Social Justice Research, Vol. 1, No.

2, 1987

Interactional Fairness Judgments:

The Influence of Causal Accounts
Robert J. Bies i and Debra L. Shapiro 2

There has been an increasing amount o f research conducted on issues o f pro-

cedural justice. Although this research has demonstrated that the type of pro-
cedure used to allocate outcomes has an independent influence on people's
judgments o f the fairness o f a decision, there is growing empirical evidence
that such judgments are influenced by the enactment o f the procedure as
well. Fairness concerns raised about the propriety o f a decision maker's
behavior during the enactment of procedures are representative of a desire
for interactional justice. In this paper, we present three studies that examine
the effects of giving a causal account, or a justification, versus not providing
a justification, on judgments ofinteractionalfairness and endorsement of a
decision maker's actions. In Study L a laboratory study, ratings of interactional
fairness and support for a manager were higher when subjects received a
causal account that claimed mitigating circumstances for a manager's im-
proper action than when they did not receive such a causal account. A
second laboratory study replicated the same pattern of findings in two dif-
ferent organizational contexts. In addition, it was found that the perceived
adequacy o f the causal account was a critical factor explaining its effect. In
Study 3, a field setting, ratings of both interactional fairness and procedural
fairness were higher when a manager provided an adequate causal account
to justify the allocation of an unfavorable outcome. The discussion focuses
on the implications o f these findings for research on interactional
and procedural justice.

KEY WORDS: procedural justice; organizational behavior; social psychology; accountability;

attribution.

~The Kellog Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

2SchooI of Business Administration, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
199
0885-7466/87/0600-0199505.00/0© I987 PlenumPublishingCorporation
200 Bies and Shapiro

INTRODUCTION

I made a lot of tough decisions as a manager. Although I m a y not always be right,

I try to be fair. In my twenty years as a manager, I've learned that m u c h of what
is meant by being "fair" really means treating people with respect. For example, I
always explain to m y people why I did what I did. Even as president of this division,
I justify my decisions. I think that is part of m y moral obligation as a manager. My
people think it's only fair.
From an interview with the president o f a division o f a Fortune 500 consumer
products c o m p a n y

Stimulated by the pioneering studies of Thibaut and Walker (1975) on

different methods of dispute resolution, there has been an increasing amount
of research conducted on issues of procedural fairness (see Folger and
Greenberg, 1985, for a comprehensive review). The primary focus of this
research has been on examining people's reactions to different types of pro-
cedures. Examples of different procedures that have been studied include
(i) adversarial and inquisitorial modes of dispute resolution (e.g., Lind et
al., 1980); (ii) arbitration and mediation (e.g., Brett and Shapiro, 1985); (iii)
the opportunity to exercise "voice" (e.g., Folger, 1977); and (iv) diary-keeping
in performance appraisal (e.g., Greenberg, 1986). One of the major findings
of this stream of research is that the type of procedure used to allocate out-
comes has an influence on people's judgments of the fairness of a decision
that is independent of outcome favorability (Folger and Greenberg, 1985).
In particular, people feel less dissatisfied with an unfavorable outcome when
they perceive the procedure to be fair (e.g., Lind et al., 1980).
Although the type of decision-making procedure is important in
understanding peoples' reactions to the fairness of a decision, there is grow-
ing empirical evidence that people focus on the enactment of the procedure
as well. In a study of job candidates' reactions to corporate recruiting pro-
cedures, Bies (1985) found that people distinguished procedural considera-
tions from those dealing with the process itself in describing fair and unfair
recruiting activities. For example, consistent with previous research on pro-
cedural justice (e.g., Folger, 1977; Thibaut and Walker, 1975), people felt
fairly treated when they had opportunity to fully present their case to the
interviewers, but felt unfairly treated when they were denied that chance.
However, separate from these procedural considerations, they also mentioned
interactional considerations such as the perceived truthfulness of the inter-
viewer's communication and respectful treatment (e.g., whether the inter-
viewer asked job-relevant or -irrelevant questions of the candidate) as criteria
they used to evaluate the fairness of recruiting procedures. Similarly,
Sheppard and Lewicki (this issue) found that executives distinguish the pro-
cedure from its enactment when they describe fair and unfair treatment in
different areas of management responsibility (e.g., planning, motivating).
Causal Accounts 201

Fairness concerns raised about the propriety of the decision maker's

behavior during the enactment of procedures are representative of a desire
for interactionaIjustice (Bies and Moag, 1986). During the enactment of pro-
cedures, people are particularly sensitive to the processes of interpersonal
communication and decision making. For example, people have normative
expectations for truthfulness and respect in communication (Bies and Moag,
1986). In addition, people have expectations that a decision maker will pro-
perly enact the rules of the procedure (cf. Lind and Lissak, 1985).
However, despite the best efforts and good intentions of decision
makers, they sometimes enact procedures in ways that deviate from norms
and expectations concerning an "ideal" process. For example, most of us are
familiar with increasingly long delays in the journal review process even
though there are guidelines concerning turnaround time. Similarly, we hear
complaints about the sarcastic nature of some reviewers' comments. Since
the journal review process is so central to out careers and mental health (for
a discussion of these issues, see Cummings and Frost, 1985), one would ex-
pect that delays and rude behavior would always result in claims of unfair
treatment. Yet, under such circumstances, we have observed that some of
our colleagues complain that they were unfairly treated while others do not.
One explanation for these differences in interactional fairness judgments
is that some journal editors may provide reasons to explain the delays or
the reviewer's rudeness while other editors may not (Bies and Moag, 1986).
In organizational contexts, such reasons can be found in causal accounts (Bies,
1987)-that is, explanations regarding a person's responsibility for his or
her actions. For example, a journal editor may explain that the delay in the
turnaround time is due to an increase in manuscript submissions. Or, con-
cerning a reviewer's sarcastic comments, the editor may explain that such
rude behavior is the result of the reviewer being overburdened by an increase
in journal-related responsibilities. In providing such causal accounts, the
editor is claiming that deviations from an ideal process are due to mitigating
circumstances (i.e., that the person is not fully responsible for his or her ac-
tions). Since previous research has suggested that giving such a causal ac-
count is associated with greater feelings of interactional fairness (Bies and Moag,
1986), we need to know why that kind of justification influences peoples'
fairness judgments.
A causal account claiming mitigating circumstances may contribute to
the perception of interactional fairness because it attempts to eliminate a worst-
case reading of the decision maker's intentions (Schlenker, 1980). For exam-
ple, if the journal editor was silent as to why there was a delay in the review
process or the sarcastic nature of the reviewer's comments, then we might
likely infer from the absence of "discounting" evidence as provided by a causal
account (cf. Kelley, 1972) that such actions were intentional or deliberate.
202 Bies and Shapiro

Since the perceived intentions of another person can influence perceptions

of unfair treatment (cf. Garrett and Libby, 1973; Leventhal et al., 1969; Reis
and Mims, 1982), the absence of any causal account for improper action
should undermine the feelings of interactional fairness (Bies and Moag, 1986).
Conversely, a causal account claiming mitigating circumstances should
enhance the perception of interactional fairness. As a result, we hypothesize
the following:
Hypothesis. The presence of a causal account claiming mitigating cir-
cumstances regarding improper action during the enactment of a procedure
will result in higher ratings of interactional fairness relative to the absence of
a causal account in a similar situation.
The absence of any causal account is likely to result in feelings of
resentment toward the editor in our example (cf. Folger and Martin, in press).
As such, a causal account may act to protect the editor from potential negative
moral evaluations (cf. Ross and DiTecco, 1975). For example, if a delay in
turnaround time is perceived to be the result of mitigating circumstances
rather than being intentional and deliberate, then he or she might be expected
to incur less blame or disapproval (Fincham and Jaspars, 1980). Converse-
ly, the presence of a causal account claiming mitigating circumstances might
be expected to contribute to higher ratings of approval relative to the absence
of a causal account.
The work of Folger and his colleagues provides some evidence in sup-
port of this reasoning (e.g., Folger, in press). For example, in a study by
Folger and Martin (in press), subjects competed with each other in a winner-
takes-all competition. The set of rules were announced before the competi-
tion, but changes in the rules for distributing the outcomes were announced
after the competition was over. All subjects were informed that they had
lost the competition. However, half of the subjects were provided good
reasons and half of the subjects were provided poor reasons for changing
the rules. In addition, half of the subjects were given the opportunity to
"recommend the experimenter for a permanent job as research assistant" while
the other half were not provided that option. Folger and Martin predicted
there would be a main effect of justification on subjects' hiring recommen-
dations. As expected, they found that people were more willing to recom-
mend the experimenter when the reasons for changing the rules suggested
there were mitigating circumstances for such an action. Although these resear-
chers did not have a direct measure of approval for the experimenter's ac-
tions, it seems likely that the recommendation to hire a person reflects an
endorsement of that person. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis. The presence of a causal account claiming mitigating cir-
cumstances regarding improper action during the enactment of a procedure
will result in higher ratings of approval relative to the absence of a causal
account in a similar situation.
Causal Accounts 203

To date, no empirical research has examined the relationship between

causal accounts and interactional fairness judgments. Such research is impor-
tant for two reasons. First, the cognitive appraisal of an injustice should be
an important mediating variable in explaining different emotions and
behaviors in response to that situation (cf. Lazarus, 1982). Although Folger
and Martin (in press) proposed to examine the influence of causal accounts
on perceptions of fairness, they did not measure such cognitive processes
directly. Instead, they focused on other responses, such as feelings of resent-
ment and hiring behavior. Second, people may make inferences about the
fairness of the procedure from the actions of the decision makers (Bies and
Moag, t986). As such, we need to investigate what factors may influence
a person's appraisal of a decision maker's actions.

STUDY 1

Study 1 tested the propositions that a causal account in which

mitigating circumstances are claimed for a manager's improper actions will
enhance ratings of interactional fairness and support for the decision maker
relative to an identical situation in which no causal account is provided.

Method

Subjects and Design

Subjects were 38 male and 18 female graduate business school students

enrolled in an evening MBA program in the Chicago area who volunteered
to participate in the study. Subjects were assigned randomly to one of the
two experimental conditions. There were 28 subjects in each condition.
The overall design of the experiment was a completely randomized two-
group single-factor design. One group received a causal account claiming
mitigating circumstances for the manager's improper action and the other
group did not receive such information.

Procedure and Materials

Subjects were told they were participating in a research investigation
of managerial decision-making processes. They were given a package of
materials in a folder, which included a case about an employee grievance.
This case involved an assistant brand manager at a large consumer products
firm who felt he had not received due recognition for his development of
a new promotion plan. The limited information in the case suggested that
the plan was indeed developed by the assistant brand manager, but his "boss"
204 Bies and Shapiro

received the social and financial recognition for the ideas. This information
created a scenario in which the boss may have "used" his subordinate to receive
recognition from top management. Each subject was asked to take the role
of an arbitrator and make a recommendation on the grievance concerning
the apparently improper actions. The materials were developed by the senior
author f r o m interviews with marketing administrators for the purposes of
this study. The names of people and products were changed to protect con-
fidentiality.
As part of the materials, subjects were given memos containing com-
ments allegedly f r o m "other" managers who were present at a meeting dur-
ing which the boss presented the new promotion plan. These managers were
described as being "unbiased" observers. The memos included the experimen-
tal manipulations of causal accounts.
In the mitigating circumstances causal account condition, subjects read
the following memo:
The Creamy Swirl promotion looks exciting and has considerable potential. The
meeting itself was interesting. When Mike introduced the plan, he mentioned his
assistant brand manager's efforts and contribution. The meeting was slow and detailed
as it began. At the coffee break, Mike talked to some of us about our reactions and
those of the boss. He told us he wanted to present it well so his assistant could get
appropriate recognition. We told Mike that be needed to change his approach to get
the group brand director's approval. In the discussion after the break, Mike got more
excited and referred to it as "his plan." Based on our talk at the break, I don't think
he meant to claim credit by using those words, but wanted to demonstrate his sup-
port for and c o m m i t m e n t to the plan. Mike tried to share the recognition, but the
group brand director felt that Mike was just being humble. I don't think Mike in-
tended things to happen this way. In any event, the new promotion plan is a good
one and should increase our market share.

Subjects in the no causal account condition did not receive a m e m o

concerning the boss's intentions and motives.
In addition to the causal account m e m o , all subjects read two "filler"
memos which contained no causal information that briefly described the
meeting in neutral terms. For example, each m e m o referred to the meeting
as a "good one" that "raised issues." Also, there was reference to the fact
that the meeting had "one coffee-break where we got to talk to other
managers." There was no reference to the boss in either memo. These two
filler memos were the only pieces of information that subjects in the no causal
account condition received. Extensive pretesting was conducted to ensure that
they provided no confounding information when the filler memos were
presented in the context of the causal account memo. The filler memos were
used in order to minimize the "obviousness" of the hypotheses and to in-
crease the plausibility of making decisions with all types of information.
Causal Accounts 205

Dependent Measures

After the case and memos were presented, subjects were asked a series
of questions. On a 9-point scale with 1 = very unfair and 9 = very fair,
subjects rated whether the subordinate had been treated fairly by his boss
in the situation. In addition, on 9-point scales ranging from t (not at all)
to 9 (very much so) subjects were asked to rate the degree to which they (i)
approved of the actions o f the boss, (ii) felt the boss had betrayed the assis-
tant brand manager, and (iii) felt the boss should be reprimanded for his
actions. The responses to the three questions were highly intercorrelated (mean
r = .62). Thus, they were summed to create an Approval Index (Cronbach's
c~ = .83).

Manipulation Check Questions

Three questions assessed the effectiveness of the manipulation. The

questions, measured on 9-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very
much so) were:

1. Did you get the impression that Mike Cushing intentionally tried to gain the full
credit for the promotion plan?
2. Did you get the impression that unforeseen factors in the situation had an impor-
tant impact on Mike Cushing's actions? (reverse scaled)
3. Did you get the impression that Mike Cushing purposely took full credit for the
new Creamy Swirl promotion plan?

The responses to the three questions were highly intercorrelated (mean

r = .65). Thus, they were summed to create a Causal Account Index (Cron-
bach's oz = .83). After completing the questionnaire, the subjects were
debriefed.

Results

The check on the validity o f the independent variable manipulation in-

dicated that it was successful in establishing the desired perceptions.
Specifically, the results confirmed that the causal account information was
perceived correctly, F(2, 81) = 33.54, p < 0.0001. As expected, subjects
in the mitigating circumstances causal account condition 2 = 10.0) per-
ceived significantly less intentionality in the actions of the boss relative to
subjects in the no causal account condition ( 2 = 16.8).
206 Bies and Shapiro

Judgments of Interactional Fairness

The mean ratings of interactionat fairness were significant between the

two causal account conditions, F(1, 54) = 8.48, p < 0.001, w2 = .12. Sub-
jects in the mitigating circumstances causal account condition rated interactional
fairness significantly higher (X = 3.7) than those who were in the no causal
account condition (X = 2.3). Thus, with regard to the judgment of interactional
fairness, Hypothesis 1 was supported.

Approval of the Boss's Actions

For the approval of the boss's actions, there was a significant main effect
of causal accounts, F(1, 54) = 9.49, p < 0.01, ~02 = .14. As predicted, the
subjects' approval rating of the boss's actions were a function of causal ac-
counts in a similar pattern to that of the processual fairness judgments. Sub-
jects gave a higher approval rating to the boss in the mitigating circumstances
causal account condition (X = 14.4) than did the subjects in the no causal
account condition (X = 10.0). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported.

Discussion

The results of Study 1 support the hypotheses that a causal account

claiming mitigating circumstances will enhance ratings of interactional fairness
and approval ratings of the boss relative to the absence of a causal account.
When there is the appearance of impropriety during the enactment of a pro-
cedure, the data suggest that fairness judgments and reactions to decision
makers are mediated by reception of a causal account.
There are limitations to the generalizability of the results of this study,
however, First, the construct of interactional fairness was operationalized with
only one question and it can be argued that this question was too situation-
specific. To address this problem, multiple operationalization of the con-
struct is necessary to establish the generalizability o f these results. Second,
it can be argued that the pattern of our findings may be specific to the
organizational context used in the experiment. If another study, using dif-
ferent contexts, found a similar pattern o f findings, this, too, should con-
tribute to the generalizability of the conclusions o f Study 1. To deal with
these limitations, a second experiment was conducted that used a multiple
operationalization of the interactional fairness construct, and which used two
different organizational contexts.
Causal Accounts 207

STUDY 2

In Study 2, we replicated the mitigating circumstances versus no causal

account comparison. In addition, two different organizational contexts were
used in this study. One context involved a sales purchase decision and the
other setting was a budget decision context. In both organizational settings,
there was the appearance of improper behavior by the decision maker
during the implementation of the organizational procedures. As in Study 1,
it was hypothesized that a causal account claiming mitigating circumstances
would result in higher ratings of interactional fairness and higher approval
ratings of the decision maker.

Method

Subjects and Design

Subjects were 50 male and 37 female currently employed graduate and

undergraduate business school volunteers. All were randomly assigned to one
of the four conditions. The average age of the participants was 26 years old,
and their average work experience was 7 years.
The overall design of the experiment was a 2 x 2 factorial design in
which the independent variables were causal accounts (none, mitigating cur-
cumstances) and the organizational context (sales purchase decision, budget
decision).

Procedure and Materials

Subjects were told they were part of a study examining "human rela-
tions" issues in organizations. Subjects were presented with a case that was
based on a composite o f actual events involving an allocation decision in
an organizational setting. The stimulus materials for the experiment were
developed out o f interviews with managers and Iower-level employees in a
field setting. The case included a description of the situation and a letter in
which the news about the allocation was delivered. The subjects were asked
to take the role o f the person receiving the news. In the case, the subjects
were apparently deceived by the decision maker about the size o f the poten-
tial sale or budget that they would receive (the improper behavior). In the
sales context, the salesperson received a "smaller than expected" sale. In the
208 Bies and Shapiro

second organizational context, the manager who submitted the request receiv-
ed a "smaller than expected" budget.
The subjects were asked to read the case and an attached letter. The
letter included the experimental manipulation of the causal account variable.
The letter made reference to a $205,000 sales proposal (or budget request).
To manipulate the perception of an unfavorable outcome, the actual amount
received was $145,000. Extensive pretesting determined that the difference
between the former and latter amount was sufficient to be characterized as
an unfavorable outcome. All subjects received the same unfavorable outcome.
Following this introductory paragraph, the causal account manipula-
tion was delivered. In the mitigating circumstances causal account condition,
subjects read:
As you know, an important source of informationwhichinfluences my purchase deci-
sion (budget decision) involves the economicconditions facing my division. Two of
our customershave cut back on their orders for the comingyear due to someeconomic
troubles they are experiencing at this time. As a result, our revenues are projected
to be less than expected. To deal with this situation, a ceiling has been placed on
the amount of any new divisional expenditures (budgetallotments). Thus, this change
in the economicenvironment had an important bearing on the decision concerning
your sales contract (budget request).
In the no causal account condition, subjects did not received any ex-
planation or justification.

Dependent Measures

After the case and memos were read by the subjects, they were asked
a series of questions. Interactional fairness was measured with three items that
were derived from research conducted by the first author (Bies, 1985). On
9-point scales, subjects rated the degree to which the decision maker had (i)
treated the person fairly, (ii) treated the person in an arbitrary manner (reverse
scaled), and (iii) acted openly and honestly. The responses to three questions
were highly intercorrelated (mean r = .45). Thus, they were summed to create
an Interactional fairness Index (Cronbach's o~ = .74). On 9-point scales, rang-
ing from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much so) subjects were asked to what degree
(i) they approved of the manager's action and (ii) whether they felt the
justification in the causal account was adequate enough.

Manipulation Check Questions

Three questions assessed the effectiveness of the causal account

manipulation. Two of the questions, measured on 9-point scales varying from
1 (not at all) to 9 (very much so) were (i) Do you have a general under-
Causal Accounts 209

standing o f the reasons for the decision? (ii) Did you get the impression that
Malcolm Wilson was primarily influenced by factors external to his firm in
his decision making process? In a third question, subjects were asked to
allocate up to 100 points among those factors that they felt were responsible
for the unfavorable outcome. The number of points allocated to "mitigating
circumstances" were divided by a factor of 10 and used as another check
on the manipulation. The responses to the three questions were highly inter-
correlated (mean r = .42). Thus, they were summed to create a Causal Ac-
count Index (Cronbach's (c~ = .73). After completing the questionnaire, the
subjects were debriefed.

Results

Manipulation Check

The check on the validity of the causal account variable manipulation

indicated that it was successful in establishing the desired perceptions, F(1,
83) = 71.63, p < 0.001. Subjects in the mitigating circumstances _causal ac-
count condition attributed the outcome more to mitigating factors (X = 18.7)
than subjects in the no causal account condition (X = 10.7) The pattern was
the same in both organizational contexts.

Judgments of Interactional Fairness

The terms of interac~ional fairness judgments, there was a significant main

effect for causal account, F(I, 83) = 15.01, p < 0.001, c02 = .12), but no
significant main effect or organizational context nor significant interaction
involving that factor (F < 1). Relative to the condition in which no causal
account was given, the causal account claim o f mitigating circumstances
resulted in higher ratings of interactional fairness in the sales purchase context
(19.0 vs. 15.2) and the budget decision context (18.4 vs. 14.4).
To further explore why causal accounts are effective in enhancing feel-
ings of interactional fairness, we entered the subjects' ratings of the adequacy
o f the justification for the causal account as a covariate into the analysis
of interactional fairness judgments. The analysis of covariance found that the
adequacy o f justification variables was highly significant, F(1, 83) = 38.84,
p < 0.001, co2 = .30, while the causal account manipulation was no longer
statistically significant (F < 1). Thus, although Hypothesis 1 was supported
again, it was the adequacy of the justification in support of the causal ac-
count, rather than the specific claim itself, which accounted for the variance
in people's reactions.
210 Bies and Shapiro

Approval o f the Decision Maker's Actions

In terms of approval ratings, there was a main effect for causal account,
F(1, 83) = 11.76, p < 0.001, o:2= .10), but no significant main effect of
organizational context nor significant interaction involving that factor
(F < 1). Relative to the absence of a causal account, the causal account claim-
ing mitigating circumstances resulted in higher approval ratings of the deci-
sion maker's actions in the sales purchase context (7.1 vs 4.8) and the budget
decision context (5.9 vs. 4.8).
Once again, we entered the subjects' ratings of the adequacy of the
justification for the causal account as a covariate into the analysis of
managerial approval. The analysis of covariance found that the adequacy
of justification was highly significant F(1, 83) = 38.84, p < 0.001, c02=
.30, while the causal account manipulation was no longer statistically signifi-
cant (F < 1). Thus, akhough Hypothesis 2 was supported again, the perceived
adequacy of the justification was more important than the causal account
claim in explaining the pattern of approval ratings.

Discussion

The results of Study 2 corroborate those of Study 1. Using a better

measure of interactional fairness and two different organizational contexts,
a causal account claiming mitigating circumstances was found to result in
higher ratings of interactional fairness and support for the manager than when
no causal account was given. An analysis of covariance suggested that it is
the perceived adequacy of the justification that is the critical factor influenc-
ing judgments of interactional fairness. This finding suggests that the mere
providing of a causal account claiming mitigating circumstances is not suffi-
cient to enhance ratings of interactional fairness and support for the manager;
rather, such a causal account must be perceived as adequate in order to do
so. Thus, the results of Study 2 support and amplify the conclusions derived
from the first study.
Although Studies 1 and 2 indicate that an adequate causal account can
influence people's judgments of interactional fairness and approval
ratings of organizational decisionmakers, these studies do not indicate whether
causal accounts are important in naturally occurring assessments of organiza-
tional procedures and decision makers. Accordingly, in the next study we
examined the influence of causal accounts in naturally occurring evaluations
of organizational decision makers.
Causal Accounts 2l I

STUDY 3

In this study, we conducted a survey on people's reactions to a typical

organizational o u t c o m e - t h e rejection of a proposal or a policy recommen-
dation. Although the primary purpose of this survey was to replicate the
laboratory findings in a naturally occurring field setting, it provided an op-
portunity to examine the influence o f a causal account on judgments o f pro-
cedural fairness as well. To date, no research has examined the latter
relationship, even though some theorists suggest that a causal account is an
important aspect of the concept of "due p r o c e s s " - t h a t is, fair procedures
(Aram and Silapante, 1981). This study represents the first empirical test of
such conjectures.
As independent variables, we measured the presence of a causal account
claim and the perceived adequacy of its justification. As dependent variables
we measured interactional fairness judgments, procedural fairness judgments,
approval of the boss's actions, and affective reactions in response to the
decision.

Method

Subjects

The 102 participants in this survey were volunteers from three different
subgroups. The sample included 45 currently employed people who were
enrolled in an evening MBA program, 33 students in a day MBA program
who had at least 2 year's work experience, and 24 people currently employed
in a finance, advertising, or consumer products company. The average age
o f this sample was 29 years and the average amount of working experience
was 6.5 years. The sample included 48 men and 54 women.

Materials

In this survey, participants were asked to recount a specific "rejection"

experience with their current boss. They were asked to provide as much detail
as possible about the situation, including the actual dialogue. This episode
provided the stimulus for the participants to respond to the survey questions.
The causal account claim variable was measured with a single item. On
a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so), subjects were asked
212 Bies and Shapiro

to evaluate the degree to which their boss claimed the rejection was due to
circumstances beyond his or her control. To test the reliability o f this one-
item measure, we correlated this ordinal rating with the judgments o f two
independent raters who coded the recounted experiences for the presence or
absence of this type of causal account. To do so, the one scale item was
transformed into nominal data by categorizing all ratings less than the mid-
point anchor of "to some degree," to reflect absence of a causal account and
those from the midpoint and above to reflect the presence of a causal ac-
count. The chi-square analysis generated a gamma coefficient o f .96 for the
causal account, suggesting that the one item was a reliable measure to be
used in the regression analyses.
In addition, on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very
much so), subjects evaluated the adequacy of the causal account with this
item: "Did your boss provide an adequate explanation for the refusal?" The
two independent variables were weakly correlated, r = .07, ns.
Interactional fairness was measured with three questions. On 7-point scales
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so), the participants rated the
degree to which they felt that their boss (i) had treated them fairly or unfair-
ly in this situation, (ii) was honest or dishonest, and (iii) had properly enacted
the procedure in evaluating the proposal/request. The reliability of this five-
item scale was .80.
Procedural fairness was measured with two questions with end points
o f 1 = very unfair and 7 = very fair. The subjects rated the degree to which
they felt that (i) the decision-making process was fair or unfair, and (ii) the
boss made his/her decision in a way that was fair or unfair. The reliability
of this two-item scale was .93.
The subjects rated their approval of the boss's handling of the situa-
tion with two items on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disapprove)
to 7 (strongly approve). On a second 7-point question, the subjects rated the
degree to which they felt more or less favorable toward their boss ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot). The reliability of this two-item scale was .83.
As an indicator of affective response, we asked the participants to
describe their feelings of (i) anger, (ii) resentment, and (iii) outrage on 7-point
scales. The reliability of this three-item scale was .90.

RESULTS

We used regression analysis to establish the relative influence of a causal

account claim and the adequacy of justification in the allocation of an un-
favorable outcome. Examination o f the effects of the causal account claim
and its justification, shown in Table I, indicate that with each of the depen-
Causal Accounts 213

Table I. The Influence of Causal Accounts in a Naturally Occurring Environment:

Study 3"
Interactional Procedural Approval Affective
Independent variables fairness fairness ratings reactions
Beta weights
Causal account claim .01 .08 .05 .05
Adequacy of justification .83b .76b .75b .55b
Total (Rz) .69b .58b .55b .30b
UsefuIness analysis
Claim beyond justification .00 .00 .00 .00
Justification beyond claim .69b .57~ .555 .30b
~Variance accounted for is indexed by the multiple correlation coefficient. High scores
indicate feelings of processual fairness, feelings of procedural fairness, high approval
ratings, and positiveemotions. Pairwise deletion was utilized. Total sample size was 102.
~p < 0.001.

dent variables, the a d e q u a c y o f justification dimension exercised a stronger

influence than the causal account claim. In the case of interactional fairness
judgments, the a d e q u a c y o f justification/3 = .83, p < 0.001, and the causal
a c c o u n t claim/3 = .01, ns. In the case o f procedural fairness judgments,
the a d e q u a c y o f justification/3 = .76, p < 0.001, and the causal account
claim/3 = .08, ns. In the case o f approval ratings, the adequacy o f justifica-
tion/3 = .75, p < 0.001, and the causal account claim/3 \ .05, ns. In the
case o f affective reactions, the a d e q u a c y o f justification/3 = .55, p < 0.001,
and the causal a c c o u n t claim/3 = .05, ns.
We also assessed the relative influence o f the causal a c c o u n t and the
a d e q u a c y o f justification variables by examining the ability o f each to ex-
plain variables b e y o n d that explained by the other. This analysis, also shown
in Table I, replicated the results described above. In each c o m p a r i s o n ade-
q u a c y o f justification explained greater variance b e y o n d the causal a c c o u n t
claim, whereas causal account claim did not explain significantly more variance
t h a n the a d e q u a c y o f justification considered alone.

Discussion

T a k e n together, these results are consistent with Studies 1 and 2 and

provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. In addition, they suggest that a
causal a c c o u n t o f mitigating circumstances is not in and o f itself sufficient
to enhance perceptions o f interactional fairness or procedural fairness. Rather,
the causal a c c o u n t must be perceived as adequate to have the latter effects.
Hence the adequacy o f the justification, rather than the claim itself, explains
214 Bies and Shapiro

most of the variance in people's feelings of fairness and manager approval

in the context of unfavorable managerial action. Given the naturally occur-
ring environment in which this study occurred, the pattern of findings con-
cerning the influence of causal accounts adds considerably to the validity
of the conclusions drawn from the two laboratory simulation studies. As such,
we may confidently conclude that adequate causal accounts are criticial in-
puts to international and procedural fairness judgments. The implications of
these findings are discussed below.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The purpose of our studies was to examine the extent to which a causal
account could influence people's reactions to a decision maker's behavior
during the enactment of organizational procedures. All three studies are con-
sistent in suggesting that a causal account claiming mitigating circumstances
enhances the perception of interactional fairness and approval of the decision
maker's actions. The third study suggests that a causal account can influence
the perception of procedural fairness as well. These results are consistent with
recent critiques of equity theory claiming that fairness judgments are based
primarily on attributional information (Cohen, 1982; see Greenberg, 1984,
for a review of this literature).
The findings of the three studies concerning the influence of a causal
account are consistent with field research on interactional fairness. For exam-
ple, Bies (1985) found that job candidates expected a causal account when
their interviews were canceled or they received a rejection letter. The failure
to receive such a justification was cited as the basis for claiming unfair treat-
ment. Related to this latter finding, Sheppard and Lewicki (this issue) found
that executives have similar expectations for justification concerning the
assignment of blame. Taken together, data from both laboratory experiments
and field surveys consistently demonstrate that a causal account can influence
judgments of interactional fairness.
The results of Studies 2 and 3 suggest that we need to distinguish be-
tween two different dimensions of a justification to more fully understand
why a causal account influences people's perceptions. Specifically, one needs
to take into consideration the influence of the specific claim of a causal ac-
count (e.g., mitigating circumstances) versus the perceived adequacy of the
justification for the claim. The results of both studies suggest the perceived
adequacy of the reasons in support of the claim is significantly more impor-
tant than the claim itself in influencing interactional fairness judgments and
support for managerial action. These findings are consistent with the research
of Folger and his colleagues (Folger et al., 1983; Folger and Martin, in press)
which shows that providing an adequate, not poor, justification for changes
Causal Accounts 215

in allocation procedures mitigates feelings of discontent. It may be that ex-

planations are n o t processed "mindlessly" (cf. Langer, 1978), at least when
they are offered in the context of unfavorable outcomes. Acting as "intuitive
jurists" (cf. Hamilton, 1980), people seek to determine the decision maker's
responsibility for the impropriety as a basis for evaluating whether that per-
son had acted fairly. Such an evaluation requires a sufficient amount of proof
to mitigate the decision maker's responsibility. As such, the adequacy of the
justification is an important consideration in people's analysis of a decision
maker's behavior.
What constitutes adequacy of justification emerges as an important
question for future research on interactional fairness. For example, is adequacy
a reflection of the sheer number of arguments, that is, the amount of reason-
ing? Or, is the adequacy of justification more closely linked to the quality,
not the quantity, of the argumentation (cf. Petty and Cacioppo, 1984)? Im-
portant quality dimensions might include sincerity and honesty (cf. Lewicki,
1983; Shapiro, 1985) as well as believability (Schlenker, 1980).
The results of Study 3 broaden the domain of theory and research on
procedural justice to include causal accounts or justification. Although the
concept of due process in organizations includes justification (e.g., Aram
and Silapante, 1981), current models of fair procedures have neglected this
variable (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaat and Walker, 1975). This is surprising since
court trial and arbitration procedures require a causal account along with
the verdict. Causal accounts contribute to the appearance of fair procedures
because they allow people to determine whether the decision maker has sup-
pressed his or her biases and acted according to the prevailing norms of
morality (cf. Leventhal, 1980).
Although the theories of procedural justice have ignored justification
(cf. LeventhaI, 1980; Thibaut and Walker, 1975), many of the empirical
studies have not. For example, many of the later studies (e.g., Lind et al.,
1980) included a causal account as part of announcing the verdict outcome.
While these researchers concluded from their studies that it was the disputants'
greater degree of process control (e.g., chance to fully present their "case"
to a third party) that enhanced their satisfaction with an unfavorable out-
come, it may have been that receiving a causal account along with the
verdict had an independent or interactive influence as well. Indeed, the results
of our three studies demonstrate that a causal account can have such an ef-
fect on people's fairness judgments. Thus, future research in procedural justice
needs to examine the separate influence of procedural variables, such as the
distribution of process control, and interactional variables, such as the perceived
adequacy of causal accounts, on perceptions of procedural fairness.
The effect of causal accounts on procedural fairness judgments con-
tributes additional complexity and insight to the justice-based explanation
of leader endorsement put forth by some researchers, most notably by Tyler
216 Bies and Shapiro

and his associates (Tyler and Caine, 1981; Tyler et al., 1985). According to
the justice-based explanation, procedural fairness judgments are critical in-
puts to support for leadership. The present study suggests that this perspec-
tive needs to take into consideration the leader's perceived motives and
intentions when there is the appearance of impropriety. For example, the
mere violation o f procedures may be insufficient to create the feelings of
infairness and outrage which might contribute to the withdrawal of support.
Our date suggest that such feelings are predicated upon the perception of
the violator's intentionality. However, if a leader can provide an adequate
causal account claiming mitigating circumstances, then he or she may be able
to maintain control and authority in the context of apparent impropriety.
It should not be too surprising that many leaders are sensitive to the causal
analyses of their actions in times of "trouble." Motivated by self-presentational
concerns (Bies, 1987; Reis, 1981), leaders will attempt to manage people's
interpretations o f any impropriety to maintain the appearance o f fairness
during the enactment of procedures.
The use of causal accounts, however, is not without potential costs.
For example, there is the issue of believability when it is provided. If the
causal account is flawed or found to be untrue, then there is good possibility
of future mistrust and anger on the part of the receiver. In addition, a leader
may be limited in how often he or she can continue to make "excuses" before
his or her support begins to erode. These potential trade-offs to the use o f
causal accounts suggest a new direction for research on leader endorsement.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the findings o f all three studies suggest that (i) causal
accounts claiming mitigating circumstances represent a critical input to
judgments of interactional and procedural fairness and (ii) the perceived ade-
quacy of justification for a causal account claim is more important than the
claim itself in explaining people's reactions to unfavorable outcomes. The
social informational context thus emerges as an important determinant o f
people's interactional and procedural fairness judgments (cf. Salancik and
Pfeffer, 1978). As such, what one says about the enactment of a procedure
can be as important as what one does when he or she enacts the procedure.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

We acknowledge the following people for their valuabe assistance in

the evolution o f this paper: Jerry Greenberg, Tom Tyler, Max Bazerman,
Anne Reilly, and Susan Smith.
Causal Accounts 217

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