2017 REMEDIAL LAW

I.
What trial court outside Metro Manila has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
following cases? Explain briefly your answers.

(a) An action filed on November 13, 2017 to recover the possession of an apartment
unit being occupied by the defendant by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, after the
former ignored the last demand to vacate that was duly served upon and
received by him on July 6, 2016. (2.5%)

Suggested Answer: It depends. The instant action is an accion publiciana

considering that more than a year has lapsed from the date of last demand
(Natalia Realty, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 126462, November 12, 2002; Penta Pacific
Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction and Development Corporation, G.R. No.
161589, November 24, 2014). Thus, if the assessed value of the apartment unit
does not exceed P20, 000.00, the Municipal Trial Court has the exclusive original
jurisdiction over the action (Penta Pacific Realty Corporation, supra; BP Big. 129,
Sec. 33). On the other hand, if the assessed value of the apartment unit exceeds
P20, 000.00, the Regional Trial Court has the exclusive original jurisdiction over
the action (Penta Pacific Realty Corporation, supra; BP Blg. 129, Sec. 19). The
allegation of the assessed value of the apartment unit must be found in the
complaint, otherwise the action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
because the trial court is not thereby afforded the means of determining from the
allegations of the pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action pertains to it or to another court (Penta Paclfic Realty Corporation, supra).

(b) A complaint in which the principal relief sought is the enforcement of a seller's
contractual right to repurchase a lot with an assessed value of ₱15,000.00. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
The Regional Trial Court has the jurisdiction over an action in which the principal relief
sought is the enforcement of a seller's contractual right to repurchase a lot. Since said
action is one for specific performance to enforce a contractual right, it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore cognizable by the Regional Trial Court (Surviving
Heirs of Bautista v. Linda, G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014; BP Big. 129, Sec. 19).

II.

Santa filed against Era in the RTC of Quezon City an action for specific performance
praying for the delivery of a parcel of land subject of their contract of sale. Unknown to
the parties, the case was inadvertently raffled to an RTC designated as a special
commercial court. Later, the RTC rendered judgment adverse to Era, who, upon
realizing that the trial court was not a regular RTC, approaches you and wants you to
file a petition to have the judgment annulled for lack of jurisdiction.

What advice would you give to Era? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
I will advise Era that a petition to have the judgment annulled for lack of jurisdiction has
no basis. In Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc. (G.R. No. 202664, November 10, 2015), the
Supreme Court ruled that the fact that a particular branch which has been designated
as a Special Commercial Court does not shed the RTC's general jurisdiction over
ordinary civil cases under the imprimatur of statutory law, i.e. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The designation of Special Commercial Court was merely intended as a procedural tool
to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the court's exercise of
jurisdiction.
This designation was not made by statute but only by an internal Supreme Court rule
under its authority to promulgate rules governing matters of procedure.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: I will advise Era that a petition for annulment of judgment is
untenable. I will tell Era that the available post-judgment remedies could be any of the
following depending upon the date of his receipt of the judgment: Motion for
Reconsideration, Appeal, Petition for Relief from Judgment, or Certiorari. The Regional
Trial Court, despite its having been designated as a Special Commercial Court remains
possessed of authority as a court of general jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases,
whether civil or criminal. The Constitution vests not only in the Supreme Court, but in all
Regional Trial Courts, the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding
laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law (Jesus C. Garcia v. The
Hon. Ray Alan T. Dillon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013). The designation of the court
as a special commercial court is an internal arrangement for lower courts that could be
allowed by the Supreme Court, with the Office of the Court Administrator as the
implementing arm, with the purpose of giving priority to commercial cases on top of the
trial court's regular cases.

III.

Answer the following briefly:

(a) What elements should concur for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for
conviction? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
(a) For circumstantial evidence to warrant the conviction of the accused, the
following elements should concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance;
2. The facts from which the circumstances arose are duly established in court;
and
3. The circumstances form the unbroken chain of events leading to the
conclusion of the culpability of the accused for the crime for which he is convicted
(Bacolod v. People, G.R. No. 206236, July 15, 2013).

(b) When is bail a matter of judicial discretion? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) Under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is a matter of judicial
discretion under the following circumstances:
1. Before conviction, in cases where the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua; and
2. After accused's conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

In People v. Leviste (GR. No. 189122, March 17, 2010), the Supreme Court ruled
that the absence of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court does not automatically result in the
grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent
sound discretion approach.

(c) Give at least two instances when a peace officer or a private person may make a
valid warrantless arrest. (2%)

SUGGESTED Answer:
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private
person may make a valid warrantless arrest in the following instances:
1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
2. When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
 3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

(d) What is a tender of excluded evidence? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(d) Tender of excluded evidence is a remedy embodied under Section 40,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which states that "if documents or things offered
in evidence are excluded by the Court, the offeror may have the same attached
to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may
state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness
and the substance of the proposed testimony."
In Cruz-Arevalo v. Querubin-Layosa (AM. No. RTJ-06-2005, July 14, 2006), the
Supreme Court ruled that this procedure, also known as offer of proof, is made
for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against the
offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded
evidence. The appellate court will better understand and appreciate the
assignment of error if the evidence involved is included in the record of the case.

IV.

Give brief answers to the following:

(a) What is the doctrine of hierarchy of courts? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The doctrine of hierarchy of courts, as a rule, requires that recourse
must be first made to the lower-ranked courts exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court (Dio v. Subic Bay Marine Exploration, Inc.,
G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014).

(b) What is the Harmless Error Rule in relation to appeals? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) Under Rule 51, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the Harmless Error
Rule states that no error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done
or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is a ground for granting
a new trial or for setting aside, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
to be inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.

(c) When does a public prosecutor conduct an inquest instead of a preliminary

investigation? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the public prosecutor conducts an
inquest instead of a preliminary investigation when a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a
preliminary investigation. [S6 R112]

V.

After working for 25 years in the Middle East, Evan returned to the Philippines to retire
in Manila, the place of his birth and childhood. Ten years before his retirement, he
 bought for cash in his name a house and lot in Malate, Manila. Six months after his
return, he learned that his house and lot were the subject of foreclosure proceedings
commenced by ABC Bank on the basis of a promissory note and a deed of real estate
mortgage he had allegedly executed in favor of ABC Bank five years earlier.

Knowing that he was not in the country at the time the promissory note and deed of
mortgage were supposedly executed, Evan forthwith initiated a complaint in the RTC of
Manila praying that the subject documents be declared null and void.

ABC Bank filed a motion to dismiss Evan's complaint on the ground of improper venue
on the basis of a stipulation in both documents designating Quezon City as the
exclusive venue in the event of litigation between the parties arising out of the loan and
mortgage.

Should the motion to dismiss of ABC Bank be granted? Explain your answer.
(5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
No. ABC Bank's motion to dismiss should be denied. In Briones v. Court of
Appeals (GR. No. 204444, January 14, 2015), the Supreme Court ruled
that a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself
should not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein
and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue. The
Supreme Court ruled that it would be inherently inconsistent for a
complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when
it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such
stipulation is contained. In this case, Evan's complaint directly assails the
validity of the promissory note and deed of mortgage, which contains said
venue stipulation; hence, said venue stipulation is not binding on him.
Evan correctly filed his complaint with the Manila RTC pursuant to Rule 4
of the Rules of Court.

VI.

Hanna, a resident of Manila, filed a complaint for the partition of a large tract of land
located in Oriental Mindoro. She impleaded her two brothers John and Adrian as
defendants but did not implead Leica and Agatha, her two sisters who were permanent
residents of Australia.

Arguing that there could be no final determination of the case without impleading all
indispensable parties, John and Adrian moved to dismiss the complaint.

Does the trial court have a reason to deny the motion? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the trial court has reason to deny the motion. Section 11, Rule 3
Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a
ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his
initiatory pleading in order to implead Leica and Agatha, for under the
same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be
made on motion of any party or on the trial court's own Initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just (Ablaza v. Republic,
G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010).

VII.

Elise obtained a loan of ₱3 Million from Merchant Bank. Aside from executing a
promissory note in favor of Merchant Bank, she executed a deed of real estate
mortgage over her house and lot as security for her obligation. The loan fell due but
 remained unpaid; hence, Merchant Bank filed an action against Elise to foreclose the
real estate mortgage. A month after, and while the foreclosure suit was pending,
Merchant Bank also filed an action to recover the principal sum of ₱3 Million against
Elise based on the same promissory note previously executed by the latter.

In opposing the motion of Elise to dismiss the second action on the ground of splitting of
a single cause of action, Merchant Bank argued that the ground relied upon by Elise
was devoid of any legal basis considering that the two actions were based on separate
contracts, namely, the contract of loan evidenced by the promissory note, and the deed
of real estate mortgage.

Is there a splitting of a single cause of action? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there is splitting of a cause of action. A creditor cannot file a civil
action against the debtor for collection of the debt and subsequently file an
action to foreclose the mortgage. This is an example of splitting of a single
cause of action, a practice that is vexatious and oppressive (Danao v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48276, June 6, 2001).

VIII.

A.

Laura was the lessee of an apartment unit owned by Louie. When the lease expired,
Laura refused to vacate the property. Her refusal prompted Louie to file an action for
unlawful detainer against Laura who failed to answer the complaint within the
reglementary period.

Louie then filed a motion to declare Laura in default. Should the motion be
granted? Explain your answer. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, the motion should not be granted because it is a prohibited pleading.
Under Section 19(h) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, a motion to
declare defendant in default is among the pleadings that are prohibited in
cases covered by said Rule. Considering that an action for unlawful
detainer is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, Louie's motion
to declare Laura in default is a prohibited pleading, and thus, should not
be granted.

B.

Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Makati City to collect ₱350,000.00,
an amount representing the unpaid balance on the price of the car Yana had bought
from Agatha. Realizing a jurisdictional error in filing the complaint in the RTC, Agatha
filed a notice of dismissal before she was served with the answer of Yana. The RTC
issued an order confirming the dismissal.

Three months later, Agatha filed another complaint against Yana based on the same
cause of action this time in the MeTC of Makati City. However, for reasons personal to
her, Agatha decided to have the complaint dismissed without prejudice by filing a notice
of dismissal prior to the service of the answer of Yana. Hence, the case was dismissed
by the MeTC.

A month later, Agatha refiled the complaint against Yana in the same MeTC.

May Yana successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha's third
complaint? Explain your answer. (3%)
 SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, Yana cannot successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule. In order for
the Two Dismissal Rule to apply, Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
requires that both dismissals through plaintiff's notices were made by a
competent court. Moreover, in Ching Cheng (G.R. No. 175507, October 8,
2014), the Supreme Court ruled that the following requisites should concur
for the Two-Dismissal Rule to apply:
a. There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
b. Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
c. Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
d. When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by
the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims
of the former.

In this case, the Makati City RTC had no jurisdiction over the first
complaint which was dismissed through Agatha's notice, because it is
below its jurisdictional amount of at least P400, 000.00. Therefore, the
Two-Dismissal Rule cannot be successfully invoked in this case

IX.

Abraham filed a complaint for damages in the amount of ₱750,000.00 against Salvador
in the RTC in Quezon City for the latter's alleged breach of their contract of services.
Salvador promptly filed his answer, and included a counterclaim for ₱250,000.00 arising
from the allegedly baseless and malicious claims of Abraham that compelled him to
litigate and to engage the services of counsel, and thus caused him to suffer mental
anguish.

Noting that the amount of the counterclaim was below the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the RTC, Abraham filed a motion to dismiss vis-8-vis the counterclaim on that ground.

Should the counterclaim of Salvador be dismissed? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Salvador's counterclaim is compulsory in nature, and thus should not
be dismissed. Section 7, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines a
compulsory counterclaim as any claim for money or any relief, which a
defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of
suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's complaint
(Rungcayao v. Fort Ilocandia, G.R. No. 170483, April 19,2010). A
counterclaim is compulsory where:
1. It arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject flatter of the opposing party's claim;
2. It does not require the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction, and;
3. The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim (Spouses Arenas v.
CA, G.R. No 126640, November 23, 2000).
Regarding the trial court's jurisdiction, Section 7, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court explicitly states that in an original action before the Regional Trial
Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the
amount. In relation thereto, the Supreme Court held in Alday v. FGU
Insurance Corp. (G.R, No. 138822, January 23, 2001), that claims for
damages, allegedly suffered as a result of plaintiff's filing of a complaint,
are compulsory. In this case, the court's jurisdiction over Salvador's
counterclaim, despite being below the jurisdictional amount is evident from
the following: Salvador's claims for litigation expenses arise out of
Abraham's complaint for damages; Salvador's claims do not require the
 presence of third parties; and being compulsory in nature, the trial court
may exercise jurisdiction over said claim.

X.

On the basis of an alleged promissory note executed by Harold in favor of Ramon, the
latter filed a complaint for ₱950,000.00 against the former in the RTC of Davao City. In
an unverified answer, Harold specifically denied the genuineness of the promissory
note. During the trial, Harold sought to offer the testimonies of the following: (1) the
testimony of an NBI handwriting expert to prove the forgery of his signature; and (2) the
testimony of a credible witness to prove that if ever Harold had executed the note in
favor of Ramon, the same was not supported by a consideration.

May Ramon validly object to the proposed testimonies? Give a brief explanation
of your answer. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ramon may validly object to the proposed testimony of the NBI
handwriting expert. The alleged promissory note attached to Ramon's
complaint is an actionable document since it is a written instrument upon
which an action or defense is grounded (Asian Construction and
Development Corporation v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 176949, June 27, 2012).
Accordingly, Harold's failure to specifically deny under oath the
genuineness of said actionable document amounts to an implied
admission of its genuineness and due execution under Rule 8, Section 8
of the Rules of Court. Harold cannot thus raise the defense of forgery by
presenting the testimony of a handwriting expert. Well-settled is the rule
that the trial court may reject evidence that a party adduces to contradict a
judicial admission he previously made since such admission is conclusive
as to him (Equitable Card Network Inc., v. Capistrano, G.R. No. 180157,
February 8, 2012).

However, Ramon may not validly object to the testimony of a credible

witness to prove that the promissory note was not supported by a
consideration. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a
document does not bar the defense of want of a consideration (Hibberd v.
Rohde and McMillan, G.R. No, L-8414, December 9, 1915).

XI.

A.

Teddy filed against Buboy an action for rescission of a contract for the sale of a
commercial lot. After having been told by the wife of Buboy that her husband was out of
town and would not be back until after a couple of days, the sheriff requested the wife to
just receive the summons in behalf of her husband. The wife acceded to the request,
received the summons and a copy of the complaint, and signed for the same.

(a) Was there a valid service of summons upon Buboy? Explain your answer
briefly. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) No, there was no valid service of summons in this case, since the
summon was not personally received by Buboy. For substituted service of
summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to
personally serve the summons within a reasonable period. "Several
attempts: means at least three tries, preferably on at least two different
dates" (Mancha. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006).
(b) If Buboy files a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the twin grounds of
lack of jurisdiction over his person and prescription of the cause of action, may
he be deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court? Explain your answer briefly (3%).

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) No, the filing of the motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not a
voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 170122, October 12, 2009). Under Section 20, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss
on other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

The filing of a motion is deemed voluntary submission to the court's

jurisdiction only when it constitutes an unqualified voluntary appearance
before the court, such that the defendant failed to object to the court's
jurisdiction over his person (PVIB v. Spouses Dy, G.R. No. 171137, June
5, 2009).

B.

What is the mode of appeal applicable to the following cases, and what issues may be
raised before the reviewing court/tribunal?

(a) The decision or final order of the National Labor Relations Commission.
(1.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Strictly, there is no appeal from an NLRC decision. However, NLRC
decisions or final orders are reviewable on petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, filed before the Court of Appeals (St. Martin
Funeral Homes v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998).
Petitioner may raise the issue on whether the NLRC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction (Pfizer Inc., v.
Galan, G.R. No. 158460, August 24, 2007).

(b) The judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. (1.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) The mode of appeal is petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner may raise errors of fact, law, or both under Section 2 of
Rule 42.

XII.

A.

Judgment was rendered against defendant Jaypee in an action for unlawful detainer.
The judgment ordered Jaypee to vacate and to pay attorney's fees in favor of Bart, the
plaintiff.

To prevent the immediate execution of the judgment, would you advise the
posting of a supersedeas bond as counsel for Jaypee? Explain your answer
briefly? (2%).
 SUGGESTED ANSWER
I would advise Jaypee to post a supersedeas bond, but I would also
advise him that the posting of a supersedeas bond alone does not prevent
the immediate execution of the judgment. To stay the immediate execution
of the judgment in an ejectment case, the defendant:
1. Must perfect an appeal;
2. File a supersedeas bond; and
3. Periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of
the appeal;

Otherwise, the writ of execution will issue upon motion of the plaintiff
(Achang V. Hon.
Luczon, G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014; Rule 70, Section 19 of the
Rules of Court).

******************

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
As counsel for Jaypee, I would not advise the posting of a supersedeas
bond. The supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the unpaid rentals,
damages and costs which accrued down to the time of the judgment
(Section 19, Rule 70, Rules of Court; Chua V.
Court ojAppeals, G.R. No. 113886, February 24, 1998). In other words,
the supersedeas bond covers the monetary judgment of the lower court;
thus, if the judgment does not make any pronouncement as to the
pecuniary liability of the defendant, the posting of the supersedeas bond
should not be required. Attorney's fees are not covered by a supersedeas
bond (Once v. Gonzales,G.R. No. L-44806, March 31, 1977).

B.

A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued on September 20, 2017 by the RTC
against defendant Jeff enjoining him from entering the land of Regan, the plaintiff.

On October 9, 2017, upon application of Regan, the trial court, allegedly in the interest
of justice, extended the TRO for another 20 days based on the same ground for which
the TRO was issued.

On October 15, 2017, Jeff entered the land subject of the TRO.

May Jeff be liable for contempt of court? Why? (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Jeff may not be liable for contempt. Under the Rule on Preliminary
Injunction, a TRO is e²fective only for a period of 20 days from service on
the person sought to be enjoined. It is deemed automatically vacated if the
application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the
said period and no court shall have the authority to extend or renew the
TRO on the same ground for which it was issued. [Sec5 Rule 58] Here the
extension of the TRO by the RTC was invalid since it was for the same
ground for which the TRO was issued. Hence the TRO was deemed
automatically vacated and thus Je²f may not be liable for contempt for
ignoring it.

XIII.

Police officers arrested Mr. Druggie in a buy-bust operation and confiscated from him 10
sachets of shabu and several marked genuine peso bills worth ₱5,000.00 used as the
buy-bust money during the buy-bust operation.
 At the trial of Mr. Druggie for violation of R.A. No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous
Drug Act of 2002), the Prosecution offered in evidence, among others, photocopies of
the confiscated marked genuine peso bills. The photocopies were offered to prove that
Mr. Druggie had engaged at the time of his arrest in the illegal selling of dangerous
drugs.

Invoking the Best Evidence Rule, Atty. Maya Bang, the defense counsel, objected to the
admissibility of the photocopies of the confiscated marked genuine peso bills.

Should the trial judge sustain the objection of the defense counsel? Briefly
explain your answer (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, the trial judge should not sustain the defense counsel's objection. In
People v. Tandoy (G.R. No. 80505, December 4, 1990), the Supreme
Court held that the best evidence rule applies only when the contents of
the document are the subject of Inquiry. Where the issue is only as to
whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence
rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.

Here, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the
purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents. Other
substitutionary evidence, like a photocopy thereof, is therefore admissible
without the need of presenting the original.
Hence, the best evidence rule does not apply in this case. The trial judge,
therefore, should not sustain the defense counsel's objection.

Atty. Maya Bang, however, may object to the photocopies of the

confiscated marked genuine peso bills for being hearsay evidence. Since
it does not appear that the prosecution was able to establish that its
submission of photocopied documents is justified under Rule 130,
Sections 3 (a), (b), and (d) of the Rules of Court, said photocopied
documents do not have any probative weight and should be disregarded
whether objected to or not (Republic v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892, April
19,2016).

*********************

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
The photocopies of the confiscated marked money should be excluded as
evidence under the Best Evidence Rule. To be admissible as secondary
evidence, the prosecution should have shown that the original marked
money has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, or that
it is in the custody of the adverse party (People v. Pamarlto, G.R. No.
108453, July 11, 1994).

XIV.

Immediately before he died of gunshot wounds to his chest, Venancio told the attending
physician, in a very feeble voice, that it was Arnulfo, his co-worker, who had shot him.
Venancio added that it was also Arnulfo who had shot Vicente, the man whose cadaver
was lying on the bed beside him.

In the prosecution of Arnulfo for the criminal killing of Venancio and Vicente, are
all the statements of Venancio admissible as dying declarations? Explain your
answer. (5%)
 SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, not all statements of Venancio are admissible as dying declarations.
A dying declaration is a statement made under the consciousness of an
impending death (Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 37). It may be
received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. In
this case, presuming there is evidence that Venancio was conscious of his
impending death when he made his statement that it was Arnulfo who shot
him, said statement may be considered as a dying declaration which is
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. The degree
and seriousness of the gunshot wounds sustained by Venancio and the
fact that death supervened thereafter may constitute substantial evidence
of his consciousness of his impending death (People v. Tanaman, G.R.
No. 71768, July 28, 1987).

While Venancio's statement about the death of Vicente may not be

considered as a dying declaration, it may still be admitted in evidence as
part of res gestae, which is also an exception to the hearsay rule (Rules of
Court, Rule 130, Section 42). Venancio's statement about the killing of
Vicente may be considered to have been made after the occurrence of a
startling occurrence. Thus, it may be admitted in evidence.

XV.

In an attempt to discredit and impeach a Prosecution witness in a homicide case, the

defense counsel called to the stand a person who had been the boyhood friend and
next-door neighbor of the Prosecution witness for 30 years. One question that the
defense counsel asked of the impeaching witness was: "Can you tell this Honorable
Court about the general reputation of the prosecution witness in your community for
aggressiveness and violent tendencies?"

Would you, as the trial prosecutor, interpose your objection to the question of the
defense counsel? Explain your answer. (4%)

XVI.

Engr. Magna Nakaw, the District Engineer of the DPWH in the Province of Walang
Progreso, and Mr. Pork Chop, a private contractor, were both charged in the Office of
the Ombudsman for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019) under a conspiracy theory.

While the charges were undergoing investigation in the Office of the Ombudsman, Engr.
Magna Nakaw passed away. Mr. Pork Chop immediately filed a motion to terminate the
investigation and to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that because he was
charged in conspiracy with the deceased, there was no longer a conspiracy to speak of
and, consequently, any legal ground to hold him for trial had been extinguished.

Rule on the motion to terminate filed by Mr. Pork Chop, with brief reasons. (5%).

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to terminate should be denied. In People v. Go (G.R. No.
168539, March 24, 2014), the Supreme Court ruled that the avowed policy
of the State and the legislative intent to repress acts of public officers and
private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices, would be
frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a
private person who conspired with such public officer in violating R.A. No.
3019. Since the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature
and involves evidentiary matters, the allegation of conspiracy against Mr.
 Pork Chop is better ventilated before the trial court during the trial, where
he can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.

XVII.

Juancho entered a plea of guilty when he was arraigned under an information for
homicide. To determine the penalty to be imposed, the trial court allowed Juancho to
present evidence proving any mitigating circumstance in his favor. Juancho was able to
establish complete self-defense.

Convinced by the evidence adduced by Juancho, the trial court rendered a verdict of
acquittal.

May the Prosecution assail the acquittal without infringing the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy in favor of Juancho? Explain your answer.
(5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the prosecution may assail Juancho's acquittal without violating his
right against double jeopardy. In the similar case of People v. Balisacan
(GR. No. L-26376, August 31, 1966), the Supreme Court held that if an
accused who first entered a plea of guilty was later on allowed to prove
any mitigating circumstance, his prior plea is deemed vacated. The court
should require him to plead anew on the charge, or at least direct that a
new plea of not guilty be entered for him. Thus in this case, since Juancho
was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances in his
favor, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the prosecution's
appeal.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled in the Balisacan case that a plea of
guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense
charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and
leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law
under the circumstances. Since Juancho was only allowed to testify in
order to establish mitigating circumstances for the purposes of fixing the
penalty, his testimony, thus, could not be taken as a trial on the merits to
determine his guilt or innocence. Juancho's acquittal is therefore void
considering that the prosecution was not afforded an opportunity to
present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant.

XVIII.

Tomas was criminally charged with serious physical injuries allegedly committed against
Darvin. During the pendency of the criminal case, Darvin filed a separate civil action for
damages based on the injuries he had sustained.

Tomas filed a motion to dismiss the separate civil action on the ground of litis pendentia,
pointing out that when the criminal action was filed against him, the civil action to
recover the civil liability from the offense charged was also deemed instituted. He
insisted that the basis of the separate civil action was the very same act that gave rise
to the criminal action.

Rule on Tomas' motion to dismiss, with brief reasons. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
The motion to dismiss should be denied. Darwin's civil action is based on
physical injuries, and is therefore an independent civil action which may
proceed independently of the criminal case (Article 33, Civil Code).
However, Darvin cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
 omission charged in the criminal action (Rule 111, Section 2, Rules of
Court).

As the Supreme Court ruled in People v. Lipala (G.R. No. 200302, April
20, 2016), "the independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176,
as well as claims from sources of obligations other than delict, are not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by
the offended party even without reservation".

XIX.

Boy Maton, a neighborhood tough guy, was arrested by a police officer on suspicion
that he was keeping prohibited drugs in his clutch bag. When Boy Maton was searched
immediately after the arrest, the officer found and recovered 10 sachets of shabu neatly
tucked in the inner linings of the clutch bag. At the time of his arrest, Boy Maton was
watching a basketball game being played in the town plaza, and he was cheering for his
favorite team. He was subsequently charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, and he entered a plea of not guilty when he was arraigned.

During the trial, Boy Maton moved for the dismissal of the information on the ground
that the facts revealed that he had been illegally arrested. He further moved for the
suppression of the evidence confiscated from him as being the consequence of the
illegal arrest, hence, the fruit of the poisonous tree.

The trial court, in denying the motions of Boy Maton, explained that at the time the
motions were filed Boy Maton had already waived the right to raise the issue of the
legality of the arrest. The trial court observed that, pursuant to the Rules of Court, Boy
Maton, as the accused, should have assailed the validity of the arrest before entering
his plea to the information. Hence, the trial court opined that any adverse consequence
of the alleged illegal arrest had also been equally waived.

Comment on the ruling of the trial court. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
The trial court's correct insofar as Boy Maton is considered to have waived
his objections to the illegality of his arrest. In Villanueva vs. People (G.R.
No. 199042, November 17, 2014), the Supreme Court held that objections
to the irregularity of arrest must be made before his arraignment. In this
case, Boy Maton made no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment. Hence the trial court is correct when it ruled that Boy
Maton had already waived his right to question the illegality of his arrest.
Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused "shouId be timely raised
in a motion to quash the information at any time before arraignment, failing
in which, he is deemed to have waived" his right to question the regularity
of his arrest (People v. Cunanan, G.R. No. 198924, March 16, 2015).

However, the trial court erred when it ruled that Boy Maton Iikewise
waived his right to assail the illegal search. In the Villanueva case (supra),
the Supreme Court ruled that "a waiver of an illegal arrest is not a waiver
of an illegal search." It further held that “while the accused has already
waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to
have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search."
Therefore, Boy Maton may still move for the suppression of the evidence
confiscated from him being the consequences of the illegal arrest.

-NOTHING FOLLOWS-