CHAPI'ER - V

NIRVIKALPAKA IN NYAYA-VAISESIKA

SYSTEM

SECTION - I

KNOWLEDGE AND VALIDITY

 112

CHAPrER - V

I
NIRVIKALPAKA IN NYAYA-VAISESIKA SYSTEM

SECTION - I

KNOWLEDGE AND VALIDITY

The Indian Philosophers expound the nature of knowledge

and its source and examine its validity and authority

first, and then proceed to ascertain the different catego-

ries of knowledge. Kanada, the great propounder of
•
I -
Vaise~ika-Sutra, possibly occupies the first place in the
traceable history of epistemological tradition. But the
Nyaya-Vai~esika thinkers,particularly the later Naiyayikas,
•
spend substantial energy in tackling the epistemological
problem.
I
The Nyaya and the Vaisesika philosophers admit the
•
quality theory of knowledge. Gotama, the propounder of the
Nyaya-sutra, refers to the knowledge sometimes by the
word buddhi or sometimes by the word jnana. Gotama is
1
of opinion that all these words express the same sense.
Though Gotama mentions these words in different aphorisms he
does not take any serious attempt at defining knowledge.
Kanada also does not define buddhi but includes it among
•

1. buddhirupalabdhir jn~mami tyanartilantaram.

- Nyaya-sutra [Link].
 113

I -
the qualities. While commenting on the Vaisesika-sutras
•
I -
Prasastapada adds one more word in synonyms of buddhi as
2
given by Gotama, and recognises it as Pratyaya. Thus,

Kanada and his commentators endeavour to define buddhi as

•
quality in general. Quality rests in a substance, and in
the case of buddhi it is none other than the self. Like
other qualities jnana also does not possess qualities and
does not stand as an independent antecedent in conjunction
, -
and disjunction. Prasastapada proceeds one step further
and announces that knowledge is an entity related to the
genus of the quality gunatva and also is devoid of quality
•
and action.

Thus, ontologically jnana is a guna of the self and

•
yet itself without component parts, so without shape and
form. But epistemologically jnana refers beyond itself to

its object. Since the cognitions themselves have no definite

form to distinguish them from each other, they are distin-
guished by their object alone. 3 This feature distinguishes

2• buddhirupalabdhir j'fianain pratyaya i ti

,
.
paryayayh •
- -
Prasasatapadabhasya, Page 171, line 16, edited
•
by Vindhesvariprasad Dvivedin, Vizianagram
Sanskrit Series, No. 6, Benares.
I
3. arthenaiva vise~o hi nirakarataya dhiyam 1
Nyayakusumanjali 4.4a.
 114

knowledge from the other qualities of the self. Of all the

qualities of self it is jnana that has this self-trans-

cending reference to an object and this reference is

4
intrinsic to knowledge. The qualities like desire,aversion

[Link] refer to an object but only through the via-media of

knowledge. While jnana is directly related to its object,
5
a desire and an aversion refer to an object indirectly.

Knowledge , as the Naiyayika contends, is without any part

and in this sense without any form. Though it is formless

yet it is capable of being analysed, inasmuch as it has

constituent logical elements and relation.

- I
The Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers do not always join
•
their hands in arranging the knowledge in classes. They

4. jnanatvecchadivyavrttasvabhavasya visayapravanatvam
0 • •

apeksitam iti •
•
Nyayalllavati, pages 812-814, edited by
Pt. Harihara Shastri and pt. Dhundiraja Shastri,
Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares 1934; buddheh
•
sv8bhavikam caitanyamastheyam.
- Nyayavartikatatparyat~ka on Nyaya-sutra 1.1.15,
page 159, lines 3-4, edited by Gadadhara Shastri
Tailanga, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series No. 15, Benares 1898.
5. tattrapi sv~havikavisayapravanatvameva vyavasthapakam,
• •
icchadau tu jnanaupadhikam tat.
- Nyayalllavati Kanthavara~a, page 812, lines 9-10,
edited by Pt. Harihara Shastri and Pt. Dhundiraja
Shastri, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares 1934.
 115

usually classify knowledge under two heads - yathartha and

I
But a section of the Vaisesika school headed
•
by Vallabhacharya classifies jnana or buddhi under two
groups -- vidya and avidya, and further subdivides the former

into smrti and anubhava. Knowledge is generally divided

•
into pram a and aprama. Aprama or false knowledge includes
I
both error and doubt. The champions of the Nyaya-Vaise~ika
school neither include error and doubt into right knowledge,
nor exclude £hem from the purview of knowledge. So Vacaspati
I
Misra in his Nyayavarttikatatparyatlka maintains that the
wrong knowledge also manifests the object with its general

feature.
- or right knowledge
The definition of prama cons-
titutes the content of an animated discussion both in the
/
Nyaya and the vaisesika schools, particularly in the later
•
Nyaya system. Gotama does not make an attempt to define
prama in his Nyayasutra. But Vatsyayana, the great commen-
tator of Nyaya-sutra speaks of prama as the knowledge of
6
that as that. While commenting on the commentary of

6. tasmin tad i ti pratyayci'l.

~·

- Vatsyayanabha~ya on Nyaya-sutra 2.1.37,

page 284, line 4, edited by Ganganath Jha and
Dhundiraja Shastri, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series,
Vidyavilas Press edition, Benares. 1925.
 116

Vatsyayana, Uddyotkara interpretes pran\~u;a as the cause of

7 I
upal~hi or apprehension. But Vacaspati Misra frames the
definition of prama as the knowledge that does not deviate
8
from its object and that is other than memory. Though
- I
Udayana in his Tatparyaparisuddhi puts emphasis on the
character of avyabhicaritatva, in his Nyayakusumanjali he
- He considers right
gives a simplier definition of prama.
knowledge to be an independent impression which corresponds

to reality. So Prarna, as Udayana contends, is a cognition

corresponding to the object. 9 He has perhaps been influenced
by the definition of prama given by vacaspati and Jayanta

Bhatta. He reconciles the two views. Jayanta Bhatta seeks to

•• ••
define Prarnana as the collection of the two types of object
•
viz. consciousness and unconsciousness one which cooperates

7. -
upalabdhihetuh pramanarn.
• •
- Nyaya-sutra 1.1.1, Adibhasya,
•
Nyayavarttika,
page 5, line 19, Vidyavilas Press edition.
The Chowkharnba Sanskrit Series, Benares 1915.
a. .
prama ca smrter anya'rthavyavicari
- Nyayavarttikatatparyat~ka on Nyaya-sutra 1.1.3,
page 63, line 27, edited by Gadadhara Shastri
Tailanga, Vizianagrarn Sanskrit Series No. 15, Benares
1898.
9. yathartho I nubhavo manamanapeksatayesyate I
• •
- Nyayakusurnanjali 4/1;
mitihsarnyakparicchittih
• •
- Ibid. 4/5.
 117

to produce such an apprehension of object as is other than

10
illusion and doubt. The knowledge of an object, as Jayanta
views, which successfully leads the comprehender upto the
object or helps him to avoid is true. While defining a right
I
knowledge Sridhara also joins his hand with Udayana. In
I _ - I
his Nyayakandall, a commentary on Prasastapadabhasya, Sri-
•
dhara defin~~idya or right knowledge as a cognition of
the nature of a definite idea free from doUbt and illusion. 11
According to him, Prama is a definitive awareness that
remains ever uncontradicted. Vallabhacarya, an exponent of
I 12
the Vaisesika
•
school, defines Prama as "the right knowledge."
But ultimately he prefers to define it as "the non-apprehen-
sion of something as being what is other than it." 13

10. avyabhicarinlm asandigdrlam arthopalabdhim vidadhati

[Link] samagr1 pramanam •
•
- Nyayamanjari, Part-1, Page 12, Lines 6-7, edited by
Suryanarayana Sukla, Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 196,
Varanasi 1971.
11. nihsandigdhSbadhitadhyavasayatmika pratltir vidya •
• I - - -
- Prasastapadabha~ya, Nyayakandall, Page 702, lines
22-23, edited by Vindhyesvariprasad Dvivedin,
Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, No. 6, Benares.
12. satyanubhavah prama. - Nyayalllavati, page 766,
•
line 3, edited by Pt. Harihara Shastri and Pt. Dhundiraja
Shastri, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares 193•.
13. paratmatayanapalambha.
- Ibid, page 769, lines 32-3.
 118

Thus, it appears that all these definitions of Prama

- I'
given by the advocates of the Nyaya-Vaise~ika school are
negative in character, and the negation is intended to
• I
exclude doubt, error and memory. Gangesa is perhaps the
first Naiyayika who attempts to define the positive

character of right knowledge. In his Pratyaksacintamani. .

Gangesa mentions a series of definitions of Prama given
by the Purvapaksin, and rejects all these definitions by
•
astounding logic. He, then, offers two alternative defini-
tions of Prama. He firest defines Prama as the knowledge of a
thing as it is. 14 To know a piece of silver to be as such
is valid knowledge. Subsequently he offers a more formal
- • I
definition of Prama. In this alternative definition Gangesa
endeavours to define prama as an experience whose qualifier
is such that it belongs to the object. 15 The later Naiyayikas
-

headed by Annainbhatta favour this definition. The word

••
1
tadvat 1 in the definition signifies that which has 'some-
thing• as its determinans (prakara). So prama is an appre-
hension which has for its determinans (prakara-object)
I
•something•, when the determinandum (visesya-object) is that
•
which has that •something•.

14-. .
yatra yadasti tatra tasyanubhavah prama •
- Tattvacint:amapi, Vol. I, Pratyak~akha~ga, page 401,
line 2, edited by Pt. Kamakhyanath Tarkabagish, Motilal
Banarsidass Publication, Delhi 1974.
15. tadvati tatprakarakanunhavo va
- Ibid., page 3.
 119

A question may be raised here that a second definition

of Prama given by Gangesa is too narrow (avyapti), since it

does not cover certain instances of valid knowledge_ It

fails to cover the right cognition of 'potness• in a pot.
I
It has 'potness• for its determinandum (vise~ya) and pot for
i~determinans (prakara). It would conform to the definition
of Prama if the pot could be said to present in potness.
But actually it is 1
potness• that is present in pot and not
vice-versa. As potness cannot surely have pot for its
characterizer the definition of Prama being •tadvati tat-
prakaraka' fails to cover the right cognition of potness in

a pot.
. /
To avoid this difficulty Gangesa interprets the word
• tadvat • as "that which bears a relation to that something".
In the case under reference there is surely 'tadvat• meaning
11
that which has a relation to that somethinq ... When pot-
ness and pot are related entities it cannot be said that it
is only potness that has some relation to • pot •, pot has
also some relation to potness. But this relation might not
be the same. While potness is said to be the pratiyogin
of the relation pot is the anuyogin of the relation that
potness bears to pot. An~ha~}a also endeavours to defend
this definition of Prama by interpreting the word •tadvat•
as "that which has a relation to that something ", and thus,
makes an attempt to avoid the charge of under coverage of
 120

the definition. 16 Annambhatta

• - is
is of opinion that prama
••
that anubhava of a relation to something, when that relation
to something does really exist. Thus, it appears from the
definition of prama as given by Gangesa and also interpreted.
by Tarakasamgraha-d1pikaxara that prama has both epistemic
and ~ntological components. Truth or Prama~ya is a property
of knowledge or prama and not of the object of the knowledge.

.
If Pramanya were a property of the object an error appren-
ding its object would also be true. So the Navya Naiyavikas
recognise
. .
Pr-amanya as a property of knowledge, not as a pro-
perty of the object of knowledge.

Different schools of Indian Philosophy differ widely

among themselves on the method by which prarnanya of a
•
knowledge establishes itself. While a large section is of

opinion that pramanya is known automatically the other

•
maintains that it is comprehended through the external
agencies. While Philosophers of the Samkhya system regard
both Pr-amanya and apr-amanya of knowledge as categories
• •
experienced automatically without the help of any external
factor, the Naiyayikas hold the view that both pramanya
•

16. yatra yatsambandho'sti tatra tatsambandhanubhavah•

ityarthat ghatatve'pi ghatasambandho'sti iti navyaptih.
• • •
- Tarakasamgrahadlpika, page 99, edited by Niranjan
Svarup Brahmachari, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar,
Calcutta.
 121

and apramanya of knowledge are known with the help of new

•
17
factors. Gotama, the great propounder of Nyayasutra,

.
considers the pramanya of verbal testimony
-
alone in order to
de:fend his thesis that the authority of the Vedas that have
18 - I
emanated from God cannot be challenged. But Vacaspati Misra
in his Tatparyatlka admits the validity of perception and

verbal testimony which is established through the causes

19
other than those required for genesis and revelation of
the knowledge itself.
. /
But Udayana and Gangesa give an extended scope to

. .
the concept of Paratahpramanya and maintain that Pramapya
of every sort of knowledge is established by the conditions
- "

-/
pramanatva. pramanatve svatah sainkhyah sam as ri tah• I
17~
-• - • •
_, •
naiyayikas tu paratah saugatas caramam svatah //
.
• •
- Manameyodaya. 2, 17-19;
or, vadanti kechit pramanyamapramanyamiti svatah 1
• • •
ubhayam paratah pr8huraksapatpaksiladayah I
• • • •
- Manameyodaya, Chapter on Prameya, page 176, edited by c.
Kunhan Raja and s.s. Suryanarayana Shastri, Theosophical
Publishing House, Adyar, Madras 1933.
- - I -
18. sa na manyeta drstartha eva' ptopadesah pramanam,
••• • •
.
arthasya' vadharanad iti, adrstartho' pi pramanam .. . .
arthasya • nun\anad. i ti.
- Nyayasutra, 1.1.8, vatsyayanabha~ya, page 87, line 2-3,
edited by Ganganatha Jha and Dhundhiraja Shastri,
Vidya Vilas Press, Benares, 1925.
- I v-- -
19. tasmat pratyak~asabdavijnanayor na svato' vyabhicaragraha
iti prav:ttisamarthyam tajjatiyatvam va lingam arthavya-
bhicaraya' nusaraniyam •
•
- Nyayasutra, 1.1.1. Nyayavarttikatatparyatika, page 9,
lines 12-1(, edited by Gadadhara Shastri Tailanga,
VizianaQram Sanskrit Series No. 15, Benares 1898.
 122

20
Other than those necessary for its genesis and revelation.

The Naiyayikas do not proclaim that when a knowledge

comes into being it is in the beginning neither true nor false.
They rather contend that every knowledge is either true or
false right at the beginning. Truth or falsity (pr-ama9ya
or apr-amanya) is due to a set of conditions that are different
•
from those conditions that give rise to knowledge. The
paratah theory, as admitted by the Naiyayikas, proclaims
•
the additional factors are needed to make a knowledge true.
Pramanya is generated in a knowledge due to gunas or
• •
excellences. Thus, the Naiyayikas admit the Paratah theory
•
in respect of the origination of truth. They admit the
Paratah theory in respect of the apprehension of truth also •
•
The truth of a knowledge is apprehended by the manifestor
other than the knowledge of a knowledge. If a knowledge were
right from the beginning comprehended as true, then it could
not subsequently be discovered to be false. If a knowledge
were apprehended to be true right from the beginning, it
could not possibly be doubted whether the knowledge is true
or false. But a comprehendet sometimes doubts, immediately
after having the knowledge, whether the knowledge is true or
not. Such doubts, the Naiyayikas claim, cannot be accounted
for if every knowledge initially comprehended to be true.

20. pramayih paratantratvat sargapralayasambhavat I

• -, - - -
tadanyasmin anasvasan na vidhantarasambhavah //
•
- Nyayakuswnanjali 2.1, Ganganath Jha Granthamala,
Vol. 6, edited by Durgadhara Jha, varanasi 1973.
 123

Though the Navya Naiyayikas admit the Pratah theory

•
of knowleage the old Naiyayikas headed by
-
Vacaspati Misra
,

consider the validity of Mental Perception (anuvyavasaya),

Inference and Analogy as a concept established by its ownself.

The intention of Vacaspati Misra is to mean that in inference,
analogy and mental perception no doubt arises as to the
validity of knowledge acquired, inasmuch as the process
21
involved in all these is full-proof. It is not the
~

intention of Vacaspati Misra that validity is inducted or

revealed by the causes ~quired for genesis or apprehension
of the knowledge concerned. But if validity of a knowledge
depends on another knowledge then emergence of a definite
knowledge free from all doubts would be a myth. All this
leads one to the conjecture that the neo-logician does not
hold the view that validity depends on other factors and
comprehensions for its revelation. To avoid these discre-
. /
pancies Gangesa in his Tattvacint:amani makes it clear that
•
validity of a knowledge does not depend on some external

21.
-
anumanasya tu ••• nirastasamastavyabhicarasankasya
/

svata eva pramanyam anumeyavyabhicarilingasamutthatvat

•
••• jnanagatatajjatlyatvalingagr-ahina~ ca jnanasya
- -. I -
• - -
manasapratyaksasya tadrsasya' drstavyabhicaratya
• • •••
parito nirastasamastavibhramasankasya svatah
•
pramapyam •••
- Nyayasutra, 1.1.1., Nyayavatttikatatparyatlka, page 9,
lines 4-6; 14-16; edited by Gadadhara Shastri Tailanga,
Vizianagram Sanskrit Series No. 15, Benares 1896.
 124

agencies, inasmuch as,this is ascertained simply by absence

of knowledge relating to unauthentic character of the
o I
knowledge concerned. Gangesa is of opinion that the
conditions and factors necessary for manifestation of know-
ledge do not effect revelation of validity pertaining to the
knowledge. But at the sametime, he proclaims that revelation

of validity does not depend on external factors. The ascer-

tainment of validity, Gangesa proposes, is effected through
absence of knowledge relating to invalid character of the
22
relevant knowledge.

22. jhatitipravrttis tu karacaranadimati ' -

sarirajnanatvader
0 0 <>
• I - - - - - 1~ -
v~sesaya•nuvyavasayena grahad apramanyasunyad
•
-~ ~ -
....,_ ~
0

vyavasayad eva, na pramanyajnanam pravarttakam ity

0

uktam.
Tattvacintamani, Vol. 1, Pratyaksa
Q 0
Khanda,
••

page 285 - 286, Motilal Banarsidass Reprint :

Delhi 1974.
SECTION - II

DEFINITION OF PERCEPl'ION
 125

SECTION - II

DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

- I
The Nyaya-Vaise~ika Philosophers recognize perception
(Pratyaksa pramana) as the stronger authority than all other
• •
sources of knowledge, inasmuch as, the latter rest on the
-
former for their genesis. So the exponents of Nyaya-Vaisesika
/
.
school headed by the propounders of Nyayasutra and
- - ,
Vaise~ika

sutra consider Pratyaksa to be the first Pramana. Gotama in

• •
his Nyaya-sutra first ~ttempts to define perception. He
defines perception as that cognition which is produced by
the contact of sense-opgan with the object, which is not
representable by words, which is not erroneous and which is
23
well-defined. While explaining the definition of percep-
tion given by Gotama Vatsyayana holds that the words • jnana • I
• indriyarthasannikaz;;ajanya.• 1 • avyapades"ya •, • avyabhicari• and
•vyavasayatmaka' are inserted in the definition to avoid the
coverage of the definition to pleasure (sukha)l inference,
.
knowledge expressible by words (sabdajnana)
,_ -- 1 error (viparyaya)
and doubtful perception (samsayatmaka pratyaksa) respectively •
•

23. - . """-
indriyarthasannikar~otpannamjnanamavyapadesyamavyabhi-
/

. •
carivyavasayatmakam pratyaksam
- Nyayasutra. 1/1/4.
 126

It is a fact that the content of the mind with the sense

organ is also a factor that results perception only. But
Gotama, as Vatsyayana interprets, does not feel it necessary
to include the contact of the mind with the sense organ
(indriyamanasasamyaga) in the definition of perception, since
perception is capable of being distinguished from other types
of knowledge by the contact of the sense organ with the
cognized object. 24 Though the contact of the mind with the
self, the contact of the sense organ with the mind, the
contact of the object with the light, the colour of the
object, the colour of that which is in contact with the
object, the large dimension of the object and the multi-
plicity of the component parts of the object are factors
that bring about perception, Gotama mentions only that
factor which is the cause peculiar to perception and not
th ose th a t are common to o th er f orms o f . ti on. 2 5
cogn~

24. ~- ~
yatpratyak~ajnanasya visi~~akarapam
- . taducyate,
yattu samanamanumanadijnanasya na ~vartate iti.

- Vatsyayanabh~ya, Page 60, lines 3-5,

edited by Ganganatha Jha and Dhundhiraja Shastri,
Chowkhamba sanskrit Series, Vidyavilas Press
edition, Benares 1925.
25. nedam karapavadharapartham sutram api tu
samanasamanajatlyavisesanartham. yatpratyaksasyasadha-
• • •
ranam karanarn talabhidhiyate. na punah sadharanain
• • • • •
karanam nivartyate iti •
•
- Nyayasutra 1.1.4, Nyayavarttika, page 32, lines 6-9,
Vidyavilas Press edition, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series,
Benares 1915.
 127

Uddyotakara in his Nyayavarttika proposes that Gotama men-

tions the contact of the sense organ with the object,
because it is this contact that forms the distinctive
feature of every individual perception. In every individual
perception what differentiates it from every other percep-
tion, is either the sense organ concerned or the object
26
perceived. A section of Nyaya school further proposes
that the contact of the sense organ with the mind is
mentioned in the definition of perception, since it is a
factor that is common to perception that are otherwise
27
different. When one perceives a crowd of men, cats, dogs
etc. the factor of mind-contact remains the same. But the
sense-object-contact is different with the perception of
each of the thing perceived. While explaining the defining
feature of perception as given by the author of Nyayasutra,

- • I -
26. indriyarthasannikarsagrahanam va visesakatvat.
• • •
y_ai:ib1driyarthasannikar~adupaj"ayate vijnanain
- I •
tasyanyataradvisesakam bhavati. indriyamarth •
•
- I • '- - •
va tadvise~akam tena vyapadesat yasmadidam
...,..._ - I -
jnanamindriyena va vyapadisyate arthena va
rupavijnanamiti caksurvijnanamiti
···'-
va.
- Ibid, page 32, lines 1•-18.

. .
27. indriyamanahsamyogasa va'grahanam bhede'bhedat.
. .
yasmat pratyaksajnanabhede indriyamanahsamyogo
na bhidyate iti.
- Ibid, pages 32-33.
 128

Uddyotakara is of opinion that the Nyayasutra does not

mention the contact of the mind with the sense organ, since
28
it is similar to mind-soul contact. Both the mind-soul
contact and sense-mind contact subsist in a substrate which
29
is not capable of being perceived by the senses. Both
subsist in the mind and neither of the two belongs to the
object perceived. 30 Since the purpose may be served aby any
of the two contacts the author of the Nyayasutra does not
31
mention both.
- -
Though Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara hold that all the
qualifications given in the definition afford one complete
I
definition of Perception, Vacaspati Misra in his magnum opus
Nyayavarttikatatparyatlka announces that avyapade~ya and
vya~~aka are not to be taken as defining characteristics

28. . .
indriyamanahsamyogasya ca 'grahanain sarnanatvat.
kena sarnanatvaditi vacyarn. atmaaanassaiayogena
san\anatvat.
- Ibid, pages 33, lines 5- 8.

.
2 9. atindriyadhamtava sarnanyarn, yatha'tmamanahsanmiyogo'
tindriyadhara evamindriyarna nahs ainyogo • pl ti
•
Ibid, lines 8-9.
30. yatha'tamanahsamyogo
•
visayavrttih
• • •
tathendri-
.
[Link]'piti. manovrttitvain va •
Ibid., lines 10-11.
31. anyatanthidhanena va caritarthatvad anabhidhanam
it!.
- Ibid, page 33, lines 13-14.
 129

of Perception. According to him, these two words signify the

32
two forms of perception - nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka.
Thus Vacaspati recognizes indriyarthasannikarsatannamjnanam
avyabhicari as the definition of perception. 33

• I
Gangesa, the pioneer of neo~logicians, spends consi-

derable energy in explaining the definition of perception.

In his Pratyaksacintamani he mentions a series of definitions
• •
of perception given by the Purvapaksin and seeks to disprove
•
all these definitions. While Vacaspati defines perception
as the undevLating cognition that results from the contact
. ,
of the sense 1 organ with the object, Gangesa refuses to

accept it, since it tails to cover the direct apprehension

of Superhuman agent or God having no sense organ. To avoid
this difficulty a section of the Nyaya school recognizes
the knowledge resulting from the contact of the sense organ
with the object as the definition of janya pratyaksa. But
•

32. tadasya nirakaranam laksnagatenalocanajnanavarodhar-

- /
•
thenavyapadesyapadena -• •
sucitamiti.
- Nyayasutra, 1.1.4, Nyayavarttikatatparyat1ka, page 22,
lines 13-141 tasmatsavikalpakapratyaksavarodhartham
•
Vyavasayatmakapadamiti siddham.
- Ibid, page 85, lines 9-10, edited by Gadadhara
Shastri Tailanga, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series No. 15,
Benares 1898.
3 3. indriyarthasannikarsotpannain jnanamavyabhicari ti hi
•

.. ..
pratyaksalaksanamanavayavena samanasamanajatiyavya-
/
vrttam [Link] laksayi tum.
• •
Ibid, page 98, lines 7-9.
 130

G anges'a offers two definitions of perception to tackle this

problem. In the first definition he attempts to define per-

ception as direct awareness thus, explains immediacy as the
34
defining feature of perceptual cognition. But to cover
the perception of individual and that of Superhuman agency
he offers a second definition of Pratyaksa which is defined
•
as that cognition which cannot have another cognition as its
instrumental cause or Karana • [Link] recollection of

invariable concomitance is considered as the instrumental

cause of inferential cognition. In an anology the compre-
' ~ .....,_
hension of similarity (sadrsyajnana) is the instrumental
•
cause. And in the verbal cognition the comprehension of
words is being considered as the instrumental cause. But
in a perceptual cognition, both in janya and ajanya pratyak~a,

the sense organ is regarded as the karana. So all the per-

•
ceptual cognition whether it is the perception of
individual or of Superhuman agent, does not have any
cognition as its instrumental cause. In a qualified
.
" holds, the knowledge of a
perceptual cognition, Gangesa

34. pratyaksasya
•
saksatkaritvam
•
laksanam.
• •
- Tattvacintamapi, Vol. - 1, Pratyak~akhap9a,
page 543, line 2, edited Kamakhyanatha Tarkavagish,
Motilal Banarsidass Publication, Delhi 1974.
35. .
jnanakaranakain Jnanami ti tu vayam •
Ibid, page 552, line 1.
 131

qualifier (vi~esanajnana) should not be considered as an

• •
instrumental cause or Karana in absence of vyapara or
•
36
me¢diating condition.

A question may be raised here that the definition

of perception being .
~nanakaranakamjnanam•
I
fails to cover
I
the relational perceptual cognition (visistavaisistapratyaksa).
• • •• •
In a relational cognition the qualificandum of the cognition
is limited by the limiting property of being qualificandum
and is determined by the property of being the qualifier which
is again qualified by another qualifier O£
I
.
'visesanatavacche-
•
-

daka •. So the Purvapaksin argues that the cognition of the

•
I ..,.._
qualifier (visesanajnana) results from the cognition of the
• •
qualifier of a qualifier, and as a matter of fact, the
cognition of the qualifier of a qualifier may be treated
as a Karana of relational perceptual cognition with the help
•
of the cognition of the qualifier as being the vyapara or
mediating condition. In reply to this objection Gangesa
. /

makes it clear that the cognition of the qualifier of a

qualifier should not be considered as a Karana of the rela- .
37
tional cognition in absence of the supporting evidence.

36. I'
v i s~stapratyakse ca vi~esanajnanam na karanam
• • • • • •
[Link].
- Ibid, lines 1-2.
37.
I

. I
na tu visesanavisesanadhirapi
..
karanam manabhavat •
.. - /
visesanadh1dvara .. - -

•
- Ibid, page 553, lines 1-2.
 132

The Purvapaksin may further argue that this definition

•
.
" does not cover recognition
of perception given by Gangesa
or 'Pratyabhijna•. Pratyabhijna is a propositional judgement

which apprehends the • that • and the • this • as related.

It does not consist in two judgements, a memory and a
perception, but is one perceptual judgement of their related-
ness. The opponent is of opinion that the Naiyayikas

.
recognize Pratyaksa as a form of perception. In the case of
"this is that Devadatta" (whom the comprehender sav before)"
this Devadatta is perceived by the ordinary contact of the
sense organ with Devadatta and that Devadatta which the
object of the previous experience is apprehended by the
extra-ordinary connection (jnanalak~a~a sannikar~a) in the
form of memory of that Devadatta. So the Purvapaksin objects
•
that as a recognition or Pratyabhijna is produced by the
impression of the previous experience, the previous appre-
hension of •anubhava• may be considered as a karapa of
PratyabhijAna. This definition of perception may, thus, fail~

to cover a recognition which cannot have another cognition

as its kara~a. To meet the charge of the
-
Purvapak~in
.
Gangesa
/

replies that in a recognition the memory of the object of

the previous experience is a causal condition. If it were
produced by the impression of the previous experience then
 133

Pratyabhijna would be treated as a memory. 38 So it would not

be wrong to claim that the definition of perception being
• jnanakaranakain jnanam • is free from all defects and is common
•
to both ~eternal and non-eternal (jnaya and ajanya) per-
ception.

38. pratyabhijnayantu tattasmrtih karanam na tu

• • •
samskaradvara anubhavah karanam tasyah
• • •
sams~arajanyatve smrtitvapatteh.
• •
-Ibid, page 554, lines 1-2.

,
SECTION - III

NYAYA-VAISESIKA CONCEPT OF
NI·RVIKALPPJ<A PRATYAKSA
 134

SECTION - III

- ,
NYAYA-VAISESIKA CONCEPT OF NIRVIKALPAKA PRATYAKSA
• •

Like the Mimamsaka and the Vedantin, the Naiyayika and

/
Vaise~ika Philosophers also admit 'nirvikalpaka' and •savikal-
paka' as two forms of perception. According to Vatsyiyana and
Uddyotakara, the propounder of the Nyayasutra does not make
mention of two forms of perception. But the great Vacaspati
I
Misra in his comments on the Nyayavarttika recognises
the division of perception, and claims that the author of
Nyayasutra indicates nirvikalpaka
. .
pratyaksa and savikalpaka
--
, and vyavasayatmaka given
pratyaksa by the words avyapadesya
•
39
in the definition of perception. From the analysis of
- I
Vacaspati Misra it reveals that Gotama is also aware of two
types of perception.

- - I
Like the author of Nyayasutra and the author of Vaise~i-

kasutra also does not explicitly mention the classification of

39. tadasya nir~aranam laksanagatenaloeanajnanavarodhar-

- , •
thenavyapadesyapadena
• •-
-[Link] tamiti.
-N¥ayasutra, 1.1.4, Nyayavarttikatatparyatika,
page 83, lines 13-14; edited by Gadadhar Shastri
Tailanga. Vizianagram Sanskrit Series No. 15,
Benares 1898.
 135

I - /
perception. But Prasastapada in his comments on Vaise~ika-

sutra expressively mentions nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as a

•
form of perception and specify it by the name of
- ,...._ 4Q I I
alocanajnana. Vyomasiva and Sr1dhara,the two commentators
I - -
of Prasastapadabha~ya 1 discuss the nature and role of
/ I -
nirvikalpaka pratyaksa in the Vaisesika scheme. Sridhara in
• •
his Nyayakandali asserts that in a nirvikalpaka pratyaksa
•• •
the cognizer apprehends both the qualificandum and the
qualifier as a whole. According to him, in the non-relational
stage of perception the cognizer comprehends the undifferen-
tiated class and individual i.e. nirvikalpaka pratyak~a is a
perceptual cognition of a total whole in which the elements
41
have not yet been cognized as two terms of relation. The com-
prehension of assimilation and differentiation depends on the
cognition of a similar object. A class is comprehended as a

generic character when it is cognized as included in another

40. dravye tavat trividhe mahatyanekadravyavattodbhuta-

- -~
rupaprakasacatustayasannikarsad
•• •
- .
dharmad~samag~e
•
- -
ca svarupalocanamatram.
~
- Prasastapadabha~ya, - -
pages 552-553, edited by Gopinath
Kaviraja and Dhudhiraj Shastri, Chowkhamba Sanskrit
Series No. 384, Vidyavilas Press edition, Benares 1929.
41. .
k~ntu
- -
samanyam . - "
vise~ am
cabhayamapi gfhnati.
~ . - - -
- Prasastapadabha~ya, Nyayakan~al~, page 446, lines 11-12,
edited by Kshetresachandra Chattopadhyay, Varanaseya
Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, Varanasi 1963.
 136

object. In the same manner, specific individuality also is

cognized when the exclusion of the specific feature from a

similar object is known. As no other object is cognized in
I -.
a non-relational perception, Sr~dhara declares, the
apprehender fails to make a distinction between individual
42
and class. In a non-relational cognition the cognizer
cognizes them as such, but not as an individual and universal
43
in absence of the cognition of sameness and differentiation.
Subsequently, the undifferentiated whole becomes differen-
tiated into two elements - qualificandum and qualifier,
as related by certain relation.
J
Mention may be made in this connection that sridhara•s
view of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa emanates from the view of
•
-
Vacaspati
/
Misra, the author of Nyaya-Varttikatatparyat~ka.
,
While explaining the significance of the word 'avyapadesya'
occurring in the definition of perception as given by
Gotama, Vacaspati holds the opinion that a nirvikalpaka
pratyaksa apprehends the nature of class etc. (jatyadi)
•
but not the class etc. as the qualificandum and qualifier

• • J I
42. yadi paramidam samanyamayam vise~a ityevam vi~icya
na pratyeti vastvantaranusandhanavirahat.
- Ibid, lines 12-13 •
• 3. pindantaranuvrttigrahanaddhi sarnanyam vivicyate,
•• • •
[Link] • yam iti vi vekah.
• • • •
- Ibid, pages 446-447.
 137

44
of the cognition related by a relation. Thus, it appears
that Vacaspati is the first Naiyayika who proclaims that the
undifferentiated whole (the class and the individual) is the
object of non-relational perception.

A serious attempt has been made by the Naiyayikas,

particularly by the neo-logicians, to tackle the problem of
indeterminate perception. The Naiyayikas classify cognition
on the basis of the nature of cognition of the object cog-
nized. On the basis of this principle the Nyaya School
admits two types of cognition - qualificative and non-
qualificative. The former is known as relational or
savikalpaka and the latter as non-relational or nirvikalpaka
cognition. ~ anuvyavasayas are of four types vyavasaya
jninas also, as the Naiyayikas think, are of four types.
While cognitions resulted by Inference, Analogy or verbal
testimony are relational or determinate in character, cognition
emanated from sense-object contact is of two types - deter-
minate or savikalpaka and indeterminate or nirvikalpaka.

44:. ~
avyapadesyam. - -
jatyadisvarupavagahi - - -·
na tu jatyadinam
I I - -
mitho visesanavisesyabhavavagahi •••
• • •
- Nyaya-sutra 1.1.4, Nyayavarttikatatparyat~ka,
page 82, lines 8-9, edited by Gadadhara Shastri
Tailanga. Vizianagram Sanskrit Series No. 15,
Benares 1898.
 138

The Naiyayikas widely differ among themselves in

regard to the treatment of determinate cognition. In a

I
savikalpaka praty~a the qualificandum (vise~ya), the
qualifier (prakara) and their relation (sambandha) are
cognized. The peculiarity of this type of cognition is that
it apprehends a complex object, i.e. a relation and its
two simple terms. Within the complex object there are two
elements and these elements again are related with respect
to their relation. According to Navya-Nyaya, there is no
independent reality of qualified object. In the example
'dandlpurusah' or the stick-possesser, what is intended to
•• • •
say is not anything other than related to a stick. A
person holding a stick in his hand is not ontologically
a new entity. What are real are the person, the stick and
the relation between them. The first term of the relation
is the qualificandum of the cognition, the second term of
the relation is the qualifier of the cognition and the
relation is the qualification. A large section of the Nyaya-
school define~qualified cognition as the cognition having
a property of the qualificandum limited by the limiting
property of being qualificandum and determined by the
property of being qualifier. These Naiyayikas maintain
that in a determinate perception a qualified qualifier is

comprehended. But it is not a general principle that every

qualifier must be qualified. If the object of a cognition
 139

is an unending series of qualifier one would fail to cognize

the object of the cognition. 45 So Gange~a proclaims that
a qualifierless object is to be admitted at one stage,
and th?t qualifierless object should be apprehended in an
indeterminate perception. 46 He recognizes savikalpaka
or determinate cognition as 'visista-vai~istyavagahi jnana•
• • ••
or the cognition of the qualificandum or relation qualified
by the qualifier. 47. Here the relation of the qualifier i n
a qualificandurn is the qualification of the qualifier in a

48 • /
/

• .
qualificandum. The word 'vaisistya• signifies this quali-
fication. Thus, Gangesa asserts that a cornprehender
apprehends the relation qualified by a qualifier, and this

45.
/ . ,
vise~a~am vise~a~avadeva bhaset iti na niyam~.
-
- gauriti jnane
anyatha """""- ,
visesana
•
"
- tadvisesanana-
ntapararnparavi~atve v~~aryyavasanaprasamga9.
. . .-
- Tattvacintama~i, Pratyak~a Kha~a, Nirvikalpa-
kavada Motilal Banarsidass Publication, Delhi 1979.
46. kvacitnuivi~esanasyapi bhane prathamato'pi tatha
- ,
syadvisesat
•
• -
• •

- Ibid, lines 8-9.

47.
-- ~
tathacavisesanavadvisesyajnanatvarn
• • •
~ """""'- . ~ ~-
vis~ajnanatvarn.
••
- .
- Ibid, page 821, lines 11-12.
48.
I
vaisistyarn
. .
yasya yatra·. yah sambandah sa eva tatra tasya

••
- Ibid, lines 7-8.
 140

I 1 ..,.._
is technically expressed by 'visi~~a-vaisi~~ya-jnana•.
e I
Following Gangesa all the later Naiyayikas endeavour to
define savikalpaka pratyaksa as samsargavagahijnana i.e •
•
a cognition in which relation of the terms is cognized.
For a relational cognition it is absolutely necessary that
the qualificandum and the qualifier be related by a relation.
In a relational cognition of a jar as qualified by the
qualifier 'blue• the comprehender cognizes the relation of
inherence, inasmuch as, the blue colour inhers in the jar.
But from the exposition 'blue • colour, inherence and jar
one does not have a qualificative cognition but only a
conjunctive cognition.

In a co9junctive cognition there must be at least

two qualificandum with respect to two independent qualifiers.
But in every relational cognition there must be one general
qualificandum with respect to one chief qualifier. So the
cognition of blue and jar is radically different from a blue
jar. When one cognizes both blue and jar, they are not
related by any relation. When a cognizer cognizes a jar as
qualified by the blue colour he necessarily apprehends the
blue and colour as related by the relation of inherence.
According to Navya Nyaya, a relation can never be expressed
in a word. It is to be understood from the order of words
denoting the terms of relation.
 141

The Vyavasaya or determinate cognition is cognized by

· 49 Th N i - ik
anuvyavasaya or i ntrospect~ve cogn~'t'
~on. e a yay as ad mit
the actual psychological state of savikalpaka jnana. But
there is a storm of controversy over the problem of an actual
state of nirvikalpaka pratyakaa. A section of the Nyaya school
•
maintains that nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is not an actual
•
psychological state of cognition but purely a logical stage.
For the justification of a qualificative cognition a non-
qualificative cognition is postulated in the Nyaya
scheme. 50 But the author of Nyayakaustava supports another
theory, according to which, the non-relational state of
cognition is [Link] state of consciousness. Everyone is
aware of the state of consciousness on the first moment of
awakening from a deep sleep. But most of the Naiyayikas
hold the opinion that nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is a cognition
•
prior to every act of relational cognition. They postulate
the actual occurrence of this non-relational cognition.
Unless this non-relational cognition of the qualifier
or qualificandum is admitted a relational cognition in which

49. jnanajnanatvena sarvva vittirasamadaderutpadya

-bhananubhuyat eva.

so.
- Ibid, page 802, lines 4-5.
.
guariti pratyaksam
•
~

..
..,.._ .
,
visesanajnanajanyam visista-..
jnanatvadanumitivaditi.
- Ibid., Nirvikalpakavada, page 809, lines 8-9.
 142

the qualificandum, the qualifier and their relation are

cognized, would be impossible. So the Naiyayikas affirm that
every relational cognition, particularly every qualificative
perceptual cognition, is preceeded by an actual occurrence
to the non-relational type of perception in which the mode of
qualifier is directly presented and which does not need to be

cognized through any mode at all.

The problem of nirvikalpaka pratyak~a has not been

taken into consideration by the Pracina Naiyayikas except
Jayanta Bhatta, Vacaspati and Udayana. But these old Naiya-
••
yikas fail to definitely establish the nature of nirvikalpaka.
. ~
Gangesa is perhaps the first navya Naiyayika who makes an
attempt to present a full-bodied form of the theory of
nirvikalpaka pratyaksa, and subsequently, all the latter
•
Naiyayikas take interest in this problem.

The Naiyayikas do not generally draw a line of

demarcation between qualificative and non-qualificative
cognition on the basis of linguistic marks. The Nyaya system
maintains that in a non-relational cognition the comprehender
cognizes the simple unrelated objects but in a relational
cognition a complex object as related by a relation. But they
do not distinguish them as uncomrnunicable and communicable
cognition. It is interesting to note that Jayanta Bha~~a

in his Nyayamanjari holds the opini-on that all sorts of

perception apprehends the same set of objects. There is no
 143

slightest difference of a determinate perception from an

51
indeterminate one so far as their real objectsare concerned.
Jayanta Bhatta proposes that a determinate perception is
••
proceeded by the memory of the name of an object. But an
indeterminate perception is not similarly produced. While the
former cognition is communicable, the latter is uncommuni-
cable. 52 The uncommunicability of a non-relational knowledge
is also indicated in the definition of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa
.
as given by Gangesa
. ~ -
his Tattvacintamani •
~n
•
•

. / -
Gangesa in his Tattvacintamani defines nirvikalpaka
•
pratyak~a as - -
'namajatiyojanarahitani / - -
vaisi~~yanavagahini~-

• nirvikalpakam •. 53 He explains indeterminate per-

prakarakam
ception in terms of negative characteristics - (i) there is
no introduction of names, universal etc., (ii) it is not a
cognition of a relation {iii) and it does not have any
prakara or mode. It is generally believed that Gangesa
. /

accepts the uncommUnicability of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa and

•

51. yadeva savikalpena tadevanena grhayate •

•
- Nyayamanjari, part-1, page 92, edited by
Suryanarayana Shukla, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit
Series, Varanasi 1971.
52. tasmadya eva vastvatma savikalpakasya gocarah I
I
•
sa eva nirvikalpakasya sadollekhavivarajitah //
•
- Ibid.
53. Tattvacintamani,
• . ..
pratyaksa khanda, Nirvikalpaka-
vada, page 809, lines 2-9, edited by Kamakhyanatha
Tarkavagisha, Motilal Banarsidass Publication, Delhi,1974.
 144

it is indicated by the characteristic being 'namayojanarahita•

occurring in the definition. Actually speaking, according to

the Naiyayikas, the determinate and indeterminate perception
1 I
do not involve any names or words. Gangesa also subscribes to
their view. If words are involved in a relational perception

then non-relational perception can be defined as that which

.
does not involve the use of words. But Gangesa does not define
/

determinate perception as a cognition in which words are

involved. Keeping the view in mind the later commentators
, -
explain narnayojanarahita as vaisistanavagahi. But they do
-
••
not answer the charge of useless repetition.
e I I I - -
Gangesa refers to visistavaisistanavagahi and
•• ••
nisprakaraka as two other essential features which may be
•
admitted as two separate definitions of nirvikalpaka
pratyaksa • In an indeterminate perception, Gangesa proposes,
. ,
•
there is no comprehension of relation. He further points out
that it is not a perception of an object qualified by any
prakara or mode. It is a direct acquaintance with an object.

.
" and inter-
All the later Naiyayikas follow Gangesa
prete nirvikalpaka pratyaks a as a cognition in which the
I

qualifier is cognized, but not their relation. Though

~ - - -
Visvanatha in his Siddhantamuktavali supports Ganqesa's
. ~

definition, he does not admit that in an indeterminate per-

ception the cognizer cognizes the mere qualifier. ~ccording

to him, the nirvikalpaka pratyak~a apprehends the

 145

./
differentiated whole. It presents samanya and vise~a as
54
generic character and specific individuality respectively.
In an non-relational perception the knower cognizes the
distinction between the class and individual, but he does
not cognize that they are r~lated by the relation of inherence. 55
Vi~vanatha holds the opinion that in nirvikalpaka pratyak~a

one cognizes not mere jarness, not merely undifferentiated

whole of jar - jarness but the two elements jar and jarness.
Thus, in a non-relational cognition the cognizer cognizes
the unrelated jar and jarness, and later on in a relational
cognition he cognizes these two elements as related by
certain relations.

Time seems to be appropriate to deal with the problem

whether the cognition of negation is indeterminate or not.
• I -
Udayana and Gangesa, the two great champions of Nyaya School,
affirm that the cognition of negation (abhava} should be a
qualificative one. Udayana in his Nyayakusurnanjali seeks to
define abhava as the object of the cognition that depends

54. - . /
.. -
tathaca prathamato ghataghatatvayorvaisistyanava-
- •
gahyeva jnanam jayata, tedeva nirvikalpakam.
- Bha~apariccheda, verse 58, Muktavali, pages 186-187,
edited by Hariram Shukla Nyayacharya, Kashi Sanskrit
Series No. 6, Vidyavilas Press edition, Benares 1951.
55. anavastilabhiya prathamam vi~esanajnanam vai~istyana-
• • ••
vaghayeva sv1karyarn.
- Ibid, Dinakar1, page 186, lines 15-16.
 146

. _, 56 . th
on the cognition o f t h e second term Prat~yog~. AS ~n e
case of a relation it is the second term (Pratiyogin) that
determines the relation not the first term (anuyogin), so

negation is also determined by its counter positive (Pratiyo-

gin), not by the locus oev(anuyogin). One cannot cognize
simple negation which is not determined by the second term
(Pratiyogin). Since the comprehension of negation necessarily
depends on the comprehension of Pratiyogin, the cognition
of negation, as Udayana claims, should be considered as a

re l .
at~ona
l one. 57

It is to be noted that some Naiyayikas do not subs-

cribe to Udayana•s position that the cognition of negation
necessarily depends on that of Pratiyogin. While writing
notes on Udayana•s Nyayakusumanjali Mahesh Chandra Nyaya-
ratna rightly points out that a section of the Nyaya school
who does not consider the cognition of counterpositive
(pratiyogin) as the pre-requisite for the cognition of
abhava, recognizes the cognition of negation as an indeter-
58
minate one.

56. pratiyogimatranirupaniyohyabhavah.
- -~ .
. 2.1. Vivrti, page 20, line 11,
- Nyayakusumanjal~,
edited by Laksana Shastri Dravid, Chowkhamba Sanskrit
Book Depot, Vidyavilas Press edition, Be nares 1912.
_,
57. yastu tatpur~ sara eva prakasate, tatra tasya
vikalpasamagr1samavadhanavate eva samarthannayam bidhih.
- Nyayakusumanjali 2.22, page 106, lines 4-6, ibid. •
58. yanmate pratiyogijnanam na tatra karanam,
- .-
tanmate'bhavasya nirvikalpakasattve'pi indriyadeva
tadutpatttih sambhavati •
•
- Ibid, page 4, lines 16-18.
 147

. /
Like Udayana Gangesa also declares that there can be

no cognition of negation in indeterminate perception. A

negation has to be located somewhere. The negation of jar
on the floor can be cognized in two different ways the
floor is negation-of-jar-possessing (ghatabhavavadbhutalam)
•
and negation-of-the jar on the floor (bhutale gha~~hav~).
• I
A:t the first stage, as Gangesa holds, the cognition of
negation has its locus as its qualifier and not the
negation. In the case of "the negation of jar on the floor 11
(bhutale ghatBbhavah) the floor is the qual if ie r and the
• •
negation is qualificandum. The cognition of qualifier, accor-
• I 59
din~ to Gangesa, is the cause of a qualified cognition.
So he admits the indeterminate cognition of bhutalatva.
Subsequently the comprehender cognizes the floor qualifying
- - - • 60 In
the negation of the jar (ghatabhavavad bhutalam) .
this cognition the floor is the qualificandum and the negation
of the jar is the qualifier.
. /
Thus, Gangesa affirms that
there can be no indeterminate cognition of negation.

59.
I

.. ~- - •
visistajnanamatram prati visesanajnanam hetuh.
- Tattvacintama~i, Pratyak~a Kha~a, Nirvikalpakavada,
I

.. ~ •

.
page 812, lines 3-4, edited by Kamakhyanatha Tarka-
Vagisha, Motilal Banarsidass Publication, Delhi, 1974.
60. prathamain bhutale ghata [Link] ti buddhih tatra
~
• •
.
- - / I ""'""'-
bhutalam, vise~a~am abhavovisepy~ vise~yajnanaca
- ~-
na kara~am, pascad / -
bhutalavise~yakam gha~abhavavaditi
--
Jr1anam.
- Ibid, page 822, lines 11-13.
 148

A careful analysis reveals that a section of the

Naiyayikas does not subscribe to the principle enunciated
. ,
by Gangesa that the cognition of the qualifier is the
cause of a relational [Link] old Naiyayikas like
- , I
vacaspati Misra and the neo-logicians like Rucidatta
maintain that like the cognition of qualifier that of a
qualificandum also is the cause of a qualificative
cognition. In an indeterminate perception one cognizes
the qualifier as well as the qualificandurn. In the case

of the cognition of negation of the jar on the floor

(bhutale gha~abhavah) the floor is the qualifier and the
• •
negation is qualificandum. These Naiyayikas firmly state
that like the cognition of the floor the cognition of
negation also should be taken as the cause of the cog-
nition of negation on the floor. On the strength of this
arguments Rucidatta endeavours to establish that there
should be an indeterminate perception of negation.
- I
The Nyaya-Vaisesika
•
thinkers hold the opinion that
in order to comprehend a primary knowledge about an
object (vyavasaya) an introspective cognition (anuvyava-
saya)which has vyavasaya as its object is necessary.
But there cannot be any such introspective awareness of
indeterminate perception, inasmuch as, the anuvyavasaya
must be a doubly qualificative cognition, whereas an
indeterminate perception is not a qualificative cognition
 149

at a11. 61 so, according to the Nyaya School, an

anuvyavasaya fails to apprehend an indeterminate percep-
tio'n. Keeping the view in mind the nee-logicians who
recognise nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as a first step of per-
•
ception, endeavour to establish it through the process of
# I
inference. The inference given by Gangesa runs thus :

-. ..62
,
•gaur~ti
•
. I ,..._ - •
pratyaksamvisesanajnanajanyam I ""'- -
visistajnanatvat.
i.e., the qualificative cognition of the cow is caused by
the prior knowledge of the qualifier cowness, since it is a
qualificative cognition. According to Gangesa, qualifi-
. ,

cative cognition depends on the cognition of a simple

object which will be taken into consideration as a

qualifier in the subsequent qualificative [Link],
the neo-logicians with all emphasis at their command
affirm that for the justification of a qualified cognition
an indeterminate cognition of the qualified simple objects
should be postUlated. While giving his own arguments

I - - ""-
61. VaiSi~~yanaVagahijnanasya pratyak~am na bhavati,
ghatarnahain Jimanu t1 pratyayat, tatratmani jnanain
•
-- bhaste, jnane
prakaribhuya ~-
ghatah, tatra ghatatvam, •••
• •
.
nirvikalpake ca ghatatvadikarn
•
na prakarah• •••
Btl~apariccheda, Karika 58, Muktavali, paqe 187,
edited by Hariram Shukla Nyayacharya, Kashi Sanskrit
Series No. 6, Vidyavilas Press edition, Benares, 1951.
62. Tattvacintamani, Prayaksakhanda, Nirvikalpakavada,
• • ••
Page 809, lines 8-9, edited by Kamakhyanatha Tarka-
vagisha, Motilal Banarsidass Publication, Delhi 1974.
 150

. ,
for indeterminate perception Gangesa cites the case of a
child who perceives a cow as cowness-possessing for the
first time in his life. The eyes of the child come into
contact with cowness and gives rise to the perception of
cowness without any mode. Subsequently. the child perceives
the cow as cowness-possessing. so. for the justification of
the first determinate perception of the child the postula-
tion of an indeterminate perception is necessary. But it is
to be noted that all qualificative cognitions are not pro-
duced by a cognition of a qualifier. God. according to the
Navya-Nyaya. perceives all objects and his perception is
determinate one, and this perception is eternally there.
. ,
So Gangesa announces that all qualificative cognitions
which are produced at all, are produced by the relevant
qualifiers. 63 This cognition of the relevant qualifier
is indeterminate perception. On close scrutiny it reveals
that an introspective cognition is in one part indeterminate
and in another part determinate. It is indeterminate as
cognition of cognitionness (~universal) and is determinate

,
63. prathamikam gauriti pratyak~am jnanam janyavise-
~- . ., ~- -
~apajnanajanyam janyav~si~}ajnanatvat anumitivat.

- Ibid, page 817. lines 4-6.

 151

64
as cognition of objective cognition (vyavasaya}. Like the
introspective cognition, Gange~a proposes, the qualified cog-
nition of the cow also is in one part indeterminate and in
another part determinate. So far as the cognition of cowness
is concerned it is indeterminate and the cognition of the
65
cow qualified by the mode of cowness is determinate.
A comprehender, as the Naiyayika claims,postulates a non-
relational cognition prior to a~ non-eternal relational
cognition, and he cognizes both determinate and indeterminate
cognitions as parts of one objective cognition (vyavasaya-
jnana) and of one introspective cognition (anuvyavasaya) as
well.

""""'._..._ • I -•
64. jnanatve ca nirvikalpakam visayavisistatvamse
• • 4 •

savikalpakamapi •••
- Ibid, page 823, lines 5-6.

65. -.
gauriti savikalpakamapi gotvamse nirvikalpakameva
tatra prakarabhanat.
Ibid, page 823, lines 11-12.