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Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives

The document discusses various frameworks for classifying the goals and objectives of states in foreign policy. It outlines general-specific, normative-descriptive, vital-non-vital, long-range-medium-range-short-range, and concentric circle models of classification. Additional models covered are the Northedge analytical model and others from authors like Wolfers, Legg-Morrison, and Frankel.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
94 views15 pages

Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives

The document discusses various frameworks for classifying the goals and objectives of states in foreign policy. It outlines general-specific, normative-descriptive, vital-non-vital, long-range-medium-range-short-range, and concentric circle models of classification. Additional models covered are the Northedge analytical model and others from authors like Wolfers, Legg-Morrison, and Frankel.

Uploaded by

mojeedsodiq0
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

FOREIGN POLICY: GOALS & OBJECTIVES

Generally, the foreign pÍlicy gals and objcctives of state actors in the international system are
collectively described asthe'nåtional interest, While we customarily distinguish betwcen goals and
we may
means, it is impossible to draw a sharp linc of demarcation bctween the two ideals. What or
reasonably accept is Arnold Wolfers' conclusion that 'all means can be said to constitute intermediary
as cnds in
being sought
proximate goals,and tew goals if any can be considercd ultimate in the scnse of
themsclves' (Wolfers, 1962, p. 68).Thus there is hardly any state in the international system which is
more and no less than the desire for
convinced that thc sum total of its involvement in world affairs is no
'national interest' as the collective term
power; on the other hand, almost all state actors use the term
told the American people that 'a small
for their motivations in forcign policy. George Washingtonthe greatest part of mankind, interest is
knowledge of human nature willconvince us that with far
man is more or less under its influence' (quoted in
the governing principle; and that almost every Lord Salisbury and Lord Palmerston,
Morgenthau, 1968, p. 8). Two remarkable British statesmen,
are known for their famous declarations that
only bond of union that endures among nations is the absence of all clashing interests'
(i) "the
(Lord Salisbury), and enemies. Britain's interests are eternal and
'Britain has no eternal allies and no eternal
(ii) Palmerston)
these interests it is our duty to follow' (Lord that 'nations have no feelings but only
asserted
General Charles de Gaulle of France famously that in politics there are no permanent friends or
interests'. We are also familiar with the saying
enemies, only permanent interests."
Classification of Goals and Objcctives the values,
actors, particularly nation-state actors, define their interests in terins of orders of
When
international system, they arrange these in varying
goals and desires they seek in the security as the
and urgency using the well-being of their peoples and their
valuations, importance the dangers, threats and challenges which they face as
highest values. They also define cieariy
have.
well as the opportunities which they identifiable They are (a) the general-specific;
in the [Link]-range-medium-range-short
Some nine classifications are
vital-non-vital; (d) the
(b) the normative-descriptive; (c)(e)thethe concentric circle model, () the Northedge analytical
range models or classifications; (h) the Wolfers model and (i) the
Frankel model.
model,(g)the Legg-Morrison model,
(a) General-Specific Classification. security,
objectives of actors which relate to universal ends such as
This schemeclassifies all human rights as general objectives
of
disarmament and
peace, happiness, success, prestige,
that involve particular problems, such as the Arab demandsforfor
demands
foreign policy. Other objectives and occupied Arab territories in the Middle East, or
recovering all Israeli conquered releasing aliens imprisoned in a foreign country, or the
of
OPEC oil price increases, or goalsreturn Yakubu Gowon to Nigeria, are classified as specific
Nigerian demand on Britain to (Holsti, 1972, pp. 134-6).
objectives or goals of foreign policy
(b) Normative-Descriptive (Seabury, 1963, p. 86) normative goals. They are images of the
classification groups all ideals which actors [Link] world which actors desire (e.g, a
This future set of conditions in the
future state of affairs and the other hand,
oppressed). Descriptive values, goals and interests, on the
world in which no one is
attainable (that is they are far removed from wishes and hopes) and
are those which are real, in Nigeria- UK trade in two years time).
persistently pursuedby actors (10% growth
pp. 136-9)
(c) Vital-Non-Vital (Holsti, 1972,classified as 'vital' if they are the core interests and values ol
Foreign policy objectives arc also national wcll-being, strategic defences,and nationa
changing
self-preservation and either
actors(i.c. relate to 'non-vital' interests or goals if they are
economic and industrial capacity); and as
1
(notconstant)/or peripheralin character. These non-vital goals relate, in varying degrees, to trade
expansion, access to lorcign markets, cconomic development,
soCial welfare, the spread of one'sideology, cultural jamborces, industrial fairs, forcign aid, space
travels, territorialexpansion, diplomatie andmilitary displays, and very many other such valucs.
They may not induce or compel the use of force in their realization as do the vital goals of self
defence, and national cconomic and industrial capacity.
(d) Long-Range-Medium-Range-Short-Range (Holsti, pp. 142-9)
Long-range goals are universal values such as those we have described earlier as general or
normative Examples are the goals of world-wide revolution in the foreign policy of the former
USSR, the founding of the Commonwealth of Nations on the ideals of fraternity and shared
beliefs; and defunct USSR's long-standing goals of safeguarding its frontiers with Europe, and
securing access tothe MiddleEast and the lndian sub-continent. Other examples in history are the
USA's long-range goals of building independent, democratic and affluent states on free
enterpr1se economic principles; of cstablishing world peace by containing communism; and of
achieving collective security, and strengthening the regime of international law. For developing
nations, the long-range goais are new internationaleconomic order; a world devoid of imperialism;
the attainment of technological transfers and rapid domestic economic development.
Medium-range objectives correspond, in their essentials, to our description of non-vital
interests.1They involveusing foreign policy to advance or protect some public as well as private
demands andneeds of social welfare and economic development. They also relateto actor
prestige as well as to actor desires and goals of achieving additional territories, spheres of
influences and bases.
Short-range objectives refer to those interests we have carlier described as specific and
descriptive. They relate to particular interests which are currently being persistently pursued.
(e)Concentric Circle Model (Northedge, 1976, pp. 194-7)
Theconcentric circle model classifies goals of foreign policy into ore (innermost circle):
high-priced goals (next circle); and lower-priced 2oals (outermost circle). The first set, (core
goals), are not negotiable,while the second and third are. Nigeria's classification of its
interests in terms Africa as the centerpiece (and within that West Africa then the rest of Africa
inorder of importance), then the Western world/Asia, followed by Latin America
approximates the concentric circle model for the country.
() The Northedge Analytical Model
This is a five-part classificatory model. Itgroups all goals of foreign policy into strategic,
political, economic, legal and ideological. The strategic goals seek security at home and
security for an actor's overseas or imperial possessions; access to foreign markets and sources
of raw materials; defense, and such other values as global andregional balances. The political
goals relate tousing foreign policy in order to preserve an actor's form of government,
political institution, and culture, and the projection abroad of these as values. The economic
goals concernthe promotion of standards of living, the attainment of full employment without
inflation, self-reliance, trade expansion, and so on. The legalgoals are the defense of
international legal order while the ideological goals constitute the final category, and concern
beliefs as well as the defense of some political doctrines and values.
(g)The Legg-Morrison Model (1971, pp. 143-4)
Professors Legg and Morrison suggested asix-part classification model which bears near
identical resemblances to the Northedge model. It groups foreign policy goals into securily.
cconomic. political, cultural-psychological,power or capabilitygoals, and externalgoals. The
securily goalsof foreign policy cover survival, territorial integrity, military alliances, ald
inumate concerns for the general balance of forces and powers in the world. The ecoomie
objeclives are designed to respond positively to changes in technology, population, values.
beliels, Cxpectations, and political systems. They therefore focus on markets, raw maleass
2
industrialisation, investments, and the protection of lines of communication and commerce.
rhe twO scholars identified the political objectives of foreign policy as the desire to maintain
legitimacy and stable governments, and preserve doinestic political institutions and va
They also involve expectations of seeing similar political regimes abroad. The cultuFal.
pSychological goals relate to prestige, status, ideologies, religion and moral principles Thes
therefore resemble earlier classification categories described as general and normative goals The
power or capability objectives are hardly indistinguishable from the security objectives. They concers
the goals of contracting military, economic and political alliances; the establ1shment of foreign military
strategic
bases as a positive means of increasing an actor's military effectiveness; th- control of
waterwaysand land routes; the establishment of intelligence networks, and concern for credibility
actor
Finally, the scheme provides for external goals which essentially reflect the sum total of
responses to threats and dangers as wellas actor exploitation of external opportunities.
(h)The Wolfers Model (Wolfers, 1962, pp. 73-9)
The classification model provided by Professor Wolfers is in five parts: possession goals, milieu goals.
national self-extension goals, self-preservation goals and goals of self-abnegation. Possession goals deal
with traditional: goals of preserving national independence, territorial integrity and national well-being.
Milieu goals seek favourable conditions beyond national boundaries, and emphasize suchchange values as
a of the
peace, international law and social justice. The goals of national selfextension demand both
territories, and
status quo; the acquisition of power or domination over other persons and
competition and resort to violence. Goals of national self-preservation, on the other hand, require the
maintenance, protection and defense of the status quo; they stress possession goals; and call for
Finally
adequate power to ward off actual attacks, deter potential aggression, and safeguard what exists.
Wolfers isolates goals of national self-abnegation. These are goals that transcend national interests.
solidarity,
They play down national power, seek co-operation from others, and demand international
international legal order, and international peace.
(i) The Frankel Model (Frankel, 1970)
The final classification model is that of Professor Frankel. It is, in three parts, namely:
aspirational, operational, and explanatory goals. Frankcl'saspirational goals of foreign policy
They are long-term, and
relate to the good life and to the ideals which an actor wants as realities.
grounds
do not require cost-effectiveness analysis because such analysis will eliminate them oninterests,
of costs. Operational goals in foreign policy are narrower than aspirational goals and
and deal with goals amenable to short-term attainment. They stress capability, cost-effectiveness,
Frankel identifies
prospects of success, and a conscious arrangement of priorities. Finally,
explanatory goals in foreign policy. These are interests and values which concentrate on
explaining,evaluating, justifying and rationalizing foreign policy choices, decisions and actions.
Summary
These nine classification systems have much in common. All the goals defined as 'general' such as
peace, happiness, citizen well-being, national security, collective security, prestige, and so on, run
through the nine classification systems. They correspond in their entirety to the goals classitied as
as vital interests,
normative. Their security and citizen well-being components are variously definedwhich are classified as
core interests, high-priced goals and possession goals. They are the same goals
aspirational by Frankel and as milieu by Wolfers. and short-
Goals defined as 'specific' are similar to those categorized as descriptive goals, medium- cultural-
ideologicalland
operational
range goals, or those spelt out in detail as strategic, political, economic, legal,identified as
psychological in the models of Northedge, Legg-Morrison and Wolfers, and
by Frankel. that
wefind
Finally, if we compare the three models of Northedge, Legg-Morrison and Wolfers,
milieu
andthe
(i) the strategic goals of Northedge, the security objectives of Legg-Morrison,
interests of Wolfers are the same;
3
(ii) the political goals (Northedge), capability goals (Legg-Morrison) and the possession goals
(Wolfers) arc similar; while
(iii) the economic goals (Northcdge) and cconomicobjectives (Legg-Morrison)are identical; and
(iv) finally, the legalas wellas ideological objectives (Northedge), the national self-abncgation and
nationalscll-cxtension goals (Wolfers) are both similar and akin to thestrategic-security-milieu
goals alrcady mentioncd in this chapter.

FOREIGN POLICY: ITS INSTRUMENTS


(a.k.a Instruments of InternationalI Relations)
(John Baylis and Steve Smith, p. 254; Minix and Hawley pp282 - 302)
Actors use various instruments in seeking to realize their foreign policy goals and objectives.
These instruments are diplomacy, economics, force and propaganda.
DIPLOMACY
1.
What Is Diplomacy?
Diplomacy is one of those infuriatingly big terms used in the study of world politics that can have a
variety of meanings depending upon user and usage....The conscientious student may be able to find
uses of this term that are so general that diplomacy is almost synonymous (the same thing as or can be
used interchangeably) with both "international relations" or "world politics" and/or foreign policy".
You willfind many references to, for example,great power diplomacy, super power diplomacy, summit
diplomacy, crisis diplomacy, which - particularly in media reports - ap,car to deseribe and characterize
aprocess that is much wider thana specific discussion of one facet of diplomacy might suggest. Links
between international relations/world politics and international history - which are often referred to as
diplomatic history help to reinforce this notion of interchangeability of terms. Similarly, frequent
references can be found to, for example, British diplomacy, Russian diplomacy, Nigerian diplomacy,
both in the academic literature and in media reports which suggest that the writer is referring notjust to
diplomacy as such but to British, Russian or Nigerian foreign policy behaviour as a whole...
From the perspective of world politics as a whole, diplomacy refers to a process of
communication that is central to the workings ofthe international system. From the perspective of states
and other international actors,diplomacy can be identified as a method or a tooi rather than a global
process and can be understood as such. Diplomacy offers one instrument that international actors might
use to implement their foreign policy either as a tool in its own right ("pure" diplomacy) or as a means
of communicating the use or threatened use of other instruments to other parties. (John Baylis and Steve
Smith, p. 254.)
Minix and Hawley: Diplomacy, like war, is a means used by nations to achieve their desired goals.
Diplomacy "is concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and
other [Link] a state perspective diplomacy is concerned with advising, shaping and
implementing foreign policy" (Barston 1993, i). It may involve multiple activities: face-to-face
negotiaions between belligerents or allies, ccongmig de between, partners, or media posturing
at international conferences. When Nikita Khrushchev pouDded his shoe oh the table at the United
Nations, he was engaging in diplomacy every bit as much as Henry Kissinger was on his shutie
flights between Israel and the Arab [Link] conduct of diplomacy may include correspondence,
discussions, lobbying, diplomatic visits, consultations,treaties, and even coercion, but the goal iS
always the same: to achieve desired foreign policy goals.

4
Traditionally diplomacy has been primarily bilateral, conducted by a diplomat assigned by
one nation to represent it in another state, usually in its [Link], however, supra-national
organizations such as the United Nations and the Europcan Union often conduct diplomacy as
well, negotiating on behalf of their members and providing a forum for diplomacy of all sorts. The
broadening of the spectrum of diplomatic actors is a recent development in the craft of diplomacy.
We will focus primarily on the interaction of states and nations as individual players in the game
of diplomacy. We must remember, however, that in the contemporary world states seldom act
unilaterally; it is far more common to see these traditional actors work in conjunction with other
states via supranationalorganizations. For example, in carrying out Operation Desert Shield and
Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf, the United States did not move alone against Saddam
Hussein's occupation of Kuwait. Instead, it formed a coalition with the Gulf Cooperation Council,
the Arab League, the European Union, and the United Nations in order to oust the Iraqis.
*To many, diplomacy is one side of a coin - war is the other. And in truth, when diplomacy
fails, war is sometimes the result. However, wat is only one endof the wide continuum on which
diplomacy is located. States that are at peace with one another need diplomacy as much as those
on the brink of war, and diplomacy is often most valuable in ending a war or winding down
hostilities through a series of treaties that give all participants something of what they want.
Diplomacy has two major definitions:"the art and_practice of conducting negotiations among
nations," and "skill in handling affairs without arousing hostility." Seldom can the first function be
accomplished well without large doses of the second.
from
ideally, diplomacy is the craft of managing to get what one's own nation wants
war sometimes
another nation or other nations without going to war - although the threat of
achieve their
referred to as "saber-rattling" can be an instrument of diplomacy. How do nations
For example,
goals without war? And once conflict has erupted, how can nations achieve peace?
Arab neighbors, which
how can the Israeli government pursue its vital national interests with its settlement to
often have conflicting national interests? Can a peaceful, mutually agreeable what cost? What will
so, at
disputes such as water rights along the Jordan River be achieved? If
goal? Will this goal be worth the
the Israeli government give up in order to achieve its desired communicate with each other. To a
cost? To answer such questions, nations must above all else
by one nation or supranational
great extent, then,diplomacy consists of communication directed result.{This communication
organization towards another, in order to achieve a certain end
negotiations (public
generally can take three different forms: signaling, negotiations, and public
diplomacy).
A. Signaling of either
Signaling is the least formal aspect of diplomacy, relying largely on nuance
representing
statement or action rather than on direct, face-to-face meeting between diplomats allowing
For example,
their respective nations. This indirect diplomacy may take many forms. the United States signaled
direct media coverage of the invasion in 1994 was one instance wherecoercion in the form of an
and that
the Haitian junta that American patience was exhausted
process; when President Richard
invasion was the next step. Signaling also can be a positive
the usual American term
Nixon referred to "The People's Republic of China" rather than usng that the unwavering
"Communist China" in a 1971 speech, he was sending a clear signal relations between the two
American hostility toward the PRC was abating and that friendlier
trading status to China was a
nations were possible. Likewise, the granting of most favored nation
patterns and discussions with
signal that the United States wanted to continue present trading
China, despite serious concerns about human rights issues in that state.
Signaling, then, is perhaps the most subtle form of diplomacy, and nations have learned
order to understand exactiy
to examine one another's behavior and public postures carefully in
what is being communicated.

5
B. Negotiations
Negotiation between or among nations represents another key point on the spectrum of
diplomatic communication. (We usually picture negotiation as a group of international lawyers
and diplomats seated around a large table draped with finc linen and adorned with microphones
and pitchers of (we assume) water. Behind each diplomat stands a bevy of interpreters and lesser
diplomats serving as couriers to those at the table. Or we see photographs of the United States
secretary of state seated on a brocade armchair next to the president of Syria, conducting peace
negotiations in the Middle East. Although these two portraits are genuine, they are in fact not the
norm.)
KNegotiation is "a prOcess through which two or more parties - be they individuals,
groups, or larger social units - interact in developing potential agreements to provide guidance
and regulation of their future behavior" (Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965, 466). An attempt to reach
an agreed-upon solution prior to the use of threats or of force, negotiation is the most important
tool in the diplomat's kit. Usually nations communicate or negotiate with each other through
their embassy,staffs, but sometmes they must rely on intermediaries. Depending on or the nature
conducted at the ambassadorial level below.
of the issue to be settled, negotiations usually are
Types ofnegotiation
()High-Level versus Low-Le vel Negotiations However, such
High-level:negotiations take place at the ambassadorial level or higher. the groundwork
talks has laid
negotiations often take place after an arduous series of low-level
below the level of ambassador,
carried out
for agreement. Low-level negotiatións are those
although they may be on highly technical work necessary for producing agreement on issues as
exploratory talks carried out at a low
complex as the Law of the Sea or GATT. Or, they may be
at the beginning of what may
level in order to avoid premature publicity or outside interferencè
be extremely delicate negotiations about volatile issues.
(ii) Direct veYsus Indirect Negotiations talk or negotiate directly) or
Negotiation may be direct (i.e. the two entitiesconcerned or an entity not officially
with a nation
indirect, as occurs when negotiations are necessary
becomes the only real possibility. For
recognized by another and going through athird party
diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic
example, the United States did not extend formal triumph in China. Nonetheless, there were a
until 1979, thirty years after the communist
of China required negotiation and resolution; consequently,
variety of issues between the two nations that
officials as intermediaries to convey messages
they carried on indirect negotiations, using Polish probably better than the two nations' complete loss
back and forth. The process was tedious, but
Kissinger made his secret trip to China to open
of contact with each other. Likewise, when Henry
Richard Nixon's epochal journey, the initial, indirect negotiations took place with the
the way for did not
case toChina. Similarly, the United States with
Pakistani government presenting the American
Organization until 1991. Prior to that, all contact
formally recognize the Palestine Liberation intermediation of Arab states. Only after many secret
the PLO was indirect, primarily through the decades, could formal dialogue begin and formal
and indirect sessions, in some cases lasting
diplomatic recognition ultimately come about.
Separate versus Linked Negotiations
(ii) have been perceived as separate and
Traditionally, issues under negotiation between states direct bearing on
entities; thus, negotiations over water or fishing rights have had no todayNations can
distinct Generally, this is still the case
same nations over trade.
disputes between the negotiate water rights or immigration ISsues.
over trade issues, but successfully
be at loggerheads may
may conduct
exist between two or more states, they intractable
Desp1te all the points of contention that seemingly
diplomacy on some issues even while locking horns over other,
Successtul
issues of deep concern. that point, HenrY
However, in the 1970s the chief architect of American diplomacy at
6
Kissinger, introduced the concept of
the United States, by Iinking the vitallinkage into the international arena.
Kissinger
arms
treaties to the behavior of the Soviet Union control negotiations then taking place onbelieved
the
that
SALT
control and even manipulate that behavior. Ifwithinthe
the international system, could
successfully
series of trade and strategic arms United States could engage the Soviets in a
negotiations, the Sovicts would then bc less likely to cndanger
their standing with the United States by
encouraging wars of national liberation. international misbehavior in other arcas, for example, by
To Kissinger and American
that all areas of Soviet behavior were linked policy-makers, it was plain
together,
should produce favorable results in another. The Soviets, and that exerting pressure in one area
They separated the issues and viewed them as discrete and however, did not share this world view.
independent of one
negotiation in international arms limitations agreements did not, and in their another. Thus,
preclude their fueling pro-communist efforts throughout the world. They denied view should not,
any linkage at all. that there was
C. Public Negotiation(Public
Diplomacy)
The third form of diplomatic communication is public negotiation, or public diplomacy. This
uses the media in order to persuade both world and national public opinion that
reached by the two sides in a dispute are imminent, and to byild public support decisions for those
positions. Such public diplomacy often resembles propaganda by attempting to present
whatever decisions are reached in the most fayorable possible light for the home audience, as
well as for the global one,. (Recommendedexpatiation of Public Diplomacy and Summitry as a
means of conducting it básed on Minix & Hawley pp. 477-479)
The Diplomatic Game
Recognition
In order for traditional diplomacy to take place, there must be what is called diplomatic
recognition between the nations involved. This simply means that one nation recognizes another
as sovereign, andrecognizes the existing government as the legitimate government of the nation.
Although this process sounds dull and dry, it often involves complex issues. If a nation has
broken away from another, should it be recognized? The deci .on to recognize or not to
recognize such a newly formed nation can have enormous consequences. For example, during
the Nigerian Civil War, the newly formed Republic of Biafra had based much of its hope of
independent nationhood on the assumption that Great Britain, Israel, the United States and some
African States would recognize it, that is, extend formal diplomatic recognition, as a prelude to
extending the [Link] perhaps even military aid that would be necessary to their
maintaining [Link] failure of these states to extend formal diplomatic recognition to
the upstart state (only France, Gabon, The Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia recognized it)
sealed its fate.
*æsually the decision to extend diplomatic recognition is pro forma, more or less
automatic. However, particularly in the case of a revolutionary state, the decision can be
difficult. Although most diplomatic theorists urge that the only consideration in deciding about
extending recognition should be whether or not the government in question actually controls the
nation, other factors often intervene. For example, after the -Russian Revolution, President
WoodrowWilson refused to extenddiplomatic recognition to the newly formed Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR), prímarily because of his distaste for the Bolshevik regime. but also
because he was appalled at the assassination of the Tsar and his family. Not until 1933 did the
United States officially recognize the Soviet Union, and then it was as much an economie
decision as a political one: American businessmen simply found it terribly difficult to carry out
normal commercial transactions without formal relations between the two states. Similarly, the
United States refused toextend recognition to the People's Republic of China in 1949, largely as
the result of Cold War politics, and continued to insist that the rump government of the kepube
7

ion
of China on Taiwan represented all of China. This refusal to deal with the reality of the
communist victory in China distorted America's Far Eastern policy for nearly thirty' years, and
played a significant role in both the Korean War andthe VietnanWar.
In the intricate game of nations, the decision to brcak diplomatic relations is often cven
more significant than the decision to cstablish them. Ofen the brcaking of diplomatic relations
between nations has been the last step prior to war, the final sign that diplomacy has not worked
and force is noW seen as a necessary step. Nigeria apparently did not appreciate this fact when it
broke diplomaticrelations with France over its nuclear testings in the Sahara an insult France did
not forget during the civil war and for years after. Interestingly, the decision to break formal
relations often serves asS an impetus to finding some sort of peaceful solution instead of resorting
to war but that too did not happen in this case although there was rio war; in "crisis diplomacy,"
breaking diplomatic relations can be a useful ploy.
Ambassadors
exchange of
When nations do recognize each other. the first step is usually the To be
other nations.
ambassadors, individuals who represent their own nations in dealings with
adventure, glamour,
an ambassador is often thought of as a "cushy" job. Foreign travel, itintrigue,
is portrayed in movies and
least as
parties, and receptions dominate an ambassador's life - at
novels. The real work of a nation's representative is far more mundane.
observe what is happening
An ambassador has three principal responsibilities: (i) to convey to the host nation
government, (ii) to
in the host nation and report back to the home
represent the home government in
the desires of the home government, and (iii) to ambassador is in effect a middle man
negotiations, meetings, and ceremonial occasions. The
to that of the host nation - in other words, a
on the ground linking his or her government process between nations. The world electronic
transmission belt in the total communications
ambassadorial functions. Modern more rapid
media have partially eclipsed this aspect ofreduced the ambassador's role in immediate and
communication between national capitals has
negotiation; unlike the nineteenth-century representative, the modern ambassador is not a
direct to take whatever actions are
fundamentally independent or autonomous individual empowered
to the home national capital, because of
necessary. The center for decision-making has shifted
inclinations to bend and shape foreign
both the speed of modern communications and leaders' use "personal emissaries" or "unofficial
policy themselves. A national leader often may the ambassador completely. For
ambassadors" to communicate with another nation, bypassing on the ground in Haiti, President
personnel
example, although the United States had diplomaticHaitian junta that the threat of invasion was
Clinton sent personal emissaries to convince the
real and imminent, and thus to achieve a solution to the crisis. Prominent individuals such
both
former presidents, e.g. Obasanjo, or Secretary-General of international organizations e.g. Kofi
as successful businesspersons or celebrities
Annan or even close associates of the national leader,
used as personal emissaries. These developments have led to the vievw that the role of the
can be become obsolete. But the ambassador is still
diplomat (Ambassadors and lesser diplomats) has
vital in personally connecting two nations. ambassadors, especially those sent to major
It is also important to keep inmind that while
capitals, are usually political appointees, who may know virtually nothing of the
foreign nations to which they are sent, the vital
languages, histories, customs, and governments of the
observation and assessment of the host nation rests
role of ongoing and more or less permanent diplomats deal with the
These tr: ied
primarily with the professionals on an embassy staff.
details of diplomacy, from working out agreements for their ambassadors to sign, to aiding
travelers in distress. An embassy
commercial transactions, issuing visas, or aiding tourists and
labeled part of the staff but charged
staff also often houses intelligence agents, officially and supervising spies. In addition to tne
primarily with clandestine activities such as recruiting often maintains consulates,
embassy, located in the host national capital, a home nation also
dividuals accused of serious crimes are sheltered behind diplomatic immunity but it remains
on essential protection for the diplomat. Even Nigeria abused diplomatic immunity when the
Ruhari regime in July 984 got former Transport Minister Umaru Dikko kidnapped in London,
Ministry of
drugged and bundlcd him nto a crate marked as a diplomatic parcel for delivery to the
External Affairs, Lagos.
TheNew Diplomacy
as the result of
The number of sovereign nation-states has doubled since 1960
today there are some 193
decolonization, national self-determination, and zealous nationalism;
politics and diplomacy. With the
nation-states, each staking its claim to a role in internationaldiplomatic theater from Europe to
enormously increased number of actors, the spread of the of issues on the diplomatic agenda,
complexity
include literally the entire globe, and the resultant
diplomaçy has tended to become less important, while multilateral diplomacy (involving
bilateral The take-off stage for multilateral diplomacy
was
grown in importance.
more than two states) has
Nations in 1919.
the signing of the Covenant of the League of complicated business in the twenty-first century
Diplomacy has become an extremely actors (nation-states), with the panoply of new
of traditional international these
The various groupings
MNOs), the complexity of issues and the intensity with which
transnational actors (NGOs, complicated the types, methods, amount, and tenor of
tremendously addressed,
ISSues are debated have the ways in which diplomatic issues are
diplomatic relations and have changedas population, trade, environmental quality, and so forth
such
resolved, and disseminated. Issuesthey are recognized as the domain of special interest groups
that global
have become so specialized agendas. As a result, many low-level issues have a grand
issue
formed to advance particular multilaterally. High-level issues, those dealing with the this is
context and can be addressed only although
are still largely in the realm of bilateral negotiations,
designs of war and peace,
before 1989: for
not so true today as it was common method of [Link] contemporary negotiations, global
Multilateral diplomacy is a made multilateralism much easier, since
technology has of contacts a
several reasons. First, instantaneous. Simply put, the greater the number
communications are virtually
the likelihood that that actor will communicate in a
greater is more
national actor experiences is, the the environment, which are becoming more and
multilateral fashion. Second, issues
like the problem
global issues. Pollution produced by one nation is
important,are almost by definition bilateral solutions simply will not work. Third, today the
of many neighboring states,
and safer, way for a nation's
prevailing opinion is thatmultilateralism is a preferred, and probably superpower, the
especially true since 1989, as the sole remaining
politicians to act. This hasbeen act, unilaterally.
itself incapable of acting, or unwilling to
United .States, has often found Storm represent the culmination of late-twentieth-century
Operations Desert Shield and Desert
operations were
not as a
orchestrated by the United States actingEuropean
multilateral diplomacy. These conjunction with the United Nations, the
singlepower, but;in çon_ultation and multilateral framework, Islamic
others. Without such a
SCommunity and the Arab League, among against another Islamic nation such
as Iraq.
difficult indeed to act
states would have found it very

Types of Diplomacy
Diplomacy today assumes multiple forms.
amounts
summitry or image diplomacy; usually attracting large
() One of the best-known is newsworthy and "sexy." Summitry also
leader-to-leader diplomacy is of Seven (G-
of media coverage, this to face with their counterparts. The Group international
represents a way for leaders to come face in a much-ballyhooed summit over successful China
powers meets annually
7) industrialized China (first time in 30 years Since
economic issues. Richard Nixon traveled to virtually every president since
then... AS One
Union, as has
revolution in 1949) and to the Soviet
10
might imagine, there are enormous benelits, and enormous polential pitlalls, accompanying this
personal, high-level diplonacy. One of the potential benefits is that personal barriersis no
maydoubt.
lade
away and genuine friendships develop betwecn formerly antugonistic lcadcrs. There
devclopgd, mong President
for example, that sincere,personql leclings of considerable depthAIwar
Jimmy Carter, Prime Minialer Menachen Begin, and President Al-Sädat, feelings that
may
enabled them to sign the Camp David accords in 1979. However personal animosities President
Yizhak Shamir and
develop as well, as happened e.g. betwcen Israeli Prime Minister Isracli settlements in
George Bush at their first meeting in the Oval Office to discuss the issue ofnoted that the world's
also
the Occupied Arab Territories. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has healthy egos collide.
leadersalmost always"enjoy"a healthy dose of ego"; when two such(Kissinger 1994, 142).
"negotiations can rapidly deteriorate from intractability to con frontation"
high-level or low-level in terms of issues
(ii) Diplomacy also can be. characterized as either
involvedissues of war and peace peac are High diplomacy (or High politics) and take place at the
diplomatic activities are low
ambassadorial level or,above; other issues which dominate daily
level, having to do with system maintenance and stability.
(ii) Crisis and Coercive Diplomacy
Most foreign policy is routine and characterized by bureaucratic inertia. However, there
environment, or in the relations between two
are times when a desired change in the international
diplomatic surprise or a fait accompli, a "done
states, can be achieved by resorting to the yse of suddenly undertook a peace initiative by going
deal" in popular parlance! In 1977 President Sadat negotiations, cut short the formalities, and
to Jerusalem; he thereby circumvented the prolonged East - goals which would have taken
accelerated the chance of achieving peace in the Middle
Conference. (Handel 1981,3).
years to accomplish at the scheduled Geneva Peace German dictator Adolf Hitler, eschewing
Of course, not all surprises are pleasant. In 1938
troops into Czechoslovakia, annexing a
even the appearance of negotiations, simply sent Nazi rest of the world wiih a fait accompli. If
heavily German portion of that nation, and presented the
chose not to accept this surprise, Hitler had
theimajor European powers, Great Britain and France, their alternatives were to accept this act or
left them with no room at all for diplomatic maneuver;
moved another step closer to World War
to challenge it militarily. They accepted it, and Europe
II.
Crisis Management. of crises is in
Surprise is acritical element of international crisis, and the management
threat, short decisional time, and
turn of utmost importance in the conduct of diplomacy. High model postulates that crises are
surprise are the distinguishing characteristics of crises. The crisis
be controlled and brought
inherent in the international system and that for the most part, they can
the theory, once a nation's security machinery
to satisfactory, peaceful resolution. According to controlled, responsive, diplomatic fashion. The
kicks in bureaucrats can master the situation in a necessarily produce the
reality, however, is that the opposite is more often the case. Crises do not
optimum conditions for diplomacy and negotiation. U.S. behavior during the crisis fell far short of
The Cuban Missile Crisis is a casein point.
execution it was theoretically'
9 the calm, deliberate, careful, conscientious decision-making and
expected to be and often portrayed. The myth abounds about Kennedy's apparent controlled and
thirteen-day crisis and this
masterful way of forcing Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles in the
harnessed to a policy by an elaborate
D has become aparadigmatic example of the way force can be 1975, 258). The real
manipulation of hreats and gambits, negotiation and intimidation (Nathan
elaborate government plans
lesson learned from this crisis management is that all the delicate and
bring astorm to resolution. The whole
1or coping with the unexpected are often insufficient to
point of normal diplomacy, of course, is to cnsure that there will be no crises.

11
Preventive Diplomacy
Preventive diplomacy - action to resolve, manage, or contain disputes before lhey escalate
into violence - has become one of the watchwords of the post-Cold War era. More and more
nations subscribe to the theory that almost any conflict can be kept below the threshold of
violence, if not completely solved, if only there is early and determined intervention.
Governments are proclaiming the importance of preventive diplomacy, institutions like the
United Nations practice preventive diplomacy, and private foundations pour money into the study
of preventive diplomacy (Stedman 1992-93, 46).
Former foreign policy maker and professor of international relations Lincoln Bloomfield
points out that preventive diplomacy is highly desirable because it is "the best available strategy
is to head off violations [of the international orderl before they take place." According to
Bloomfield, three available approaches can strengthen and stabilize preventive diplomacy:
"publicity
publicity, deterrence, and peaceful change, In the world of modern communications,nations into
embarrassing
has already been a powerful diplomatic instrument," shaming or must be used to
nonviolence. Deterrence, which has been effective in preventing nuclear war, necessary, by the
sanctions," and if
prevent nonnuclear conflict by "a credible and timely threat of the international community must
dispatch of "conflict-prevention military units." Finally,peaceful change. The United Nations
establish procedures for solving disputes and facilitating enforcement; national leaders must be
already has the machinery for prevention, deterrence, and
1995, 163-77).
willing to use it (Bloomfield 1995, 155-60; see also Wendt abound. Stephen John Stedman, for
skeptics
Despite the high hopes of enthusiasts, has been oversold. Successful preventive
example, maintains that preventive diplomacy
where and when crisis can escalate to conflict.
diplomacy requires foresight, the ability to predict foreign policy experts over the last ten years
However, "the striking aspect of the performance of political changes." Successful preventive
important
has been their inability to predict the most The fail
a quality Stedman finds in short supply.
diplomacy also requires careful good judgment,believes, ugoslavia
could be costly; the case of Y
ure to calculate appropriate action, Stedman escalates crisis into violence. "The urge to take
underlines the danger of miscalculation that
action [Link] something, anything - can lead to ill-considered policies that lack
preventive that effective preventive diplomacy requires
strategic sense."Finally, Stedman points outpictures of violence show up on television" - not
mobilization of public support "long before the
S
task. Stedman thus concludes that preventive diplomacy is not the panacea its enthusiasts
a an easý goals, and prudent judgment about acceptable
< proclaim."Absent well-defined interests, clear
conflict prevention simply mean that one
costs and risks, policies of preventive diplomacy and
(Stedman 1992-93, 52).
founders early in a crisis rather than later"
Open versus Secret Diplomacy recent phenomenon, largely the result of
Open or public diplomacy is a relatively peace conference in 1919. In setting
President Woodrow Wilson's initiatives at the Versailles
at," Wilson was reacting to the commonly
forth his principle of "open covenants openly arrived Iwas clandestine or secret diplomacy,
held belief that one of the major causes of the World War Wilson was in effect disavowing the
table.
which had failed to bring all issues and actors to the
a diplomacy marked by closed
Continental diplomacy established at the Congress of Vienna,keeping the terms of treaties and
membership and diplomats who spoke only to one another, own people.
their
agreements secre not onlyfrom potential foes but also from
Opendiplomacy fit nicely with the concept of democracy, the newest form of government
less as a way of keeping secrets Irom
on the world stage in 1919. Secret diplomacy was seen from domestic enemies within the nation.
one's adversary than as a means of keeping information clandestine element and enlist the cnti
Open diplomacy would, it was believed, climinate this
population in democratic support of national policy.
operate better than private or
In lact, in many cases public or open diplomacy may indeed
12
secret diplomacy. In South Africa's transition from apartheid to majority (black) rule, intense
global media scrutiny of cach step of the proccss, from the original agreements between the white
government and leaders of the black majority through the jockeying for power of the African
National Congress and its rivals to the actual passage of power from F, W. de Klerk to Nclson
Mandela, may well have ensured a degrce of stability in a highly volatile situation. Likewise, the
openness of American attempts to force the Haitan ijunta to relinquish power, accompanied by
open threats of force and mobilization of military might, was both an attempt to enlist the supporl
of the American people for a fundamentally unpopular policy, and to hasten the departure of the
colonels and generals.
Open diplomacy, however, will not work in all situations. While the bursting of flashbulbs
and the whir of cameras may reduce misperceptions about what has been said, they also prohibil
themselves and
tree and open discussion of issues. Only in private can negotiators freely express
agreements. Most
debate iSsues, or make the sorts of intricate compromises necessary to conclude
issues, but private
practitioners as well as most pundits favor a free and open debate about policyextremely
be revealed. It is doubtful.
conduct of negotiations until terms are more or less ready to
Senator Sam Nunn, and retired general Colin
1or example, that former President Jimmy Carter, conclusion to the standoff between the
Powell would have been able to bring about a peaceful members in public; in private,
United States and Haiti had they been forced to deal with the junta
dictators and permitted the unopposed
they were able to work out a deal that both removed the democracy. It is plain, then, that
land1ng of American troops to begin the process of restoring
there are times and places for both public and private diplomacy.

2. ECONOMIC MEASURES
foreign relations, various economic instruments are
While diplomacy is the primary instrument of include loans, credits and currency control;
its supporting tools. These economic instruments embargoes, quotas and tariffs; economic
blockade, blacklisting andpre-emptive buying; boycotts, these categories.
of
penetration; rewards and foreign aid. Let us discuss each
are economic measures which serve as double-edge
Loans, credits and currency controls
terms often goes a long way in securing
Swords. The granting of loans and credits on easy or soft
projects that touch the lives and future of many
and retaining friends. It commits actors jointly to times when they enable donors to save
in the recipient nation. Loans and credits maycome at secure power. In either case, they
recipient groups from falling from power, or enable them to hand, the release of loans may be
create considerable goodwill and dependence. On the other may be revised and tightened, or
deliberately delayed, cut off, or suspended. The terms of credits
goods and services of the donor which it
operated in a way which compels a recipient to buy themanipulating loan assistance and credit
reallywould not want (tied loans). It is, therefore, by recipients, or backwards in
facilities either forwards to ease the economic difficulties of actor
measures become potent
order to exert economic pressures on them, that these economic
instruments in foreign relations.
amounts
Currency controls or currency change affect nationals and foreigners. They limit
business, tourist
which nationals can take out in the form of foreign exchange and sprrd during and these
interactions
and other trips. They may be so strict that they inhibit business and tourist
may, in fact, be the sole goals of policy. Foreigners are affected if they cannot repatriate their
investments because of currency controls,. These may be calculated hostile economic measures taken
against them which, though domestic, generate international reactions.
The second sct of cconomic measures comprises economic blockade, blacklisting, and pre
emptive buying or banning sales. The goal of a blockade is to starve a victim of vitally necded
Scarce resources. It entails some policing and military action which may affect third parties. It iS,
therefore, very close to war or the full-scale of force in secking to realize some obiectives of
13
ioreign policy. Blacklisting, on the other hand, is less coercive. An actor identifies other actors,
companies, individuals, neutrals, non-combatants doing business with its cnemies, and proceeds to
hanits citizens and official agencies from dealing with them. It also pleads with its friends and
allies to stop doing business with such international persons and groups. Disinvestment policy
against apartheid South AIrica is a good cxamplc of this: Americans withdrew their investments in
companies doing business in South Africa. General Obasanjo în 1977 stated a policy of requiring
MNCdoing business simultaneously in Nigeria and South Africa to cancel their South African
operations "if they feel their bread is better buttered on our side" His government actually
Declaration
nationalized BP to convince the British to back down from recognizing the Unilateral
of Independence (UDI) by Rhodesia (nowZimbabwe). economic instrument of
Similarly, pre-emptive buying which is non-coercive may be used as
with its allies, buys up
international relations and foreign policy. An actor intervenes in a market
prices to outbid its
all available conmodities whether it wants them or not, pays very highavailable to its enemies. The
commodities are not
enemies, and by these devices ensures that those
weakening the capability of its
goals foreign policy seeks with these measures are those of hopefully creating domestic crises
enemies, lowering thestandard of living of their peoples, and
for the enemies.
we have boycotts, em bargoes, quotas and tariffs. Through a trade boycott, a state
Then products.
eliminate the importation of a specific commodity or of a total range of importrestrictions
may others of access markets or impose severe
on
Through embargoes, states can deprive
businessmen. Or a state may simply ban others from trading in specific goods with Its
their forbad selling
pain of dire consequences. The US e.g. had its Battle Act which
adversary on
Soviet Union and it invoked it against Nigeri when Nigeria wanted to
strategic goods to the 1960s. Quotas, on their part, are quantitative controls of
sell cobalt to the USSR in the early states,
economy which may hurt others or which may be taken unilaterally between depending on
domestic are either inducenents oY punishments,
thereby causing a crisis in relations. Tariffs of
lowered or raised. The essential point, however, is that by the manipulation change
whether they are compelled to
economic measures, actors areeither favourably induced or coercively of the General
these However, through the international action
attitudes, positions or policies. imposing
their
Tariff and Trade (GATT), limits are imposed on what states can do in
Agreement on
quotas or manipulating tariffs.
This is a deliberate policy of creating
Economic penetration is the next measure. relationship in a way that effectively
dependency
excessive dependence, and exploiting economic policy behaviour of another actor. The targets
influences and, at times, determines the foreign are invariably the standard of living of the
actor practising penetration
pursued and grasped by the of its
of its imports; the size, prices and stability
dependent actor; the volume and varietyeconomic domestic
thoughts and life-styles; its
commodities; its élite groups and their
and on its credit and loan facilities; and its
development based on its imports and export earnings
these targets can be captured, then the entire
critical areas of need for technological assistance. If penetrated. The strategies adopted are
economy is rendered dependent, and has been effectively the economy of actor B and exploit
penetrate
many and varied. For example, if actor A plans toinfluence its foreign policy behaviour, it could
B's resultant dependency relationship in order to commodity prices above prevailing world
guarantee markets to B's export commodities, pay facilities to B to augment its export
market prices for such commodities, perhaps provide credit secure large import orders from B,
maybe
earnings and ease its problems of funding its imports,generally help B sustain a level and standard
dispatch economic and technical advisers to B, and without A's penetration. So far all this looks
case
of living higher than what would have been the
incapacity to act externally without caring what A's
good, but in reality it exposes B to risks of an B's standard of living is artificially bascd and could
feelings and reactions willbe. Even internally, IMFs Structurat
wants to exert pressures on B. The
be lowered without warning by A if actor A
14
Adjustent Programmes with their regime of strineent conditionalities for debt relief since the
1980s can be seen as eXample of attempts at penctralion
Finally we have rewardsand foreign aid. Some of the cconomicmeasures which we have
already mentionedconstitute rewards and aid. Loans and credits may, but necd not, constitute aid.
If providcd at conccssionary rates they are aid. Lower lariffs, cconomic and technical advisers, and
guaranteed favourable prices are also aid. However, foreign aid as a deliberate and conscious
instrumentof foreign relations is annuch more refined andcoordinated venture. It generally goes
to a few states and these are hardly, by any serious account, the most needy. The strategic
relevance of such states to the realization of the goals of donor's foreign policy, rather than their
humanitarian priority, counts most. Secondly, donors may perceive that without their assistance
regimes friendly towards them may collapse or be unable to modernize their armed forces,
economy and social systems. Because of these considerations they develop foreign aid
programmes that may have as their components economic aid, development loan assistance,
technical assistance and military assistance.
the
We must, however, admit that genuine concern for the wel|-being of others and the peace of
world do influence foreign aid schemes. This is when aid programmes respond to the need to diversity
respond in
the economy of recipients, or when they attack human want and suffering, and or when they
emergencies and disasters. What we are stressing is that these are hardly the primary motivations and
objectives of for aid. They are subordinate to the political-military-economic objectives of creating most
the defence and security
favourable attitudes in recipients towards the donors, of linking the recipient up
that create
systems of the donor, and of using economies of donor and recipient states in ways
dependencies.
measures or sanctionsface
Wolfers (1962, p. 109) has warned us of the limitations whicheconomic
of Nations. First, it is
the League
as instruments of foreign relations. He drew from the experiences of
similar coercive economic measures.
often very difficult to secure the agreement of other states to take
markets and sources of economicassistance,
Yet, without the cooperation of other actors, alternative unsupported by either military
loans and credits may be securcd . Secondy, economic sanctions
ineffective. This is especially
sanctionsor by thewillingness to use military force, will most likelytobethe
resorts se of force in order to break
the case in situations where the target of economic sanctions
they are asked to terminate their'
the sanctions. Thirdly, actors may fear loss of face and prestige if pushing hard on the
programmes. This fear may, cause them to proceed with their aid and perhaps stop
270-6).
recipient to change foreign policy behaviour (Holsti, 1972, pp.
3. FORCE MEASURES (Ofoegbu 86-89)
we mean all actions of
The third major instrument of foreign relations is use of force. By use of force
use of coercion and
one actor [Link] actor's territory without its consent and all threats and actual
world of
military action. The following fall in the category and are often encountered in the real
International Relations:
(i) military intervention,
(ii) guerrilla warfare,
(ii) demonstration of force,
(iv) covert action organizing coups d'etat,
(V) financing and organizing assassinations
(vi) bribing,
(vii) organizing, training and arming nationals of one state and
returning them to overthrow their own government,
(vii) creating political scandalsin foreignstates,
(ix) infilrating voluntary organizations in foreign states and
using these organizations to subvert their states, and
15
(x) sponsoring srikes and riots abroad.
The most serious of course, is military intervent ion abroad. It is part of crisis management
Troops travel abroad either in aid of an existing regime or in complicity with the rehellious forces
fighting for its ovethrow. Guerrilla attacks, on the other hand, involve highly dedicated men in small
paramil1tary units who attack persons, institutions and established authority systems without waiting lor
revolutionary situations. They combine terrorism with mobility and surprise. These days we have
terrorism pure and simple, sometimes local, oflen, [Link] demonstrationof force is akin to
gunboatdiplomacy in which a major or relativcly superior power lays out part of its forces and arsenal
near enough to the scene or theatre of conflict in order to deter the adversary and/or intimidate actors
from coming to the aid of a targcted victim, Aclassic case was the situation in Jordan where there was a
detemined Arab move in 1957 to depose King Hussein, a known friend of the USA and the Western
world. The USA dispatched troops of its Sixth Fleet to Lebanon, a neighbouring state to Syrta and
Jordan, todeter both Egypt and Syria as leaders of the Arab anti-Hussein group in the Middle East. The
Arab destabilization plan for Jordan was thereafter dropped. Asimilar situation in the Dominican
that state
RepubliC in 196l involved sending twenty-(wo US warships into the territorial waters of restore
and
tme when some pro-Trujillo elements wanted to overthrow Dominican government
Trujillo to office. The arrival of US warships frightened these pro-Trujillo forces out of the
1963.
Republic. In Czechoslovakia, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact pa intervened militarily in economic
abandonment of
Their objectives were to depose Premier Dubcek and cause a complete
andpolitical reforms. These two objectives were achieved. a view to their
Organizing a coup d'etat, financing assassination, training nationals with involve using
They
return1ng to overthrow their own governments have much in common.
them outside the target state or,
nationals of the target state; training, financing, perhaps equipping external actor to provide
aliernatively, tyain'ng ihe moutside, and using the embassy of intervening
overthrow of their own
finances and arms. These are then relied wncsteandertrte the COVert'operaio'IA
as
government. These kinds of initiatives are invariably ndertaken
e.g. has been credited with the overthrow of
*Premier Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran I953
*Arbenz government of Guatemnala, 1954
1961 &
*Assassination Patrice Lumumba of the Congo
*Ngo Ding Diem Vietnam 1963. and bribes given in order to see
The other measures -- essentially espionage activities
destructive but nonetheless force
information or influence importantdecisions -- are less
normal and approved modes of interaction
measures. In foreign relations they run counter to the
principles that establish international and
among actors. They also violate treaty laws [Link]
regional organizations.
They are largely occasions
The occasions when intervention is legally permissible are few.
when
intervention
() treaty rights expressly provide for actor, and other
(i) there exists flagrant and widespréad violations of human riglhts by an
are
actors feel that the moral foundations of the regional or international system of the
trust in the values
threatened, and it is absolutely necessary to restore faith and
system,
() non-intervention will culminate in widespread domestic cl os, civil disorder and system
breakdown, and
(iv) intervention can avert foreign ahnexation.
(v) Self-defence and anticipaory self-defence
Outside these legal parameters, however, aclors do use 'force' measures, albeit illegally. in seeking
toachieve thegoals of their foreign policies. This is a reality of world politics.
16

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