Weighted Voting Systems (Biased Voting Systems)

A weighted voting system is one in which some voters have more weight on the outcome of an election. Examples
of weighted voting systems are fairly common. A few examples are the stockholders of a company, the Electoral
College, the United Nations Security
Council, and the European Union.

Example 1.

Consider a small company with a total of 100 shares of stock and three stockholders,
A, B, and C. Suppose that A owns 45 shares of the stock (which means A has 45 votes),
B owns 45 shares, and C owns 10 shares. If a vote of 51 or greater is required to approve any measure before the
owners, then a measure cannot be passed without two of the three owners voting for the measure. Even though C has
only 10 shares, C has the same voting power as A and B.

Example 2.

Now suppose that a new stockholder is brought into the company and the shares of the company are redistributed so
that A has 27 shares, B has 26 shares, C has 25 shares, and D has 22 shares. Note, in this case, that any two of A, B,
or C can pass a measure, but D paired with any of the other shareholders cannot pass a measure. D has virtually no
power even though D has only three shares less than C.
The number of votes that are required to pass a measure is called a quota. For the two stockholder examples above,
the quota was 51. The weight of a voter is the number of votes controlled by the voter. In the case of the company
whose stock was split A –27 shares, B –26 shares, C –25 shares, and D –22 shares, the weight of A is 27, the weight
of B is 26, the weight of C is 25, and the weight of D is 22. Rather than write out in sentence form the quota and
weight of each voter, we use the notation

This notation is very convenient. We state its more general form in the following definition.

Using this notation, we can describe various voting systems.

■ One person, one vote: For instance, {5: 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}. In this system, each person has one vote and five

votes, a majority, are required to pass a measure.

■ Dictatorship: For instance, {20: 21, 6, 5, 4, 3}. In this system, the person with 21 votes can pass any measure.

Even if the remaining four people get together, their votes do not total the quota of 20.
■ Null system: For instance, {28: 6, 3, 5, 2}. If all the members of this system vote for a measure, the total number of

votes is 16, which is less than the quota. Therefore, no measure can be passed.
■ Veto power system: For instance, {21: 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1}. In this case, the sum of all the votes is 21, the quota.

Therefore, if any one voter does not vote for the measure, it will fail. Each voter is said to have veto power. In this
case, this means that even the voter with one vote can veto a measure (cause the measure not to pass). A voter has
veto power whenever a measure cannot be passed without that voter's vote. If at least one voter in a voting system
has veto power, the system is a veto power system.
In a weighted voting system, a coalition is a set of voters each of whom votes the same way, either for or against a
resolution. A winning coalition is a set of voters the sum of whose votes is greater than or equal to the quota. A
losing coalition is a set of voters the sum of whose votes is less than the quota. A voter who leaves a winning
coalition and thereby turns it into a losing coalition is called a critical voter.
As shown in the next theorem, for large numbers of voters, there are many possible coalitions.

Example 3.
Suppose that the four owners of a company, Ang, Bonhomme, Carmel, and Diaz, own, respectively, 500 shares, 375
shares, 225 shares, and 400 shares. There are a total of 1500 votes; half of this is 750, so the quota is 751. The
weighted voting system for this company is {751: 500, 375, 225, 400}.
a. Determine the winning coalitions.
b. For each winning coalition, determine the critical voters.
Solution
a. A winning coalition must represent at least 751 votes. We will list these coalitions in the table below, in which we
use A for Ang, B for Bonhomme, C for Carmel, and D for Diaz.

b. A voter who leaves a winning coalition and thereby creates a losing coalition is a critical voter. For instance, for
the winning coalition {A, B, C}, if A leaves, the number of remaining votes is 600, which is not enough to pass a
resolution. If B leaves, the number of remaining votes is 725—again, not enough to pass a resolution. If C leaves,
the number of remaining votes is 875, which is greater than the quota. Therefore, A and B are critical voters for the
coalition (A, B, C )and C is not a critical voter. The table below shows the critical voters for each winning coalition.
Try this:
Many countries must govern by forming coalitions from among many political parties. Suppose a country has five
political parties named A, B, C, D, and E. The numbers of votes, respectively, for the five parties are 22, 18, 17, 10,
and 5.
a. Determine the winning coalitions if 37 votes are required to pass a resolution.
b. For each winning coalition, determine the critical voters.

Banzhaf Power Index

There are a number of measures of the power of a voter. For instance, as we saw from the Electoral College
example, some electors represent fewer people and therefore their votes may have more power. As an extreme case,
suppose that two electors, A and B, each represent 10 people and that a third elector, C, represents 1000 people. If a
measure passes when two of the three electors vote for the measure, then A and B voting together could pass a
resolution even though they represent only 20 people. Another measure of power, called the Banzhaf power index,
was derived by John F. Banzhaf III in 1965. The purpose of this index is to determine the power of a voter in a
weighted voting system.
Consider four people, A, B, C, and D, and the one-person, one-vote system given by
{3: 1, 1, 1, 1}.

To find BPI(A), we look under the critical voters column and find that A is a critical voter three times. The number
of times any voter is a critical voter, the denominator of the Banzhaf power index, is 12. (A is a critical voter three
times, B is a critical voter three times, C is a critical voter three times, and D is a critical voter three times. The sum
is 3 +3+ 3+ 3= 12.) Thus,

BPI(A)=3/12=0.25

Similarly, we can calculate the Banzhaf power index for each of the other voters.
BPI(B)=3/12=0.25 BPI(C)=3/12=0.25 BPI(D)=3/12=0.25

In this case, each voter has the same power. This is expected in a voting system in which each voter has one vote.
Now suppose that three people, A, B, and C, belong to a dictatorship given by {3: 3, 1, 1}.

The sum of the numbers of critical voters in all winning coalitions is 4. To find BPI(A), we look under the critical
voters column and find that A is a critical voter four times. Thus BPI(A)= 4/4=1

BPI(B) =0/4=0, BPI(C)=0/4=0

Thus A has all the power. This is expected in a dictatorship.
Try this:
Suppose the stock in a company is held by five people, A, B, C, D, and E. The voting system for this company is
{626: 350, 300, 250, 200, 150}. Determine the Banzhaf power index for A and E.