FILED ZOUMER IS. aM 84g BARBARA A. wi: COURT OR COMMON TEENS ENF devon a STATE OF OHIO, z (CASE NO.: 2023-CR-00407 z Judge Richard P. Ferenc DECISION AND ENTRY ON CHAD C. DOERMAN, DEFENDANT’S MOTION NO. 42 Defendant. Defendant’s most recent motion, filed January 12, 2024, is captioned: “Defendant’s Motion #9 to Suppress and In Limine” (the “MTS”).' A hearing on the MTS was held February 21, 2024. The Defendant was present in court. His counsel and counsel for the State were present as identified on the record. At the close of the hearing, the Court directed defense counsel to submit a written closing argument by February 28, 2024, The State was directed to submit its written closing argument by March 7, 2024. The Defendant’s written closing argument was timely filed on February 28, 2024? The State’s written closing argument was timely filed on March 7, 2024. Pertinent Factual Background ‘The Defendant is alleged to have killed his three young sons, ages 7, 4, and 3, on June 15, 2023. All were shot and killed at their family’s home on Laurel-Lindale Road, in a more rural, southeasterly area of Clermont County. It is also alleged he seriously wounded another child and his wife. The Defendant was apprehended at the scene and immediately taken into custody. He was secured in the back seat of a Deputy Sheriff's SUV cruiser that was parked along Laurel-Lindale Road, some distance from the actual crime scene. He remained in this cruiser for about 50 minutes until he was transported from the scene to the Sheriff's office in Batavia, Ohio. ‘A Clermont County grand jury returned a 21 count indictment against the Defendant on "The correct number of this defense motion, in sequence with all other defense pretrial motions filed as of January 12, 2024, is 42, not 9. The Court, sua sponte, amends the caption to correspond to this correct number. The Defendant's Motion No. 9 is actually captioned: “Motion for Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Evidence.” The entry determining this motion was joumalized on November 21, 2023. 2 The defense errantly captioned this written closing argument as: “Defendant's Post-Hearing Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and In Limine.” (Emphasis added.) 1June 22, 2023. He stands indicted on nine counts of aggravated murder, each coupled with three capital aggravating circumstances, eight counts of kidnapping, and four counts of felonious assault. ‘The Hearing ‘The State presented six witnesses: Sheriff's deputies Chad Popham, Jeffrey Rudd and Melissa Schmees; Sheriff's detective Michael Ross; Renae Butcher, a social worker employed by Child Focus, Inc., who provides her professional services primarily for inmates within the county jail; and Amy Griffin, a nurse employed by the private medical provider who provides medical treatment for inmates within the county jail. The State also admitted, without objection from the Defendant, the following exhibits: Exs. 1, 1AL, and 12, are audio-video recordings captured by Dep. Popham’s body worn camera (“Popham’s BWC”) on June 15, 2023, while at the scene; Exs. 2A and 2B, are audio-video recordings captured on Dep. Rudd’s body worn camera (“Rudd’s BWC”) on June 15, 2023, while at the scene and in transit with the Defendant to the Clermont County Sheriff's Office upon leaving the scene; Ex. 3 is a copy of the “Miranda Advisement Card” (the “Rights Card”) used by Det. Ross prior to his interrogation of the Defendant at the Sheriff's office; Exs. 4A and 4B are the audio-video recordings of the Defendant's custodial interrogation at the Sheriff's office on June 15, 2023 (the “Custodial Interrogation”); Ex. 5 is the audio-video recording regarding Ms. Butcher’s interview with the Defendant on June 16, 2023, in the Defendant’s cell at the county jail (the “Butcher Interview”); and Ex. 6 is the audio-video recording of Ms. Griffin’s medical examination and interview of the Defendant on June 17, 2023, in the Defendant's cell at the county jail (the “Griffin Exam”). The Defendant did not testify and the defense called no witnesses and presented no other evidence of any nature at the hearing ‘The MTS ‘The MTS is directed only to statements made by the Defendant after he was transported from the scene and initially interrogated at the Clermont County Sheriff's office and then transferred to the county jl. There are essentially three instances of custodial statements obtained from the Defendant the MTS challenges. The first instance is the Custodial Interrogation that took place in a small interview room at the Sheriff's office on June 15, 2023. The second instance is the Butcher Interview that took place on June 16, 2023, in the Defendant's jail cell after he was transferred from the Sheriff's office. Ms. Butcher is a mental health social worker employed by a private entity, Child Focus, Inc. Her interview related to the potential mental health issues of the Defendant at that time.‘The third instance, the Griffin Exam, occurred on June 17, 2023, also in the Defendant’s jail cell. ‘his third instance was initiated by the Defendant as he was complaining of chest pains and requested ‘medical attention. These statements were elicited solely in response to nurse Griffin’s questions related to his claims of chest pains. ‘The Defendant raises a number of claims as to each of these three instances. The Court will address each instance separately and address facts relative to each accordingly. The Custodial Interrogation The Defendant raises a number of claims regarding the Custodial Interrogation, conducted primarily by Det. Ross, at the Sheriff's office on June 15, 2023. The Court summarizes these claims as follows: 1. Det. Ross failed to properly advise the Defendant of his pre-custodial interrogation rights as enunciated by Miranda v, Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 [Link]. 1602, 16 [Link].2d 694 (1966) and its progeny (the “Miranda Rights”); 2. A valid waiver of the Defendant’s Miranda Rights was not obtained because “Mr. Doerman was never presented with a written copy of his rights.” (MTS, p. 2) 3. A valid waiver of the Defendant's Miranda Rights was not obtained as Mr. Doerman was never asked to sign a written waiver. (MTS, p. 2); 4, The Defendant unequivocally invoked his right to counsel, yet the Custodial Interrogation continued thereafter unabated; and 5. The detectives employed “outrageous police conduct” (MTS, p. 13) during the Custodial Interrogation to such an extent that the will of the Defendant was overcome, thereby rendering any statements made during the Custodial Interrogation involuntary. (MTS, p. 9) The second and third claims, as set forth above, are without merit. In Jn Re T:D.S.,__ Ohio St.3d __ Slip Opinion 2024-Ohio-595, __N.E.3d__, at P19, the court reaffirmed the following well-settled principle of law regarding these claims: ‘After reading the Miranda warnings to T.D.S., Detective Reese asked whether he understood them. T.D.S. nodded his head and continued to answer the detective’s questions. TD.S. points out that he was not given a written copy ‘of the wamings and that he did not sign a waiver, but there is no requirement that a waiver be written. State v. Myers, 154 Ohio St.3d 405, 2018-Ohio-1903, 114 N.E.3d 1138, P68.The fifth claim, as set forth above, is also without merit. As will be addressed in more detail below, Exs. 4A and 4B are the audio-video recordings of the Custodial Interrogation of the Defendant. ‘These two recordings total approximately three hours and eleven minutes. However, between these two recordings, there is approximately one hour when the Defendant was sitting in the interview room and no interrogation was taking place. Thus, the real time the Custodial Interrogation took place was just alittle over two hours. The interview room was a small, windowless room, perhaps 8” x 12’. There is a small desk in the right front comer with a chair. Mr. Doerman sat in a padded, cushioned, straight-backed chair next to the desk. There is another chair in the rear comer of the room where another officer could sit. In State v. Garrett, 171 Ohio St.34 139, 2022-Ohio-4218, 216 N.E.3d 569, at $101, the court held: Ifa defendant challenges a confession as involuntary, the state must, prove a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US. 157, 168-169, 107 [Link]. 515, 93 [Link].2d 473 (1986). Voluntariness of a confession is determined by ‘the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.” State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N-E.2d 1051 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus. A waiver will not be deemed to be involuntary ‘unless there is evidence of police coercion, such as physical abuse, threats, or deprivation of food, medical treatment, or sleep.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-4575, 999 N.E.2d 557, P35. ‘The Defendant's claims regarding the issue of police coercion are separated into two categories, by and large. The first category relates to the Custodial Interrogation. Arguments primarily related to this, category are set forth at section I, Interrogation, at subsections A., i, i., and iii, of his memorandum at pp. 1-9. ‘The second category relates to the Butcher Interview and the Griffin Exam. The arguments and analysis relative to this category start at section II: Mr. Doerman’s Police-Recorded Statements, at subsections A., B.,C.,D., and E. of his memorandum, at pp. 10-18. Candidly, in these sections there is a blend of claims, some of which are tied more to the Custodial Interrogation than the latter two police recorded statements. Others appear more related to the two police recorded statements and not the Custodial Interrogation. As to the Custodial Interrogation, at p. 9 of the MTS, the defense argues:However, the individual circumstances of a suspect can make some, perhaps less obviously coercive conduct cross the line and the resulting confession involuntary. See, ¢.g., Katz, Ohio Arrest, Search and Seizure, (2023) §21:3, pp 811-815. The Court, in assessing the voluntariness of a confession, should look at the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the individual suspect. See, e.g. Ashcraft v. State of Tenn., 322 U.S. 143, 154, 64 [Link]. 921, 88 [Link]. 1192 (1944) and Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239, 60 [Link]. 472, 84 [Link]. 716 (1940). It is submitted that the totality of the circumstances here, including Mr. Doerman’s mental condition, show that the Detectives’ actions overcame his will and his admissions were therefore involuntary. (Emphasis added.) However, there is no evidence before the Court as to the Defendant’s mental condition during the Custodial Interrogation. Again, the Defendant did not testify nor did he present any other evidence to even suggest what his mental condition was at that time. The defense did not cross-examine the interrogating detectives to ascertain their opinions of the Defendant's mental condition during that process. Further, the defense does not elaborate or identify what evidence constitutes the “totality of the circumstances” relative to the above claim. A court is not required to scour the record for evidence to find support for a movant’s argument. Krlich v. Clemente, 11% Dist. No, 2015-T-0089, 2017-Ohio-7945, 4 17. Nevertheless, the Court considers the following claims, raised by the Defendant in his memorandum at section II B., Police Coercion, to be asserted to challenge the legitimacy of the Custodial Interrogation. At p.13, the following claims are set forth: In this case, the totality of the circumstances include: Chad Doerman was in jail. He had no power, no agency in the situation; no one in his position would reasonably think otherwise. At least one CCSO officer threatened him prior to this. Det. Schubert said, outside the cruiser where Mr. Doerman was sitting, loud enough to be heard, “Is that the Motherfucker?” “Yeah.” “Shut the door so I don’t fucking kill him” CCSO detectives had previously ignored his requests for counsel. Detectives used coercive tactics during the interrogation of June 15%, including Detective Ross comparing him to a monster. His mental state was such that he could not make a knowing, intelligent or voluntary consent to police being present ~ had he been asked. He was in no condition to object to their presence.He was not informed of the recordings and did not know police were recording the conversations. ‘The outrageous police conduct herein should not be countenanced. ‘The Court will address each of these claims as listed. ‘That the Defendant was in jail is certainly correct. That he had “no power, no agency in the situation and no one in his position would reasonably think otherwise” is nothing more than an ipse dixit, self-serving conclusion of counsel. This is not evidence of physical abuse, threats, deprivation of food, ‘medical treatment or sleep that constitutes police coercion. Garrett, supra, at] 101. While at the scene and walking along Laurel-Lindale Road to his separate cruiser, Det. Schubert ‘walks past the cruiser holding the Defendant. He did utter the profane words and veiled threat as set forth above. But, the claim he uttered these words, “loud enough to be heard,” begs the question-by whom? ‘There is no allegation that the Defendant heard them and no evidence was adduced at the hearing that he did, The Court has reviewed Rudd’s BWC that recorded these words. Det. Schubert was walking at a ‘normal pace as he was going to his cruiser. As he approached Rudd’s cruiser with the Defendant in the back seat, he was about 6 -7 feet away from and along the driver’s side of the cruiser. He did not stop walking and go over to the Defendant and utter these words. He kept walking away from Rudd’s cruiser. ‘These statements may have taken 4 to 7 seconds to utter and they were uttered in a normal, conversational tone. He did not shout these words in the Defendant’s direction. At the time he uttered these words, there ‘were other deputies standing in the same area. There was ambient police radio conversations close to the detective and the Defendant that can be heard when the words were uttered. The rear door of Rudd’s ‘cruiser was only partially ajar and the window was only down about halfway. Just prior to Det. Schubert's walk-by, Dep. Rudd had tumed up the air conditioning in his car as the Defendant complained it was “hot as hell,” increasing the noise level inside Rudd’s cruiser. The Court finds it most unlikely that the Defendant could have even heard these words. And, during the final 40 minutes of the Custodial Interrogation, Det. Schubert enters the interview room for the first time. He is wearing the same clothing as he wore during his walk-by. The Defendant gave no indication that he recognized Det. Schubert; that he had seen him while in Dep. Rudd’s cruiser; or had heard Det. Schubert’s statements. Absent any ‘evidence that the Defendant actually heard these statements, this is not evidence of physical abuse or a threat as a means to gain a confession during the Custodial Interrogation, nor any of the other factors Garrett found to constitute police coercion. Id. ‘The claim that CCSO detectives had previously ignored his requests for counsel appears to be more related to the police recorded statements and not to the Custodial Interrogation. That the detectives ‘may have ignored his request for counsel will be more thoroughly addressed below. But, standing alone, this claim is not evidence supportive of the factors of police coercion as set forth in Garrett, supra.The first clause of the claim that “[d]etectives used coercive tactics during the interrogation of June 154” is just another example of an ipse dixit, self-serving claim of the Defendant. There is simply no identification by the Defendant of any specific coercive actions, consistent with the requirements set forth in Garrett, that are present here to support this claim. ‘The second clause of this claim is accurate in that the detectives used the term “monster” while interrogating the Defendant. But the timing and context of the use of this term belies the Defendant's contention here. State's Ex. 4 captures the Custodial Interrogation from its inception, about 5:51 p.m. on June 15, 2023. This video runs for about two hours. State’s Ex. 4B picks up when Ex. 4A stopped recording. Ex. 4B runs for about one hour and 12 minutes.’ The word monster is first uttered by Det. Ross in Ex. 4B, at approximately [Link] and again at [Link]. In this same exhibit, at [Link], Det. Ross states that “I haven't lied to you [the Defendant), don’t lie to me.” At [Link], Det. Ross tells the Defendant that “I have been nothing but kind to you.” The Defendant responds to this statement at [Link], stating, “I know and I respect you sir.” The interrogation continues and at [Link] 52 and at [Link], Det. Ross uses the word monster the last two times. The Court has reviewed this portion of the Custodial Interrogation a number of times. Without going into the details of how this word made it into the interrogation, the Court finds that it was a reasonable use of the word in response to certain statements the Defendant made about himself and his personal characteristics during the interrogation. The use of this word was very limited, only spoken four times, and they were not uttered in any threatening or overbearing tone, Consequently, the Court finds that uttering this word four times was not so overbearing or coercive that the Defendant's will was overcome. Thus, the use of this word is not evidence supportive of the factors of police coercion as set forth in Garrett, supra. ‘The claim regarding the Defendant’s mental state being “such that he could not make a knowing, {intelligent or voluntary consent” and “[hJe was in no condition to object to their presence,” whether directed primarily to the Custodial Interrogation, the Butcher Interview or the Griffin Exam, is, once again, nothing more than an ipse dixit, self-serving conclusion of counsel. Again, the defense adduced no evidence to support this bare claim. This claim is certainly not evidence of any of the coercive police tactics addressed in Garrett, supra. See, In Re T.D.S., supra, at 4 30. (To establish a confession is involuntary duc to coercive police conduct, there must be some indication of physical abuse, threats, deprivation of food, medical treatment, or sleep on the part of the police.) The final claim that the Defendant “did not know the police were recording the conversations,” > Each video recording has a time line at the bottom of the screen that tracks the time. Both start at [Link]. Ex.4A. actually stops recording at [Link]. Ex.4B actually stops recording at [Link]. References to the time in each video ‘where certain statements were made will be identified as occurring as follows, e.g.: Ex. 4A at [Link]. 7appears to be directed primarily to the Butcher Interview and the Griffin Exam. This claim is of no real consequence to the determination of the voluntary/involuntary nature of the Custodial Interrogation. As noted earlier, the Defendant’s Custodial Interrogation lasted a little over two hours. During that time, he was given a bottle of water, a can of Coca Cola, dipping tobacco, offered food which he declined, and asked if he needed any medications which he declined. While his hands were initially cuffed behind his back, just prior to the start of the Custodial Interrogation, Det. Ross loosened them and ‘moved his hands in front of his body which enabled him to stretch his arms from time to time, drink water and Coke and put dipping tobacco in his mouth and his ability to move his arms was less restrictive than at the outset. Det. Ross’ demeanor and inquisitional tone throughout the Custodial Interrogation was calm and none threatening. At no time during the two plus hour interrogation did any detective make any type of threat to the Defendant. And the defense, having the same access to the recorded Custodial Interrogation as the State and the Court, identifies none. At no time, during the interrogation did any detective make any type of promise of any nature to the Defendant and the defense identifies none. There ‘was clearly not one single act of physical abuse of any nature inflicted upon the Defendant during the interrogation. And, after more than 90 minutes of being interrogated, even called a monster, the Defendant acknowledged that Det. Ross had been nothing more than kind to him and that he respected him. And, a number of times during the Custodial Interrogation, the Defendant said he was not afraid or scared, ‘One final note as to the issue of the alleged involuntary and coerced nature of the Defendant's statements during the Custodial Interrogation. A similar custodial interrogation was addressed in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 [Link]. 2250, 176 [Link].2d 1098 (2010). Thompkins claimed his statements were coerced, In rejecting the claim, at 386-387, the court held: ‘Third, there is no evidence that Thompkins’ statement was coerced. See, Burbine, supra, at 421, 106 [Link]. 1135. Thompkins does not claim that the police threatened him or injured him during the interrogation or that he was in anyway fearful. The interrogation was conducted in a standard sized-room in the middle of the aftemoon. It is true that apparently he was ina straight-backed chair for three hours, but there is no authority for the proposition that an interrogation of this length is inherently coercive. ‘The Court, having considered the totality of the actual circumstances before it, finds the statements made by the Defendant during the Custodial Interrogation were voluntary and this prong of the MTS is denied. The first claim, as set forth above, asserts that Det. Ross failed to fully and properly advise the Defendant of his Miranda Rights before he initiated the Custodial Interrogation.‘The last Justice Ginsberg referred to the Miranda decision as a “pathmarking decision.” Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 53, 130 [Link]. 1195, 175 L.Ed2d 1009 (2010). The determination of this claim necessarily begins with the Miranda decision, and more particularly, the procedural safeguards that must be employed before law enforcement initiates a custodial interrogation. In Miranda, supra, at 478-479, the procedural safeguards were defined: To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his ‘right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights ‘must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. (Emphasis added.) ‘That these procedural safeguards seemed to be fairly straightforward and easy to implement, just follow the script, history tells us otherwise. In 1981, in California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359-360, 101 [Link]. 2806, 69 [Link].2d 695, the court, once again, addressed the manner in which Miranda’s warnings must be given to pass constitutional muster: This Court has never indicated that the ‘rigidity’ of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant. See, ¢.g., United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 375-376 (CA2), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 907, 91 [Link]. 150, 27 [Link].2d 146 (1970). This Court and others have stressed as one virtue of Miranda the fact that the giving of the warnings obviates the need for a case-by-case inquiry into the actual voluntariness of the admissions of the accused. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 US., at 718, 99 [Link]., at 2568;Harryman v. Estelle, supra. Nothing in these observations suggests any desirable rigidity in the form of the required wamings. (Emphasis sic.) Quite the contrary, Miranda itself indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its strictures, The Court in that case stated that ‘[t]he warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. 384 US., at 476, 86 [Link]. at 1629 (emphasis supplied). See also id., at 479, 86 [Link], at 1630. Just last Term in considering when Miranda applied we noted that that decision announced procedural safeguards including ‘the now familiar Miranda ‘wamings...or their equivalent.’ Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297, 100 [Link]. 1682, 1688, 64 [Link].2d 297 (1980) (emphasis supplied) (All emphasis sic.) Not surprisingly, post-Prysock courts still struggled to determine if particular Miranda warnings were a fully effective equivalent to Miranda's original “script.” In 1989, in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 109 [Link]. 2875, 106 [Link].24 165, the court revisited its Prysock decision. Eagan was accused of stabbing a woman. Id. at 197. He eventually was taken into custody by police in Hammond, Indiana. Jd. Prior to questioning Eagan, the police read to him the following waiver form. “Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. ‘You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. ‘You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you've talked to a lawyer.’ 843 F.2d 1554, 1555-1556 (CA7 1988 (emphasis added is the original text.) 1d. at 198. ‘After reading the form and signing it, Eagan confessed to stabbing the woman. /d., at 199. Over his objection, the trial court admitted his confession. Id. He was convicted and sentenced to 35 years in prison, Id. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Jd. 10Eagan, thereafter, sought a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied by the United States District Court for the Northem District of Indiana. /d., at 199. Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, the District Court’s decision was reversed. Jd. at 200. The appellate court held that “the advice that counsel would be appointed ‘if and when you go to court,’ which was included in the first warnings [as set forth at p. 10 above] was constitutionally defective.” Id. In reversing the appellate court’s decision, the court held, at 202-203: ‘We have never insisted that Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in that decision. In Miranda itself, the Court said that ‘{t]he warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.’ 384 U.S., at 476 (emphasis added). See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297, 100 [Link]. 1682, 1687, 64 [Link].2d 297 (1980) (referring to ‘the now familiar Miranda warnings ... or their equivalent’). In California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 101 [Link]. 2806, 69 [Link].2d 696 (1981) (per curiam), we stated that ‘the ‘rigidity’ of Miranda (does not] exten{d] to the precise formulation of the wamings given a criminal defendant,’ and that ‘no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy its strictures.’ Id., at 359, 101 [Link],, at 2809. (Emphasis sic.) Miranda has not been limited to station house questioning, see Rhode Island v. Innis, supra (police cat), and the officer in the field may not always have access to printed Miranda warnings, or he may inadvertently depart from routine practice, particularly if a suspect requests an elaboration of the ‘wamings. The prophylactic Miranda warnings are ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.’ Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 [Link]. 2357, 2364, 41 [Link].2d 182 (1974). Reviewing courts therefore need not examine Miranda warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warmings reasonably ‘conve[y] to (a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.’ Prysock, supra, 453 U.S., at 361, 101 [Link]. at 2810. ‘We think the initial warnings given to respondent touched all of the bases required by Miranda. The police told respondent that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him in court, that he 1had the right to speak to an attomey before and during questioning, that he had “this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if [he could] not afford to hire one, and that he had the ‘right to stop answering at any time until [he] talked to a lawyer.’ (Emphasis added.) About one year after the Duckworth decision was rendered, the Ohio Supreme Court was faced with a similar question. In State v. Dailey, 53 Ohio St.3d 88, 90, 559 N.E.2d 459 (1990), the first question before the court was whether the wamings given by a Guernsey County Sheriff's deputy complied with Miranda. Dailey was in the custody of a Guernsey County Sheriff's deputy and being transported for questioning to the Sheriff's department. En route, the deputy read the standard Guernsey County Sheriff's Miranda rights form to the defendant. The recited rights were: “Before you are asked any questions you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during questioning. You have the same right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.’ Id. at 89. Upon questioning by the deputy, after acknowledging he understood his Miranda rights, Dailey ‘made an incriminating statement. Id. The trial court granted Dailey’s motion to suppress, finding the State had not “met its ‘he burden’ of showing the four elements of the Miranda warnings were [met].” Id. ‘The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision “that the challenged words, ‘[y}ou have the same right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you can’t afford to hire one,’ do not adequately convey that an indigent has a right to an appointed counsel.” Id, In reversing the appellate court’s decision, the Supreme Court, at 90-91, cited, with approval, the holding in Duckworth: In Duckworth, supra, 492. U.S. at___, 109 [Link]. at 2880, 106 [Link].2d at 177, the court approved, as touching all of the bases required by Miranda, ‘warnings informing a suspect ‘that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him in court, that he had the right to speak to an attomey before and during questioning, that he had ‘this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if [he could] not afford to hire one,” and 12that he had the ‘right to stop answering at any time until [he] talked to a lawyer.’ (Emphasis added.) Defendant does not claim that he failed to understand the warnings read to him. Instead he contends that the warnings are inadequate because they do not explicitly make reference to ‘appointment of counsel.’ The warnings read to the defendant clearly apprised him of the state’s intention to use his statement to secure a conviction, informed him of his right not to answer questions and to have counsel present even if he could not afford to hire one. The warnings are no different from those approved by the court in Duckworth. We therefore conclude that the wamings given to the defendant were adequate. (Emphasis added.) Accord State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.34 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836, 4.69. In Powell, supra, the United States Supreme Court was, once again, called upon to determine ‘whether Miranda warnings that do not follow the precise wording laid down in that case may still pass constitutional muster. Powell, supra, at 60. Powell was arrested by Tampa, Florida police officers and transported to their headquarters for questioning. 1d. at 53. Prior to initiating the custodial interrogation, the department's standard Miranda tights form was read to him. Id. The form reads: “You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you can’t afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you with- out cost and before questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.’ Id. at 54. Powell acknowledged “he had been informed of his rights, ‘that he understood them’ and ‘was willing to talk’ to the officers.” Id. He then confessed to the offense of unlawful possession of a weapon. Id. Powell moved to suppress his confession, “[cJontending that the Miranda warnings were deficient because they did not adequately convey his right to the presence ofan attorney during questioning.” Id. (Emphasis added.) The trial court denied his motion. Id. ‘The Florida appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the warnings given, “did not ‘adequately inform [Powell] of his right ... to have an attomey present throughout [the] interrogation.’ "Id. 13Upon appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, holding that the ‘catch-all phrase [you have the right to use any of these rights at any time during this interrogation] did not supply the missing warning of the right fo have counsel present during police interrogation. "Id. at 55. (Emphasis added.) ‘At 59-60, the court begins its analysis of the invariable nature of the warnings Miranda requires: To give force to the Constitution’s protection against compelled self- incrimination, the Court established in Miranda ‘certain procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial interrogation.’ Duckworth v. Eagan, 492. US. 195, 201, 109 [Link]. 2875, 106 [Link].2d 166 (1989). Intent on ‘givfing] concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow,’ 384 U.S., at 441-442, 86 [Link]. 1602, Miranda prescribed the following four now-familiar warnings: “[A suspect] must be wamed prior to any questioning [1] that he has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attomey, and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Id, at 479, 86 [Link]. 1602. Miranda’s third warning—the only one at issue hero—addresses our particular concern that ‘{tJhe circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege [to remain silent] by his interrogators” Id., at 469, 86 [Link]. 1602. Responsive to that concer, we stated, as ‘an absolute prerequisite to interrogation,’ that an individual held for questioning ‘must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.” Id., at 471, 86 [Link]. 1602. The question before us is whether the warnings Powell received satisfied this requirement. (Emphasis added.) ‘The four warnings Miranda requires are invariable, but this Court has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 [Link]. 2806, 69 [Link].2d 696 (1981) (per curiam) (‘This Court has never indicated that the ri ‘Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal ty of 14defendant.’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297, 100 [Link]. 1682, 64 [Link].2d 297 (1980) (safeguards against self- incrimination include ‘Miranda warnings ... or their equivalent’). In determining whether police officers adequately conveyed the four warnings, we have said, reviewing courts are not required to examine the words employed ‘as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the wamings reasonably “convefy] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.’ * Duckworth, 492 U.S., at 203, 109 [Link]. 2875 (quoting Prysock, 453 US., at 361, 101 [Link]. 2806). ‘The court reaffirmed its decisions in Prysock and Duckworth, which found the particular Miranda rights administered in each case were equivalent to the four, invariable warnings, Miranda requires. Id. at 60-61. ‘Turning their attention to Tampa’s standard Miranda rights form, and examining it in light of their decisions in Prysock and Duckworth, the court, at 62, held: ‘We reach the same conclusion in this case. The Tampa officers did not ‘entirely omi{t],” post, at 1210 — 1211, any information Miranda required them to impart. They informed Powell that he had ‘the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of [their] questions’ and ‘the right to use any of [his] rights at any time [he] want{ed] during th{e] interview.’ App. 3. The first statement communicated that Powell could consult with a lawyer before answering any particular question, and the second statement confirmed that he could exercise that right while the interrogation was underway. In combination, the two ‘warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s right to have an attomey present, not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all times. (Emphasis added.) In conclusion, at 64, the court held: For these reasons, ‘all... federal law enforcement agencies explicitly advise ... suspect{s] of the full contours of each [Miranda] right, including the right to the presence of counsel during questioning,’ /d, at 12. The standard warnings used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation are exemplary. They provide, in relevant part: “You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning.” Ibid., n. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). This advice is admirably informative, but we decline to declare its precise formulation necessary to meet Miranda’s requirements. Different words were used in the 15advice Powell received, but they communicated the same essential message. (Emphasis added.) ‘The ultimate questions here are whether the Miranda warnings read to Doerman on June 15, 2023: i) complied with the four invariable warnings required by Miranda; ori incantation of those warnings, were they a fully effective means adopted to fully notify him of his right to silence; or ili) if not a rigid incantation of the Miranda warnings, did they touch all the bases required by Miranda; or iv) did the words used explicitly advise him of the full contours of each Miranda right, thereby communicating to him the same essential message. State’s Ex. 4A, records Det. Ross reentering the interview room with Doerman at approximately [Link]. He brings with him a small black binder or folder and sets it on the desk. He then adjusts the handcuffs, as noted above. At [Link], Det. Ross tells Doerman he “wants to talk to him about what happened today, but I gotta read this to you real quick, alright, and I read this to everybody, alright.” Det. Ross has in his hand, the standard business card size Miranda ‘warnings issued by the Clermont County Sheriff (the “Rights Card”). The Rights Card reads as follows: ORAL WARNINGS TO BE GIVEN TO A SUBJECT PRIOR TO INTERROGATION Before we ask you any questions, you must understand: - You have the right to remain silent. - Anything you say can be used against you in court. - You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have a lawyer with you during questioning. - Ifyou cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any ‘questioning if you wish. Do you understand these rights? if not a rigid Are you willing to answer some questions? Between [Link] and [Link], and reading from the Rights Card, Det. Ross advises Doerman of the following Miranda rights: 1. You have the right to remain silent. 2. Anything you say can be used against you in court. 3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any questions. 4. If you cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed for you. At [Link], Doerman says, “yep.” At [Link], Det. Ross states, “you understand, oh good.” 16At: :05, Det. Ross begins his interrogation of Doerman. As clearly exposed in State’s Ex. 4A, Det. Ross, inexplicably, completely omitted, the third invariable Miranda warming, “that he has the right to the presence of an attomey,” Powell, supra, at 59, during questioning. Also of critical importance, is the detective’s failure to adopt any other fully effective ‘means to notify Doerman of this invariable right to fully advise him of his right to silence. Miranda, ‘supra, at 479. He simply embarked upon his interrogation of Doerman at [Link]. Accordingly, the Court finds that the detective did “touch all of the bases required by Miranda,” Duckworth, supra, a 203, and Dailey, supra, at 91. And, the detective here did not advise Doerman of “the full contours of each Miranda right.” Powell, supra, at 64. ‘The Court finds the decision in Powell compels it to answer all four questions, as set forth above, in the negative. In Powell, supra, at 62, the court found that the Tampa police, “did not ‘entirely omit,” any information Miranda required them to impart.” (Emphasis added.) First, the court found the Tampa police properly advised Powell he had the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any questions. Id. ‘And, while they did not advise him, “that he has the right to the presence of an attorney” as Miranda requires, Miranda, supra, at 479, they did use another fully effective means to advise him of this right by reciting Tampa’s catch-all phrase, “you have the right to use any of these rights at any time during this interrogation.” Id., Accordingly, the court found: “{iJn combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s right to have an attomey present, not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all, times. Id. While Det. Ross did advise Doerman that he “had the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, State’s Ex. 3, he did not advise him of the equally invariable right under Miranda and its progeny as explained above, to have a lawyer present during his interrogation. Not did he adopt any other fully effective means to notify Doerman of this right, such as the other effective means approved by the United States Supreme Court in Prysock, Duckworth, and Powell, and by the Ohio Supreme Court in Dailey.. Consequently, the Court finds that Det. Ross did not: i) properly advise Doerman of the four invariable warnings required by Miranda; ii) adopt other fully effective means to fully notify Doerman of his right to silence; iii) touch all the bases required by Miranda; and iv) advise him of the full contours of each Miranda right such that he communicated to him the same essential message. Accordingly, all statements obtained from Doerman during the Custodial Interrogation are suppressed and the State shall not be permitted to introduce any statements obtained during the Custodial Interrogation in its case-in- chief. The State cites United States v. Clayton, 937 F.3d 630 (6% Cir. 2019), in support of its contention that the Miranda rights Det. Ross read to Doerman pass constitutional muster. Irrespective of its holding, 7this Court is not bound to follow it. In State v. Burnett, 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 424, 755 N.E.2d 857 (2001), the court held: Given the uncertainty, we are reluctant to abandon our role in the system of federalism created by the United States Constitution until the United States ‘Supreme Court directs us otherwise. Both inferior federal courts and state cours serve as ‘laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.’ United States v. Lopez (1995), 514 U.S. 549, 581, 115 [Link]. 1624, 1641, 131 [Link].2d 626, 652 (Kennedy, J., concurring). We therefore conclude that we are not bound by rulings on federal statutory and constitutional law made by a federal court other than the United States Supreme Court. It logically follows, that if the Ohio Supreme is not bound to follow rulings on federal constitutional law from federal courts other than those of the United States Supreme Court, Ohio’s inferior courts are, likewise, not bound to follow such rulings. ‘There is a second reason why this Court will not give credence to the decision in Clayton. There are other decisions regarding analogous fact pattems as in Clayton, that reach the opposite result. In Lujan vy. Garcia, 734 F.3d 917 (9* Cir. 2013) and United States v. Wysinger, 683 F.3d 784 (7* Cir. 2012), both cases held that law enforcement’s failure to advise an in-custody suspect, prior to initiating a custodial interrogation, that he has the right to have a lawyer present during the interrogation, runs afoul of Powell. Lujan, at 932-933; Wysinger, at 800. This split in the federal appellate circuits regarding the constitutional efficacy of the wamings at issue here, is another compelling reason to wait until the United State Supreme Court revisits Powell. Until the United States Supreme Court rules that the combination of completely ‘omitting the right that a suspect has the right to have a lawyer present during the interrogation, and fails to adopt other fully effective means to notify the person of his right of silence, does not violate the procedural safeguards first established in Miranda, the Court is bound to follow Powell. ‘The Court will now tum its attention to the fourth claim, as set forth above, that Doerman un- ‘equivocally invoked his right to counsel. In State v. Cepec, 149 Ohio St.3d 436, 2016-Ohio-8076, 75 N.E.3d 1185, at 4 37, the court held: To invoke the right to counsel, the suspect must make an unequivocal request. The person ‘must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis at 459, 114 [Link]. 2350. ‘{T]his is an objective inquiry.’ Id. Courts are required to ‘examine [the] appeltant’s words not in isolation but in context.’ Murphy at 520-521, 747 18NE.2d 765. Cepec was convicted of aggravated murder with capital specifications and sentenced to death. Id., at P32. Pertinent here, is Cepec’s claim that he unambiguously invoked his right to counsel during his custodial investigation, on June 3, 2010, and that all statements made thereafter should have been suppressed. Id., at P 43. Cepec acknowledged that prior to being interrogated on June 3, 2010, his Miranda rights were read to him. [d., at P 38. During the custodial interrogation, questions were asked regarding the potential presence of the deceased’s blood being found on Cepec. /d., at 39. Farther along in the custodial interrogation, one detective requested another to “get his Luminol light to check Cepec’s hands for blood.” /d., at P 40. When the detective left the room to get the Luminol light, Cepec asked the remaining detective about the light. Id, at P41. After it was explained to him, that it could detect the presence of blood, Cepec asked: ‘Well, before you use it, can I have a lawyer here?” /d. The detective responded: ‘No, | don’t think we need one for that. If you didn’t do anything, why do you need a lawyer?" Id. After this exchange, the custodial interrogation continued for several hours and the Luminol test was never administered. d., at P 42. His statements made after his request for counsel were introduced at trial. Cepee’s argument on appeal was that “his question about having a lawyer present for the Luminol test was a clear and unequivocal request for counsel that revoked his previous waiver and triggered his right to counsel.” /d,, at P43. Therefore, any statements he made after he posed the question should have been suppressed. Id. The court disagreed, holding that when “[vJiewed in context, Cepec requested counsel for a particular, identified circumstance. Namely, Cepec asked whether he could have an attorney present before the Luminol test would be administered.” Id., at P44. Citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, $30, 107 [Link]. 828, 93 L-Ed.2d 920 (1987), the court held that ‘a suspect’s unambiguous request for counsel for a limited purpose need not be interpreted as a request for counsel for all purposes.” Id., at P45. ‘Of import to this claim, is the court’s holding, at P 46: Here, an ordinary person would understand Cepec’s question ~ ‘Well, before you use it, can I have a lawyer here?” — to unambiguously refer to having. counsel present for the Luminol test. It was not a general request for counsel. CCepec had not asked for counsel up until that point and then asked for counsel only in the context of an exchange with the detective regarding the function of the Luminol test. And the Luminol test was never actually administered. When no test was performed, Cepec continued to speak to detectives without counsel and to deny his involvement in Frank’s death. Thus, when Cepec’s request is 19considered in the context of the exchange, we conclude that Cepec did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel for all purposes of the interview. In light of the holding in Cepec, the court turns its’ attention to the statements Doerman made regarding the presence of counsel. ‘As noted above, Det. Ross began questioning Doerman at [Link]. Between [Link] and [Link], ‘Doerman states: “T'll wait for a lawyer, I really don’t know, give me a couple of days, Ian talk to a lawyer so that way I can get nice good answers.” At [Link], Det. Ross states, “I understand.” To ascertain the full context of Doerman’s request for counsel, the Court begins its inquiry when Doerman is being escorted from the immediate crime scene to Dep. Rudd's cruiser. Walking along the roadway to the cruiser, at [Link], Doerman asks Dep. Rudd to get his wallet out of his back pocket. Dep. Rudd immediately responds, “shut up dude, you have the right to remain silent, fucking use it.” Seconds later, Doerman responds, “yes sir.” (State’s Ex. 2A, Rudd’s BWC). As the body wom cameras also have the running military time in the upper right comer, it reflects that Doerman was secured in Rudd’s cruiser at about 16:30, or about 4:30 p.m. on June 15, 2023. Dep. Rudd transported Doerman for the scene to the Sheriff's office in Batavia. State’s Ex. 2B, Rudd’s BWC, reflects that Doerman arrived at the Sheriff's office at approximately 17:57 or 5:47 p.m. He was then escorted into the Sheriff's office and into the interview room. State’ Ex. 4A shows Det. Ross engaging the recording device in the interview room at about 5:51 p.m. Doerman enters the room shortly thereafter. For perhaps two minutes. Doerman sits alone in the interview room. He makes no statement of any nature. A deputy then enters the room and remains until Det. Ross reenters the room at about [Link] on State’s Ex. 4a. During the 38 minutes or so Doerman was in the interview room, neither he nor the deputy guarding him asked any questions or made any ‘As noted, Det. Ross starts his questioning at [Link]. At [Link], Doerman requests a lawyer. During this time period, Det. Ross asked a number of questions, most of which were not about the events of the day, but rather questions about a prior contact between the two years past, and how he was feeling at the time. Doerman would respond to some of these questions, but would remain silent after some. At ‘one point, when Doerman was not responding to his questions, Det. Ross asked him if he was thinking and if he was alright. Doerman did not respond. ‘At about [Link], Det. Ross, asks Doerman, “why don’t we do this, why don’t you tell me what’s happening, what happened today.” At [Link] Doerman responds. Over the next 20 seconds or so, Doerman responds to some additional questions posed to him. Between [Link] and [Link], Det. Ross changes gears and asks him when he last ate, slept, if he was thirsty, or hungry. Doerman would answer some of these questions and not respond to others. 20‘At [Link], Det. Ross asks, “what happened to your family today? No response. ‘At [Link], Det. Ross asks, “somebody make you upset? At [Link], Doerman responds but itis unclear what he says. Between [Link] and [Link], Det. Ross poses about five questions about the day’s events. Over the following several seconds, Doerman answers some questions, but not other. Finally, at about [Link], Det. Ross asks, if Doerman was saying he just lost his way and, without hesitation and, almost interrupting Det. Ross, at [Link]-[Link], Doerman states: “I'll wait for a lawyer, really don’t know, give me a couple of days, I can talk to a lawyer and get nice good answers.” Det. Ross’s responded, at [Link], “I understand.” Then, at [Link], Det. Ross asks Doerman, “Do you have a lawyer.’ From his apprehension at the scene, his placement in the cruiser at the scene, and during his transport to the Sheriff's office, Doerman remained totally silent for over one hour while in police custody. He asked no questions and he did not make any statements during this time period. Then, while in the interview room for nearly 40 minutes before Det. Ross began his interrogation, he asked no questions and made no statements. ‘The Court can best describe the interview process as one trying to pull teeth. Doerman would, at times, sit in total silence and not look at Det. Ross or answer his questions. At other times, he would hesitate for a few seconds before responding to a question. His conduct and demeanor from the time he ‘was secured in the cruiser until he asked for counsel is that of a person either unwilling to talk to officers or exceedingly hesitant to do so. In Cepec, the court found that an ordinary person would understand the following question, “Well, before you use it, can Ihave a lawyer here?-to unambiguously refer to having counsel present” for the light test. Cepec, supra, at 37. ‘The first clause of Doerman’s statement, “I'l just wait for a lawyer,” is not a question, but a declaration that he wants a lawyer. The Court believes that an ordinary person would understand this declaration unambiguously refers to having counsel present. The second clause, “I really don’t know,” could be considered ambiguous. Does it mean he really didn’t know if he would wait for a lawyer, or he didn’t know if he had lost his way, the last statement from Det. Ross before the statement was made? ‘Taken in isolation, and If Doerman had stopped talking at that point, it is possible that an ordinary person might not understand the first two clauses unambiguously referred to having a lawyer present and lead to a finding that Doerman did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. But, Doerman did not stop. The final two clause of his statement, “give me a couple of days, Ican talk to a lawyer to get nice good answers,” convinces the Court that an ordinary person would understand these declarations ‘unambiguously refer to having a lawyer present. And, coupled with his statement, “I'll wait for a lawyer,” aleads this Court to conclude that Doerman unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. This conclusion is bolstered by Det. Ross’ responses to Doerman’s declaration, “I understand,” and “Do you have a lawyer?” ‘Therefore, construing the totality of the circumstances leading up Doerman’s declaration and the full context of all the words spoken by Doerman at the time he asked for a lawyer, the Court finds he ‘unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. Det. Ross was required to stop questioning him immediately, Miranda, supra, at 474, and no evidence resulting thereafter from the interrogation can be used against him. Miranda, supra, at 479 ‘The Butcher Interview and the Griffin Exam ‘The Court will address these in tandem as they both relate to addressing an inmate's medical issues while in jail, be it one’s mental health or one’s physical health. State's Ex. 5, the Butcher Interview, and Ex. 6, the Griffin Exam, are similar in the following ‘manner. The real time each professional was in Doerman’s cell was just under two minutes. Neither of them asked him any questions that could be reasonably construed as being with an intent to elicit incriminating statements. Both performed their respective obligations in a calm and professional manner and neither engaged in any conduct that could be remotely considered as threatening or coercive. They both treated Doerman respectfully at all times. In fact, Ms. Butcher told him that she was there to check on him to see if he was doing ok and was not there to judge him or make any judgments, just there to take care of him. Ms. Griffin simply asked a few questions to ascertain the nature of his symptoms that prompted him to request medical treatment. She is heard advising him that his heart rate was good at 83, that he had no temperature, and his blood pressure was normal. Her follow-up questions were minimal and simply asked if he had any history of the symptoms that prompted his call. While the defense asserts a number of alleged constitutional and statutory violations compelling the suppression of the statements Ms. Butcher and Ms. Griffin obtained from Doerman, they gloss over the impact Doerman’s incarceration in the County jail has on the various rights he claims were violated. In Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 [Link]. 3194, 82 L-Bd.2d 393 (1984), the court addressed the right of privacy a prison inmate may be entitled to within the confines of his cell. At 525-526, the court held: ...we hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and, that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions. 2(Emphasis added.) ‘At 526-527, the court further explained its holding limiting the constitutional rights of inmates while in their cells: Within this volatile ‘community, prison administrators are to take all, necessary steps to ensure the safety of not only the prison staffs and administrative personnel, but also visitors. They are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves. They must be ever alert to attempts to introduce drugs and other contraband into the premises which, we can judicially notice, is one of the most perplexing problems of prisons today; they must prevent, so far as possible, the flow of it weapons into the prison; they must be vigilant to detect escape plots, in which drugs or weapons may be involved, before the schemes materialize. In addition to these monumental tasks, itis incumbent upon these officials at the same time to maintain as sanitary an environment for the inmates as feasible, given the difficulties of the circumstances. ‘The administration of a prison, we have said, is ‘at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking. Wolff. McDonnell, 418 US., at 566, 94 [Link]., at 2979; Hewitt v, Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467, 103 [Link]. 864, 869, 74 [Link].2d 675 (1983). But it would be literally impossible to accomplish the prison objectives identified above if inmates retained a right of privacy in their cells. Virtually the only place inmates can conceal weapons, drugs, and other contraband is in their cells. Unfettered access to these cells by prison officials, thus, is imperative if drugs and contraband are to be ferreted out and sanitary surroundings are to be maintained. Determining whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate’ or ‘reasonable’ necessarily entails a balancing of interests. The two interests here are the interest of society in the security of its penal institutions and the interest of the prisoner in privacy within his cell. The latter interest, of course, is already limited by the exigencies of the circumstances: A prison ‘shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room.’ Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-144, 82 [Link]. 1218, 1220-1221, 8 [Link].2d 384 (1962). We strike the balance in favor of institutional security, which we have noted is ‘central to all other corrections goals,’ Pell v. Procunier, 417 US., at 823, 94 [Link],, at 2804. A right of privacy in traditional 23Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order. We are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered the paramount interest in institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by our society that ‘[lJoss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement.’ Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S., at 537, 99 [Link],, at 1873. ‘While the Butcher Interview and Griffin Exam were certainly not searches of Doerman’s cell, under the Fourth Amendment, the principles stated by the Hudson court in support of its holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply within the confines of a cell, nevertheless carries significant weight and import in resolving the issues here. ‘A county jail is statutorily mandated to provide medical services to all inmates. R.C. 341.192. A ‘medical provider includes a physician or other healthcare providers. Id., at (A)(2). Subsection (A\3) defines necessary care, as “medical care of a nonelective nature that cannot be postponed until after the period of incarceration of a person confined in a jail.” The standards a county jail must implement and follow to provide the state mandated adequate ‘medical care to inmates, is set forth in Chapter 5120:1-8 of the Ohio Administrative Code (the Ohio Admin, Code), “Standards for Full Service Jails.” The Clermont County jail is such a jail. The numerous standards a full service jail must adopt and follow, in pertinent part, include the following: (A) (Essential) Health authority. The jail has a designated health authority with responsibility for health and/or mental health care services pursuant a written agreement, contract or job description. The health authority may be a physician, health administrator or agency. . . . The health authority is responsible and authorized to: (B) Essential) Inmate pre-screen. Before acceptance into jail, health-trained personne! shall inquire about, but not be limited to the following conditions and the health authority shall develop policies for the acceptance or denial of admission for: (1) Suicide thoughts/plan. (2) Current serious or potentially serious medical or mental health issues needing immediate attention. (©) Essential) Receiving screen. Health trained personnel, in accordance with protocols established by the health authority, shall perform a written medical, dental and mental health receiving screening on each inmate upon arrival at the 24jail and prior to being placed in general population. (1) Inquiry includes at least the following: (@) Current and past illness and health problems; (©) Current and past mental health problems; (©) Current medications for medical and mental health; (f) Hospitalizations for medical or mental health purposes); (Use of alcohol and drugs including types, amounts and frequency used, date or time of last use and history of any problems after ceasing use i.e. withdrawal symptoms @ Suicidal risk assessment; (2) Observation of the following: (@) Behavior including state of consciousness, mental health status, appearance, conduct, tremors and sweating; (3) Medical disposition of inmate: (@ General population; (b) General population with prompt referral to appropriate health or mental health services; (©) Referral for emergency treatment; (@) Medical observation/isolation; (© Mental health observation/precautions. (E) Essential) Full-service scope. The jail provides twenty-four-hour emergency medical, dental, and mental health care services. (EH) Essential) Health and mental health complaints. The jail shall ensure that there is a daily procedure whereby inmates have an opportunity to report medical and mental health complaints through health trained personnel, or for urgent matters, to any jail employee. The jail employee shall contact the appropriate medical or mental health department immediately. ‘These are just a few of the required standards the Clermont County jail must adopt and implement to remain as an accredited full service jail by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections. ‘These provisions were set forth because Ms. Butcher’s interaction with Doerman in his cell was necessary to comply with the mental health standards required as addressed above. The same applies to Ms. Griffin's exam as well. Clearly, both professionals were following state mandated standards, the County jail must and did follow, to address Doerman’s immediate mental health evaluation upon placement in the 25jail and to respond to his self-initiated medical emergency. ‘The question now becomes, if these standards impinge upon Doerman’s constitutional and statutory rights as the defense claims, are they nonetheless constitutionally reasonable and override any claimed violation by Doerman? In Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 [Link]. 1028, 108 [Link].2d 178 (1990), an incarcerated, mentally ill man, challenged the constitutionality of a state regulation that permitted the administration of antipsychotic medications against his will. The court, at 222, held that any constitutional right Harper may have had to avoid the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “must be defined in the context of the inmate's confinement.” It held the standard that permitted such action, “which recognize both the prisoner's ‘medical interests and the State’s interests, meet the demand of the Due Process Clause” Id. ‘At 223-225, the court explained its rationale to reach its conclusion: ‘The legitimacy, and the necessity, of considering the State’s interests in prison safety and security are well established by our cases. In Turner v. Safley, 482 US. 78, 107 [Link]. 2254, 96 [Link].2d 64 (1987), and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 [Link]. 2400, 96 [Link].2d 282 (1987), we held that the proper standard for determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed to infringe on an inmate’s constitutional rights is to ask whether the regulation is ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’ Turner, supra, 482 US, at 89, 107 [Link], at 2261. This is true even when the constitutional right claimed to have been infringed is fundamental, and the State under other circumstances would have been required to satisfy a more rigorous standard of review. Estate of Shabazz, supra, 482 US., at 349, 107 [Link],, at 2404-05. The ‘Washington Supreme Court declined to apply this standard of review to the Center’s Policy, reasoning that the liberty interest present here was distinguishable from the First Amendment rights at issue in both Turner and Estate of Shabazz. 110 Wash 24, at 883, n. 9, 759 P.24, at 364, n. 9. The court erred in refusing to apply the standard of reasonableness. Our earlier determination to adopt this standard of review was based upon the need to reconcile our longstanding adherence to the principle that inmates retain at least some constitutional rights despite incarceration with the recognition that prison authorities are best equipped to make difficult decisions regarding prison administration. Turner, supra, 482 U.S., at 84-85, 107 [Link]., at 2259-60; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 US. 26119, 128, 97 [Link]. 2532, 2539, 53 [Link].2d 629 (1977). These two principles apply in all cases in which a prisoner asserts that a prison regulation violates the Constitution, not just those in which the prisoner invokes the First Amendment. We made quite clear that the standard of review we adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights. See Turner, 482 U.S., at 85, 107 [Link], at 2259 (‘Our task .. is to formulate a standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims that is responsive both to the ‘policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights’ ’) citation omitted); id., at 89, 107 [Link],, at 2261 (“If Pell [v. Procunier, 417 US. 817, 94 [Link]. 2800, 41 [Link].2d 495 (1974) }, Jones, and Bell [v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, (60 [Link].2d 447 (1979) ] have not already resolved the question posed in [Procunier v.] Martinez, [416 U.S. 396, 94 [Link]. 1800, 40 [Link].2d 224 (1974),] we resolve it now: when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if tis reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”); Estate of Shabazz, supra, 482 US., at 349, 107 [Link],, at 2404 (‘To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights’). In Turner itself we applied the reasonableness standard to a prison regulation that imposed severe restrictions on the inmate's right to marry, a right protected by the Due Process Clause. See Turner, supra, 482 U.S., at 95-96, 107 [Link], at 2265 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 [Link]. 673, 54 LEd.24 618 (1978), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1, 87 [Link]. 1817, 18 L.E4.2d 1010 (1967). Our precedents require application of the standard here. In Turner, we considered various factors to determine the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation. Three are relevant here. “First, there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate ‘governmental interest put forward to justify it.” 482 ULS., at 89, 107 [Link], at 2262 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586, 104 [Link]. 3227, 3232, 82 [Link].2d 438 (1984)). Second, a court must consider “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.” 482 U.S., at 90, 107 [Link]., at 2262. Third, ‘the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of 27the reasonableness of a prison regulation,’ but this does not mean that prison officials have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” /d., at 90— 91, 107 [Link], at 2262; see also Estate of Shabazz, supra, 482 USS. at 350, 107 [Link], at 2405. ‘To determine if a given standard is reasonable, courts “must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.” Overton v. Bazzetta, $39 U.S. 126, 132, 123 [Link]. 2162, 156 L-Ed.2d 162 (2003). And, “{tJhe burden, moreover, is not on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.” Id. In light of the factors to determine the reasonableness of the state standards, as addressed by Harper, supra, the Court will address the Butcher Interview first, then the Griffin Exam. First, the standards relative to the Butcher Interview do have a valid and rational connection between these standards and the legitimate governmental interests to justify it. Ms. Butcher testified that it is her responsibility to assess the mental health concems of newly admitted inmates at the County jail. ‘And, the standards set forth in the Ohio Admin. Code, supra, reflect that such an inquiry is necessary, for ‘example, to determine the proper placement of the inmate in the jail, e.g., in the general population or in isolation due to the seriousness of the inmate’s mental health condition. The reasonableness of these standards are also important to assess the inmate’s immediate mental health condition to ascertain if immediate mental health care is needed. Finally, the standards are in the best interests of the inmate, the jail staff and other inmates from a safety and security perspective. Not immediately assessing a newly arrived inmate’s mental health status could result in self-inflicted injury to the inmate or to the jail staff or other inmates. Secondly, institutional safety is paramount in a jail setting. To delay an immediate mental health assessment to advise the inmate of his Miranda rights and accommodate a request for counsel is not reasonable. Such a delay could result in the deterioration of his mental health condition, thereby putting the inmate at risk and all staff members who must monitor his condition until counsel arrives. Finally, what is the ready alternative? Just sit idly by and hope the inmate does not cause injury to himself or others nearby until his claimed constitutional right to counsel or privacy is honored? ‘The Court is satisfied that the state standard Ms. Butcher's complied with by conducting and her minimal intrusion of Doerman’s privacy, satisfies the test required by Harper, supra. Accordingly, the statements made by Doerman in response to Ms. Butcher's questions will not be suppressed. This same analysis is equally, if not more so, applicable to the Griffin Exam. Again, Doerman 28invited this contact by complaining of chest pains. The jail is statutorily mandated to provide medical care for all inmates, and per the state standards, as set forth above, provide this care 24/7. To suggest that Doerman’s constitutional rights to privacy and the presence of counsel before emergency medical treatment can be administered to him, overrides the state standards requiring a jail to provide emergency ‘medical services borders on the surreal. No one can reasonably argue that there is a ready alternative to delay providing emergency medical treatment to an inmate. ‘The Court is satisfied that the state standards Ms. Griffin complied with in tending to Doerman’s ‘emergency medical complaints satisfies the test required by Harper, supra. Accordingly, the statements made by Doerman in response to Ms. Griffin's questions will not be suppressed. ‘The Court also finds the questioning of Doerman by Ms. Butcher and Ms. Griffin do not qualify ‘as custodial interrogation as contemplated by Miranda. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-302 100 [Link]. 1682, 64 [Link].2d 297 (1980), the court held: We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A Practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforesecable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. (Emphasis sic, fn. omitted.) Assuming for the sake of argument that Ms. Butcher and Ms. Griffin were de facto sheriff's deputies during their encounters with Doerman, it is wholly unreasonable to suggest that they should have snown their mental health questions and medical question would be “reasonably likely to elicit an in- criminating statement,” which their recorded interview unequivocally show they did not. 29Finally, the defense claims that the Butcher Interview and the Griffin Exam violated certain state and federal statutes and thus any statement of the Defendant should be suppressed, are without merit. As the Court has determined that these two interviews with Doerman were constitutionally permissible, suppression is not warranted, See, State v. Campbell, 170 Ohio St. 278,2022-Ohio-3626, 211 N.E3d 1174, § 22; State v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 416 N-E.2d 598 (1980); United States v. Santos-Portillo, 997 F.3d 159, 165 (4% Cir. 2021); United States v. Powell, 847 F.3d 760, 771 (6% Cir. 2017). Consistent with the above analysis; ‘THE COURT FINDS THE FOLLOWING: ‘The Defendant’s Miranda rights were violated because Det. Ross failed to properly and fully advise Doerman of them prior to initiating the Custodial Interrogation and all statements obtained from Doerman during the Custodial Interrogation shall be suppressed and the State shall not adduce any of these statements in their case-in-chief. ‘The Defendant’s Miranda rights were violated when the Custodial Interrogation continued after the Defendant had unequivocally and unambiguously invoked his right to counsel when he told Det. Ross, “I'l wait for a lawyer, I don’t know, give me a couple of days, I can talk to a lawyer and get nice good answers.” Therefore, irrespective of the detectives failure to fully and properly advise Doerman of his Miranda rights as immediately set forth above, all statements obtained uring the Custodial Interrogation shall be suppressed and the State shall not adduce any of these statements in their case-in-chief. ‘The Defendant's Miranda rights were not violated due to the failure of the detectives to have him sign a written waiver form advising him of these rights. ‘The Defendant's Miranda rights were not violated due to the failure of the detectives to give him a written copy of these rights. .. The statements obtained by the detectives as a result of the Custodial Interrogation, irrespective of the violations of Miranda, as set forth above, were, nevertheless, voluntary and were not the product of any coercive conduct by any detective or any other deputy who had any contact with Doerman at any time after his apprehension. ‘The Butcher Interview and the Griffin Exam were constitutionally permissible and none of the statements obtained from Doerman shall be suppressed. Accordingly: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Suppress and In Limine is granted in part, and all statements obtained during the Custodial Interrogation shall be suppressed and the State shall not introduce State’s Ex. 4A and 4B, the audio-video recording of the Custodial Interrogation or in any other way adduce these 30statements in their case-in-chief, for the reasons set forth above at paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Court's Findings. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Suppress and In Limine is otherwise denied, for the reasons set forth above at paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Court’s Findings. Richard P. Ferenc, fudge (CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ‘The Court served a copy of this Entry upon Mark Tekulve, the County Prosecutor, Lara Baron Allen, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attomey, Assistant Prosecuting Attomeys Katherine Terpstra, Clay Tharp, and Nicholas Horton, 76 S. Riverside Drive, 2" Floor, Batavia, Ohio 45103 and Counsel for the Defendant, Gregory W. Meyers, 250 E. Broad Street, Ste. 1400, Columbus, Ohio 43215, and W. Stephen Haynes, 302 E. Main Street, Batavia, Ohio 45103, all by ordinary U.S. mail on the date it was filed as reflected above. 31