Nawab Khan, chief of Pandiah,
and the gathering dispersed.
useless, removed him,
Eventually, the Amir, finding Riza Khan
and placed Sultan Muhammad
Khan in the office of his father, at
the same time releasing Nauroz
Khan, who, with his son, Muhammad
Sadik Khan, went off to join Sirdar
Yakub Khan, the Amir's son, at
Herat.
In 1870, Sultan Muhammad
Khan was shot dead m the Lal-

Khan, who was instantly killed

pura bazaar by the son of Riza
Nauroz Khan having returned from
by the Khan's followers.
chieftainship, and marked his tenure of
Herat, then assumed the ^

office by great vigour

and energy, and endeared himself to the tribe
by his generous hospitality.
in 1864, the Mohmand border
After the affair near Shabkadar
until the beginning of
was not disturbed by any serious outrage
of Fort Michni,
1873 when Major H. Macdonald, the Commandant
dastardly manner. Major Macdonald
was 'murdered in a most
of the 16th Bengal Cavalry,^ were stroll-
and Captain R. M. Clifiord,
unattended on the bank of the Kabul river, about
ing unarmed and
fort, when they were suddenly attacked
by armed
a mile above the
escape Captain Clifford succeed-
men Both officers attempted to ;

was wounded in the thigh by a match-

ed but Major Macdonald
was thereupon pursued, and hacked to death
lock ball, and fell, and
with swords. Captain Clifford would also have probably lost his
for the intervention of a party of villagers in
life if it had not been
scene of the outrage, who, hearing the shots,
a hamlet near the
the murderers.
turned out and fired upon

formerly the Robilkhand Horse, ^vas

disbanded in 1882 and re-estab-
1 I his
legimeu ,
iT>.i«rPciment.
^j^^^ .^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ Cavalry.
446 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

From inquiries made into the circumstances of the outrage, it

was established that the murder was committed under the direction
of Bahram Khan, half-brother of Nauroz Khan, chief of Lalpura.
Bahram Khan had been for some time in charge of an outpost at
Nasir Kot,^ about two miles above Michni, and had the reputation
of being a wild and restless character. No adequate motive for the
crime was discovered, but it was proved that Bahram Khan had
for some time previously formed the intention of making himself
notorious by the murder of a British officer. After the murder,
Bahram Khan fled to Ningrahar, and evaded all attempts at
capture but in 1879 those of his retainers who had actually cut
;

down Major Macdonald were seized at Dakka, and met with their
well-deserved, though long-delayed, fate. For this outrage a fine of
Ks. 10,000 was imposed upon the Michni Tarakzais, which they paid
without demur. Though not active participators in the deed, they
had failed to give warning of an act which they well knew was
meditated.
At the end of the same year (1873) Captain Anderson, the offi-
cer commanding at Fort Shabkadar, was fired at, though happily
without effect, by a member of the Hafizkor sub-section of the
Tarakzai clan but the insult was promptly avenged by confiscation
;

of the lands held by members of the section, and their prohibition

from entering British territory for a period of three years. From
this time till the invasion of Afghanistan in 1878, our relations
with the independent Mohmands continued undisturbed. In 1874,
the arrest of Sirdar Yakub Khan by the Amir was the signal for
rebellion at Lalpura, and Nauroz Khan, the chief at Lalpura, dis-
obeyed the summons to go to Kabul, and retired to Gandab. The
afiairs of Lalpura continued in a very disturbed state, but these
troubles did not extend to our border. In 1875, Muhammad Shah
Khan, the son of Sultan Muhammad Khan, was installed as Khan
of Lalpura. In 1877, Nauroz Khan died at Gandab, and his sons
shortly after came in to Peshawar.

Operations against the Mohmands in 1879.

Affair at Kam Dakka.

When war was declared against the Amir of Afghanistan in
1878, Muhammad Shah Khan sent a Mohmand contingent to

I Then in Afghan territory.

 THE MOHMAND TBI BE. 447

fled with-
co-operate with the Amir's troops at Ali Musjid, but they
out firing a shot, and Muhammad Shah Khan came
in shortly after

to Lieutenant- General Sir S. Browne, at

Dakka, and tendered his

submission. , He was recognized as Khan of Lalpura

and did fairly
good service. The sons of Nauroz Khan, Muhammad Sadik

Khan and Akbar Khan, were at this time with the British Army.
Moghal Khan, the Khan second in importance only to
of Goshta,
in, and held aloof.
the chief of Lalpura, refused to come
It is

said that it was at his instigation that a raid was made by hill

Mohmands on the village of Sarai, on the left bank of the Kabul

river in the Kama district.

In consequence of this raid, and owing to the

murder of two
tending their
camel- drivers from the camp at Jalalabad while
camels grazing, a small column, as per
.°
Hazara M. B., 2 guns. 17- A' ^
Guide Cavalry. 50 sabres. margm, was Sent
. •
.-l
mto the
.

Kama •

district
*.

Infantry, 300 bayonets,

..
the 11th of January 1879, under the
q^^

command of Brigadier-General F. H. Jenkins. No opposition was

met with, and the village of Shergarh was surprised, the headman
of the village and a' ringleader of the
marauding party being
captured. A party of Mohmands was observed making for the

hills, and the mountain guns

opened on them with effect. On
the following day the column returned to camp,
having accom-
plished the object for which it had been detached.
the 6th of February 1879, a force of Mohmands, aided
On
by Bajauris, and estimated at 12,000, made an attack on the
village of a friendly chief in the
Kama district. This chief,
Azim Khan, the Khan of Chardeh, had previously tendered his
submission to the British, and had been put in charge of the two
districts of Goshta and Chardeh.
This raid, like the previous

one, was made at the instigation of Moghal Khan, the hostile

Khan of Goshta.
On the 7th February, a small force, as shown in margin,

10th Hussars, one troop. numbering about 900 men, under Brig-
Detachment, Rifle Brigade, adier- General H. T. Macpherson, v.c,

20tii"puniab N. I. C.B., was Sent from Jalalabad to attack

Det
.. 4th Gurkha Regiment. ^^^ enemy. A simultaneous movement
was ordered from Basawal by Chardeh towards Goshta, to
intercept the Mohmands should they retire by the route by
which they had advanced. This force, consisting of 2 mountain
448 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

guns, 300 infantry and 1 squadron of Guides Cavalry, was

under the command of Brigadier- General J. A. Tytler, v.c, c.b.,
and was accompanied by Azim Khan and a few followers. The
two columns crossed the river, but the enemy, havipig received
information of the intended movements, did not wait to be
attacked, but retreated to the hills before the arrival of the troops.
The columns therefore returned to their respective stations,
and by the 11th all excitement in this district had passed over.
About this time an agitation was got up by the mullas, and
much excitement was caused among the Mohmands by their
fanatical preaching. This excitement found vent in an attack
on Mr. G. B. Scott, Surveyor, at Zankai, above Michni, on the
28th of February 1879.
Arrangements had been previously mad^ by the Deputy
Commissioner of Peshawar, with the Tarakzai Mohmands, for the
safe conduct of a party through their country for the purpose of
surveying the Shanilo route from Peshawar to Dakka. Steps had
also been taken to prevent any opposition on the part of the Halimzai
Mohmands from Gandab. This was considered necessary owing
to the preaching of a wandering mendicant mulla, known as
the fakir of Mian Isa, from the Halimzai village of that name,
in British territory,where he had long resided. On the outbreak
of hostilities he had taken to the hills, and soon gained influence
among the ignorant clansmen. On the 26th of February Mr. Scott
arrived at Michni, and the following day went to Sahib Chin, and
returned without any interruption or unfriendly demonstration
whatever. An escort of seventy men of the 24th Punjab Native
Infantry liad been told off as a guard for him.
On the morning of the 28th of February, Mr. Scott, taking
with him only two non-commissioned officers and twenty sepoys
of his guard, accompanied by the Telisildar and several maliks,
proceeded to Zankhai. He was joined on the way by some men
of the Tarakzai clan. On arriving at Zankhai he began to
sketch, and had been at work some little time, when he observed
a body of men approaching from Gandab. He at once determined
to return, and gave the order to retire. The party had gone
about two miles, when a body of the enemy began to open a brisk
fire on them. At first no notice was taken of it, but soon the
fire became too hot, and the sepoys were ordered to retuin it.
 THE 310 nil AND TRIBE. 449

A skirmisliing action then began, and the sepoys were ordered to

retire in parties of at first ten each, and then five each, one cover-
ing the other. The country people who had remained with the
party (about twenty or thirty in number), under the command
of the Tehsildar, Shahpasand Khan, helped to keep off the enemy,
but their ammunition soon failed. The retirement was continu-
ed until a mass of low hills was reached. Here Mr. Scott sent for
reinforcements. Leaving the road, the party continued their re-
treat along an almost level spur for about half a mile, at the end of
which was a steep descent to the bed of a small stream. Here the
enemy charged, sword in hand, and succeeded in cutting down a
naick and a sepoy, whose bodies had to be left on the ground.
They were, however, eventually beaten off, and forced to seek
cover.
enemy seemed to have had enough, and the re-
After this the
treat was continued almost unmolested to Gidarnao. About a
mile beyond this village the remainder of the guard, under Captain
E. G. Newnham, was met, and the whole party returned to Michni.
—
Our loss had been one non-commissioned officer and one sepoy
killed, one sepoy shot through the foot, and, in addition to this,
Hidayat Khan, a malik of Sena, was shot through the face.
The sub-divisions of the Tarakzais and Halimzais implicated
in this outrage were fined Rs. 2,000, which they eventually paid.
More serious than the Zankhai affair was the gathering head-
ed by the well-known Mulla Khalil, in April 1879. This man was
the grandson of a Swati from Pakli, in the Hazara district. A
man of little education, but of great ambition, he had at this time
risen to a position of much influence among the Mohmands. For
some weeks before this, rumours had been rife of gathering of
Mohmands of the Khwaezai and Halimzai clans, for the purpose of
raiding on British territory, or making attacks on the British posts
along the Khaibar route. On the night of the 20th April, a few
Mohmands, numbering perhaps 200 or 300, began to cross over
the Kabul river from Palosi to Shinpok. On the 20th April, the
Khan Lalpura sent to the officer commanding at Dakka (Major
of
0. Barnes, 10th Bengal Lancers), to say that a large body of
Mohmands were within three miles of that place, and had already
exchanged shots with his outposts. The Khan asked for
help, as he expected a night attack. Major Barnes made such
Vol. L 3 M
450 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FRO 31 INDIA.

arrangements as were practicable for the defence of Lalpura, but

the anticipated attack did not take place.
As, however, reports from every quarter agreed in stating that
the Mohmands were in large numbers,
?*hTZ.:\^'nilldSf
'•
Major Barnes moved out the JoUowing
Mhairwara Battn., 3 com- morning with the troops as per margin,
P^^^*^^'
to ascertain the character and number
of his neighbours. The road, as far as the foot of the Kam
Dakka pass, was found clear of hostile tribes. Having halted
the guns and main body of the cavalry at the foot of the pass.
Major Barnes pushed forward the infantry and a few mounted
orderlies to Kam Dakka, which is a village on the south side of
the Kabul river, seven miles east of Dakka. No opposition of
any consequence was offered to this reconnaissance, a few shots
only being exchanged across the Kabul river, Kam Dakka was
found unoccupied by the enemy, but all reports were unanimous as
to the MDhmands being in great strength in Rena and Parchao, on
the north side of the river. The Kam Dakka villagers were
friendly, but expressed grave fear for their own property and
lives, and begged that the reconnoitring party might not to be

withdrawn.
The force returned to Dakka the same day without meeting
any opposition, and, on a report of the intelligence gained by it
being telegraphed to Lieutenant-General F. F. Maude, v.c, c.b.,
commanding the 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force, at
Landi Kotal, instructions were issued to despatch two companies
of theMhairwara Battalion to Kam Dakka. This step was taken
on the recommendation of the Political Officer, Major E. R. ConoUy.
That officer was in camp at Landi Kotal when the telegram from
the Officer Commanding at Dakka arrived, and strongly advised
that help should be sent to the people of Kam Dakka, as the in-
habitants were, Maj or Conolly stated, friendly to the troops.
In consultation with the Political Officer, it was also decided
to send a force from Landi Kotal to reconnoitre
through the Shil-
man valley towards Kam
Dakka. The object of this reconnais-
sance was to reassure the inhabitants, who were considered
topographical information of
to be friendly, to open up and obtain

1 Now the 44th Merwara Infautry.

 THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 451

this part of the country, some of which was unknown, and to

work round on Kain Dakka, so that should any of the Mohmands
have crossed the Kabul river, they might possibly be caught be-
tween the troops from Dakka and this reconnoitring colimin.
Lieut.-Colonel F. B. Norman, Commandant, 24th Punjab

ll-9th Royal Artillery, 2 guns.

Native Infantry, accompanied by Major
i-i2th Foot 2 COS. E. R. ConoUy as Political Officer, marched

24th Punjab N. I. 2 from Landi Kotal in command of this

'.',

Bhopal Battalion 2 „ column, consisting of the troops noted

April.
in the margin, at four o'clock on the afternoon of the 21st
On the same day, in accordance with the orders received, a detach-
ment of the Mhairwara Battalion, consisting of 130 men under the
4 Native Officers. Command of Captain O'Moore Creagh,^
11 Non-Commissioned Officers, ^^^g despatched from Dakka at five
4 Drummers. .,,--,
o'clock m the evening
•
.j.i £*ji,
to the triendly
119 Sepoys.

village of Kam Dakka, with instructions to protect that place

the Kabul river, and
against an enemy to be expected from across
to hold the village for three days.
tools, and carry-
This detachment, provided with entrenching
ing spare ammunition, and rations, did not
reach Kam Dakka till
night, as great difficulty was
a quarter past eleven o'clock that
experienced in getting the mules over the intervening
hills.

As the orders to the detachment were to occupy the

village

it. Captain Creagh concluded its

of Kam Dakka, and to entrench
inhabitants would be expecting the troops, but he
nevertheless
of the arrival of the de-
sent forward a messenger to give notice
tachment.
On his arrival at Dakka, Captain Creagh summoned the
Kam
headmen of the village, and announced to them the ob act with j

which the troops had been sent. The villagers were, however,
said they had
averse to the troops entering their village, and
assistance, as they
neither asked for, nor did they require, any
were quite able to protect themselves. They further expressed

it as their opinion that the

detachment would be defeated by the
enemy, as it was unaccompanied by any mountain guns; they
therefore had no wish to compromise themselves with their tribe

INow Lieut. -General Sir O'Moore Crecgli, v.c-, k.cb.

3M2
452 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

on account of the troops. Their demeanour was evidently any-

thing but friendly.
That night the detachment bivouacked outside the village
of Kam Dakka, throwing out the necessary picquets for its pro-
tection and at four o'clock on the morning of the 22nd of April
;

Captain Creagh again summoned the headmen, but they refused to

have anything to do with the troops, and refused even to furnish
a messenger to Dakka. They, however, said that in the attack
which would take place they would remain neutral, and would
not allow the enemy into the village of Kam Dakka.
Captain Creagh, in order to carry out his orders, took up
a position covering the right and left front of Kam Dakka, with
the understanding that the inhabitants of that place would them-
selves protect their own front, as they said they would do. He
then reported all well to the officer commanding at Dakka, as the
enemy did not appear too numerous, only a few of them being
visible on the hill in front of his position.
About five o'clock in the morning, crowds of the enemy were
seen crossing the river, and ascending the hill in front of where
the troops were stationed, and threatening their flank. The
impending attack was then reported to Dakka, and as the enemy
opened fire upon the detachment at about half-past five o'clock,
and the inhabitants of Kam Dakka became more sullen, the troops
were withdrawn altogether from the latter place. A fresh position
was then taken up, with the right of the detachment resting on the
Dakka and Kam Dakka road, and the left towards the Kabul
river, with a support and reserve in rear of the right, and the

baggage in rear of the left at the same time cavalry were applied
;

for from Dakka, as the enemy were advancing into the open.
This position was held for about an hour, while continual re-
inforcements oined the enemy, who kept up a heavy fire on the
j

troops but the right flank being again threatened, the detach-
;

ment fell back slowly through some cultivated ground. At about

eight o'clock in the morning, a party of the Mhairwara Battalion,
consisting of one ofiicers, and
jemadar, four non-commissioned
thirty- one men, escorting ammunition from Dakka, came down
through the pass to join the detachment. On seeing them the
enemy withdrew to the hilltops, but continued to extend to the
right.
 THE MOHMAND TBIBE. 453

From what this escort told Captain

Creagh, he came to the
conclusion that he could expect no reinforcements on that day,
and therefore he resolved to take up the best available position, to
enable him to maintain himself against the attack of the enemy
as long as possible. Fixing upon a tomb in a graveyard to his
left rear, Captain Creagh threw back the right of the detachment,
and brought the skirmishers facing the hills, with the tomb in
the "rear.
Part of the supports, the reserve, and the c^ooZie-bearers were
set to work to build stone breastworks flanking each other, the
baggage was placed under the river bank, where it was out of fire,
while the skirmishers kept up a brisk fire, which prevented the
enemy from attempting to come down the hills to close quarters,
although they kept up a continuous fire. The hills commanded
this position at a distance of about 500 yards, but no better was
available, as it was necessary for the troops to keep near the
river for the sake of the water-supply, and the ruined tomb and
stones round it furnished materials for the rapid construction
of breastworks.
Scarcely had this entrenchment been completed, about nine
o'clock in the morning, and the baggage followers and animals been
brought under cover, and a supply of water obtained in the
massaks, when
enemy came down from the hills and completely
the
surrounded the detachment. The attack and defence continued
from nine o'clock in the morning about three o'clock in the
till

afternoon, the enemy times making an assault on the

several
entrenchment, and being repulsed only by bayonet charges.
About two o'clock in the afternoon the enemy's circle had closed
round the troops to a uniform distance of from 60 to 1 00 yards.
About three o'clock in the afternoon the ammunition began
to run low, and the position became most critical, when it was
noticed that the enemy were moving from right to left, while for
the first time they cleared away from the rear of the position.
This movement on the part of the enemy was due to the approach
of reinforcements, under the command Captain D. M. Strong
of
10th Bengal Lancers, accompanied by Captain L. H. E. Tucker
Political Officer.
On the situation of the Mhairwara detachment at Kam Dakka
becoming known at divisional head- quarters, at ten o'clock on the
454 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

morning of the 22nd of April, through the receipt of a telegram

from the officer commanding at Dakka, Lieut.- General Maude
immediately directed the Kam Dakka detachment to be reinforced
from Dakka by one company of the 1-5 th Fusiliers,^ and by another
from the Mhairwara Battalion, ordering at the same time three
companies of the l-12th root,^ and two guns of ll-9th Royal
Artillery (a mountain battery) from Landi Kotal to Dakka, and
two companies of the 2nd Gurkhas, from Basawal to the same
place. One company, l-12th Foot, and the two mountain guns
were subsequently diverted to Kam Dakka, direct across country
from Haft Chah, midway between Landi Kotal and Dakka.
On the arrival of the reinforcements from Dakka at the pass
overlooking the Kam Dakka plain, Captain Strong, who was in
command of the party, seeing the Kam Dakka detachment in
a low, irregular enclosure of broken walls, surrounded by groups
of the enemy with red and white standards, advanced immediately
with a company of the l-5th Fusiliers, and one of the Mhairwara
Battalion, at the same time ordering up a troop of the 10th Bengal
Lancers, which was some distance in rear while descending from
;

the pass to the position of the Kam Dakka detachment, a small

party of the enemy was attacked by the l-5th Fusiliers, and driven ^

with some loss into the hills. About half-way down a detachment
of the Mhairwaras was posted on a ridge, where it greatly assisted
in keeping the enemy ol the flank of the troops, and in maintain-
ing communications with the rear.
On reaching the position held by the Kam Dakka detachment,
it was found that the enemy were under cover about 100 yards
off, while a body with standards occupied a hill 500 yards distant,

the only shelter for the troops being close under the walls of
the enclosure, as the enemy's bullets were dropping inside it. ,The
troops now received orders to cease firing, as the ammunition was
running short, and awaited an assault with fixed bayonets, with
instructions to fire only if the enemy showed at 150 yards distant.
The British officers were told off to different posts to superin-
tend the defence, and to carry out the gradual evacuation of
the position. Still it was felt that this withdrawal would be with
heavy loss so long as the enemy held their well-covered position

1 Now 1st Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers*

a Now lat Battalion, Suffolk Regiment.
 THE MOEMAND TBIBE. 455

The approach of Lieutenant

within 100 yards of the troops.
who had been sent to bring up the troop of the 10th
C. E. Pollock,
Bengal Lancers, was therefore a welcome sight, as he rode across
the plain to announce that the cavalry were under cover
about

200 yards off.

Fromapointontheriverbank, about 120 yards from the posi-

tion of the enemy, Captain Strong, with Lieutenant Pcllock,

then
dispersed the
led a charge of the cavalry to the cornfields, and
enemv, those who escaped the cavohy rushing down a steep
bank into the river, their standards and tur'ans floating down the
stream. The rest of the enemy fled to the hills on the right,
from which a continuous fire poured down upon the cavalry during
the charge. The Kam Dakka detachment, b if ore retiring from
the enclosure, charged the enemy, and then returned to carry off
the dead and wounded, while the cavalry covered the further

withdrawal of the infantry.

The mountain guns, with a company of the l-12th Foot from
Landi Kotal, had by this time arrived, and, coming immediately
into action, shelled the enclosure, which, on its being evacuated
by the KamDakka detachment, had been taken possession of
by the enemy. The guns opened with common shell and percus-
sion fuzes, and a shell from each gun having burst in the middle
of the enclosure, the standards disappeared, and the enemy fled
precipitately from this point, shrapnel being fired at them as
they ran.
Major R. Dyce, ll-9th Royal Artillery, who had now assumed
J.

the command, considered it necessary to retire to Dakka. The

retirement was consequently ordered, the cavalry leading, followed
by the Mhairwara Battalion, baggage, wounded, etc., then the
mountain guns, with the detachments l-5th Fusiliers and l-12th
Foot, under Major H. L. W. Phillips, of the latter regiment, cover-
in<y the rear. The withdrawal of the force was conducted regularly,
but much time was lost by the number of doolies blocking up the
road, and by the baggage mules, whose loads were constantly
falling oiT.

Major 0. Barnes, commanding at Dakka, had intended that

the Kam Dakka detachment should be relieved from its critical
position, but that the pass leading to that village should be held
for the night, and the enemy attacked the following morning with
456 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

all the available troops at Hs and for this purpose he

disposal,

had despatched rations and spare ammunition to the force but ;

Major Dyce determined not to hold the pass or to await the rations,
as he considered it highly improbable that they could reach him
after dark, and knew that they could not arrive till very late. The
cavalry and battery mules would have necessarily been sent away,
as there was no ground for them to stand on water would not
;

have been procurable, and none of the troops had tasted food
since breakfast. The Kam Dakka detachment had been fight-
ino- since six o'clock that morning, the detachment l-5th Fusi-
liers since midday, and that of the l-12th Foot had been on the

move since half-past eleven o'clock in the forenoon, while the

cavalry were without forage or water.
Major Dyce, commanding the troops, followed in rear of the
guns, watching if the enemy should attempt to descend from the
opposite side to open fire upon them but when quite up to the top
;

of the pass, as the enemy had made no advance, the guns were or-
dered down to a position about 300 yards from the points w^here
the path through the pass leads into the plain towards Dakka
Kulan.
It was half-past six in the evening when the officer command-
ing the rear-guard reported all the baggage and doolies up to the
top of the pass. The officer commanding the troops now instructed
the rear-guard commander not to hold his ground longer than abso-
lutely necessary, as, should the enemy get close up before he reached
a spur which had to be crossed, the rear-guard would be taken in
reverse.
As the position taken up by the guns was much cramped by
the doolies and baggage animals, it was impossible to bring them
into action they were consequently retired to Dakka Kulan, where
;

they were brought into action with the cavalry on the flank.
Incessant firing was now taking place, but it was too dark to dis-
tinguish friend from foe. The guns remained in position till the
main body of the rear-guard were well closed up, and then fell

back to Dakka, where they arrived about eight o'clock in the

evening, the rear-guard coming in about half an hour later. The
enemy, though pressing the rear-guard closely and keeping up
a heavy fire, occasioned very few casualties, as it was quite dark
and the fire, though continuous, was misdirected.
 THE 310 HMAND TBI BE. 457

On the following morning, the 23rd of April, a force under

Lieut. -Colonel C. J. C. Sillery, l-12th Foot, who had now assumed
command at Dakka, marched at half-past six o'clock over the same
ground to the
"
pass. The column consist-
C-3rd Royal Artillery.
i j- ^i , i
•
i
ii-9th ., „ 2 guns, ed 01 the troops noted in the margm.
i-i2th Foot, 2 companies. rpj^^
f^^jj ^^^^g ^^.^^^ halted in advance of
l-otn Fusiliers, 1 company. ^ ^
10th Bengal Lancers, 3 troops. Dakka Kulan, and two guns were sent to

Mti?;*aBL«„':Tro"4W «^« '^''''''' '«*'•. ^« *°

--^^ ^'' •J"^'^ '^'
river reaches in the enemy case of
attempting to cross. The remainder crowned the pass, while
the cavalry and the 2nd Gurkhas advanced.
Before reaching the pass, a raft was observed to cross the
Kabul river, and men were assembling as if to embark in it. A
mountain gun fired a shell at it at a range of 1,800 yards, which
struck about 100 yards short, and appeared to ricochet into the
raft. The enemy dispersed, and shortly afterwards the raft
disappeared.
The 2nd Gurkhas and l-5th Fusiliers being posted in the
positions the enemy -had occupied the previous day, the cavalry
then advanced to Kam Dakka, and sent parties two miles ahead
down the river.
The column under Lieut. -Colonel F. B. Norman here joined
the Dakka detachment. This column, as already stated, had
marched from Landi Kotal on the afternoon of the 21st on ;

that night it had halted about three miles from Kam Shilman,
and reached Loi Shilman on the evening of the 22nd. During the
day, Lieut.-Colonel Norman received news, by heliograph, of the
threatened attack at Kam Dakka, and that the villagers of that
place were unfriendly, and he, at the same time, received orders to
press on as rapidly as he could, and, if possible, take the enemy in
flank. On
the morning of the 23rd, the force pushed on through
the Shilman valley and reached Kam Dakka, as mentioned above,
about 2 P.M. but found that the fighting, of which reports had
;

been received during the morning, was over, and that the Mohmands
had dispersed.

Onthe arrival of Lieut.-Colonel Norman's force, the Dakka

column was withdrawn to the fort. The troops under Lieut.-
Colonel Norman remained at Kam Dakka during the 24th, and
Vol. I. 3 If
458 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

were quite undisturbed, and on the 25tli they returned to Landi

Kotal.
The casualtiesamong the troops in the affair of the 22nd
were 6 killed and 1 8 wounded ; those of the enem}^ vv^ere very con-
siderable, and were estimated at about 200 killed and wounded.
It was computed that about 1,500 men were opposed to our
troops.
The only cause for regret beyond the loss of so many gallant

men was, the Commander-in-Chief considered, that the original

intention of Major Barnes, to hold the pass during the night
and to attack the enemy in the morning, had not been adhered
to, as, had this been done, the enemy would have no doubt received

a severer lesson than they got on the 23rd of April. The Com-
" but for the cool-
mander-in-Chief also recorded his opinion that,
ness, determination, and gallantry of the highest order, and the
admirable conduct which Captain Creagh displayed on this occa-
sion, the detachment under his command would, in all probability,
have been cut off and destroyed." For his gallant conduct this
officer subsequently received the Victoria Cross.
Many of the Lalpura men came down armed to Kam Dakka,
and, as they did not assist the detachment, it was naturally pre-
sumed that they joined the enemy. The Kam Dakka men also,
after applying for the assistance of the troops, were many of

them recognized in the ranks of the enemy. On this being

brou^^ht to the notice of the Political Officer (Major Conolly)
he stated that the Kam Dakka men had behaved throughout in
the usual Patlian manner, doing their best to pull well with both
sides. They were in a most difficult position, afraid of punish-
ment from the troops ifthey were hostile to them, and afraid of
the Mohmands if they gave help to the troops, lest they might
cross over the Kabul river and burn Kam Dakka, to deter the
inhabitants from again helping the troops, and also as an effectual
way of annoying the British Government. It was to prevent
any mischance of this sort, the which would have been
effect of

most injurious to the prestige of the Government, that he ad-

vised that Kam Dakka should be defended. The Political Officer,
therefore, did not see how the inhabitants of Kam Dakka could
have behaved otherwise than they did.
 TEE MOHMAND TRIBE. 459

Lieut. -General Maude recorded his opinion that if such were

the opinions of the Political Officer, and if it prob-
he considered
able even that the Kam Dakka inhabitants would act as they
did, he should have informed the General Officer Commanding to
that effect when he advised him to assist them with troops. Had
he done so, the Lieut. -General would have sent any
either not

of Her Majesty's troops on such an errand, or would have taken

care that their supports were nearer than Dakka, seven miles off,
or Landi Kotal, about fifteen miles distant.

Operations against the Mohmands in 1880.

Action on the Gara heights in January.

In April 1879, the same month as the Kam Dakka affair above
related, Muhammad Sadik Khan, the eldest son of Nauroz Khan,
who was with Lieut. -General Sir S. J. Browne, at Gandamak, fled
from the British camp and joined the Amir Yakub Khan [whose
mother was -a Nauroz Khan], and, as soon as our troops
sister of

left Dakka June

in 1879, he was appointed Khan of Lalpura in
the place of Muhammad Shah Khan.
When the second advance into Afghanistan took place,
Muhammad Sadik Khan of Lalpura hesitated for some days, but
at length appeared at Dakka, and for two months all went well at
Lalpura, and also at Goshta, where Moghal Khan sat in an atti-
tude of passive hostility.
The journey of the Amir Yakub Khan to India gave the
first shock to the Mohmands, and further agitation was produced
by the news of the fighting at Kabul. Moghal Khan was the first
to go, in December 1879, but his gathering was speedily broken up
by a cannonade across the river from Char deh, the Khan of
which
place again remained loyal to the English, partly from
inclina-
tion, and party from enmity to Moghal Khan. MuUa Khalil
had for some time been rousing the impressionable tribesmen,
and working on Muhammad Sadik Khan, who, at length, unable
longer to bear the taunts and passionate messages of
the mullas,
retired from Lalpura toRena, January 1880, and put him-
in
self at the head of the
men who had already collected there with
Mulla Khalil. The movement, having gained the tribal
chief
as its leader, soon spread, and the Mohmands
flocked down to
3N2
460 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Palosi and Eena. Meanwhile, an important diversion was effected

by detaching Akbar Khan, a younger son of Nauroz Khan, who
was appointed by the British Government as Khan of Lalpura
in the place of his brother. Under the circumstances, he was
unable to render much active assistance but one-half of the
;

Nauroz Khan interest, the most powerful in the tribe, was thus
secured to us. On the 11th of January the enemy began to
cross the river and on the 14th, about 5,400 men, under Mu-
;

hammad Sadik Khan and Mulla Khalil, had crossed, and taken
up a strong position on the Gara heights, about two miles
from Fort Dakka, and between that place and Kam Dakka. This
ground had been reconnoitred on the 7th by Colonel T. W. E.
Boisragon, commanding at Fort Dakka, and almost every officer
in the garrison had made himself familiar with its features, in
anticipation of the enemy taking up this position. It was now

determined that, while a column from Dakka attacked the enemy's

position in front, another column should be sent from Landi Kotal
to attack them in flank and rear, so that, surrounded on three
sides, and the unfordable Kabul river in rear, escape would be
impossible and destruction almost certain.
On the morning of the 15th, therefore, the Dakka column,
^ T, ^s per
^ margin, under the command of
,
l-C R. TT A
H. A.. 4. guns. ^ '

6th Dragoon Guards, 94 sabres. Colouel T. W. E. BoisragOn, 30th Pun-

}mtnga?c!;a™,5orht. J^b Native Infantry, was drawn up

8tiiN. I.. 100 bayonets. in positiou facing the Gara heights by
30th P. N. 1, 500 bayonets. ,, x J "U
rri,
"U •
i
•^
Ihe action
11 A.M. had been purposely
delayed to allow the Landi Kotal column time to arrive.
Brigadier- General J. Doran, c.b., had marched six hours pre-
viously from Landi Kotal, and, it was hoped, was now in a position
to cut off the enemy's retreat. The Mohmands had, as usual,
strengthened their position by constructing stone breastworks
on all the commanding points, and had even thrown up dur-
ing the night an entrenchment along the foot of the ' hills.

The action was begun by two guns of l-C Eoyal Horse

Artillery.These opened fire at a distance of 1,000 yards on the ad-
vanced sangars, and the first shot burst just over the crest of
the most advanced work. In the meantime. Colonel Boisragon had
drawn up the infantry in the plain in a position to threaten the
 TEE MOHMAND TPIBE. 461

enemy's left flank, whicli appeared the most vulnerable, and had
been selected as the point of attack.
The attack consisted of 300 men in skirmishing line, 200
in and 200 in
support, reserve, and in this formation the
advance was made at 1-55 p.m. As they reached the foot of the
hill, the rif^ht, finding itself overlapped by the enemy, involun-
tarily edged off to the right, thus leaving a gap in the centre, which
was filled up from the supports. Captain E. H. Webb, 8th Native
Infantry, commanded the whole of the fighting line. Much shaken
by the well-directed fire of the guns, which had lasted for about an
hour and-a-half, the enemy abandoned their foremost line of
works, and also those which immediately commanded them, as
the infantry came on. The hillsides were most rugged and pre-
cipitous, but the advance was covered by the fire of all the four
guns, and the enemy evacuated one position after another, until,
at 2-30 P.M., theGara heights were gained, and the enemy, utterly
routed, were flying down the reverse slopes towards Kam Dakka.
The reserve having charge of the ammunition, etc., and not being
required to take an active part in the attack, moved to the right,
and eventually crossed over the Gara pass.
In the meanwhile, two guns, with a cavalry escort, were moved
to the extreme right to shell the Jwtal upon the track from Haft
Chah to Kam Dakka, in case the enemy should defend it. The
remaining two guns were taken to the left, and, after clearing
the heights near the river, opened upon such of the enemy
fire

as could be seen crossing, and upon those on the other side who
had already crossed.

The main body of the infantry,

after gaining possession of
the heights, descended the spurs into the Kam Dakka plain, and
formed up on the river bank at four o'clock in the afternoon.
The Mohmands hardly attempted to hold the kotal on the Haft
Chah and Kam Dakka and were easily dislodged bv the
road,
infantry. As soon as the guns of the Landi Kotal column were
heard, about 5 p.m., Colonel Boisragn's force pressed on
and
occupied the village of Kam Dakka, where they were joined by
Brig. -General Doran about half-past six o'clock.

In the meantime, the enemy had made good their escape,

either towards Rena or across the river.
462 FBONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The advance of the Landi Kotal column, which was composed

of the marginally-named troops, had
11— 9th Royal Artillery, 2 guns. _ . * _ / _ ^. -^

200 bayonets.
5tli Fusiliers, been delayed beyond all expecta-
25th K.O. Border .,200 bayonets. .^ions by the unforeseen difficulties
^
17th Bengal Cavalry. 20 sabres.
"C" Co.Tm. S. & M., 30 bayonets, of the road. The troops assembled
^; N. t"
4th M. ?T- I., 200IZ
'""y°"''"-2
„ ^
a before half-past
little
^
r four in the
^

31st P. N. I., 300 „ 3 morning at the fort in the Loargai

valley. An advanced guard under Lieutenant
of 100 Jazailchis,

G. Gaisford, 5th Punjab Infantry, had gone on ahead an hour

earlier to seize the Inzari Kandao, about eight miles from camp.

Owing to the darkness of the night the progress of the troops

was slow, and it was not till 7-40 that the head of the column reached
the Inzsri Kandao. Here a halt was made, to enable the rear to
close up, and the Brig. -General received a report from Lieutenant
Gaisford, who had ascended a peak near at hand, that no enemy
was in sight.

At 8-45 A.M. from the Inzari Kandao was

the descent
beo'un. The track was narrow and difficult that the troops
so

could only move in single file. The battery mules could hardly
be got along, and, although only the reserve ammunition, water
mules, and a few dandies were with the troops, even these caused
most serious delay. The path was, in fact, a mere goat track ;

some baggage animals fell over the precipices and were lost, and
the rear-guard was sixty-seven hours in covering seventeen miles.
At the foot of the Torsappar Hil], Brig. -General Doran received
information that the enemy were occupying the Shilman Gakhe
in force. Another halt was therefore ordered, to allow the moun-
tain guns to come up, and a company of the 5tli Fusiliers was de-
tached to crown some commanding heights in advance.
At 10-30 A.M. the troops again moved forward. The road
was still most difficult, some of it being over slippery rocks, on
which the horses of the cavalry detachment, and even the unshod
battery mules, could not keep their footing.
At about 11-30 a.m., during a third short halt, the guns of
Colonel Boisragon's force were heard. After that the path was
somewhat better, and the troops advanced more rapidly. It was

iNow the 61st (P. T.. 0.) Pioneers. 2 Now the 64th Pioneers.
3 Now the 31st Punjabis.
 THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 463

nearly one o'clock before the gorge of the Shilman Gakhe came
in sight. The pass was held by the enemy, who showed three
standards, one of which was planted in a breastwork on a conical
hill in front of the pass. A company of the 5th Fusiliers was
extended to seize a rocky hill, about half a mile from the crest
of the Shilman Gakhe, and a company of the 31st Punjab Native
Infantry occupied some heights to the left, a company of the 25th
Foot connecting the two. The mountain guns opened on the
enemy from the hill held by the company of the 5th Fusiliers, and
the first shell caused them to abandon their advanced breastwork.
The leading companies then advanced and cleared the pass of the
enemy, who retired to a high hill facing and completely com-
manding the descent towards Kam Dakka. As this hill had to
be taken, and it rose a thousand feet above the pass, a further
delay was inevitable. Fortunately, the enemy made but a feeble
resistance, and the hill was quickly carried by two companies
of the 5th Fusiliers, supported by two of the 31st Punjab Native
Infantry. Another company of the 31st Punjab Native Infantry
was sent down the pass to clear some lower hills in front, in
which groups of the enemy were posted. The detachments of
the 5th Fusiliers and 31st Punjab Native Infantry rapidly drove
the enemy before them in the direction of Kam Dakka, and by
half-past two the road was clear.
In the meantime. Brigadier- General Doran had established
heliographic communication with Dakka, which could be seen
from the crest of the Shilman Gakhe. By this means he learnt
that Colonel Boisragon had crossed the Gara heights, and was
between them and the Kabul river.
At 2-45 P.M. dense masses of the flying enemy could be seen
moving down the right bank of the river and across the mouth
of the nala running from the Shilman Gakhe to the Kabul.
Having stayed some time trying to ascertain the where-
abouts of his baggage, regarding which no information could
be obtained, Brig. -General Doran began the descent of the
Shilman Gakhe at about 3-20 p.m. The path down to the Kabul
river was nearly as bad as that between the Inzari Kandao
and Torsappar, and it was not till five o'clock that the mouth of
the nala was reached. Here, about six or seven hundred of
the enemy were discovered on the opposite bank of the river.
464 FRONTIEE AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

making tlieir way from tlie ferry to tlie village of

across the sands
Rena. Another party was crossing on two rafts, and some on
the right bank were making for the ferry. The mountain guns
opened at a thousand yards, and a steady fire was kept up
by the few British infantry at hand. Many of the enemy were
seen to fall and be carried off, found on
while a few bodies were
the spot the next day. Brigadier- General Doran's troops reached
Kam Dakka and there joined Colonel Boisragon's
at 6-30 p.m.,
force, as already related. Both columns bivouacked without bag-
<Tao-e, many without food, and some without even greatcoats.
The baggage of the Landi Kotal column was ordered to re-
main for the night near the Shilman Gakhe, but none of it got
so far that night, or even the next. Very great difficulty was
experienced by Lieut. -Colonel G. C. Hodding, commanding 4th
Madras Native Infantry, who was in charge of^the baggage with
two hundred men of his regiment, in getting the animals over
the extremely difficult road. The almost impassable nature of
the path beyond the Inzari Kandao caused an immense block of
animals at that place, and the confusion v/as increased by a false
alarm, causing a panic among the mule-drivers and followers,
in which some animals and loads were lost, and many drivers
deserted. The baggage and guard bivouacked for the night on
the Inzari Kandao, without water. Next day (16th of January)
the march was resumed, and a detachment of sappers came out
from Landi Kotal to improve the road ; nevertheless, in spite of
the exertions of Lieut. -Colonel Hodding and his officers, the
baggage only advanced that day as far as the first water, four
miles from the bivouac. On the 17th, the baggage struggled over
the Shilman Gakhe, being met by a hundred men of the 31st
Punjab Native Infantry, under Major Gordon Gumming, who
came out to render assistance, and the bulk of it reached Kam
Dakka about half-past ten that night ; some, however, did not get
in till the next morning.
On the 16th of January the troops halted at Kam Dakka,
and the day was spent in collecting materials for rafts and the
;

following day, two rafts having been prepared, five hundred men,
under Colonel Boisragon, were passed over, with orders to destroy
Rena. The crossing commenced at 10-30 a.m., and was completed
at 4-30 P.M. Rena was reached at six o'clock, and was found to
 THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 465

be completely deserted, as was tlie neighbouring village of Parcbao,

and the whole country for three miles down the river. On the
18th, Rena was burnt, and
one tower blown up by a party of
its

sappers, under Lieutenant A. R. F. Dorward, Royal Engineers.

Pursuant to Brig.-General Doran's orders, the troops after this
recrossed to the right bank, and, two additional rafts having been
constructed, the operation was effected in less than three hours.
The column then marched back to Dakka, which was reached at
4-30 P.M., without a shot having been fired during the day.
The defeat of the Mohmands on the Gara heights had caused
a panic in the tribe, and the country was reported to be deserted
for miles round. Brigadier- General Doran's column returned
to Landi Kotal on the 18th January by the Gara Kandao and Haft
Chah, and the baggage was sent by the Dakka pass.
Owing to the arrival of Brigadier- General Doran's column
too late to intercept the enemy, the combined movement on the
15th had proved a failure. The Mohmands, however, suffered
a severe defeat at the hands of Colonel Boisragon's greatly in-
ferior and their loss was computed at 70 killed and 140
force,
wounded. Out of the 70 killed, 21 bodies were seen by our officers
lying in the ravines of the Gara heights many were carried off,
;

and others drowned, one shell bursting on a raft.

Our loss was slight. In the Dakka column there were only
two killed and three wounded, and among the troops from Landi
Kotal there were no casualties at all. 1-C Royal Horse Artillerv
expended, in the action of the 15th of January, 150 rounds, namely,
32 common shell and 118 shrapnel.
The two guns, 11 -9th Royal
Artillery, with Brigadier- General Doran, expended on the same
day twenty-one 7-pounder shells. The infantry of the whole force
fired 13,286 rounds of small-arms ammunition.
-.The Mohmand which was opposed to us consisted of men
force
from nearly all the large clans. The Tarakzai proper do not, how-
ever, appear to have been present, although the Isa Khel and
Burhan Khel branches were well represented. The Safis, and in
particular the Kandahari section, supplied a strong contingent.
Major-GeneralR. 0. Bright, c.b., commanding the 2nd Divi-
sion, Kabul Field Force, remarked, with regard to these opera-
tions, that a want of forethought was shown in not ascertaining
with more care the nature of the route by which Brigadier- General
Vol. L 3 q
466 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Doran's column was intended to advance. The baggage should

certainly have been sent from Haft Chah by the Gara Kandao,
which would have been cleared on the retirement of the enemy
before Colonel Boisragon's troops.
The moral effect of the defeat of the 15th of January was very
great, and for some months after this the Mohmands remained
quiet. In June 1880, the united bands of Muhammad Sadik Khan
and Moghal Khan of Goshta attempted to close the river at Basawal
for the passage of our rafts, but were attacked by Akbar Khan and
dispersed at night. About the time of Ayub Khan's success at
Kandahar, preparations were made for a rising among the Moh-
mands, which collapsed as soon as the news arrived of his defeat.
On the withdrawal of the British troops from Afghanistan, Akbar
Khan was confirmed as Khan of Lalpura by the new Amir, and his
relations with us continued to be satisfactory for some years.
In 1888 the Burhan Khel raided some sheep in British ter-

ritory and came into collision with the villagers of Matta. Pir
Dost Khan was held responsible for the misbehaviour of this
section, and his annual allowance of Rs. 1,000, which had recently
been granted in lieu of his jagir, was confiscated. This allowance
was subsequently restored to the Khati, on condition that he distri-
buted a portion among the Burhan Khel clan, and paid over their
iust shares to his brother Abdul Ghani Khan and another relative,
who had claims upon him. The settlement now made put an end
to the intrigues which had resulted from Pir Dost Khan's indo-
lence, and his misappropriation of his allowance in former years.

Abdul Ghani was killed by Pir Dost Khan in 1895, and his
allowance was continued to his nephew Abdul Rahman. In the
following year the partisans of Abdul Ghani murdered Pir Dost
Khan, who was succeeded by his son Ghulam Khan.
In 1890 the Mulla Khalil induced some Khwaezai tribesmen,
who were joined by a few bad characters belonging to the Halimzai,
to fire upon the Kabul river survey
party. No damage was done
however, and the Tarakzai jirga, who were with the surveyors, be-
haved well, and so did the Halimzai clan as a body.
In 1889 the Amir made an attempt to establish control
over the Baezai clan
" proposing a treaty of alliance and sub-
ordination on their part," He also demanded payment of tithes,
 THE M OHMAND TBI BE. 467

and wished to build forts at Bedmanai and Mitai. These pro-

posals, however, were not acceptable either to the Mohmands
or to the Khan of Lalpura. The people of Mitai now became
divided into two parties, one friendly to the Amir and the other
anti- Afghan. The former was led by Malik Ghairat, who received
a yearly subsidy of rupees 2,000 from Kabul but in 1893 Ghairat
;

was expelled from Mitai, in the course of a local quarrel, and was

succeeded as leader of the pro-Afghan party by Malik Sultanai.

In February 1896 fighting broke out in the Mitai valley
between the two factions of the Musa Khel Baezais. One side
was led by Malik Ghairat, who now upheld the claims of Safdar
Khan of Nawagai, while the opposing faction was commanded by
Malik Sultanai, the protege of the Afghan Sipah Salar, Ghulam
Haidar. The mentioned party had already met with some
first

success, when on the 23rd April the Sipah Salar sent 400 khassa*
dars (Militia) to seize Mitai village and take Malik Ghairat pri-
soner. Ghulam Haidar Khan claimed the whole of Mitai as
the Amir's territory, and had previously warned the Khan of
Nawagai to abstain from any interference within these limits.
Accordingly he now peremptorily ordered thfe latter to withdraw
from several villages in the valley to which he had laid claim.
This action on the part of the Afghan commander-in-chief provoked
a strong remonstrance from the Government, but Ghulam Haidar
Khan declined to relinquish this portion of Mohmand territory or to
withdraw his troops. Consequently a lengthy correspondence on
the subject ensued between the Government of India and the Amir.
Meanwhile the Government of India had decided to enter
Settlement of the Assured into relations with the Halimzai, Tarak-
cians, 1896. Utmanzai, Dawezai, and the Isa and
^ai,

Burhan Khel of Pandiali, with a view of bringing them under sole

British control. The Baezai and Ivliwaezai, and the Safis, who
inhabit scattered villages between the Mohmand country and Bajaur,
were not included in this proposed settlement, as the policy to be
adopted towards these sections had not yet been decided. In con-
sequence of this decision the representatives of these six clans were
summoned in October to assemble at Shabkadar in the following
November, and Mr. W. K. H. Merk, i.c.s., then Commissioner
and Superintendent of the Peshawar Divison, was entrusted with
the task of effecting a settlement with them.
3 02
468 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

In answer to the summons over 1,000 representatives of the

clans came into Shabkadar on the 7th November, and the next few
days were employed in the business of the settlement. To begin
with, the tribesmen were informed that theyhad now passed under
the so.c control of the British Government and they were, at the
Bam3 time, assured that they would lose nothing by the change,
inasmuch as our Government would continue the payments of the
Kabul ^ and Lalpura allowances to those clans who had previously
enjoyed them, and would grant similar new allowances to those
who had not. In return the " assured " clans would be bound
to render such services as the Government might demand, and
the allowances would be conditional on their loyalty, fidelity,
and good behaviour towards us. The assembled jirgas accepted
the situation entirely, notwithstanding the efforts of certain parti-
sans of the Si^ah Salar who tried to raise doubts in their minds.
After a discussion, lasting over some days, the details of the appor-
tionment of the allowances amongst the clans were finally settled
with the assistance of Muhammad Shah Khan and Muhammad
Sadik Khan, ex-Khans of Lalpura, who were suitably rewarded
by Government for their services on this occasion. Akbar Khan
of Lalpura, who had been invited by Government to be present at
the settlement, failed to appear, and, from the attitude of the tribes,
men towards him, it was very evident that they had no wish what-
ever to have a khan, and no inclination to be dealt with through
him. At a durbar held at Shabkadar on the 26th November by the
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, the settlement arrived at by
'Mi. Merk was finally confirmed, and the assembled jirgas then

returned to their homes.

Before the assembly of the jirgas at Shabkadar in November,
the Sipali Salar had vainly exerted himself to prevent the maliJcs
from coming in. Malik Lalunai, the hereditary agent of the Khan
of Lalpura, who was completely under the Sipah Solar'' s influence,
entered Gandab in November with fourteen Jchassadars to attempt

1 The Kabul allowances were tribal sub- The Lalpura allowances were personal
pidies given by the Afghan Government to grants made by the Chief to individual men
the whole tribe or section, to secure their of importance in the clan,

good conduct, loyalty and service ; and The Hahmzai and Tarakzai had been in
every member of the clan received his receipt of these allowances under the former
share. regime.
 THE MOHMAND TBI BE. 469

to gain over the tribes. Whilst the jirgas were assembled at Shab-
kadar these intrigues continued, and were then directed towards
prevailing upon some of the elders to return to their homes and to
renounce all with the British Government. It was also
relations
reported later that the houses of certain maliks of Yakhdand and
Kamali, who went to Shabkadar were burnt by the Hadda Mulla
and certain others.

Meanwhile the correspondence with the Amir, on the ques-

tion of Afghan interference in Mitai, dragged on throughout the
year 1896. The Amir ignored the request that he should with-
draw his khassadars, and claimed that the Durand agreement
had awarded the whole of Mohmand country to Afghanistan.
Eventually he agreed to resume the demarcation of the Afghan
boundary (which had been completed as far south as the Nawa
Peak by Mr. Udny's Commission in 1895), and asked the names
of the villages which were considered to be on the British
side of the line. He was accordingly informed that the whole
of the Halimzai, Tarakzai, Isa Khel, Burhan Khel, Dawezai and
Utmanzai clans of the Mohmands, including the Safi villages, and
the Mitai and Suran valleys, together with all Musa Khel villages
east of the Kunar watershed must be held to be in British territory.
But, in the hope of bringing about a speedy settlement, the Govern-
ment of India offered to cede the Baezai, and Khwaezai villages
in the Bohai Dag to Afghanistan. Mr. Udny and the Sipah
Solar Ghulam Haidar Khan were appointed by their respective
Governments to carry out the settlement, and met at Landi
Khana on the 11th March 1897. But the difficulties raised by
the Afghan representative made it impossible to proceed with
the demarcation, and accordingly Mr. Udny's party was with-
drawn.
In the following April the Afghan troops evacuated the
Mitai valley, and, as Afghan interference with the Mohmand
clans on the British side of the Durand line then ceased, the Gov-
ernment of India decided not to press the Amir to proceed with
the delimitation. The boundary between independent Mohmand
territory and Afghanistan consequently remained undemarcated,
and though the question was revived in 1904-05, it has not yet
been finally settled.
470 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

After 1884 the relations between the Khan

and of Lalpiira
the Amir
of Afghanistan
° became very
The Khan of Lalpura. .
^ ^ . ^ , .
"^

strained. Ihe lormer had decnned to

attack the Khan of Nawagai, with whom the Am^ir was much
incensed on account of his action in expelling Dilaram Khan of
Jhar for having paid a visit to Kabul. The Khan of Lalpura
had pleaded want of money as his excuse for not obeying the
Amir's commands, but the friendship and family ties which bound
him to the Nawagai chief were probably the real reasons for his
inactivity. As a punishment, the Amir deprived him of the jagir
of Hissarak, which he presented to the Khan's brother Hassan Jan.
During the next few years the Khari's grants and revenues were
gradually reduced by the Amir and his authority as titular chief
;

of the Mohmands was disregarded by the Governor of Jalalabad and

the Sifah Solar, who began to deal direct with the Halimzai and
other sections.
In 1887 the KJianwaged war, though with little success,
against Moghal Khan of Goshta, ^ who had rebelled against the
Amir and had fled to the hills. Later on he assisted the Afghan
Commander-in-Chief in operations against the Sangu Khel Shin-
waris. These services temporarily restored him to favour with
the Amir, and in 1890 he was well received at the Kabul court.
In the following year, however, he again became discredited
with the Afghan ruler, owing to his failure to crush Umra Khan
of Jandol, against whom he had taken the field in support of the
Khan of Nawagai.
A year later his revenues were still further reduced ; and in 1894
certain allowances, hitherto paid to the Mohmands through him
as their chief, were disbursed through the Sipali Salar^s Agent,
Lalunai. This individual soon became chief of Lalpura in all

but name, and Akbar Khan was meanwhile detained in Asmar by

Ghulam Haidar Khan.
In 1896 Akbar Khan was invited in his capacity of titular chief
of the Mohmands to assist the British ofiicials in the settlement
of the "assured clans" which has been mentioned above. The
Khan, however, failed to appear, and indeed he seems by this
time to have lost all influence with the Mohmands, and the

lAs the result of this rebellion the Khan-ship of Goshta was abolished by the Aruir.
Moghal Khan, the last chief, died in exile in 1893.
 THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 471

"assured" clans showed no desire to recognise him as their chief,

or to have any dealings with him.

During the disturbances in 1897, which will presently be

described, Akbar Khan's attitude towards the British was one
of supineness, if not of open hostility. A year or two later he
was virtually deprived of his position by the Amir and has since
then lived with his son under surveillance at Kabul.
"While Afghan influences were at work, as previously men-
tioned, to detach the Mohmands from their allegiance to the
British Government, other intrigues were being prosecuted which
had far more serious consequences.
Early in the year 1897 it was reported that the Hadda Mul-
mu ^A n ^^ ^^^ inciting the Mohmands to acts
The TT
Hadda ^T
Mulla. p i ^t^ u t,hadj even announced
ot hostility. He
that the members of the jirgas, who had attended the Durbar
at Shabkadar in November 1896, should not receive Muham-
madan burial--a threat which, coming as it did from an acknow-

ledged leader of their religion, must have been a terrible one in

the eyes of his bigoted followers.
This Najm-ud-Din derived his title from the village
mulla,
of Adda or Hadda, in the Jalalabad district, where he was born
about the year 1817. In 1883 he was expelled from Afghanistan
by the order of the Amir, and took up his residence in the
Jarobi glen, in the most rugged and inaccessible district of the
BaezaiMohmand country. He acquired great power over the
Mohmand clans, especially the Baezai tribesmen among whom
he and was able to exert very considerable influence over
lived,
the Khan of Nawagai and the people of Bajaur. Although he
was unable to bring about a general rising of the Mohmand clans
in 1895, he is said to have led a contingent of his followers to
oppose the advance of the Chitral Relief Force at the Malakand
pass. He was also reputed to be a firm friend of the Si^ah Solar
Ghulam Haidar from whom he obtained assistance in the shape of
money and arms. The mulla' s efforts, however, to prevent the settle-
ment with the " assured clans " signally failed; nor did he meet
with any marked success when he endeavoured in the beginning of
1897 to intrigue with the Mian Guls of Swat and to foster an
anti-British movement in Bajaur.
472 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA

At the beginning of tlie fanatical rising of the Swat tribes

in July, under the leadership of the Mad Fakir, there was no

evidence of any disturbance among the Mohmand clans. In

fact some thirty leading men of the Tarakzai and Halimzai sec-

tions visited the Commissioner

of Peshawar and offered assist-

ance.
At this date the Hadda Mulla was in Jarobi, and had so

no sign of activity, though he was doubtless

far shov>^n
only

awaiting the development of the Mad

Fakir's movement.

Shabkadar fort by Moh-

Raid on Shankargarh and attack of
mands and others under the Hadda Mulla in August 1897.
that the Hadda
the 3rd August reports reached Peshawar
On
Swat valley with a small following,
Mulla had started for the
and had summoned the Shinwaris, Ningraharis, and other clans
against the British. The Mulla's call to
to join him in a jehad
proclamation
arms was sounded in the following
;

victory is at hand. Let com-

Help from God awaits us and
it, after

pliments, be understood by,

and known to, the followers of the greatest of

viz., all the people of Ningrahar, the Shinwaris and others, that
the prophets,
Swat, Bajaur and Buner have all united together and succeeded
the people of
troops of the infidels stationed in Swat, and have
in annihilating the
All the Muslims are hereby informed that the
1 lered their property.
Mohmands as a body have joined me in advancing upon Dheri (Shankargarh)
for the purpose of carrying on a jehad. It is hoped that you on
vid Gandab,
will rise up if sitting and start if standing. Taking
the receipt of this letter
the necessary supplies with you, come without fail as soon as possible. God
be willing the time has come
when the kafirs shall disappear. Be not idle,

what more should I insist upon. Peace be upon you.

On the same day the Hindu inhabitants of Shankargarh,

near Shabkadar fort, were greatly alarmed of an in- by rumours
tended raid, was
and reported
it that the Baezai tribesm.en, after

meetin^^ the mulla at Bedmanai, had dechned to accompany

him so far afield as Swat, but had volunteered to join in an

attack on the above mentioned village. Sir Richard Udny, the

Commissioner of Peshawar, regarded these rumours as extrava-

gant and disbelieved that any real danger existed of a raid

into British territory. He, however, despatched Subadar-Maj or

 THE MOBMAKD TBIBE. 47$

Abdur Rauf Khan, Commandant of the Border Military Police, tc

Shabkadar, with orders to take all necessary precautions. On
the 5th, this officer reported that the mulla, with a small fol-
lowing of and murids, was at Kimg in the Bohai Dag,
talihs
on his wayGandab, and that he had demanded free pas-
to
sage through Halimzai territory with the avowed intention oi
making a raid across the British border. On the 7th August in-
formation was received that the mulla, with some 3,000 well
armed tribesmen, chiefly Baezai Mohmands, and men from Lal-
pura and Ningrahar, had reached Gandab, and that an attack
on Shankargarh was imminent.
Sir R. Udny relied upon the Halimzais, as members of an
assured clan, and holders of land within our borders, to oppose
the mulla s advance, and prevent any raiding party from moving
through the Gandab valley. Consequently he declined Brigadier-
General Elles' offer to reinforce the Shabkadar garrison with
regular from Peshawar, and contented himself with in-
troops
structing Subadar-Major Abdur Rauf to warn the villagers of
Shabkadar, Matta-Moghal-Khel, and Kattozai, and the clansmen
of Pandiali and the Gandab valley that they would be held
responsible for repellingany raids within their limits. The Halimzais
of Gandab were no doubt genuinely anxious to prevent the
mulla and his following from passing through their country,
and their leaders gave all possible information of his movements to
the Police Commandant at Shabkadar. They, however, lacked the
power to resist the great religious leader, supported as he was
by a fanatical gathering from all the neighbouring clans they ;

were eventually compelled to yield, and some of their fighting men

even joined the mullahs forces.
On the afternoon of the 7th August, the mulla'' s followers,
numbering between 4,000 and 5,000 men, descended from the Sar
Dheri hills on the north-west and advanced across the plain to-

wards Shankargarh. Then, dividing into two portions, half the

force attacked Shabkadar fort, while the remainder swarmed into
the village of Shankargarh, which they looted and burned.
Almost all the inhabitants had previously removed their
families and property, and had either left the neighbourhood or
had taken refuge in the fort. The attack on Shabkadar fort was
Vol. L 3 p
474 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

easily by the garrison^ under the command of Subadar-

repulsed
Maior Abdur Eauf, who claimed to have inflicted a loss of forty
killed and wounded on his assailants.
One Hindu of Shankargarh
who had remained in the village was killed and another wounded,
but there were no other casualties on our side.
At about 5 A.M., on the 8th, the enemy drew off, and about
a third of the laslikar recrossed the frontier, while the remainder
retired out of range of the fort.
At about 8 P.M., on the 7th, a message reached Peshawar
from Subadar-Major Abdur Rauf stating
9th
Action of Sbabkadar,
August 1897. that the mullcCs force had crossed the
border and was approaching Shabkadar. Sir Eichard Udny at
once requested Brigadier-General EUes to move out his troops in
2 squadrons, i3th B. L.
Support of the Border Military Police, and
r 4 guns, 51st Field Battery, shortly after midnight a column, strength
*?
^ 2 companies, Souierset. L. I. .
•"
.
i i , i
" 20th Punjab Infantry. as in margin, was despatched under com-

mand of Lieut.-Colonel Woon, 20th Punjab Infantry. All the

transport at Peshawar had been taken for the troops operating in
Swat, but 100 mules belonging to the Sapper Company were
available and a number of two-wheeled carts [turn-turns) were
obtained locally.
the arrival of the troops at Hajizai ferry at 2 p.m., a second
On
message ^ was received from Shabkadar stating that the enemy
had sacked and burned Shankargarh and were besieging the fort.
Owing to the strength of the current and the paucity of boats,
great difficulty was experienced in crossing the river, which was
then in flood. At 6 a.m., one squadron was sent forward to
reconnoitre, and Lieut.-Colonel Woon following with the advanced
portion of his column, consisting of four and a half companies and
two guns, reached Shabkadar at 10 a.m. After resting his troops
for a couple of hours, Lieut.-Colonel Woon moved on to make
a demonstration against the enemy, who were posted on the high
ground to the west, commanding the entrance to the Gandab valley.
The cavalry pushed forward to the foot of the hills, and tried to cut
off some of the tribesmen who had descended
on to open ground

1 The garrison of Sbabkadar Fort on 7th District Police, all armed with fcjnider

August consisted of one native officer and rifles.

fortv-eix men of the Border Military 2This message had been sent off at mid-
J^olice and thirteen men of the Peshawar night by the hand of a friendly Halimzai,
 ACTION
A T
SHABKADAR,
9th August 1897.

All Kandi

Tore Kanappa \

Bhallo Handao

SHABKADAR

2 20th Punjab Infantry

(400 Rifles)
3 Somersets
(2 Companies)
4 13th B. L.
(1 Troop)
^"^
E.R.EIies
5 51st F. B.R. A.
Brig^ General
(4 Guns)

I B.Topo. Oy. No. 6,697.

Exd C. J. A., February 1907. No. 4,057-L, 1907.
 TBE MOHMAND TRIBE. 475

but finding tlie enemy in great strength they were obliged to retire.
Meanwhile, as the troops were exhausted by their arduous march in
the excessive heat, Lieut. -Colonel Woon decided to withdraw to
the fort and await the arrival of the remainder of his force. The
rest of the column,having been delayed at Hajizai ferry, did not
reach Shabkadar till the evening. The casualties during the day
were five men of the 13th Bengal Lancers wounded.
Early on the morning of the 9th August Lieut.-Colonel Woon
again advanced, and found the enemy occupying a position on
the undulating plateau at the foot of the hills. His intention
was to make a frontal attack with the infantry, and to turn
the enemy's left with the cavalry and artillery. The infantry
began the action shortly before eight o'clock, but the field battery
was delayed by bad ground and did not open fire till nearly an hour
later. The enemy now made a determined attempt to turn our
left flank, and Colonel Woon was compelled to order a retirement
to
avoid being cut off from the fort ; same time he began to
at the
icinforce his left with a company of the 20th.
At this moment
Brigadier-General Elles arrived from Peshawar and assumed com-
mand. He found the enemy's line extended for about two
tliat

miles, and that the troops were outflanked and subjected to

a cross
lire the guns had come into action close to the infantry, while the
;

cavalry were posted a little distance in rear of the battery.

General Elles at once extended his infantry further to the left
and ordered the battery, which had begun to withdraw, to come
into action again to support them. The cavalry were sent about
a mile and a half to their right, and then moved up a dry nala-hed
which brought them on to the left of the hostile position near the
village of Sheikh Janda Baba. As soon as tlie leading squadron
had formed up. Major Atkinson, who was in command, gave the
order
to charge, and the troopers swept down upon the enemy's
left rear •

then moving in somewhat extended order, owing to the

rough and
broken ground, they rode along the whole front, which they
completely
cleared. As the cavaby approached under cover of the
artillery
fire which swept the ground in their front, the
tribesmen, who were
scattered about in small groups, promptly took to
flight, and the
greater number escaped along a large wr/Za in rear of the
position •

others took cover behind the rocks which strewed the plateau'
and fired at the horsemen as they passed.
At the conclusion of this
3P2
 —

.476 FROSTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

charge, the squadrons reformed on the left of the infantry, and a

portion of the force afterwards advanced some distance to the
front. The enemy had, however, now retreated to the hills, and
General EUes, deeming it inadvisable to follow them up with the small

force at his disposal, withdrew to Shabkadar.

The enemy numbered from 5,000 to 6,000 men, a considerable
proportion of whom were armed with breech-loading rifles. Their
losses amounted to more than 200 killed, including 30 or 40 head-
men, besides a large number wounded Malik Sultanai one of the
;

leaders of the Musa Khel of Mitai received a mortal wound. The

casualties on the British side amounted to four officers wounded, nine
non-commissioned officers and men killed, and sixty-one wounded.
Great difficulty was experienced in obtaining reliable information
as to the composition of the mullahs force. Subadar-Major Abdur
Rauf who submitted a statement showing the various clans who
^

took part in the raid, estimated the total number present at 9,000
men, which is largely in excess of that given by General Elles.
To quote, however, from the report of the Commissioner of
Peshawar :

It may be said that every tribe in the tract of country bounded on the east
by the Panjkora and Swat rivers and the British frontier, on the south by the
Kabul river, on the west by the Silala and Kunar watersheds, and on the north
by Koh-i-Mohr range, was more or less implicated, including, besides Mohmands
of all clans (except perhaps the Tarakzai), the Utman Khels of Ambahar and
neighbouring valleys, and the Kandahari Safis who are under the jurisdiction of
the Khan of Nawagai. The Mullagori Mians of Sapari on the left bank of the
Swat river, just beyond the Abazai frontier, also joined, and lost several men
killed and wounded but what probably added most to the determination and
;

impetuosity of the gathering was the arrival of large reinforcements from tribes
who are subjects of the Amir, viz., Shinwaris and Khugiards of the Ningrahar
valley, Mohmands from the villages of Lalpura, Girdi Sarkani, Hazarnao,
Basawal, Ambarkhana, and Chardeh, along the banks of the Kabul river,
Utkhel Ghilzais, from the distant Lughman valley on the north side of the
Kabul river beyond Jalalabad, and Safis from the still more distant valleys of
Badel and Pech, which drain into the right bank of the Kunar river.
Of the Mohmands the Baezai clans, including the Musa Khel of Mitai,
etc., seem to have furnished by far the most numerous contingent, and the

Khwaezai were also largely represented, while of our own '

assured clans ' the

I See Appendix.
 THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 477

and Halimzais
Utmanzais, Dawezais, Isa Khel and Burhan Khel of Pandiali,

of Kamali were all more or less concerned.

in the
The question of the participation of Afghan subjects
raid became the subject of correspondence
between the Government
his soldiers had ever
of India and the Amir, who denied
that

joined the mulla, or that any of his people had

done so with his
cognizance. It was, however, reported that the Amir subse-
Jalalabad, expressing
quently sent a firman to the Governor of
having gone to join the
his displeasure at men from that district
Hadda Mulla, and directing that no more should be allowed to
go.
miles
the 10th August the cavalry reconnoitred some three
On
who
up the Gandab valley, but saw no sign of the enemy,
however,
had retired further into the hills. The gathering,
for several
though discouraged by their defeat, did not disperse
to Ghalanai, at once start-
days, and the mulla, who had gone
ed to lay in stores of grain and
ammunition with the inten-
tion of making another raid over the border at an early date.
reinforce the troops at
Meanwhile prompt measures were taken to
of the British force
Shabkadar and by the 12th August the streiigth
;

at that place was raised to 2,500

men. In order to improve
bridge-of-boats was thrown over
the existing communications a
Hajizai, and a field telegraph
the branch of the Kabul river at
line connecting Shabkadar with Peshawar was completed by
the 16th August.
frontier, and
In view, however, of the disturbed state of the
spreading to the Afridis and other
the possibility of the excitement
tribes, the Government decided
that it would be a wiser policy
Peshawar for immediate action
to concentrate a strong force at
immediate punishment
wherever required than to undertake the
of the Mohmands.
The question of an expedition against this tribe was therefore
the composition of the
deferred, pending a full enquiry regarding
Mulla's gathering and the responsibility of the different
Hadda
sections, and until it should be more convenient to Government to
send troops across the frontier.
one at
Accordingly two moveable columns were formed,
readiness to
Peshawar and one at Shabkadar, and were held in
 —

478 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

move at an hour's notice. The fort at Michni was also garrisoned

by 150 regular troops.

Meanwhile the Hadda Mulla's gathering had gradually

dispersed, partly owing to their disappointment at the failure of

the Mad Fakir's enterprise in Swat, and partly because of the
difficulty ofobtaining supplies in Gandab. Najam-ud-Din him-
self, after a fruitless attempt to obtain assistance from the Khan

of Nawagai, retired to Jarobi.

As soon as the mulla's direct influence was removed, the
Halimzai, Isa Khel, and Burhan Khel Mohmands attempted to
conduct in assisting him. The headmen of the first
iustify their
named section pleaded that they had been powerless to oppose
his advance through their country and, admitting that they
were now imable to resist Government, begged
the British

for mercy. Ghulam Khan of Pandiali, chief of the Isa and

Burhan Khel, wrote to the Political Officer at Shabkadar saying
that he was friendly to the Government, and warning him that
the mulla was collecting a force in preparation for a second raid
across the border. The Tarakzai maliks, who remained loyal to
the British Government, also sent inform^ation regarding the
movements of the other Mohmand clans, and stated that the
Halimzai had urged the mulla to attack Michni in order to com-
promise their people.
Towards the end of August the Hadda Mulla was again on
the move, but he failed in his attempt to collect the clansmen
for another raid across our border in the direction of Shabkadar.
About this time was reported that he was in communication
it

with the Afridis (who had attacked and destroyed the Khaibar posts
on the 23rd and 24th August vide Volume II) with a view to co-
operating with them in simultaneous attacks on the British frontier.
He had also written to the Mad Fakir in Swat urging the latter to
attack the Khan of Dir, and shortly afterwards it transpired that
he had again collected a force and was preparing for an invasion
of Dir, as will be related in Chapter XIII.

The Mohmand Expedition, 1897.

new move on the part of the Hadda Mulla materially altered

This
the situation and the Government, who had at first intended to
;
 THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 479

postpone the punishment of the Mohmands until the Afridis had

been dealt with, now sanctioned the immediate despatch of an ex-
pedition against the former tribe.
The objects to be attained were the punishment of the Moh-
mands for their attacks on the Britisli border, and the defeat
and dispersal of the mullcCs forces, so as to prevent any viola-
tion of Dir territory which might imperil the safety of the Chit-
ral road.

The plan of was as follows

operations the Malakand ;

Field Force under Sir Bindon Blood was to advance from the
Swat valley through Bajaur, and co-operate with a force under
Brig." General Elles, which was to enter Mohmand country from
Shabkadar.
The composition of the latter force is given in Appendix C.
Brigadier-General Elles was given the local rank of Major-Gen-
eral while in command of the Mohmand Field Force, and was given
chief political control until such time as his troops should unite
with the Malakand Force and come under the direct command of
Major-General Sir B. Blood Mr. Merk, i.c.s., accompanied the Force
:

as Political Officer.
command on the 9th Septem-
Major-General Elles assumed
ber. At this time the Hadda MuUa was said to be in Jarobi,
and the Halimzai and Pandiali Mohmands, who were alarmed
at our preparations, appealed to him to lead the Baezai and
Khwaezai clans to their assistance. Small contingents from the
various clans were reported to be holding the Kharappa pass
and the Palewangai kotal, a little to the south of the Burjina
pass, with the intention of opposing our advance by the Gandab
and Alikandi routes. The friendly Tarakzai jifga, however,
who came into Shabkadar, promised to prevent the hostile clans-
men from entering their territory, and agreed to guard the
Shanilo and Gatta-Gudar ferries over the Kabul river, and
the Zankhai pass, thus securing the left flank of General Elles'
force against raiding parties from the Khaibar side.

On the 15th September the Divisional Head-quarters with the

1stBrigade and No. 3 Mountain Battery marched to Ghalanai,
eighteen miles from Shabkadar, and the 2nd Brigade moved to Dand.
Though no opposition was met with, the long march and intense
 .

480 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM lifDlA.

heat were a severe test of the endurance of the troops.

The Kha-
rappa pass proved exceedingly difficult, and the greater part of the
transport was unable to cross until the following day.
The track
beyond Dand was quite impracticable for camel convoys, which
were required to bring up supplies for Sir Bindon Blood's force
Nawagai as well as for General Elles' brigades and consequently
;
at
a halt was made at Ghalanai to allow time
for improving the

road. the 16th General Elles, with a cavalry escort, recon-

On
noitred the Gandab valley as far as
Katsai all the villages were ;

found to be deserted and nothing was seen of the

enemy. On the
following day Brigadier-General Westmacott, with the marginally
2 squadrons, I3th B. L. noted troops, marched to Katsai, two
No. 3 Mountain Battery. ^^^ ^ j^^y ^:^Yes SOUth of the Nahald pasS.
2 Maxim guns Devon Kegt ,
i r i
20th Punjab Infantry. The pass was reconnoitred and lound to
be and unfit for camel transport. An attempt to open
difficult

up signalling communication with Nawagai was unsuccessful, but

a letter was received from Sir Bindon Blood, stating that the
Hadda Mulla was holding the Bedmanai pass with a force of
about 1,000 men. The advance of the Malakand Field Force to
attack this position was, however, to be postponed till the 18th,
owinc^ the employment of Brigadier- General Jeffreys' brigade
to
in the Mamund valley. By the 18th the camel road to Ghalanai
was completed, and the field telegraph Hne was extended to that
place from The jirga of the Halimzai section in
Shabkadar.
Gandab now came in and agreed to comply with the following
terms, viz., surrender of 300 jizails, 300 swords, and all rifles in
their possession, payment of a fine of Rs. 5,000, and dehvery
of 2,400 maunds of grain. Supphes and forage were also taken
without payment while the troops remained in the valley.
The question of dealing with the principal supporters of the
Hadda Mulla was reserved for future action,^ and the jirga were
informed that the slightest symptom of bad conduct would, not-
withstanding full compliance with the terms, expose them to treat-
ment as enemies. They were also required, as a guarantee of good
faith, to bring back their families, which had been removed to the

1 They were subsequently fined an additional 1,600 rupees, but their property was
spared in consideration of good behaviour.
 THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 481

small Halimzai valleys draining into the Kabul river. In reply to

their enquiry regarding their jagir in Panjpao and their allowances,
they were simply informed that the orders of Government would be
communicated to them hereafter.

The remainder of the '* assured clans," who had

jirgas of the
also written for orders, were summoned to attend in Kamali on
the 21st.
Meanwhile reconnaissances had been made in various directions,
and the Khapakh pass and the route into Kamali over the Nahaki
pass had been carefully examined. On the 19th the 1st Gurkhas,
28th Bombay Infantry, and half No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers
and Miners, joined Brigadier- General Westmacott's column, and
marched with it to Nahaki village, at the northern end of the pass.
Brigadier. General Macgregor also moved from Dand to Ghalanai
with two battalions of the 2nd Brigade, escorting a large convoy
of supplies.

During the day a message was received from Sir Bindon Blood
stating that the Bedmanai pass was now held by a strong'
hostile
force, and requesting General Elles to join him forthwith,
as he
did not consider it advisable to withdraw his troops to assist the
brigade in the Mamund enemy in his front had been
valley until the
dispersed. Accordingly on the following day the Head-quarters
with two squadrons, 13th Bengal Lancers, and the Somersetshire
Light Infantry, joined the 1st Brigade at Nahaki, while Brigadier-
General Macgregor with a wing of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry
and the Patiala Regiment marched to Wuchajawar, where an ad-
vanced depot was form^ed. The remainder of the 2nd Brigade also
moved up from Dand to Ghalanai. The cavalry reconnoitring in the
Bohai Dag were on near the village of Kung, but no casualties
fired

occurred another party examined the Danish Kol towards

;
Mulla
Kilai. On this date the Kamali-Halimzai jirga arrived at Nahaki
but General Elles was obliged to postone the settlement with this'
section and with the representatives of the other " assured clans
"
until a more convenient time.
On the 21st September Major- General with the 1st Brigade
Elles,
and the cavalry and artillery, marched to Lakarai, and one squadron
reconnoitred as far as Khazina, meeting with no opposition. Nahaki
was now occupied by three battalions of the 2nd Brigade and two
Vol. X 3 Q
4:82 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

guns of No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery, while the 37th Dogras

and the Nabha Eegiment held the other posts on the line of com-
munications.
At Lakarai village Major -General Elles was met by Sir Bindon
Blood and received news of the two attacks by the Hadda MuUa's
followers on the British' camp at Nawagai, on the 19th and 20th
September.^ It was reported that the hostile force at Bedmanai now
numbered over 4,000 men and had been augmented by a contingent
of Ningraharis and Safis from Kunar under the Sufi Mulla. In

order to enable Major-C4eneral Elles to deal with this gathering,

and to clear the Mitai and Suran valleys, Sir Bindon Blood placed
his 3rd Brigade and a mountain battery at the former's disposal, as
he himself was obliged to join Brigadier- General Jeffreys in the

Mamund valley. ,

On the 22nd General Elles moved his force on to Khazina, a

small hamlet close to Kuz Chinarai, where he was joined by the 3rd
Brigade of the Malakand Field Force from Nawagai.
The Bedmanai pass lies about five miles west-south-west of
* .•
Action ^v,. Ro^rv.or.ni
oif the r.oco
Bedmanai pass, K^z Chiuarai. The track leading
^ from
^ _

23rd September 1897. this village to the pass runs along the

bed broad dry nala. About a mile and a half from Kuz
of a
Chinarai a narrow gap, between Gharibai hill and the northern end
of a spur which juts out from the Yari Sar mountain, gives entrance
to a broad valley. Crossing this, past the villages of Khalil Kor,
Batan-Shah, Bar-Chinarai, and Sarakhwa, the path winds upwards
along the nala, through a narrow gorge between the steep rocky
spurs which branch out like the sticks of a fan from the Ilazai peak
on the west, and the gentler slopes descending from the Yari
Sar ridge on the east. The summit of the pass, 3,850 feet, is
about 1,000 feet higher than Kuz Chinarai, and is commanded
by the topmost peak of Yari Sar, which towers nearly 3,000 feet
above it.

The plan of attack was as follows the 1st Brigade with one :

battery was to make a turning movement along the Yari Sar

ridge, while the 3rd Brigade, supported by the remainder of the
artillery, advanced up the pass road.

I See Chapter XIII,

 .

SKETCH PLAN OF ACTION

A T

EEDMANAI PASS
Scale lijach.= lirule

- !•

Gharwirrv Shxxh'
 TEE MOHMAND TRIBE. 483

At 7-15 A.M. the combined force under the command of Major-

General Elles moved off from
1st Brigade, Mahmand Field Force.
^^^ ^amp between Khazba
Commanding —Brigadier-General R. West- i tt- mt • •
mi n

macott, C.B., D.s.o.

^"^^ -^^uz Chmaiai. The bag-
Ist Battalion, Somersetshire Light Infantry. gage and fom: Squadrons of
2nd ., 1st Gurkha Rifles. , ,

lemamed m camp
.

20th Punjab Infantry. the cavalry

28th Bombay Pioneers.! under command of Lieut.-
^ No. 5 Company, Bengal bappers and Mnieis.
3rd BrigaUe, Malakand Field Force.
^Olonel n ^\T t\ \
he. W. Deane.

Commanding—Lieut. -Colonel B. C. Graves. The 39th Gaihwal RifleS

1st Battalion The Queen's Regiment. ^^[^.ed the Gharibai hiU,' which
22nd Punjab Intantrv.
39th Garhwai Rifles.' commanded the entrance to
No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
^^^ ^^gj^ ^^^^ ^^^ j^j.^^.
Roi/al ArtiJleru. n i -vt t-^ • .

valley and JNawagai. Diumo"

r,
Commandnig 1
—Lieut.
T- n
4.
-Colonel
1 I V
A.
Ti I^ 4^1
E. Duthy, ,
-^»»"oci.x. j^lixiu.^
B.A. advance they met with '
their
^""7''' from a party slight opposition
Battery, ^
.

1 Mountam
Tu
XT , f ^.,,
No. Royal Artillery. p
,

^ .
j. ./

No. 3 „ „ „ „
01 about 200 of the enemy
No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery (4 gun? ^ho Were posted in the ).

village of Ghanam Shah. Four squadrons under Major Delamain,

11th Bengal Lancers, were sent on to watch the Mitai and Suran
valleys. In the latter the enemy were seen in considerable numbers
and kept up a continuous fire at long range. Accordingly Major
Balfour, with one and a half squadrons, 13th Bengal Lancers, from
the camp, was sent up this valley, but, coming under fire of the
enemy he was obliged to fall back after several horses
in the hills,
had been The cavalry then held the villages at the mouth of
hit.

the valley and prevented the inhabitants from joining the tribesmen
on the Bedmanai pass. Shortly after 8 a.m., the 20th Punjab
Infantry with the maxims, supported by the 1st Gm-khas, 28th
Bombay Pioneers, and No. 3 Mountain Battery, advanced up the
wooded spur south of Khahl Kor, driving back the enemy's picquets,
who were concealed among trees and rocks.
Meanwhile the Queen's and 22nd Punjab Infantry, with the
other two mountain batteries, advanced through the gap at the
foot of the southern slope of Gharibai hill. On the left of the
British advance the enemy were driven back from ridge to ridge
and at 10-30 a.m., the 20th Punjab Infantry, well supported by
the fire of No, 3 Mountain Battery, reached a saw^/ar- crowned

1 Now 128th Pioneers.

3Qa
484 FRONTIER AND OVERSEiS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

height (marked 5,500 on plan) which commanded the kotaL The

enemy then retired in different directions, the majority moving
further up the main li lg« to the Yari Sar peak where they had
built a large sangar. In the meantime the two batteries with
the 3rd Brigade had come into action on a ridge 1 J miles south-
east of Bar Chinarai, and shelled a party of the enemy posted
in some Buddhist rains on the kotal. After a short time these

tribesmen retreated up the heights on the west of the pass, and

the Queen's moving forward seized a wooded knoll in the centre

of the gorge which commanded
the summit of the pass. The
ascent to the enemy's on the Yari Sar lay over a
last position

bare grassy slope, and was extremely steep. The supporting

battalions were now ordered to close up, and the 20th Punjab
Infantry again pushed on, covered by the fire of the Gurkhas

and No. Mountain Battery, which had advanced to the 5,500

3
spur. By 11 a.m. the Yari Sar was gained, and the maxims,
which kept up with the firing line of the 20th tliroughout, were
now turned on the retreating enemy. Save for a few parting shots
from snipers on the western heights, all resistance now ceased, and
the two advanced battalions of the 3rd Brigade occupied
the pass,

while the Sappers and Miners set to work to improve the road.

The casualties on the British side only amounted to one man

killed and three wounded.

Had a determined defence been made by a strong body of the

enemy, occpying the western cliffs in force as well as the heights to

the east, the losses of the attacking force must necessarily have been
great. The enemy, however, were never in very great strength,
and subsequent information showed that there were not more than
700 or 800 men present, principally Baezais, with a contingent of
some 120 men from Lalpura. Three or four dead bodies were
found, but their losses, which must have been heavy, could not be
correctly estimated, asmost of the dead and wounded were carried
off. That the resistance was so slight, was no doubt due to the
heavy losses incurred by the enemy in their attack on the 3rd
brigade camp at Nawagai on the 20th September, which caused a
large part of the mulla's gathering to disperse and also to the
;

fact that the enemy were uncertain up to the last moment whether
we meant to attack the Bedmanai pass or Mitai on the 23rd.
 THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 485

Moreover, as mentioned above, the contingent from the Mitai

and Siiran valleys were cut off by the cavalry, and were unable
to assist in the defence of the pass.

At the conclusion of the action, the 1st Brigade, with No. 3

and No. 5 Mountain Batteries, moved down into the Bedmanai
valley and occupied the villages of Kharwanzai and Bobak Kor,
while the 3rd Brigade with the remaining battery and the cavalry,
returned to Kuz Chinarai.
On the 24th September the 3rd Brigade entered the Mitai
Operations in the Mitai and vallev and destroyed all the Musa Khel
Suian valleys.
and towers, with the excep-
villages
tion of Dukhanuna. No was offered by the enemy,
serious opposition
but a few of their riflemen kept up a long range fire from the
surrounding hills. The only casualties were two men of the Queen's
wounded. On the completion of the operations the brigade return-
ed to camp at Kuz Chinarai. On the following day a portion of
this Brigade, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Collins, moved
up the Suran valley as far as the Shinwari village of Bahadur
Kila. Some of the tribesmen fired occasional shots from the
neighbouring hills, but otherwise made no attempt to interfere
with the troops. The destruction of the whole of the Suran
villages was completed shortly after midday and the column marched
back to Kuz Chinarai.
The 3rd Brigade^ now received orders to join the Tirah
Expeditionary Force and accordingly on the 26th September
the troops began their return march, and proceeding via
Nahaki and the Gandab valley reached Peshawar on the 2nd
October.
While the troops under Lieut.-Colonel Graves were engaged
in the Mitai valley, the Divisional Head-quarters with the
1st
Brigade moved down the Bedmanai valley to Sarfaraz Kila. No
opposition was met
but a few of the enemy were driven
with,
off from some water reservoirs which they had been trying to
cut in order to render them useless for the troops. During the
night several shots were fired into the camp and one sepoy was
wounded.

1 No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal ArtiUery, and No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers
and
Miners, accompanied this Brigade.
486 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the following morning the 1st Brigade continued its advance

, ^,
.
T K-
Jarobi
in the
towards Jarobi, a wild mountain den
'
Engagement ^
_
<=>

glen, 25th September. head of the Shindarra

situated at the

valley. A cavalry patrol, (half troop, 13th Bengal Lancers and half
troop Patiala and Jodhpur Lancers) reconnoitred as far as Sarakhwa
at the entrance to the Shindarra ravine. Finding the ground here
impracticable for cavalry they were obliged to wait for the advanc-
ed guard, which consisted of the Somersetshire Light Infantry
with two maxim guns and No. 3 Mountain Battery. Some small
parties of the enemy on the hills on either side of the defile were
quickly dispersed by a few rounds from the guns and long range
vollevs from the infantry. The Somersets, 28th Bombay Pioneers,
and No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery now took up a position at
the mouth of the Shindarra gorge, while four companies of the
1st Grurkhascrowned the heights on the west. When these troops
were in position, three companies of the 20th Punjab Infantry,
with the Bengal Sappers and Miners and No. 3 Mountain Battery,
advanced up the Shindarra ravine to the Fazal Kila tower, then,
turning sharp to the right, they pushed on up the Jarobi glen
to Tor Kila. Here the battery came into action and were
ioined shortly afterwards by the Gurkhas, while the 20th and
the Sappers moved on to the Hadda Mulla's mosque, about
half a mile further up the gorge, which here varies in width from
100 to 400 yards. As the troops neared the head of the glen
a party of about 150 tribesmen armed with rifles opened fire from
behind rocks and sangars on either side, and about a dozen ghazis,
issuing from the mosque, charged down on the leading company.
Six of the swordsmen were promptly shot down and the remain-
der fled.

By time Tor Kila and other fortified villages in the

this
trorge had been destroyed and as nothing was to be gained by

remaining in Jarobi, where there was no ground suitable for a

camp, General Elles gave the order to retire. The troops began
to withdraw at 3-30 and were followed up by the enemy
P.M.,

on either side of the ravine until they were checked by the fire
of the Gurkhas on the heights above Fazal Kila. The force
reached Tor Khel at 6 p.m. and bivoucked there for the night.
The casualties during the day were one man killed, and one
Native officer and seventeen men wounded. The enemy were
 TEE MOEMAND TJRIBE. 487

composed of Musa Khel from Mitai, Isa Khel of Jarobi, and other fol-

lowers of the mulla. Their exact losses could not be ascertained, but
they were known to have lost ten men killed. Three towers and
five so-called forts in the Jarobi glen were also destroyed.
On the 26th the force moved from Tor Khel in two columns.
Punishment of the Bae/.ai The first column Under Brigadier-Gen-
and Khwaezai clans. Westmacott, with the baggage and
eral
hospitals, marched down the broad valley which opens out east-
ward of Tor Khel, past Mamozai, to Khwarina, which was reached
without opposition. All towers and forts met with on the way
were demolished.
The second column under Lieut. -Colonel Sage, 1st Grurkha
Rifles, after destroying the towers and fortifications of the large
village of Manzari- China, moved down the Bohai Dag to Lash-
kar Kila. Here a group of four fortified villages, with strong
towers, were destroyed. A portion of the defences of Koda Khel
were next demolished, and a few of the enemy opened an ineffec-
tive fire on the rear guard as the column marched off to join the
remainder of the Brigade at Khwarina.
On the 27th September Brigadier-General Westmacott with
No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery. the marginally noted troops
2-lst Gurkha Rifles. i i ^ "
i i
proceeded
, ,

^ battahon, 28th Bombay Pioneers.

to Complete the
V No. 5 Company. Bengal Sappers and Miners.
punishment of the Koda
Oxfordshire Light Infiintry.l
T"!, 1 "R
1 Squadron 1st Bengal Lancers. l
IVJiei JJaezai.

The villages belonging to this section lie on the right bank of

the Bohai Dag watercourse, two miles south-west of Khwarina ;

and to the west and south of the group, within easy rifle range, are
precipitous heights known as Kafaro
Kotai and Eokai Manzai
respectively. The villages, nine in number, were all fortified and
possessed towers they proved to be of a better and more sub-
;

stantial construction than most of those liithert<j met with in the

Mohmand country.
About a mile from the first village the Gurkhas formed for
attack and moved forward, supported by the fire of the artillery.
The Bombay Pioneers cleared the enemy out of a sangar on liigh
ground to the north of the village, and occupied some low hills
on the west. The Oxfords now arrived from Kung and opened long
range fire on the enemy in the villages^ while the cavalry moved
1 Joined tb« column from Eang,
488 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

off to watch the left flank. Driven from their villages by the hot
fire, the enemy soon withdrew to the hills above, and, taking cover

behind rocks and up a brisk fusillade on the troops,

sangars, kept
while the Sappers and Pioneers were engaged in demolishing the
towers and forts. Accordingly the guns advanced to a second
position in support of the Gurkhas, who then cleared the enemy
from the Kafaro heights. Some sangars on the Bokai Manzai hill
were next shelled, and after a few volleys from the infantry most
of the enemy's riflemen dispersed. When nearly all the forts and
towers had been destroyed, the troops were withdrawn under cover
of the fire of the artillery and the Oxfords, which prevented the
tribesmen from following up.
The casualties in this aftair were five men wounded. A signaller

of the Somersets who was reported missing rejoined his regiment

unharmed on the 29th, having spent two nights in the hills.
As the column was proceeding to deal with the Khwaezai vil-
laf^es of Kutai, the jirga arrived and offered to submit. The troops
accordingly marched on to join the remainder of the Brigade at
Kung.
Meanwhile another column had proceeded to Torakhwa and
Azimkilla (belonging to the Musa Khel Eaezai), and after destroying
the defences, had continued its march unopposed to Kung.
The Head-quarters and 1st Brigade halted at Kung on the 28th.
The Oxfordshire Light Infantry now replaced the Somersetshires in
the 1st Brigade and the latter battalion marched to Nahaki with
a portion of the hospital and a convoy of sick.
The destruction of the Koda Khel forts and towers on the
previous day had its due effect on the Khwaezai, whose jirga came
in early in the afternoon of the 28th and by the evening all their
;

villages, except Kung, had paid up their fine of arms and money, or

had given hostages for payment. The Kung people, with charac-
teristic Pathan wrongheadedness, stood out, owing to a domestic
quarrel as to the appointment of their share. They were given
until next morning to comply on penalty of having their forts and
towers blown up. The remainder of the clan eventually paid up
220 guns and Rs. 1,600 in cash.
During the day the jirgas of the Halimzai of Kamali, Isa Khel,
Burhan Khel, Utmanzai, and Dawezai, also came in, and terms
were announced. They were required to supply free forage, grain
 THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 489

and wood so long as the force should remain within their res-
pective limits ; to surrender all breech -loading and muzzle -loading
rifles ; to deliver up a specified number of jezails and swords,
and to pay a fine varying from 1,000 to 2,000 rupees. These
terms were to be complied with in full by the morning of the 4th
October.
There was a good deal of sniping into camp during the
night, although the heights were well picqueted this was attri- :

buted to the Kung, who had refused our terms.

inhabitants of

Our casualties were two men wounded, and one or two animals hit.
The inhabitants of Kung remained obdurate, and on the morn-
ing of the 29th September their forts and towers were destroyed
under a desultory fire from the hills. No casualties occurred, and
the force marched to Nahaki down the Bohai Dag watercourse,
the transport preceding the troops and moving for a great portion
of the way on a broad front. No opposition was met with the ;

Khwaezai villages were for the most part deserted, but the Halim-
zais of Kamali had returned and w^ere pursuing their ordinary
avocations.
The was now ordered to stand fast at Nahaki
1st Brigade

for the present, and Brigadier- General Westmacott assumed com-

mand of the line of communications.
On the 30th September the 2nd Brigade, which had beenrecon-
2nd Brigade. stituted, marched from Nahaki, across
Commanding-Bng.-Geneial ^^leKamali plain, to Bar Yakhdand.
Macgregor.
Troopd.
-^

Ihe countr}^ was bare and parched, and in-,

?:,lsSlengalLance,-s.
everywhere intersected by deep nalas
No. 5 Co.. Bengal s. and M. impassable for transport, except at a few
2nd Bn., Oxfordshire L. I. •

known crossmgs. rm.

i -. -.
j

9th Gurkha Rifles.

The troops crossed the
Patiala Regiment. Palasang Nala, which runs into the Danish
Kol, and camped just beyond Bar Yakhdand, a large Utmanzai
village containing about 200 houses and several towers. No
opposition was encountered and the villagers at Yakhdand were
ostentatiously friendly. During the afternoon a reconnaissance
was pushed on to the Shatai pass, and working-parties from the
troops Avere employed in improving the track up to the kutal which
proved to be very difficult.
Meanwhile the Utmanzai jirga brought in the arms
due
from the clan, but no rifles. The tribesmen stated that thev
Toi. I. 3 R
490 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

had no weapons of this description in their possession : accordingly

an additional fine of Rs. 500 was accepted instead.
On the 1st October Major-General Elles, with a portion of the
2nd Brigade, marched over the Shatai
H.-Q3. and 1 sqd., 13th B. L-
4 guns, No. 5 Bombay M. By.
pass into the Pipal vallev, and camped at
No. 5 Co., Bengal S. and M. a r ai,
lurii, near Ali-JSner m Dawezai territory.
^r t\ •
j. -j.

9th Gurkhas.
Patiala Regiment. The Dawezai jirga came in during the day
and complied with the terms which had been imposed upon them.
On the following day the Turu column recrossed the Shatai pass and
proceeded to Mulla Kili in Danish Kol, where they were joined by
the remainder of the Brigade from Yakhdand. On this day a man
of the 9th Gurkhas was reported missing, and it was subsequently
ascertained that he had been murdered by some villagers from
Dand who had stolen his rifle.
The Isa Khel and the Utmanzai were finally settled
of Pandiali
2 guns, No. 5 Bombay M. By. MuUa Kill, and on the 3rd a
with at
^' ^"""^ ^'
oih GurkhS'"'*^^
column under Lieut. -Colonel Wodehouse
Section No. 45 N. F. H. marched over the Garang pass to Lagham
in Pandiali. The remainder of the 1st and 2nd brigades were
now withdrawn from Mohmand country, by the Nahaki-Shalkadan
route, and reached Peshawar on the 6th and 7th October, when
the Field Force was broken up.
Lieut.-Colonel Wodehouse's troops halted at Lagham on the
4th, while the Burhan Khel jirga proceeded to Ghalanai to pay
up their fine to Major-General
Elles. On the following day
the column continued march over
its the Alikandi hills. The
track was difficult and required a considerable amount of road-
making work to render it passable, so the troops did not reach
Matta Moghal Khel until late in the afternoon.
The objects had now been accomplished. The
of the expedition
Mohmand tribe concerned in the raid on Shankargarh had been
thoroughly well punished either by the destruction of the towers
and forts of those who stood out against our terms, or by money
fines in addition to partial disarmament. The Hadda Mulla's *
gathering had been effectively dispersed ; his stronghold at Jarobi
destroyed, and he himself, discredited amongst the clans who had
so lately flocked to his standard, had been obliged to flee before our

1 Mulla Najam-ud-Diu died at JaUlabad in 1903.

 TEE MOHMAND TRIBE. 491

troops into Afghan territory. The payments of money fines and the
delivery of arms had, in almost every case, been punctually carried
out. The country of the hill Mohmands, never before visited by
any troops, had been traversed from south to north and from east to
west, and the purdah effectually lifted. Their fastnesses of Bed-
manai and Jarobi had been entered by our troops -with comparative
ease, and the clans had had cause to regret bitterly their temerity
in defying the authority of the Sarkar by joining in the raid of the
7th August 1897.
The Indian Medal, 1895, with clasp inscribed "Punjab Frontier,
1897-98 " was granted to the troops employed in the action
of Shabkadar and the subsequent operations in the Mohmand
country.
The allowances of the five " assured clans " (Tarakzais excepted),
who were implicated in hostilities against the British Government,
were suspended after the outbreak in August 1897. In conse-
quence, however, of the complete submission of the clans, their full
compliance with the terms imposed, and their subsequent good beha-
viour, these allowances were renewed from the 1st April 1898.
By the terms of the Durand Convention the Musa Khel Baezais
of Mitai had come under British control, and after the expedition
of 1897 described in the
preceding pages, they represented that
the allowances which they had formerly received from the Afghan
Government had ceased, and they therefore petitioned that they
might share the privileges granted to the other " assured " clans.
Accordingly in November 1902 the Musa Khel of Mitai became
an '• assured clan,"
and receiVed allowances on conditions similar
to those imposed on the other sections by the agreement of 1896,
mentioned on page 467. The representatives of the clan further
bound themselves to maintain friendly relations with their neigh-
bour the Khan of Nawagai, whose claim, that the whole of the
Mitai valley was the daftar or hereditary land of the Tarkanri
tribe, and therefore formed part of his Khanate, had been
a con-
stant source of feud. Khan Muhammad Ali Jan, son of the Khan
of Nawagai, was present when this settlement was made with the
Musa Khel, and expressed himself satisfied with the arrangement.
It may
be noted here that the Khan of Nawagai had tempo-
rarily gained the upper hand in Mitai in 1898, when fear of inter-
ference on the part of the Afghans no longer restrained him. But
3 R2
492 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

in the following year the Mohmands had combined against him

and since then he had practically relinquished the Mitai and Suran
valleys. The object summoning the Khan's representative
of

to witness the settlement with the Musa Khel, and the purport of
the clause regarding friendly relations with Nawagai were to avoid
giving offence to the Tarkanri chief, who might otherwise have
resented the fact that the Government had subsidised a clan whom
he claimed as tenants and subjects though they were in reality
independent.
About the end of April 1903 the crops and wells belonging

The Shinpokh-Smatsai affair,

to the Villages of Shinpokh
and Smatsai
1903. on the right bank of the Kabul river were
destroyed by some Afghan khassadars and Morcha Khel tribesmen
at the instigation of the Sartip of Dakka, who wished to punish
the maliks for their dealings with British officials.
Shinpokh, which consists of three hamlets, each containing
about twenty houses and a tower, is inhabited by Burhan Khel
Mohmands who were formerly expelled from Dakka by the Morcha
Khels. This village was admitted by the Amir, in 1896, to be
within British territory. Smatsai, which is a Tarakzai village,
inhabited by Shilman tenants from Loi Shilman, is also regarded

by the Government as British. It is however situated in a part

of Mohmand country which has not yet been delimited, and is

claimed by the Amir as being on the Afghan side of the Durand

line.

On the 29th April, Captain W.

Venour occupied Smatsai
E.
with a small force of Khaibar Eifles, and on the next day a detach-
ment was sent to protect Shinpokh. No opposition was met with
and the marauders had withdrawn. On the 2nd May, however, some
300 Mohmands, several of whom were armed with Lee-Metford rifles,
took up a position on the left bank of the Kabul river, opposite
Smatsai, and opened fire on our levies. As the Khaibar Eifles were
only armed with Sniders they were unable to reply to their assail-
ants the latter, however, contented themselves with sniping, and
;

kept well out of range of the Smatsai garrison. Intermittent sniping

continued for several days, and a small contingent of Khwaezais
also joined in the demonstration —
probably with a view to induc-
ing Government to summon their jirga and grant them allowances
on the lines of the '"•
assured clans."
 THE MOHMAND TBI BE. 493

Correspondence ensued between the Government of India and

the Amir regarding the action of the Sartip of Dakka. His Majesty
eventually undertook to punish the Morcha Khel and the Moh- ;

mands who were Afghan subjects were ordered to disperse. The

Khaibar Rifles were then withdrawn from Smatsai and Shinpokh,
and some thirty Shilman khassadars were specially engaged for the
protection of these villages.
On the 21st March 1906 a well-armed band of noted outlaws
Raids on jogin and Tangi in ^om
Hazarnao in Afghan territory, ac-
^^o<'- companied by a number of Khwaezai and
Tarakzai Mohmands. raided the village of Jogin, near Michni, and
looted the houses of two well-to-do Hindus, carrying off property
to the value of nearly 16,000 rupees. The action
of the Afghan
subjects, who participated in this raid,
was brought to the notice of
the Amir. The Tarakzais acknowledged their responsibility and sur-
rendered twenty men suspected of complicity in the affair seven of ;

these, against whom sufficient evidence was obtainable, were brought

to trial under the Frontier Crimes Act. It transpired later that
the stolen property was publicly auctioned in Lalpura.
On the 9th April following, some Khoda Khel Mohmands, and
a few Utman Khels, under the leadership of the Hazarnao outlaws
made an attack on Tangi, a large village close to Abazai. Three
Hindus and one Mussulman inhabitant were killed, the latter prob-
ably by accident, since the Muhammadans of Tangi were tacit
abettors of the outrage, and made no attempt to repel the raiders,
who confined their depredations to Hindu houses. A small party
of Border Military Police, with some villagers of Abazai, pursued the
invaders as they retired, and wounded a few of them, but were unable
to make any captures. No Mohmands of the " assured clans" were
implicated in this affair ; and though the raiders passed through Safi
Mohmand territory on their way to the border, the Safis were un-
aware of their intentions, and were not held responsible. The Tangi
Mussulmans and Laman Utman Khels were heavily fined for their
misbehaviour, and a protest against the conduct of the Khoda
Khels was forwarded to Kabul.
A portion of the Hazarnao gang wasambushed at Tandi in
July 1906 by a party of the Khaibar Rifles under Captain Bickford :

two of the outlaws were killed and four captm'ed,

494 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The extension of the railway from Peshawar to the Afghan

frontier through Shilman was commenced in 1906. The Mohmands
have offered no serious objection to this undertaking and many of
them have come forward to share in the work and profit by well-
paid labour. The line now under construction runs only to a point,
known as mile 300, on the Kabul river, about five miles below
Gatta-Gudar ferry beyond this the alignment has not been finally
:

determined. The protection of the line is guaranteed by the

Tarakzais, who receive a special additional allowance of Rs. 5,000
on this account. The allowance of the Mullagoris has also been
raised from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 5,000 in return for the right to open

up communications through their country whenever Government

may require to do so.

Although, with the exception of the Smatsai affair and the
two raids at Jogin and Tangi on the Peshawar border described
above, there has been no actual outbreak on the part of the
Mohmands since 1897, our relations with the tribe are by no
means satisfactory. The postponement of the delimitation of
the frontier in Mohmand territory, and the uncertainty as to
whether the final settlement will assign them to the Afghan
or to the British Government have doubtless caused much of the
unrest which now prevails among some of the clans. This has also
been fostered, in no small degree, by the intrigues of Afghan subjects,
aim the " assured clans " from their allegiance to the
who at seducing
British Government, and by the undisguised hostility of the mullas.
Besides the Sufi. Mull a, who brought a contingent of Ningraharis
to assist in the defence of the Bedmanai pass in 1897, the most active
of the religious leaders are the Kama Mulla, a priest called Abdul
Baqi, and an individual known as the Gud Mulla —the last two be-
ing pupils and successors of the late Hadda Mulla. They are all
bitterly opposed to the British and do their utmost to prevent the
clansmen from having any dealings with our officials indeed their ;

threats have made some'of the clans hesitate about accepting their
allowances. The mullas have further threatened to interfere with
the work of the Shilman railway line.
Trouble has also been caused in recent years by disputes with
the Afghan frontier officials over the collection of dues on timber
floated down the Kabul river below Dakka, and the seizure of drift
wood. The Tarakzais have always had the privilege of collecting
 THE MOHMAND TRIBE. 496

this toll,but the Amir's own property was specially exempted.

Since 1898, however, the Amir has declared all timber exported to
be a state monopoly, and therefore free of dues— a claim which, if
substantiated, means a heavy Tarakzai clan. A quarrel
loss to the

over this business resulted in another collision at Smatsai in 1905

between some British levies and villagers and a party of Afghan
khassadars who had been sent by the Sarhang ofDakka on the pre-
text of recovering drift wood. Protests to the Amir regarding illegal
or unfriendly acts on the part of his officials in these regions have but
little effect, since the latter are usually adepts in the art of mis-
representing facts and motives. It is hoped, however, that a speedy
settlement of all debatable questions connected with this portion of
the frontier will terminate the present condition of uncertainty among
the Mohmand clans, and remove a source of disputes and quarrels
between them and Afghan subjects. In 1904 when it was proposed
to complete the demarcation of the frontier south of the Nawa
peak, the Mohmands offered to be responsible for the safety of the
British Mission while employed in their country. The question, how-
ever, was then deferred, and when it was revived a year later, it was
held that the Mission could not depend upon tribal protection, nor
was the time deemed opportune for the despatch of a military escort
through Mohmand country.
In conclusion it may be said that, so long as present conditions

prevail, the authority of the Grovernment of India over the " as-
sured clans " is none too firmly established, while little or no control

is exercised over the remainder of the Mohmand tribe.

 — .

496 FRONTIEB. AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

f Kandab»ri» . .
1
::.!-(inSurkam»r).
iflZTa
L Wader . J

f Ahmad Khel .
O
-{ Ismail .. '^(iii Tartara and Earob«la).
LDaulat Khel ..J

rNaraizai ..")
-( Ahmedakzai . . ^(in Hazarnao and Basawal).
l.Baekzai . . J

S f In K.UZ and Bar Yakhdand.

fHassan Khel . .^
rKuclH. or nomads ^'•^«"^«''
.-iKr^Buz ;
; l<-
IZa TChel .J

I
fBabazai Kor .
."1

CWudredunkal or. settled clan*. .{ Miu Pipal).

tHassan Khel ..J

I
f'Dawat Khel.
j Maimana Khel.
LKhadi Khel.

X /'Khuga Khel .
.~^:

IsaKhel . . \ ,r..^x,s\
1
Attamar Khel .
. M^*'°^''-
1< I
Koda Khel ..J
o

j3 fMusa Khel ..^

<1 .1, -<
Miro Khel . . WMitai).
® LBara Khel . . J

§ rMuhammad Khan Ror (Bar) ."i

—M
.

O
««»
Hin Pandiali).
to
2 LKharrappawal (Kuz)

Kandai
-/LTuiuf Kh«l
.

.
.^
Hin PandiaU).
)

8
fEamca Ebel
Kadai Kor . }-(in Qandab).
.

Wall Bag Kor.;;}"

I

(9» ,

I •.s
«
]
Ibrahim Khel ..")
« I

I
Hamza Khel . . Hin Kamali).
tBuiha Khel

IS
fDalka Khal.
S< rDadu Khel . . {
Shabmanior Khal. 1
I r
fEbani Khal.
S I Kaaim Khal . . <
"*
^ Ixham Zhal.
 . . . .

APPENDIX B.

Estimate of the numbers of the Mohmand clans and others who took part in the
action of ShahJcadar on 9th August 1897, submitted by Subadar-Major
Abdur Rauf, Native Commandant, Border Military Police.

Section. Men.
Khwaezai 500
Baezai 3,000
Burhan Khel
of Pandiali 400
Isa Khel ::|
Tarakzai^ 300
Halimzai of Gandab 500
Halimzai of Kama'li 200
Dawezai
Utmanzai 1,000
Kandahari Safis

Mullagori^
Utman Khel 1,000
Sheikhs (disciples of the Hadda Mullah)
Khugianis ^, 200
Men of Badel glen . . , 300
Shinwaris of Shigal in Kunar valley 400
Mohmands of Basawal, Hazarnao, etc., west of Dakka. 300
Miscellaneous unclassed 1,000

Total 9,100

—
Note. This total exceeds General Elles' some of whom dispersed on the 8th.
estimate vhich was about 6,000 but it ; 1 The Tarakzai clan did not join in
may represent the numbers which took hostilities against us and remained loyal
p-irt in the raid on the 7th September, throughout.

( 497 )
Vol. I.
3S
 APPENDIX C.

Composition of the Mohmand Field Force, 1897.

1st Brigade. 2 Sectidns, No. 5 British field hos-

Commanding —Brigadier-General pital.

Westmacott, c.b., d.s.o. No. 44 Native field hospital.

1st Battalion, Somersetshire Divisional Troops.

Light Infantry. 13th Bengal Lancers.
20th Punjab Infantry.
2nd Battalion. 1st Gurkhas. No. 3 Mountain Battery, r.a.
2 Sections, No. 5 British field No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.
hospital. 28th Bombay Infantry (Pioneers).
3 Sections, No. 31 Native field |
No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and
hospital. I
Miners.
1 Section, No. 45 Native field Patiala Regiment, Imperial Ser-
hospital. vice Troops. 1
2nd Brigade. Nabha Regiment, Imperial Service
Commanding —Brigadier-General Troops. ^
C. R. Macgregor, d.s.o. Maxim gun detachment (2 guns),

2rid Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Devonshire Regiment.

Infantry. 1
| No. 63, Native field hospital.
9th Gurkhas. 1 Section, No. 45 Native field hos-
37th Dogras. j
pital.

1 Attached to 2nd Brigade.

2 Attached to Mohmand Field Force from l9th September.

(498)
 APPENDIX D.
Commands and Staff of the Mohmand Field Force, 1897.

Staff.

General Officer Commanding the Force (with the local rank of Major-
General), Brigadier-General E. R. Elles, c.b.
Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant M. R. Elles, r.e.

Orderly Officer, Captain K. MacLaren, 13th Hussars.

Assistant Adjutant General, Major C. L. Woollcombe, K. 0. S, B.
Assistant Quarter Master General, Major G. H. W. O'Sullivan, r.e.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General (Intelligence), Captain F. A.
Hoghton, 1st Bombay Grenadiers.
Commanding Royal Artillery, Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Duthy, r.a.
Field Engineer, Captain F. H. Kelly, r.e.
Principal Medical Officer, Surgeon-Colonel E. Townsend, a.m.s.
Chief Commissariat Officer, Captain 6. Westropp.
Divisional Transport Officer, Captain F. A. Rideout,
Ordnance Officer, Major T. E. Rowan, r.a.
Survey Officer, Major W. J. Bythell, r.e.

1st Brigade.
Commanding, Brigadier-General R. Westmacott, c.b., d.s.o.
Orderly Officer, Lieutenant R. C. Wellesley, r.h.a.

D. A. A. G. Captain W. Royal Irish FusiHers.

P. Blood,
D. A. Q. M. G. Captain F. J. M. Edwards, 3rd Bombay Cavalry.
Brigade Commissariat Officer, Captain E. Y. Watson.
„ Transport Officer, Captain W. H. Armstrong, East Yorkshire
Regi-
ment.

2nd Brigade.
Commanding, Colonel (with local rank of Brigadier-General) C. R. Macgregor,
D.s.o.
Orderly Officer, 2nd-Lieutenant E. W. C. Ridgeway, 29th
Punjab Infantry.
D. A. A. G. Captain G. M. Gloster, Devonshire Regiment.
D. A. Q. M. G. Captain H. Hudson, 19th Bengal Lancers.
Brigade Commissariat Officer, Lieutenant D. H. Drake-Brockman.
„ Transport Officer, Lieutenant R. G. N. Tytler, Gordon
Highlanders.
( 499 )

SS2
 APPENDIX E.

The disposition of the different corps and units of the Mohmand Field Force
on the 28th September 1897.

At Kung.
No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.
No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery (4 guns).
13th Bengal Lancers (3| squadrons).
Divisional Troops
No, 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners
(2 sections).
28tli Bombay Pioneers.
2nd Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
2 Maxim guns, Detachment Devonshire Regiment.
1st Brigade
20th Punjab Infantry.
2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rij9.es.

rs Sections, No. 5 British Field Hospital.

Medical units
"(2 „ „ 31 Native „
At Nahaki.
r Detachment, 13th Bengal Lancers (57 lances).
Divisional Troops
(_2 guns, No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery.
En route to Peshawar 1st Battalion, Somersetshire Light Infantry.
f9th Gurkha Rifles.

2nd Brigade • • < Patiala —

Regiment returned from 3rd Brigade,
[ Malakand Field Force.
1 Section, No. 5 British Field Hospital.
1 ,, ,, 31 Native „ ,,
Medical units
S 44-

^ >5 j> ""^ )> >> »>

At Wuchajawar advanced Depot.

Divisional Troops . No. 5 Company, Bengal
. Sappers and Miners
(2 sections).

2nd Brigade . . 37th Dogras (6 companies).

At Ghalanai.
113th Bengal Lancers (1 field troop).
Nabha Battahon, Imperial Service Troops.
Divisional Troops No. 44 Native Field Hospital.
1 Section,

L |> 5> ^" >» >J J>

The 3rd Brigade, Malakand Field Force, was en route to Peshawar.

( 500 )
 CHAPTER XII.

AK0ZAI-7USAFZAI AND TABKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR.

As the and Bajaur do not coincide with the borders

limits of Dir
of any particular tribe or administrative area, it will be more con-
venient to deal with the two countries together. The people who
inhabit these countries are the Akozai-Yusafzai, other clans of whom
inhabit the Swat valley, and have already been described in
Chapter VIII, and the cognate tribe of Tarkanri,
The country known as Dir roughly comprises the whole area
drained by the Panjkora river and its affluents, as far south as its
junction with the Bajaur or Rud river. The upper Panjkora
valley,above Chutiatanr, is known as the Panjkora Kohistan, or
Kohistan-i-Malizai, and is divided into two portions, of which the
upper is called Bashkar and the lower Sheringal. The principal
side valleys included in Dir are the Kashkar or Dir, the Baraul,^
and the Maidan^ on the right, and the Ushiri and Talash valleys
on the left.
Bajaur may be described as the country watered by the river
of that name, also known as the Rud river, together with its tri-

butaries from the north and north-east, exclusive of the Jandol

stream. This area includes the four valleys of Rud (or Bajaur),
Babukarra, Watelai (or Mamund), and Chaharmung. South-west
of the Chaharmung valley, but also included in Bajaur, lies a tract
of country called Surkamar, belonging to the Khanate of Nawagai.
It comprises the 7ialas of Kamangara, Chamarkand, and Guluna,
whose waters flow into the Pipal or Ambahar stream, together with
the Batai plain, which extends westward from the Shagai ridge to
the mouths of the Mitai and Suran Nalas, near Kuz Chinerai and
Karkano Shah, and southward to the Lakarai gorge.
The Jandol which lies between the Maidan and Babu-
valley,
karra valleys, formerly belonged to Bajaur, but is now politically

1 These two valleys were at one time included in Bajaur.

(501 )
502 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

part of Dir ; the people of tlie upper valley, however, at the pre-
sent time do not own allegiance to the Khan, and are in reality-
independent of both Dir and Bajaur. For a description of this

valley see page 512.

The northern limit of Dir is the crest of the mountain range
which divides it from Chitral and Yasin. To the west the boundary
is formed by the Durand line, which follows the crest of the Hindu

Eaj range, and separates Dir and Bajaur from Afghanistan. On the
east and south, these two countries are bounded by Swat Kohis-
tan and the Swat valley, and by the territories of the Utman
Khels and Mohmands.
The whole country included in Dir and Bajaur is extremely
mountainous. From the mass of mountains, which form an almost
impassable barrier to the north of the Panjkora and Swat Kohistan,
three principal ranges branch off in a southerly direction. The
eastern chain, forming the watershed between the Swat and Indus
rivers, runs south to the Dosiri peak, and thence in a westerly direc-
tion to the Malakand pass. The central range forms the watershed
between the Panjkora and Swat rivers. This range, whose greatest
altitude is 15,000 feet, sinks near the Laram pass to about 7,000
feet. Thence to its termination, at the junction of the Swat and
Panjkora rivers, it is known as the Laram or Siar range. It is
crossed by three main passes, the Laram, the Katgola, and the
Badwai.
The western range is a continuation of the Hindu Eaj which
runs in a south-westerly direction, forming the watershed between
the Panjkora and Bajaur rivers on the east, and the Kunar river
on the west. From the Pushkari to the Shingara peak, this range
forms the boundary between Dir and Chitral. Southwards from
the Shingara peak, the Afghan boundary follows the crest and has
been demarcated as far as the Nawa peak. The northern half of
this portion of the Hindu Eaj is also known as the Uchiri, while the
southern half is called the Lakra range further south again, it
:

becomes the Kabul-Tsappar range. The Pushkari peak, the highest

point of this portion of the Hindu Eaj, is 16,500 feet. South of
the Binshi peak (12,150 feet) the range sinks to an average height
of 9,000 feet. A succession of almost parallel spurs, jutting out
from this main range, divide the basin of the Bajaur river into
eeveral separate valleys.
 —

AKOZAI-TUSAFZAI AND TAUKANBI TRIBES OF DIE AND BAJAVR. 503

The most important pass is the Lowari (10,200 feet) across

which runs the main road from India to Chitral. It is considered
fit for mule transport from April to November. Other passes are :

The Binshi, Trepaman, and Loegram, giving access from Bajaur

to Asmar the Nawa pass, leading from Nawagai to Pashat in the
;

Kunar valley the Kaga and Ghakhai (or Hindu Eaj) passes, lead-
;

ing from the Watelai valley across the Lakra mountains in Mamund
country.
The Panjkora river is fed from snows and glaciers and is, during
summer, deep, rapid, and unfordable. In winter, its volume greatly
decreases, and it can be forded in many places. The main valley
of the Panjkora is considerably narrower and less rich in alluvial
soil than that of Swat. The many subsidiary valleys, however are
extremely rich and fertile, and afford subsistence for the majority
of the population. The principal tributaries of the Panjkora are
the Dir (or Kunai), Baraul, and Maidan streams.
The Bajaur, or Eud river, and its affluents, rising in the lower
mountains of the Hindu Eaj, are not snow-fed and consequently
;

are full in winter, and low during the summer months.

The climate of the Panjkora valley is generally temperate. In
the upper valleys, it is cool in summer and intensely cold in winter.
There is considerable rainfall in July and August. In Bajaur, the
summer, though short, is extremely hot, while the rainfall is rather
less than in Dir. Fever and ague are prevalent in the Panjkora
and Bajaur valleys, but these localities have not such a bad reputa-
tion, in this respect, as the Swat valley. There are several suita-
ble sites which could be used as sanitaria, should it
in the hills
ever be necessary to occupy this country with British troops during
the summer.
In the Panjkora river basin, and the adjoining side valleys, the
crops are similar to those of Swat with the exception of rice, which
is cultivated in less quantities. Iron of good qualityis smelted from
s-ind obtained in the upper Baraul valley. The chief exports
ai-e ghi, hides, and a small quantity of wheat and barley
; imports
are salt, crockery, and household goods.
There is also a considerable export of timber, which is obtained
from the deodar forests in the Panjkora Kohistan, and floated down
the Panjkora and Swat rivers. This trade, which was formerly
in the hands of the Kaka Khel Mians of Ziarat, near Nowshera,
 .

504 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

is now one of the main sources of tlie revenue of tte Khan of Dir.
In order to prevent the deforestation of the country, an arrange-
ment was made whereby the Khan agreed to the inspec-
in 1905,
tion of the forests by an official deputed by the Government of

India, and to certain restrictions as to the amount of timber to be

felled annually. InBajaur, wheat, barley, and maize are grown.
Fuel is scarce throughout this area.
It to estimate the exact amount of supplies avail-
is difficult

able in Dir and Bajaur; but it is certain that from these coun-
tries and from Swat sufficient supplies could be obtained for a con-
siderable force.
The most important route through the country here described
is the road from the Swat valley to Chitral over the Lowarai pass.

Leaving the Swat at Chakdara it leads through Adinzai terri-

tory over the Katgola pass into the Talash valley, and thence by
the Kamrani pass to Sado. Turning right-handed from Sado it
runs up the Panjkora valley via Robat (or Shamardin), Warai,
Darora (or Gandegar) to Dir, and thence up the Dir valley to the
Lowari pass, which gives access to Chitral territory. An alterna-
tive route branching off from Sado runs westward to Ghosam, and
then, turning northward, ascends the bed of the Jandol river to the
Janbatai pass after crossing this, the road leads along the Baraul
;

valley to Chutiatanr and Dir, where it joins the first mentioned

route. Both these roads have been greatly improved since 1895,
and the first is used by the annual reliefs marching to and from
Chitral. Further details regarding them and the arrangements
which have been made for their protection will be found on page 551.
The four sections of the Malizai-Khwazazai branch of the Akozai-
Yusafzai tribe who inhabit Dir and the
lo peop e.
Panjkora valley are the Painda Khel,
the Sultan Khel, the Nasruddin Khel, and the Ansa Khel.
The Painda Khel occupy the Ushiri, Niag, and Kharo valleys
on the left bank of the Panjkora, and
^^^ a e
^
^ sub-section, called the Akhund Khel,
to which belongs the family of the Khan of Dir, have as their daftar
the Dir or Kashkar valley, with its subsidiary nalas, as well as
the district of Bibiaor on both banks of the Panjkora between
Chutiatanr and Darora. ^
 AKOZAI'TUSAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 505

The Dir stream rises below tlie Lowari pass, and flows south-
wards through a narrow valley, with steexo mountains on either
reaches the Panjkora river just above Chutiatanr. Its
side, till it
tributaries are the small mountain streams draining the Jajurai,
Dobandi, and Aleh Nalas on the right, and the Miana and lesser
nalas on the left. Except for about two miles of more open country
about Dir fort and village, cultivation is restricted to the river-
bed and its immediate borders. Above Dir the valley is thickly
wooded with and pine trees, and grass is plentiful. The upper
fir

portion of the valley, above the village of Kashkar, is inhabited

—
by aliens Katanis or Bashkaris, and there are also numerous
Gujar settlements. The population of the lower valley is mixed,
and includes a number of Swatis. The valley of the Dir, and the
side waZas watered by its affluents (excepting the Dobandi Nala),
together with the portion of the Panjkora valley, about a mile
in length, between the mouth of the Dir and Chutiatanr fort, is
also known as Kalandi district,
and is all Akhund Khel daftar.
The Dobandi Nala, which also belongs to the Akhund Khel, is
a narrow vaUey watered by the stream which rises near the Zakhanna
pass. It is thickly wooded and contains a fair amount of well culti-
vated land, but is chiefly notable on account of the iron smelting
which is carried on there. The Dir river is generally unfordable, but
is bridged in several places. Tlie main route to Chitral runs up
the valley.
The Bibiaor district contains some twenty villages. The Chitral
road runs through this district and paths lead from it up the side
valleys.
The Ushiri valley is about nineteen miles long and
ten miles
wide at upper end, whence it contracts to a narrow gorf^e at its
its

junction with the Panjkora valley. Its elevation falls from 11,000
feet at the head of the valley to 3,700 feet near Darora. Two
branch
streams, which rise near the Sidghai and Barkand passes, unite
at
Ushiri village to form the main stream which drains the valley.
There is an ample water-supply, and plenty of cultivation, while
the slopes of the surrounding hills are thickly wooded. The main
route through the valley isa difficult track along the left bank
of the stream. Three difficult passes, the Barkand, Shema-shami,
and Sidghai lead into Upper Swat, the last two being only fit
for
men on foot. Paths run from Almas into the Niag valley, and
Vol. L 3 m
 —
506 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

from Jabbai to Upper Panjkora. The Ushiri stream is bridged in

several places near the larger villages, but is seldom fordable. The
villages of Darora and Jabbar, at the lower end of the valley, belong

to the Sultan Khel.

The Niag which lies between the Ushiri and Kharo
valley,

valleys, has an area some ninety-five square miles, and is fifteen

of

miles in length by eight miles in width at its broadest part. Like the
Ushiri, it is contracted at its lower end to a narrow gorge, through
which its stream finds an exit to the Panjkora. The valley is extremely
fertile, and its upper portion is well wooded. The Niag stream,
except when it is si^oUen by melting snows or heavy rain, is in-
significant. It is bridged at Mulla-gujar, Sundial, and just above
its junction with the Panjkora river. There are roads along each
bank ; the southern road, which is fit for pack transport, leads over
the Swatai pass into Upper Swat. The northern road, however,
is impracticable for laden animals beyond Sundial. A side -path leads
over the Shalga pass into Ushiri.
The Kharo valley is situated between the valleys of Niag and
Tormung. It is ten miles long by six miles across, at its widest part,
and has an area of about forty-eight square miles. The higher slopes
of the mountains, which reach an altitude of 10,000 feet at the upper
end of the valley, are well wooded and grassy. Fruit trees are very
abundant, and there is a considerable export of fruit to Swat.
The Kharo stream is unbridged, but is almost always fordable. The
chief markets are Kotah and Kumbar.

There is a fairly good road up the valley as far as Dorial, whence

paths lead over three difficult passes —the Sarlai, Landai and Tangu
intoUpper Swat and the Deolai valley in Nikbi Khel country.
A number of men of the Painda Khel section, more particularly
from the Kharo valley tribesmen, take service in India, chiefly in
the Central India and Hyderabad States and in the Bombay Army.
The Sultan Khel inhabit the right bank of the Panjkora from
the southern limit of Bibiaor to Khal
and the whole of the Tormung valley
on the left bank. They also possess the villages of Darora and
Jabbar in the Ushiri valley. Their territory on the right bank thus
comprises the Alakhun and Panjkora Nala, together with the
Khal district, which includes the valleys of Eogano and Lukman-
 AKOZAI-TUSAFZAl AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAVR. 507

Banda. This tract is bounded on the west by the ridge which divides
it from the Aka Khel and Lajbok valleys, and on the south by
Ansa Khel country.
The Panjkora Nala is watered by a stream which has its
source near the Maidan peak (10,700 feet), and, after receiving
numerous minor tributaries during its course, reaches the Panjkora
river through a deep narrow gorge near Kotkai, midway between
the mouths of the Niag and Ushiri streams. There is good grazinty-
ground throughout the valley, and the ravines and mountain sides
in its upper portion are finely wooded with fir and pine. The chief
villages are Sehrai, Patao, and Panjkora. Besides the Sultan Khel,
a number of Gujars live in this valley.

The Khal comprises four villages collectively known

district of
as Khal, on the right bank of the Panjkora, two and a half miles
above Eobat, and the valleys of Lukman-Banda and Rogano.
The Khal villages (Laorai Killa, Zarmundai, Bar Killa, and
Kundai) are inhabited by Ibrahim Khel— Sultan Khel and Akhund-
zadas, and contain 160 houses, with about sixty acres of cultivated
land. The Lukman-Banda Nala is a narrow treeless valley five miles
in length, running north-west from the Panjkora about one mile
above Khal. It contains thirteen hamlets inhabited by Rogani and
Bakkar Khel, who are tenants of the Khans of Khal. The Rogano
valley runs westward from the Panjkora from a point almost mid-
way between the Niag and Kharo valleys. There is a good water-
supply and fair grazing-ground. The chief village Jailar contains
about eighty houses. Various paths lead to the adjoining valleys
;
that over the Danda pass to Lajbok being fit for pack transport.
The inhabitants, are all Rogani and hold the land as tenants
of the Khans of Khal.

Umra Khan attacked Khal after he had expelled Muhammad

Sharif Khan of Dir and forced th-e Khans to take refuge in
Swat.
The Tormung is a small valley, with an area of about twenty-
four square miles, situated on the left bank of the Panjkora, south
of the Kharo Nala. Tormung, the chief village, has a ioopholed
tower, but other villages are unfortified. Roads lead up both
banks
of the Tormung stream a path over the Manja pass into
:
Nikbi
Khel territory is fit for laden animals, and a more difficult route
leads by the Batarai pass to Uch.
3 T2
508 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The territory of the" Nasruddin Khel comprises the lower

portion of the Maidan valley below the
cm .
Ismailzai-Tarkanri boundary, together
with the side nalas Lajbok and Samalgai, the right bank
of

of the Panjkora from Khal to its junction with the Maidan

stream at Shazadgai, and the district of Robat on the left bank.
This track is roughly bounded on the north-west by Upper
Maidan, and on the south-east by the Laram range while the lands ;

of the Sultan Khel and Ausa Khel lie to the north-east and south-
west, respectively.
Lajbok is a small valley running north-east from Lower Maidan
at Shakartangai. It contains a population of a little over 500
people, who are mostly Akhund Khel Painda Khel, although
the land belongs to the Nasruddin Khel.
The Robat district stretches in a north-westerly direction from
the Laram pass to the Panjkora at Robat, where there is a large
fort, the residence of the two Khans ^ who share the rulership of
the district. The valley is rich and fertile, well cultivated and
wooded.
plentifully It contains a number of aliens —Rogani,
Warkak, Mashwani, etc., who hold villages and lands as tenants.

A road leads up the valley across the Laram pass to Uch.

The total poulation of the Nasruddin Khel amounts to about
5,000 people, distributed among seventy villages, of which the fol-
lowing are fortified, viz., Shakartangai, Shazadgai, Bargulai, Barun,
Ranai, and Robat. was continually opposed to Umra
The tribe
Khan during his wars of aggression. Their chief men are the Khans
of Robat, and Fahm Jan of Bargulai and Barun.
The Ausa Khel occupy lands on both sides of the Panjkora.
On the right bank their territory, which
includes the valleys of Malakand, Makhai
and Shatai, stretches from the Nasruddin Khel boundary at
Shazadgai to the junction of the Bajaur river. Thence it ascends
the left bank stream as far as Toratigga, a black rock
of that
between Ghosam and Ghobanai, which marks the Jandol bound-
ary. On the left bank of the Panjkora, the Ausa Khel country
extends from the Robat district of the Nasruddin Khel to the

1 Abdullah Khan and Zarim Khan. The latter is a son of Khani Jan Khan who
was the ruler ofRobat in 1895.
 AKOZAI'YVSAFZAI AND TARKANRl TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 509

junction of the Swat and Panjkora rivers at Sharbatai, thus

including the Talash valley. To the east lies the Adinzai country,
whose boundary runs from just west of the Laram pass along the
Katgola ridge to Barchanrai peak and thence to a point about a
mile below Chakdara.
The Malakand Nala is a small bare valley, with fair grazing-
ground, through which a path runs via the Shalkandai pass into
Jandol. It contains 1,400 inhabitants, who can muster about 280
armed men.
Makhai valley, on the left bank of the Eud, whi-ch it joins at
Kotkai, is inhabited by Utman Khel tenants
of the Pai Khel sub- ^

section of Ansa Khel. A road fit for pack mules leads over the
Makhai pass at the head of the valley to Mundah.
The Talash valley, which has an average elevation of about
3,000 feet, extends some six miles from the left bank of the Panjkora
eastward to the Topai Sar spur of the Laram range, which divides
it from Adinzai territory. To the south, it is bounded by the
Deolai peak and the Dusha Khel hills. It is watered by the Loi
—
stream, into which several ncdas usually dry run down from the —
slopes of the Siar range, which forms the northern boundary of the
valley.
The main route to Bajaur enters by the Katgola pass and runs
down the valley to the Panjkora river bank through a narrow defile
about a mile and a half in length called the Shigu Kas on either side
of which are rocky precipitous The Chitral road leads over
hills.
the Kamrani pass to Sado. Besides this, numerous mountain tracks,
most of which are impracticable for laden animals, communicate
with adjoining valleys.
The Ansa Khel, during a period of twelve years or more, prior
to the extension of British influence over this trans-border country
in 1895, were either under the authority of Umra Khan, or were
subjected to his raids.
A sub-section of the Ansa Khel, deserving of mention is the Dush
Khel (a branch of the Bahlol Khel division of the Sheikh Khel—
Ansa Khel) who inhabit the mountainous district of that name lying
along the left bank of the Panjkora, between the Talash valley and
Sharbatai. They also share some land with the Khadakzai, in Swat.

1 A few of these tenants also hold land in the Shahtai valley.

 510 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Owing to the inaccessibility of their territory, they were able to

resist Umra Khan far longer than the Talash
the encroachments of
valley tribesmen,and only paid revenue to him for two or three
years. They bear an ill reputation for raiding and robbery, and
appear to be more independent than their neighbours, with whom,
however, they keep on good terms. Their district now forms
part of the Khan of Dir's territory.

A certain number of aliens live among the Dush Khel as ser-

vants or tenants, having received land in reward for past services.
These are: —
Dehgan, said to have come from Kunar in Afgha-
nistan ; who are also found in Sam
Dalazalc, a race of doubtful origin,
Ranizai Swati or descendants of original inhabitants ; Gwari and
:

Bajauri, supposed to have come from Utman Khel country and

Bajaur, respectively.
The Tarkanri, or Tarkanlanri, claim to be akin to the Yusaf-
zai and Utman
through their
Khel,
The Tarkanri. , ait „ tt- •

common descent rrom Kais or Abdur

^

Kashid, who is said to have been the 37th in lineal descent from
Talut, or Saul, King of Israel. They are supposed to have
immigrated into Bajaur from Laghman, during the latter half
of the fifteenth century. This tribe is divided into four sections,
viz., the Ismailzai, Isazai, Salarzai, and Mamund.
The Ismailzai inhabit the upper Maidan valley, above the
limit of Nasruddin Khel country at Aya
The Ismailzai. They also own a number of
Serai.

villages in Lower Baraul and the Atan Nala. Two branches of

the Atrapi stream, which take their rise from near the Tajka and
Maidan peaks, unite south-west of the Mehrgram spur, and flow to
Nagotal, where the combined stream is joined by the Kalut Khel,
which rises near the Kalpanai pass. These two streams now form
the Kunai or Maidan river, which waters the main Maidan valley,
and flows into the Panjkora between Shazadgai and Udigram. The
other affluents of the Kunai are the Aka Khel on the left bank and
the Ananguri, and Katorzai on the right. Religious families of
saiyids or mullas own no less than twenty-three villages in the
Ismailzai district. These people are useless drones, cultivating very
little land and paying no revenue, and are not liable to military
service.
 AK0ZAI-7USAFZAI AND TABKANBI TRIBES OF DIE AND BAJAUE. 511

There are fortified villages at Gur^ Maidan, Baudai, Kotkai

Dokrai, and Aya Serai.
The Maidan valley, whicli is some ten miles in length to the
boundary of Nasruddin Khel territory (four miles above its junction
with the Panjkora) is rich and fertile, and contains a large cultivat-
ed area. Paths, running up the various subsidiary nalas and over
the passes and hills at their head, communicate with the adjoining
districts. Only two are fit for pack animals, viz., (i) up the Anan-
guri valley by the Inzar pass to Jandol, and (ii) up the Katorzai
Nala over the Shalkandai pass to Barwa.
The Isazai inhabit the Jandol and upper portion of the
Baraul valley about Janbatai. They
are divided into three chief sections, the
Mast Khel, Musa Khel, and Ali Beg Khel, of which the Mast
Khel is the Khan Khel, and claims hereditary rights over the whole
of the Jandol valley. A large number of Mashwanis, occupy land
as tenants of the Isazai. Other minor sections, who were either
descendants of Kafirs or aboriginal tribes, though now considered
to be Pathans and to belong to the Isazai clan, are Sheikh Khel or
Shahi Khel, Khwazazai, Senzai, and Mandizai the last three,
:

however, are unimportant, and only own one or two villages each.
The Mast Khel occupy Barwa, and the surrounding hamlets,
and the Tangai valley, together with a few outlying villages such
as Anapia and Gol Bandai further south. The Musa Khel inhabit
the Shalkandai valley, which runs north-north-east from Mundah.
The Ali Beg Khel have a few villages in the Shontalai valley,
but their principal hamlets, Kanbat, Tyah, Tanglai, Balcda,
Ghwa, and Rabanda are situated in a nala which runs from
Kanbat north-west to the Shahi kotal.
The Sheikh Khel own some dozen villages in the Maskini valley
above Gambir, on the west of the Jandol river. They have frequently
been at enmity with the Mast Khel, and in their wars with them
have several times lost and retaken the lands which they now
occupy.
The Mashwani tenants of the Isazai hold lands in the upper
slopes of the border hills on the northern limit of Jandol. They
own between forty and fifty villages.
Besides the above-mentioned sub-sections and the Mashwani,
there are numerous settlements of religious communities who have
512 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

received villages and land in Jandol from the Isazai, as seri or free-
hold. In 1895 the number of these people in Jandol was estimated
as follows, viz., Saiyids^ 1,790, owning five villages Akhundzadas,
;

505, owning six villages Mians, Mullets and Sahibzadas, 1,630, own-
;

ing eighteen villages. Since that date their numbers and possessions
have considerably increased. These people are exempt from taxa-
tion and upon for ^military service.
are not called
There are also two important towns, Maiar and Mian Kilai,
inhabited by a mixed population, and a number of small villages
occupied by some 600 or 700 people of alien races and aboriginals.
Maiar is a large town and trading centre situated just above
the junction of the Maskini and Jandol streams. It belongs
to Ahhundzadas and contains about 1,500 houses with a large
bazaar. It has a mixed population of Hindus, Muhammadan
traders, Sheikh Khel, Utman Khel and others, estimated in 1895
at a total of 7,500 persons. Mian Kilai is owned by Sahibzadas^
and is built on the right bank of the Jandol river just opposite
Mundah. It is a trading centre for all the neighbouring countries
and is considered to be the principal market between Peshawar
and Badakhshan. The population, estimated at 5,000 people in
1895, includes Hindus, Muhammadan traders, and artificers.
The total population of the Jandol valley was estimated in
1895 to amount to close on 27,000 persons, but, as may be
seen from the above description, a large proportion do not belong
to the Tarkanri tribe.
Although the Mast Khel claim all the Janbatai district as
daftar or hereditary land, the population there is very mixed. The
Khan, however, belongs to the Mast Khel sub-section of the Isazai,
and his followers may therefore be included in their fighting
strength.
The boundaries of the Jandol valley inclusive of the Maskini
Nala are :
— On the north, the Janbatai range and the ridge between
the Trepaman and Sargullo peaks. On the east the spur running
south from the Suki peak to the Mohan peak
dividing it from
Maidan. On the south the Eud river. To the west the watershed
between the Maskini and Babukarra valleys.
The valley is fourteen miles long and ten miles wide at its upper
end narrowing towards the south to about six miles, its total area
beinpf about 144 square miles. It is extremely fertile and well
 ' ;

AK0ZAI-7USAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 513

cultivated but contains little forest except on the western side of

tlieMaskini valley.
The Jandol stream, which provides an ample water-supply,
rises in the Janbatai range, and has as tributaries the Maskini or
Ram Gul and the Shontalai on the right, and the Tangai and Shal-
kandai on the left. The main route up the valley crosses the
Janbatai pass, and several paths and tracks branch off in different
directions from Mundah.
The Janbatai district or Upper Baraul is bounded on the north
and north-west by the crest of the Uchiri range, and extends east-
ward to the watershed, between the Bin and Shingara Nala, which
divides itfrom Lower Baraul. It thus includes the Janbatai,
Binshi and Bin Nala. The district is part of the Mast Khel daftary
and revenue is paid to the chief of this clan, the Khan of Janbatai
the population, however, is mixed. Crops of wheat, barley,
Indian corn, and rice are raised in the valley, and iron of excellent
quality is exported, as also ghi, hides, and fruit. A local pattern of
fire-arm manufactured at Jabo sells for Rs. 10 to 20. There are
forts at Janbatai, Ido, Shai, and Shahkot.
The main road through the valley to Dir and Chitral crosses
the Janbatai pass it was improved in 1895 and is now fit for
;

pack transport. Other routes lead by the Binshi pass to Asmar

and by the Dolai and Jabo passes at the head of the Bin Nala to
Narai or Narsat.
The Lower Baraul valley, which includes the subsidiary nalas
of Maidan Khar, Shingara, and Atan, extends as far as the boundary
of Dir proper at Ganurai, three miles above the Panjkora junction.
It is well cultivated throughout, and the hills, especially on the
south side, are thickly wooded. The whole of Lower Baraul, except
the minor Khanates of Atan, Darikand, and Sandrawal, is known
as the Baraul Bandai district, and belongs to the Bahadur Shah
Khel sub- section of Ismailzai Tarkanri. The population, however,
is very mixed and includes many Yusafzais as well as people of
other tribes. The Atan Nala is inhabited mainly by Kohistanis,
Swatis, and Gujars. Forts have been built at Darikand, Bandai,
Dirkhan, Sandrawal, Sarbat, and Atan.
The Baraul river is formed by the junction at Janbatai Fort
of the Janbatai, Binshi, and Bin streams thence it flows for some
;

seventeen miles north-east to the Panjkora at Chutiatanr. The river

Vol. I. 3U
514 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

is periodically swollen to a rapid torrent by rains and melting

snows. It is crossed at Darikand and Sarbat by bridges fit for laden
animals, and there are fords at Ido, Darikand, and Dir Khan. The
water is lowest in June, when it is used to irrigate the rice- fields.
The Salarzai inhabit the valleys of Babukarra and Chahar-
mung in Bajaur, and also possess lands
The Salarzai. -^^ Shortan and Marawara, across the
Afghan border.
In Babukarra, their territory is bounded on the north by the

Hindu Kaj, which divides it from Asmar, and on the east, the Tak-
wara spur, running from the Trepaman Sar to the Shinkas peak
above Mian Kilai, separates it from Jandol. On the west is the
Mamund valley, and to the south lies the country of the Shamozai
Utman Khel, on the right bank of the Bajaur river. The valley
is about fifteen miles in length with an average width of five or six

miles. At Ragha two forts, built by the Khan of Nawagai, on

either side of a narrow gorge, guard the entrance from the south.
About eight miles further north, near the chief village of Pashat, the
valley divides into two branches. The eastern, or Batwar Nala
runs up to theTrepaman pass, over which a difficult route leads
into Asmar. The western branch, called the Loegram Darra, runs
up to the Loegram pass, 7,750 feet. The easiest route from Jandol
or the Babukarra valley is over this pass. Numerous paths lead
into the Jandol valley, the best being over the Takwara or Rasha-
kai Kotal to Mundah.
In this valley the Salarzai are divided into divisions called
Madak and Sadin, which are again sub-divided into Upper and
Lower, or Bar and Lar. In the lower valley, the Lar Madak are
on the west, and the Lar Sadin on the east in the upper portion
;

the Bar Madak lands lie to the east and the Bar Sadin to the west.
These divisions are distinct from the usual division into Khels.
The Chaharmung valley lies between the Mamund country
on the north-east, and the Kamangara valley on the south-west,
bein^y divided from the latter by a spur which juts out in a south-
easterly direction from the Nawa peak. From the southern end
of this ridge, a line drawn across the valley through Kotkai and
Tangai forms the boundary of the Khan of Nawagai's territory in
this valley. The Salarzai in these two villages, and others to the
south, own allegiance to the Khan and pay revenue to him, but the
 AKOZAI-YVSAFZAI AND TABEANBI TBIBES OF DIB AND BAJAVB.
515

portion of the valley above this Hue is inhabited by the Saad-

ud-din and Ahmad Din sub-sections of the Salarzai, who are in-
dependent.
The Khan Khel of the Salarzai is the Ibrahim Khel, to which
belong the Naivahs or Khans of Nawagai, and the Khans
of Khar,
Jhar, Asmar, and Pashat (in Babukarra), who exercise a kind of
feudal right over the rest of the Salarzai clans.

The Mamunds, the last and most important of the four

sections of the Tarkanri tribe, inhabit
^, ,, ,

the Mamund or Watelai valley, which

lies between the two Salarzai valleys of Chaharmung and Babu-
karra. Like the Salarzai, the Mamunds also own lands in Shortan
and Marawara, in the Kunar valley of Afghanistan. From the
Lakra range, which forms its north-western boundary, a spur
jutting out near Lakra Sar (9,370 feet) runs south-east,
and divides
the main Watelai Nala from a western branch called the
Kakazai
Nala. To the east of the Watelai, the valley is known as Wur
Mamund, and to the west as Kakazai Mamund country.
The valley is about thirteen miles in length with a maximum
breadth of ten miles, and is open and well cultivated, but much
cut up
by deep dry Considerable quantities of wheat, barley, and
nalas.
hhusa are obtainable, and small autumn crops of Indian corn and
jowar are raised ; firewood, however, is scarce.
The main nala is waterless above Inayat Kila, except when
rains or melted snow send a freshet from the hills. The people
in the open valley obtain water from tanks and wells. The princi-
pal villages are at the head of the valley close under the hiUs
where a good water-supply from springs is available.
Eoads fitpack transport lead up the valley, and branch off
for
to all the villages. For about eight miles above Inayat Kila, the
main route, though difficult, is practicable for field artillery. From
Khalozai there are two routes along the Upper Watelai and the
Kakazai Nala to the Kaga and Hindu Raj passes, which give access
to Shortan and Marawara in the Kimar valley. The first of these
passes is a mere foot-track, while the second is only practicable foi
lightly laden animals. Camping -grounds, suitable for a brigade
of all arms, exist at Khalozai and Zagaderai, on either side of the
Watelai Nala, five or six miles above Inayat Kila.
3U2
516 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

From tlie village of Tanai southward tlie valley is claimed

by the Khan of Nawagai as part of his territory.
The Mamunds are said to muster 12,000 fighting men, all possess-
ing fire-arms. They are perhaps the most warlike of the Tarkanri
Ecctions.
The position of the Khan Nawab of Nawagai
or is somewhat
peculiar. He is the head of the Ibrahim
The Khan of Nawagai. g-j^^^ but
Salarzai, is also recognized
as the hereditary chieftain of the whole Tarkanri tribe. In former
days all sections of the tribe owned allegiance to the chief of

the ruling family of Nawagai, but owing to internal dissensions

the authority of the Khan as supreme ruler has greatly dimin-
ished. Although, however, the direct rule of the present Nawab
Is limited to a comparatively small area, and his authority over part
of the territory claimed by him is only nominal, he still exercises con-
siderable influence over the whole tribe, especially in matters of
foreign policy.His influence also extends to other neighbouring
tribes beyond the border of Bajaur, such as the Safis of the
Kandahari plain, the Dawezai Mohmands of Pipal, and the Manda],
Alizai, and But Khel sections of the Utman Khel.
The actual territory of the Nawab of Nawagai is an irregular
tract of country on the left bank of the Rud river, and the dis-
trict of Surkamar. The boundary of the Eud river strip runs
across the lower ends of the Chaharmung, Mamund, and Babukarra
valleys, and has been a constant source of strife between the
Nawagai Chief and the Salarzai and Mamund tribesmen who inhabit
them.
In Surkamar the people are Mohmands, Safis and Shinwaris,
the last of whom occupy the Chamarkand valley.
The Mitai and Suran valleys belonged in former days to the
Tarkanri tribe, and were inhabited by
and Shinwari tenants,
Safi
who paid tithe to the Tarkanri chief. Many years ago the Moh-
mands expelled these settlers and took possession of the two valleys,
but they refused to own allegiance to the Khan of Nawagai, who
claimed them as subjects, on the ground that they had immigrated
into his territory. The Mohmands were supported by the Afghan
Government in maintaining their independence of Nawagai, and
after continuing the struggle for some years with varying fortune
the Khan in 1899 finally abandoned the attempt to recover his
 —

AKOZAI-TUSAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 517

possession in Mitai and Suran.^ The Safis are all greatly under the
influence of the Khan of Nawagai, and those who hold lands north
of Lakarai may be considered as his feubjects.
In addition to the two chief tribes of Dir and Bajaur described
above, the following alien or non-Pathan races may be mentioned :

The Bashkaris, who, like the Torwals and Garhis of Swat

Kohistan, are probably descendants of
Alien races.
TSiCes which peopled these countries before

the Pathan invasion. These are found in the upper portion of the
Panjkora Kohistan known as Bashkar.
The Mashwani, whose origin is doubtful, but who may possibly
be akin to the Mashwani tribe of Afghanistan, are found in the
Jandol and Maidan valleys, where they live as tenants of the

Tarkanris.
The Sheikh Khel, Mandizai, Senzai, and Khwazazai in Jandol
and the Haramzai and Shaibzai in the Maidan valley, are said to
be of Kafir descent, but have now become Muhammadans, and
are recognized as Pathans. The Eogani, Katni, and Guroh, who are
of similar stock, are found in various parts of Dir. Gujars are also

to be found in considerable numbers in all parts of the country.

The people of Dir and Bajaur are all Sunni Muhammadans.

Though extremely bigoted they are probably far more superstitious
so
than really religious and though not individually fanatical, like
;

many of the more southern Pathan tribes, they are extremely sus-
ceptible to the baneful influence of their mullets, who
are able to

among them a collective fanaticism to an extraordinary degree.

excite
The country is infested by priests and religious communities,
who make a handsome profit out of the ignorant and superstitious
pilo-rims to the numerous shrines. In addition to the baiyids, or
descendants of the Prophet, the other religious classes are Saliib-
zadas, descendants of well-known mullets ; Mians,
descendants of
saints and spiritual leaders ; and Ahliundzadas, or Pirzadas, descend-

ants of saints of merely local or, tribal reputation.

In 1895 the most influential priest was the Hadda Mulla, Najm
Ud Din who lived in Molmaand country, and whose career is
described in Chapter XI. He was recalled to Afghanistan by
the Amir-in 1901 and died in 1903, when he was succeeded by Mir

1 See Chapter XI, page 492.

 ....

518 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Saliib Jan Badsliali. A follower of tlie Hadda Mulla called Palam

Baba lias nowadays considerable influence in Dir, and is said to be
bitterly opposed to the British.
The principal shrines are Sheo Baba at Hariankot near Dir,
Khan Shahid, in Baraul, and Bibi Saliiba at Maiar in Jandol.
In character the people of Dir and Bajaur closely resemble
the other Pathan tribes, though perhaps, in common with the Swatis,
they excel them in treachery. A marked characteristic of the people
of Dir, which is also shared b}^ the Swat tribes, is a stern sense
of discipline, which enables their leaders to exercise a control
far more complete and effective than is usual among Pathan com-
munities. This spirit of discipline also exists among the Bajauris,
but to a much less degree than among the people above mentioned.
It is by the aid of this discipline that their leaders are enabled
to dangerous collective fana-
incite these people to display that
ticism which has already been mentioned as a notable trait in
their character.
The Tarkanri, and more especially the Mamunds, have a rather
than the Akozai-Yusafzais
higher reputation as a fighting tribe
of Swat and have proved on the
Dir, but these latter, as they
occasions when we have come into contact with them, are by no
means to be despised.
The number of fighting men in Dir and Bajaur is estimated to
be at the present time as under —
Dir—
Talash valley and Dush Khel . . . 2,500
Malizai tribes (Akozai-Yusafzai) in Panjkora valley 26,500
Panjkora Kohistanis . . . . . 5,200
Tarkanris .. .. .. .. 6,000
Khwazazai (see Upper Swat tribes) ., .. 11,150

Total . . 51,350

Bajaur —
Salarzai .. .. .. .. 8,000
Mamunds, Watelai valley . . . 12,000
Other Tarkanris and tribesmen in Nawagai-Surka-
mar, including Mohmands, Safis, Shinwaris, etc. 10,000

Total . 30,000
 AKOZAI-TUSAFZAI AND TARKANBI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAVR. 519

In the event of a general fanatical

rising, tlie people of Dir and
Bajaur would almost certainly be able to reckon on assistance
from the Baizai and Eanizai of Upper and Lower Swat, who muster
about 9,000 and 7,000 fighting men respectively, the Baizai clans of
the Indus valley with 4,500 fighting men, and the Utman Khel to
the number of 9,000. The Bunerwals also might have to be reckoned
with. Although it is unlikely that the whole of these tribes and
sections could simultaneously combine to fight as a single force, still
it is not impossible that a religious war or a threatened invasion of
their country might induce all to take up arms at one and the same
time.
k& will be seen in the account of the attack on the Malakand
and Chakdara in July 1897 {see Chapter IX) nearly 20,000 men were
able to collect with surprising secrecy
and suddenness.
The system of land tenure in Dir and Bajaur is similar to that
which holds good in Swat and Utman Khel country. When the
Pathan tribes originally occupied these countries, all the land was
divided up, and each section was allotted a portion, called daftm
or ta'ppa. Each tappa was then again portioned out among the
sub -sections or Khels, whose individual members each received
a share called hrakha. All such shareholders are termed daftari.
Certain portions of the land have also been given as free grants
{seri) to chiefs or tribal jirgas, but more usually to religious com-

munities. These are often disputed lands which, if held by ordinary

daftaris, would be a constant source of disturbance.
With the exception of grants,
all land is subject to a
seri
peculiar system of periodical redistribution, called JcJiasanre or vesh,
which takes place at intervals of five, ten, fifteen or twenty years,
according to local custom. This system, which applies to individual
daftaris and to whole villages, is thoroughly bad in every way, since
itnaturally leads to interminable quarrels and disputes, and imder
itno man is willing to expend money or labour on the permanent
improvement of his holding.
Both Dir and Bajaur are divided into numerous small khanates
held by hereditary khans, or by nominees of the feudal chief,
that is to say, at the present time the Khan of Dir in the case of Dir
and the Khan of Nawagai in Bajaur. In 1895, as has been abeady
mentioned, Umra Khan of Jandol had established himself as
 —

520 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

paramount cliief of all the country of Dir and a considerable part

of Bajaur.

Eevenue amount of one-tenth of the produce

or ushar to the
of the land is usually paid by daftaris to these minor Khans
or to

the ruling chief. The khans, who form a sort of aristocratic

class, maintain two kinds of retainers, viz., (1)

tiarkhor, who are

personal servants and receive food, clothing, and wife (u) ;

malatirs, fighting men, partially trained, who are given houses and
land near posts where they are stationed as guards or police.
The rule of the khans does not appear to interfere with the
communal system government by jirga, which is universal
of

throughout these countries, and the system of which is as fol-

lows :

The management of all matters relating to a village rests with

the village counci\—jirga. Each village was originally represented
in the jirga of its khel, each khel in that of its sub- division, and each
sub- division in the nVgra of the whole tribe. This system still holds
good, except that has been modified by one of party government,
it

which has since come into existence. In each village there are two
or more political parties {dalla) each represented by its own
jirqa. The party who by numbers or influence are the stronger

are in power (bande dalla), and their jirga for the time being
rule all matters concerning the village, administer justice, and
control the village revenues. The party in opposition [lande
dalla) have to bow to the will of the party in office, until such
time as they can challenge the government. A few days' contest,
generally accompanied by fighting, settles the matter one way or
other, and the winners settle themselves in office. The same
party system prevails throughout the whole tribe, and, according
to the results of the village parliamentary contests, varies the
power the party jirga in the higher tribal councils. All these
of
matters are regulated by an unwritten, but widely recognized,
code of constitutional law.
This system of party government which is similar to that in
Swat, Utman Khel, and Sam Eanizai, obtains throughout Dir and
Bajaur, though it is somewhat modified in certain localities owing
to the an aristocracy belonging to the families
growth of of the

numerous khans and petty chiefs.

 AKOZAI-TUSAFZAI AND TAEKANRI THIBES OF DIE AND BAJAVB. 521

An account of tlie rise of Umra Khan of Jandol (grandson of

Faiz Talab Khan) and of his connection with Chitral affairs has been
already given in Chapter II. By the end of the year 1893 this
chief had established his authority over the whole of the districts of
Jandol, Dir (including the Maidan and Baraul valleys), the Talash
valley, and the territories of the Dush Khel and Adinzai. He had
also invaded the disputed district of Narsat and occupied the villages
of Nari and Sao. The tract of country which Umra Khan had
brought under his control thus extended from the Dir-Chitral border
in the north to the Swat river in the south, and included the whole
of Dir, the greater part of Bajaur,and a portion of Swat. The
Khan Nawagai, for many years actively hostile to Umra
of
Khan, had now made peace and entered into an alliance with
his former enemy. Muhammad Sharif, the Khan of Dir, had
been expelled from his former possessions and had sought refuge
in Upper Swat.

The Chitral Relief Expedition under Lieutenant-General Sir

Robert Low, K.C.B., in 1895.
It has already been mentioned in Chapter II that in con-
sequence of the disturbed state of and the dangers
affairs in Chitral,
which threatened the British Agent and his escort interned in that
place, the Government of India had, on the 14th March, ordered the
mobilization of a division, in case it should be necessary to use force
to compel Umra Khan's compliance with their demand that he
should withdraw from that country.
On the 21st March news reached India of the attacks on the
detachments under Captain Ross and Lieutenant Edwardes be-
tween Mastuj and Chitral. Thereupon the Government, recogniz-
ing that the Jandol Chief and the Chitralis had taken the initiative
and entered on active hostilities, issued orders for the immediate
despatch of the relieving force from India.
Peshawar had been selected as the base of operations, but,
owing to the inconvenient nature of the communications between
that place and Hoti Mardan, the base was moved to Nowshera.
This alteration necessitated the construction of new railway sidings,
and some amendment of the programme of concentration. The
1st division was selected for mobilization, as being the nearest
to the theatre of operations ; but some modifications were made,
Vol. L 3 X
 —

522 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

owing to the absence of certain units in Waziristan, and the fact

that the full complement of cavalry and wheeled artillery was not
required. The detail of troops composing the Chitral Kelief Force
was as follows :

1st Infantry Brigade.

Commanding— Brigadier-General A. A. Kinloch, C.B.
iBt Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment. 37th Dogras.
1st ,, King's Royal Rifle Corps. No. 1 British Field Hospital.

15th Sikhs. „ 14 Native „

2nd Infantry Brigade.
Commanding— Brigadier-General H. G. Waterfield.

2nd Battalion, King's Own Scottish Guides Infantry.

Borderers. No. 2 British Field Hospital,
1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders. „ 35 Native „ „
4th Sikh Infantry.
3rd Infantry Brigade.
Commanding— Brigadier-General W. F. Gat acre, D.S.O.

1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment. 2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles.

2nd ,, Seaforth Highlanders. No. 8 British Field Hospital.

25th Punjab Infantry. „ 19 Native ,, ,,

Divisional Troops, i
11th Bengal Lancers. No. 1 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners
Guides Cavalry. 4
13th Bengal Infantry. »j o ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,

23rd Punjab Pioneers. Engineer Field Park, from Roorkee.

15th Field Battery, Royal Artillery. No. 4 B.itish Field Hospital, A and B Sec-
tions.
No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artil-
lery. Nos. 17 and 18, Native Field Hospitals.
No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artil- No. 1 Veterinary Field Hospital.

lery.

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, 4 1 Maxim gun and detachment, 1st Battalion,

guns. Devonshire Regiment.

Lines of Communication Troops. 2
1st Battalion, East Lancashire Regt. No. 2 Veterinary Field Hospital.
29th Punjab Infantry. Field Medical Store Depot.
3Q^;1^ ,,
British General Hospital, Peshawar.

No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery. Native „ „ ,,

4 British Field Hospital, C and D i General Veterinary Hospital, Umballa.

Sections. J Base ,, Store Depot, Umballa.

No. 24 Native „ j,
Orchrance Field Park, Rawal Pindi.

1 The 34th Punjab Pioneers were mobi- Lancers, then at Hoti Mardan, for such
lized towards the end of the month and additional cavalry as might be required on
joined the Divisional Troops in order to the lines of communication and No. 6 ;

assist in the probable road-making require- Company, Madras Sappers and Miners,
ments of the force. were placed at the disposal of the Officer
2 About the 9th of April the General Commanding the lines of communication
OfficerCommanding the Force was em- to assist in bridging the Swat river.
powered to draw upon the 9th Bengal
 AKOZAI-YVSAFZAI and TARKANRI tribes of DIR AND BAJAVR. 523

No3. 5 and 6, British Field Hospitals ") For sick and wounded returning from the
„ 28 and 29 Native Field Hospitals -) front.
Reserve Brigade.
Commanding —Major-Geneal G. N. Channer, V.C., G.B.
No. 7 (Bengal) Mountain Battery. Sections C and D, No. 3 British Field
3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade. Hospital.
26th Punjab Infantry. Sections A and B, No. 25 Native Field
2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles. Hospital.

*> „ 3rd „ „ No. 31 Native Field Hospital.

Moveable Column (Abbottabau).
No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery. 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.
2nd Battalion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles. A and B Sections, No. 26 Native Field
Ho.9pital.

The above details proceeded on the Field Service scale of

strength, establishments, etc., as laiddown in the Field Service
Equipment Tables for the different branches, except that
the
number of British Officers with regiments of native cavalry
and
infantry were not increased above the peace establishment.
Kailway concentration commenced on 26th March, and
in
seventeen days from the order to mobilize, 15,000 troops,
rather
more than half that number of followers, and 20,000 transport
animals had been concentrated at Hoti Mardan and
Nowshera
while, during the same period, about forty days'
supplies for the
whole force had been collected at and beyond the base.
The provision of suitable transport for
the force was a matter
owing to the mountainous character
of great difficulty, since,
of
the country through which it was to advance, it was
necessary to
make use almost exclusively of pack animals. All available
Gov-
ernment mules were collected, and a large number of animals
were
purchased and hired. Eventually 30,669 animals were
procured for
pack transport, representing a carrying power of 103,238
maunds.
The services of the Gwalior and Jeypore (Imperial
Service)
Transport Corps were also accepted.
Numerous other offers of Imperial Service troops were
made
but the Government were unable to accept them, as they did
not
consider the occasion one of sufficient importance.
The following statement of the objects of the
expedition was
published in Government General Order No. 324, dated
the 29th
March 1895 :—
Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol, in spite of his oft-repeated
assurances
of friendship to the British Government, and regardless of frequent warnings
3 X2
 — —

524 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

to refrain from interfering with the affairs of Chitral, wliich is a protected State
under the suzerainty of Kashmir, has forcibly entered the Chitral valley and
attacked the Chitral people. He has failed to explain his attitude when
asked to do so, or to withdraw when required, and, as he has disregarded all
remonstrances, the Chitral Eelief Force will be despatched against him.

The first object of the expedition is to relieve Chitral territory from in-
vasion by Umra Khan, and assure it against such aggression in future. The
force will advance into Swat, and thence proceed, as strategic and political
considerations may show to be best, to the territory of Umra Khan, so as to
coerce him into putting an end to the pressure placed by him upon the town
and country of Chitral. If this object cannot be effected without passing
through Bajaur and Dir, and attacking Umra Khan in Chitral territory,
that course will be adopted, and should Umra Khan not make submission and
reparation, he will be punished. If further measures for the relief and rein-
forcement of the British ofiicers now in Chitral are necessary, the force will
advance to Chitral to efiect that object.

Every possible means will be taken to make known to the people of the
countries on the Peshawar border that the reasons and objects of the expedi-
and that the only cause of quarrel is with Umia
tion are as above set forth,
Khan and with those who have supported him in committing aggression upon
Chitral and defying the lawful authority of the Government of India. As
little interference as possible will be permitted in the country through
which the troops have to pass in order to reach the objective of the force, and
neighbouring tracts will be untouched unless the people offer opposition
or show active hostility. The length of time during which the force will
remain across the border must depend on its having thoroughly assured
the object to the expedition.

Our quarrel being, as stated above, only with Umra Khan of

Jandol and the tribesmen who had joined him, every endeavour
was made to secure the neutrality of the other independent tribes
through whose territory the British force required to pass. On
the 17th March a proclamation in the following terms had been sent
to all the tribes concerned :

To all the feople of Swat atid the 'people in Bajaur ivho do not side loith

Umra Khan.
Be it known to you, and any other persons concerned, that :

Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol, in spite of his often-repeated assur-

ances of friendship to the British Government, and regardless of frequent
warnings to refrain from interfering with the afiairs of Chitral, wh'.ch is a
 AKOZAI-YUSAFZAl AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAVR. 525

protected State under the suzerainty of Kashmir, has forcibly entered the
Chitral valley and attacked the Chitrali people.

The Government of India have now given Umra Khan full warning
that, unless he retires from Chitral by the 1st of April, corresponding with the
5tth day of Shawal 1302 H., they will use force to compel him to do so. In
order to carry out this purpose, they have arranged to assemble on the Pesha-
Avar border a force of sufficient strength to overcome all resistance, and to
march this force through Umra Khan's territory towards Chitral.
The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the
present, and prevent any future, unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and,
as soon as this object has been attained, the force will be withdrawn.

The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying

any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them
to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes ; and the)' will

scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as

they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march
of the troops. Supplies and transport will be paid for, and all persons are at
liberty to pursue their ordinary avocations in perfect security.

The Sam Ranizai consented to the passage of the British force

through their country, and the Khans of the Khan Khel Baizai and
of the Ranizai in Lower Swat endeavoured to restrain their people
from any act of hostilit}^ The attitude of the Manki Mulla, who had
much influence in Swat and Utman Khel country, was doubtful,
but a misunderstanding between him and the Mian Guls, grand-
sons of the Akhund, prevented the Upper Swatis from combining
against us.
In return for a yearly subsidy of Rs. 12,000, and a present
of 1,000 rifles, Safdar Khan, the Khan of Nawagai, agreed to use
his influence over the Tarkanri tribesmen to induce them to keep
the peace, and promised to furnish supplies and render assistance to
the troops. He subsequently failed, however, to keep to the terms
of his agreement, and contented himself with maintaining a neutral
attitude, being probably fearful of the resentment of the Amir and
the vengeance of Umra Khan, when the British should again with-
draw from the country.
The maliks and leading men among the Bunerwals, Utman Khel
and Mohmands also appeared anxious to restrain their people from
joining in a quarrel which in no way concerned them.
 — — —

526 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the 30th March, the Divisional Head- quarters, with the 2nd
and 3rd Brigades, moved to Hoti Mardan from Nowshera, and were
followed by the 1st Brigade on the 31st. Divisional troops were
now allotted to brigades as under :

1st Brigade. — 11th No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal

Bengal Lancers ;

Artillery ;
Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No. 4
—
Ini Brigade. 1 squadron, Guides Cavalry No. 8 Mountain Battery,;

Royal Artillery No. 1 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

;

"ird Brigade. —
1 squadron, Guides Cavalry No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain
;

Battery No. 6 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

;

One squadron of the Guides Cavalry was transferred to the

lines ofcommunication troops.
The 1st and 2nd Brigades had been ordered to take over
twenty days' supplies for men and five days' grain for animals, and
to maintain this supply intact as long as possible. The 1st Brigade
was to be equipped with mule transport, the 2nd with mules and
camels, and the 3rd with camels and carts all corps, however, ;

retained their obligatory mule transport.

No tents, except those for hospital use, were taken, and the
allowance of personal baggage was 40lb for officers, 20lb for
British soldiers, and lOlb for native soldiers.

Onthe 30th March, the following telegram from the Com-

mander-in-Chief in India was communicated to the troops :

Iwould hke you to puUish to the Chitral Field ^orce, before they march
ofi the following order addressed
from me to you and them in wishing you and
the force under your command the success upon which so much depends.

I can best describe the

importance and sanctity of the Mission on which the

country now sends you forth by quoting the words in which His Excellency
the Viceroy referred to it in Council on Thursday last. His Excellency said :

'
For the present we have before us a single issue, the claim of brave men,
British and Indian, who have not flinched in" the performance of their duty,
their hour of need. It is a claim that I
to the support of their countrymen in
believe will go straight home to every British and Indian heart, and will

with mianimity, and will quicken the steps of every man

inspire our councils
whose duty calls him forth on this expedition.'

Onthe 1st April Sir E. Low, with the 2nd and 3rd Brigades,
marched to Jalala, while the 1st Brigade pushed on to Lundkwar.
It was the intention of the
General to advance into the Swat valley
 AK0ZAI-YV8AFZA1 AND TARKANBI TBIBES OF DIB AND BAJAVB. 527

over the Malakand and Sliakot passes, and to avoid the Morah pass,
the use of which might arouse the susceptibilities of the Buner
tribesmen on his right flank.
Late in the day, however, notv/ithstanding the supposed friendly
attitude of the border tribes previously mentioned, it was reported
that all three passes were held by tribesmen who intended to oppose
our advance. The Morah and Shakot passes were said to be
defended by 13,000 and 6,000 men, respectively, while only some
300 were believed to be holding the Malakand. In consequence of
this information Sir Robert Low now decided to make a feint with
his cavalry towards the Shakot, and to advance with the rest of
his forceby the Malakand, making a forced march that night to
Dargai with the 2nd and 3rd Brigades. This plan had to be modified
owing to heavy rain, which prevented the troops from moving
before daybreak ; all three brigades, however, concentrated at the
foot of the Malakand pass by 8 a.m. on the 2nd April, and Lieu-
tenant Cockerill, Intelligence Officer, with a company of the Guides,
reconnoitred the enemy's position.
The road to the pass, after leaving Dargai, lay north-east for
two miles up a gradually narrowing valley to the foot of the Mala-
kand hills then, turning north-west and leaving the bed of the
;

valley, it ascended very steeply by zigzags to the crest, which

was gained near a small village from this, one track descended
;

northwards into the Swat valley direct, and another, after run-
ning north-east for nearly three quarters of a rbile along the east
side of the ridge and just below the crest, crossed by a rocky
cutting through a gap in the hills, and, descending, joined the
other track. North-east of this gap, precipitous hills, which
rise to a height of over 4,400 feet, formed the left of the enemy's
position ; while to the south-west of the village mentioned above,
the crest of the range, sloping very steeply upwards, culminates in
three peaks nearly 4,000 feet in height, on which the right of
the enemy's position rested. The whole of the intervening ridge,
including the village, was held in force, and thus the position to be
attacked was over two miles in length.
It was the intention the
General Officer Commanding
of
to force the pass with the 2nd Brigade, and then push forward
the 1st Brigade, which was equipped entirely with mule transport,
as far as the Swat river. Accordingly at 8 a.m. on the 3rd April the
 528 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FRO 31 INDIA.

2nd Brigade, under General Waterfield, advanced from Dargai in

tlie order sliewn in the mar-
Oi-der of Ilarrh :— 2nd Brigade. .
-n -,

Guides Cavalry, squadron.

1 -^ S^^* ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ acCOm-
^^^.^^^^^^
infantry, 2 companies. C-^ panied bv the Ist reserve
Jj^^^^^ '

Maxim gun detachment. ) .i t

•
Remainder of Guides Infantry. ammunition, and the men
3 Mountain Batteries. Carried their greatcoats and
Sappers and Miners, 3 companies. , .

King's Own Scottish Borderers. halt a day S rations. The

Gordon Highlanders. remainder of the baggage
4th Sikhs rear -guard of
;
1 company. _
oo o
was leit at Dargai, under
small regimental guards, to follow later.
The 1st Brigade marched
from Shakot village at 7 a.m. and
off

followed the 2nd, while the 3rd Brigade was held in reserve at
Dargai.
The plan of attack by the 2nd Brigade was as follows : — The
4th Sikhs and Guides Infantry were to scale the hills on the enemy's
right and turn their position west of the pass, while the remaining
battalions advanced up the valley supported by the fire of the three
mountain batteries, which were to take up a preliminary position
on a ridge marked A in plan.
On reaching a bend of the valley a little to the westward of the
first artillery position, the 4th Sikhs began to ascend the spur
on their left, while the Guides, after continuing up the nala for
about half a mile, climbed a parallel spur on the right of the Sikhs,
which rose steeply some 2,000 feet above the plain. Both these
spurs were defended by the enemy's marksmen, who were posted
in numerous sangars comm.anding the ascent, while numbers of the
tribesmen, who were not in possession of fire-arms, were held in
readiness to hurl down rocks and stones on the advancing troops.
The three mountain batteries, which were brigaded under
command of Major J. Dacres-Cunningham, finding the range too
great for efiective fire, now advanced to a second position, marked
B on plan. From here they shelled the sangars opposed to the
flank attack of the Guides and 4th Sikhs, as well as the defences
which stretched southwards in tiers below the pass itself. The
ranges varied from 2,300 to 2,800 yards.
The remainder of the infantry now pushed on up the valley,
passing ahead of the guns and cavalry. About noon Brigadier-
General Waterfield, realizing that the turning movement was likely
to be delayed by the difficulty of the ascent and by the stubborn
 AKOZAI-YUSAFZAI AND TABKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 529

resistance of the defenders, decided to begin his frontal attack.

Accordingly the King's Own Scottish Borderers, who had reached
a point of the valley just north of C (vide advanced up
plan),
three separate spurs to attack the village marked D. The approach
to the village, which appeared to be the key of this portion of the
position, was over very steep, rugged ground, covered with low
scrub jungle and commanded by several sangars. The Gordons
moved some 600 or 700 yards further up the nala, and then sent
four companies up a spur on the right of the Borderers, the remain-
der subsequently advancing stil] further to their right towards the
crest east of the village. The maxim guns also accompanied the
advance of these two battalions. Meanwhile, the artillery, hav-
ing advanced to the close support of the infantry attack, came
into action on the slope marked C, and opened fire at ranges
of 1,000 to 1,400 yards.
The whole 2nd Brigade having been now launched to
of the
the attack. Sir Kobert Low called up the 1st Brigade to support
them. The 60th King's Royal Rifles were sent up the hill between
the Guides and the King's Own Scottish Borderers, while the Bed-
fords and 37th Dogras, passing in rear of the Gordons, attacked
the enemy's extreme left, which they overlapped considerably.
The 15th Sikhs formed the reserve.
The Gordons and King's Own Scottish Borderers, well support-
ed by the fire of the mountain batteries, which prevented the enemy
from concentrating or reinforcing weak points, captured sangar
after sangar, in spite of the dogged resistance of the
defenders,
and pushed their way steadily up the hillside. As they neared
the
summit a short halt was made, to collect the men; the advance
was then sounded and the position was carried at the point of
the
bayonet by a simultaneous rush of the Gordons, King's
Own
Scottish Borderers, and 60th Rifles. The 4th Sikhs and the Guides
having fought their way up the hill reached the crest
on the
enemy's right at the same time. The Sappers and Miners,
follow-
ing close on the fighting line, set to work to improve
the rough
track up the pass.
The action had lasted for about five hours, during which
the
enemy were under shell fire from sixteen guns. In holding
on to
their position to the very end, and standing
up to the final
bayonet charge, the tribesmen gave proof of the ^
possession oi
VOI..I.
3^
530 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

fighting qualities of which the people of this part of the frontier

had not hitherto been suspected.
The Bedfords and 37th Dogras pursued the enemy as far as
Khar, where they bivouacked for the night, rejoining their Brigade
on the pass the next morning. The 4th Sikhs passed the night on
the ridge about a mile west of the pass, while the remainder of the
2nd Brigade returned to Dargai.
The enemy's strength was estimated at about 12,000 men ;

the number armed with fire-arms was at first supposed to have been
3,000, but was afterwards found to have been considerably greater.
Their losses amounted to some 500 killed (the Swatis themselves
admitting a loss of 300), but the number of wounded, among whom
was an important leader called Sheikh Yamin, was not ascertained.
It was noticed that the wounds inflicted by the Lee-Metford rifle,
which was used by the British troops for the first time, were in
many cases extremely slight and the small bullet appeared to
;

have insufficient stopping power when used against a semi-civilized

or savage enemy.
Onthe British side eleven were killed and fifty- one wounded,
including eight British and two native officers 16,563 rounds of
;

Lee-Metford and Martini -Henri ammunition were expended during

the action, and the artillery fired 115 ring shell and 331 shrapnel.
During their advance, when about half-way up the hill, the
60th Kifles had come upon the remains of an old disused Buddhist
road. This proved to be well aligned, and must originally have
been most substantially built. After two days' work it was suffi-
ciently repaired to allow of the passage of camel transport, and
thus greatly facilitated the task of forwarding supplies.
At 1 P.M. on the 4th April the 1st Brigade moved down from
the pass towards the Swat valley. The 2nd Brigade was ordered up
to the top of the pass, and the 3rd Brigade remained at Dargai
pending the passage over the Malakand of the baggage and supplies
two brigades.
of the other
As the advanced guard of the 1st Brigade, consisting of
No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, and the Bedfordshire
Regiment, under Lieut. -Colonel Patterson, approached the vil-
lage of Piran, two miles south of Khar, the enemy was observed
in considerable numbers on the hills north and north-east, on the
right of the road. Lieut. -Colonel Patterson promptly occupied
 AKOZAUYVSAFZAl AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 531

the heights on either side of the road commanding the passage of

the defile.No. 3 Mountain Battery, Eoyal Artillery, coming up
opened fire from the Piran spur just north of the village, and cleared
the enemy from the low hills about 1,000 yards to the north, and
checked their advance along the eastern ridge towards the pass.
The 37th Dogras, with one company, I6th Sikhs, were now
moved forward, and drove the enemy off a low hill one mile south
of Khar village, which formed the extreme right of their position
and commanded the exit from the defile. After having followed
the enemy for a short distance on to the open ground beyond,
the Dogras were directed to fall back and hold this hill.
The guns had meanwhile advanced to a ridge on the west of
the road and half a mile north-west of Piran, and the remainder of
the infantry deployed below them. The enemy now made several
attempts to retake the hill occupied by the Dogras, charging close
up to the position, supported by the fire of their marksmen on the
higher ridge to the south-east. The Dogras, however, with the com-
pany of the 15th Sikhs and No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and
Miners, which had been sent to reinforce them, steadily repulsed each
successive attack, inflicting considerable loss on their assailants.
The remainder of the Brigade, having again advanced about
half a mile, oncemore deployed to cover the passage of the baggage.
Towards evening a number of the enemy, leaving the ridge opposite
the main body of the British Brigade, moved round the left flank
of the Dogras' position. Here they were charged by two troops of
the Guides Cavalry under Captain Adams which had just made their
way and had been sent forward to the attack by
across the pass,
Brigadier- General Kinloch. Advancing over heavy cultivated
ground intersected with nalas, the two troops resolutely attacked
the enemy, who numbered some 1,200, cutting down thirty and
driving the remainder in headlong flight to the hills.
The enemy numbered between 5,000 and 6,000 men, being
mainly tribesmen who had come over from the Morah and Shakot
passes in the hopes of being in time to assist the defenders of
the Malakand. Their loss in killed alone was estimated
at 600,
of whom 350 belonged to the Swat valley. The casualties
in the
1st Brigade were two killed and eighteen wounded.
The 1st Brigade bivouacked for the night close to Khar.
On
the morning of the 5th April nothing was seen of the enemy
in the
532 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

neighbourliood of the camp. The

Brigade halted at Khar,
1st
and was joined by the 2nd Brigade, less the Gordon Highlanders,
who remained on the Malakand Kotal. Two squadrons of the
Guides, accompanied by Brigadier- General Blood, Chief Staff Officer,
moved up the Swat and reconnoitred the river opposite Chak-
valley
dara. This village and the fort of Ramora, some two miles higher up,
were seen to be undefended, but a body of men estimated at 3,000
strong was observed just beyond Thana, the chief village of Swat,
situated at the foot of the hills on the left bank between two and
three miles from the Chakdara fords. The people of Thana were
warned that unless the gathering dispersed at once, troops would be
sent against them.
Some of the leading men of the Adinzai valley, who had crossed
the river to interview the British officers, were assured that their
people would not be interfered with unless they opposed our advance.
In the evening the Jchmis and headmen of Thana and some men
from Aladand came in and made professions
of friendship. The
tribesmen who had Thana moved away from the
collected near
village, but only to occupy a position commanding the approach

to the river, whence they retired next day some four miles higher up
•
the valley.
It may here be mentioned that Muhammad Khan, the
Sharif
ex-ruler of Dir, who since his expulsion by Umra Khan had sought
a refuge at Mingaora in Upper Swat, had been interviewed by
the Political Officer at Dargai, and had offered to assist the British
force. Although the Government could not undertake any res-
ponsibility for the maintenance of his authority after the withdrawal
of the troops from the country, he was promised aid in the shape
of arms and money, and was encouraged by the prospect of recover-
ing possession of his former territories. On the 5th April the Khan
was permitted to Swat river with the intention of raising
cross the
the clans who still him against Umra Khan.
sided with
Shortly after, it was reported that he had secured all the
forts along the Panjkora and Maidan routes and had attacked the
fort of Dir. This alliance with the Khan of Dir subsequently
secured for our troops an unopposed passage through the Baraul
and Dir valleys. It also prevented opposition from the powerful
Malizai and Khwazazai clans of the Panjkora valley and the

western portion of Upper Swat.

 AKOZAl'lVSAIZAl AND TASEANUI TBIBES OF DIB AND BAJAUE. 533

On the 1 1th Bengal Lancers marched over the Malakand

6th, the
pass to Khar, The 2nd Brigade made a demonstration as far as
Thana, and after marching through the village moved back to camp
near Aladand.
No enemy was seen on the right bank of the river, but in the
evening it was reported that a large force of Umra Khan's personal
followers under the command of his brother, Muhammad Shah Khan,
and occupied Chakdara and Ramora.
Early on the morning of the 7th April Major F. J, Aylmer,
v.C, R.E., with No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, and
one company from both the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the
4th Sikhs, was ordered to reconnoitre the river bank and select
a site for a bridge. Captain Barton with one squadron of the
riuides was sent at the same time to watch the enemy who had been
seen above Thana on the previous day.
On approaching the river Major Aylmer' s party was fired on
from the hills on the opposite side. It was now seen that the
enemy were holding the villages of Dalbar and Chakdara and a spur
west of the latter village, thus commanding the low- lying open
ground on the left bank. The fort of Ramora and surrounding
villages' were also occupied by armed parties of the enemy. Leaving
two companies to guard the camp at Aladand, Brigadier- General
Waterfield moved the 2nd Brigade down to the river, which was
here about three feet deep and divided into several separate
channels. About 9 a.m., Lieut. -Colonel Scott, with the 11th Bengal
Lancers and one squadron of the Guides, arrived from Khar.
He had been ordered to reconnoitre the Adinzai valley towards Uch,
and brought instructions from Sir Robert Low to General Waterfield
directing the latter to support the cavalry reconnaissance and to
destroy Ramora fort across the river.
Meanwhile No. 8 Mountain Battery and a half battalion of the
King's Own Scottish Borderers had opened fire on the enemy's posi-
tion,and were shortly afterwards reinforced by the 4th Sikhs and
maxim guns. Under cover of this fire the cavalry forded the river,
but had only got part of the way across when the enemy, led
by some 200 horsemen, broke into a hurried retreat up the Adinzai
valley.
The 4th and 15th Sikhs, the latter having been sent on
from the 1st Brigade, now crossed the river and occupied
 -

534 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the villages of Dalbar and Chakdara, meeting with, no further

opposition. Some 300 of the enemy were taken prisoners, and a
quantity of arms, cattle and grain was seized. The second half
battalion of the Borderers, with the Bengal Sappers and Miners
and No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery, all under command of Lieut.
Colonel Dixon, moved up the river to a ford near Ramora, and
a party was sent across to destroy the fort. The explosives carried
were, however, insufficient to blow up the thick walls. On
reaching the further bank the cavalry had at once taken up the
pursuit and followed the fugitives as far as the Katgola pass,
being joined on the way by Captain Barton's squadron of Guides,
which had forded the river higher up. The cavalry succeeded in
overtaking the enemy and killed at least 100 many of the mounted
;

men abandoning their horses took refuge in the broken ground,

and their leader, Muhammad Shah Khan, himself narrowly escaped
capture. The force commanded by this chief amounted to some
4,500 men, amongst whom were other relatives of Umra Khan^
and many fanatics from Upper Swat. Their losses were estimated
at 250 killed, besides many wounded. Our casualties were three
killed, one drowned, and nine wounded.
At about 4 P.M. the cavalry returned from the pursuit.
The 4th and 15th Sikhs were left to hold the villages of Dalbar
and Chakdara, and the hill to the south-west, while the remainder
of the troops fell back to Aladand. The Gordon Highlanders and
Guides Infantry rejoined the 2nd Brigade here the same evening.
The safety of the Swat valley being a matter of supreme
importance. Sir Robert Low decided to leave his senior Brigadier,
General Kinloch to guard it with the 1st Brigade, and the 2nd
Brigade was thus ordered to lead the further advance. This
brigade, reinforced by the 23rd Pioneers, crossed the Swat river on
the 8th, and the 3rd Brigade moved up to Khar.
On this date the 1 Ith Bengal Lancers reconnoitred the Talash
valley as far as Shamshikhan, and bivouacked a mile south of Uch.
Meanwhile the Guides Infantry with No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery
had occupied the Katgola pass, while a squadron of Guides Cavalry
made up the Adinzai valley to the Laram pass. The
a reconnaissance
route through the Talash valley was reported fit for transport ani-
mals, and ample supply of water and fuel was said to be available ;

the Laram pass, however, was found impracticable for the transport.
 —

AKOZAI-TUSAFZAI- AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 535

The delay in the Swat valley from the 4th to the 8th April
was chiefly due to the difficulty encountered in conveying supplies
over the Malakand pass. To feed the troops on the north side of
the pass it was found necessary to use during the 4th, 6th, and 6th,
all the mules of the force, as these were the only animals that could
cross the pass by the zig-zag road then existing and consequently ;

it was not till the 8th, when camels had been crossing the pass
for two days, that was possible to re-equip the 2nd and 3rd Bri-
it

gades with transport for their baggage and twenty days' supply.
The time thus lost in the actual advance was utilized in
settling down the Upper Ranizais who had left their villages, and
in impressing on them their responsibility for peace within their
boundaries. After the final warning had been sent to the gathering
near Thana, the conduct of Swat generally, notwithstanding
repeated efforts to stir up fanaticism, remained excellent. The
Mian Guls, who were anxious to pose as rulers, attempted to enter
into correspondence regarding Government intentions in Swat,
but a reply was sent informing them that, until they showed
a firman appointing them rulers of Swat, no further correspondence
would be held with them. No strong feeling against us existed
among fhe true Pathan population in the valley, who openly cursed
their religious leaders.
Reports were also received of unrest among the Bunerwals,
Mohmands, and Utman Khel. Although it was considered unlike-
'

would give trouble so long as their own territory

ly that the former
was not menaced, still, as a measure of precaution, the Reserve
Brigade under Major-General Channer, v.c, c.b., was moved to
Mardan. Orders were also issued for the mobilization of a second
Reserve Brigade, but the troops of which it was composed did not
leave their stations.
About the 5th April Sir Robert Low, having received informa-
tion that Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler were prisoners in the
hands of Umra Khan, had asked for instructions with regard to
possible negotiations with that chief for their release. The reply
received on the 8th April was as follows :

Your telegram of April 6th. The Government of India agree that you
should not be the first to open negotiations with Umia Khan about the
prisoners : it can only delay their release to let him see our anxiety about them.
In case Umra Khan makes overtures, you are authorized to say that before
536 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

we consider overtures, all Umra Khan's prisoners, both British and native
officers and men, must be released and if a hair of their heads is injured,
;

the arm of England's just vengeance will pursue him to the end, leaving him

neither land nor name and

; her means will be spent in dealing out to him
the just punishment for any ill-treatment of his prisoners, for whose safety
he will be held personally responsible. Nothing will turn us from the enter-
priseon which we have entered, and Umra Khan now knows that the SirJcar
never uses empty threats, and he will find every word now sent to him will
be fulfilled.

On the Oth April the force noted in the margin made a recon-
lith Bengal Lancers.
naissance as far as Sado on the Panjkora
1 squadron, Guides Cavalry, river. The stream though rapidly rising,

fth Sikh 'Sn^ry^'

was found to be still fordable for
Guides Infantry. cavalry : the Shigu Kas defile at the
end of the Talash valley was reported to be just passable for
camels but these animals could not betaken over the Kamrani
;

pass, which otherwise was the best route, since it could be

commanded by the enemy's fire. The cavalry bivouacked at
Gumbat, while the remainder of the force spent the night at the
junction of the Shigu Kas and Kamrani roads.
On the following day these advanced troops pushed on to
Sado, and the Guides Cavalry reconnoitred up the Eud-Jandol
valley, being fired on by a small party of the enemy near Kotkai.
The remainder of the 2nd Brigade, accompanied by Divisional
Head-quarters and two companies of the 23rd Pioneers, marched to
Gumbat, leaving a detachment to hold a post near Uch. A por-
tion of the 3rd Brigade also advanced to a camp about three
quarters of a mile from Uch.
was now ascertained that Umra Khan was at Mundali.
It
He had released six Muhammadan sepoys, who had been taken
prisoners at Eeshun, and they had arrived safely at Khar. In the
hope of procuring the release of the two officers also, a further
letter was sent to the Khan advising him to deliver up his remaining
prisoners unhurt and to come in himself and submit to the terms
imposed by the Government. The sequel to this attempt at nego-
tiation is related below.
On the 1 1th April the whole of the 2nd Brigade was concentrat-
ed at Sado and Khungai. The baggage and rear -guard, which had
been much delayed by the difficulties of the road through the Shigu
 AK01AI-7U8AFZAI AND TARKANRl TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAVR. 537

Kas, were fired upon by a small party of the enemy near Zulm
Baba on the opposite side of the As the Panjkora had now
river.

become unfordable. Major Aylmer. v.c, with No. 4 Company,

Bengal Sappers and Miners, and tw<> companies, 23rd Pioneers, set to
work to make a bridge. This was built on raft piers constructed
from logs found on the river bank, and was made passable for men
on foot by the evening of the 12th, when six companies of the Guides
Infantry were sent across to guard the bridge-head.
The 3rd Brigade, which had completed the passage of the Swat
river on the 11th, was ordered to concentrate at Gumbat, and to
improve the road over the Kamrani pass.
On the evening of the 12th the distribution of the troops was
fDivisional Head-quarters.
'^'^ gi^en in the
I 11th Bengal Lancers. margin.
1 squadron, C4uides Cavalry.
j

No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal On the morn-

Sado, Khungai and neigh- j Artillery. ing of the 13th
hourhond. 1 No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.

2nd Brigade. Lieut.-C o 1 one1

2 companies, 23rd Punjab Pioneers.
Battye, in com-
No. 4 Compan3% Bengxil Sappers and
Miners. mand of the
L
Gumbat nvd Kamran^ 3rd Brigade, Guides, acting on
pass.
( i squadron. Guides Cavalrj-. instructions re-
Uch .
'
(. 2 companies, loth Sikhs. ceived from Sir
i squadron, Guides Cavalry.
Robert Low, pro-
6 companies, l5th Sikhs.
Chakdara 6 companies, 23rd Punjab Pioneers. ceeded to punish
Nos. and
1 Companies, Bengal
tj

Sappers and Miners. certain villages

f\ squadron. Guides Cavahy. from which the
\No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal
\
transport had
Khar Artillery.
/ 1st Brigade (except 1st Sikhs). been fired upon
V 13th Bengal Infantry.
during its march
^ 1st Battalion, East Lancashire Regi-
ment.
\
through the Shigu
Malakand pass •j29th Punjab Infantry. Kas defile.
/ Wing, 34th Punjab Pioneers.

V2 companies, 30th Punjab Infantry. It was intended

squadron, 9th Bengal Lancers. to send more
Dargai SINo. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Batterj-.
2 companies, 30th Punjab Infantry.
troops across to
f 1 squadron, 9th Bengal Lancers. supp ort the
Jalala
t 2 companies, 30th Punjab Infantry. Guides, but im-
fortunately the river had risen during the night, bringing down
huge logs of timber, which earned away portions of the bridge,
rendering it quite impassable by 9 a.m. The remaining company of
Vou L 3 2
538 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the Guides, with a supply of ammunition, was, however, sent across

in rafts.
Leaving two companies, imder Lieutenant Johnson, to hold the
entrenched position at the bridge-head, Lieut. -Colonel Battye
moved off at 6 a.m. with five companies, and advanced up the left
bank of the Jandol^ stream towards Subhan Killa, which was reached
at nine o'clock. On the way, parties were sent to burn the villages
of Walai, Khazanai, and Dehrai. The Guides now forded the Jandol
stream, and ascended the heights west of the Panjkora, destroying
Gaihai and some other small hamlets en route. By 10-30 a.m.,
Lieut. -Colonel Battye reached the crest of the ridge west of the
bend river below the Jandol -Panjkora junction, and sent
of the
forward an advanced picquet to cover his front. Lieutenant Stewart
with one company was now despatched to Harangai with instructions
to burn the village, and Lieutenant Codrington with another com-
pany was ordered to move along the ridge in a south-easterly direc-
tion and support this party.
About noon the enemy was observed in considerable force near
Kotkai, three miles further up the Jandol valley, and large parties
were seen crossing to the right bank of the stream. It was not
until 1 P.M. that Lieut«-Colonel Battye, in reply to his heliograph
message reporting the state of affairs, received an order to retire
to his entrenched position. He at once sent orders to Lieutenant
Codrington to withdraw the burning party meanwhile. Lieutenant
:

Stewart, in compliance with that officer's instructions, had already

collected his men near a village about a quarter of a mile south-east
of Harangai. From here his line of retreat lay either up the spur to
the position held by Lieutenant Codrington, or over a lower col
and along a na/a running north-east to the Panjkora, just above
Zulm-Baba. Lieutenant Stewart chose the latter route, and, after
reaching the river and ascending the right bank for about a mile,
eventually joined Lieutenant Codrington's party.
Meanwhile Lieut.-Colonel Battye, being anxious for the safety
of detached companies on his left, whose movements
these
he was unable to observe, held on to his position with the

This portion of the stream is called

1 Panjkora a little below Sado. The eastern
indifferentlythe Rud (Bajaur) or the limit of the Jandol valley proper is be-
Jandol. The two unite just west of Ghosam tween Ghobani and Ghosam.
and their combined waters flow into the
 dK0ZAI-7U8AFZAI AND TABKANRI TTtlBES OF DIB AND BAJAUB. 539^

remainder former time to complete

of his force, in order to give the
their withdrawal. At length the order was given for
the main body

of the battalion to retire, but not before the enemy had begun to
press onwards in formidable numbers. Lieut.-Colonel Battye
with
Captain Campbell and two companies moved down a spur running
north-east, while Lieutenant Lockhart with a company and a half

descended a parallel spur about midway between the first party and
Lieutenant Codrington. When about a third of the descent had
been accomplished, the enemy charged down one of the spurs, but
were checked by steady volleys, though a few succeeded in getting
within twenty paces of the defence.
Lieutenant Codrington's party had now reached a point opposite
the upper end of the island just below the mouth of the Jandol
stream, when he received a signal message from Brigadier-General
Waterfield directing him to look out to the north and prevent sur-
prise. He accordingly moved up the hill again, sending Lieutenant

Stewart's company to reinforce the main body, while his own com-
pany took up a position on a lower spur some 500 yards in rear, to
protect the flank.
As soon enemy were seen crossing the main ridge, the
as the
artillery on the left bank of the river opened fire and, as the
;

tribesmen came nearer, the supporting infantry w^ere able to give

valuable assistance and prevent them closing in upon the Guides.
Very deliberately the different companies retired, fiercely
assailed on all sides, yet coolly firing by word of command and
relinquishing quietly and almost imperceptibly one position only to
take up another a few yards further back. As they came down
on to the open ground at the foot of the hills, the enemy pressed
forward with still greater boldness. At this moment Lieut.-
Colonel Battye, who had been conspicuous among the last group
at each successive retirement, fell mortally wounded, and the
command devolved
of the battalion on Captain Campbell.
When he saw his commander fall, Subadar Rajab, with a hand-
ful of men, rushed forward and shot down several of the tribesmen
at close quarters, thus checking their advance at a critical moment.
The Guides now retired across level ground through high crops along
the river bank to the bridge-head, fording the Jandol stream on
their way. During the latter part of this movement a body of the
enemy moved along the left bank and tried to cut ofi their retreat.
3 Z2
 540 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

They were, however, frustratedby the two companies which had

been left at the bridge-head under Lieutenant Johnson, who had
now moved out to support the main body from a position on the
high ground north of Khazanai. Darkness had begun to close in
when the last of the companies arrived at the bridge-head.
A company of the 4th Sikhs were sent across the river on massak
rafts to reinforce the Guides, while theGordon Highlanders and
No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery took up a position on the left
bank to support them during the night. The remainder of the
2nd Brigade now withdrew to camp some 1.^ miles from the river.
The enemy kept up their fire till 11 p.m. It was subsequently
ascertained that the enemy had planned a night attack, and intend-
ed to try and rush the entrenched post, but were deterred by the
Btar shell fired by the Derajat Battery.
Firing was resumed after daybreak, and Captain Peebles, in
charge of the maxim wounded about 8 a.m.
guns, was mortally
Our losses on the 13th and 14th were two British officers and
three men killed, twenty men wounded, including five followers.
The enemy, among whom were a large number of Shamozai
Utman Khel, subsequently admitted a loss of over 500 men, out of
a total gathering of some 5,000 men.
In his report Sir Robert Low expressed the opinion that
although the disinclination to retire was a fault on the right side,
still, under the circumstances, it would have been better had

the officer commanding began to retreat without waiting for

orders: the retirement however, as was carried out, was a splendid
it

performance. For their gallant conduct in charging the enemy when

Lieut.- Colonel Battye was wounded, Subadar Rajab and four
men subsequently received the 3rd Class of the Order of Merit. The
Commander-in-Chief also recorded his admiration of the manner
in which the retreat was accomplished, and a special tribute was
paid in Government orders to the memory of Lieut. -Colonel Battye.
From the 14th to the 16th xA.pril the two brigades halted at
Sado, while a suspension bridge was constructed, the cables being
formed with strands of telegraph wire.
On the 17th the 3rd Brigade and a portion of the 2nd Brigade
crossed the Panjkora during the morning. But, the descent to
the valley from the right bank being difficult, Sir Robert Low, in
order to avoid undue delay, ordered Brigadier- General Waterfield
 AKOZAI-YUSAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUS. 541

to pass the 3rd Brigade baggage over the bridge and to follow with
his own brigade on the next day.
The 3rd Brigade, preceded by the cavalry, now advanced up
the Jandol valley. The cavalry scouts were fired on by a party
of the enemy near Dagh, and when the leading squadron of the
Guides reached Ghosam, a large body of tribesmen were seen
advancing from Mian Kilai. The advanced cavalry fell back on
Ghobani, and the enemy coming on down the right bank of the
Jandol stream occupied the forts of Andak and Dherai and the spurs
to the south. About midday the 3rd Brigade advanced to the
attack from Ghobani, where the artillery came into action against
the forts. First moving south towards Manugai, and then turning
westward, the Seaforth Highlanders and the 4th Gurkhas drove
the enemy from ridge to ridge, meeting with but little resistance.

The cavalry meanwhile worked up the river-bed in the hopes of

cutting off the enemy if they attempted to recross, but the tribes-
men kept well out of reach of the sowars, and finally disappeared
into the hilly country to the west.
Our casualties in this affair were eight men and nine horses
wounded. The enemy, whose loss was not ascertained, numbered
between 3,000 and 4,000 men, chiefly Mamunds and Salarzai
Tarkanris, with a few Mohmands.
On the 18th April the 2nd and 3rd Brigades advanced to
Mundah and Mian Kilai, which were both deserted, except for
a few Hindu traders found in the latter place. A cavalry recon-
naissance was made to the foot of the Janbatai pass and met with
no opposition.
Meanwhile, as no news had been received as to events in

No. 2 Derajat M. B. CMtral, Sir Robert Low decided to push

1st Battalion, The Buf=f8. forward the 3rd Brigade as rapidly
2nd Battn., 4th Gurkha Rifles. t i -r> r^ i

Half No. 4 Co., B. S. and M as possible. Accordingly Brig.-General

2 sections. Field Hospital.Gatacre Continued his march to Barwa,
with the troops noted in the margin. Seventeen days' supplies
accompanied this force. On this day Sir Robert Low received
information that Umra Khan, after spending the previous night at
Maiar, had fled up the Maskini valley and crossed the Afghan
frontier into Asmar, where he sought refuge with the Sipah Salar.
It will be convenient here to give a short account of the nego-
tiations which had taken place between Sir Robert Low and Umra
 —

542 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Khan. On the 11th April two messengers from Umra Khan arrived
at Sado and stated that their master desired to arrange terms of
peace. The Native Political Assistant was sent to interview these
men, but, failing to find them, went on to Mundah, where he was
received by Umra Khan and permitted to see the captured officers,
who were brought over from Barwa. Lieutenant Edwardes was now
released and reached Sado on the 13th. He brought a verba] mess-
age from the Khan asking why he had incurred the hostility of
Government, how long it would last, and what were the terms which
would be offered to him. Sir Robert Low replied that the cause
of quarrel had already been stated in former correspondence, but
that if the Khan now released the remaining prisoners, and abstained
from further hostilities, and assisted the troops in their advance
on Chitral, he would not be dispossessed of his territories in Jandol.
Umra Khan, however, asked for time to consider the matter, but
was informed that no truce would be made. On the 15th Sir
Robert Low, in accordance with instructions received from Gov-
ernment, informed the Khan that in consequence of the delay in
accepting them, the terms offered in the previous letter must be
cancelled. He added that until the other prisoners were released,
no further intercourse would be held with him, and. that the
question of terms would be decided by the Government.
On the 16th Lieutenant Fowler and the remaining prisoners
were sent to the British camp at Sado, bringing a letter from Umra
Khan, of which the following is a translation :

You wrote informing me that Government troops had arrived at my

bomidaries, and that if I wished to save my hfe and property from ruin, 1

should make over to you the two- English officers, and should submit to what-
ever conditions the Government of India might impose. I have now acted
according to this writing : one of the two officers has already been sent in
and the other whomhad kept only to advise me, I now send in with the
I

Sahibzada. The conditions you write in your second letter 1 have accepted,
and I have recalled my forces from Chitral. I was not present in the fight
of Ranikoji (that of 13th April). On the strength of former services rendered

by me, I ask that the Government troops may go to Chitral by some other
road, because Jandol is near to other tribes. If any one should show hostiUty,
I shall get into trouble. I shall be obhged by your granting this. If Government
come by Jandol, I shall withdraw from Jandol, and when the Government troops
have returned to Peshawar, I wiU return to Jandol. You may trust whatever

the Sahibzada may tell you. I ask to be informed of such as is agreed to.
 —

AKOZAI-TUaAFZAI AND TARKANRl TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 543

To this Sir Kobert Low replied :

I am glad that you have sent to me Lieutenant Fowler and the remaining

prisoners. have also received your letter, in which you say that you have
I
accepted the terms laid down for you but you are aware that I informed
;

you by letter yesterday that the conditions laid down by me were cancelled
owing to your delay in accepting them, and I can now only inform you that
[ have sent your letter to the Government of Lidia for their consideration

and for such orders as they may see fit to give.

Sir Robert Low was now instructed to inform the Khan that
the Government could only accept his unconditional surrender,
but were willing to oiier an honourable asylum in India for himself
and family, together with a reasonable number of followers.
Umra Khan, however, had fled to Afghanistan before these instruc-
tions were received, and it was therefore decided that no further
communication should be held with him unless he first made
overtures. Sir Robert Low was also directed to inform the Bajauris
that, provided they ceased hostilities, their villages and property
would be spared.
19th April Brigadier- General Gatacre with the advanced
On the
portion of the 3rd Brigade marched to the Janbatai pass, and
bivouacked for the night about two miles beyond the kotal.
the following day the force moved to Bandai, where news
On
was received that the Chitral garrison were being very hard pressed.
Sir Robert Low accordingly
authorized Brigadier- General Gatacre

to push on at once with a small lightly equipped column of

500 men.
On the 21st General Gatacre advanced
1st COLtTMN. X 1
irom -n
• •
1

1 No. 4 Co., Ben. s. and M. ISandai in two columns,

his troops
2nd Bri.. 4th C'urkha R,Hc.s ghown iu the margin concentrating
M. is. o o
2 guns, No. 2 (Dcrajat)
1 section, No. 19 N. them again at Dir on the 22nd. On the
F. H.

.-o ^^-^i^^Rnff-^" 21st information was received from the

1st Bn., Tho nutt^.
,

2 gun^. No. 2 (Derajat) M. B. Khan of Dir that the siege of Chitral had
F. H.
1 section. No. 8 B. ^^^^ ^^^.^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^.^

followers had fled. This news being confirmed on the following

day Sir Robert Low ordered General Gatacre to advance less
and with duo consideration for his troops.
hurriedly,
Brigadier-General Gatacre now issued orders for the troops
detailed above (with the exception of the Derajat
Battery, which
^44 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

was replaced by two maxim guns of the Devonshire Regiment) to

march from Dir to the Lowari pass, with ten days' supplies.
The route to Gujar, at the foot of the pass, lay for eleven miles
up the Dir valley beside the tumbling snow-fed torrent that streams
from the south side of the pass. The track was in general extremely
difficult, frequently losing itself among the boulders that choked

the bed of the stream, or rising steeply to traverse the face of a rocky
blufi, only to fall again with equal abruptness on the further side.
This portion of the road had to be re- aligned and reconstructed
throuo^hout, the river had to be bridged in some four or five places,
and stone staircase ramps had to be built in the water at more than
one point, to enable laden animals to pass where the stream washed
the foot of precipitous cliffs. From Gujar, 8,450 feet, to the sum-
mit of the pass, a distance of three miles, the track lay over frozen
but often treacherous snow, at first at a fairly easy gradient, but
growing steeper and more slippery as the pass was approached.
Beyond the crest a great snow cornice, fifteen feet in height, over-
hunty the head of the glen, down which the track descended for
about 1,000 yards at a gradient of 1 in 3 or 4, over vast drifts of
avalanche snow, in which great rocks and the uprooted trunks of
gigantic trees lay deeply imbedded. From the foot of this descent the
route lay down a steep and rocky gorge, now following the tangled

bed of the torrent, now winding through line forests of pine and cedar,
or traversing open grassy slopes clogged with the drainage of melting
snows. About three miles from the pass thereis a camping- ground

called Ziarat, situated high above the torrent at an elevation of 7,200

feet and surrounded by a forest of pine trees. Onwards from Ziarat
to Ashreth, a distance of about six miles, the character of the valley
remains the same. Throughout its entire length of twenty- three
miles, from Dir to Ashreth, the road was a mere goat-track, offering
extraordinary difficulties to the passage of troops, and requiring
extensive improvements before laden animals could follow it.

On the 23rd April an advanced party of Sappers and Mners

with a half battalion of the Buffs, and one company, 4th Gurkhas,
marched to Kolandi, improving the road and constructing a bridge
on the way. Next day this party moved on three and a half miles to
Mirga, making three bridges over the stream during the march. On
the 25th the remainder of the Gurkhas marched from Dir to Kolandi,
while the advanced party, reinforced by the other half battalion of the
 AKOZAI'YUSAFZAI AND TAEKANRI TRIBES OF DIB AND BAJAUR. 545

Bufis, pushed on to Gujar. Here^tliey set to work to clear the track

leading up the pass. Wet weather now set in, which, added to the
severe cold, was very trying to the troops, who were without tents.
At 3-30 A.M. on the 26th the first portion of the column resumed
its march up the pass in the following order :— Advanced guard
of

Sappers ; two companies of the Buffs as a tramping party ; 200 coolies

carrying light loads; remainder of Sappers, followed by their

mules carrying equipment and baggage one company, 4th Gurkhas,

;

with baggage. Two more companies of the Buffs Hned the route to
the top of the pass to assist the column during the ascent, which,
notwithstanding the extreme difficulty of the track, was completed
by 7 A.M. A number of mules fell while descending the steep slope
on the far side but none were injured, and there was but little

damage done to the loads.

The Buffs, who supplied fatigue parties to assist the other troops
were obliged to bivouack by detachments along the road.
across,
The remainder of the advanced party reached Ashreth at nightfall,
and on the 27th the second half of the column crossed the pass.
The next two days were spent in improving the road down the 2)a88
on the north side, and on the 30th the whole colunm, excepting
two companies of the Gurkhas left at Ziarat, concentrated at
jireth, where it was ordered to halt for the present.

It has already been stated on another page that Sher Afzal

and a number of the leading men of Chitral, together with some of

their followers, Bashkar by the Khan of Dir's
had been captured in

lashkar. The whole of these prisoners, numbering about 900 persons

inclusive of women and children, were brought into the head- quarters
camp at Dir on the 27th April. The majority were subsequently
sent back to Chitral, and on the 1st May the following were des-
patched as prisoners to India : —
Sher Afzal, Kokand Beg, Yadgar
Beg, Danial Beg, Muhammad Afzal Beg and Inayat Shah ; and later
Sher Af zal's daughter, the widow of Nizam-ul-Mulk, followed them.
The object of the expedition had now been successfully accom-
plished. The relieving forces had reached Chitral territory, and the
British garrison had been rescued. Umra Khan, after releasing the
prisoners who had fallen into his hands, had fled the country, while
Sher Afzal and his principal confederates were in our custody.
The following gracious message from Her Majesty the Queen
Empress was forwarded by the Viceroy to Sir Robert Low, con-
Vol. L * -^
 — —

UQ FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

gratulating Hm on the successful result of the operations :

Pray convey to my brave troops my admiration of their gallantry and

endurance, my sorrow at the loss of valuable lives, and my anxiety for the
recovery of the wounded and sick.

To return now to the troops south of the Lowarai pass.

The 2nd Brigade, with the exception of the 11th Bengal Lancers,
who returned to the Swat valley, and certain other detachments,
remained at Mundah. Reconnaissances were made in the Bajaur,
Maskini, Maidan, and Panj kora valleys. While taking part in the
last of these Captain W.
R. RoJDertson was treacherously attacked
and severely wounded by a tribesman from Dir, who formed one of
his local escort. This fanatic was afterwards captured and executed.
The 1st made various reconnaissances in the Swat valley.
Brigade also
No met with, and after the fighting at Chakdara on
opposition was
the 7th April the inhabitants of this valley refrained from any
further exhibition of hostility.
Towards the end of April the line of communication was placed
under the command of Major- General E. Stedman, c.b. The object
of appointing an ofiicer of this rank was to ensure his being senior
to all the Brigadiers in the event of their commands being extended
along the lines of communication, or in case it became necessary to
form moveable columns. The line of communication was divided
into four sections as under :

No. 1, Base to the Panj kora.

At Dargai 1,250 camels.
„ Khar 1,250 „ No. 2, Panj kora to Dir.
„ Chakdaral 1,200 „
Sarai 1,250 „
No. 3, Dir to Ashreth,
Panj kora 1,250 „ No. Ashreth to Chitral.
4,
bridge.
Mundah 1,250 „ Maj or- General Stedman's
Kanbat 3,000 mules and ponies. command extended from the
Bandai 1,500 donkeys.
Dir 1,800 mules and donkeys. base at Nowshera to Bandai,
Gujar
Ziarat
660 donkeys.
300 „
and later to Dir. A staging
Ashreth 660 „ system of transport for the
Drosh 500 mules.
Gairat 450 „
forwarding of supplies was
Broz 400 „ established. During May the
Chitral 200 „
number of transport animals
employed at the different stages was as given in the margin.

1 Hired bullocks and 400 mules of UKResorve Brigade worked on this section.
Maundage animals also worked up to Mundah.
 AKOZAI-TUSAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR.
547

Prior to this date, owing to the rapidity with which it had been
necessary to push on the advance, no definite system of supply could
be organized. Advanced depots were now formed at Dargai, Chak-
dara, Mundah, Dir,and Kala Drosh. At each of these twenty days'
suppHes were maintained for troops in the section dependent on
the depot, and one day's supplies for all troops in front.
Twenty-five field post offices were established. Beyond Dargai
the mails were carried by runners, disposed in stages, who were
found to be more satisfactory than sowars, since they could use
narrow mountain paths and were able to travel at night and without
escort. In his report Major- General Stedman remarked " consider-
ing that the mails are now carried from Nowshera to Chitral in less
than 77 hours with satisfactory regularity, I think that high praise
is due to the Postal Department for the care they have
bestowed
upon the training and supervision of the ignorant tribesmen from
whom their postal runners were perforce recruited."
Telegraphic communication had been completed as far as Dir
by the end of April, and was extended to Chitral in May. On
mobilization 200 miles of field material and 20 offices had been sent
to the base ; but altogether 26 field offices were opened and 221 miles
of posts and 403 miles of wire
were erected. The erecting party
at the front averaged five miles of line daily for tliirty-seven days.
In April constant interruptions were caused by transport animals
breaking the hght field posts, and during the next two months there
was a good deal of trouble owing to wire-cutting and thefts of
material by the tribesmen.
In addition to the trestle bridge thrown across the Swat river
at Chakdara, a pontoon bridge with twelve pontoons, which had
been brought up on elephants, was constructed in May ; while a
suspension bridge was completed by the end of June. A new
suspension bridge of 200 feet span also replaced the temporary
structure made on the Panjkora at Sado, and other bridges were
constructed at Chutiatanr and Darora.
It has alreadybeen mentioned in Chapter II that the column
from Gilgit under Lieut. -Colonel Kelly had remained halted at
Chitral after the reUef of the fort on the 20th April. As, how-
ever, the presence of this small force alone was not considered
an
adequate assertion of our military supremacy, and since it was also
desirable to complete and maintain communication by
the Dir
4A2
548 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

route pending a decision as to future policy and action, Sir Robert

Low was instructed to send a portion of his division on to Chitral.
ist Bn., Tho Buffs. Brigadier- General Gatacre, with the

N°; 4 Co".te?s: fm''- t™«P« "°ted ™ the margin, was accord-

1 coy., 4th Gurkha Rifles. ingly directed to pusli on to Chitral,
which he reached on the 15th May.
The remainder of the 4th Gurkhas held the line of communica-
tion from Ziarat to Broz the 25th Punjab Infantry remained at
;

Dir and Gujar, while Bandai and Janbatai were garrisoned by the
Seaforth Highlanders.
Sir Robert Low, escorted by one company of the Seaforths,
arrived at Chitral on the 16th May, where he reviewed the troops
composing the garrison which had held the fort during the siege,
and the two relieving columns.
On the 10th May a 4th Brigade, as shown in the margin, was
l8t Bn., East Lancashire
^o^^^^ ^^^m troops employed on the lines
Regiment. of communications, and was placed under

loth^T'^^^^'t''''^'
thecommand of Brigadier-General A. G.
1 squadron, 9th B. L. Hammond, v.c.
During the next two months various movements of minor
importance took place, and the troops were largely employed in
improving the roads along the lines of communications.
After the relief of Chitral at the end of April, all organized
opposition on the part of the tribesmen ceased. In the Jandol valley,
however, shots were frequently fired into our camps, and attacks
on individuals or small parties continually occurred. On the 15th
May a British sentry was shot dead at Mundah, and at Kambat
a party of the enemy attacked some Hazara coolies, killing four
and wounding twenty-three. Altogether from about the middle of
April to the date of the withdrawal of the forces the total number
of killed and wounded in these numerous outrages amounted to two
British soldiers and forty-nine followers killed, and one British,
two native soldiers, and forty- seven followers wounded. Nineteen
men, who had committed fanatical attacks, were arrested and execut-
ed, and six men were known to have been wounded by sentries.
Considerable annoyance was also caused by damage to tele-
graph material and thefts of wire, mostly in Jandol. These out-
rages were at first supposed to be nothing more than the natural
outcome of the disorder which ensued after the flight of Umra Khan
 AKOZAI'TUSAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 549

from Jandol, and were believed to have been committed by a few

of liis sympathisers who had not yet dispersed to their homes.
Later on, however, parties of tribesmen numbering from 80 to 300
began to attempt attacks on our camps. These incidents, combined
with the facts that the inhabitants of the valley made no move to
cultivate their lands, and that a number of Peshawaris employed
in collecting supplieson the lines of communication were desirous
of returning to their homes, seemed to point to the possibility of
further outbreak. Measures were promptly taken to put a stop to
this unrest. The chief instigators —usually —
religious leaders were
arrested, and fines, payable in grain or cattle, were imposed on certain
villages. Ahmad and Sher Afzal of Shahi, relatives of
Saiyid
Umra Khan, were employed to organize a system of tribal police,
and the people were induced to set to work on the cultivation of
In consequence of the arrest of leading men, jirgas
their fields.
came in from the Lower Salarzai and Shamozai Utman Khel and ;

it became evident that a serious endeavour had been made to raise

the Jandolis and all the neighbouring clans.
The Hadda Mulla had assured the people of Nawagai and
the Utman Khel and Tarkanri tribes that the British intended to
annex their country and disarm them. The Manki Mulla, while
abstaining from active help, consented to the proceedings of his
brother priests. The people of Buner were also becoming suspicious,
and occupied the Buner passes after sending their women and children
into the hills. On receipt of a letter
from Major Deane, however,
explaining that no interference' with their country was intended
they quieted down, and their fighting men dispersed.
On the 11th June the Upper KSalarzai and Mamund jirgas also
came to Mundah, accompanied by the Khan of Nawagai, who had
been ordered to attend and explain the non-fulfilment of his promise
to maintain order among his people. The Khan and the various
jirgas were received by Sir Robert Low and appeared to
be well
by his assurance that the Government had no intention of
satisfied
taking over their country or of demanding revenue from them.
Henceforward the troubles in the Jandol valley sensibly diminish-
ed, but some disturbance was caused in the Baraul valley
by
people from Asmar. Some mule-drivers in a post near Bandai
were
cut up on the 19th June, and about this time several followers
were
killed and convoys were lired on. It was, however, not possible
550 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

to deal with the perpetrators of these outrages without having

recourse to action which would probably have caused undesirable
complications, as they came from territory beyond the limits of
British influence.
the end of July the road to Chitral via the Panjkora valley
By
had been extensively improved, and it was decided to abandon
the Jandol-Baraul route and withdraw the troops stationed in those
valleys. Accordingly by the middle of August the advanced
troops were moved back bank of the Panjkora, and the
to the left
British units of the 2nd Division went into summer quarters on
the Barchanrai south of the Talash valley.
hills

About this time the Reserve Brigade at Mardan and the Abbott-
abad moveable column were broken up.
During the withdrawal of the troops from Jandol no trouble
was experienced from the tribes. After the completion of the
movements, the Khans of Nawagai and Pashat came to Sado with
the Shamozai and Salarzai jirgas, and stated that they had taken
steps to prevent any disturbance. They also requested that the
bridge at Sado might be left intact, and undertook to prevent any
interference with it on the part of malcontents among the tribes-
men.
About the middle of July a number of Umra Khan's lelatives
were sent to Peshawar by the Amir, who had refused their request
for permission to proceed to Bajaur direct, lest their return to that
country should^be displeasing to the Government. These people
were, however, sent back to Jandol, where lands were assigned to
them by the order of the Political Officer, since they were unable
to agree amongst themselves as to the division of the property of
their late chief. Barwa was given to Saiyid Ahmad Khan Satbar ;

to Sher Afzal Khan ; Shalii to the sons of Muhammad Zaman

Khan Chanda to Mir Hassan Khan Damthal to Zanulla Khan
; ; ;

Tor to Mir Afzal Khan Mundah to Abdul Majid Khan Kaskothi to

; ;

Abdul Ghani Khan and other cousins and Maskini to the family of
;

Muhammad Shah Khan, who did not himself return until September.
On the 4th September the troops composing the Chitral garrison
ceased to form part of the Relief Force and on the following day
the 3rd Brigade was broken up. On the 8th the Commander-in-
Chief arrived at Malakand, and after inspecting the troops in the
Swat valley, proceeded to the Laram pass and to Barchanrai. On
 AKOZAI-YUSAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 551

the 16th the General Officer Commanding the lines of communica-

tions issued orders for the final withdrawal of the troops. The last
convoy Gujar on the 18th, and on the next day the
for Chitral left
garrison of that post withdrew to Dir. The final evacuation began
on the 20th and was completed by the 27th without any disturb-
ance. The telegraph line from Drosh to Chakdara was dismantled,
the stores necessary for its reconstruction being left at Drosh, Dir,
and Chakdara.
On the 28th September the Divisional Head-quarters demobilised
at Nowshera. In taking leave of the Chitral Relief Force Sir Eobert
Low, in his farewell order, placedon record his high appreciation of
the fine services of the troops whom it had been his privilege to
command in the field for the past six months.
The question of the future policy with regard to Chitral, and
the means of communication with that country, had been under
consideration since the beginning of the military operations.
The Government had recommended the retention of a
of India
British force in Chitral and the maintenance of the road from Now-
shera via Panjkora and Dir. In June the Secretary of State had
informed the Government that, in view of the large number of troops
which would be required to ensure the security of the road and the
heavy burden which would consequently be thrown on Indian reve-
nues, these proposals were not acceptable. Before, however, fresh
arrangements could be completed for the settlement of Chitral and
the evacuation of trans-frontier posts occupied by the troops, a
change of government occurred, and the new Secretary of State in-
formed the Indian Government that the matter would be recon-
sidered. In reply to a request for further information as to the
proposed arrangements for keeping open the road to Chitral, the
Government of India stated that, as the Khan of Dir and the Swat
were friendly, it was expected that the Panjkora-Dir route
Jchans,
could be safeguarded by tribal levies and that it would only be
necessary to employ troops at Chakdara and the Malakand pass.
For Chitral the Government recommended a garrison of two bat-
talions of Native infantry, one company Sappers and Miners, and
one section of a Native mountain battery. It was added that the
Native Infantry battalion in the Gilgit Agency could be withdrawn,
and that the detachments at Mastuj and Ghizr would probably not
be required.
552 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

This information removed the doubt which had hitherto been

felt by the Home Government as to the feasibility of keeping
open the road by peaceful means and without heavy expenditure.
Accordingly on the 9th August formal assent was given to the
proposals of the Government of India.
On the 10th August Sir Robert Low had been instructed to
arrange for garrisoning the Malakand pass and Chakdara, and to
settle terms with the Swatis and the Khan of Dir for the safeguard-
ino- of the road through their territories. The Khan of Dir in return
for an annual allowance of Es. 10,000, subsequently increased to
Rs. 15,000, undertook to keep open the postal route, protect the
telegraph line, maintain the road, levy-posts, and camping-grounds
in good order, and to protect the route with levies, the cost of upkeep
of the latter being defrayed by Government. An extra sum of
Es. 1,000 fer mensem was also granted as postal subsidy, and Es.
10,000 per annum was allowed in compensation for tolls and taxes,
which the Khan agreed to forego in future. The Khan also received
a present of Es. 25,000 for his services during the relief operations.
The Dir levies, numbering 310 men (subsequently increased to
350 infantry and 40 sowars), were to hold posts at Chakdara,
Sarai, Sado, Eobat, Warai, Darora, Dir, and Kolandi. They are
recruited chiefly from the Malizai Yusafzai, the remainder being
Tarkanri, Utman Khel, and other Pathans. They were at first
provided with Sniders but have since been re -armed with Martini-
Henry rifles.
The Khan of Nawagai was granted an allowance of Es. 6,000
per annum. Arrangements were also made with the kharis and
, „ J ^,1
1 Squadron Cavalry.
maliks of Swat for the maintenance of
1 Mountain Battery. the road through their valley — see Chap-
°^ ^'^'""' '"^
'
^7^rl and fortified posts were built at
ter VIII,
4 Battalions of Infantry. Chakdara and Malakand for the garri-
sons, noted in the margin, which were left to hold those places.
A Political Agency of Dir and Swat was established with head-
quarters at Malakand, and Major H. A. Deane was appointed as
political officer in charge.
 AKOZAl-YUSAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAVR. 553

. e3 .-T '3 — Extinct.

CO

.9

—9 others, all killed.

—Hassan . Hassanzai Isazai, Black Mountain,

a
-I Mahaban, and banks of
—Yakub . Mada Khel Indus.

— Aka . Akazai
—Mami, married
Ayesha . Ashazai
—Ilias —Taji Gadai Gadaizai
1 — Salar Salarzai 5M
—Naso Nasozai

Daulatzai
o CO
CO Chagarzai Malizai, Buncr and Chamla
valley.

Nurizai

o Ranizai . Left bank of river in Lower Swat.

X

Kuz Sulizai
o
CO Baziai ; Left bank.
Babuzai Upper Swat
valley.
Bar Sulizai

Adinzai
Right bank
Sbamozai of Swat
river.
Nikbi Khel

—Sheikb Khel
— Nura Khel Dir and
— Khwajo —Mali
—Nasruddin ci

;i: Pan] -
Khel 5 k o r a
—Sultan Khel valley.
15
Painda Khel

—Sabit
Sebujni >
— Chuna J (
Right bank
river in Up'
—Shamai . Shamizai J per Swat

— Khandak , Khadakzai
i Right bank of river
— Aba . . Abazai in Lower Swat.

Vol. 1. 4B
554 FEONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.
 AKOZAI'TUSAFZAI AND TABKANRI TRIBES OF DIB AND BAJAUR. 555

»»

XI
Q
Ph
Pm
 .. . . ..

APPENDIX C.

Details of Commands and Staff of the Chitral Relief Force.

Divisional Staff.

To Command the Division— Major-General Sir R. C. Low, k.c.b.

Aide-de-Camp . Lieutenant R. B. Low, 9th Ben. Lancers.

Orderly Officer ,, A. A. Irvine, 3rd Bengal Infantry.
Chief Staff Officer Colonel B. Blood, c.b., r.e. (with rank
of Brigadier- General).

Assistant Adjutant General . Lieut.-Colonel J. H. S. Craigie, Highland

Light Infantry.
Assistant Quarter Master Lieut.-Colonel G. H. C. Dyce, 33rd Bengal
General. Infantry.

Deputy Assistant Quarter Captain J. E. Nixon, 18th Ben. Lancers.

Master General, Intelli-

gence.
Intelligence Officer Lieutenant W. R. Robertson, 3rd Dra-
goon Guards.
Colonel on the Staff, Royal Colonel W, W. Murdoch, e.a.

Artillery.

Staff Captain, Royal Artillery. . Captain M. F. Fegen, r.a.

Colo7iel on Staff, Royal Engrs. Brevet- Colonel H. P. Leach, d.s o., r.e.

Adjutant, Royal Engineers . . Captain J. A. Tanner, d.s.o., r.e.

Field Engineer . Major C. C. Ellis, r.e.

Superintendent, Army Sig- . Captain T. E. 0"Leary, Royal Irish Fusi-

nailing. liers.

Principal Medical Officer Surgeon-Colonel T. Maunsell, a.m.s.

Survey Officer Captain W. J. Bythell, r.e.

Inspecting Veterinary Officer • • Veterinary-Major R. Poyser, a.v.d.

Divisional Commissariat Officer Lieut.-Colonel A. G. Yaldwin.

„ Transport Officer . Major C. M. FitzGerald.

1st Brigade Staff.

Comm.anding— • • • Brigadier-General A. A. A. Kinloch, c.b.

Orderly Officer .. . • Captain J. G. Turner, 2nd Ben. Lancers.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant and „ W. E. Bunbury, 25th Punjab
Quarter Master General, Infantry.
( 556 )
 . . ..

APPENDICES. 557

Brigade-Major .. .. Captain H. E. Stanton, D.s.o., r.a.

Brigade Commissariat Officer . . „ R. P. Jackson, Commissariat-

Transport Department.

2nd Brigade Staff.

Commanding— .. •• Colonel H. G. Waterfield (with rank of

Brigadier-General).

Orderhj Officer . . . Lieutenant P. E. Ricketts, 18th Bengal

Lancers.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Captain W. G. Hamilton, East Lane.
Quarter Master General Regiment.
Brigade-Major .. . . Captain A. C. Batten, 2nd Punjab
Cavalry.

Brigade Commissariat Officer. Captain C. G. R. Thackwell.

3rd Brigade Staff.

Commanding— • • • • Brigadier- General W. F. Gatacre, d.s.o.

Orderly Officer '. . . Lieutenant R. G. Brooke, 7th Hussars.

Dejnittj Assistant Adjutant and Captain L. Herbert, Central Lidia
Quarter Master General. Horse.
Brigade-Major . . • Captain G. C. I. Stockwell, Highland
Light Infantr}'.
Brigade Cotnmissariat Officer . . Captain A. B.Williams.

Staff of Divisional Troops.

Brigade-Major . . . Captain G. J. Younghusband, Corps of
Guides.
Commanding Royal Artillery . . Lieut.- Colonel W. Aitken, r.a.
Adjutant, Royal Artillery . . Captain G. C. Dowell, r.a.
Brigade Commissariat Officer. . Captain R. W. Nicholson.

Lines of Communication Staff.

Commanding — • • . . Colonel A. G. Hammond, v.c, c.b., d.s.o.

A.-D.-c. (with rank of Brigadier-

General).

Orderly Officer .. .. Lieutenant E. B. C. Boddam, 2nd Bat-

talion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Brevet-Major S. C. H. Monro Seaforth

Quarter Master General. Highlanders.
Commanding Royal Engineer Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel W. T. Shone,
D.s.o., R.E.

Adjutant, Royal Engineers . . Captain B. B. Russell, r.e.

Principal Medical Officer . . Surgeon-Colonel G. Thomson, i.m.s.
 ..

558 APPENDICES.

Base Commandant, Nowshera Major A. F. Barrow, o.m.g., 12tli Bengal

Infantry.
Road Commandant on the Lines Major F. S. Gwatkin, 13th Bengal Lan-
of Communication. cers.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Captain C. W. Somerset, 12th Bengal

Quarter Master General. Infantry.
Veterinary Officer at the Base . . Veterinary- Captain F. W. Forsdyke,
Ordnance Officers . . Major K. S. Dunsterville, r.a.

„ „ Captain M. W. S. Pasley, R.A.

C. H. L. F. Wilson, r.a.

Reserve Brigade Staff.

Commanding — .. .. Major-General G. N. Channer,. v.c, C.B.
Orderly Officer . . . Captain B. H. Boucher, Hampshire Regi-
ment.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Major H. L. Smith-Dorrien, d.s.o., Derby-
Quarter Master General. shire Regiment.
Brigade-Major .. .. Captain H. H. Dobbie, 30th Punjab
Infantry.
Brigade Commissariat Officer Lieutenant W. T. Vincent.
Brigade Transport Officer . . Captain A. B. H. Northcott, Royal Scots
Fusiliers.

Brigade Signalling Officer . . Captain W. E. M. Norie, Middlesex Regi-

ment.
Field Engineer . . . Major J. W. Thurburn, r.e.
 APPENDIX D.

Strength and distribution of tie Chitral Relief Force on \st May 1895.
560 APPENDIX B—contd.
 APPENDIX E.

Arrangements for the Lines of Communication, Chitral Relief Force, sanctioned

in G. G. 0. No. 478 of 10th May 1895.

Organization. — An officer of the rank of Major-General will command the

Line of Communications from tlie base to the advanced depot. The duties of
the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications will be as de-
fined in the Fiekl Service Manual, Part XI, paragraph 51.
The Hue will be divided into four sections, each in charge of a Road
Commandant :--

1. Base to Khar, about 58 miles.

2. Khar to Mundia Khan, about 42 miles.
3. Mundia Khan to Dir, about 48 miles.
4. From Dir onwards.
The General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications will take
orders only from the General Officer Commanding the Chitral Relief Force.
His powers will be as defined in the Field Service Manual, Part XT, paragraph
52, with the following addendum :

"Detached operations will be conducted entirely under the orders of

the General Officer Commanding the Chitral Relief Force, but
in the event of communication with the latter being, from any
circumstances impracticable, the General Officer Commanding
Line of Communications will assume the command and res-
ponsibility, but he must not himself leave the Line of Com-
munications."
All requisitions that he may make on Brigadier- Generals, or other officers,
for duties on the Line
Communications must at once be complied with.
of
The principal Commissariat Officer of the force and the principal Trans-
port Officer will be under the orders of the General Officer Conmianding the
Line of Communications ; as well as all Commissariat Officers and all Trans-
port Officers, except Brigade Commissariat and Brigade Transport Officers
who are under General Officers Commanding Brigades. The exception to
this will be when Brigade Transport is used on the line apart from the brigades,
and the Transport Officer accompanies it.

All Ordnance Officers and Depots, as they stnnd, will be under the Gen-
eral Officer Commanding the Line of Communications.

( 561 )

Vol I.
4 Q
662 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The Inspecting Veterinary Officer and all other Veterinary Officers will

be under the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communications.

Staff of the Line of Communications.

Oeneral Officer Com- Major-General E. Stedman, c.b.

manding.
Aide-de-Camp . . Lieutenant H. AV. F. Cooke, 24th Punjab Infantry.
Assistant Adjutant and Colonel I. S. M. Hamilton, d.s.o.

Quarter Master Gen-

eral.

Deputy Assistant Adjut- Captain G. V. Kemball, Royal Aitillery.

ant and Quarter Mas-
ter General.

Principal Medical Surgeon- Colonel G. Thomson, Indian Medical Service.

Officer.

Chief Commissariat Lieut.-Colonel A. G. Yaldwyn.

Officer.

Chief Transport Officer Major C. M. Fitzgerald.

Base Commandant ,, A. F. Barrow, C.M.G., 12th Bengal Infantry.
Deputy Assistant Adjut- Captain C. W. Somerset, 12th Bengal Infantry.
ant and Quarter Mas-
ter General at the Base.
Road Commandants Major F. S, Gwatkin, 13th Bengal Lancers.
Brevet-Major S. C. H. Monro, Seaforth Highlanders.

Major G. H. W. O'Sullivan, Royal Engineeis.

„ A. J. Watson, Suffolk Regiment.
Commanding Royal Engi Lieut.-Colonel W. T. Shone, d.s.o., e.e.

neers.

Adjutant, Royal Engi Captain B. B. Russell, e.e.

neers.

Field Engineers .. Major H. E. S. Abbott, e.e., Captain G. Wilhams,

E.E., Captain W. G. R. Cordue, e.e., Captain
H. C. Nanton, e.e.
Assistant Field Engineers Lieutenant A. J. H. Swiney, e.e., Lieutenant A.
Walpole, E.E., Lieutenant H. F. Thuilher, e.e.,

Lieutenant F. F. N. Rees, e.e., Lieutenant S,

D'A. Crookshank, e.e., Lieutenant E. C. Ogilvie,

R.E., Lieutenant H. A. L. Hepper, e.e.

 APPENDIX F.

Agreement with the Khan of Dir.

annex the territory

Whereas the Government of India have no desire to
of the Khan of Dir, but require a road
to be kept open from the Swat valley
behalf of himself and of his successors,
to Chitral territory, the Khan of Dir, on
fully and freely undertakes :—
to Ashreth,
that he will keep open the road from Chakdara
that he will make any postal arrangements required,

that he vnW protect the telegraph on any occasion

when it is put up,
camping-ground
that he will maintain the road, levy posts and
enclosures in good repair, and
that he wdll protect the whole line with levies.
II.— In return for the above considerations the
Government of India
undertake to grant the Khan aof ten thousand rupees a year, and
payment
a present of four hundred Snider rifles with such a supply of ammunition as

may be deemed advisable and they will defray the cost, as may be neces-
;

sary, of the maintenance of the levies.

their part, in con-
Ill —-The Government of India further undertake on
sideration of the accepting the conditions aforesaid and performing
Khan
the services required by them, that they will not interfere
with his adminis-

tration of the country as fixed by its present boundaries.

IV.— In consideration of receiving from the Government of India an

annual payment of 10,000 rupees the Khan and his

of Dir, on behalf of himself

successors, declares that trade passing along the road from

Chakdara to
Ashreth shall for ever be free from all toll or tax within his territories.
v.— The payments for the levies will be made at the end of every month ;

II, and of the

the payment of the allowance to the Khan mentioned in clause
sum mentioned in clause IV in consideration of freedom of trade from taxes,
shall be made in equal half-yearly instalments, one payment in the spring

of the year,and one in the autumn. The first payments on these accounts
will become due on the 1st of April 1896.
VI.— The Khan of Dir, on behalf of himself and of his successors, under-
takes, at any time when the Government of India may
wish to place troops
temporarily on the Laram hill or on the Dusha Khel range, to give sufficient

around for their accommodation upon receiving a fair rent for the site or sites.

Laram : ") (Sd.) MUHAMMAD SHARIF KHAN,

The I2th Sevtemher 1895. 3 Khan of Dir.
( 563 )
4 C2
 CHAPTER XIII.

AKOZAI-YUSAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR—conid.

After the withdrawal of the troops of the Chitral Relief Force

at the end of 1895, the condition of affairs in Dir and Bajaur was
on the whole satisfactory, although there was a certain amount of
unrest among various local factions. The new political arrange-

ments promised to be successful, and the levy system for keeping

open the road through Dir worked well, mails and stores being
passed through to Chitral without interference. Moreover, the
abolition of tolls and taxes gave a welcome impetus to trade.
In January 1896 the Khan of Dir caused some trouble by
invading the Jandol valley but when the British Political Officer,
;

Major H. A. Deane, represented that such interference was likely

to provoke the lasting enmity of the Jandolis, who were in a position
to cause serious trouble on the flank of the Chitral road, he at once
agreed to withdraw his followers. In May, troops proceeded from
India by the Nowshera-Dir road to relieve the garrison in Chitral
which returned by the same route. These movements were com-
pleted without any interference or disturbance on the part of the
tribesmen.
During the autumn the Khan Nawagai, wishing to extend
of

his authority over the Salarzai people of the Babukarra valley,

attacked the Khan of Pashat and seized two of his forts. The Khan
of Dir, with Saiyid Khan of Barwa, also threatened to take part in
the quarrel, but fortunately Major Deane was able to bring about a
settlement which put a stop to further hostilities. During this year
some anxiety was caused by rumours of the return of Umra Khan.
He had been permitted by the Amir, with the consent of the Govern-
ment of India, to proceed on a pilgrimage to Mecca. On his arrival
in India on his homeward journey, the Government had proposed
to grant him an allowance and a residence at Quetta. He, how-
ever, declined this offer and returned to Kabul.
( 56i )
 AKOZAI-YUSAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAVR, 5G5

At the beginning of 1897 it seemed not unreasonable to expect

that the constant strife of former years was now about to be
succeeded by a period of peace and prosperity. It was evident,
however, that such a state of affairs would not be welcomed by the
mullas and others of the priestly classes. These individuals,
besides cherishing a fanatical hatred of all unbelievers, were bitter-
ly opposed to any civilizing influence which might tend to destroy
their supremacy among an ignorant and superstitious people.
Consequently they were intensely suspicious of any advance on
the part of the British, and did their utmost to discourage friendly
relations between the tribesmen and the Government officials.
The Hadda MuUa was known to be inciting the Mamunds and Na^a-
gai clans to join with their neighbours, the Mohmands and Utman
Khel, in a hostile demonstration against us. The Palam Mulla.
also endeavoured to stir up the fanaticism of the people of Dir, and
urged them to attack the troops on their way to Chitral at the time
of the annual reliefs. The Khan of Dir, however, seized and
punished his messenger, and informed Major Deane that he would
presently deal with the mulla himself, who, as he now discovered,
had been tampering with the levies.
There was evidence, too, of Afghan intrigues amongst the
Bajaur clans, and the Khan of Dir received a letter from Kabul
enquiring what action he would take in the event of a general rising
of the Muhammadan tribes. The Sifali Salai\ Ghulam Haidar,
who was still in Asmar on business connected with the demarca-
tion of the Afghan boundary, also caused much mischief by spread-
ing false reports as to the intentions of the Government with regard
to Mohmand territory.

Notwithstanding these indications of unrest, and the undisguis-

ed hostility of the religious leaders, the Chitral reliefs were carried
(.ut in May without any disturbance.

In June the Khan of Dir established his authority over the

tribes on the right bank of the Swat river, and early in the following
month Major Deane received a number of Swati jirgas and effected
a settlement between them and the Khan, which appeared to
^

satisfy all parties. The influence of the Mian Guls, who had been

1 The title of Nawab of Dir was conferred by the Government upon Muhammad
Sharif Khan in recognition of hia friendly services.
566 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

a source of trouble in Upper Swat, was on the wane, and with the
Khan of Dir paramount from the Lowari pass to Chakdara the
safety of the Chitral road seemed to be assured. The attempts of
the ynullas and other intriguers had apparently failed, and the

people appeared to be inclined to settle down to peace and quiet.

About the middle of July, however, a fresh complication
was caused by the appearance of a religious fanatic called MuUa
Mastan or Fakir Sartor, ^ who came to be known later as the Mad
Fakir. This man arrived at Landakai in Swat from Buner, and
in an incredibly short time spread a flame of fanaticism which
culminated in an attack on the posts at Malakand and Chakdara
by a large gathering of Swatis and tribesmen from many of the
neighbouring clans.
This attack and the events in the Swat valley which imme-
diately preceded it have already been described in Chapter VIII.
The Malakand from the 26th July
fighting continued at the
till the 1st Augustand Chakdara, which was attacked at the same
;

time, was not relieved until August 2nd, when the tribesmen were
dispersed after suffering very heavy losses. The original gather-
ing of about 1,000 followers of the Mad Fakir had been increased
during this short period by numerous reinforcements to some 12,000
men at the Malakand and 8,000 at Chakdara. In addition to the
Swat valley tribesmen, the following clans were included among the
enemy, viz., Adinzai, Dush Khel, Ansa Khel of the Talash valley,
a small party of Painda Khel, and contingents from Bajaur, and the
Maidan and Upper Jandol valleys. Sections of the Utman Khel
and Bunerwals and some 2,000 British subjects from Yusafzai
alsotook part in the rising.
The Khan of Dir was away in Kohistan when this fanatical
outbreak occurred, and he had evidently been unwilling or unable
to restrain his people. But though his attitude may have been
uncertain at first, when he saw that the Mad Fakir's attempt was
doomed to failure, he took prompt measures to prove his loyalty
to Government. On the 5th August he reopened communication
with Chitral and held the Panjkora bridge with his own retainers.
He then visited Major Deane at Chakdara and promised to
disarm and punish any of his subjects who had taken part in the
rising.
1 Bare headed.
 AK0ZAI-7USAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 567

The Khan ofNawagai, notwithstanding the efforts of the

mullas and others to turn him from his allegiance, declined to
encourage openly any hostility to Government.
It was soon evident that this was no mere local disturbance,
but rather a preconcerted attempt of the combined tribes to drive
the British from their country. Accordingly on the 30th July the
Government of India issued orders for the despatch of a force to
suppress the rising and to punish the tribes implicated in the
attacks on our troops.

Operations of the Malakand Field Force in Dir and Bajaur.

The composition of this force, which was known as the Mala-
kand Field Force, and was under the command of Major- General
Sir Bindon Blood, k.c.b., has already been given in
Appendix A
Chapter VIII.
The operations of the Malakand Field Force in the Swat valley,
the Utman Khel and Mohmand countries have been fully dealt
with in the chapters referring to these tribes. It is, however, pro-
posed briefly to recapitulate these movements, before dealing in
detail with the operations in Dir and Bajaur.
By
the 8th August the concentration of the force was com-
pleted. The
1st Brigade was at Amandarra, the 2nd at
Malakand
and Khar, and the Keserve Brigade remained at Mardan to watch
the Bunerwals. On this date news was received of an attack
on Shabkadar by the Mohmands, led by the Hadda MuUa. This
attack afforded still further proof of the general
nature of the
fanatical disturbance among the Pathan tribes.
Meanwhile the troops of the Malakand Brigade, which had
been reinforced, had already started operations in the Swat valley
for the punishment of the tribesmen. On the 9th August the
Lower Swatis submitted unconditionally, and on the 17th the 1st
Brigade advanced into Upper Swat, proceeding as far as JVIiangora,
and returned to Thana on the 26th.
It was now decided to postpone the punishment of the
Buner-
wals to a later date and to proceed at once with the coercion of
the
Utman Khel on the left bank of the Swat river. Accordingly on
the 30th August the 2nd Brigade marched down the valley with
this object, and the Ecscrve Brigade was ordered up from
Mardan
and Rustam. At this time, however, events transpired in another
 568 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

portion of the frontier wMcli necessitated postponement of tlie

operations against the Cis-Swat Utman Khel, and the 2nd Brigade
was recalled.
It -will be remembered that the Hadda Mulla's gathering
of Mohmand tribesmen, which attacked Shabkadar, was signally
defeated on the 9th August by a force from Peshawar under
Brigadier- General Elles, and dispersed to the hills. Towards the end
of August, however, the mulla succeeded in collecting a fresh
force, and on the 30th news was received that he was advancing
into Dir in order to retaliate on the Nawab for his friendly
attitude towards the British Government. On receipt of this
information the 2nd Brigade was recalled from Cie-Utman Khel
territory and the 3rd (or Reserve) Brigade under Brigadier-General
Wodehouse was pushed forward to Uch in the Adinzai valley.
This prompt move caused the Hadda Mulla to abandon his
advance towards Dir, and his gathering dispersed. Nevertheless,
on the 3rd September, the Government decided to undertake the
punishment of the Mohmands forthwith and a force of two
;

brigades, under the command of Major -General Elles, was ordered

Advance of Maiakand "Field to advance from the Shabkadar direc-
Force through Bajaur to co- ^-^^^ ^j^-^^ Maiakand
^^^ brigades of the
operate with Mohmand i*ield
'=>

Force. Field Force were to co-operate from the

east, moving through Bajaur, via Sado and Nawagai. The object
of this expedition was to support the Chiefs of Dir and Nawagai
and to safeguard our communication with Chitral, and then, in
conjunction withthe force under General Elles, to break the
power of the Hadda Mulla and crush the hostile gathering in the
Mohmand country.
At this time the attitude of the Panjkora valley tribes caused
considerable anxiety. The Swat valley had natur-
fighting in the

ally given rise to much unrest among them, and they were also
stirred by the general spirit of fanaticism which had spread through-
out the Pathan peoples on the border. Exaggerated reports had
reached them of the Afridi successes in the Khaibar and on the
Samaria range ; and the mullas diligently spread a report that
a jehad, or religious war, had been ordered by the Amir, who himself
intended to take part in it. The movements of the Hadda Mulla
and the activity of the Mohmands also had a most disquieting effect
on the Dir and Bajaur peoples.
 AK0ZAI-7V8AFZAI AND TAEKANBI TRIBES OF DIB AND BAJAUB. 569

It has already been mentioned that the orders of the Govern-

2 squadrons, iith Bengal ment for an advance into BajauT reached
^TotrFieid Battery, Royal ^^^ Bindon Blood on the 3rd September.
Artillery. On the following day a column, as per
f compSes, 22nd Punjab margin, under Brigadier-General Wode-
infantry. house, marched from Uch to Sado with
^ No. 5 Company, Madras -
i i •
t
Sappers and Miners. ordcrs to secure the bridge over the
2 sections, Field Hospitals. Panjkora.
This column was reinforced
on the 5th September by No. Mountain Battery, Eoyal Artillery,
1

the 1st Battalion, West Surrey Regiment (The Queen's), and

No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
It transpired later that this move was only just in time to pre-
vent the seizure of the bridge by the Bajauris and Shamozai Utman
Khel. Information was received that these clans had met in jirga
at Khar (in Bajaur) and had decided to oppose the Government.
The minor Mians of Bajaur and a representative of the Khan of
Nawagai who were present had promised to lend arms and men,
though, as they told the jirgas, they could not themselves join in
active hostilities against the British troops.
The Khans of Nawagai, Jhar, and Khar, when called upon to
explain their conduct, stated that they had been powerless to over-
come the unanimous determination of the Bajaur clans to resist us.
The prompt advance of General Wodehouse's force to the Panj-
kora, however, had anticipated the action of the Bajaur tribesmen
and for the moment frustrated their plans. Consequently they
abandoned the idea of fighting for the present, pending a further
meeting of the clans to reconsider their future policy.
On the 6th September the Shamozai Utman Khel expressed
their willingness to submit to terms, and three days later, on the
arrival of our troops at Ghosam, messages were received from
the Khan of Nawagai and other Bajaur Chiefs offering to assist
the Government.
On the7th September Sir Bindon Blood, with divisional head-
quarters and the 2nd Brigade under General Jeffreys, marched
from Chakdara to Sarai, and on the next day advanced across
the Panjkora to Kotkai. This brigade was equipped entirely with
mule transport five days' rations for men and one day's grain for
;

animals were carried in regimental charge. Mobile seven days' rations

were carried by the Brigade Commissariat. Similar arrangement^
Vol. I,
^ jj
570 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

were made for the 3rd Brigade, except that its transport consisted
chiefly of camels. Fourteen days' supplies were also carried by
the Divisional Commissariat. The 1st Brigade was left to hold
the Swat valley and the line of communications up to Sado it was
:

equipped with camels, carts, and a few mules.

On the 9th September the 2nd Brigade with Divisional Head-
quarters moved to Ghosam. The advance into Mohmand country
was now postponed for three days in order that Sir Bindon Blood
might deal with the Shamozai Utman Khel. A fine of 100 rifles
was demanded from this section, but the time at the General's dis-
posal was not sufficient to allow of punitive measures so as to en-
force full compliance with the terms, and only fifteen breech-
loading rifles and eighty- six guns were given up.
Meanwhile Major Deane, with a cavalry escort, proceeded to
Bettle terms with the Jandolis, and went up the valley as far as
Barwa. The Khans of Mundah, Tor Chandeh, and Shah were sub-
missive and gave up over thirty rifles. But Umra Khan's brothers
and his cousin Abdul Majid Khan, who had also participated
in the rising in Swat, failed to comply with Major Deane's
demand that they should surrender a certain number of rifles and ;

as they had sent away their women and children, it was evident
that they contemplated resistance. They were, however, promptly
seized before they could put these plans into execution, and were
sent under escort to Malakand, where they were detained until
they had complied with the terms imposed.
On the lOth-llth September the 3rd Brigade concentrated
3 squadrons, Guides Cavalry,
at Shakrata, and a portion of the 1st
31st Punjab Infantry. Brigade, as showu in the margin, was

^ No. 5 Company, Madras

moved upto Sado, to guard the Panjkora
Sappers and Miners. bridge and the advanced depot which
was formed Cavalry reconnaissances to the Batai and
there.
Shinai passes met with no opposition and ; on the 12th the
2nd Brigade encamped at Khar (in Bajaur), while the 3rd
Brigade advanced to Shamshak at the southern end of the
Watelai valley. At this place some Mamund and Salarzai maliks
visited the camp, and enquired what were the intentions of
Government with regard to their people, but no representative
jirga appeared on behalf of either of these sections. The maliks
were informed that, as a condition of peace, fifty rifles would be
 AKOZAI'TUSAFZAl AND TARKANRJ TRIBES OF DIB AND BAJAUR. 571

demanded from the Mamunds and forty from the Salarzai. Mean-
while the cavalry reconnoitred the Watelai and Chaharmung
valleys, but except for a few harmless shots from the Mamund
village of Zagai no opposition was encountered.
Sir Bindon Blood now intended to co-operate with the Mohmand
Field Force, by sending Brigadier- General Jeffreys with a portion
of the 2nd Brigade across the Eambat Pass to Butkor and Danisb
Kol, while he himself with the remainder of his force was to move
into Mohmand territory by way of Nawagai. In accordance with
this plan, the2nd Brigade marched from Khar on the 14th September,
and seized the Rambat Pass. Leaving the Buffs and the company
of Sappers and Miners to hold the pass, the General moved the rest
of his troops back to a camp on the right bank of the Chaharmung
stream, about two miles from Markhanai. This village belonged
to the Mandal Utman Khel who had taken part in the fighting
in the Swat valley, and had hitherto made no sign of submission.
The camp near Markhanai was a four-sided entrenchment,
Attack on 2iid Brigade Camp the type usual in frontier warfare.
of
at Markhanai by Mamunds.
^he troops bivouackcd on the perimeter,
protected by a breastwork, while the hospitals, transport, stores,
were placed in the centre. The east face was on the edge
etc.,

of a wide nala about sixty feet deep, with precipitous banks,

beyond which was a stony plain intersected by numerous small
ravines. On
the other three sides was open country, except that,
in a fold of ground, about seventy yards from the west parapet,
some terraced fields sloped down to a nala which ran northwards to
the Chaharmung stream, about 1,200 yards distant.
Shortly after 8 p.m. three signal shots fired by the enemy were
followed by a heavy fusilade from the east, west, and north, which
caused considerable loss among the animals in the centre of the
camp. The troops at once manned their trenches on the perimeter,
and lights and fires were promptly extinguished. The attack,
which was mainly directed on the east face, held by the Guides
Infantry, was replied to by steady volleys, while the battery fired
star shell to light up the enemy's position. The tribesmen made
no attempt to rush the camp, but, utiHzing the cover afforded by
boulders and nalas, to approach to close range, kept up a galling
fire till 10 P.M. Firing now ceased for a time and signal fires were
seen to be lighted at several villages in the Mamund valley.
4D2
572 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

A little before 11 p.m. the attack was renewed with increased

vigour and lasted for about three and a half hours. This time
the main attack was made on the west face, held by the 38th
Dogras. Brigadier- General Jeffreys ordered the Dogras to hold
their fire in the hope that the enemy would attempt a charge ;

but the tribesmen could not be induced to leave the cover of the
broken ground close to the parapet, and accordingly a counter-
attack was ordered. While collecting their men for this purpose,
Captain W. E. Tomkins and Lieutenant A. W. Bailey, 38th Dogras,
were killed, and Lieutenant H. A. Harrington was dangerously
wounded. The attempt was then abandoned, and shortly after-
wards the enemy drew off. The casualties of the 2nd Brigade
during this night attack were two British officers, two sepoys and
two followers killed, one British and one native officer, and nine
other ranks wounded ninety- eight horses and transport animals
;

were also killed or wounded. The enemy consisted of some 400

Mamund marksmen under the leadership of Muhammad Amin of
Inayat Kila, with a few Salarzai, and some men of the Shamozai
and But Khel Ismailzai sections of the Utman Khel. They lost
twelve men killed besides many wounded.
Early next morning Captain E. H. Cole, with a squadron of
the 11th Bengal Lancers, started in pursuit up the Mamund valley,
and, overtaking a party of the enemy near Badan Kot, killed twenty-
one of them, and drove the remainder into the hills surrounding
Badan gorge.Being prevented by the difficult ground from follow-
ing the fugitives any further. Captain Cole withdrew his troopers.
On seeing this, the enemy as usual recovered their courage, and
began to harass the retirement of the cavalry, but as soon as
they observed the approach of supporting troops from Markhanai
they dispersed.
Information of the affair at Markhanai had at once been sent
to Nawagai, and as soon as Sir Bindon Blood had ascertained
beyond doubt that the Mamunds were responsible for this attack
on our camp, he instructed Brigadier-General Jeffreys to take
prompt measures to punish them.
The previous orders for the advance of the 2nd Brigade over
the Rambat pass were accordingly cancelled, and on the 15th
September Brigadier- General Jeffreys concentrated his troops at
Tnayat Kila.
 AK0ZAI-7USAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 573

Meanwhile the 3rd Brigade remained in an entrenched position

at Nawagai, where Sir Bindcn Blood decided to await the advance
of Major- General Elles' force from Peshawar. The reasons for
this course were as follows :—{i) Sir Bindon Blood did not consider
that his single brigade was strong enough to deal with the Hadda
Mulla's following unsupported, or to force their position on the
Bedmanai pass (w) it was inadvisable to join General Jeffreys,
;

since the 2nd Brigade alone was strong enough to carry out the
punishment of the Mamunds, and a retrograde movement in the face
of the hostile Mohmand gathering would have been most unwise,
especially as -the country in rear was intricate and difficult; (m) it
was of the utmost importance that the Khan of Nawagai should be
upheld by our present support for, if left to himself, he would
;

almost certainly have been powerless to resist the pressure brought

to bear upon him to join in active hostilities against the Government.
Reconnaissances were made by the cavalry of the 3rd Brigade
from Nawagai to the Kandara, Ata Khel, and Ambahar valleys.
On the 15th and 16th September cavalry patrols reconnoitred
the Bedmanai pass, which was found to be strongly held by the
Hadda Mulla's forces.
On the 17th news of the fighting in the Mamund valley reach-
ed Nawagai, but the Khan, though strongly urged by his advis-
ers, and by envoys from the Sipah Salar, to turn against us,

remained true to his agreement to assist the Government. His

retainers were employed in preventing any attack on the camp, and
so far had been successful in their efforts. On the 18th communi-
cation was opened up with the Mohmand Field Force under Major-
General Elles, which had reached the Nahaki pass.^ On the 19th
Sir Bindon Blood was directed from Army Head Quarters to pro-
ceed to Inayat Kila, but owing to the situation at Nawagai he was
unable to comply with this order until the 22nd.
On the night of the 19th some 2,000 of the Hadda Mulla's
followers from the Bedmanai pass made an attack on the camp,
but were easily driven off. Our casualties were one man killed
and one wounded. The camp was situated on stony terraced fields
which sloped gently downwards towards the south. To the north
the ground was open. On the east and west faces were deep oialas

\ Vide Chapter XI.

67-4 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

about 150 to 200 yards from the camp, in which the enemy could
collect, and on the west the terraces gave good cover even nearer.
About a mile beyond on either side were steep rocky hills, and from
the western ridge a low spur jutted out eastward to within 1,000
yards camp.
of the
On the 20th a second night attack was made from the north
and north-west by a body of tribesmen under the leadership of
Sufi. Mulla of Batikot who had joined the Hadda Mulla's force.

Information had previously been given by the Khan of Nawagai

that an attack was probable, and accordingly the troops were on
the alert and well prepared.
The attack, which began about 9 p.m., was well carried out by
rushes of swordsmen, covered by a smart fire of small arms and the ;

firino-, with rushes at intervals, sometimes against three sides of

the camp at the same time, went on till about 2 a.m., when the
enemy drew off.
The steadiness of the troops somewhat trying
during this
action was quite perfect, and the safety of the camp was never
in the slightest degree doubtful, although the enemy's swordsmen
were so determined that many of them were shot down close to the
entrenchment. The fire discipline of the infantry was shown to be
excellent the star shells fired by the mountain battery were most
;

useful, and shrapnel and case were also fired at diflterent times with
great effect. Besides the 3,000 engaged in this attack the enemy
had another body of some 2,000 in reserve. Their losses were heavy
and amounted to at least 330 killed, besides a large number wound-
ed, and several leading men were known to have been killed.

On our side the casualties were one man killed, thirty- one
officers and men wounded, including Brigadier-General Wodehouse.
The cavalry were sent in pursuit at daybreak, but the enemy
were not seen. On this date Sir Bindon Blood and Major-General
Elles, Commanding the Mohmand Field Force, met at Lakarai. On
the following day the former proceeded to the Mamund valley,
1st Battalion. Royal West while the 3rd Brigade, as shown in
Surrey Regiment (The Queen's). ^^^ margin, under Command of Lieut.-
'^
22nd Punjab Infantry.
39th Garwhal Rifles. Colonel B. C. Graves, 39th Garhwalis,
1 Squadron luh B L.
No. 1 Mountain Battery, R.A.
marchcd to Kuz Chinarai, and was
'
trans-
^

No. 3 Co., Bo. s. and M. ferred to the Mohmand Field Force, vide
Chapter XI. After taking part in the operations of this Force, the
 — —

AK0ZAI-7U8AFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 575

3rd Brigade marched to Peshawar on the 2nd October, and was

eventually employed with the Tirah Expeditionary Force.
We may now return to the operations of the 2nd Brigade.
On the 16th September Brigadier-General Jeffreys advanced from
Inayat Kila up the Watelai valley. His troops were divided into
three columns as under :

squadron, llth Bengal Lancers.

4 guns, No. 8 Mountain Battery.
!14 companies, The Buffs.
G „ 35th Sikhs.
2 sub-sections, No. 4 company, Bengal Sappers and
Miners.
No. 2, Lieut. -Colonel ^6 companies, 38th Dogras.
Vivian, 38th Dogras. \ 4 sub-sections, No. 4 company, Bengal Sappers and
Miners. •
(

No. 3, Major Campbell, ( 2 companies. The Buffs.

Guides Infantry. Glides Infantry.
) 5 ^^

2 sub-sections. No. 4 company, Bengal Sappers and

Miners.

The plan of operations was as follows :

No. column was to advance along the Kaga pass road to

1

Badalai, destroying the fortified villages of Tanrai, Minar, and

Hazarnao en route. No. 2 column was to move along the eastern
foothills against the villages of Shinkot, Lower Chingai, Dama-
dolah, and Badan, while No. 3 column, moving more or less
parallel with the centre force, was to direct its march towards
Agrah, and deal with the villages met with on the west of the
'

Watelai stream.
Lieut. -Colonel Vivian met with no opposition at Shinkot
or Chingai, and having destroyed these villages, moved on to
Damadolah. Here he found a considerable force of the enemy
holding a strong position. Having decided that without guns his
small force was insufficient to carry the position, he now withdrew,
and was followed up for some distance by the enemy, who were
driven off with loss. This column reached camp at Inayat Kila
at 4 P.M., the only casualties being two men slightly wounded.
Meanwhile the other two columns moved up the valley. At
about 7-30 a.m., the cavalry reported that the enemy were holding
Badan, and Lieut.-Colonel Ommaney, with four companies of
the Buffs and two guns was ordered to dislodge them. The
576 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

enemy evacuated this position without showing fight, and the

Bufis followed them up towards the hills as far as Dabar, leaving
the village of Badan to be destroyed by No. 2 column, which
was expected to come on later. Meanwhile the remainder of No. 1
column pushed on towards Badalai. When nearly opposite the
villaf^e, Lieut.- Colonel Goldncy received a report from the cavalry

that the enemy were collecting in strength from the west.

He accordingly halted and ordered the detachment of the Buffs at
Dabar to rejoin the column. Shortly afterwards, however, the
enemv were reported to be moving off towards the Kaga pass at
the head of the valley. On receipt of this informatiorf Brigadier-
General Jeffreys directed Lieut. -Colonel Goldney to push on
without waiting for the remainder of the Column ; and at the
same time he sent a message* ordering Major Campbell to bring
his detachment up on the left of the centre force. A few of the
enemy who were holding Badalai were quickly driven ofi, and
about 9-30 a.m., Captain Eyder, with IJ companies 35th Sikhs,
moved up the spur to the east of the village to protect the
rio-ht flank. The guns, with IJ companies as escort, also moved up
the on the right of Badalai, while the remainder of the 35th
hill

Sikhs advanced against Upper Chingai. Having cleared this vil-

lage two companies pushed on to Shahi Tangi, which was reached at
10-30 A.M. Here Lieut. -Colonel Goldney halted to await the
arrival of the Buffs. As soon as they perceived that the advance of
the troops was checked, the enemy began to press forward in con-
siderable numbers. Lieut.-Colonel Goldney thereupon ordered
the Sikhs to retire, and the two companies which had advanced
rather far from their supports were hotly attacked as they fell back
towards Chingai.
A body of the enemy advancing across some open ground on
the west threatened to cut off their retreat, but were checked
and dispersed by an opportune charge of the squadron under
Captain Cole. This action relieved the pressure on the Sikhs,
who now turnfed on their assailants and drove them off at the point
of the bayonet.
At this moment the four companies of the Buffs arrived, and
the two sections of the battery came into action on the ridge north
of Chingai. Meanwhile No. 3 column under Major Campbell came
up, and having occupied a position on the right bank of the Watelai
 ;

AKOZAI-YUSAFZAI AND TABKANEI TRIBES OF DIE AND BAJAVR. bl7

stream, checked the advance of a large body of tribesmen who were

crossing from the western side of the valley to reinforce the enemy
at Shahi Tangi. During the retirement of the 35th Sikhs from
that village, Lieutenant V. Hughes and one sepoy were killed and
Lieutenant Cassels and sixteen men wounded.
Shortly after midday the Buffs, with the 35th Sikhs, again
moved forward, covered by the fire of the artillery, to com-
and Shahi Tangi.
plete the destruction of the villages of Chingai
This was successfully accomplished by 2-30 p.m., and appreciable
loss was inflicted on the enemy, who had all the while maintained
a stubborn resistance.
The Brigadier- General now began to withdraw his troops, with
the intention of returning to camp at Inayat Kila.
The flanking party of the 35th Sikhs was still on the high ridge
above Chingai orders to retire had been sent by signal to Captain
;

Ryder earlier in the day, but had failed to reach him. About
3-30 P.M., however, Captain Ryder, observing the retirement of the
main body, began to withdraw his men along the ridge, but in
a direction which diverged from the general line of retreat. As this
party fell back it was hotly assailed by the enemy on all sides
but eventually, with the assistance of the Guides, who most gal-
lantly came to their support. Captain Ryder's men succeeded in
reaching the plain just as darkness set in. During their retirement
the Sikhs had repulsed repeated charges of the enemy's swordsmen
with heavy loss but their own casualties were also severe, and
:

amounted to fifteen killed, three missing, and twenty-four wounded,

among the latter being both the British and two native officers.
Twenty-two Martini-Henry rifles also fell into the hands of the
enemy.
Brigadier-General Jeffreys had halted the covering troops in
order to give Captain Ryder's party time to withdraw, but as soon
as he was assured of the latter's safety, he continued the retire-
ment. At about 7 P.M. the General reached Bilot, where he was
met by four companies under Major Worlledge, who had marched
to his assistancefrom Inayat Kila. This reinforcement was at
once sent to support the Guides, since it was evident
from the
sound of firing that they were still engaged with the enemy. The
BufEs, who were retiring in extended order,
had now reached
Munar, while the battery escorted by the Sappers and Miners
578 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

and a compar^^^^ of the 35tli Sikhs was moving to a position just

north of Bilot.
Seeing that it would be difficult to reach Inayat Kila that night
and being anxious for the safety of the detachments on his right,
Brigadier-Greneral Jeffreys decided to occupy Munar and Bilot.
Darkness had already set in, and in the confusion the order to hold
Munar failed to reach the officer commanding the Buffs, who conse-
quently continued to retire. A
heavy thunderstorm breaking at
this moment added and they
to the difficulties of the troops,
now became separated. The Buffs and the company of the
35th Sikhs, which had lost touch with the battery, made their
way independently to the camp at Inayat Kila, where they arrived
about 9 P.M. Meanwhile the guns with the Sappers and Miners
had mo v^ed on to Bilot, where they were joined by about a dozen
men of the Buffs. General Jeffreys now ordered this small force
to take up a defensive position in the village, part of which was
burning but the enemy rushing up occupied some walls within
;

close range, and poured in a destructive fire causing serious loss in

men and animals. Lieutenant Watson, r.e.. Lieutenant Wynter,
E.A., and several men were wounded, and a number of the battery
mules were hit. The guns fired a few rounds of case, and most
persistent attempts were made by the Buffs and Sappers to clear
the village but their repeated charges, though most gallantly led
;

by Lieutenants Colvin and Watson, failed to dislodge the.^enemy.

Eventually about midnight, the four companies under Major
Worlledge, who had been unable to gain touch with the Guides in
the darkness, arrived at Bilot. With the assistance of this re-
inforcement the tribesmen were quickly driven off, and no further
attack was made on the village during the rest of the night. Por
their gallant conduct in this affair Lieutenants Watson and
Colvin, R.E., and Corporal Smith, East Kent Regiment, received
the Victoria Cross.
The day amounted in all to 2 officers
casualties during the
(Lieutenant Hughes, 35th Sikhs, and Lieutenant Crawford, r.a.)
and 36 men killed, 11 officers, 102 men, and 3 followers wounded.
On the 18th September the 2nd Brigade destroyed the village
of Damadolah, where a large quantity of grain was obtained. During
the operations the enemy kept up a desultory fire from the hills
north-east of the village, and as usual followed up the subsequent
 AKOZAI-YUSAFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIE
AND BAJAUR. 579
retirement, but they were unable to get to close
quarters. Their loss
was not ascertained, but was probably severe on : our side two men
were killed and wounded.
five
On the following day Hazarnao and several other
villages in
that vicinity were destroyed without opposition, and
a large supply
of grain and hJiusa was brought away. At Bilot it was found that
the bodies of seven Muhammadan sepoys,who were buried there
on the night of the 16th, had been exhumed and stripped, but
not
mutilated.
On the 20th the village of Zagai was attacked and
destroyed
without loss. This village belonged to some ex-retainers
of Umra
Khan, who were now led by one Ustaz Muhammad.
During the
withdrawal of the troops, the Buffs were closely pressed by the
enemy while retiring over difficult ground from a spur on the
north-
east. The enemy, however, were driven back with heavy loss,
and
made no attempt to follow up the troops when they reached open
country. Our casualties were four officers (Major Moody,
Captain
Hulke, Lieutenant Power and Lieutenant Keene, East Kent
Regi-
ment) and ten men wounded. During the return march a tower
near Zagadherai, also belonging to Umra Khan's retainers, was
demolished.
The next day was spent quietly in camp at Inayat Kila.
A few shots were fired by the enemy during the night, but no
serious attack was attempted. The village of Dag was next cleared
and destroyed on the 22nd the enemy offered little resistance
;

beyond harassing the rear-guard during the retirement, when one

man was killed and two wounded. On this date Sir Bindon Blood
arrived from Nawagai, escorted by two squadrons of the
11th
Bengal Lancers.
On the 23rd the Brigade destroyed Tangai, about one and a
half miles south-west of Dag. The enemy were seen in large
num-
bers on the surrounding hills, but the excellent disposition
,>i the
Buffs and 35th Sikhs, aided by artillery fire, prevented
them from
seriously interfering with the Dogras and Sappers who
were engaged
in demolishing the defences of the village. On t' 3 completion of
this work the force moved back to camp. Only two casualties
occurred during the day.
On this date the KhanJhar visited the camp and reported
of
that the Mamunds, disheartened by their heavy losses,
were anxious
4E2
580 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

to come to terms. Sir Bindon Blood accordingly agreed to suspend

hostilities for iorty- eight hours to allow the headmen to meet and
arrange matters, and to send in a jirga.
Advantage was taken of this temporary truce to reorganize
the 2nd Brigade, which had suffered considerably from casualties
and sickness. No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, the Buffs, and 35th
Sikhs were sent to the Panjkora, where they were employed on
the line of communications. They were replaced by two squadrons
Guides Cavalry, No, 7 Mountain Battery, R.A., West Kent
the
Regiment, and 31st Punjab Infantry. Supplies were also sent up
from^the Panjkora without interference, and a convoy escorted by
three squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers was forwarded to the
3rd Brigade which had advanced from Nawagai to Kuz Chinarai
to co-operate with the Mohmand Field Force.
To return now to the question of negotiations with the
Mamunds. The tribesmen had been informed that a representa-
tive jirga must attend at Inayat Kila and that a fine of fifty rifles
and Rs. 4,000 would have to be paid before terms could be
discussed. On the 24th September the headmen of Dabar, Badan,
and Upper Chingai brought in Rs. 400 and four fire-arms, and
stated that they were trying to bring about the submission of the
rest of the tribe. It was explained to these men that nothing less

than the complete submission of the whole tribe would be accepted,

and that terms of peace could only be arranged with a full and
representative jirga.
At the request of the khans the armistice was extended for
another twenty-four hours, and on the evening of the 26th a full

jirga came in. They produced fifty worthless jezails and 3,575
Kabuli rupees, the Khan of Jhar standing security for the balance
of the fine. During an interview with Mr. Davis, Assistant Political
Officer, which took place on the next day, their attitude was unsatis-
factory. They were told that must be surrendered as
fifty rifles

a penalty for their share in the attack on our posts in the Swat
valley, and in addition they were ordered to return twenty-two
rifles captured during the fighting on the 16th September. The
jirga at first definitely declined to comply with these demands,
on the ground that " all the world had turned out to take part in
the ghaza at Chakdara," and that the rifles captured on the 16th
had been carried off by men from Afghan territory who had joined
 .

AKOZAI-TUSAFZAI AND TAEKANBI TBIBES OF DIE AND BAJAUR. 581

in the fighting. They refused to give hostages as security for the

return of the rifles, but promised to discuss matters further with
their peopleand give an answer on the next day. The promised
reply, however, was never received from the jirga, and it was after-
wards ascertained that they had not even taken the trouble to make
tlicir fellow tribesmen acquainted with the terms imposed.
Though ostensibly friendly to the Government there is little

doubt that the Khans of Nawagai, Khar, and Jhar secretly en-
couraged the Mamunds to resist compliance with the terms, and
they evidently hoped that, owing to the disturbances which were
taking place in other parts of the frontier, our troops would soon
be compelled to evacuate their country.
Any expectations which might have been entertained as to the
peaceful intentions of the Mamunds were dispelled by reports received
on the 28th. It was even thought that an attack on the camp
would be attempted during the night. The tribesmen, however,
were fully employed in removing their property to the hills in pre-
paration for further fighting. Their main object in securing these
few days' respite had apparently been to gain an opportunity for
sowing their land.
Operations were resumed on the 29th September, when the
following villages were destroyed without opposition — Zagaderai, :

Khalozai, Amanatta, Jangzai, and Kamar.

Shagai, Fifteen
large well-built towers, which formed part of the defences of these
fortified villages, were demolished, and ample supplies of grain,
hhusa, and fuel were taken back to camp.
On the following morning Brigadier- General Jeffreys, with
^ . , ^ , , ^ ,
the troops noted in the mar-
Guides Cavalry 163 sabres.
No. 7 Mountain Battery, R.A. gm, marched up the Valley to
Royal West Kent Regiment 380 Rifles,
attack Agrah and Gat. These
3lst Punjab Infantry . . 385 „ .
^
38tii Dograg . . . 342 „ two villages are situated on
Guides Infantry .. ^64 ,.
the lowcr slopeS of the SpUT
which juts out from Lakra
Total .. 1,391 „

Sar and forms the watershed

between the Kakazai and Upper Watelai Nalas.
As the column approached, a large hostile force was seen on
the ridge to the west of the villages, and numbers of the tribesmen
were collecting from other parts of the valley. The enemy's position
was one of considerable strength. A rocky, precipitous ridge
 -

582 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

divided the space between the two villages, while on either flank
were steep boulder-strewn spurs commanding the ground over
which the troops had to advance. The action was begun by
the cavalry, who, after advancing over very difficult ground for
some distance up the Kakazai Nala, dismounted and opened fire
on a number tribesmen who were coming across from the west.
of
The plan of attack on the two villages was as follows The: —
Guides Infantry were to advance up the spur on the west of Agrah,
which was strongly held the West Kent Eegiment moving on the
:

right of the Guides was to clear some wooded ground south of

Agrah, and then advance to a certain point on the hill in rear of the
village. The 31st Punjab Infantry were detailed to occupy the
rocky ridge between the two villages, and the 38th Dogras were
held in reserve.
The having taken up a position on the right bank of
artillery,

a small nala about a mile and a half south of Gat, opened fire on the
ridge against which the 31st Punjab Infantry were to advance.
Here the enemy, well protected by numerous sangars and huge
boulders, stoutly opposed the attacking troops, and clung des-
perately to their position, until they were finally driven out at the
point of the bayonet. While gallantly leading this attack Lieut.
Colonel O'Bryen fell mortally wounded, and Lieutenant Peacock,
of the same regiment, also received a severe wound.
When Brigadier-General Jeffreys saw that the 31st Punjab
Infantry were hotly engaged, he ordered two companies from the
reserve to support them from a small knoll : mewhat further to
their right, while the battery advanced about half a mile to a second
position whence they could shell the ground east of Gat.
The Guides Infantry, having occupied the spur on the west,
were now fully employed in checking the advance of the enemy on
their front and left flank. Meanwhile the West Kent Eegiment
had gained the slopes above Agrah, and the Sappers and Miners
proceeded to demolish the village. A little later the West Kents
moved across to support the left flank of the 31st, and in so doing
they met with a desperate resistance from the tribesmen, who were
well posted behind sangars and stone walls, which enclosed the
terraced dotted about the hillside. In clearing one of
fields

these sangars Lieutenant Clayton Browne was killed and several

men wounded. Following up this partial success, the enemy's
 AKOZAI-YOSAFZAl AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 583

swordsmen promptly charged the remainder of the party in the

sawgrar and drove them back. Major Western, however, at once
ordered a counter-attack, and the supports led by Captain Styles
made a bayonet charge and dispersed the tribesmen.
Gat village was now partially destroyed, but as the enemy were
observed advancing in large numbers from the direction of Zai,
the officer commanding the West Kents withdrew his battalion.
As soon as the West Kent Regiment was clear of Gat, a gen-
eral retirement was ordered. This was steadily and skilfully car-
ried out, and the Brigade returned to. Inayat Kila at 4 p.jM.
The casualties in this action were two officers and ten men
killed, seven officers and forty-two men w^ounded. The enemy's
losses were severe four leading maliks were killed, and many dead
;

had been left in and near Gat village.

Sir Bindon Blood now determined to strengthen the force in
the Mamund valley with a view to crushing all further resistance as
speedily as possible. He Panjkora for Inayat Kila
accordingly left

on the 2nd October, accompanied by one squadron, Guides Cavalry,

No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, and four companies, 24th Punjab
Infantry. Brigadier -General Meiklejohn was also ordered to follow
with a further reinforcement consisting of the 10th Field Battery,
Royal Artillery,^ No. 5 Company, Madras Sappers and i\Tiners, and
the Highland Light Infantry. This latter column reached Inayat
Kila on the 4th.
Onthe 2nd October the troops of the 2nd Brigade were em-
ployed in foraging, and, after collecting some 1,100 mule loads of
supplies, returned to camp without meeting with any opposition.
On the following day Brigadier-General Jeffreys, with the troops
Guides Cavalry, 2 squadrons, noted in the margin, marched up the
No. 7 Mountain Battery.
^ y^lley towaxds Agrah and Gat.
The
"
guns. " enemy, expecting that the latter village
was to be attacked, collected in the Mils
?l7SbManfr;'""°"'-
38th Dogras. abovc it but on arriving opposite Badalai
:

Guides Infantry.
^^^^^ ^^ ^^ the right and
^^^ ^^^^^^
seizedand destroyed that village, meeting with but little opposition.
During the retirement, however, the enemy came boldly forward

IThe advance of this field battery is marched to Inayat Kila over country
noteworthy. Early in September it moved entirely destitute of made roads and
to the Panjkora over a very difficult road where no wheeled traffic had previously
from toarai to Sado. Four guns now been seen.
584 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

from the direction of Chingai and the villages to the north-west,

and made persistent efforts to surround the flanks, but were
checked by the cavalry and the fire of the covering troops. The
casualties in the 2nd Brigade on this date were two men killed
and seventeen wounded.
At Tnayat Kila. ^^ ^^^ ^^^ October another
Brigade {Brigadier-General MeikUjohn).
1st redistribution, aS showu in
2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry. .
^
24th Punjab Infantry (4 companies). the margin, WaS made Ot
s.

31st „ „ the troops composing the

2nd Brigade {Brigadier-GeneralJeffreys).
Maiakana J^ieiQ
MQlflVflnrl "F'iplrl Forpp
.POrCC.
Royal West Kent Regiment.
38th Dogras. The Mamunds being now
Guides Infantry.
aware oi the arrival oi£ xiresh
•
s. ±.\. i,
i
^ .

Divisional Troops.
, ^
. . ,

10th Field Battery, Royal Artillery (4 guns). trOOpS, and reCOgmSing that
No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Ax^iiiery.
^^lq Government was deter-
No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery (4 guns).
Guides Cavalry. mined to bring about their
s^b^ission at all costs, re-
No:5^°T''^'SZs^T'''T'^^^T''
On the line of communications— quested the Khan of Nawagai
1 squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers. to intercede, and arrange
1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment. t T
16th Bengal Infantry. terms o± peace. Accordingly
20th Punjab „ q^ -^j^g recommendation of
21st „ „
24th „ „ (4 companies). Maj or Deane, who had arrived
35*^Sii^^^-
at Inayat Kila, hostilities
were suspended in order to allow the khans to reopen negoti-
ations with the tribesmen. Foraging parties were, however, still
sent out daily, and on the 6th October the cavalry had a slight
skirmish with the enemy
which a duffadar was wounded ; but
in
after this date no further shots were fired in the valley.
In consideration of the heavy losses which they had suffered in
killed and wounded, and by the destruction of their villages, and
the confiscation of grain and supplies, the terms originally imposed
were somewhat reduced. The Mamunds were now required to make
complete submission, but were only asked to return the twenty- two
rifles taken from our troops. They were warned that if they failed
to comply with these final terms, the Khan of Nawagai would be
authorised to occupy the whole valley and seize their lands.
This time the Mamunds appeared to be in earnest in their
desire for peace they sent away their allies who had come from
:

beyond the limits of the Watelai valley, and picquetted the ap-
proaches to our camp in order to prevent night firing by any possible
 AK0ZAI-7V8AFZAI AND TAREANSI TBIBE8 OF DIB AND BAJAUB. 585

malcontents. The re8titution of the rifles and the final settlement

were, however, delayed by intrigues from the Afghan side.
Messengers from the Sipah Salar crossed the border and urged the
tribesmen not to give up the arms ammunition was also being
;

forwarded from Kabul, and two mule loads were reported to have
been received on the 8th October. Eventually, however, the
tribesmen were persuaded to surrender the rifles which had been
demanded, and on the 11th October the Mamund jirga came into
Nawa Kila, about half a mile from the British camp.
The tribesmen were received in durbar by Sir Bindon Blood,
and stated make complete submission and
that- they desired to
secure a lasting peace they also added that they had only fought
;

against us in order to prevent the annexation of their country, which

they greatly feared. A written statement was then given them to
the effect that Government did not contemplate any such action,
provided that the behaviour of the tribe was satisfactory and they
continued to abide by the terms of their agreement. They were
further assured that, although the question of the Afghan boundary
line cutting through their land could not be discussed, no inter-
ference on the part of Afghan officials would be permitted in the
portion of their territory which lay within the British sphere of
influence.
The jirga appeared to be well satisfied with their reception
and with the assurances given to them, and promised faithfully
to observe the terms of settlement. They also agreed to expel
Ustaz Muhammad and other adherents of Umra Khan from their
valley.
The operations against the Mamunds were thuB brought to a
close, and on the following day the troops evacuated the Watelai
valley and marched to Jhar.
From the 14th September to the 11th October the casualties
in the 2nd Brigade were 6 officers killed, 24 wounded, 55 non-com-
missioned officers and men killed and 194 wounded 135 horses
:

and mules were killed and wounded or otherwise lost. The enemy's
losses during the period were estimated at 300 killed and 250
wounded and they suffered severe punishment in the destruction of
property and loss of grain and fodder.
In his report on the operations in the Watelai valley Sir Biadon
Blood attributed the difficulties experienced in overcoming the
VOL. I. °j,
586 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

resistance of the Mamunds to the following causes. The invasion

of the valley was preceded by no decisive action which might
have served as an object lesson to make the tribesmen realise
our strength, while the physical features of their country gave
the enemy many advantages which they utilised with no little
tactical skill. Owing to the absence of water in the low-lying open
country, many of the villages were situated near the rivulets in
the lower slopes of the surrounding hills. Here the ground was in-
variably steep, broken, and very difficult. In retiring before the
advance of our troops, closely following them up during the
and
inevitable retirement they reached open country, the tribesmen
till

chose the only tactics which could give them any measure of suc-
cess. The fact that part of their lands lay in Afghan territory was
a further advantage, in that they could easily remove much of their
property beyond our reach.
The stubborn defence of their country in spite of continuous
losses, gained for the Mamunds a well deserved reputation for
bravery and good fighting qualities.
On the 13th October the troops under Sir Bmdon Blood moved
to Mattashah, three miles north of Jhar in the Babukarra valley
in order to bring about a settlement with the Salarzai Tarkanri.
Although the Salarzai were implicated in the general rising,
Settlement with the Salarzai they had taken uo Very active part in the
Tarkanri, October 1897.
actual fighting and had not as a section
combined with the Mamunds against us. Moreover, since the
advance of the troops through Bajaur, they had abstained from
any interference with the line of communication. It was therefore
considered that a sufficient punishment would be infficted by a fine
of 20 rifles and 200 other fire-arms. The attitude of the Salarzai
was at first uncertain they were divided by internal feuds and the
;

difficulty in arriving at a settlement was increased by the action

of the Khan of Nawagai, who, in order to further his own designs
upon their valley, was only too anxious to involve the inhabitants
in hostilities with Government. After much discussion the Salarzai
decided to submit but a quarrel ensued between the Upper and
;

Lower Salarzai as to the distribution of the fine, and, as they

failed to agree, hostilities appeared to be imminent. Major Deane
thereupon solved the difficulty by dealing with the Upper Salarzai
separately, and on the 18th October they surrendered 100 guns
 AK0ZAI-TU8AFZAI AND TARKANRI TRIBES OF DIR AND BAJAUR. 587

which were accepted as full compliance with the terms, since it

was known that they possessed no rifles. On the following day the
Lower Salarzai also submitted they handed over 100 fire-arms and
;

ten breech-loading rifles and gave security for the remainder.

During their stay at Mattashah the troops thoroughly recon-
noitred the Babukarra valley. Snipers fired nightly into camp
although it was protected by tribal picquets. Little damage was
done, but on the 19th some twenty shots were fired and a sowar was
wounded. As the jirga stated that this outrage was instigated by
a recalcitrant malih, his villages and towers were destroyed by the
troops and his lands were confiscated by the jirga.
On the 20th October the troops moved to Jhar and on the
;

following day a Shamozai Utman Khel jirga came in and made

submission. They surrendered tvrenty rifles and thirty-five other
fire-arms ; as they had already given up a number of arms in Sep-
tember at Ghosam, and had since then assisted us by guarding the
line of communication, this was now accepted as a full compliance
with the terms imposed. On the 22nd October ^he Jandolis also
brought into Ghosam the balance of rifles due from them.
The last of the troops crossed the Panjkora river on the 23rd
Withdrawal of troops from and four days later the whole force re-
Bajaur and Dir. turned to the Swat valley.
The following rewards were granted to the three Mans who
had assisted the troops during the operations in Bajaur viz., to the
;

Khan of Nawagai, Rs. 10,000 to the Khan of Khar, Rs. 3 500

; •

and to the Khan of Jhar, Rs. 2,500.

After undertaking operations against certain other tribes as
described in previous chapters, the Malakand Field Force was
broken up on the 19th January 1898. But in order to ensure the
safety of our communication with Chitral a movable column
wag
the Swat valley and the defences of the posts at Malakand
left in
and
Chakdara were strengthened.
The Indian Medal, 1895, with clasp inscribed '' Punjab Frontier
1897-98," was granted to the troops employed in the
operations
in Bajaur and in the Mamund country.
The subsequent events in Dir and Bajaur, after the withdrawal
of the Malakand Field Force, may now be briefly
described.
The Chitral reliefs were successfully carried out during
the
month of May 1898. Later in the year the Chiefs of
Dir and
588 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Nawagai renewed their quarrel over the possession of the Jandol

valley but eventually a settlement was agreed upon. The
;

Nawab of Dir retained possession of Jandol, in return for which

he paid to the Khan of Nawagai a sum of Rs. 20,000 and aban-
doned all his claims in the Babukarra valley. For the next
two years affairs in Dir and Bajaur remained quiet, though the
Khan of Nawagai had some difficulty in maintaining his position
in the face of constant internal quarrels among his people. To
assist him in holding his own his subsidy was increased by Rs.
5,000 annually, and he received a present of 10,000 rounds of
ammunition. During 1901 and 1902 the Khan
Nawagai became
of

embroiled with the Salarzai of the Chaharmung valley and with

the Mamunds, and the Nawab of Dir was only dissuaded from
espousing the cause of the Khan against the latter section by the
intervention of the Political Agent.
In the beginning of 1904 there was considerable friction between
the Nawab of Dir and the subject tribes on the right bank of the
Swat river, who complained of the oppressive rule of the Chief.
The Adinzai were especially dissatisfied and were again anxious
to secure the protection of Government, which they had previously
requested in 1895. A settlement, however, was effected by the
Political Agent, and the Nawab of Dir, being warned that any
a(^<^re8sive action against the Swat tribes would be displeasing

to Government, abandoned his intention of coercing them. .Later

in the year a quarrel arose between the Nawab's two sons in Jandol.
Mian Gul Jan, the younger son, who some time previously had
been deprived of his governorship in the Adinzai valley, was now
expelled from Mundah by his elder brother Auranzeb (better
known as Badshah Khan) and fled to Nawagai. This Mian Gul
Jan, son of the Muhammad Sharif Khan of Dir, must not be confused
with the titular Mian Guls, who are descendants of the Akhund
of Swat.

On arriving at Nawa^^ijai, Mian Gul Jan persuaded the Khan

to help him, and invade Jandol but the attempt was foiled by
;

Badshah Khan, who defeated the Nawagai lashkar. In December

Muhammad Sharif Khan suddenly died, and was succeeded by his
son Badshah Khan. Mian Gul Jan was then in Swat, where he was
detained by the Khan Khel jirga and subsequently he went to
;
 AKOZAI-YUSAFZAI AND TAEKANRl TRIBES OF DIE AND BAJAVR. 589

Peshawar on the invitation of the Chief Commissioner. Badshah

Khan's succession was recognized by the people of Dir and the
tribes on the right bank of the Swat but some trouble was caused
;

by Saiyid Ahmad Khan of Barwa, who seized the fort of Tor and
endeavoured to oust Badshah Khan from the Jandol valley. Fail-
ing in his first attempt Saiyid Ahmad withdrew to Bajaur, where
he prevailed upon the Khans of Nawagai and Khar to assist him
'
against the new ruler of Dir.

Late in December the combined forces of these three allied

Chiefs invaded Jandol and occupied Barwa, Maiar, f.nd Gambir.
At the latter place 200 rifles which had been presented by Govern-
ment to the late Nawab of Dir were seized. Matters were now
further complicated by the action of the Salarzai and Mamunds
who attacked the Chief of Nawagai's nominee, Saminulla Khan
of Pashat. They had been induced to create this diversion by
Muhammad Ali, eldest son of the Khan of Nawagai, who had
quarrelled with his father and had gone over to the side of the
Khan The attack on Pashat was repulsed by Saiyid
of Dir.
Ahmad, who moved a force into Babukarra from the Upper Jandol
valley, and at the end of January 1905 a truce was arranged
between the Chiefs of Dir and Nawagai, and the forces dispersed.
The Dir tribesmen were dissatisfied with the Chief for not having
expelled the Bajaur Khmis from Jandol, while the Ibrahim Khel
Salarzai were equally discontented, since the only result of their
enterprise was to establish Saiyid Ahmad in possession of Arif,
Gambir, and Tor. It seemed probable therefore that a struggle
would soon be renewed between this latter section and the Mast
Khel for the possession of the Jandol valley.
. On the 15th April a durbar was held by the
Chief Commissioner
of the North -West Frontier Province for the formal installation
of Badshah Khan as Khan of Dir. The durbar was attended by
all the notables of Dir and Upper Swat, including the Mian Guls.
An agreement was made with the Khan, defining his obligations
towards the Government, and granting him the same allowances
as had been paid to his father. The Khan also consented to give
an allowance of rupees 5,000 a year, and certain revenues, to
his brother Mian Gul Jan, on condition that he did not return
to Dir.
590 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Little more than a month, however, had elapsed when Mian

Gul Jan, brealdng his engagements, escaped from Peshawar and
appeared in Bajaur. Here he soon collected a following, and,
having allied himself with Saiyid Ahmad, advanced against Badshah
Khan with some 3,000 men. The Khan of Dir was outnumbered
and the combined Bajaur forces succeeded in reaching the Maidan
valley. As the defeat of the Khan of Dir, which now seemed
probable, would have upset the arrangements for the security of the
Chitral road, the Swat Valley Moveable Column was concentrated at
Chakdara at the end of May with a view to supporting him. At
this time Badshah Khan was reinforced by some Dir levies under
Sardar Khan, ex- Khan of Bandai, and with the aid of the moral
support afforded by the advance of the British troops he was
enabled to hold his own. He now made terms with his brother and
gave him the Khanship of Mundah. Mian Gul Jan had by this time
discovered that Saiyid Ahmad was playing him false and had no
intention of sharing the profits of his successes either in Maidan or
Jandol. Saiyid Ahmad shortly afterwards withdrew his force from
Maidan and the Khans of Nawagai and Khar, who had again
;

attacked Jandol, also evacuated that valley. On the 12th June

Saiyid Ahmad and Mian Gul Jan, with the jirgas of the tribes con-
cerned, came to Chakdara, and a settlement of the Dir-Bajaur
dispute regarding the Jandol valley was arrived at.
The boundary between Jandol and Dir was defined Mundah :

was assigned to Mian Gul Jan, and Saiyid Ahmad Khan retained
possession of Barwa, Tor, and Gambir. The conditions, which are
given in Appendix G, were to hold good for two years, during which
time the chiefs promised to maintain a truce.
The settlement, however, is by no means entirely satisfactory,
and it is not improbable that the struggle for the possession of the
Jandol valley may be renewed at' some future date. The Shahi
Bibi, widow of the late Nawab of Dir, who espoused the cause of
her favourite son Mian Gul Jan, and was the chief instigaoor in the
previous quarrel, is said to be still busily intriguing against Badshah
Khan. Although it matters little to the Government which chief
eventually establishes his claim to the rulership of the Jandol
valley, it is utmost
of the importance to prevent any disturbance
among the Dir and Bajaur tribes which might threaten the security
of our communication with Chitral.
 AEOKZAI-YVSAFZAI AND TAEKANUl TBIBES OF DIB AKD BAJAVB. 591

In December 1905 the Khans of Dir and Nawagai attended

a durbar at Peshawar, and were presented to His Koyal Highness
the Prince of Wales.
Disagreements between the Nawab of Nawagai and his eldest

son caused further disturbances in Bajaur during 1906, but the situ-

ation is now (1907) quiet for the moment.

End of Volume I.
 L^i"

L
 University of California Library
Los Angeles
This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.

f^fif^\^-^^ ^'^

31
V. K 'nS.- ii i: fSmilM

JUL 2 3 2003

BUt 2 WKS Pi^OiVl L'ATh KtCtlVbD

M
JCLA ACGu^jo
ImtRMi^brary Loans
lieao UnfVersity Rlesearch Library
9D0C 951575
lO« Angeles. CA $0095-1575

4 2003
^ECDVRL ,-.uS:
 L 005 487 417 7

D 000 435 426 2