VEDANTA EXPLAINED

Samkara's commentary

The Brahma-sutras

[VoL-Omk]

V. H. DATE. MA, PkD.

With a foreward by
Pbof. R D. RANADE, M.A, [Link]

BOOKSELLERS' PUBLISHING CO.

 FfliCE ; Hs. 17/8.

2-65 83
DAT- V-\

!. \1 ". I-
My Spiritual Teacher
 PREFACE
Sri Sarhkaracarya has hitherto been shown as a
great idealist and manisf; but this expository treat-
ment of his greatest work, viz. his commentary on
the Brahma -Sutras, which I am presenting in two
volumes, aims at pointing out in addition the etbico-
spiritual standpoint of his philosophy. It is not the
mere intellectual understanding of the reality, but the
moral and the spiritual awakening of man which is,
according to Sarhkara, responsible for the realisation of
the Atman in this very life. If this be the truth, a new
light will be flashed upon the philosophy of the great
£clrya. He will be seen to have built upon the
foundations of renunciation and asceticism a new but
an everlasting structure of moral and spiritual equality
of all men before God and their identity in Him ,

To achieve this purpose, a mere literal translation

of his Bhasya, as a Sanskritist or a grammarian would
like to have it, will not do. On the contrary, a free ren-
dering in simple and philosophical language is desirable.
I have remained absolutely faithful to Samkara, though
I have added a few lines here and there to bring out
explicitly what is merely implicit in the commentary,
my aim being to preserve the unity of ideas rather than
that of mere words. 1 have tried to see that the ideas are
connected logically, and that the arguments of Putva-
paksin and the "Vedantin develop in a natural manner.
In other words, my aim has been to see that the entire
book reads as a connected whole, as though it had been
originally written in English. 1 believe that a readable

account of the metaphysical position of Samkara, as

gathered from his commentary on the Brahma-Sutras,
 J

I PREFACE

will go a long way to understand his theistic and

mystical position, which is mainly to be found in his
minor religious worts. People, in general, have still
to understand that the monistic idealism of Saiiikara is
simply a prelude to his central teachings in philosophy
which are mainly theistic and mystical in character. I
shall therefore be more than rewarded if, while giving a
readable but full account of his commentary on the
Brahma -Sutras, I show in his own words that the
mystical knowledge of reality is the sole end both of
philosophy and religion. I shall, however, have to wait,
tillthe second volume is complete, to he able to write a
critical survey of the philosophy of Samkara, as
developed in his commentary on the Brahma-Sutras.

I shall then be able to point out how the doctrine

of Maya is not incompatible with its so-called rival
doctrine of Cidvilasa. Why Sarhkara favours the one
and not the other is because he finds that the doctrine
of Maya, unlite the other, serves the double purpose
of bringing home to consciousness the reality of
Brahman and the unreality of anything else, apart from
Brahman, Had Samkara been slow to understand the
element of truth contained in the Cidvilasa theory, it
would have been impossible for him to explain the
meaning of 'Sarvam thalu idam Brahma". But the
important point to note is that, to 5aihkara, the
'sarvam', like 'ahariV, is nothing else but Brahman,
though he holds that the experience 'all this is
Brahman comes much later than the experience,
'

'I am the Brahman'. From the view-point of mere

logic, as we shall see, the 'ahaiii' and the 'sarvarti', that
'
I and the world ' have their e
'
'

from the other term viz. BrahmE o proposi-

mentioned above. But from the view-point of
spiritual experience or anubbava, there remains only the
Brahman, as both the subject and the predicate of the
proposition, and the consciousness of the or the T
'world' as a separate entity drops down altogether. In
 KUWACB UI

order to preserve this truth, and in order not to allow

the idlers and pretenders to say that they are having
the Brahmanic anubhava, when, as a matter of fact,
they are engrossed with the sensuous and sensual plea-
sures, Samkara keeps himself away from the Cidvilasa
theory. The world may be a 'Vilasa' of Brahman, but
let it not be a 'vilasa' for one who has not realized the
Brahman. Better it would be if one were to think that
the 'vilasa' as divorced from Brahman is only transitory
and insufficient to satisfy completely and finally, and
that therefore it is as good as an illusion, I shall then

be able to point out how the genesis of Maya is due

to the urge on the part of Brahman to become many
which, instead of being conscious of the Brahman which
is immanent in them, become conscious of themselves as

finite and limited; how Brahman instead of being a blank

is the repository of all the qualities, so much so, that
Sarhkara believes— to borrow a phrase from Ratoadasa,
a saint of Maharasfra — that Nirgupa is just the same
as Bahuguna; how Saiiikara leads us on through the
different stages of n on -contradiction to the ultimate
mystical criterion of Svanubhava; and how, finally,
Samkara show3 us that the individual soul is a gainer
and not a loser by being absorbed in the Brahman.

The transliteration and the literal meaning of the

words in the Sutras may create a taste for Sanskrit even
in those to whom the language may be totally unfamiliar.
The translation of the Sutras is not simply aphoristic in
nature; the additional words in the brackets are
intended not only to explain the Sutras, but also the
topic and the context in which they arise. And, as
indicated above, the rendering of the commentary is so pre-
sented that it gives a complete and unitary picture of the
arguments for or against. Many of the Upanisadic and
other references therefore which ought to have been
explained or pointed out in the footnotes have been so
incorporated in the body of the commentary that, some-
times, the argument begins with the form of a story or a
 IV PREFACE

dialogue in an Upanisad, and an attempt has been made

to bring out the whole Vedantic position with as much
narrative interest as force of reasoning. If a particular
argument consists of too many queries and replies, or
doubts and counter-doubt a, I have, instead of tiring out
the reader by compelling him to go through these
unending meanderings, simplified the issues and presented
them as several points in the argument. I have taken
utmost care, however, not to omit or neglect even the
smallest point in the argument of the Purvapaksin or
the Vecfantin. As for the footnotes, they are given
only when they are absolutely necessary.

Some more features of this undertaking deserve

emphasis here. I have given at the end of each volume
a broad outline or summary of the whole volume, so
that one may have at a glance the relevant position of
a particular philosophical thesis in the whole scheme, as
well as be acquainted in a general way with the rich-
ness and extent of the field of inquiry covered by
Sarhkara. 1 have also thought it well to give separately

almost all the important Upanisadic and other references

in the commentary, so that such of my readers as may
thereby be tempted to read Sarhkara in the original may
be encouraged to come in contact with that beautiful,
simple and powerful work. The Sutra-wise index of
references too will be immensely useful for a compara-
tive study rf the different schools in Vedanta. I also
intend to give at the end of the second volume some
important philosophical passages in the original from the
Commentary of Samkara which will explain my critical
survey of his philosophy.

Professor R. D. Ranade, M.A., D. Litt., Ex-vice-

Chancellor of the University of Allahabad, has been so
intensely and unceassingly kind to me in all my affairs
ever since he first taught me philosophy in 1923, that
whenever my head touches his feet in gratitude, it is a
wrench to take it away from them. He has not only
made me what I am philosophically, but has also
enabled me to a small degree at least, to value the way
f the Spirit, and to understand sympathetically how
Sanatkumjira must have been able to remove the grief
of NSrada by imparting unto him the lore of the Atman.
I am therefore all gratitude to this great saint
for having blessed my undertaking. Another great
influence upon my life is of the 'philosopher'statesman'of
India; for it is the writings of Professor S. Radhakrishnan
which have inspired me to make philosophy
understandable and to bring it within the reach of all.
Truth is truth even if some are slow to understand it.
But it is with respect to these 'some' that Dr.
Radhakrishnan has taught me that the truth must be
given in the form in which it is acceptable. I can never
be too grateful to him also for having blessed me.

My whilom colleague, Dr. K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar,

Professor of English, Andhra University, Waltair, has
exceedingly obliged me by reading the proofs and by
making a number of valuable suggestions. It was he
who persuaded me to publish my earlier book, 'The
Yoga of the Saints' (Popular Book Depot, Bombay, 1944),
and again it was he who voluntarily came forward to
help me in this new venture. I am grateful to him foe
teaching me that friendship based on a sense of dedica*
tion to higher values does not easily fade away.
Another friend of mine, and a Sanskrit scholar Dr.
M. A. Karandikar, M. A., Ph. D., of the Elphinstone
College, Bombay, has helped me in the
selection of the Upanisadic and other sources in the
original and in correcting their proofs. I am greatly
indebted to him for this. Professor K. L. Varma, M. A.,
Principal of my College, is to be specially thanked
in this connection for the very kind interest he has taken
in the publication of this volume and the tangible
encouragement he gave me by affording me facilities for
the books which I required. One of my post-graduate
students, Mr. Shyam Sundar Joshi, getting interested in
VI PREFACE

my work, has helped me a lot in the correction of the

galley -proofs, and my thanks are due to him in full
measure. Nor must 1 omit to mention that my sons
have been very helpful to me: Viivioath in preparing
the Siitra-wise index and in comparing the references
with the manuscript, and Raghunath, in addition ta
this, in doing the typist's job so willingly and so well.

It would have been impossible for me to bring out

this volume had I not been fortunate in meeting the
young, upright, and obliging gentleman, Mr. D. M.
Tilak. With courage and generosity he has rendered me
a great service, which I shall ever remember with grati-
tude. I cannot commend too highly the quick despatch,

the sincerity of purpose, and the aesthetic sense be has

displayed in the production of this volume.

My debt to Bhamati, as also to such eminent

scholars as George Thibaut, Mai Muller, Vasudeva
6'astri Abhyankar and the Acarya-bhakta Bapat, and
others, is too obvious to require any special mention. It
is in the company of the work of these pioneers in the field,
that I have Deen able to evaluate to some degree the
precious store of Atmanubhava in the philosophy of
Sarhkara.

Finally, I am greatly indebted to the University of

Rajputana far making a generous grant towards the cost
of publication of this volume.

7th February 1954

 FOREWORD
small foreword
I have great pleasure in writing this
to a very important work of my
former student and now
Professor at Maharaja's College. Jaipur, Dr. V. H.
Date,

M.A., Ph. D. The translation of Ankara Bhasya has been

attempted by very few persons in the history of Sanskrit
Scholarship, and I am glad that Prof. Date can be
plac-
particular cha-
ed in that list. His translation has this
racteristicabout it, namely, that it is not merely literal
always
but expository. Dr. Date makes his translation
readable by introducing seme stories from the
upam-
sads and similar works. I think the book would be
alike. At the
useful to University student .nJ j.-holirs
:
;

sum-
end of each volume Prof. Date intends to give a
maty of the contents of the volume which will enable
Bhasya. lhe
the reader to have a short glimpse of the
Date
primary interest of the Sankara Bhasya, ae Dr.
tells us, is ethico-spiritual, the metaphysical portion
being in the background. *4 <3§ S3 WT as he
points out,

is an extension of the experience

of wi OTrrRn. Sankara-
his sata
carya has put this idea very beautifully in
sloki wilt innpiBft fw* afsSnaf^ao q«iEr.| Dr. Me
has kept before himself the model of Dr
Radhakri-
shnan's works on Indian philosophy, who, as everyone
knows, has eminently succeeded in creatine interest in
the minds of his readers by his lucid
and comprehen-
sive exposition. The transliteration and the translation
exposition of the
of the Siitras, along with the clear
objections and answers in the shape of l$WT
and 3^ra
will be found very useful by students of
the Bhasya in
India or outside. If Prof. Date sometimes undertakes
to evpound the texts of the Upamsads
seriatim, his
readable as
expositions will also be found eminently
X tO REWORD

they will introduce readers to the contents of the Upa-

nisads at first hand in the same clear manner. Prof.
Date is not merely well-versed in European Philosophy,
but also in Indian Philosophy having learnt it, and
?articularly the Vedanta, from a Shastri of repute,
inally, I shall feel very glad, as Prof. Date will cer-
tainly fed, that his translation will enable some at least
to rise on the ladder of Vedanta Philosophy to its real
spirit, namely, a first-hand contact with Reality, which
is the beginning, the end and the life of the world-
Tajjalan.

Sth February 1954.

J Sanskrit Sutras, Transliteration,

Translation and Commentary

II Sutrawise Summary of

Philosophical points

III Extracts from Upanisads tf

other Sources as found in

Sarhkara's Commentary

IV Sutrawise index of

Upanisadic references
 i

VEDANTA EXPLAINED
(StohkaTa's Commentary on the Bra hm -Sutras)

Adhyaya First

Pdda First

Satiikara's Introduction: Nature of Adhyasa.

The words 'asmad' and 'yusTiiad'', that is, the words T

and 'thou', indicate the subjectand the object in experience.
The latter ace so apposed in nature to each othec like
light Hid darkness that it is a plain truth that they can
never be identical. Much less will the attributes of them
be identical. It will be wrong therefore to superimpose
the objects and their attributes on the self- illuminating
subject, the cognition of which can be denned only by the
ivurd a.-mnJ". Equally wrong will be the superim position
of the subject and its attributes on the object. And yet.
so natural and illusory is the practice of the world to
1

mingle the truth ami falsehood and to superimpose one

on the other, forgetting all the while that they can never
he identical on account oi' theit attributes being absolutely
opposed to each other, that we readily have such ex-
'1 am this', "This is mine '.

But what do we mean by "adhyiisa' or 'superimpositian'

at all? It is the apprehension cii something perceived
previously hut remembered' while perceiving something
else. In the opinion of some, adhyiisa means the super-
imposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing.'
Othets define it as the illusion due to not being able to
note the difference between the two things'. To some
others, fiiil, i! mans :he .[.soi'ip! ion of false attributes ta

a thing. All these views however agree in representing

adhyasa as the false apprehensinri of ;iie a tribute? of one
thing an another, e. g. the appearance of silver on the
mother-of-pearl 7 , or the appearance of one moon as double.

Ho* can, one may ask, the objects and ;hsir attributes
be superimposed on the Atman who, as has been said
above, is never an ohject. and who is therefore said to be
'pratyak', i. e., who manifests or shines as sat, cit and
ananda ? The Atman who is totally disconnected with
the idea of 'yusmad', can hardly be said to be amenable
to superimposition which one may experience with refer -

We reply that notwithstanding its being pratya-

gjtman and us being unrelated to the objective world
which is denoted by the word 'yusmad', the pure Atman
too is capable of being known as an object, whenever one
becomes aware ot nneseli as 'lam'/ as ;d.;n of [he intuitive
certainty" of the existence of one's self. And it is not
a universal rule that objects in front of via or in contact
with sense-organs should alone be superimposed on one
another. The akasa though imperceptible is still called
by ordinary people as having a coloured surface. Similarly
it is no contradiction to superimpose the objects which

are un-atmanic in character, on the pratyagatman or the

MtMumlaom imperceptible Arman. Wise men call this

kind of adbyasa as avidya'"; and by contrast with this,

they call it as VjJyii which iin.d'le.-l b?m ;n discern therea!
nature of the Atman i'vdslu'l. Slicfi beinc the nature of
vidya and avid vis. r.c-i'h-.T i!i-.' A 'leers of the un-Itman nor
the virtues of the Atman will in any way aifect" the
substratum on which they are superimposed. It is due
to this mutual B u peri mposi lion of the Atman and the
un-atman thai there .u'l-o .ill he ['radical distinctions of
\

ordinary and Vc-dic :i .\ ;vn -.lining to knowledge and its

:

objects, prohibition* and injunctions, as also pertaining

How is it, it may be asked, that the means of right

knowledge such ;ls rvriierrinn .Hid oilier.-, and the various
Stutis have theii origin in avidya ? The answer is not
difficult to find, in the first place, the absolutely free and
unattached Atman cannot he said to be the knower unless
the body, the mind and the senses are first superimposed
upon it, and there arise the wrong notions such as, 'I am
this", 'it is mine', etc. And, secondly, ir is only after the
knower is established that the body and the senses will
be active", and the means of knowledge will be
employed. In short, it is the avidya in which is rooted
the distinction between the knowet and the known, and
it isdue to it that we employ the means of knowledge and
 ;. t. 5

follow the instruction; of Sruti. In this respect there is

no difference between a man and a lower animal''. A
cow runs away through fear from a man who has a
raised stick in his fund; hut it moves towards him if he
has fresh green grass with him. A man too approaches
another, if the Litter is of nenlle Ivlnvinur; hut heruns
away from a fierce- looking strong person, who approaches
shouting and flourishing a sword in hand. So, in spite
of the [Link] nt intelligence between men and animals,
iheir co.'nitional and other activities of the practical
worldly life are ultimately due to the mutual superimposi-
tion of the Atman and the un-arman.

Now what can we say about thu kind of activity

which is enjoined by the Vedas ? No doubt a person
who wishes to qualify himself for the performance of such
actions, a sacrifice for instance, gets Mrs;the intellectual
conviction that the soul ought to have a relation with the
next world". But this does not include the knowledge
of the real nature of the Arman who is, as the Upani$ads
tell us, beyond the boJilv want- ol juinjwr and thirst,
beyond the distinctions of castes such as Brahmins and
Ksatrriy;is. and Ivyoci :he rounds of birth and death.
As a matter of fact, this kind of knowledge has no purpose
to serve for a person who has to perform a sacrifice; on the
other hand, it goes against and Ji^qiii-iiiies that person.
But before the adi'ent of such Aupinisadic knowledge of
the Annan, what can be said of the whole of the Karma-
Kanrja ? The reply is, it has its basis in avidyj. Unless
she distinctions ofciste. asratn.i. age. etc. are superimposed
upon the Atman, there will be no possibility of the
performance of a sacrifice by a Brahmin.

How
this natural and endless supi'ri nipt*! ruin
operates in the world and creates the ::tlse [Link]: J'.;.- :[Link]
the soul is the doer and experiencer of actions and their
effects, we shall explain by a few examples. man A
considers himself happy or otherwise, as his wife and
children are. 1 1-; LL'iL-iJi'ii; h:ns \l'
t '.o he s'.oui, lean, fair,

mute, deaf or blind, when as a matter of fact his body or

sense-organs are so. The desires, the doubts and the
various modifications of his mind, as also the sense of
'.}-;- 1^1 ."'''!-.-:..::::.':: -V. [h.! Lvi [LI H 'I Til", .ire .1-erilvd
1

L.-L I.

by him as belonging to the eternal Atman in him, the

witness of all' 1 And reciprocally, the PratyagSUBMI
.

nlso is superimposed hy him on body, senses, mind etc.' 6

With a view therefore to remove this adhyasa ivhieh

is the root-cause of all evil, and thereby to enable one to
.ttiiir. :he knowledge ofthe unity of the Atman, the study

of the Vedanta is undertaken. And that all the VcdJnta

passages have this purpose alone, we shall prove in what
follows, viz. the Sariraka-mTmaihsa 17 .

The first Sutra of this Vedinra-mimiiiiua is as follows:

! Qlgltilftttuiu l
(0

[Atha—nGW ;
ata/i — therefore ; Bra hma-jijnasa—desire to
know the Brahman.]
NOW THEREFORE THE DESIRE TO KNOW THE BrAHMAN. 1
 The word 'now' indicates [Link] the inquiry about
the Brahman to! lows as consequence of some prior event.
;i

It does nor induute 'hi- m.-Ti beginning of a new subject

such as the nature of Brahman, after another subject has
been finished. Nor does it make us aware of any prior
event which it not connected as cause or condition of the
inquiry of Brahman. To say that the word 'now' is used
to indicate the auspicious beginning of a work, is also
inadequate: for such a beginning is [Link] cared by the mere
sound of the word '[Link]'. So far as its meaning is con-
cerned, it is used then to denote a necessary connection.

What then is [Link] necessary, jrueccdiiit, condition

which, when fulfilled, makes one fit to enter upon the
inquiry of the nature of Brahman? It cannot be the
study of the Vedas exclusively, for it is the common
antecedent of' both the inquiries regarding the Brahman
and Religious duty. Neither can the knowledge of
Ri'jigio'j* duty hi .=.nJ ro 'k tho ;:n:.\'.ede:ii because one ,

can have the kno'-i-'lcJ^i. of tik- Rrihmin even without the

1

tuowicdjii- of such duty, by merely si isdyin^ the Vedanta

literature. Here '.here is no indication of the order of suc-
cession, as is indicated with reference to certain things
to be done in a sacrifice. Knowledge of Religious duty
and that of Brahman are not so related to each other that
the study of the one will prepare a person to study the
other. They differ in subject- matter and in results.
Brahma-jfiana ends in salvation and eternal bliss, while
Dbarma [Link] has transitory prosperity as its end.
[Link] iniin,: enjoins pcrlot'iuitice of religious acts, while
Brahma-jiiana does not. The fruit of one is dependent
on human activity; in theother it is not so. Brahman be-
ingeternaland an ever-accomplished fact, the knowledge
of it is not something which will accrue at some future
time as the result of human effort. The fruit of Dhanna,
on the other hand, is to be accomplished at same futute
 Jesides,
:6 differs entirely in the
ii the Brahmana, such as
"A person wishing to obtain svarga should perform the
Agnistorna sacrifice", informs us about Dharma, by urging
us to act. But a statement from (he Upanisads, such as
"The Atinan is verily the Brahman", does not render a
man inclines :e ,L- book [Link], but instructs him
straightway [Link];g the nature of the Brahman, (neither
words, whin;- ih.- •.•..i.v. V..g t about the Brahman is the
.
-

immediate t- .•; ' saJii.' iijtemiir.t. v.-irhout

requiring any in'.eimrili^:e hj^an activity, the knowledge

about Dhairrii dependent not only on the statement
it,

from the BrahMjrii ..t cr. hbiuan activity too.

i Unlike
Dharma -jnarw, then, the knowledge of the Brahman is like
perceptual knowledge which arises as soon as there is
contact of a sense with its objects. It does not wait to
come into being till there is some human activity, for it
does not require it. If Dharma -jfiana then is not the
necessary antecedent of Bra hma-j nana, we must state what
that antecedent ia.

The real antecedent conditions are; The discrimi-

nation between what is abiding and what is not abiding;
—
non-attachment to the mundane and estra-mundun^ oPKirts
of pleasure and pain; possession of tranquillity, restraint
and other virtues; 1

and (he desire lor final liberation. If

these conditions are fulfilled, then alone, irrespective of
the knowledge of Dharma, it is possible to enter upon
an inquiry of the Brahman and to know it. The word
'now' therefore indicates that Btahma-jijnasa is subsequent
to the fulfilment of these four conditions.

The word 'therefore' supplies an additional reason

as to why the four moral and spiritual means alone, and not
Dharma-jnana, are to be construed as the prerequisites of
Brahma-jnana. The statement from the Chandngya Upa-
 world may not be had
inasmuch as they are not perishable as the fruits of this
world are. Thus while the fruits of Agnihotra and other
by Veda itself as impermanent, the
sacrifices are declared
TaiturTya Upanisad, on the other hand, points out to us
that "He who knows the Brahman becomes the Brahman"
(2, 1) From this it is clear that the above-mentioned
.

[Link] as the discrimination that the Brahman

alone is the Reality, are the only necessary antecedents
of Brahma-jnana.

The
third and the last word in the Sutra, oiz,,
liifusii' indicates that Brahman is the direct and
'[Link]

principal object of inquiry. Of course this may imply

other objects of inquiry, which are less important and
therefore of a secondary nature, e, g. means of knowledge,
reasoning, sadhana and its results. When someone says.
" There goes the king ", what he means is that the king
is going along with his retinue. Sruti also tells us that
Brahman is the direct object or the [Link] ior knowledge;
e. g. we get in the Taittiriya Upanisad (3, I) " That from
.vlioni rtn>.-ebeings are born etc., desire to know that.
That is Brahman."
This desire for knowledge, again, has
for its object not merely an intellectual understanding
about the nature of the Brahman, but the realisation of it-,
for it is this direct realisation of Brahman which consti-
tutes the Summum Bonum of human life, and which is
meetanry to root out all avidya, the seed of all evil in
this Satfisara.

Brahman is derived from the root 'b[h' (to become

great), and so means the Being having unlimited greatness.
This quality of unlimited greatness, in its turn, implies
that Brahman is eternal, pure, self-conscious and free.'
The existence of Brahman is also known by its being the
-elf oievery thing. Every one has the con.-ciuiisncss of
iriecM.^cncenf '.he =cli'in the form ot '1 am'. And yer, opu
the self.
nions (Met regarding the specific nature of
The Lokayatikus and the ordinary men believe that this
body alone, when endowed with intelligence, is known
as the self. Others say rhat the organs and the imel-
BgeBCe, or the mind alone is the self.
To some others
lite -W Budohj'. the momentary
hiowl.-clye or the void
itself is the self. It is, to some others, a being
which is
distinct from the body etc. and is responsible foractions.
Some say the self is merely the suhjev: o: experience,
while some others posit the existence of an onuiiscienr,
ommpuient Lord of all, and call him the real Self as
di-t'iici from the selves: while there are some others
who
call him the Self of selves. Thus it is chat different

people hold different opinions, and advance in support

arguments and passages from Sniti which are only partly
true. When such is the state, if a man accepts as true
any one of the wrong views, he will not only not have the
highest bliss, hut will also be bound by the chain of births
and deaths. So it is with a view to make possible the
release of all that the author of the Sutras has started the

inquiry into the knowledge of Brahman, by resorting to

arguments which arc not inconsistent with Sruti.

ijanmadi — origin etc.; asya—of this; yataji — from u'liicfi.}

 The word janmadi is a compound which can be
'
'

solved in two ways', and so may mean either the sub-

sistence and dissolution merely without including the
meaning of the word ' janma ", l-iz. origin, along with them
or the subsistence and dissolution vvhi-.-ii ,-ome after the
origin. If we take the second meaning, then alone it is
possible to relate the three states to this world, in the
order of origin, subsistence and dissolution. For what
comes into being alone endures and ceases to be in course
of time. Sruti too points out the same order (Tai. 3, I).
The world that is qualified by these three state? is this
very world made up of names and forms, subjects ;inJ
objects, causes ;md effects, and space and time. It baffles
our imagination when we think about its wonderful
construction. It is this world which fa dependent for
its origin, subsistence, and dissolution on the Brahman.

We need not however increase the number of states

'mm three to si\ as rhe .'il^: \'~,,k:-. ha; done it. For the
:

motive of the sage was to speak about the nature of all

created things after once the five elements have come into
existence. In the first place, the three additional states
of modification, growth and decay are involved in the
three Mates already mentioned; the first two being a kind
ofor-gir^ion, and the last a kind of dissolution. Second-
ly, if chese six states are mentioned, they may refer to
[he five great elements as their cause and not to the
Brahman. In order to ward away this possible suspicion,
the author of the Sutras has mentioned only the three
states and not sis. Even the origin of the five great
Rtn'.us mutt be referred back to the Brahman, which is
both omniscient and omnipotent.

It is not possible therefore to attribute the origin etc.

of the world to any other cause, such as the non-intelligent
[O VEDSNTA EXPLAINED

pradhana of the Simkhyas, or the acorns of the Vaisesikas

or the transmigrat-
or the non-being of the Sunyavadins,
that the world came
ing Hiranyagarbha. Nor can it be said
ncc being spontaneously as the Lokayacikas hold, because
existence of God,
a- inferred 1-v ihuse who believe in the
a particular place, time and cause are
required for the
production of an effect.

This does not however mean that the present Sutra

embodies one more similar argument without reference to
Sruti. On the contrary, this and the other Sutras merely
afford an opportunity to collect the material from Sruti
for thought and discussion, consequent on which, and not
simply due to inference and other pramanas, there will
spring up the knowledge of Brahman. But If inference
too is brought forward to strengthen the conclusions of
the Sruti, it is a welcome rm J service;; He instrument of
knowledge. Sruti itself has admitted its utility. The
Brhadaranyaka recommends the hearing and the thinking
about the Atman; and the Chandogya declares that just
as a man led astray by robbers would arrive back in his
country of Gandhara after being guided by others and by
his intelligence, even so one who has been guided by a
spiritual teacher can employ his own reason also and
achieve the knowledge oi the Brahman.

Now, Brahma-jijf asa is unlike Dharma-jijnaEa. For

while in the latter the Sruti passages are alone capable
of giving us knowledge, in the former, not only these
but self-realization also is available as ao authoritative
source. Brahman as the object of knowledge is already
an existing thing, and therefore can be apprehended only
through intuitive knowledge. In the case of knowledge
of a thing which is to be accomplished, there being
no possibility of intuitive knowledge, Sruti would be
the only possible means of proof. Besides, the thing to
be accomplished, whether ordinary or vedic, depends
on human activity which may be done or not done.
A man may go to a place on horse-back or on foot, or not
go at all. Similarly a man may or may not accept the SoJasi
cup of somarasa in the Atitatra sacrifice ; or a man
may or may not make oblation before or after sunrise.
In all such cases, injunctions and prohibitions, options
and rules have a place, because they refer to the intellect
of man. The knowledge <rf the Vastu (Brahman or 5ub-
stancel has no reference to human intellect or activity,
rooted in itself alone. To say with regard ti
post that it g else is falsi: kii:Av!..-J;:e

that it is a post is correct, because this knowledge

'

is rooted in the thing itself. Even eo the knowledge

of Brahman depends entirely on Brahman alone, inas-
much as it is already an accomplished fact.

One may Brahman as an existing suiimnce

say that
can also be known by other means of knowledge, and
so the discussion of the Vedanta passages is not essential
to know it. But this is not correct. For Brahman is not
like the external things an object of the senses. We
perceive the world but not the Brahman. Nor can we
infer that the world is an effect of Brahman for no ;

invariable necessary connection can be established

between an effect which is perceived and a cause which
is incapable of being perceived. Therefore the present
Surra Jo;^ no; refer to inference as the means of knowing
Brahman; it refers to the Vedanta -passages which are
capable of describing the Brahman. In the dialogue
between Varum and his son (Tat. 3, 1, 6), the Brahman
is described as Bliss and as that from which beings are
horn, and that in which they live and merge after death.
This and other passages referred to by the Sutra point
out therefore the divjb .-nncki-iu;: 'h.-.r [Link] is eternal,
pure, intelligent, free and omniscient, and that it is the
cause of this world.

To confirm this, we proceed;

3 ywftPHifa M ! !i
ra. I
(?)

[Sastra—Sntti yonituut—from being tlie source!}

;
 '

Ifthe compound Sastrayoni be treated as

Sasthitatpurusa and be dissolved as 'Sistrasya yonih',
then the meaning of the Sutra is that the Brahman is
the source of the Sruti; hut if the compound is treated
as Bahuvrihi and is dissolved as 'Sasfraiii yonih Krtranam
pramlrjam yasy', then the meaning will be that the
Sruti is the means of the knowledge of Brahman.

The Sruti, i.e. the Rgveda and other branches of

study, is a mine of knowledge unci '.idi'.: nevertheless,
it comes 'as a breath' (Br. 2, 4, 10) from the omniscient
and omnipotent Brahman, just as grammar comes from
Piiijini. Where el»e can we seek for the source of this
omniscient quality of the Sruti ? Or the Sutra may be
interpreted to mean that the knowledge of the Brahman
as the cause of the world is possible only through Sruti,
as has been shown by quoting a passage in the preceding
Sutra. But as there was some room for doubt in the
preceding Sutra, whether or not there was in it a reference
to inference, the piesent Sutra is intended to remove that
doubt and explicitly state that the Sruti is the means
of knowing that Btahman is the cause of the Universe.

» tnamAvpnu (?)

Someone may raise an objection like the following :

How can it be iv/i maimed ;b::'. .Sri in the means of know-

j-,

ing Brahman 1 For in the Pfirva Mimilriisii (Sfitra 1, 2, 1),

Jaimini has stated that action is the sole end of Sruti,
and so those Sruti passages which do not aim at action
are untie**. No doubt, there are many passages in the
Veda which appear to have no connection with action.
 .], su.4. 15

is, which neither enjoin nor

prohibit any action.
that
For example, Wind is a swift deity." appears to have
'

no relation to human activity when taken in isolation.

But read in the proper contest, it means that the action
r,i sacrificing a white animal to the deity of Wind will
bear the fruit as swiftly as the wind is swift. Similarly.
"
the Fire wept on account of being confined by gods,"
is endowed with meaning because it
implies the censure
of silver and the offering of it in a sacrifice, inasmuch
a-i silver 1-produced our of he tears of Agni. Therefore,
1

Mi. Su. ?-. 7;. such Vedtc sentences,

as [aimim -ays (Pii. 1 ,

known as '[Link]' co co supplement by way ot praise or

ccu-nre ruher .-entence.s which enidr, or prohibit actions.
The mantras roo, as Jaimmi tells ns (Pi'i. Mi. Su. 1,2,40),
are connected with either the actions or their
means.
fnr example, in the mantra,
'
for strength, thee', (Yaj.

Sarii. 1,1.1), the action of cutting a branch is

implied. No
Vedic passage can therefore be said to have any meaning
unless it refers to some action or to some means or fruit
declared to
of action. The Vcdic passages which are
refer to the Brahman as an accomplished fact are there-
fore either useless, because there are other means of proof
such as perception- or t< they are to be of any use, they
must, in the first place, refer in a subsidiary manner to
some action or agent; or secondly, to the means or fruit
of action, as explained above by Jaimini; or thirdly, must
point out the process of meditation for the sake of realising
the Brahman. In any case, they do not refer to Brahman
directly or independently of any action.

In order to refute this the Sutrakara says :—

{Tat—that; I
 .

16

i. The omniscient and omnipotent Brahman then

isthe cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of
the world. This is the only harmonious and cumulative
conclusion of the Vedanta passages, such as '
Being ;

'
alone was in the beginning, one, without a second
(Cha. 6, 2, I); '
All this was in the beginning, the one
Atman alone ' (Ait. Ar. 2, 4, 1, 1) ;
'
This is the
Brahman, without cause and without effect, having
nothing el-e inside or outside; this Atman is die
Brahman, the spectator of all ' (Br 2, 5, 19) ; That '

which is seen in front of one'r self is the immortal

Brahman alone ' (Mu. 2, 2, 11). When the words in
these passages refer directly and undoubtedly to Brahman,
it will be improper to imagine that they refer to an

altogether different thing uii. action. To do so is to

commit the error in two ways ; it ie to reject the
Brahman which i= cbicgoncallv indicated and to accept
the action which is not so stated

2. Nor can it be said that these passages refer to

the agent or the deity which is implied in every
action.
But passages like then by what means, he (the
'
f man)
should see whom?", (Br. 2, 4, 13) remove ih- po-^ihilitv
A
of reference to agent, action., means or the fruit thereof.

1. Notwithstanding that it is already of the nature

or an existing thing, Brahman cannot be known through
rcrccprioi] or other means of knowledge; for the fact
that Brahman is the Self of all, cannot be understood
except by means of Sruti passages, such as '
That thou
art (Cha. 6",
8, 7).

4. Nor can it be said that instruction regarding

the nature of Brahman will serve no
purpose because
Brahman ,s not something which is to be accepted or
rejected For it is exactly this knowledge
of the Brahnv.m
as the self of all, which does not require
the further doing
or non-doing of anything, and which results in the Summum
Bonum of man's life by making him free from all pain.
 . i, sC. 4. 17

5. There may be certain

passages in which the
description of the deities is subordinate to the process
of meditation. But Brahman is not described in this manner
as an object of meditation. For meditation implies the
duality of the meditator and the object of meditation.
Once the knowledge of unity arises, and the sense of
duality is uprooted, there will be no such distinctions
is agents bind actions, nor anything which will he desired
or avoided. Hence Brahman can never be considered
in a subordinate manner as an object necessary for the
process of meditation.

6. There may be passages in Karma -Kanda in

which it is easy to point out that certain sentences known

as arthavada, whose function is to praise or censure, are

supplementary to other sen re rices which enjoin or prohibit
action,and are therefore authoritative. But the Vedanta-
passages which impart the knowledge of the Atman
hive then' own direct fruit, ri;. the final release. Valid
by themselves they do not owe their validity to other
passages which deal with activity such as meJilarrixi
or inferential reasoning I: it clear, therefore, that Sruti

l^uithorirativeasa means of the knowledge of Brahman.

At this point, some others (Vjttikaras) raise the

following objections :

1. Brahman is still the object of the process of realisa-

tion, even though we may accept that it is known through
Sruti. Knowledge about the sacrificial post or about
the Ahavaniya fire cannot be had hy ordinary means
' '

of proof it is given by Sruti.

; And yet the post and the
fire manner, because they
are described in a subsidiary
are involved in other activities which are recommended
or prohibited by the Veda. That the purpose of
Sruti passages is to induce a man either to do or
not to do a particular thing, is clear from the follow-
ing extracts : '
The purpose of it (Veda) is to give the
knowledge of some kind of activity ' (.Saba. Bha. 1, 1, 1);
'
t inducing action is known as an injunction
 ;'

18

(<iaba. Bha. 1, 1, 2): ' A

statement which gives knowledge
about religious duty is known as initiation or instruction
(Jit. Su. 1, 1, 5);." Let words be connected with the verb
denoting action ' (Jai. Su. 1, 1, 25) ; ' Activity being
the aim of Sruti, passages which have no such aim are
useless '
(Jai. Su. 1, 2, 1). The Vedanta-passages too,
inasmuch as they belong to Sruti, are purposive in the
same way. Just as agnihotra etc. ate recommended
' '

as a means to attain to heaven, even so the knowledge

of Brahman is recommended as a means for the attain-

2. The Vedantin may say that the objects of

knowledge and the fruits thereof differ in the two
Sastras. According to Karma -Kano'a, Dharma is to be
accomplished in the future; according to the Vedanta,
the Brahman is an already accomplished and eternal fact.
The fruit in one, viz. heaven, is dependent on the per-
formance of actions; the fruit in the other, vii. the release,
is nor the result of any actions. Therefore the analogy,
that the knowledge of Brahman is recommended for the
purpose of final release in the way in which a sacrifice
is recommended for attaining heaven, is not correct.
In refutation of this, we reply that the knowledge about
Brahman given by the Vedanta-passages is only in connec-
tion with some actions. The desire to know the Brahman
is produced in us on account of such directive statements:
'
Verily, the Atman must be seen (Br. 2, 4, '
Search '
5) ;

out and understand the sinless Arman (Cha. 8, 7, 1) '

•One should worship the Brahman in the form of

Atman only, (Br. 1, 4, 7); One should worship the
"

Annan only as his true nature" (Br. 1, 4, 15); "One

who knows Brahman becomes Brahman (Mu. 3, 2, 9). "

And to the questions, what is this Atman ? What is

this Brahman 7, which arise in the mind by reading the
above-mentioned directive statements, we get the reply
in other Vedantic statements that
•The Atman iseternal'
(Ka. 2, 18), Omniscient' (Mu. 1, 9),
'
all -pervading
(Sve. 3, 11), " eternally content with itself' as well as
 ;. i,i0.4. 19

'
eternally pure, self-conscious and free ", and that 'the
'
Brahman of the nature of consciousness
is and blirs
(Br- 3, 9, 28). The nature of the Brahman is thus described
because the motive of the Ve dan ta- passages is primarily
to enable a man to meditate on it in order to achieve
the final release.

3. If the Vedanta-passages were rt

of existing facts and did not refer to actions to be done

or not to be done, as if they resemble statements
like, 'there are seven continents on the earth,' 'the
king is marching,' they would be useless in practical
life. It is alleged that the fear of the serpent will be
removed by the mere assertion of the statement that
'
not a snake.'
this is a rope, But it is a matter of common
experience that the mete verbal knowledge of the nature
of Brahman does not in any way remove the wrong notions
about one's own self. On the contrary, a man having
such verbal knowledge continues to be affected by
pleasure and pain of sarhsara.

4. Besides, as stated in the Sruti (Br. 2, 4, 5), the

sravana (hearing) is to be followed by reGection and
contemplation. This clearly shows that in so far as
Brahman is known by Sruti, it becomes the obj(
the devotional process.

We say in reply that the objections are futile

1. There is a great difference between the

Karma-vidya and Brahma-vidya (i) While the knowledge
.

and practice of dharroa and adharma result in sensuous

pleasure and pain, the knowledge of Brahman results in 6nal
release which is free from pain and is beyond the ken
of the senses, {«) Unlike moksa, pleasure and pain arise
on account of the contact of tie senses and its objects,
and are experienced by all the beings from Brahmadeva
down to the blade of grass. Moksa, however, is impossible
20

for those who have not seen the Atman. (m) There
is the difference of degree in the merits or demerits and
in the consequent pleasures and pains, as also in the
capacity of persons performing religious acts. There ia
no such difference either with reference [Link]. or with
reference to persons who are capable of having it. (iu)
Those who perform sacrifices :md are given tt. leaniini: and
contemplation go .liter deaih by the northern path of
light to Brahma-loka ; while those who do the daily
routine nfagnihorra etc. or ;ueiji service and exhibit Moral"
qualities go i'V the st'iithcrn path til smoke to Candra-loka
and live there till their merit is exhausted (Cha. 5, 10, 5).
(ir) Thus, in short, is described the transitory, fleeting
nature of SarusJra cl the embodied hesngs as opposed
to the disembodied state of final release which is not
certainly the result of actions ;s directed by vol:. Sanisarai;
.

due to ignorance and is ful: or" pleasure and pain, merit and
demerit moksa, on theotherhand, cannot be thefruit ofdhar-
;

ma. It means knowledge, the disembodied and original con-

dition of purity and Hiss, as is clear from the passages: 'The
wise does not grieve, because he knows that the Atman
is though residing in the bodies, and is changeless
bodiless
though residing in the changing things. The Atman is
the greatest and the omnipresent being of all' (Ka. 2, 22..);
"
He is pure, and without prana and manas (Mu. 2, 1, 2);
'

"
This purusa is not attached to anything (Br. 4, 3, 15).
'

In other words, these passages point out that the Atman

is without gross or subtle body, and is unattached to
both of them. So it has been proved that moksa is the
eternal disembodied state and is different from the fruits
of actions enjoined by dhanna.

2. Some may hold that the eternal nature of things

is compatible with change ([Link].;lya.:. The five elements

of earth, water etc. or the three gunas of the SSrfakhyaft

are eternal in rhe sense that they are recognised as identical
even though under-going change for the sake of the evolu-
 ADHVAVA I. PA. 1, a. 4. 21

tion of the universe. But moksa is eternal in the true

sense of the word it dees not undergo any transfor-
;

mation, and is immova He fKuras'Linitya). All-per-

vading like akiiss. existing itself. '">>' ci.::\c.:: with itself,
without body, parts or modifications, it is « If- illuminating,
timeless .\::-.l una'tecied i-y merii ,'iiJ dement (Ka. 1, 2, 14).
Therefore, moksa or the disembodied condition is the same
as Brahman, and so the instruction of Brahman cannot
be mere supplementary to action.

3. Consider the following: 'One who knows

Brahman becomes Brahman (Mu. 3. 2. 9) Ineffective '
;
'

become the actions of one who sees the Brahman as the

support of the higher and the lower (Mu. 2, 2, 8) ' ;

2, 4) ;
'
Brahman knew itself as Brahman and so
has become all this '
(Br. 1. 4, 10) ; can infatua-
'
How
tion and sort ow affect him who has seen oneness in all ?'
94. 50; Seeing which, the sage, Vamadeva, realized that
'

he was Manu, he was the sun" (Br. 1, 4, 10). All these

.iruti passages indicate rhnt mokj follows immediately : i

after the realization of Brahman, or that there remains

nothing to be done after Brahma j nana to attain moksa.
If it be the result of any activity, one would get moksa,
like heaven after a lapse of some time. But just as
a man can sina vvhilo [Link]. even =o there need not be
.:;.;. I...- -.e :; I
: ,v.\ ;>.: : ."n. ,-: i
»,. .!.;: i

4. Consider again the other passages which indi-

cate that the only result of [Link].i is merely to remove
the obstacles in the way of moksa. Bharadvaja and other
sages say to their Guru, Pippalada, You are father unto '

'
n=. because you have carried us to the o: her end of avidya
(Pr. 6, 8); Narada says to Sanatkumara," 'Since I have
heard from men like thee that one who knows the Atman
overcomes grief, carry me then beyond my grief (Cha.
7, 1, 3) Revered Sanatkumara carried him beyond
;
'

ignorance, because his sins were washed out (Cha, '

22

7, 26, 2). The author of Nylya-sastra, Gautama,

too, holds the view that the successive destruc-
tion of false knowledge, faults, activity, birth and misery
results in moksa (Nya. Su. 1, 1, 2), Unlike the Nyaya 1

view the VedSntin holds that the destruction of false

knowledge results from the knowledge of the identity
of jiva and Brahman.

This knowledge of the identity of the jiva and

5,
Brahman is not due to mike-believe (bhavana)
1
on account
of the fact that consciousness is common to both, though
a similar make-believe is referred to in the Sruti, 'infinite
are the Visvedevas and infiniteis the mind in its modifica-

tions ; so it is that the person who fancies the mental

'
states as Visvedevas gets the world that knows no finitude
(Br. 3, 1, 9), The identity of the jiva and Brahman
however is real and not imagined.

6. Nor is this knowledge of identity of the nature

of superimposition (adhyasa). Brahman is not superimpos-
ed on the jiva, in the manner in which it is recom-
mended to be superimposed for the sake of meditation
on mind or on the sun (Cha. 3, 18, 1 3, 19, 1). ;

7- Nor again is the knowledge of the identity of

jivaand Brahman on the pattern of the functional identity
conceived between prana and vayu. The vayu or wind is
said to be the absorber of everything e.g., of fire, sun etc. at
the timeof dissolution, and prlna is said to be the absorber
of speech, hearing etc. during sleep (Cha. 4, 3, 7;
sight,
4, 3, 3). It is on account of this common activity or func-

tion of the two, that the praria is

 '

as the wind. The jiva however is not identical with the

Brahman in the sense that both of them have the common
activity of growing.

8. Nor does this knowledge of identity mean the

act of purification of the jiva in its activity of seeing the
Brahman, as is implied in the seeing of ghee by the
wife in the UpiiiftSu Yaga.
sacrificer's The seeing of the
identity of the jivaand the Brahman is not referted to
inany passage connected with sacrifice.

9 (i). To suppose that this knowledge of identity

arises on account of make-Krlwiv etc. as mentioned above,
is to set at naught the words in the following passages
which clearly indicate that the identity is real and not
imagined :
'
Thou art that ' (Ka. 6, 8, 7) ;' I am Brahman"
(Br. 1. 4, 10) This Atman is Brahmin,' (Br. 2, 5, 19).
;
'

The cessation of avidya as the result of this knowledge

and the fact of the realisation of the Brahman are clearly
mentioned in the passages The knot in the heart :
'

is broker, and all the doubts are cut '; He who knows '

Brahman becomes Brahman (Mu. 2, 2, 8 3, 2, 9). (ii) ;

Hence it is clear that Brahma-] nana is not the result of

some human activity, but exists in itself alone. It exists
as certainly as an object that is perceived or inferred exists
by itself. In ocht'r words, it is impossible to conceive

Brahman or the knowledge of Brahman as in any way

connected with human activity and treated as an
effect, (iii) Brahman is not an object of knowing,
because it is stated to be diffetent from the known effect
'

and the unknown cause.* (Ke. 1, 3) ; ' How can one

know Him by whose power everything else is known
(Br. 2, 4, 13). (iv).Nor again is Brahman the object
of any religious worship for the tongue cannot say
;

anything about it, though it is through its power that the

tongue speaks. Know this to be Brahman and not that
'

which is worshipped (Ke, 1, 4, and 5). '

10. If it is
J4 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

what Sruti aims at showing is that Brahman is the internal

imperishable Atman. It can never become the subject,

because all the empirical differences oi the knower, the

known and the knowledge are caused by avidya. The
paradoxical statement that 'it is not known by those who
think that they know it, but that it is known by those
who say that thev do not know it' (Ke. 2, 3), means that
it transcends the triad of the known,
the knower and the
knowledge, and that it is only to be realized. The same
idea is conveyed in the passage,
You cannot sec the seer
'

of sight, hear the. hearer of hearing, think the thinker of

thought, and know the knower of knowledge etc." (Br.
3, 4, 2). In short, the Sruti denies the imaginary trans-
migratory nature of the Atman, and thereby brings out
the eternally free nature of the same; moksa, in other
words, is not transitory.

11. To consider moksa as a thing to be produced

like ajar, or brought into being by a modification in the
original condition like curds from milk, or reached as if

it isa place of journey, is to consider it as short-lived, and

as dependent on some action of body,_mind or speech.
Moksa is nothing but Brahman or the Atman, which is
already present in all. Brahman is perfect and so nothing
can be added to it. being eternally pure, there cannot be
any Daw in it which requires ;c be removed. It is not
amenable to any change, and hence moksa does not mean
the manifestation of the real nature of the Atman on
account of the lattet being purified by some action, as if
it is a mirror which becomes clear when the dust over it

is removed.

Again, it is the empirical soul and not the Atman

that gets itself associated with the body, and which,
therefore, is said to be purified by actions such as bathing,
sipping of water, and the wearing of the sacred thread.
In the proposition, ' I am free from disease \ the empirical
soul signified by the word 'I is nothing but the aharhkara
'

that arises on account of avidya and gets itself associated

 .i,s5.4. 25

with ihe body. ' Joined with the body, the senses and
the mind, it becomes known as the enjoyer or bhokta
(Ka. 3, 1, 4), and as such, 'eats the sweet fruit'; while the
ther (the Atman) merely looks on without eating ' (Mu.
3, 1, 1,). Brahman is described to be 'the one God,
the hidden Atman in ;tll beings, all pervading, watching
all activity, the support of all, and yet absolutely free
from all qualities' (.$vc. 6, 11), or again, as 'self-luminous,
ciscnikidied, without any scars ot muscles, pure and
without evil" (is. 8). Moksa, then, being the same as
the Atman or Brahman, cannot in any way be connected
with action. It has its relation with knowledge alone.

12. Is not knowledge itself ,m activity of the mind?

No, the two ate entirely different. Action is dependent
on the mind bin independent of the nature of things, and
so admits of being done or not done. This includes even
mental actions like reflection and meditation on a deity,
as are required to be done by the 'hota' while he is saying
'[Link]'. and 'die chief priest is engaged in making the
offering Ait. Bra. 3, 8. II. Knowledge, on the other hand,
:

is not dependent on the mind of man ot the Vedic instruct-

rions. It depends on the thing itself and is made available,
hy [Link]. The difference between action and know-
ledge will be clear from the following essmpl^. Meditation
on man and woman as fire (Cha. S, 7, 1 5, 8, 1) is an
;

action because it is dependent on the will of man and

conveys a Vedic instruction. The idea of fire, on the
other hand, constitute; knowledge, because it refers to
the actual perceived fire, and is not dependent on the
mind of man or on some Vedic statement. The know-
ledge of Brahman too is in the same manner ob ctiv ely
je
real, that is, refers to Brahman alone and not to any human
activity or Vedic instruction. The various imperative
statements such as 'The Atman should be seen, medi-
tated upon etc' become as inoperative as the edge of a
[Link] when it ,.:v!ied to a stone, because the Brahman,
i.-t

which is referred to by these statements, is not something

which can be acquired ot rejected. The only purpose
 26

served by these imperative statements is that they enable

us to turn our back against our common objects of like
and dislike, as also against out activity which is directed
in achieving them, and to enable us to direct our eye on
the Atman itself. That after the realisation of the Atman,
there remains nothing to be achieved or rejected, is no
defect, but on the contrary, constitutes the strength of the
Vedintic position. It is the fulfilment of all our duty and

the end of our life. 'If one were to realise the Atman
and realise him as this very Purusa (Brahman) what and
1
for whom will he wish anything and suffer in the body?
(Br. 4, 4, 12); or as the Bhagavadgita declares, such a
person achieves the aim of his life. Brahman is not
therefore expounded as the object of any activity.

13. The opinion of those who, following Jaimini,

say that there isno portion of the Vedas which dozs not
recommend or prohibit action, or whichnot subser-
is
vient to action, is not therefore only erroneous but is
also the expression of boldness. For the Upani$adic
description of the Purusa is only a statement of fact,
and not a statement regarding any action. It is impossible
to hold that this Upanisadic Purusa ot Brahman, who is
beyond birth and death, and who is unrelated to action
which is involved in production, modification, acquisition
and purification, does not exist or is not realised. His
existence is implied by the very word 'Atman' in the
passage which tries to describe him negatively as 'not this',
not this' (Br. 3, 9, 26). To deny the Atman is to posit
him, for otherwise the very denial would become im-
possible.

It will be wrong to suggest that

the Atman need not
be known from the Upanisads, and that any body will be
aware of it as the object of consciousness. For what
people are aware of is not the Atman, but
the empirical
soul. The Atman of the Upanisads is the witness of
the soul, the in-dweller of all, the unchanging one and
same to all. Knowledge about him cannot be had from
 . i, iB. 4. 27

Karma-Kiriija or Logic. He alone is imperishable among

all perishable things, and so cannot be avoided; and being

eternal, pure, intelligent and free, he is not like a thing

which is to be got by effort. 'There is nothing beyond
the Purusa; He if the highest Good' {Ka. 1, 3, 11). He
is referred to 'as taught in the Upanisads' (Br. 3, 9, 26).
This clearly shows that the main concern of the Upanisads
is to teach the doctrine of the Atman.

14. Now even if we take Jaimini's dictum that

action alone is the import of the Vedas, we shall find
that within the domain of the Karma-KIijda portion
itself, statements regarding 'soma' and 'curdr \ such as
'One should sacrifice with "soma" or "use curds "as offering",
will became meaningless. The words 'soma' and "curds'
do not themselver indicate any action. If, on the
other hand, it is contended that they have got all the
meaning inasmuch as they form part of some action to be
done, then why should wesuppose that the jiiiina-K.i'[Link]
portion of the Veda which (jives nwrucuon about the
eternally exisimi;. uiicluii[;ini; At man, has no connect
with some future event which necessarily follows a
'

result ? Though Atman itself is not a part of at

is not subservient to acti
knowledge of the Atman i
and of the consequent B
thing with action does not change that thing into action.
Knowledge of things only as already existing facts is
possible in both the spheresof Karma and Jfiana; and it is
the common nature of both that they are necessarily
connected with results peculiar to them.

Besides, if the dictum of Jaimini is pressed too far,

some negative propositions from the Karma-Kanda itself
which recommend abstinence from action will have to be
considered as useless; for they are themselves neither
actions nor subservient to actions, and so appear to be
mere statements of existing facts. But such a conclusion
isnot desirable. If it is urged that a negative statecc
may imply a positive statement over and above
 28 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

negation of some positive idea, then there would be no

difference between actims which .ire cuioined and actions
which are prohihited. The word 'not' in the sentence,
'a Brahmin should not be killed', has got the primary
meaning of Jesuiin,; from killing, and so should not be
construed as nvcrcly [Link] the secondary or the implied
meaning, viz. of doing som^liinc" else in ir. killing, that is,
abusing for tormenting him. The negative particle
merely indicates '.lie non-existence of that action with
which i!. is connected and not any new action, unless from
context in exceptional cases, it is certain that the [Link]
sense constitutes an action. For example, in the Praj'I-
pati-vrata, the Brahmacari is asked not to see the rising
sun. Here, 'not to see the rising sun' is not simply the
absence or seeing ihc risirii: run. bur con;; i-i ires a positive
action by itself. But excepting such cases, [he negu£«
particle inJiailes J neurral condition of the mind which
arises on account of the negation of an action. It need
not be maintained that this cognition of the aegation
and the consequent neutral condition of mind will last
for a short time, and will again give rise to a desire to do
the actions; for the lire is extinguished only after the fuel
is burnt. Knowledge about the negation of an action
will first destroy the desire for action and then destroy
itself. In short, it is the neutral condition or" indifference
_

to actions that constitutes the meaning of a negative

proposition, and not an action which is contrary to some
prohibited action. So if there be any part of the Vedas
which is meaningless, it is that which has no other aim

15. Wehave proved so far that Vedic statements

regarding existing facts are not purposeless, even though
they do not point to any action. They are of the type,
'This is a rope, not a snake", and are therefore purposeful
in the way in which this proposition is in removing the
fear of the snake. No doute, one who has merely an
intellectual understanding of the Brahman may be found
engrossed as before with the afiairs of the world; but not
 . i, afi. 4. 29

certainly one who has realized the Brahman. It is natural

that a man who has la'sclv i.:leri<i;;ed himself with his
body should suffer from the effects of misery and fear; but
he will never suffer in this way ii' he me
realizes, as the

Vedas tell, that he himself is the Brahman. A person

who feels proud on account of hi J richi'-i may mourn over
the loss if he is robbed of them; but is it ever possible
for a person to mourn over the loss, if he has renounced
the world and has given up his attachment for wealth?
Similarly,a person may derive pleasure from ear-rings

because he has the sense of ownership, but is it pu-sil>!e.

for him to have the same pleasure in ownership, once
he casts away the ear-rings and feels no attachment
to them? As the Srul.i tells, 'neither pleasure nor pain
touches' a man who has lost the egoism of his body'
(Chi. 8, 12, 1).

16. As for the disembodied condition or moksa we

have already said that it is eternal. One may perhaps
say that the disern inched cnidi'ion is rnssihle after death,
but that the Atman may again assume the body on account
of the merits and demerits incurred by it. But the Atman
is neither related with body nor with merit and demerit.

To hold that the Atman is related to the body because of

merit and demerit, and that it incurs merit and demerit
because it has got a body, is to argue in a circle. To
hold again that the body, on the one hand, and merit and
dement, on the other, are endlessly related to each other
as seed and tree, is to believe in a chain ot blind men who
will be unable to lead one another. No doubt, kings
and great men are calledauthors of actions, although their
servants do these for the sake of wealth. But there is
no such link to establish the relation of master and servant
between the Atman and the body. Hence there is no
other reason for the embodied condition except the wrong
notion that the soul has got a body. Hence too arises
the ageism in the form of T am the performer of sacrifice
etc.' on account of the false knowledge that the T is

identified with the body.

 17- Following the Prabhakara school, it. need not
also be said in this connection that the consciousness of
the Atman as the body arises on account of the trans-
ference of the idea and the name of one thing to another
thing because of certain characteristics which are common
to both. The meaning of the transferred name is only
secondary and not primary. On seeing the bravery and
similar qualities of aman, he may be called a 'lion' among
men. But where there is no cognition of the two things
as separate from each other, the transference occurs on
account of error. In darkness, a post is taken for a man;
there appears silver on the shell; for there is no clear and
distinct apprehension of the post or the shell. So the
meaning of the term 'man' or of 'silver' that is transferred
to the post or the shell is not the secondary meaning, but
the primary meaning due to error. Similarly, the applica-
tion of the word T and of the consciousness of that T
to the body complex arises on account of the ignorance of
the difference between the body and the T. In the
absence of the knowledge of the difference between the
two, there will necessarily be the absence of the trans-
ference of the secondary meaning (if any) from one to the
other. So it ii supenmpositi
that the word and the meaning of T are transferred to
the body. This error is oot peculiar only to shepherds
and common people; even learned men who know the
distinction between the Atman and the body, commit it.

All this goes to prove two things; (i) that the em-
bodiedness of the Atman is due to false notion, and (ii)
that the disembodied condition or moksa can be experienced
even while living. From the view-point of one who has
realized the Brahman, 'the body is like the cast off, dead
slough of a snake; he himself, on the other hand, remains
immortal, without the body, and becomes verily the
Brahman and the Light' (Br. 4, 4, 7). So perfect is the
disembodied condition of such a person that he behaves
'as if he has neither eyes, nor ears, nor mind nor life." The
Bhagavadgita too, while describing the characteristics of
 ..[Link]. 4. 31

a one who has realized the Atman

Sthitaprajfia, tells us that
is in no way connected with any tind of action. Thus,
it has been proved beyond doubt that one who has
realized the Brahman never returns to Sariisara; nor one
who Brahman.
clings to Sarfisara has realized the

18. Finally, the objection that Brahman does not

constitute an independent topic of inquiry but a sub-
sidiary one to Dharma-jnana is also not true. Reflection
and contemplation as well as listening to narrations about
the nature of Brahman are for the purpose of realizing the
Brahman, and not for some other purpose. Had Brahman
been subservient to the proce** of mcJiMtion. it would
have been incorporated in Purva-MImaihsa alone. At
best, Jaimini would have made a separate chapter to deal
with Brahman, as if it were an appendix to Dharmi-
Jiliijsa, as he has done with reference to sacrifice and
Summum Bonum of life (Pii. MI. Su. 4, 1, !) But no-
where in Purva-MImaiiisa is there any reference to the
knowledge dealing with the identity of the Brahman
and the jiva; and hence it is appropriate to have a
separate branch of ctudy for dealing with the subject
of Brahman.

Therefore all the precepts regarding action and all

the means of kno'.vk'ji^ ick rheir utility so long as the
knowledge, "I am the Brahman', has not dawned. Once
there arises the knowledge of this non-dual Atman, that
can neither bo ,-i,-,:ip:,-J nor m-fecied at the will of a man,
there remains neither the subject as the knower, nor the
object as the known, nor again the means of knowledge.
Hence it is 'The moment one knows that he is
said :

verily the Brahman, his secondary or false consciousness

that he is related to his son or to his body drops down,
and there remains nothing to be done by him.' The
Atman appears as the subject in relation to an object so
long as it is not known in its true nature; bat the moment
the Atman is known the person becomes one with the
sinless Brahman.
 We
have proved so far that the only aim and the mo-
tive of the Vedima- passages if to make us aware of the fed
that Brahman is the Self of everything, that it has no I

relation with action, and that, being omniscient and

omnipotent, it is the cause of the origin, subsistence and
dissolution of the world. The Samkhya and other philo-
sophers, however, rely Dn inference and not on Sruti.
And so they think that the Vedanta -passages which deal
with the problem of creation point out that the cause of
the world is the connection of pradhana with Pumsa.
The followers of Kanada think that God and the atoms
are the efficient and the mac-rial causes of the world.
Others too take their stand on Vedanta -passages and use
c ion.- ;Lfj(La-.,-nr~ and fih;ci."tiont.
f:i 11.1 Against all die;e
opponents it will be shown that the only aim of the
Vedanta-pas sages is to impart the knowledge of the
Brahman. The views of the opponents will therefore
be propounded and refuted.

To state first the view of the Samkhyas. Pradhana

is the cause of the world, though it is non-intelligent and
consists of the three gunas. It can be said to be omni-
potent, because it has the power to produce all its effects;

and it is omniscient becau-.e 'knowledge comes out of

sattva' (B. G. 17, U). This is borne out by the fact

that the yo£ins rhems»'k-es become orcmisck'nt becaufS
they ate esidowi-d wi;h huJy and scales [Link] c! :..:: sot pr.v
dlijn.i.i. and possess the sattva quality of pradhana in its

highest degree. Even at the time of the dissolution of the

world, when the three gunas are in the condition of
auipoise, the pradhana has got the [Link] for knowing
, in spite of its beine noninrclli^'nt. On the other
hand. Brahman is incapable of having full or partial know-
ledge; for it is said to be solitary, devoid of body and
other,'organs of sense and action; and though it is pure
consciousness, it is conscious of nothing in particular.
And what does omniscience of Brahman mean, escept the
capacity for all knowledge as it] the case of pradhana ?
For if we mean by it a perp^uii! ice mil co;:ni!ion of objects.
Brahman robhed of its freedom to know; and if
will be
we mean by transitory coismrion, ihen it will be robbed
it

of its which i- said re- he its essence.

eternal corisciousnes;
Besides, being without the means of action, tike the body
and the senses, it can neither [Link] knowledge nor be able

to create this world. It can never be the cause of the

world because it is one and homogeneous. As opposed to
this, the pradhana is capable of modifications. It consists
of more elements than one, and may therefore be the
cause of the world.

To this the Sfrtrakara replies :

The pradhana cannot be the cause of the world; for

being non -intelligent, it cannot perform the act of 'seeing*
which is mi-n KiiicJ ri the Sruti as performed by the cause.
i

The word 'seeing' does not refer simply to the meaning

of the root "Iks' (to see) but includes in it meanings of
other words also which indicate possession of intelligence
or knowledge, in the same manner in which the word
'Yaja' is used by Jaimini to indicate any sacrifice. The
word 'this
"
in ;hc following [Link].i.-es refers to this world
of names and forms as caused by the intelligent Brahman
alone. 'This was, in the beginning, the one, non-dual
Being; it saw wuhm it -he desire, "to become many and
produce much", and so created the fire' (Chi. 6, 2, and 3);
"This was in the beginning one Atman alone, and nothing
elsehad the capacity to move. He saw within him the
desire to produce the worlds, and produced-them' (Ait.
Ar. 1, 1, 1). In one place, it is the Purusa. consisting of
34

sixteen pans' who is said to have 'seen and produced the

prana' (Pr. 6, 3). Similarly, in Mundakopanisad {1, 1, t>)

'all thi? ISmhman, that isthe world of names, forms, and

food', has beer, said to have tome out of 'Him who is
omniscient, and whoae [Link] la the knowledge of iXi
the lores'. All :h;a clearly shows, tha: the cause cf
the world is the Wine' cl the inteHigeot Brahman and
not that of the non:[Link].: pradhina.

Pradharj cannot
lattva-gurta too. for the latter is :n the condition of ei
poise with the other two gunas, and not prrdofninmi.
over others. Knowledge an-.'- only when ihc sattva pre-
dominates. And if the presence of sattva in it is sufficient
to consider the pradhlna as having the capacity to know
all, the presence of rajas and tamas which prevent
knowledge is sufficient to consider it as having the
capacity to know little. Again there must be some
conscious subject to whom the sattva will belong as a
modified state; but the pradhina is not a conscious subject.
A yogin becomes omniscient because he is a conscious
subject, and not simply because thete is an excess of

Modifying his position, a Saidkhya may say that

Brahman may he the witness, and yet it is on this very
account that the pradhlna may possess in it the causal
activity of the 'seeing' mentioned in the Sruti, just as a
ball of iron which is not itself fire may possess the quality
of burning on account of its conjunction with fire. But
will it not then be mote reasonable to say that Brahman
alone is the cause of the world rather than saying that
pradhana, which is dependent on the Brahman, is the

Besides, there is no incompatibility between the

ever-lasting all-knowingness and the freedom of Brahman.
Just as the ever-lasting heat and light of the sun are said
 ADHYAYA I, PA. t, BU. 5. 35

to have been given freely by the sun, even so Che 'seeing'

of theBrahman is a free act inspite of its eternal cognition.
The all-knowing Brahman "saw', is as clear a statement
about the freedom of the Brahmin, as the statement the
sun 'shines' about the freedom of the sun, even when
there is no object to be seen or no object to be illuminated.
And if at all the 'seeing' should grammatically require
KNBe abject to be seen, it will be no other than the very
names and forms' of this world which were before creation
present in the bosom of the Brahman as ideas to be seen
or thought of. If the Yogins can have a perceptual
knowledge of the past and the future on account of His
grace, is it too much to suppose that He himself, the
eternally pure, has an everh'i !ng .o;:!"u ion ni rhe creation,
nfcfjtfeOCe and dissolution of this world ? Like lumino-
sity of the sun, eternal knowledge, being itself the essential
nature of Brahman, does not require the means of
knowledge. Being bound by avidya, the individual soul
may require body and other instruments for the sake
of having knowledge. But as the following mantras tell
us, God is free from every hindrance to knowledge. 'He
has neither body nor senses; neither is there anyone who
is equal or superior to him; manifold and extraordinary

is his power; and his actions are the natural result of his
knowledge. Handless and holding fast the things, without
feetand moving swift, without eyes and yet having sight,
without ears and yet hearing, He knows all that is
knowable, but nobody knows him; they call him the first
and the great Purusa'. (five. 6, 8, ; 3, 19).

No doubt, the individual jiva, though bound to

sarhsira is essentially not different from ISvara, 'other
than whom, there is no
other seer or knower' (Br. 3, 7, 23).
And yet, just as a false notionarises regarding the existence
of different portions of space on account of the existence
of the limitations of things like jars and vessels in one
36

even
spare, so there arises the false notion chat the soul
and God are different on account of the ignorance of the
is attached to the limitations of
body,
fact that the soul
and the senses. The Atman is thus wrongly believed
the body and.
as the non-Atman, and therefore requires
the senses for carrying on the affairs (lit. for 'seeing') of
this sarhsara.

One may askif the r: on-intelligent pradhina cannot

of
be said to have "seen' in the manner in which a bank
a river is figuratively said to be wishing to fall. The
pradhana too brings about the evolution of the universe
U regularly, as a man should execute his plan of going to
:ivilbijr ;;ttcr [Link] his hath and dinner. Such a figura-
tive use is made even in &uti, The fire saw; the water
saw' (Cha. 6, 2, 3 ; 4). Or else, if the 'seeing' refers to
Brahman, there tco i: must be laken in a figurative sense,
because, in the context where it is used, it refers more
than once to non-intelligent objects, such as fire and

To this the Siitrakara replies :

»fi«|S|Mlr»)y^^ 1^
[Gaming- secondary ; cet— if ; no— not ; Atmojabdat—
on account of the word' Atman '.J

The Sruti passage which mentions the Sat (Being) as

alone existing before the creation of this world, and as
alone responsible for the creation of tire, water and earth
on account of its 'seeing', mentions further that it was the
divinity of Sat which thought of entering with its own
jivatman into the other [Link], oi fire, water and earth
and so evolving the world of names and forms (Ch.i, 6, 2).
If the 'seeing' or thought should refer in a Bguialfvl
manner to the pradhana, then the word "divinity" too
 urol*. ,, «. ., it. 7. 37

would refer to it; but in that case, how can 'jivitman',

which means both conventionally and etymological y I

the intelligent ruler of the body and the bearer of prima,

be &e constituent nature of the non- intelligent pradhana?
But if '
aat ' we mean the Brahman which does the act
by
of 'seeing', not in a figurative or secondary manner, but
literally or primarily, the use of the word Atman with
reference to jiv.i will !v trite liable. In a chapter of the
I

Chandogyopanisad i'fi. S, 7). Svetaketu is told that he is

the Atman. and iha: all this if :.hc Atman. the very subtle
essence, the 'sat' or the Purusa.' As for fire and water,
even though they are spoken of as possessing the 'seeing'
in a figurative manner, and as being smaller divinities,
they are in reality non-intelligent and created objects
having names and forms.

It may still be urged that the word 'Atman' may

refer to pradhana, in the same figurative manner in which
a king may say about his servant, Bhadrasena, that he is
his very soul. For the pradhana is useful in making
the jiva reap the fruit of his actions or have his salvation,
just as the minister of a king is useful to him in
peace and war. Or the word 'Atman' may refer to both
intelligent and non-intelligent beings, just as the word
'jyoti' indicates both a sacrifice and a flame, and hence
the 'seeing' may still be taken in a figurative meaning.

To this the Sutrakara replies :

ITannisfha&ya—af him who is denoted to BraFmian J

mokfopadesat—on account of relenje being promised.!

se. (the word Atman

Thepassage from the Chandogyopanisad which tells

us that the subtle Being (Sat) is the Atman and which
further espounds the truth 'That thou art', is immediately
followed by another statement which telb us that this
knowledge of the identity of the jiva and the Atman or
the Sat is achieved by one who has gat a spiritual teacher,
and that he becomes one with the Atman after the fall of
the body. This means that moksa is possible for one by
being devoted to the Sat or the Atman. If, on the other

hani the Sat were to refer to the pradhana, it would

mean that a conscious human being, who is hankering
after moksa is asked to believe that he is nothing but the
non-intelligent pradhana. This would only mean that he
would not only not have moksa, but also be bound all the
more by the ties of samara. His condition will be no
better than that of a blind person who, wishing to reach
his home, is ill-advised to take hold of the tail of an ox,
and who therefore, instead of reaching his home, ia merely
hurt by the shrubs and stones on the way as he is carried
away by the ox in any direction. Therefore it behoves
us to say that the gruti passages contain instructions
regarding the means to reaii;.j -h-_- Arman. just as it may
behave one to say that Agnihotra and other lacrificBS ire
recommended as means to attain to heaven (Cha. 6, S, 7;
6, 14, 2; 6, 16, 3). The conviction 'I am the Brahman '.
will lead one to mok?a as surely as the holding fast of a
red-hot axe without being burnt was once considered
to be the means of making a man free from the guilt of
theft. That the word 'Sat' means the 'Atman' is then
literally true and not merely in a figurative sense. Other-
wise, like devotion to the 'uktha' or the 'prana', it will
yield only transitory result (Ait. Ar. 2, I, 2, 6).

Sometimes, words are used in a figurative sense no

doubt; for instance, the word 'Atman' in 'Bhadrasena is
my Atman. But to universalize the [Link] to say that the
word 'Atman' in 'lam the Atman' is used in a figurative
sense, is to create confusion. Which meaning is intended
on a particular occasion, must he settled by reference to
the context or to the qualifying word. So if we are not to
be confused, we musttake the word 'Atman' in its literal
sense with reference to sentient beings like SvetaLetu, or
with reference in -h-iir ion*. j'.i,-h;ii the 'seeing' perform-
.-.,•:

ed by theSat. But we should take it in the figurative sense

with reference to non-sentient things, such as the senses
and elements. Again, the interpretation of the word
'jyoti' is no key to the interpretation of the word 'Atman'.
The word 'jyoti' has got the derivative meaning of 'sacri-
fice', because the sacrifice indicates the primary meaning of

the word, viz. light or flame in it. The word "Atman", on

the other hand, cannot be transferred with its meaning
which is available with reference to sentient beings, to
the non-sentient pradhana, because there is nothing
common between the sentient Brahman and the non-
aentient pradhana.

[Heyatva — fact of being discarded ; avacanat — there being

:a—and.]

carded (the pradhana is jjot mentioned hv the wobd

'Sat'); and. 8

The word has not been used to denote the

'Sat'
pradhana, even as a preliminary Etep, so that it should
denote afterwards the Brahman or the Atman. Had it
been so, gvelaketu's father who wished to instruct his
son regarding the nature of the subtle Being or the Atman,
would have first asked him to descard the notion of the
pradha.T.1 being the Sat. But this has not been done.
When the very real! star of Arundhati is to be shown,
the device adapted u to show first a bigger star near it
la if it is the sat of Arundhati, and then to direct the
attention to the real utar, thereby discarding the earlier
false knowledge n: the bigger star as Arundhati. But
such a device his not been used in the case of the know-
ledge of the Atman The false notion of the pradhana
as the Sat has not been introduced first and discarded
later, so that it should be an aid to the understanding of
Svetakem that Atman alone is the Sat or the real Being.
 Even if the pradhiina is believed to be "ejected, the
word 'and' m the Sutra indicates that there would arise
the additional defect of curiiriaici/ns; he earlier statement,
i

ini. the cause being known, everything else becomes

known. For the sixth adhyay,; I'e^ir.j with the statement
of the question as to what it is which when known enables
one to know what is ordinarily never known, hear what is
never heard, and realise what is never realized. And
the reply is given by living tin,', to blow the clay as the
cause is to know everythi:i!-; that is made out of clay; for
all the modifications of clay are mere distinctions in name
which have their origin in speech and not in clay as such.
The truth is that all these modifications are clay only
(Cha.6, 1, 2-6). If the word Sat were to denote pradhana,
then the knowledge of pradhiina as the cause would
have given us the knowledge of the individual souls.
But this does not happen, because the souls which are
sentient cannot be the effects of the non-sentient pradhana.
Therefor* the word 'Sat" does not mean pradhana.

A further reason why 'Sat' dees not mean Pradhana.

{Sva—Atman ; [Link]~on account of absorption.]

: with the 'Sat' during sleep (Cha. 6, 8, 1).

In the walling state, the soul apprehends the objects in-

tellectually and becomes endowed with the conscious-
ness of the body. The same soul goes by the name of
the ' mind ' when the person dreams on account of the
desires which only are left behind. But when be becomes
 \

SLMO. 41

devoid of the two conditions, that is, when there are

neither the external ohjtvrj. nor the body, nor the senses,
nor even the desire? of which he .-houlj he conscious, he is
said to sleep or enter, as if, in his true being vin. the
Atman. This in'.cr pre union en" the word Svjpiti (he ' '

sleeps) as Svam apito bhavati ' (becomes absorbed in

'

the Atman) is analogous to the interpretation of the word

"
hrdaya '
(heart) as ' hrdi ayarh Atma ' (the Atman is
in the hear!. Chii S, 3, 3). Similarly, again, the words
.

'
aianaya '
and '
udanya are explained as water which
' '

-
carries the food eaten by him (tadasitarii), fire which
'

carries away what has been drunlt (talpitarii) by him (Cha.

6, 8, 3, 5). So it is impossible that the conscious Atman
will be resolved in the non-con scions pradhana. Even
if the word 'Sva* were to denote, not necessarily At nun,
but pradhana as ' belonging to the Atman,' there would
be the same defect of the conscious being mixed up with
the non-conscious. The soul then, ' embraced as he is
by the conscious Atman, knows nothing inside or out-
side*during sleep (Br. 4, 3, 21); and so, it is not pradhana,
but the conscious Atman alone which is the cause of the
world, which is indicated by the word Sat ' and in '

which all conscious beings go for rest.

Pradhana is not the cause for a further reason :

ifteTIPn^ I (•
JGdti— \nawledge ; samaiiyat — on account of similarity.

fflMOM (ex

Had the Veda nta- passages contradicted each othe;

as the arguments of the logicians do, then it would hai
IV..TI plausible to hold that the cause of the world is eith

the intelligent Brahman or the non-intelligent pradhana

or something else. But there is the unanimous declara-
tion that the intelligent Brahman alone is the
42 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

Compare for instance 'Just as sparks emanate from

:

firein all directions, even so, from the Atman proceed

the pranas, and from pranas the gods, and from gods
the world?' (Kau. 3, 3); "From the Atman has come
'
forth the ikasa (Tai. 2, 1);
'
All this has come out of
the Atman
'
(CM. 7, 26, D; ' From Atman alone pro-
ceeds the prana,'(Pia. 3,3). So, just as the eyes of different
men agree inhaving the same knowledge regarding colour,
even so the vieivi iixprffscJ m 'j] litre: VeJanta passages
1.;

agree in holding the conscious Atman or Brahman as

the cause of the world. And the consensus of opinion
iscertainly a powerful argument.

A further reason in support of the omniscient Brah-

man as the cause of the world :

ISrutaxtvat — being mentioned in thi Veda ca ;

— <md.\

The mantropanisad of the Svetasvataras tells us

that '
He alone, the all-knowing God, indicated by the
word Sva is the cause and the Lord of lords, while
' '

there is none else who can be said to have produced hiia

or be his lord' (6, 9), This means chat the omniscient
Brahman alone is the cause of the world.

In the above and in the preceding nine Sutras, what we

have been showing by the help of suitable .[Link] is [Link]
the various Veda nta- passages aim at proving that the
all-knowing and the all-powerful God is the cause of tlic
origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world. The
purpose of the remaining Sutras is to show that Brahman
assumes two forms, one without limitations as the object
of knowledge, and the other with limitations as the object
 L i, »u. 12. 43

of devotion. Consider the following ' where there ap-

pears duality, one sees the other ; but when one becomes
identified with the Atman, who should see whom ?'
(Br. 4, 5, 15). When one sees nothing but the Atman,
hears or knows nothing but the Atman, he i= the Jreitesi;
but where one sees or hears or knows something else,
it is a little thing he who is the greatest attains immor-
;

tality, everything little is perishable (Cha. 7, 24. 1).

'

Having created all, the wise Being names them and

calls them by their names (Tai. Ar. 3, 12, 7). He '

is without limbs or actions, without any blemish or

defect, unperturbed, unaffected, the bridge of salvation,
and if like fire which has consumed the fuel of avidya"
n
(Sve. 6, 19). 'Not not this (Br. 2, 3, 6). 'It if neither
this,
gross nor subtle " '
Perfect is one abode,
(Br 3, 8, 8).
imperfect the other '. All these and several other passages
show that Brahman as the object of knowledge differs
from Brahman as the object of devotion. The latter
howevet is the result of avidya. So long as avidya lasts,
there arise different forms of devotion which either aim
at prosperity, success in works or gradual liberation.
'
As a man worships, so he becomes
'
(Cha. 3, 14, 1) ;

'
Whatevet one remembers at the time of death, he
attains that ' (B. G. 8, 6). Though the Atman is eternal,
unchanging, uniform and hidden in all the movable
and immovable things, he becomes manifest in propor-
tion to the degtee of the excellence of the mind, and
being endowed with power, dignity and glory ' (Ait.
At. 2, 3, 21; B, G. 10, 41) becomes an object of worship.
Similarly, m
the Brahmasiitras too (1, !, 20 and 1, 1, 22),
the sinless golden person who appears on the disc of the
sun as well as the Akasa are declared to be the highest
Being.

Thus, though Atma-jfiana is the immediate cause

of mokfa, it must be settled whether it refers to Saguna
or to Nirguna Btahman, and whether Brahman is the
object of knowledge or of devotion. The sutrakara
will solve this problem, as alao incidentally explain in
 '

the remaining Sutras the earlier point that Brahm;

and not pradhana, ia the cause of the world.

lAnadamayah— a being full of bliss ; dbbyasdt -hiuii

of repetition.}

ii! Brahman)

After having mentioned in succession several itmaJj

consiuung of food, prana, mind and intelligence, the
Tail'.iriy.->-anisad tells us that the inner-most Atman
canaistso^ bliss (2, 1,3). The question to be solved in this
connection is whether anandamaya Atman is the Brahman
itself, thf Being which is already pointed out as truth,
knowledge and eternity, or like the selfs of food, prana
etc., it I! different from the Brahman The purvapalnjl
cor j,il i: i= jivfit man only and not Brahman, be-
cause, in the first place, the anandamaya comes last in
the series of lower atmaus such .\- those tint are made up
of food etc.; secondly, even though innermost, it has joy
e.g. 'joy is its head '; and thirdly, it
etc. as its limbs,
has, unlike the Brahman, the body vis. the preceding
atman made up of intelligence {Tai. 2, 6).

In reply to this, it is to be said that anandamaya

means the highest Atman alone, for it is in this sense that
the word ananda has been repeatedly used; e.g. after
' '

introducing the topic of anandamaya as an embodied

one, it is further said to constitute the essence of flavour
(rasa). It is after getting this rasa that one nnds the
bliss ;f this bliss be not in the .ikiisi of the heart, who
would be able to breathe ? He alone makes one enjoy
the bliss and the test of this bliss of the Brahman is
;

that one who gets it does not fear anything, but reaches
the Atman and realises that Bliss itself is the Brahman
(Tai. 2, 7-9 ; 3, 6). Again we have knowledge and
'

bliss are Brahman '

So the word bliss or
(Br. 3, 9, 28).
 As for the objections, we say that they have no
force. In -.he first place, the anandamaya Atman 15 the
innermost reality of all, beyond which no other atman
is mentioned. The most ignorant of the people under-
stand by the Atman the body which is made up of food.
So in cuder to suit the understanding of the common
run of people, the Atman is first shown to be that which
is unitmjr. then another un-atman of the same shape
;

but more real because inner than the first; then another
still of the same shape, but much more real because inner

than the tecond; and soon, till the innermost Atman which
consists of ananda only is finally shown as the real one.
Just as (he very small stat of Arundhati is shown last
of ai!. a :':<-i havir,; £:«: shown rii-,- H^r orvs in the neigh-
ijourhood j". aids to ;he eyesight, oven ;n the un at ma lis
fode up of food. |-r jrja etc. are shown in succession in
order thai people d
ordinary intelligence may gradually
eliminate the false j'mans, and posit the innermost
AtiPaii consisting .,' J-ianda as the only reality. Secondly,
to speak of this A'm.m as "having the head of joy"
or the' body of intelligence' is but an imagination.
The bdtniage ni 'limbs' and "body' is used with
reference to this Atman , because it is mentioned
as the last link of the chain. Otherwise it has neither
hody [Link] jivatman his. Annniidamaya Atman
is verily then the Brahman or the highest Atman.
 —
46 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

If the affix 'maya' is said to change the meaning of

the original word, then the word anandamaya may mean
'made up of ' or consisting of inanda just as the word
" annamaya " means ' made ap of food." The objection
however is not valid, because 'maya', as Panini tells ub,
—
a. Su. 5, 4, 21) may mean abundance
'
also. In '

nnamaya yajna ' e.g., the word annamaya meani

'

.bounding in food ', and so annamaya -yajna means a

sacrifice which
in there is plenty of food. Similarly,
'
anandamaya means abounding in blisss ', and so
' '

anandmaya-arman means Brahman itself as abounding in

bliss. Tbat the bliss of Brahman knows no measure
is seen from the passage in the TaittiriyopanisaJ :2. Si,

where the sevt-ri! e- [Link] with the hliss of man

i-!(----.
:

and ending with the bliss of Brahman are measured in

ascending degree, each bliss being made up of hundred
blisses of the preceding being.

{Tat; hetn— cause; vyapadejf7t because it is mentioned.]

Because (Brahman) is mentioned as the cause or

Just as a person who mates others rich must himself

possess abundant wealth, even 60 the At man who causes '

bliss ' (Tai. 7) himself must abound in bliss. As ' maya

means ' abundance ' 'anandmaya ' means therefore the
highest Atman only.

HP3#faitf ^ #Ici I
{**,

[Mtintravarnikarti—as in mantra; eva; ca ;

giyate— mis-J

_ (Anandamava is Brahman because) the samc

the Brahmana). IS
 aohyayai. pa. t, 86,16. 47

The mantra and the [Link] portions of the Tai-

ttiriynpamsad (2, 1. and 5) Jo not contradict by dealing
wi:h two different topics, but are consistent with each
other in referring to the same Brahman. The mantra
which first [Link]* 'he topic of Brahman by saying
"
one who innws Brahman becomes Brahman,' describee
it further ao truth, intelligence and infinity, as giving
birth to akiisa and other elements, and Co all movable and
immovable things, and as residing inside the beings,
and finally a? being the innermost Atman of the series of
other atmans. The same Brahman is spoken of by the
ISrihir.,™ as 'fm;-:iJn.m,-yri' ,>nd ,.~ rcir.e [he innermost of
'

all. Besides the vidya known as Ehargavi Varurji centres

round this anandamaya '; and beyond this there is no
'

mention of any other atman. Therefore anandamaya

alone is the highest Atman.

Mc— not ;
itaro— the other : aimbabatte'i— because not
/ound.J

(Anandamaya ») not the other (rit. the jivat-

WA N ) BECAUSE (THTNCs) DO NOT fOLLOW. 16

With anandamaya it is said, " He

reference to
wished to become many and to produce (the world) ;

he made a penance ;nid c rear id this ail (Tai. 2, 6). Now "

it is impossible for the individual soul or for any other

being except the highest Atman to think, in the first

place, about things to be created during this disembodied
condition, and secondly, to create the things in such a
way as will be non-different from himself.

SfipfWOT l ?«
 —

JT THE JIVATMAN). 17

TheTaittiriyopanisjd tells us (2, 7) char the individual

soul gets the bliss of the [Link] after it first pets the taste

of the Atman ; for the Atman is described as bliss itself

and as flavour (rasa). It is clear that the attainer and the

attained cannot be one and the same. No doubt, Srati
and Smrti recommend the search of the Atman, as there
is nothing higher than the knowledge of the Atman,

In reality, the Atman is in its own nature, Atmao

alone. '
There is no other seer or hearer than the
highest Lord ' (Br. 3, 7, 23) and hence no search of
;

it is possible. Yet, in common experience owing to

ignorance, the Atman is identified with the non-atman
like body, senses etc., and so it is possible to say that
the Atman is to be searched or heard or attained.

The jivatman who is really not different from God

(Atman) is unreal. He is the product of avidya, and
being embodiec is rL'sporiJiI'l.'rorhia actions and the results
thereof. The reverse cannot be said of God. can- We
not say that God if unreal because he is identified with
the jivatman ; for he is the ground of avidya. Just as
;imagician is the cause or support of an unreal prototype
oi him who climbs up a rope and holds a shield and a
sword in his hands, or just as the unlimited akasa being
limited by the adjunct of a jar appears distinct from the
akasa in the jar, even so the Lord is different from the
jivatman, inasmuch as he is not only real but the support
or the ground of the illusory nature of the jiva.

^PTTf =ng»iraFRjT I \C
IKihndi — due to desire ca; and na not ;
— \
amtmaruipc-
k'Z-nceisity of inference.}
 itelligent pradhSni being the cause of the
world, or being the same as anandamaya. The re-
futation of the Satfikhya doctrine was already done in
the Sutra 1, 1, 5. but is again incidentally done here to
show that the Vedanta-passages are uniform in the view
that Brahman is the cause of the world. Desire and
'
ananda ' cannot belong to [Link] even in a figurative

^HH*1¥I ^ WW 3"nT# l
$ ^

OF THIS (INDIVIDUAL SOUL) IS TAUGHT- 19

[Link] anandamaya does not denote the pradhana

or the jiva, because the jiva obtains salvation when
it is joined or identified with the anandamaya. The
jiva, we are told,
'
becomes fearless when he is lodged in
that invisible, incorporeal, undefinable, unsupported and
fearless Atrnan; but the moment he feels himself even
slightly away from the Atman he encounters the fear
of Sarhsara" (Tai. 2, 7).

We must have our own say, however, in thisconnec-

tion (i.e. as against the view of the Vrttitaras regarding

the meaning of the word anandamaya). How can

the affix 'maya' mean 'modification* or 'product'
when it is added on to words anna, prana, manas and
Vijnam, and mean, all of a sudden, abundance, when
'
'

added on to the word ananda in the same context ?

it is

The words beginning with annamaya and ending with

anandamaya form one series, and accordingly hqw is it that
only the last word of the series refers to Brahman?
This is like supposing that a certain body consists partly
so

of n old lady and partly of a young lady. We

grant that
Brahman is the chief topic of discussion (Tai. Chapter 2).
But, in that case, if anandamaya
' '
were to denote the
Brahman, annamaya etc. too, would denote it. Ill
'
'

may be idid that anandamaya points to Brahman because

while other atmans such as annamaya etc. have, each
one of them, a further atman beyond it, there is no
such atman beynnd anandamaya. But in The Taittiriyo-
parusad it"ell (2, 51 it is said with reference to anandamaya

that '
|oy is its head, satisfaction is its right wing,
delight is its int wing, ananda (bliss) is its soul, and
Brahman i° its oil and support.
'
The same Brahman
which li me.-"ionc.l as truth, knowledge and infinity
is mentioned here a; the tail and support and it is to
;

have the knowledge of this Brahman, that the imaginary

description ot the ove sheaths, irom annamaya to ananda-
maya, is given. In saying therefore that anandamaya
Joes not mean Brahman, but that the tail of anandamaya
is the Brahman, we are not leaving (as the Vrittikara

supposes us to do) the original and main context of the

[faacriptioB of Brahman, and introducing the new topic
of describing the jiva as anandamaya. jht ^ $J
Now, the description of Brahman as mere member
or the tail of the anandamaya may be said to reduce it
to a subordinate position, and so if we are to stick
to the contest. on;e igjin. the fLiiiLndimnyj may be re-
cognized as the true Brahman. But this is to consider
one and the same Brahman as at once the whole, viz.
the anandamaya, and as a mere part thereof viz. the tail.
If we are to get away from this contradiction, we must
locate the mention of Brahman either in the sentence
referring to anandamaya or in the sentence referring
to the tail of it. The word ' Brahman * occurs in the
latter sentence and not in the former; and so it is proper
to say that the subject-matter of Brahman is chiefly, and
not subordinated mentioned in the sentence referring
to thetail, and rim .~i:.iiv:lrn' -.'-;, Joes not denote Brahman

D/3T-M
 ADHTATA1, pX. I, SU. 19 51

Our conclusion that Brahman is treated as the chief

subject- matter in the sentence, Brahman is the tail
'

and the support,' gains strength by what is told in the

verse which immediately follows it, viz. If he '

knows the Brahman as non-existing, he himself

becomes non-existent if he knows it as existing, he
;

himself becomes so ' (Tai. 2, o). Without any reference

to anandamaya which is known to all, this verse tell* U
what one mav gain or lose, if one only knows the being
or the non-being of Brahman. The word ' tail ' is not
to be taken literally and construed as merely a member ;
it is to be taken in the sense of support or reMjflg pbM

of all the inanda known to the world. As the Brihad-

aranyaka says, "All the created beings live only on a
very small portion of that Brahmanic ananda 32).
'
(4, 3,

Notwithstanding the above, if we are to consider

the anandamaya as Brahman, then because it is endowed
wnh qualities like joy etc. as its members, we shall have
to consider it as savisesa or saguija Brahman, as opposed
to nirvisesa or nirguija Brahman,
"
from which the
speech and mind turn away being unable to comprehend
it. One who gets the ananda of this Brahman fears
nothing ' (Tai. 2, 9). Besides, ' anandamaya abounds
in bliss " means that it contains a little measure of pain
too. But to bold this view about Brahman is to hold
it in contradiction to another Sruti passage, which te»

us that ' that is Infinite or Brahman where nothing elsif is

heard, seen or known' (Cba. 7, 24, 1). Moreover, as
iov differs from man to man, the anandamaya too will
W different. Brahman, on the other hand, is 'imperi- '

shable truth and knowledge and so cannot be divided

(Tai. 2, 1). "
It is the all-pervading God,
thehidden inner
Atman of all beings' (gre. 6, 11). It is to be noted
again that it is not the word anandamaya but the word
ananda which is repeated, (as we have already seen
in SQtra 12) ; and that the word ' ananda
' stands for
Brahman is clear from [Link]'irTvn as well a- other Upamsads
(Tai. 2, 7 2, S ; 2, 9 ; 3, 6 ; Br. 3, 9, 28). It does not stand for
;
 1

anandamaya, which, as we have seen, is not Brahman-

The passage in which the full word ' anandamaya ' is
repeated only tells us that it too, like other preceding

No doubt the stage of anandamay

in order to reach the Brahm
'
Let me be many, let me create,' (Tai. 2, 6) i
the sentence which refers to Brahman as the tail and
support (Tai. 2, 5) than to the sentence which refers to
anandamaya, and so does not tell us that ananda"
maya is the Brahman. Similarly, He is rasa,' (Tai. 2, 7) '

refers to Brahman and not to anandamaya.

As for the objection that Brahman in the neuter

gender is referred to by the masculine pronoun 'he'
in thesentence He wishes to become many," we reply
'

that themasculine word Atman tooin '[Link] Atman

has come forth akasa (Tai. 2 1) refers to Brahman, in-
'

asmuch as Brahman is the subject-matter of the chapter.

As for the word ananda mentioned in the Bhargavi
' '

Varum Vidya, in the sentence He realized ananda as '

Brahman [Tai. 3, 6), it denotes Brahman alone because

there is neither the affix maya nor any mention of the
' '

limbs such as joy as 'head' etc. Nowhere in the chapter

is there any intention to refer to the sagjni Brahman 1
having qualities or members on the contrary, as already
;
j
[Link]. ii rums at having the knowledge of nitLOina Brahman
j
which transcends speech and mind. The contusion
]
therefore is that the affix maya does no' meat) abunJ-
' ' '

ance but means only modification or product, and so

'

anandamaya like annamaya etc. does :;ot refer to

'
'
]
Brahman.

The Sutras should therefore, be explained as follows :

Siitra 12— Brahman is the chief and not subordinate

subject-matter, as is clear from its reference as the tail
and .support of the anandamaya atman (Tai. 2, 5) and from
the repetition ot [he word 'Brahman in the immediately
following verse, ' he becomes himself existent or non-
existent who knows Brahman to be so ' (Tai 2, 6). SQtra
13 —
If Brahman ia not to be considered as the chief topic
on account of the word '
maya ' meaning ' modification '

Or member (the tail e.g.), then the meaning " abundance '
too can be construed as standing for a group of members
(such as head, wingSi etc.). But the word 'tail' is not
to be taken literally as a member, but as 1 sign for Brahman
which is the real support of all. Sutra 14— Brahman
is said to have "created all rh;it_est5is' (Tai. 2. 6), all the
modifications including the ' anandamaya." Being itself
the cause of ' anandamaya ,' it cannot be said to be at
the same time only a member of that anandamaya. So
also other antra' refer to Brahman alone and not to
anandamaya.

« tarften^l <*°-3?)
JldMiflrq^W^ I Ro

[Anlfl/1 — inside ; tdd-dharmd-upade/nd— fi is qualities being

mentioned.}

In a passage of the Chandogyopanisad (1, 6, 6),

we the person seen on the sun has bright
are told that '

golden beard and harr, and appears golden to the very

 54 Veda:

tips of his nails, that his name is

'
Ut inasmuch as he ia
'

free from every kind of evil, and that one who knows
this becomes himself likewise free from evil.' And
we are further told that the
'
same person is seen in the
eye '
(!, 7, 5). The question which arises here is whether
this person who is [Link] J :is '.he o.'ivc'. o: devuricil

is merely an individual soul who has raised himself to

eminence on account of knowledge and good actions, or

whether he is the perfect and eternal God.

In the first place, the person is described as having some

form and features, such as golden beard etc.; the highest
God, on the other hand, is spoken of as imperishable '

and without form, sound) at touch' (Kau. 1, 3, IS).

Secondly, the sunand theeyearementioned as the abodes;
about the abode of Cod. Sanarkumara tells Narada that
'He lives in his own glory, and that he is all-pervading
and eternal like the akisV (Cha.7,24, And thirdly, U
the limit of the power oi he person in the sun is indicated
:

by saying that he is tbe lord of the peupie beyond rise

sun and of the desires of gods. Similarly, the power of
the person in the eye is inches led by =.-iy:ii;> that he is the
lord of the people below it and of the desires of men. On
the other hand, unlimited is the power of God. He is
'

the Lord and protector of all beings, and acts like a

bridge or bund so that the worlds may not come to a
chaos.' (Br. 4, 4, 22).

In reply to this we say that the person on the sun

must be [Link] and not jivatman, because the qualities
of God alone are mentioned. In the first place, the person
in the sun is named Ut and declared to be free from all
' '

sins the same name then is extended to the person in

;

the eye. This freedom from all sins is the characteristic

of the highest Atman alone (Cha. S, 7, 1). Secondly,
the person in the eye who is declared to be Rk, Saraan, '

Uktha, Yajus, and Brahman,' is no other than the highest

 - 1, su. 21 55

God ; for i: is Cod alone who is the inner Atman and

the cause of ail. Be-ide.-., having first mentioned with
reference to gods and men that the kk and Saman of each
are the earth, fire, etc. and speech, breath etc. respfMiively,
it isfurther said that wftb reference to both the gods
and men, the Rk and Saman are the joints of the feet of
the two persons in the sun and the eye. (Cha. 1, 6, 8
and 1, 7, 5). This description too of the adhiJawib
and the adhyatmika types of devotion' is applicable
to the highest Atman alone, on account of his bong all-
pervading. Similarly, the passage which tells us that
'people who sing unto Him to the Vina become wealthy'
(Cha. 1, 7, 6) refers again to the same God for as the ;

Bhagavadgitj u'lls u-. "whatever wealth, power, or stren-

gth one may have, it is produced from a portion of his
glory' (10, 40.

As to the features and golden form of the person,

we have to remark that Cod may assume, on account
"I hi? Msv'i,any for n for 'he sake of showing his grace
e

to Pus devotees. When the imperishable Brahman is

described as without form, sound or touch, it is the
niigiina aspect of it (Kau. 1, 3, 15); but for the sake of
Jevov.o.i ihesamemay be [Link] ;i« .[Link], as 'having
all desires, actions, odours aod tastes '
(Cha, 3, 14, 2).
Similarly, the Atman who rendu in bio own glory, may
M described as having an abode like the sun or the eye
for thf sdke of devotion, or be described as having limits
to his power and glory, in order to make him accessible
to gods and men.

,: [Link]., <,
 The Brhadaranyaka passage is clear on this point;
*
He who dwells in the sun but whom the sun does not
know, who lives inside the body of the sun and controls
him, is the Atman who lives in you too, rules and is
immortal (3, 7, 9)- The Atman who resides and rules
'

from within is different from the nii'ivi, [Link] joj' a? well

as different from the body, whether in the case of the sun

nctv^vr°Tviimn4, i (^)

ks (or
l) THE AIASA (TS BRAHMAN). 22

On beinc asked by .-alavitya, a Brahmin, as to what

the support of these worlds may be, the king Pravahana
Jaivali replied (we are told in the Chandogyopanisad
1, o, l), that it is Ikasa ; out of this that all the
for it is
beings have come forth and into this they ?hall return-
Akasa alone is the greatest of all and is their support. There
arises now a doubt as to the meaning of the word akasa.
Is it to be taken in the sense of element or Brahman ? The
former meaningis well-known, but the latter too is possible;
as, for instance, in the passages: 'If this akasa is not the
same as ananda etc' (Tai. 2, 7); 'akasa is the cause of this
world consisting of namea and forms; it is the Brahman
in which names and forms appear (Cha. 8, 14, 1). ' In
the first passage, the extraordinary quality 'ananda'
is mentioned, on account of which, akasa is taken to mean
Brahman and not the element in which there is no possibility
of ananda in the second, the principal sentence involves
;

the word Brahman as a substitute for akasa. Therefore

akasa m
The ptirvapaksin states chat inasmuch as the pri'
mary sense of the word akaia comes readily to the mind,
we need not take it to have the secondary meaning of
Brahman. ' That all these beings come from akaia
can very well be explained without recourse to Brahman
by reference ro the element itself for after the ' coming
;

forth of akaia from the Atman ', we are told that ' from
akaia itself comes forth air, from air fire, etc' (Tai. 2, 1).
Arid with reference to other beings helow it, vii. air,
fire, water, etc. akaia, the element, can be considered as

the greatest and as the abode of all.

To this we reply that tin: •.'[Link]- marks which

are mentioned arc applicable to Brahman alone. In
the first place, all the Vedanta-passages agree with the
above mentioned statement of the Chandogyopanisad,
vis. ' all these berrss;s s-ri'iij torch from akasa only' (1, 9, 1).
if the element ot 'asj-j' lv joniiJeredasthecauseof wind,
fire, etc., wind too can lie considered ?.~ the cause of fire,

water, etc., and fire too in its turn, be considered as the

cause of water, earth, etc. ;and and the word 'only'
would lose all its meaning. But if by akasa we mean
Brahman, the word only ' will exclude all other lesser
'

causes like the elements of akaia, wind and others, and

restrict the word ' akaia ' to Brahman only as the cause
of all beings, including the element of akaia. Similarly,
the word 'all' in the above passage would unnecessarily
narrow down the meaning to ' beings except the element
of akaia,' if the element and not Brahman is to be taken
as the proper meaning. Secondly, the clause, '
they
return into the akasa.' likewise points to Brahman alone.
Thirdly, not only Biahmanaloneis, relatively [Link]
as the element of akaiais with reference to [Link]. etc.,
but isalso absolutely greater than all; for the Atman alone
is said to be '
greater than the earth, the sky, the heaven,
and all these worlds '
(Cha. 3, 14, 3). Fourthly, the
 ;

A [nun alone can be said to be the final support and

rtsfiiis; placeoi all, !v^jiij t n is (lit ultimate cause of all'
'

the Brahman is knowledge, and ananda it is the abode

;

of rest for him who

gives alms and wealth' ["Br. 3. 5. 28).
And fifthly, the akasa is mentioned as infinite which is.

an additional exclusive characteristic of Brahman. When

Dalbha and Salavatya were engaged in discussion with
the king Jaivali as to what may be the support of the
Om or the UJgi:ba which comes a: iho rvgiimir.t; of
Samaveda, Dalbha declared that it was heaven. SJTtvjiva
pointed out thereupon that it must he (he earth, because
the heaven too is obtained on account of the actions
performed on the earth. But being dissatisfied widi
the views of both of the brahmins, [Link] tjid to Salavatya
that his view too about the Saman was wrong, because
the earth and the objects on it had all sprung up from
akasa. Now, if by akasa we are to mean the elemental
substance, then Jaivali too stands self criticised, inasmuch
as he commits the same error of pointing out a perishable
thing as the support, as was committed hv salavatya. The-
refore in order to preclude the possibility of akasa being
understood as the element, Jaivali brings it under the
concept of Orii and declares that it is this Om or the
Udgitha with cheek-mrd Afcasaas K [Link]. which 'is the
greatest of all, and which is,-ndless' iCha. 1,8,8). In other
words, the Udgithaowes itseternity, infinity and greatness
on account of Akasa or Brahman which alone has got
these characteristics.

So, in viewofall the prominent marks of Brahma

which are presented to the mind in the principal clauses
of the Upanisadic passages cited above, we need not stick
to the view that the original meaning of the word
akasa ' as ' an element should alone be taken because
'

it comes readily to the mind. It will be more appropriate

to take the secondary meaning of the word
as Brahman,
as noted above. Besides, synonyms used for akasa,
such as " Vyoman ' and ' Kha ' are used for Brahman
and so it is not a rule that akasa must always mean the
 —
ADHYAYA I, PA, J. SU. 23 59

elements! substance. For instance IJk and all other

"

Vedaa, as well as all the gods are secure in the highest

and the imperishable vyoman or akasV (fjk. Sarh. 1, 164
19). This knowledge, which was imparted by Varuna
'

and achieved by Bhrgu. culminated in ,"[Link]:i' '(Tai. 3, 6) ;

similarly, Orii, Ka is Brahman Kha (i.e. akksa) is Brahman'

' ;

(Chi. 4, 10, 5) Kha is the oldest (Br. 5. 1). So the

;
' '

meaning of the word alcasa is to be taken as Brahman,

" '

just as the word Agni in the sentence Agni studies a

' ' '

n
chapter is to be taken in the sense of a 'boy ' named

Mjiiavaka, who on account of his intelligence shines

like fire, and not in its literal and primary meaning as

«. snortfitwi^i ($%)

{Ata£ hence ; eva — aim ; pratia^.]

There is a passage in the Udgitha chapter of the

(
'.ii.-:iJr-vy,-,p;mi}j J il, ll. 1

, 9; which makes us aware of

the reply given by a certain Brahmin, named Cakrayana, to
the priest Prastota'whosingsin the beginningof the sacri-
licecertainhymnsofSamavedaknownasthe prastava. The
deity oi' this prastava is
'
Praiaa.' For 'all these beings
merge into prana alone, and from it they arise (1, 11,4-5). '

Now here too there arises a doubt as to the meaning of

the word Prana.' Are we to understand thereby
'

the air we breathe, or Brahman ? Passages like, ' mind

is fastened to praria,' (Chi. 6, 8. 2), and the ' praiia of
prana '
(Br. 4, 4, 18), indicate that prana means Brahman.
60

The piirvapaksin wishes to take the word prajji

we breathe; for when a man sleeps,
in the sense of the air
the breathing alone continues, and so it can be said that all
the organs of sense like the tongue and others, and the
organs of action such as the e^e, the ear as also the mind
and intelligence merge into the breath, and that they all
come out of breath alone when man awakes ' (Sat. Bra.
10, 3, 3, 6). The merging and coming out of the organs
of sense and action is not in reality different from the
merging and coming out of the beings, because the former
are nothing but the essences of the latter. Besides,
inasmuch as the ' sun ' and the ' food " are told by Cakri-
yana as the deities of udgTtha and pratihara (the two
later portions of hymr^; immi'Jiak'ly aficr he tells pragi
as the deity of the prastava, and inasmuch as the two
deities of the sun and the food do not represent the
Brahman, it is natural to suppose that prana too cannot
mean Brahman.

To this we reply that priina means Brahman, because

the characteristic marks mentioned in connection with
prana are applicable only to Brahman. In the first place,
whereas the merging and coming out of the senses alone
are spoken of with reference to breath during sleep, in
the passage quoted at the beginning, the merging and
coming out refer not only to the senses, but also to all
beings including their bodies and senses ; and so the te-
ference to praria will not be adequately interpreted as
reference to breath it is a reference to Brahman alone.
;

Secondly, even if the word " Bhiita ' be interpreted

as ' element ' and not as 'being', the word prana' would
mean Brahman. Thirdly, the argument that a passage
in Kaushltaki Upanisad (3, 3) speaks of the merging of
'

the senses and its objects and of the union of the jivatman
with praria during dreamless sleep," is not, as is supposed,
in favour of identifying prana with breath, but on the
 ; '

. I. sir. 24 61

contrary, is in favour of identifying it with Brahman.

Fourthly, mere contiguity of the word prana ' with

'

the words sun and food need not he taken as a reason

' ''
'

for a similar interpretation of the three words, as ' not

standing for Brahman'; for in the principal sentence there
are clear references to the characteristic m;irks of Brahman.
And finally, as pointed out in the previous Siitra, the
wot J.- only and ' all ' in the Sruti passage, All these
' ' '

beings merge into prana only, and from it they arise,'

will serve no purpose, if Brahman is not to be taken as
the meaning of prana.

As other passages such as. 'the prana

to certain
'

of priin.i
'
(Br.18),
'
4, 4, Mind is fastened to prana
(Chi. 6, S, 2), quoted by certain Vrttikaras, there is no
point Ji:;cus::i:it; '.ii'.'ic. inasmuch as there is no doubt or
Li-.

nn- hi^uii ,- rs'sjjrdiiig the intMning of the word prana. The

grammatical position of words, and the context clearly

indicate that the meaning of the word 'prana' il Brahman
and nothing else. The word " prana ' used in the nomi-
native is distinctly used for some thing different from
that which is signified by the word prana used in the
genitive; the former is used for Brahman, and the latter
for the air we breathe. Similarly, in the second passage
the contest shows that '
prana ' is used for Brahman.
Ifthe context shows that we are dealing with j'yotistoma
sacrifice, then the word 'jyotf in that contest clearly
sands for "jyotistoma sacrifice,' as in the passage, 'he is
to sacrifice ' Jyotisa ' in every spring.' So the word
'prapa' means Brahman.

?« gft foK"lll lJWW ,l RS-V*)

Uyotty— light ;ca— and ;carana—[at ab([Link]— being

mentioned.]
 Here we are concerned with the doubt whether the
word 'jyoti' in the following passage of the [Link]-
panisad is used in the sense of the light of the sun etc.
or of the highest Atman 'That jyoti or light which
:

shines above the heaven, above the beings, in the worlds

beyond which there arte no better worlds, is the same
light which is within man '
(3, 13, 7).

According to [Link].i. '.he word 'jyoti' means the

light of the sun and the lite, an J dw arguments advance J
are :— (i) It is well known
that jyoti means light. Light
and darkness are the opposites of each other, darkness of
the night, for example, obstructs the activity of the eye,
while that which helps it is the light of the sun, etc.
(2) The word shines " too refers in ordinary life to the
'

Mill 'iLjhi J-hi.'ii h;;- t'urm and whi."h physical ir. niiture.
:.-

Brahman, on the other hand, neither possesses body nor

form and so cannot shine. (3!, Jyoti rami mean the physic?.!
and the limited light, the effect of the sun for a physical ;

boundary is mentioned with reference to it. It shine,"

beyond heaven. There can be no boundary to Brahman
which is the cause of all, and the Atman of all. Now
it some one would say that itis possible for the physical

light of tire also to beseen on this side of the heaven, when

there is no light of the sun, we may then assume that the
light spoken of is the original, invisible first principle
or deity of light in its own nature, and not the visible light,
which is made up by mixing its own half portion with
the one- fourth portions of the original, invisible principles
or deities of water and earth. But this prc-rripartite
original light is of no use, because being invisible it cannot
either be made as the object of devotion or be used to
dispel darkness. And as the tripartite nature of the three
deities of light, water and earth was conceived by Gnd
in the very beginning (Cha. 6, 3, 3), it serves no purpose
to assume a pre -tripartite light, existing before the ordinary
 aohyaya i. pa. i, sC 24 63

linlir which is known wall. Heinle*, there is no evidence

that the pre-tri partite linn: h spoken uf as having a
boundary. So, the light hero is the ordinary light of
the sun or the lite, seer, either no thus 'id? or the other
side of the heaven. (4) That it is described as shining
beyond or below heaven is /or the purpose of devotion.
On the other hand, " he yund heaven or ' on this side
of heaven' cannot be an adequate description ol Brahman,
which is undivided and unsupported. (5) That this light
beyond the heaven is not Brahman is also clear from the
fact that it is said to be the same with the ahdominal
tight, which in its turn is purely physical on account of
its being known by the warm touch of the body and the

sound we hear when we shut our ears (Cha. 3. 13, 7 and 8).
The identity of one light with the other is possible be-
i-au^e hot liar,' physical in nature. (rii One more reason why
this light is not Brahman is that meditation on it mates a
man celebrated and beautiful. This is incomparably low
a fruit compared to the fruit of moksa which one may get

by devotion Co Brahman, i'7'i Besides no special characteris-

[!: mark of Brahman is mentioned in the passage dealing
with the light. (8) Nor does rhc previous section deal
with Brahman. It deals wiih Cayatri alone (Cha. J, 12).
And even supposing that the earlier section deals with
Brahman, there is nothing in the present section which
may enable us to say that the same topic is continued; for
passage the heaven is referred to as the sup-
in the earlier
port or place where ' His immortal three feet ' are said to
esist, while in this pa? sage the heaven is spoken of as
the boundary. So in the absence of the characteristic
Nlkt o! Brahman, the 'jyoti' means the physical light of
the sun.

To this we reply; The word jyoti" means Brahman,

'

for in the preceding passaiy Brahman has been spoken

of as having four feet, ' three of which constitute the
immortal Being in the heaven and the fourth is all these
beings. Such is His ^rcuncss he is greater than what
:

has been manifested etc' (Cha. 3, 12, 6). And we have

64

the recognition of Brahman in this passage because the

heaven, above which jyoti is mentioned as shining, ii
mentioned in the previous passage too as the place in
which the three feet of Brahman are said to be immortal.
Notwithstanding this, if we interpret jyoti as light,
we leave aside the subject under discussion and begin
a new one without any reason. Not only Brahman is
the topic under discussion of this and of the earlier passage,
but it is also the topic of the next passage dealing with
Sandilya-Vidya.

When the goi:i;mJ rop\- u:' three continuous passages'

dealing with Gayatri. jyoti and Sandfly*- vidy a respectively
isBrahman, and further when Brahman alone is indicated
on account of the relative pronoun which '
(Vat) used
'

for it, and on account of the characteristic marks such as

'heaven' and the 'four feet,' it will serve no purpose

to argue that the words '
light and shines are com-
' ' '

monly used to denote the physical light of the sun and the
like. And supposing that this light is the physical effect,
even then it can be construed that the light points not to
but to its cause, vii. the Brahman, as is clear from
itself
the mantra That (Brahman) on account of which the
'

sun becomes shining first and then shines everything

"
else (Tai. Bra. 3, 12, g. 7). Nay, Brahman is not merely
indirectly indicated as the cause by the word jyoti, but
is also the direct meaning of it, as is clear from, ' a person
sits and behaves by the light of words only ', which
' '

he may hear from another person in darkness and when

he cannot use the light of his own eyes (Br. 4, 3, 5). Simi-
larly, the mind of man who eats ghee becomes light'
'

(Tai. Sarri. I, 6, 3, 3), points out that the word 'jyoti'

can be extended to anything which has the capacity of
stimulating something elf e and as such, it can necessarily
;

be applied to Brahman, because it is Intelligence and gives

light to the whole universe. The same has been em-
phasised in theSruti :
Everything shines alter He shines,'
'

and to exclude the possibility of other things being self-

luminous, it is further said, that by His light, everything
'
 — — '

To speak of Brahman occupies a parti-

(jyoti) as if it
cular region like heaven, is useful for meditation. Though
truly speaking, there are no regions in Brahman, yet
on account of uyilJhis ;iiiJ lor the purpose of devotion, one
is advised to meditate on it, as if it exists only in the sun,

the eye, and the heart. Similarly, the visibility and audi-
bility of the abdominal fire are merely symbolic of the
devotion to Brahman. The objection that jyoti cannot
mean Brahman, because such devotion is said to
result in mundane gains, is pointless; because, whereas
the knowledge of the Brahman as the Atman would lead
one to release, the devotion shown to saguna Brahman
would give him various rewards, small or great. As the
Eh£ndogyopaiu?id' tells us, 'he who worships the
eternal Atman as the giver of wealth and devourer of
food, becomes wealthy and of strong appetite ' (1, 9, 4).
And finally, though the word heaven ' is used in the '

locative in one passage, and in the ablative in another,

and therefore means the ' support ' and ' boundary ' on
"
different occasions, yet the relative pronoun ' which
(yat) relates this "heaven' with the same word 'jyoti
or Brahman of the earlier passage with the word " jyoti ' of
the passage under consideration. Hence the word
x
'
jyoti means Brahman and nothing else.

IChaniiai — metre ; abhidlumat— being mentioned; na ;

iti ;cet- if ; nfl ; tathii- so ; cctah —inind; inpana Jwitrg;

nigflAvt— hciv.g ri-coriiiiiL'tiJeij ; to-ilui hi;also ; darjanarh
—Sruti.)

Ie it be said that (Brahman is) not (mentioned)

d (on Brahman) is recqm-

66 VEDA

MENDED (BY MEANS OF THE METRE); THIS IS SEEN Em-

WHERE ALSO). 25
In section twelfth of the third chapter of the
Chandogyopanisad, the piirvapaksin maintains thai
Giiyatriis mentioned as constituting all the_ things which
ha ye been created, and that it is this Gayatri metre which
has been further described a; sixfold and four-footed;
sixfold because described as the beings, the earth, the
it is

body, the heart, the speech, and the breath, and four-
footed because it consists of four parts of six letters each.
Naturally, the 'greatness' mentioned in the mantra
(Cha, 3, 12. 6) is with reference to Gayatri and not to
Brahman. How can the mantra refer all of a sudden to
Brahman, when in the Brahmana portion the Gayatri
alone is described ? The mantra and the Brahmana
do not give us different versions. No doubt the word
"Brahman' occurs immediately after this mantra, but
here too by Brahman we are not to understand the highest
Atman. In keeping with the context of Gayatri W2
should mean by it the Veda and as pointing to
' '

Gayatri which is a part of Veda. Besides the meaning

of the word Brahman as Veda is allowed by an earlier
passage in the Chandogyopanisad itself (3, 11, 3);
'
for him who knows this Brahman there is no rising or
setting of the sun it is one everlasting day.' In short,
;

inasmuch as the Gayatri metre is mentioned. Brahman

is not the topic under discussion.

In reply to this we say that if by Gayatri we are to

understand a kindof metre, then it is nothing butacollec
tion of letters, and so it cannot be said to be the Atman
of all. But if we take Brahman as the general topic Ot

the section under consideration, then Gayatri would

mean nothing but Brahman in the form of Gayatri, an
effect, for '
All this is verily the Brahman' (Chi.?, 14. U
To consider the metre of Gayatri as the Atman of all
is mere imagination; but to consider Gayatri as Brahman
is to consider the Brahman as the cause of all, including
even the Gayatri, and to give it tie correct explanation
 ;

..„ (hose who follow Rgveda, ci

Co be present in the great Uktha, as the Adhvaryus, oc
the followers of Yajucveda, consider it to be present in

the sacrificial fire, and as the Chlndogas, or the followers

of Samaveda, consider it to be present in the Mahavrata
sacrifice (Ait. Ar. 3, 2, 3, 12), even so, in this passage
concerning Gayatri as in the passage concerning iyo;i,
Brahman alone is meant to be the object of devotion.

Or, as the Vrttikaras' think, Brahman is directly the

meaning of the word Gayatri, and is not merely suggested
or implied by it. The four feet of the metre are, as a
matter of fact, the four feet of the Brahman, one constitut-
ing the movable and the immovable world, and the three
being the immortal nature of it. Another word having
the meaning of metre is used elsewhere also (Cha. 4 3, 8)
sense on account of similarity of number
in a different
and so the word Gayatri need not be said to be used in the
sense of Brahman by way of exception, because both of
them resemble in having four feet. The word 'Viraf,'
for example, means a metre having ten letters in each
of its parts (foot]. '
Krta also is assumed to mean the
'

number ten. and so used for the collection of two groups

of five, one indicating the adhidaivika entities of wind,
lite, the sun, the moon, and water, and theother indicating

the adhyatmika entities of breath, speech, eye, ear, and

mind. So this collection of ten entities is also spoken of
as Viraj
'
'as in the Smci, 'these ten are again the Virat
which eats the food '
(Cha. 4, 3, 8). Just as Viral,
therefore, means fend nut simply suggests.' rhe collection
of the ten entities and not the particular metre, even so,
Gayatri means the Brahman and not the metre.
70 VEDA NT A EXPLAINED

choose a boon. On being solicited by Pratardara to

bestow upon him such a boon as would conduce to the
highest good of man, Indra asked him to meditate on
Indra himself as the Immortal Life inasmuch as he was
' '

the '
Prana, the intelligent Atman,' which makes this
"

body rise up." which is "he <p^iker.' and which is' ananda
'

without age and death ' (Kau. 3, 1, 2, 3 and 8).

Though in an earlier Sutra (1, 1, 21) Prarja means Brahman,
we are presented here with marks which do not exchurafl
' prajnatma'
point to it. In the first place, the word
(intelligent Atman) as an adjective negates the meaning
of prana as ordinary breath, and the reference to mam'
'

meaning Indra himself as the object of devotion negates

the highest Atman too. In other words, prina means
the divinity of Indra himself. Secondly, the reference
to prana as the cause of the movement of the body indicates
that prana means the breath. Thirdly, the reference to
the speaker and not to speech as the object oi meditation
' '

makes the word refer to the individual soul. As opposed

to this , the description of prana as intelligent Atman,
as ananda,and as without decay and death, makes it a
synonym of Brahman. A doubt arises therefore as
to which of these meaning: should be taken as the proper
meaning of prana.

the piirvapaksin chooses to understand thereby

If
the ordinary breath because it is the well-known meaniflH
then we reply that prana must mean Brahman, if all things
are to be duly considered. To begin with, Pratardana
asks for a boon which will be of highest good not to him
alone but for man as such. It seems highly improbable
that the highest good should be of the changing nature
of prana. It cannot be achieved by any means except

the knowledge of the Atman.

L
A
man who knows
him goes beyond death there is no other path to moksa
;

(£ve. 3, 8). If anyone knows me, then nothing can

"

hinder him in his way of moksa, neither theft nor killing

etc' (Kau. 2, 1). "No work will bind him, who has seen
the Brahman which is both the higher and the lower
 —
. i, »u. i. 2° 71

(Mo. 2, 2, 8; Cf. B. G. 4, 37)- How on air which is

non-intelligent be intelligent, unless it is identified with
Brahman? Besides, the character^; ic murks of bliss,"
'immortality' etc, which come at the end of the passage
cannot be fitted with the nature of any other thing or
being, except the Brahman. Prana again is spoken of
U unaffected by good or bad actions, but as responsible
for making men do such actions as will lead them (as he
likes.) so higher or lower worlds. He is described again
as the guardian, the King and the Lord of the world (Kau.
3, 8). From all this, it is clear that Prana means Brahman.

[>£d —nor vaitui — of the spacer litmapadciil: — because

;

of reference to himself; iti cet

;

[Link] — saifibandha-
tumitt —because in rhij.J

HAT PRASA DOES NOT (INDICATE

Brahm.

It may still be contended by the ptrvapaksa that

inasmuch as Brahman is described as without speech '

or mind (Br. 3, 8, 8), and as such cannot be said to be

'

the speaker in the legend of Indra and Pratardana, and

inasmuch as, on the contrary, Indra, the speaker, mentions
himself as prana, as the intelligent at man, and asks Pra-
tardana to meditate on him, prana cannot be Brahman.
Besides, Indra has praised himself for having killed the
three-headed Brahmin, VisvarQpa, the son of Tva^ta, and
for having strewn before the wolves the bodies of persons
who have renounced the world but are averse to Vedas.
Prana means 'power and it is well-known that Indra is
'

the deity of power; and if there be any deed of power,

people call it the ' deed of Indra." All these things
are not popsible in the case of Brahman which is
without body. That Indra calls himself as prajnatma
 ;

11

is in keeping with the unobstructed knowledge of gods.

The highest good of man may be inferred rrom he pn?!t!i]n
i

of Indra himself as deity and as the object of devotion.

As a deity, he is not affected by action ; as a resident in
heaven, hehasananda; and :i.i usi-irui :i!l lie end of the uni'
t

verse he Gin be said to be without old age and death. So,

Prana must mean the soul of Indra and not Brahman,

We refute this by saying that if the Sruti-passage

'
Life enisls so long as prjnj ];:-'; s in the body
'
K lu 3,2),
i .

is not a tautologous proposition, we must mean by prana

the inner Atman who has got the power of bestowing
or taking away the life, and not a particular dt-i:y whu'h
comes into being in course of time. It is this priria in
the sense of Atman that is described as the nave round
which go forth the spokes of the senses, which in their
turn are the support of the various objects (Kau. 3, 8).
And, further, we have another Sniti which tells us that
the ' Atman is the omniscient Brahman ' (Br. 2, 5, 19)
whereby we can say that Prana is nothing but Brahman.

nself?

{Saitradr/jya— as described in Srut,; m— but; upadeiah—

; Vamadevavat— li^e VJmadeva.}

i Shut:. 30

Just as the saint Vamadeva said about himself after

having realized the Brahman that he was the Manu and
the sun (Br. 1, 4, 10), even so, Indra can be said to have
instructed Pratardana to know him only, because he him-
self must have first realized that he was
the Atman. This
knowledge, must have come to him on account
 ADHYAVAI, PA. I, 8 D. 31 73

of spiritual efforts like sraviian and manana done in pre-

vious lives. But this much is certain, that 'whoever among
the gods realises the Brahman, becomes the Brahman'
(Br. 1, 4, 101. The reference to the slaying of Tvasffs
sonisnot so much to glorify himselfas to eitol the vijnana,
the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. In order to em-
phasise this very point, Indra tells immediately after-
wards that not a hair of his is harmed, in spite of the
' ' '

horrible deeds ' done by him, simply for the reason that
he had become "one with Brahman.' Nay, Indra tell?
us further that no other person too, who realises Indra
(in the same way in which Indra had realised the Brahman)
would in any way be robbed of his moksa for having com-
mitted horrible deeds (Kau. I, 3). So, the object of know-
ledge which is praised by Indra is not his own self, but
the Brahman alone, as mentioned in the sentence, ' I am
piaija, the prajiiatma.'

mM-mukjiya-prana-lingat —
on account 0/ jigiis 0/ soul
and chief breath ; 11a Hi eel ; nu
; ;
upmai:,: [Link]- -
;

because af three /yfd tjicdiutiu!]; .ii'itjivii: being accepted;

ika— here tad-jogiit —being connoted with that,]
;

a) Coram* 31

The purvapaksin may still insist on saying that though

there may not be any reference to Indra as a deity, the
reference to the ' speaker ' as the object of knowledge
is clearly a reference to the individual foul, and not to

Brahman. Similarly,the reference to prana or the in-

telligent atman as the cause of the support of the body
74 VEBANTA EXPLAINED

is ihe rcicrence to [he principal prjna iise!f. The parable

of the principal and the lower pranas tells us the same
truth. When the lower priirij*. i.e. the speech, the eye,
the ear and the mind, became dejected to see the impending
fall of the body as the principal prana was about to depirt

from it, the latter came forward and said to them, "Do
not he infatuated; for it is I who divide myself fivefold,
and support this body ' (Pra. 2, 3). Or the prana may
be said to support the body, because it first support!
the intelligent jlva and the sense organs, which are the
instruments of the intelligent being; and so prana too
may rightly be dercribed as ' prajnitmii '. Whether prani
is the same as the individual soul, as in the <jruti ' What

is prana is prajna, and what is prajiia is prana' (Kau. 3,3),

or different from it, as in the Sruti ' together they list

in the body and together they depart (Kau. 3, 4), the
'

words ' priina rind pinin^iru may mean the individual

" '

soul and the prinjipul r>roj;li separately or taken together.

If by 'prana', on the other hand, we mean Brahman,
then who would depart from whom ? So. prana must
mean either the individual soul or the principal breath,
or may mean both but, in no case, it means Brahman.
;

The above interpretation, we reply, is inadequate

because it would mean that three kinds of devotion are
recommended in one single context. That it is one »ingle
context is clear from how the passage begins and ends*
'
Know me alone, meditate on me as Life and Immor-
tality, tot I am the prana and the intelligent Atman,' ia
Use begtonjflg of the passage; and that " prana is verily
;he intelligent Atman, the ananda, and is' without old
ageanddeath," is theendof thepaEsage. As the beginning
and the end of the passage are one and the same, it ii
natural to suppose that only one kind of devotion is men'
tioned, and not three. And whereas the ten bhuta mains
and the ten prajfiamatras, or whereas the senses and their
objects hive iht-jr support in Brahman alone, the charac-
teristic marts of Brahman including the word prana,' '

can hardly be ascribable to the jlva. Besides, the re-

 ADHTAYA I. PA. I, A 31 75

ference to the '

highest Good '
of nun inwhat Pratardana
asks for points to Brahman alone. The function of prana,
again,in supporting the body, being itself due to the
Atman, can be ascribed only to the latter. As the
5rutitells, no one lives by the up-going prana or the
'

down going npana, but by Him, the Other, in whom

they take their support '
(Ka. 2, 5, 5). Again, the state-
ments, I am Brahman.' Thou art that,' indicate that
' '

the jiva is not essentially different from Brahman. On

the contrary. Brahman itself is known as the jiva, and as
the doirand enjoyer of actions on account of the limiting
adjuncts of buddhi etc. So, the intention of sentences
like
'
Know
the speaker etc." is to direct the tmnd on
the Brahcian l-y casting j« ,:v the diss mciions or [Link]?,
:

and therein- nuke the individual soul come race to face

with the Atman and to show that it is the same as the
Atman. That the jlvatman which is involved in speaking
and other activities is llnihrnan itself is clear from another
Sruti : That which is incapable of being spoken by
'

speech, hut which enables one to speak, know that alone

as Brahman not that which people worship ' (Ke. 1, 5).
;

Finally, inadequate is the argument that prana does not

mean Brahman, because prana and prajnatma are said to
be separate, though together they live in the body and
together they depart from it. For buddhi and prana,
heme; trie sourceso!' coalition and activity, and being the
upadhis of the Atman, can very well be spoken of as
separate from each other. But the Atman, being non-
differentiated in its nature in spite of the two upadhis,
as of the Atman,
s prajna.'

The Vrttikaras explain the latter part of the Sutra

way. According to them, there is no logical
in a different
few ;r sui:ng along with the character! sue marks of
Bahmar., ..'./those which belong to the jiva and the
Mfttdp&l ptana. For they hold that the devotion to
Brahman is recommended under the three aspects ol prana,
prajna and Brahman itself. The meditation on ' life.
76 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

immortality or the
'
uttba ' (strictly on ' uttha * it
which causes the movement or the body) refers to the
ivln:-' aspect of Brahman. The prajiia aspect stands
symbolically for the jiva. The prajria or buddhi hai
nama and rupa {words and meanings.) as the objects of
knowledge : the nama being created by speech, and the
nlpa hv the .sense-organs. It is the jiva, in short, who by

the means of his intellect makes use of his organs of sense

and action, and thus experiences the various objects
(Kau. 3. 4, 5). As for the devotion to Brahman itself
it consists in the cognition
that Prana or the Brahman
is the ultimate support of both the senses
and its objects.
As the portion of the wheel at the circumference rates
its support on the spokes, and as the spokes
take their
support in the nave, similarly, the objects are dependant
on 'be =er.~es, and, the senses in their turn .ire dependent
for their support on the Prana (Kau. J, 8). Thus, Brahman
alone is the object of devotion, whether in its own nature
or in the form of its two upadhis of jiva and prana. In
the Chan dogyopanj sad too (3, 14, 2), Brahman is re-
commended as the object of devotion in the form of one
of its upadhis:
'
He is of the form of mind, prana is
his body." Thus Brahman alone is the general tapir
of the section, because, in the first place, the Iv^mnir-:
and the end of the section are the same, and secondly,
the characteristic marks of prana, prajiia and Brahman
are present.

But {as against this view of the Vrittikirs)

we hold that Brahman alnne is the topic (of knowledge.

and not of devotion).
 AdhSya Fit si

PJda Second

In the first pada Brahman has been shown as the cause

of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world
including akasa and other elements. It may be presumed
therefore that we have also pointed out by way of im-
plication that Brahman possesses the qualities of all-
Bttvadineiiess, eternity, omniscience, and of being the
Atman of all. It was further pointed out that ::,\\ thOM
[Link] [Link],-i!3i'- whcrerhe^[Link] mirks of Brahman
w-:re clearly manifest, bu! uhout vch:i'h rhcre was some
doubt on account of some words which ordinarily do
not mean Brahman, referred to nothing else but Brahmin.
Now in the second and the third padas, we shall be
concerned with certain other passages which too are
douhr/ul on account of their not containing in them
d:.:r,ii-i eristic marks of Brahman. In the second pada,
we shall deal with Brahman as the object of devotion,
and in the third, with Brahman as the object of knowledge.

?m sRWN^iJIil. I
^

[Sayvtura—evayivhcrc; prasiddha-ul>adesut — what is well'

In a passage of the Chandogyopanisad, we ace

told that after death man becomes that to which he is
devoted in this life. He is therefore asked to meditate
with a composed mind on the Brahman, which is verily
allthis world, and which is the cause of the origin, the
movement and the end oi this world, and is not affected
by desire, anger, etc. He should perform the Krattl,
i.e. he should meditate, because '
the Atman, which
consists of mind and of prana as its body, is resplen-
dent.' (3, 14). The doubt which arises here is whether
what consists of mind etc. and is the object of meditation,
is the individual soul or the Brahman,

n with the mind and pram is well-known.

Brahman, on the other hand, is said to be 'pure, without
prana or mind ' (Mu. 2, 1, 2). The reference to Brahman
in the above mentioned passage of the Chandogya vil.
'
All this is verily the Brahman,' i; not with a view to

indicate the devotion to Brahman, but to urge the man to

keep his mind calm. For in the one, homogeneous
Brahman from which all this world arises and in which
it ends, there is no room for emotions like love and hate,
One and the same eentence cannot at once enjoin the
meditation on Brahman and the calmness of mind.
The sentence 'He who consists of mind etc' follows
immediately after the sentence 'One should perform
the Kratu '; so it is clear that the performer of this KraW
or devotion is the individual soul suggested by the charac
teristic marks of ' mind ' and 'prana'. Further the descnp'
tion that ' he is the doer of all actions,' and that ' all
desires belong to him' (Cha. 3, 14, 4), is also applicable
to the individual soul, though not actually at any particular
moment, yet in successive periods of rime and of lives.
Besides, there are mentioned two more characteristic
marks of the jTva in the Sruti ' This Atman, which is
smaller than a grain of rice or of barley resides in my
heart ' (Chi. 3, 14, 3). This lodgement in the heart
and the minute nature can adequately be said to belong
to the jiva whose siie can be compared to the point of a
goad ;they are not the marks of the limitless lirslinvin.
No doubt, the Atman is immediately afterwards described
 ADHYAYA 1, PA. II, SU. 2 79

as 'greater than the earth etc."; but this greatness too

can be laid td belong to jiva in a secondary sense, inasmuch
as the minute jiva becomes as great as Brahman when
it attains moksa. The use of the word Brahman in the
end of the passage. This 1- Brahman
'
(Chi. 3, 14, 4),
'

can also be said to refer to jiva because the pronoun

'
points to nothing else but jiva ; and the word 'Brahman
may be said to indie t-,' rhe "mure status of the emancipated
jiva.

To this pCirvapaksa, o ur reply is that the object of medi-

[Link]:n;m ainiSt', !v,,iui( the ni farms: ivhidi is retri-
r,i;in:i is

buted to the word 'Brahman' in the passage 'all this ia

Brahman etc.' is the same meaning, which has been taught

by all the Vedanta-passages vi:. that Brahman is the cause

of the world. If we are not to avoid the topic tinder
discussion and turn to a new topic without any cause,
ic Menu impropriate that the Brahman spoken of here is
qualified by mind, prana and lustre. It may be said the
word Brahman is used, not for its own sake, but for
' '

the sake of making us aware of the calmness of mind that

is recommended afterwards. But it should be noted
that the relative pronoun which occurring in the dis-
' '

solution of the compounds 'manomaya,' and priirmsanra '

,

e.g. that which is qualified by the [Link] of prana as body,

refers to the proximate word Brahman '
alone in the '

previous sentence. The word denoting jiva, on the

other hand, is neither proximate nor anywhere directly

Now the qualities which will be useful for man

n his meditation are such qualities which can belong to
Brahman alone. For example, the quality of Htw.
sankalpa belongs to Brahman or the highest Atman
on account of its unobstructed power in translating its
desire of ores mi.;, rrviintrLinint; and dissolving theunivent
into an actuality. Similarly the Atman is said to be
'
free from sin '
(Cha. 8, 7, D ; Brahman, again, is said to
be 'like akasa '
on account of its omnipresence ; its being
'
greater than earth' points to the same fact that it is the ;

'
cause of all activity 'and 'of all desires' (3, 14, 4) man
Sin the Brahman itself. Brahman is the inner Atman
and so the upadhis of mind and prana too can be
ill,

said to belong to Brahman. Hence it is that Sruti and

Smrti say about Brahman Thou art woman, thou :
'

art man youth, maiden and an old man walking by the

;

aid of his stick, ail art thou with thy face turned in every :

direction, thou art born in all things '

(Sve. 4, 3). '
Witt
its hands and feet everywhere, with eyes, heads, mouths
and ears everywhere, it stands suoreme, having engulfed
all this •
(B. G. 13, 13). The only difference one can
point out is between a Sruti which refers to nirguiji
or pure Brahman, and a £mti which refers to saguiji
Brahman. Nirguna or pure Brahman is described a
'without prana, without mind, and as being white
(pure) (Mu, 2, 1, 2) saguna Brahman, on the other
'

hand, is described as '

manomaya,' '
pranasarira
"
ett
(Cha. 3, 14, 2).

sigrnfcg * gift: i \
lAn-upapaltti— being not available tu—but ; nfl—Wflj
sanrafr —embodied ;

otie.J

The present Sutra is intended to show that inasmuch

s descriptions such as, '
he whose purposes are bonis
come out true, who is like akasa, who is without specs"
 '

and other senses, who is ever contest, who is greater

than earth, are applicable only to Brahman, and cannot
'

be made applicable to the jiva or the embodied soul,

n
the qualities like nunomayatva etc. too do not belong
'

to the soul that resides inside the body. No doubt,

God also resides inside the body, but he is not simply
inside but outside as well and is all-petvading, as is clear
from the Sruti '
He is greatet than the earth, greater
:

than space, eternally present everywhere like akasa

(Cha. 3, 14, 5). The jiva, on the other hand, resides
within the body alone, because the body is the only
place where he can experience the effects of his actions
in the form of pleasure and pain.

The word '

him '
in the passage, '
Wben 1 shall
have left this body, obtain I shall him '
(Cha. 3, 14. 4)
refers to the Atman ot Brahman as the object fit to be
obtained by meditating upon him and as possessing the
qualities of ' manomayatva' etc. The object of meditation
is thus clearly stated to be diffetent from the meditator

or the jiva indicated by the wotds I shall obtain.' One '

and the same thing cannot be the subject and object ;

and hence the jiva, which is embodied, cannot possess

tl>: -jun. hnos '
[Link]'.[Link]
>:'. etc., nor Btahman which '

possesses these qualities be the embodied self.

In another passage dealing with the same topic,

t read that '
this golden person is inside the individual
soul, and is lite the grain of rice or barley or of canary"
(Sat. Bra. 10, 6, 3, 2). Here the Brahman indicated by
the word '
person '
in the nominative is distinct from the
jiva indicated by the locative. Hence, the being posses-
sing '
manomayatva '
etc. cannot be the embodied soul.

There is the evidence of Smrti too for holding that

the highest Atman and the embodied soul are different.
For insMnc: [he llh.u::iv.i,:;:i: tells us that " Rod, seated
,1

as he is in the heurt* of nil Ivines, moves them all by his

magical power, as if they were placed on a machine (18,
'

61). It may be said, no doubt, on the strength of both

,-Jruti nnd Smrti, that there is 'no other seer' but the

highest Atman (Bp. 3, 7, 23), or that the

"
Knower of
all these bodies alone (B. G 13. 2), and so it
'
is God
may be pointed out that the embodied soul is not different
from the Atman. This is true indeed. But just as the
unlimited ;ikas;i appears Limited on account of theupadhis
of jars and vessels, similarly, the Atman is spoken of by
the ignorant people as embodied, on account of the
upadhis of the body, the senses, the mind and intellect.
So long as there has not dawned the consciousness of the
Atmanic unitive life, there exists the practical difference
between the objects of activity and the agents. But
the moment one realizes the Atmanic life of unity
which is contained in the advice 'Thou art that (i.e.

Brahman), 'there is an end to all the practical view of the

world and its distinctions, like bondage and moksa.

3n5<fi+ww»«ii\«M wi Va PmiwmiH sqrin^ re

IArbJial;au!(asnv;t- -abode being small —
tat that vyapa-
—
—
; ;

dejai — being mentioned ; ca —and ; nd not ; iti -so ;

cet —
if; na nicayyatvilt
; — being meditated evaA— thus;
;

tiyomduat— li£e a\aia\ ca. J

 The argument of the purvapaksa, (as noted in Sutra
1 also) that the reference to the small abode of the heart
and to the very small size of a grain of nee or barley,
would naturally point to the jTva and not to Brahman
which j.; .ill peixsJins;, deserves to be examined a little
further. It is true that a small thing like the embodied
soul cannot he said to be omnipresent ; but :he omni-
present Atman can be said to occupy a sinaK space in
order to satisfy some purpose. The ruler of the earth
may also be called the ruler of Ayodhyi a part of it
Similarly, tlic intellect of man can conceive 'hi existence
of the all-pervading God within the lotus of 'he heart,
and please Him by meditating upon Him Jus: as
the worship of the stone of saligrama stands fo- -he worobp
of Hari, even so God is represented as occupying the
heart for the purpose of devotion. Or, jus: as the
all-pervading akaSa is said to occupy the eye of a
needle, even so with Brahman. It is to be remembered
however that the abode and the small siie of Brahman
have meaning only with reference to devotion ; otherwise,
from the view-point of Brahman they are unreal. This
consideration will dispose olf the possible argument that
lite parrots in different cages and with different perishable
bodies. Brahman also may be impermanent because it
and is likely to assume different
resides in different hearts
bodies. But the abode and the sise being both imaginary
Brahman is free from this defect.

*r»4nisiiTn?*fa *m w>n^ i *
prafrtih— w
have experience iti—so
; ; ctt—if;
a; vaijtjyat— because of difference J

E SAID THAT (BECAUSE THE JIVA AND BkAHMAN

 lTuek (of tbc two). 8

The piirvapaksin may say that inasmuch as the all-

pervading and sentient Brahman is in the hearts of all
beings and is identical with the jiva, it too must experi-
ence the pleasures and pains of life. If there is "no

other knower than the highest Atman (Br- 3. 7. 23). the

'

pleasures and pains of samsara do belong Vj the Brahman

itself.

In reply to this we say that there is no logical con-

nection between Brahman's residing in the hearts of all
and its being made the subject of pleasures and pains.
For there is difference between the rr:il«id:eo soul
and the highest God. While the former ac;s and
teaps the fruits of his acts, acquires merit and demerits,
t>

and becomes subject to pleasures and pan it. the latter

has the opposite characteristics, such as being free from
sins, and from pleasures and pains. If mere proximity
of things were to produce similar effects, ,ik^*a also wiO
begin to burn on account of its proximity with fire.

Those who believethat the individual souls are many

and all- pervading, may contend that the soul of one man
will also be inside the bodies of other men, and so the
pleasures and pains of one will be experienced by the
others Our reply is that a particular man becomes
subject to pleasures and pains in his own body, because
he has got that body as the fruit of his actions, and not
because of the proximity of his soul or body with the
souls or bodies of other men.

Let us further inquire of the piirvapaksin as to the

source of his information that Brahman will become subject
to pleasures and pains on account of its indentity with
the individual souls. If it is the Sruti passages such as.
"Thou art that," 'I am Brahman," There is no other knower
'

but the Atman,' then you cannot accept or reject the

 —
ADHYAYA I, PA. II, &9 85

authority as you please. The Sruti sentence " Thou

art that,' as a matter of" fact, removes the possibility of
the individual soul itself being subject to pleasures and
pains, inasmuch as it teaches us that the soul is nothing
but the sinless Brahman. Where then is the possibility
of Brahman being subject to pleasures Or pains ? If,

on the other hand, the knowledge of the pCrvpaksin is

not due to Sruti, we have to tell him that the individual
soul becomes subject to pleasures and pains on account
of ignorance in him, and not because the pleasures and
pains are in any way connected with Brahman. Just
as the sky, which has really no physical surface or
colour, is ;riiJ to have a blue surface, even so the Sutrakara
says that it may be conceived through ignorance that the
embodied soul becomes subject to pleasures and pains.
From the view-point of true knowledge, however, the jiva
and Brahman are identical, and so both are free from
sins and from pleasures and pains. There is 3 fundamental
difference between ignorance and knowledge. And so
there will be no connection between the identity of jiva
and Brahman apprehended through knowledge, and
experience of pleasure and pain apprehended through
ignorance. God can never be imagined to have any
connection whatever with pleasures or pains.

i 3TCTfc?q^l (M°)

[Attn cater car/icara- -movable and immovable ; graha-

(The Atman is) the eater; fi

A passage in the Kaphavalli (1, 2, 25) raises the ques-

tion as to who may be there, 'who knows thedwelling
place of Him to whom the Brahmanas and K$ttnyi5 are
but food, and death itself is like the sprinkling (of ghee)
on the food.' This implies that there must be some
 eater. But there arises the doubt as to whether the eater
is the fire, the individual soul or the highest Annan;

for a discussion involving questions and answers re-

garding all the three is available in the same Upanisad.

According to purvapaksa, the eater must be the fire

as is mentioned by Sruti (Br. 1, 4, 6) and as is known
by every one in ordinary life. Or if the mention of fire
is out place in a metaphysical discussion and as the lire

is only the destroyer, the eater may be the individual

soul, it cannot be the highest Atman, because as the
Munjakopanisad tells us, One of the two eats the
'

sweet trurt. ana the oth-.T nierelv looks on without eating'

(3, I, 1). The Atman alone must he the eater, we reply.
For there can be no other being except the Atman who
will consume or absorb in himself the whole movable
and immovable world as his food. No doubt the two
castes ot BrShmnna.. ;inj [Link] alone are mentioned
as the food but these two being the best things of all
;

stand as representatives of the whole world as food ;

and the ghee of death which i= sprinkled over the food
characterizes the world as perishable or consumable by
the Atman. It may be said that the Atman is merely a
'
looter on ' and no eater, but the context of the passage
in the Munjakopanisad shows by way of contrast,
that the Atman, unlike the jiva, does' not become subject
to the effects of actions. The passage does not aim
at denying the absorption of the world into the Brahman ;
for like creation and subsistence, absorption too of
the whole world into Brahman is declared by all the
Vedanta-passages. Therefore, the eater is Brahman alone.

TOTTTsq I N

The passage that the Atman is not born, that it

'

does not die (Ka. 1, 2, 18}, and the passage quoted in the
'
last Sutra inJi-j.-.r in^ the knowledge of the Atman as
l-ml-i: [.'(Imply difficult to achieve, show it clearly thatthe
topic under discussion is the Atman.

35T MHHMIcHMI ft vi^St^ I

t?

OF THE SAME NATURE) IS BEEN fflY NUMBER BEING

MENTIONED). 11

In the Kafhavalli, read we

these that '
two who
!;!fic the fruit of truih. and re.-iide in :he world i.e. the body
which they kivc acquired by goo ;:::!;, jrai who have :

entered the cave of the heart, the eice'lei;: aeat of tbe

Brahman, are like shade and light This is what
those who know the Brahman say, a* also tboae
householders who keep the five fire* or those who are
'
trnaciketa (1, 3, 1).

The question that arises in this connection is whether

time two are buddhi and jiva or the jiva and the highest
Atman. As a matter of fact, both the alternatives are
possible. We read in an earlier passage (Ka. 1, 1, 20)
that Naciketas asks Death to tell him by way of
granting his third boon whether there is not such a being

iii itva who is different from body, senses, mind and buddhi
and who takes a new birth after death. This means that
in the present passage too, buddhi and jiva are intended
to be different and hence referred to as having entered
into the cave. Or it may be that the two are the jiva
and the highest Atman. For a question regarding the high-
est Atman also has been previously asked viz. lo tell him
that which is different from merit and demerit, effect
[Link] the future (Ka. 1,2, 14).
 '

Now someone may say that there is, as a matter of

feet, no question or doubt to he solved , because there
is no possibility of either of the two alternatives. In
the first place, the attribute of ' drinking the truth J
(rtaplna) or ' tasting the fruit ' cannot be predicated
of the non- intelligent buddhi, though it can be
predicated of the jiva. The attribute however is stated
to belong to both of them and not to one only. There-
fore, the two beings who have entered into the cave
cannot be buddhi and jiva. Secondly, they cannot be
the individual soul and the Attnan, for the latter is spoken
of as merely a looker on and not as an eater (Mu, 3, 1, 1).

The question or the doubt mentioned above can-

not however be thus brushed aside. It does exist. For
just as a group of people is spoken of as having taken an
umbrella, even though only one of them has taken it,
similarly the two ate mentioned as ' drinking the truth
even though one of them is actually doing so. The
n
dual form of the verb ' drink (pibantau) meaning theteby
that there are two beings who perform the act of drinking,
can be explained iu having reference to the jiva who
actually tastes (drinks) the fruits of actions and to Isvara
who, in spite of his looking on merely without eating,
is said to drink because he makes the jiva drink. The
chief of the cooks, fot instance, is said to cook even though
he sits silent and makes his subordinate cook. Or
the dual form of the verb may refer even to jiva and to
the non-intelligent buddhi; for like a cook, the non-sentient
fuel also is spoken of as cooking the food. Hence in
the presence of both the alternatives, there is room
for doubt.

The purvapaksin is in favour of the first alternative ;

the two agents referred to are the individual soul and the
buddhi. The reasons he gives are In the first place,
:

the cave (whether we mean by it body or ' heart ')

it is '
'

wherein they have entered. The cave being a small

and a special place, it will be more appropriate to think
of finite agents as having made the entry than to think
of the infinite and all-pervading Brahman. Secondly,
the words in the world of good deeds
'
have definitely
'

a reference to buddhi and jiva which are within the sphere

of karma, but not to the highest Atman who does not grow
larger by metit, not does he become smaller by lenient
(Br. 4, 4). 23, And thirdly, like shade and light, they
are opposed to each other in being irtflligen; and non-

To this we reply that the mention of the number

'two ".makes us aware, in the first place, that the two
beings'must be of the same nature. And when one of
them (as even the piirvapakjin says; is the jiva, :h;n the
other also must be an intelligent being, and so, it ii no
other than the highest Atman. A
bull requires another
bull as its companion, neither horse nor man. Buddhi
and jiva being disparate in nature, the relation of the
subordinate and the superior id merely external to them.
Between the jiva and the Atman, on the other hand,
there is the internal relation of intelligence. It is present
in both and is indicated by
"
rtapana.' That a special
local position of the cave of the heart has been assigned
to the omnipresent Brahman is also, in the second place,
quite appropriate. It serves the purpose of meditation,
so that we should have a clear vision of the Brahman.
Sniti and Smriti, too, speak very often of the Atman
as residing in the cave. For instance, ' The wise man
leaves off both dejection and joy, when he comes to know
the ancient Purusa hidden in the cave, etc' (Ka. 1,2, 12);
1

He who knows him hidden in the cave of the heart,

in the highest akasa, eiperiences all bliss ' (Tai. 2, 1);
'
Search for the Atman who has entered into the cave.'
though the attribute ol evisting
Similarly, in the third place,
inthe sphere of the results of good deeds, i.e. of being em-
bodied, belongs to the individual soul only and not to
Brahman, yet it can be said to belong to the Brahman
too in a figurative way, just as a group of men is described
as one having an umbrella though only one of them has
 90

it. And lastly, the jlva and the Brahman being also
disparate m nature .ire jpproprijiely described as shade
and light. The jiva is subject to [Link] on account
of avidya, while the Atman is not because it is real.
Therefore, the two beings who have ' entered into the
cave ' are the individual soul and the highest Atman.

[Viie^aiint- --because of distinctive uiiiihht-s ; ca — and.J

CAVE ARE THE JTVA AND THE BRAHMAN), 12

A subsequent passage of the Kj[hakopanisad

(1, 3, 3 and 9) speaks of the body as the chariot and the
[Link] Mini .;s tlii' duriouvr, who is making his journey
through .>iii..\l[-.i to ihc ti;>al_ release. Another passage
(1, 3. 9) speaks of the highest Atman as the place of Visnu,
and aa the destination of the journey. Similarly, in the
passage already quoted (in the commentary of the previous
Sutra) the jiva and the Atman are distinguished as the
meditator and the object of meditation. All this goes
to show that the two beings who have got distinctive
characteristics and who have 'entered into the cave'
are the individual soul and the Atman. Besides, the
general topic is of the highest Atman itself. And again,
the reference in just the previous passage to the authority
of those who have realised
the Brahman,
proves that the
subject-matter of discussion between these persons must be
Brahman alone. So, when one of the two beings who have
entered into the cave is the individual soul, the other
must be no other than the highest Atman.

By
parity of reasoning, the passage from the Muridako-
panisad also (3, 1, I) speaks about the jiva and the
Atman and not about two ordinary birds. ' The eating
of the sweet fruit ' refers to the individual soul, and the
 .. ii, &n 91

abstinence from eating and the intelligence required in

mere looting on, refer to the highest Atman. In the
subsequent mantra, again, the same difference is shown
to exist between the two (Mu. 3, 1, 2). The individual
soul is represented as mourning because lie is in taunted

by the wrong nation that he is impotent, while the Atman

is represented as the ohject of meditation, which is said

to be the cause of the removal of the grief of the jiva

who meditates on it.
A different interpretation of he passage from the
r

Mundakopaniasd is also possible. The Paingi-rahasya

Brahmana, for instance, discredits both the interpret,!
tions of the piirvapaksin as well as of the siddhanrtn.
The two birds do not stand either for buddhi and jiva
on the one hand, or for jiva and Atman on the other.
On the contrary, they stand for buddhi and the released
soul. The being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva
or the internal organ by means of which a man dreams ;
and the being which merely looks on without eating is
the individual soul who, really speaking, isnor rheenjoyer,
but is identical with Brahman. It is "his meaning which

is found to be correct even according to •iruti and Smrtt ;

e.g. That thou art (CM. 6, 3, 7),

'
" Know me also to '

be the Ksetrajna or the individual soul {B. G. 13, 2)' '

The attribute of Ivin;; an cniovcr has been simply superim-

posed upon buddhi, on account of want of discrimination
on the part of the soul of the ihtferencc in [Link] between
the two. Neither of them can be called an actor or en-
joyer neither the non -intelligent
;
buddhi, nor the
non-modifiable individual sou]. Besides being the product
of avidya buddhi is all the more incapable of being an
actor or enjoyer. And yet, it is in the sphere of avidyi
that dualism exists, and 'one sees the other' as elephants
in a dream. But when all this becomes the Atman,
'

how should one see the other ? (Br. 4, 5, 15) So this

'

passage as well as the one from the Murijakopanisad

tell us that for one who has rcjlt:ed the Brahman, there
is an end to all the distinctions of the practical worldly

life.
 92 VBDANTA EXPLAINED

V ^rcftWT^I (tVl»)

[Atliura/i— Person within ; upupattt/i—being available.]

AVATLABLE. 13

A passage in the Chandogyopanisad states that

'
the person seen in the eye is the Atman; that being is
the fearless, the immortal, Brahman, If ghee or water
is sprinkled over the eye it is wiped away along with
the eyelid' (4, 15, 1).

According to piirvapaksa, the person in the eye. is the

image of some person standing before the eye. Or it may be
the individual soul ; for it is he who sees the forms of ob-
jects through the instrument of the eye. Besides the word
'
atman ' in the passage indicates that it must be jiva.
Or, again, it may mean the sun, the deity of the sense
of sight which causes the eye to see, as is clear from: ' he
'
(the sun-deity) resides in the eye, by means of his rays
(Br. 5, 5, 2), Qualities like ' immortality ' etc. which
are mentioned in the passage may be attributed to the
deities in the sense that they live far longer than men.
The passage however does not refer to the omnipresent
God, because a special place like the eye is mentioned
as if it is the seat of God.

To this we reply that the person in the eye must

be the highest God ; for the word Atman, as it occurs
in the Sruti ' That is the Atman," ' That thou art ' (Chi. 6,
8, 7), refers primarily to God. Immortaliry and fearless-
ness are repeatedly spoken of as his cbarac tens tics. The
eye too is fittingly described as his residence ; for just
as God is free from the stain of sin, even so the eye is not
stained by water or ghee. Besides He alone is known as
Sarhyadvama, that is, 'one towards whom all (vama) fruits
of actions go. He is also called Vlmani, and Bhamani,
that isone who distributes the fruits to all, and shines
in all worlds (Chi. 4, 15, 2). So it is that the person in
the eye is God alone.

[Stham-adi— place and other things ; vyapadeMt— being

mentioned; ca.J

TLONEO (THE EYE CAN BE THE PLACE OP GOD). 14

It is to say that the eye cannot be a fit

no objection
place for the omnipresent Brahman to reside for just ;

as the omnipresent akasa can fill in the eye of a needle,

even so the Brahman can reside in the eye. The objection
could have carried some weight, if the eye alone were
mentioned as the place of residence. The earlh etc.
" '

are also mentioned as fit places. Besides not only place

is mentioned, but forms and names also are mentioned
as characteristics of Brahman which is, really
speaking,
devoid of names and forms. His name is said to be " Ut
and he 15 spoken of as possessing golden beard
" (Cha.
1, 6, 7, 6). The ascription of a special place, name or
form to the Nirguna Brahman is, as we have already
seen, for the purpose of meditation.

(Brahman which has

one is mentioned
is Brahman only). 15

regarding the person in the eye being Brahman a

94

inasmuch u the same section of the Chandogyopanisad

which deals in its latter part with the person in the eye,
deals with the nature of Brahman and with the path
of Brahman as told by the Guru, in its earlier or in-
troductory part (4, 10, 5 ; 4, 14, 1 ; 4, 15, 1-2). On
being told by rhe tire* [Link] ' breath is Brahman," Upakosala,
the disciple of jaKila, said that prana being great he could
understand that it was Brahman, but could not under-
stand how the sensuous pleasure and the elemental akasa
denoted by ' Ka ' and 'Kha* respectively, were
Brahman. To ibis the fire; replied, ' What is Ka is Kha,
and what is Kha is Ka," meaning thereby that neither
mere sensuous pleasure which is transitory and dependent
upon sense -object contact, nor mere elemental akasa
which is non-senrifin, is Brahman, but that a combination
of Ka and Kha, one of them being substantive an J (lie other
adjective, is Brahman. In other words, that bliss which
arises in the at iisa of the heart, for instance, and which
is not transitory and dependent on sensuous objects,
is Brahman and is therefore the fit object of meditation.
Thus it is that the blissful Brahman is introduced as the
topic of discussion in the beginning of the section. After
this I ;.i:biipntya and other fires tell their own glory and
say. " This is knowledge regarding us, and this again
is knowledge
the of theAtman. As for the path, your
teacher will guide you." This means that there is no
room for introducing another topic. Add to this the
words of the teacher, jah.'la. As water does not cling
'

to the leaf of a lotus, so no sin will cling to him who knows

it,' which show that the person within the eye is the

Brahman itself, possessing the qualities of Samyadvama

and others. It is clear therefore from the context, as
well as from the common characteristic of not being
stained, that the person within the eye is Brahman.

ISruta-upamjatlfa-gati — The path of one who has heard

the Upanyads; — being mentioned ca— and.]
abhidhtindt ;
Brahman). 16

The Prasnopanisad (I, 10) describes the path of

the gods "
: Those who seek the Atman by penance,
celibacy, faith and knowledge go (after death) by the
northern path to the sun. This is the abode of the pranas,
the immortal fearless and the highest support of all,
teaching which none returns.' The Bhagavadgita too says,
"Those who know the Brahman go to Brahman after
their death by the path of fire, light, (he bright fortnight
and the six month;, when the- run i- on the north (8, -4!.
'

The same is the path of those, we are told, (C ha. 4,

15, 5) who know the person in the eye: 'Let people
perform obsequies for such a person or not; he first goes
to the world of the fire, and thence to the sun, to the
moon, and to the lightning. A
celestial being leads

him further by the path of gods to Brahman.' It therefore

follows that the person in the eye is no other than the
Brahman.

5— being nor snt ;

asaihbhaiiiit —
beta ; impossible ;i ,£TS — iraj older.!

{The pi !»» ni mm B) »J OTHER (THAN THE

If the person in the eye were only an image

one else standing before the eye, then the devotion to it is
merely impossible, because the image will last only so long
as the ob)e« before the eye will last. The intention or
the Sruti must be that the person in the eye is capable
of being seen by the meditator, and as such must
be
located in his own eye, rather than in the eye ol another
But on the supposition that the person is the reSected
image, we have to remain satisfied with one of the two
absurd alternatives. Either the devotee has to meditate
on the image of his own person reflected in the eyes of
another (who must be available at any time), or he has
to meditate on the image of another object reflected in
his own eyes. Besides, as the .Sruti tells us this image
perishes along with the body (Cha. 8, 9, 1). In
other words, ii does not pos^s* immonii^ty, fearlessness,
etc. which are the characteristics of the person in the eye.

The jiva likewise cannot be the person in the eye.

For it is vitally connected with the whole body and the

sense-organs, and not merely with the eye. It may be

suggested that this applies equally to the all-pervading
Brahman, if it is taken as the person in the eye. But
we have to remember that it is for the sake of meditation
that Brahman is conceived as occupying a particular
place like the eye or the heart. The jiva too, like the
image, does not possess the qualities of immortality, fear
lessness etc. No doubt, the jiva is not different from
the highest Atman, but so long as desires, works etc
are ascribed to it on account of avidya, it will continue
to be mortal and be full of fear. And because it lacks
the glory of God, it cannot possess the qualities of sarhya-
dvama and others.

The suggestion that the person in the eye may be

the divinity in the sun appears plausible because theSruti
tells us that he resides in the eye by means of his rays
(Br. 5, 5, 2). And yet he cannot be called Atman;
rather he is un-atman because he shines by the lustre
f the Atman. As Sruti speaks of his origin and dissolu-
tion, he cannot be called immortal etc. The deathless-
nets of the gods is only nominal ; only as compared with
human life, they live longer. They derive their glory
from the highest God, as is clear from : 'Through fear
of the Brahman, the wind blows, the sun shines, fire
and Indra do their work^ and Death runs ' to kill those
whose life is to end (Tai. 2, 8).
 Hence the person in the eye must be the highest
God alone. And when it is said that he is ' seen,' it
should be understood to mean that he is capable of being
realised by thosewho rely on Sruti, and that it has the
further motive of creating in the mind of the ignorant a
'
desire to' see him

[AiiiflrvfiiHi controller within; adhiddiva-iidiiu —

in gods

and others; tat'dhnr-ma-vyapadcfiil —his mar\s being

(is the Atman), for the characteristics of that

A
passage from the Brhadaranyakopanisad tells us
that the being who lives inside this and other worlds
and in all beings, as well as inside the earth, the gods, the
Veda, the sacrifice and the bodies of all, is immortal and
theltman; the earth does not know him, though it is his
body; he lives inside and controls all. (3.7, 1) No* who is
thiBantaryamin? Is he the Atman or same divinity or a
yogin endowed with powers, or a new being altogether ?

The purvapaksin may hold that the antaryamin

is a new being altogether, inasmuch as the name used for
it is not familiar. But it serves no purpose to suppose
the existence of a thing whose nature is not known at
all. The word, however, is not absolutely unfamiliar,

because it means 'one who controls from within." It may

mean, then, some deity ruling over the earth, etc.; for such
a deitymav have ' earth as its dwelling, lire as its sight,
and light as its mind, etc" (Br. 3, 9, 16); that is, it may be
endowed with organs of action and so become capable
of ruling. Or the being may be some yogin who is able
supernatural
to enter within all things on account of his
highest Atman,
powers, in no case, can the being be the
because the Atman is not endowed with body and sense-
organs which ate necessary for ruling.

To this we reply that the antaryamin must be die

Atman ; for the quality of controlling all can bel ™g »
the Atman alone, who not only resides within all the
created things including god?, earth, etc., but is the cause of
them all. Immortality belongs to the Atman alone. The fact
that the deitv of earth does not know him, even though
he is inside, shows that the Atman is different
from the
The beim; = described in the pj.-sa^ as unseen
"
deity. 1

and " unheard," indicating thereby that it is the Atman

alone which is devoid of names and forms. Supposing
that the body and senses are essential for the act of ruling,
it is possible likewise to suppose that the Atman
is, on

account of avidya, related to the bodies and senses of

those whom he wants to control and rule. As a matter
of fact, by means of the unfathomable power of his maya,
the Atman can control all things, even though he has
no
body. To suppose that the Atman may necessitate the
existence of another being superior to it, and soon ^d injt-
nitum, is not relevant. For really speaking, there is 00
difference between ilie individual soul and the Atman.
So the internal ruler is no other than the Atman.

3 ^ WRttl^lu^Wlvt 1 W
(Nfl— not ; ca —and Smaruuh—found
;
in Smfti
not
;
at
flT~
feeing
contrary lo it; dharma attnniittt; [Link].n
mentioned.}

SHKTl (the internal controller); for characteristics

That pradhana is not the cause of the world has already

hcenshown while dealing with Sutra 1,1,5. Wedealwith
pradhana here again, because a follower of the Sankhya
may say that as the qualities of not being seen
'

as
or being devoid of form etc' belong to pradhana
 u 11, su. 20 99

well, the pradhiina may be con side red as the an tar yam in.
As the Manu Sm[ti says the pradhana 'is not discovered
by inference, nor is perceivable by the senses, but being
unconscious lies spread in all directions, as if in sleep.
(1, 5). The attribute of being the controller may belong
to it because it is the cause of all.

To this we reply that this is not possible, because

qualities not belonging to pradhana are mentioned as
belonging to the Atman. The pradhana cannot be
seen ; nor is it able to see because it is an unconscious
element. On the other hand, in the concluding sentence
of the section dealing with the antaryamin, the Atman
ischaracteriredas 'unseen but seeing, unheard hut hearing^
unthought of but thinking, and unknown but knowing'
(Br. 3, 7, 23). Besides the word atman cannot be applied
' '

to the unconscious pradhana.

The opponent may take a turn and say, if not

pradhana, then let us suppose that the individual soul is
the antarydmin it is conscious and is therefore the seer,
;

the hearer and the thinker; it resides inside and therefore

can be described as the Atman; it has to reap the fruits of
its life, in lives yet to come, and there-
actions, if not in this
fore unlike body it must be considered asimroortal, and.
being the seeretc., it is natural to say that it is itself unseen
TheSruti too tells us. 'you will not be able to see the seer
of the sight' (Br. 3. 4, 2). Lastly, being inside and having
got to taste the fruits of actions, it possesses naturally
the quality of controlling the body and the senses. For
all these reasons, the opponent may hold that
the indivi-
dual soul is the antaryamin.

The following Sutra comes as a reply to this.

5Rto?fa^sfo ft ^fcnpfrra i ^°
ISanra^- the embedied soul ca— and ubhsye—in both;
; ;

flpi— even hi—for bhedena— as different mark— this

; ;
; ;

a&tiyatc— is studied.]
 The qualities of seeing, thinking etc. may belong to
the individual soul; yet like the akasa confined in a jar, iris
limited on account of the upadhis like the body and the
senses, h cannot therefore dwell inside the earth and
the several worlds, and control them from within. The
Kanvas and the Madhyandmas, moreover, make the dis-
tinction between the individual soul and the antaryamin,
and speak as much of the former as of the earth and other
things as being worthy to be controlled by the latter.
They are the dwelling places of the antaryamin. The
Kanvas say, ' he resides in the vijnana;' and the
Madhyandinas say 'he resides in the atman ' (Br. 3, 7,
22) ; and the words, 'vijnana 'and
'
atman ' stand for
sarira and the embodied sou: respectively.

The objection that may arise hereis that there would

be two seers in one body one the; embodied soul and the
other, the God as the antaryamin. Sruti itself is against
'
this possibility,There is no other seer but he," (Br. 3, 7.
23). denies the existence of any other seer, hearer etc.,
It
except the one antaryamin under discussion.

In reply to this we say that what appears as a differ-

ence between the two seers, the sarira, and the antaryamin
does not exist as a matter of fact. It arises on account
of upadhis of body, senses etc., the effect of avidya. There
is only one Atman, the experience of which can be had

in the form, 'I am.' Anything else which is not the

content of this experience is un-atman. But owing
to upadhis, the one Atman is treated in practical life as
if it were two, just as the one akaia is considered as two
(mabiikasa and ghatakasa) on account of the upadhi of a
jar. So, it is on account of the upadhis of avidya which
create an interest in the practical world that Sruti makes
the distinction between the kriower and the known, the
 ADRTAVAI, PA, II, sir. 21 101

injunctions and the prohibitions, and the means of know-

ledge like perception and experience of saiiiasara. Or
lis.^'iui puts it, it is in order to explain the practical world

of avidya, ' that there is the appearance of duality, and

that one sees another ; but when the practical world
v;i rushes hciort- vldyii, when all this becomes the Atman
to him, then who should see whom ?' (Br. 2, 4, 14, and
4, 5, IS), Hence too, on account of the dintinetfonii
of .iviJyj. there exists a controller as different from the
controlled ;ot her wis.: there .-xivt- only one supreme Atman.

^iVMifcyui+i qqt& i 3!

(aiong with invisibility]. 21

A passage in the Muridakopanisad tells us that 'the

higher knowledge is that by which the Immutable is
realized that which is invisible, which cannot be seized,
;

which has neither origin nor qualities, which has neither

Eyes nor ears, nor hands norfeet, which is everlasting and
yet manifold, which is all -pervading, subtle, imperishable
and which is regarded by the wise as " Bhutayoni,
the source of all' (1, 1.5; 6).

Now the qualities like invisibility being common,

a doubt arises as to whether the Bhutayoni means the

Brahman or the pradhana or the embodied soul. According

to purvapaksa, it must be the non -intelligent pradhana,
because in the passage subsequent to the one quoted above,
it has been compared with non-intelligent things; e.g.
'
just as a spider creates and takes back the threads, or
just as the herbs grow on the earth, or hairs arise from the
 '

102

body of a living man, even ao the world arises from the

-
Immutable (Mu. 1. I, 7)- One need not say in this
connection that the spider and the man are instances of
intelligent beings, for it is impossible that the threads
and the hairs will be produced without the non -intelligent
bodies. The bodies may be governed by intelligence,
but it is out of the bodies that the hairs and threads
are produced. Similarly, the world must have been
produced by the non- intelligent pradhana, even though
it may be guided by the intelligent Purusa. Besides,
not only qualities like invisibility are found to belong
to pradhana, but there is also no mention of a quality
which does not belong to it. Qualities lite knowing
'

which are mentionedin the concluding

a 11, "perceiving a 11,'
portion (Mu. I, 1, 9), may however be pointed out as
contrary to the nature of pradhana but it must be remem-
;

bered that the i.'arlkr reference to the Immutable aa

invisible (1, 1, 5-6] is different from the reference to
that which is higher thin the Immutable (Mu. 2, 1, 2).
Now that which is higher may be all-knowing and
' ' " '

'all-perceiving'; but chat which is Immutable or the

Bhutayoni must be pradhana. Or if the word yoni '

were to mean the efficient cause, then Bhutayoni may

mean even the embodied soul for by resorting to merits
;

and demerits the jiva too can be called the cause of the
origin of things.

To this we reply that the Bhutayoni is the highest

God only. For omniscience can neither belong to the non-
intelligent pradhana nor to the embodied soul which is limi-
ted. Besides, the same Immutable Bhutayoni, which is first
said to be the original cause of all created things (1, 1, 7),
is further spoken of as omniscient and as the cause of the
created things. "From him, who is omniscient and whose
penance consists of knowledge, comes forth this Brahman
in theform of sub tie elements, the gross elements possessing
names and forms, and food such as barley and wheat'
(1,1, 9). From the identity of reference, we believe
that the same immutable Bhutayoni is omniscient also,
 L ii, 8U.21 103

and istherefore Brahman; it is neither pradhanan nor jiva.

Nor again in the passage (Mil. 2,1, 2) which refers to 'that
which is higher than the high Immutable,' is there any-
thing meant except the immutable, intelligent Bhiitayoni
under discussion. For prior to this passage, there is anothet
passage from the same Upanisad (1, 2, 13) which recom-
BKBda he Guru toimpart the Brahma -vidya to his disciple,
i

so that the latter may realize that truthful, immutable

being. As to why the word Immutable has been
' '

usedin the ablative, and as to what the 'higher than

the high immutable' may mean, we shall mate it clear
when we deal with the next Sutra.

We reach the sime conclusion in another way.

The Mundakopanisad begins with the topic of Brahma-
vidya by telling us (1, 1, 1) that it was first imparted by
the Cteator to his eldest son Atharva. It is said

to be both the foundation and the culmination of

all other vidyas for it being known, everything else
;

becomes known. (1, I, 3). It differs in kind from all other

types of knowledge, such 21 the knowledge of the Vedas.
grammar etc. It is therefore known as para vidya,
due to which the Immutable being ot the Brahman is
known (1, 1, 5), as distinguished from the a pari which
is only a preliminary to the para. The one leads to bliss,
the other to mere worldly prosperity. Fools alone may
consider the apara or the lower vidya as the Summum
Bonum, and so become subject to old age and death
over and over again. Unless one considers the ' boats
->:
^Sacrifices, and the eighteen' Brahmins required fora
sacrifice, as frail ' means, unless one turns away with
disgust from the lower knowledge which, by contrast
only brings out the glory of the higher, and is convinced
that the eternal Atman cannot be achieved by means of
transitory actions, one does not become fit to receive the
higher knowledge. But once he knows the futility of the
lower knowledge and of actions, he should with humility^
and with fuel in hand, surrender himself unto the Guru
or the Spiritual Teacher who is not only learned but
also steadfast in the realisation of Brahman (1, 2, 7; 1.
2, 12)-

All this points out that the Immutable source o: all.

or the Bhutayoni is Brahman alone. If this were not so,
the knowledge of Brahman would not be considered as para
vidya. And if Bhutayoni is to be understood as pradhana,
there would result a third kind of prad ha na -vidya besides
the two mentioned in the Upanisad. At best, the know-
ledge of pradhana will lead to the knowledge of its non-
sentient effects viz. the things of enjoyment, but not of
the conscious individual souls; and [he knowledge of the
souls will not likewise lead to [he knowledge of things.
In other words, the knowledge of pradhana or jiva will
not give rise to the knowledge of everything else, as it
happens in the case of the knowledge of the Brahman. And
above all, the knowledge of pradhana has never been
acknowledged by anyone as leading to moksa.

Lastly, the argument that Bhutayoni must be non-

intelligent because things compared to it, by way of
illustration, are non- intelligent, is not sound. For there
is no such rule like this. Even on
the Sankhya theory,
the pradhana is not considered as gross in nature , because
in the example taken for comparison the earth is a grass
element. For all these reasons, the source of all or the
Bhutayoni which possesses the qualitiirs of invisibility
etc. is the highest God.
 (.11,86. 23 105

The [Link] liiio P'T-on who l- :!ic jjiii; as Bhiitayoni,

is described as effulgent, bodiless, the same inside and
'

'
outside, unproduced, without mind or prana and pure
(Mu. 2, 1, 2), The individual soul, on the other hand,
which wrongly considers itself as being limited by name
and form, cannot possess the attribute; of effulgence etc.,
and is therefore, different from the Bhiitayoni Similarly,
the same passage which mentions the highest Atman
as higher than the high Immutable
'
distinguishes the '

pradhana from the Bhiitayoni. The word Immutable' '

(aksara) means here the uiuiKiiiii.',- potential source of

names and forms, the support of the subtle Eve elements,
that which is lodged in God and forms his upadhi. and
which transcends all other effects but is not itselfan effect.
The intention of the Sutra is not toadmit the independent
existence of pradhana, so that we may first say that the
aksara and pradhana are one and the same thing, and then
distinguish the pradhana from_the Atman. The intention
is rather to distinguish the Atman as transcending the

aksara or the immutable. If at all the pradhana is to

be assumed, then we have no objection to its being as-
sumed in such a way as will not contradict the Sruti
in the way in which the .[Link] has iven defined above.
i.e.

Then, too, as said above, the 'Bhiitayoni is different from

the pradhana, and is nothing else but God.

(3n*mn i ^3

;
upanyasdt — bong mentioned
.USE ITS FOBM IS MENTIONED.

In the passages which follow the mention of the

Being which is higher than the aksara, there is first the
description of the creation of all things from prarja. Then
of the form of this very Bhutayoni
 ;

!06 VEDANTA EIPLAIHED

as : ' Fire is his bead ; the sun and the moon, his eyes :
quarters, hi; ears the Vedas, hi; spivch
: the universe, :

his hear! the wind, his breath

; the earth, his feet
;

he is verily the inner Atman of all ' (Mu. 2, 1, 3, 4}. In

view of the entire context, it is proper to hold that this
form belongs to God alone, and not to the jiva who is
of a limited power, or to pradhana which cannot be the
atman of all. This bodily form, however, instead of
contra dieting the quality o! invisibility, is intended to
show that the Bhutayoni is the inner Atman of all. For
does not a person who has realised the Brahman sing
the saman ' I am the food. 1 am the eater of food' (Tai. 3,
10, 6), only to indicate that the Brahman is the Atman
of all, even though he has no desire to eat the food himself?
Some others say in this connection that the pssage
quoted in the beginning (2, 1, 4) does not refer to the
source of all beings but refers to ctearion, the inner self
of which is not the Atman but the Hiranygarhha or
Prajapati. For in the passage 2, 1,3 andagain from2, I, 5
to 2, 1, 9, ate mentioned only the thing; that ate created

such as, prana, mind, senses, the five elements, herbs,

and juices. It seems improbable that, all of a sudden,
in the midst of the two passages (2, 1, 3 and 2, 1, 5),
there should be a reference to Bhutayoni, as the Atman
of all. So in the intervening passage too (2, 1, 4), it seems
reasonable to hold that a being born from the ultimate
source of all, and not the source itself, i.e. the Bhutayoni
or Brahman is mentioned
That being must be the
Prajapati or the Sutratma, about whose birth we get
reference in Rgveda and othet places Hiraijyagarbha :
'

was (born) in the beginning, as the first laid of the beings

with the three worlds as his body; he made the earth
and the sky him alone as God, we worship by offering
;

oblations ' (Rg. 10, 121, 1). Being the first-born Person
with body, he too may be called the internal atman of
allother created beings, in the sense, that he lives in the
form of the thtead of" prjna iSGtrarnijj in all beings
(Bf. 3, 9, 9 ; and Mu. 2, 1, 4). The reference to Bhuta-
yoni or the Atman, therefore, as the source of all comes
in the end after the description of the whole of creation.
In 2, 1,10, for instance, he is described as the Purusa,
who this universe, including karma, penance etc.
is all

twrcifaww; i
(**-w
wrap hwiwkmSiii^ i W
[Vaisv<maTa/>;sadhtlTaria— ordinary ; sdbda- -word ;vih;at
-
—oitfing to qualification.}

Vaisvanara is (the highest Atman) 1

op a specific quality belonging to (two

WORDS (vrz. Vaisvanara and self). 24

Tbe Chandogyopanisad tells us that six brahmins

[Link] the ting, ASvapati Kekaya, in order to learn
from him the nature of Vaisvanara atman and on being ;

asked as to what beings they worshipped, they said turn

by turn, that the heaven, the sun, the wind, the akaSa,
the water and the earth respectively were the objects
which they worshipped. Hearing this the king re-
plied that these constitute respectively the head, the eye,
the prana, the mid- portion of the body, the bladder, and
the feet of the Vaisvanara; for they indicate the lustre,
the forms, the motion, the space, and the wealth, which
are in the Vaisvanara. Besides, his chest is the alter;
hairs, the grass on the altar; and his heart, mind and mouth
Garhapatya, Anvablrya and Ahavaniya,
the three fires,
mpecttvery. The king then deprecated their mode of
worshipping the Vaisvanara Atman in parts, and advoca-
ted the contemplation on it, as measured by a span, so
the devotee would be the eater of food in
all
that
the worlds and beings (S, 11, to 5, 18).

Vaisvanara-atman ate
Now both the words in ' '_

ambiguous. The word Vaisvanara may mean the

'
'

abdominal fire,' 'the elemental fire or "the Fire-divinity

' .

or
and the word atman may mean the individual soul
' '

God. Which of these live meanings, then, are we to have

 EXPLAINED

by 'Vaisvanara -atman'? According to purpavaksa we

may mean by it, in the first place, the abdominal fire

or ' the fire inside the human body, by means of which

the food is digested ' (Br. 5, 9). Or secondly, it may
mean the ordinary fire, 'as a sign of ihe Jay, i.e. the suti
which the gods made for the world ' (Ftg. 10, 88, 12).
Or thirdly, as the passage 'May the god Vaisvanara,
the ting of worlds, favour us with pleasure and prosperity'
(Rg. 1, 98, 1) shows, we may take it to mean a divinity.
With reference to the word atman which is used along
with Vaisvanara, it may mean the individual soul. The
proximity of the abdominal fire, and measurement by a
a span, indicate that it must be the embodied soul.
But on no account, would Vaisvanara mean the highest
God.

To this we reply that he cause the heaven, the sun

etc. are the head, theeye, etc., the VaisVanara must be the
God or the atman of the worlds, though he is described
thus for the purpose of meditation. This is the distinc-
tive meaning of the ' Vaisvanara-atman," over and above
the meanings put forth by the purvapaksa. As the
cause of all, God possesses within him all the stages of
all the effects ; and so the description of the several worlds
and beings as the limbs of God is adequate. The state-
ment regarding the rvsiih or mcdnaiion on :b-: V'aiji'iirara,
vii.
'
He eats the food in all worlds, beings and selfs,'
has meaning only with reference to God. Similarly, the
statement, 'all his sins are burnt etc." (CM. 5, 24, 3), re-
garding one who meditates on the Vaisvanara and knows
him, shows that Vaiivanara is nothing else but God.
To add to this, the topic of the passage under discussion
is the nature of the Atman or Brahman. For all these
reasons, Vaisavanara means Brahman.

nfangntf Fnftfa i Vi
[Smtnyama-naiii— what is told in smfti; Otiununw*-—
inference sydd
; — may be ; i
THE VaIsVANARA IS THE HIGHEST GOD). 25

A verse from the [Link].:rv;i Jo-scribes the highest

God as 'theatman of the worlds, and as one whose mouth
is fire, whose head is the heaven, whose naval is the iikiisa.
and whose feet, eyes and ears are theearth, the sun and the
quarters' respectively (M. Bha. 47, 63). This Smrti
enables us to infer a .Sruti corri^pondin;; .'snd prior to it
as its authority, because the Smrti has in it the presence
of the sign viz. ' the heaven as head, and fire as mouth'
etc.. which is also present in the Vaisvanara Sruti of
the Chan dogyopani sad. Even taking far granted that
Smrti passages are sometimes given to eulogise, we say
that such a grand eulogy cannot be without the sanction
of a prior Sruti. Vaiivanara, therefore, is the highest God,

pwft ^nqtflq^ I
^
ISahAtidibhyali— because of word and others; onto}— inside;
ptOtifjhanM —
on account of presence ; ca— and ; na not ; —
iti— so cet—if na ; mth£— Iffp tfiflt; dry/i-upadeiat—
; ;

being recommended to behold ; asaihbhavat— not being

possible ; puru,tawi — person ;— apj also ; ca; enaih hint 1

adhiyote — ii studied.]

If it is said (that Vaisvanara is notthe Atman)

IT IS) I

God),

HEAD OF FIRE.I'AN-D HLCALrSE lit (THE VAISV.1PJAI.~Z «

REFERRED TO AS PUKttSA (BY VAJASANETtNS) 26 .

VauSvinara cannot be tie highest God,_ because

ordinarily the word Vaisvanara means fire. In Satapatha
no
Brahmaria (10, 6, 1, 11) the word Agni is affixed to
Vaisvanara and there it means fire residing within man. In
the Chandogyopanisad (5, 18, 2), again, the three fires
are mentioned as the heart, the mind and the mouth of
Vaisvanara; and in the same Upanisad (5,19.1) it is men-
tioned as the place where oblations of food to prana are
to be offered. For all these reasons Vaisvanara is to be
understood as abdominal fire. Or in view of the qualifi-
cations, •heaven as the head etc' (Cha. 5, 18, 2},
Vaisvfmrrrj may be taken to mean elemental fire. This
k clear also from the mantra, 'The sun who has by hia
light covered both the earth and the heaven and the
intervening space, is fit for being meditated" (Rg. Sarh.
10, 88, 3).Or again, the heaven etc. may be the limbs of
the powerful Fire-deity, if not of the elemental fire.

All these arguments ai

For what is recommended here is that the abdominal lire
itself should be meditated upon as a symbol of the highest
God, just as the mind is recommended for being meditated
upon as the symbol of Brahman (Cha. 3,18,1,). Or,
what is recommended here is the meditation of the highest
God as qualified by the abdominal fire, just as God is
recommended to be meditated as qualified by the upidnfi
of mind, praqa and light (Cha. 3, 14, 2). Had there
been no intention of the Stun to refer to the highest God,
and had the aim been merely to point to the abdominal
fire, there would have been no specific references to
'lustrous heaven as the head' etc. in the passages quoted
above. This applies equally, as we shall see while
dealing with the next Sutra, when the Vaisvanara is
interpreted as meaning the elemental fire or the deity of
fire. The abdominal fire can be said to be within man,
and not as the same as man or Purusa. The Vajasanyins
however say that Vaisvanara is Purusa. and that one who
knows him as residing inside eats the food in all places.
(Sata. Bra. 10, 6, 1, 11). So the highest God alone can be
the Purusa as well as be inside the body of man.
 There ace some who read the last portion of the Sutra,
not as
'
VaiSvanara is the Purusa,' but is ' like Purusa.'
Then the likeness of the Vaiivinara or the highest God,
with Purusa will be explained thus. With reference to
k external world, it can be said that the heaven is his
head, and the earth is his feet ; while with reference to
man, he will be said to be located, as if between the chin
and the head of the devotee.

TMEH. THE DEITY (OF F[Re) NOR (THE ELEMENTAL) H»E. 27

The elemental fire which gives only heat and light

cannot be supposed to have the heaven as its head, etc.
The fire-deity too cannot have them as its limbs, because it
has not produced the heaven etc. This power of produc-
tion is derived from God. So it will be more appropriate
to call the heaven and the like as the head etc. of God,
rathet than of the fire-deity. Besides, the word atman
in the "
Vaisvanara-itman (as seen before) is thoroughly
'

applicable to abdominal fire, the elemental fire and the

fire-di ty.

wsji^iWy atftPi: i ^

According to Jaimim there will be no logical flaw

if, instead of taking Vaisvanara as the symbol or upadhi
of God, we mean by it God himself, and so
worship him
 W
112

directly rather than worship him as a symbol or as limited

by upadhis. The possible objections :11:1111st this view
are (as already considered under Sutra 26) : That the
words Vaiivanara and have different meanings, and
fire

that the Vaiivanara resides inside the man, and that

these suggest that VaiSvanara means the abdominal
fire. Apart from the refutation we have done while
dealing with Suira 2(>. JiMmlni says that the passage from
the Sarapntha [Link] (10, 6, 1, 11) does not at all refer
to the inner residence of the abdominal fire because it is
not the topic or discussion and contains no word which
is a synonym for that particular fire. On the contrary, it
refers to the supposed similarity of the highest God to man,
and to his existence inside man, that is, on the portion
of human body vi;. the portion from forehead to chin.
What is 'on' and of the body can be said to be inside,'
' ' '

because it is a parr or a limb of the whole just as a branch

;

of a tree can be said to be within the tree. Or, the passage

may be said to refer to both the sagupa and the nirguna
aspects of the Atman saguna, so far as he is said to be
;

'like man', on account of his adhidaivika and adhyatmika

similarity from head to feet to the external world and to
man, arid nirguija so far as he is a mere onlooker, and so
residing within all, without being affected by the upadhis.
In keeping with this interpretation, the word Vaisvauara,
'

can be explained to denote the highest Acman, thus :

(1) ViSva— all, and Nam —jiva ; so Visvanara means one '

who is the atman of all things including the souls ;

or,
(2) Visva-all modifications, and Nara-creator; so it means
the cause of all, or again, (3) One ruler whose subject- arc
thesouls. Thus the word Viivfi!i:;r,i, which is the same
as Vaiivanara means the highest Atman, the cause, the
ruler and the internal self of all. The word "Agni|
roo means the highest Atman ; Ag -'towards the agra'
i.e. towards the end or fruirs of actions , and NT —
lead; soft indicaes 'one who makes the souls approach the
fruits of their actions." In other words, Agm or Agratfl
(one who is the leader) means Atman. Similarly, the
idea of the three fires in the heart, the mind and the mouth.
 to be adequate

s it passible to

3lfiHJ%fc4IW3T: I
^

God transcends all measurement*, no doubt yet he ;

shows his grace to his devotees and manifests before them

in iform which may be a span in length.

[Anurmftefr —on account of meditation ; Badarifr.f

(on HtM). 30

Just as the corn of barley which has its own siie,

is said tomeasure a 'prastha' (two pounds), because that
particular measure is used, even so God, who is beyond
measure, is said to be measured by a span. For he is medi-
tated upon by devoteesin their heart, which is measured
by a span. Or, God is said to be a span in length,
because the motive may be that he should be meditated
upon, at if he has a form which is measurable by a span.

[Sariipattc/t — supposition ;
jaiminii ;
MtJu-Hi- — the same;
 —

In the Vajasaneyi Brihmana where the same topic

is being discuss; J. rh-.> lanoiii ;][Link]. il.i mem hers of the
VaiSvanara, such as the heaven and earth, are identified
with the adhyatmika members such as the forehead and
eye of the human body, and the meditation of God is
being recommended on the portion of the human body
which measures a span, and which is between the forehead
and the chin. The highest God was thus obtained
'

by the several gods," we are told, because they meditated

'

upon him as if he was of the measure of a span.' And

we are told how the King -\.-;r."jip:i:i too said to his dis-
ciples that he would show unto them how the VaisVanara
"

had that measure, and then, pointing by his finger succes-

sively to his forehead, eyes, nose, space, saliva within
the mouth and to the chin, he said that they were
respectively the heaven, the sun, the wind, the akasa,
the wealth or water in the bladder and the feet of the
Vaisvanara." All this account goes to show that the
Vaisvanaravidya of the Vajasneyi-brahmana (&t. Bra.
10,6, 1, 11] is the same as that of the Chan dogyopani sad
(5, 11, to 5, 18), in spite of the minor differences between
the two. The heaven and the sun are spoken of in the
one as 'standing above,' and as 'possessing light,' while
they are spoken in the other as ' possessing light ' and as
having 'infinite forms '. Both the tests make the identi-
cal use of the expression 'measured by a span '. So, as
Jaimini says, it is appropriate to call the highest God as
'Rradefiunitra', because Sruti wishes Him to be so
imagined for the purpose of devotion.

[Amananli— they thinly ; en and ; ena* — him ;

asmin —
 m). 32

The infinite, unmanifejt Annan, says Yajnavalkya,

resides in Che souls which are not released ; and he says
to Atri that the place of the soul is between the Nasi
(nose) andthe Varana (eyebrow) ;for it is the Varana
and the Nasi which ward off and destroy the sins of the
senses. It is this place which is the juncture of the
heaven (head) and the earth (chin), and a contemplation
on which, as if on God, destroys the sins. So what Sruti
speaks of God, vis. as pradesamis tra is quite appropriate.

God is also known

as ahhivimana, because, be is
known as the subject of eve: y inJividui! soul; or because,
being everywhere, be transcends all measurement;
orbecauseheisthecreatorofall. From all this, it fallows
that Vaisvanara is the highest God.
 AOHYAYA FIRST
PADA third

[Dyu — (heaven); bhu — begi?miflg with; '™

-ttyrtfij; rtdi ay,

tamarli — abode; [Link]—nr. account of word

the

BEEN MENTIONED). 1

The Mundakopanisad (2, 2, 5) speaks of the being

in whom the heaven, the earth and the akasa, as well as
1

the mind and praija are woven ' and asks us ' to know
that Annan alone, and to leave off ail other talking ;
for he is the bridge leading to Immortality.'

According to purvapakja, the being ot the support

referred to in the passage must be different from the
Brahman. For the word ' bridge ' reminds us that there
is another bank towards which it leads; Brahman, on the

other hand, being eternal and all-pervading is without

'

end and has no other bank' (Br. 2, 4 12). It can be

said that pradhana, as told by Smrti, is the support,

because it is the cause of all. Or, it may be the wind; for
the wind is said '
to be the thread on which all these
worlds and beings are strung together' (Br. 3, 7, 2). Or,
again, inasmuch as the word 'atman' lsused with refUMO!
to the support, it may be the individual soul. For though
it is finite, it can be said to be the support of the objects
of experience, on account of its being theauthor of actions.
 ;.m, 80.1 117

To this we reply. The use of the word 'atman'

on account of its pervasive and sentient character, is
adequate only with reference to Brahman, and not to
the non-intelligent pradhana or the finite soul. Corres-
ponding to this word ' atman of the Mundaka, Brahman
'

is designated by the word 'Sat' in tie Chandogyo-

panisad; 'All these creatures have their root in the
Sat, their residence in Sat, and their support in Sat' (6,
8, 4). Again, in the passages preceding -, 1,10) and foll-
owing (2, 2, 1 1) the passage from Mundaka quoted in the
beginning (2, 2, 5), Brahman alone is mentionedby various
terms such as ' Purusa,' ' penance,' ' para ', ' immortal,'
and others. The Purusa is all this, sacrifice, penance.
'

Brahman, the highest and the immortal;' 'That immortal

Brahman is before and behind, to the tight and to the left.'

Jt is likely that one may think at this point that the

support will make us aware also o: o: her ihings which have
this support, and that the expression ' Brahman is all this'
implies that Brahman is manifold in nature, just as a tree,
in spite of its unity, consists of different parts such as
branches, stem and roots. In other words, there may
arise a duallstic conception of the world and the Brahman
as separate from each other Brahman considered as rhe
;

substantive and the world as adjectival. It is therefore

inorder to ward off this suggestion that, in the passage
under discussion, we ate told to know 'him as the support
or as the one Atman only.' The Atman is not to be
consideted as many and as qualified by rhis world of
manifold effects; rathef it is to be known as one homogene-
ous substance or support after removing from the mind
the false knowledge of this worldly existence. If one
isasked to bring the seat on which Devadatta is seated,
he brings the seat and not the man. So the passages Know
'

him alone as the Atman,' Brahman alone is all this,'

'

'
The Atman is, like a piece of salt altogether, both
inside and outside, full oi knowledge (Bf. 4, 5, 13), all
'

aim at removing the wrong notion of the reality of this

world. From death to death he goes, who sees
'
118 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

any duality here '

(Ka. 2, I, 10) has been described the
fate of the believer in the unreal world. That which is
"
all ' is said to be in reality nothing but
Brahman not ;

that which is Brahman is intended to be 'all* or many.

The ' to be cancelled, and the Brahman retained.
all ' is

As for word ' bridge ' (setu) we must not be

the
led away by what it suggests viz. that there is another
tank, just as we most not suppose it as one made up of
wood and clay. Rather, must we catch the meaning of
it, the idea of holding together or lending support, which
is in the etymology of the word, vis.
'
si ' to bind. Or,

as suggested by some others, the bridge here indicates

the means of attaining Immortality, which consists of
the knowledge of the At man and the leaving off of idle
talk, as recommended in the passage. It does not refer
to the support of the heaven, the earth etc., and therefore
the question of talcing the word 'bridge' to mean pradhana
or something else than Brahman does not arise.

fiThlu«JU|^»^|r| I
1

It is a common experience of us all that we become

subject to love and hatred because certain things which
promote the well-being of the body please us, and certain
other things which are harmful displease us. Disease
and death to the body fill us with horror and infatuation,
and yet being misled by avidya, the feeling, that I am '

the body anJ other things of the not-self, binds us to

perpetual misery. As against this condition of bondage,
it is pointed out that the destination of the released is the
Brahman. It is fit for them to resort to the support
of heaven, earth etc., because ' When He who is both the
cause and the effect is seen, the knots of the heart are
 i. m, «8.4 119

broken, all doubts are solved and the actions cease to

,

effect (Mu, 2, 2, 8), and because, being free from the

bondage of name and form, the wise man reaches theself-
effulgent Person,who is greater than the great avyakta '

(Mu. 3, 2, 8). Other Sruti passages too mention the

Brahman as the fit abode of the released When all the r '

desires go away from his heart, he becomes immortal,

and attains to Brahman in this very life (Br. 4, 4, 7).
'

Pradhana and other entities, on the other hand, are not

admitted by any as fit objects to be achieved by the
released. Besides, the condition of leaving off all speech,
in order to know the support of the heaven and the earth
etc. as told by the Mundakopanisad. is exactly the same
condition as told by the Brhadarapyaka to know the
Brahman. The two upanisads prove thereby that the
support of the heaven etc. is Brahman alone. 'The wise
man should first know the Atman and fix his mind upon
that alone, and should cease to talk many words, for it
"
is nothing but weariness (Br. 4, 4, 21).

HI£HIHHcHJ*y^l *
[Nfltiot; anumdnaih-irtjercnci; amt-iabiiit-oaimi to want
of any word indicating it.J

There is not a single word which will exclusively

1 pradhana, or vayu; we cannot
therefore take
them as support of the heaven etc. On the othet hand,
terms like 'Omniscient" etc. indicate that the support
isan intelligent being (Mu. 1, 1, 9)-

{PTdva-bhrt-heaen of life; ca-and].

(Wnrl ™p »., D m of phSnA fi. C. THE INDIVIDUAL

 i
120 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

The individual soul to cannot be the support of

heaven etc., because though it can be called as intelligent
and atman, it is not omniscient. Besides being limited
by upadhis, it is not all-pervading. The jiva maybe
considered as an instrumental cause of this world, because
the unseen store of merit and demerit of thejiva requires
the world for enjoying the fruits but on no account
;

thejiva can be called the material cause of the world.

^? s M"i^ii^ 1

IBhedaiiyapadiiiit-dUtinction being shown,]

The passage 'Know him as the Atman' indicates

the knower as the jiva, and the known Atman a;' '

separate from it. The jiva is that which has the desire
ofmoksa; hence Brahman indicated by the word Atman '

is the support of the heaven etc.

[Pra$aranat-because of context}.

The whole chapter deals with the nature of the

highest Atman. It begins with the inquiry as towhatit
may be, which when known, everything else becomes
known (Mvi. I, 1, 3). So it is the knowledge of the
Brahman which is referred to here.

Stfcti \iiiiiiibhyaih-on account of presence and eating,"

ca-flnd.]
AMD EATING (INDICATE BRAHMAN AND J1VA RESPECTIVELY).

That Brahman is the support of the heaven and the

earth etc. (as mentioned in iiie ruiiige uudii discussion:
Mu. 2, 2, 5) is again strengthened by a further pas-
sage in the Mundakopanisad (3, 1, 1) where 'the
two birds, tilt- inseparable [Link] of each other' are
mentioned asthelsvara and the jiva. One of them is refer-
red to as being merely present, and the other as eating
the fruits of actions. Had ihete been no reference to Isvara
first in the passage 2, 2, 5, as the support of the heaven

etc., a reference to him, all of a sudden, in J, 1,1, and in

distinction from the jiva, is entirely without meaning.
The same is not however, true of the jiva, who unlike
ISvara is an object of common experience. Therefore,
even a casual reference to jiv.i ruterwards without a prior
reference need not strike us as unreasonable. The motive
of the Sruti is to mate us acquainted from the very begin-
ning wjrh the fact that Isvara, who is not the object of
common experience, is the support of the heaven etc. and
that he is distinct from thej'Tva whois limited by upadhis.
Totake the jiva to be the supporter of the heaven etc.
in the first passage is to render the reference to Iivara
in the second passage out of place to suppose the ISvara-
to be so, however is noi to tinder be rei "erence tojiva un
'

called for. but to explain the fact that jiva though identical
with Brahman is considered as separate because it eats
the fruits of its actions.

Out conclusion remains unaffected even though the

two birds are taken to mean the buddhi and the [Link] less
jiva, as stated in the Paingi Upanisad. For, just as the
akasa contained in a jar is nothing but the infinite akasa
without the even so the jiva is nothing else but the
jar,
highest Atman, when viewed without the adjunct* ol

internal organ body etc. Our contention is (1) that

the jiva as limited by the upSdhis is not the support of
the heaven etc ; but (2) that the highest Atman is the
 122

support. According Co Paingi Upanisad too the jiva

appears different in different bodies is not the sup-
tli.i!

port ; but the upadhik-si jiv.i who is identical with the

highest Atman is the support. The conclusion of the
two passages therefore i '

PRAS1A KEEPS AWA(e). 8

The seventh chapter of the Chandogyopanisid

begins wi! ha dialogue between Narada and Sanatkumara.
Appro idling with huimhiya.-; a disciple, Narada requests
Sanatkumara to initiate him in the knowledge of the
Atman, so that hemay berelieved of his worldly sorrows.
In the course of the conversation, Narada asks if there
was anything greater than name; and Sanatkumara says in
reply that it was speech. Then there is a series of ques-
tions and answers as to which is greater and greater Mill,
so that, every succeeding member of the series becomes
greater or higher in importance than the one preceding.
Following the name, we get the series consisting of speech,
mind, sankalpn, eiitA. dhyfina. vijiiana, power, food, water,
fire, memory, hope and
akasa, prana (7, 1 to 15). And
a little later (7, 23 and 24) Sanatkumara says: 'One must
know the Bhiiman (i. c. the great) which when known,
one sees nothing else; hears nothing else, and when one
'.
sees something else, hears something else, that is little
'
it the prana, or whether, in connection with Narada'e
grief, we should mean by it the highest Atman, know-
ledge of which alone would remove that grief ?

According to pilrvapaksa the ' BhGman ' means

the prana; for, (1) though there is series of questions and
answers as to what is greater and greater still, from the
name to the prana, there is no such question or answer
after the positinj; c:"rr;In.i \±- thegreatestof all. (2) But
soon after, the Bhuman is so described as to mean prana.
i3i [Link] calls the person who knows the prana

as the
'
ativadin ' i. e. one who can make a statement
regarding the greatest of all things, and recommends

that such a person need not disown that he is an ati- '

vadin ' (7, 15, 4). (4) Therefore, the sentence which
follows this, but precedes the description of Bhuman,
i'i;. But this person who speaks the truth is the real
'

(7, 16, 1) does not refer to something else but

'
itivSdjn
refers to the greatness of prana alone. The pronoun
this person ' refers to the person who knows
1
' '
this in
the greatness of prana; so without breaking away from
the topic of prana, the description goes on from the
ativadin of prana, through another series, so to say, from
truth to Bhuman. Bhuman therefore means prana.
(5) That Bhuman indicates a condition in which one does
not see or hear anything else need not offer any difficulty,
because the same may be seen to be applicable to prana.
In deep sleep when all other senses become merged in
prana (Pra 4 2 3) it is the prana that keeps awake.
(ejThe'Bliss'ofv^ilh-;- : ;?
explained as belonging to prana because in deep sleep,
when the jiva sees no dream, there is happiness (Pra. 4. 6)
(71 Similarly, the -immortality' of Bhuman (Cha. 7, 24, 1)

may refer to prana also (Kau. 3, 2). (8) That the

Upa-
nisad begins with the statement, that the know edge
of the Atman enables one to overcame grief, need not
consi-
again deter us from holding that prana alone is
dered here as the Atman of all; for in the seventh
the
chapter itself (15, 1) we are told that praija alone is
 '
Father, mother, brother, sister, teacher and Brahmana.'
(t>) Besides, prana is conceived as the nave of the ' '

wheel in which all the 'spokes' of the things in the

world are fixed; prana, therefore, is conceived as Bhuman.

To thia we reply.(1) The sdtra clearly states that

the reference to Bhuman comes after the reference to
'
Sariiprasada ' or the joy. That sariiprasada points to
deep sleep and not to jiva is clear again from its separate
mention along with the waking and dreaming conditions
(Br. 4, 3, 15). As prana alone is awake in deep sleep
'
Sariiprasada' then indicates the prana to which it belongs.
So the Bhuman which is described Jater than prana must
indicate an entity different from prana. (2) On the other
hand, if Bhuman were the same as prana, there would be
no sense in saying that prana is mentioned after prana.
The series ni member* beL'ii'.ninjf with ' name' and ending
with '
prana ' has in it every term as different and new
from its preceding term. It is natural therefore to hold
thatwhat is told about Bhuman is different and new from
what is first told about the prana. (3) The statement
regarding the ativadin is not made exclusively with
' '

regard to the man who has the knowledge of prana, as

our opponent supposes, but it is made a second time and
by way of contrast regarding an altogether different man
with special reference to his knowledge of truth. (4)
This too may be challenged, and it may be pointed out
that a truth-speaking Agnihotrin is not an Agnihotrin
because he speaks the truth, but because he performs the
agnihotra, and yet truth-speaking is bis special quality.
Similarly, truth-speaking may be pointed out as a special
quality of the person who is called ativadin on account
of his knowledge of prana; not that the person is ativadin
simply because he speaks the truth. But to offer this
explanation is not only to give up the direct meaning of
theSruti passage according to which the ativadin becomes
so on account of truth ', but also to ignore the meaning
'

of the particle but which intends to break away, by

' '

way of contrast, from the context of prana, and to begin

 ADHYAYA 1, PA. Ill, SU . 8 125

with the new topic of the person who is known as

ativadin

through truth. In short, the quality of being an ativadin

docs not refer to the knowledge of prana,
but to that of
Brahman through the series of truth and other things.
(5) Nor does it stand to
reason to suppose that a new to-
pic has not been introduced
.-imply bee.' use the question-

arid- 1 he-answer form is not

there. When the conversa-
tion goes on regarding a
brahmin who has studied one
great
Veda if someone says about another, but he is
'

without
who has studied four Vedas ", we do understand
the question and the answer that a new topic has been
introduced. Similarly, even though there is no new
entities
question asked by Narada, after the hierarchy of
being
was closed by the mention of prana, Sanatkumara,
Hied with compassion, tells as if, oi ins own
accord, ihat

the uimIi-v of [Link]^[Link] is :s!se 'King, if it arises

.l

false thing hke

merely on account of the knowledge of a
priin.i. rut that he alone is an ativadin
who becomes so
hi .[Link] of truth. Now this truth is nothing but
Uuhman truth, knowledge
Brahman: lor as Srm rdls i
is '

.iv,d infinite
"
(Tai 2. U. It is this way (hat Narada is
m
led on beyond prana by a series of steps of
Vijnani eic.
to Bhiiman. which is the same as the highest At
man or
the truth, the k::0(vleJ ;e or which would really
mate a
;

person an ativadin. This interpretation ol ours is

16)
discission
quite consistent with the genesis of the whole
«s. the grief of [Link].i and lu = desire to put a slop to it
by means of the knowledge of the Atman, as also with
the result of the inqutrv, vi;.' his faults being removed,
revered
he was shown the other side of darkness' by the
atman
Sanatkumara{Cha.7.l.3anJ7.:6.2i. Theword
and toe
cannot be applied in the real sense to prana;
tessitmn u: grief cannot take place without the
knowledge
to moksa
of the Atman. There is no other path
'

!Sv,.. fi. 151. That [Link] the last wordagain, .s

(7)
of Sanatkumira's teaching is seen from the ractthat
n is
the Atman
further told thai ;he prana springs forth from
'

topic
alone' (Cha. 7, 26, 1 ). Neither can it be said that the
one
of Atman comes and that therefore
last of all,
126

is freeto say thai; Bhiiman is praija '.

"
For being asked
by Narada as to the abode of the Bhuman, Sanatkumln
answers that he resides in his own glory (7, 24, 1), and
further continues the same topic of the Bhuman to the
end of the chapter, with the only change of the word
Atman for Bhuman. The greatness of the Bhiiman as
well as its self-existence are far more fittingly applicable
to the Atman than to prana.

{[Link]; upapctte fi-bemg jit; ca-and.}

Atman) agree, (BhOman is Atman). 9

(1) The inapplicability of ordinary perception and,

other sense-activities to Bhiiman is found to be the same
in the case of the Atman too. '
Where one sees nothing
else, hears nothing else etc. That is the Bhuman ' (Cha.
7, 24, 1). Identically the same we read in another Smti
passage regarding the Atman, ' When all this becomes
the Atman, who should see whom?' (Br.. 4, 5, 15).
Regarding prana, too, it can be said that during deep sleep
there is the absence of activities; but if we remember that
the topic under discussion is Atman, we shall see that the
alleged absence of activities, instead of re/erring to prana,
merely means the inapplicability of them to the Atman.
inasmuch as the Atman is not attached to anything,
(2) The bliss of deep sleep, again, does not refer to prana
but to Brahman or Bhuman, because it is ' great and not '

'
little ' (Cha. 7, 23, 1). And because it removes the
ordinary pleasure which is mined with misery, the bliss
of the Atman is also spoken of as the "highest ' and a,
constituting its very nature, 'on a small portion of which
all the creatures live ' (Br. 4, 3, 32). (3) The immorta-
lity of Bhuman again (Ch.i 7, 24, l)>as distinguished from
the relative immortality of long life of prana or other
things, is intended to remind us that Bhuman is Brahman
 '

;. m, 80.10 127

or the ultimate cause of all, excepting which, as the

Brhadaranyaka says, everything else is perishable (3, 4, 2).
(4) Similarly, the qualities of truth, omnipresence, Self-
existence and being the Self of all, mentioned as belonging
to BhSman, can belong to the highest Atman also.

\ WIRlftWWJ (?"-(*) I

} INCtUDlNa AKASA. 10

"What is that 'asked G.;r>;i, " 111 which the akasa, in

its turn, is filled in all directions ?' ' It is Aksara, as the
', replied Yajnavslkyaf It is neither [Link]
Brahmanns say
nor small etc' (Br. 3, 8, 7; 8). Now
the doubt that
ariseshere is whether the word 'aksara' means a syllable
or the highest Atman.

The purvapaksa view is that aksara means by con-

vention a syllabic. The '
[Link] '
(or the
collection of fourteen Sutras which Panim, the gram-
miirhn is said to have received from godSankara) contains
in it such syllables. Sruti mentions this 'all as Orh
fChii. 2, 21, 4); and as a symbol of Brahman, it is said
to be the Atman of all, and as such, fit to be meditated

To this we reply that aksara means the highest

Atman. Having firstmentioned that all the things in
the world, either of the past, the present or the future
have their support in the akasa Yajiiavalkya, further tells
Gargi that the akasa too finds its support in the aksara;
but to be the support of all things cannot be the quality
of any being except Brahman. Aksara therefore means,
in the first place, that which is not ksara or perishable;
 ;

and secondly, [Link] wmdi pervades (from the root 'sis' to

'pervade'). Altera then means Brahman. That Oft is
said to be all this is simply a sort of praise, because Om
is considered as a symbol of Brahman for meditation.

A follower of the Sankhya school may say that if

cause can be said to be the support of all its effect, then
the aksara too may be construed to mean pradhana, and
not necessarily Brahman. To this the Sutrakara repKeW

[Sa-ihis: ca-and; praiihanat-because of cammatid.l

This (lending of support) es dub to

(or god). U
It is due to the command of this aksara,
'
Gargi O
that the sunand the moon stand supported (Br. 3, 8, 9)
and the command must be the work of God alone, and
not of the non-intelligent pradhana, for otherwise day
also may recalled to produce ajar on account of a command.

[Anya (digercnt)-bha\ia (mtUTc)-vyavrttc/i-being excluded.]

DIFFERENT

The aksara has been described as unseen but a

"

unheard but hearing, unperceived hut perceiving ...v.

(Br.8, 3, 11). No doubt, the qualities of being 'unseen,'
'
unheard etc. may be said to belong to the pradhana
'

but the other opposing qualities which, at the same tint

belong to the Aksara are found lacking in the non
Ltrdliiyiit pradhana. Aksara, therefore, is not pradhina.
Similarly the same passage which tells us that there '
 ..at, sO. 13 129

is no other seer but the ak^ara, no other hearer or knower

but the ak$ara, excludes the possibility of the plurality
of individual souls. Nay, the upadhis too are excluded
from the nature of theaksara for it is said to be 'without
;

pn, without ears, and without speech or mind etc.'

(J, 8, 8). So the akjara does not mean the embodied
soul at all. Undoubtedly, then, it is nothing else but
Brahman.

THE HIGHEST BRAHMAN, I

of Orh). 13

During the course of the discussion of meditation

on Orh, in the fifth section of the Prainopanisad, the sage
[Link] rolls Satyakama that ic is by means of this' Orh
which is both the saguna and the nirguna Brahman,
that a person attains to one of them,' and that he who
meditates on Oih with its three parts, a, u, rh, goes to the
highest Purusa (5, 2 ; 5, 5). The doubt that may arise
in this connection is whether the object of meditation
is the lower or the higher Brahman.

According to the piirvapaksa, it is the lower Brahman ;

for one who meditates on Oifi consisting of three parts,
enters first into the sun, and from there he is carried by
the Skman to Brahmaloka, a locality which is restricted
by limits, and which therefore cannot be the fit reward
for one who has known the higher Brahman. No doubt,
such a man is said to reach the 'highest' or 'para- Purusa";
but the word ' para * has got only relative significance
with reference to the physical body which is gross. So
the 'para-Purusa' is nothing but the Hiranyagarbha or the
Brahmaloka.

To this we reply. The nirguria or the highest

Brahman alone is the object of meditation. For, this
same object of meditation is spoken of afterwards as the
object of sight. The man who meditates beholds tlv '

Person of hia meditation too," the person who dwells

in the town of body, and who is greater than the jlva-
ghanaor the Hiranyagarbha. If it is a question of medita-
tion alone, it matters little if the object of meditation is
even imaginary ; a rope can be meditated upon as a serpent.
But it the meditation of a thing is to turn into a vision,
the object must be real and existing. And so the trans-
cendent Being which is spoken of as the object of sight
of the devotee wim mcJi :.::;; [Link] ir musi he an existine
.

entity. It is the highest Atman, the object of both

meditation and ;hc perrl-crcd ^idi: or intuirion i it is not
the lord of Brahmaloka for he may be the object of
meditation, but not of intuition because the reality that
belongs to him is imaginary and due to upadhis.

An objection may be raised in this connection. It

may be pointed out that so far as meditation is concerned
the person is said to be transcendent simply
'
' but when ;

the person is said to be in;uiteJ. he is described as trans- '

cending the transcendent Jivaghana.' How should one

know then that the person as the object of meditation
and the person as the object of vision are not two but
one and the same person ?

The persons appear as two, we say in reply, if the

'jivaghana ' is supposed to be the object of meditation,
so that the Person "transcending the jlvaghana' wi"
be a different person as the object of sight. What
we hold is that the jlvaghana is not at all the object of
meditation, as is clear from the two words ' para ' and
'purusa " which arc both present in both the passages
dealing with meditation and vision. It is the
'
trans-
 ..in, bu. 13 131

cendent Purusa 'or the highest Almm which is the object

of meditation and continues to be the object of vision
too. As for the meaning of the word jlvaghana ' which '

again is said to be 'transcendent.' we solve the compound

not as that which is '
composed of (ghana) the jivas,' but
as 'one having the characteristics of ih; jiva.' Now this
liv..i[h;nv! or iTv.i. rhfi^h. in reality, it is the same as the
Atman. is to be understood as limited on account of its upi-
dhis, just as a piece of salt, though it is in essence nothing
but salt in general, is ,i sperm,- different portion from it
on account of its being limited. And the jlvaghana ia
said to be 'transcendent,' because tt transcends the senses
and their objects. And yet we have to remember that
in spite of the transcendent character of the jlvaghana,
ic is not the object either of meditation or of vision. As
said above, it is the Purusa ot Brahman which' transcends
the transcendent iTvaghana ', and is the object both of
meditation and of vision.

Or, jlvaghana may he iti::ipiv-ed. as some others do it,

iurhc Br. hm aloha, the residence of Brahmadeva or as Brah-
;

madeva himself. The Brahmaloka is said to be higher than all

other lokas or worlds, and the Brahmadeva or the Hiran-
yagarbha is said to be the cosmic Person including in him
all the jivas. So when it is said that the man who meditates

upon the Oiti with its three parts is lifted by the power of
the Saman-hymns to the Brahmaloka, it means that he docs
not stop here, hut goes further along with the jlvaghana
or Brahmadeva in having the visum of the highest Atman
which transcends the iiva L'turi,'. and yet is the jn-dweller
of all the [Link], we come to the same conclu-
sion that the hides'- A'nii'n who transcends the trans-
cendent Brahmaloka along with the Lord of that lob,
istheonlyobject both of meditatioi '

Besides, Srutialso tells us that para-Puru sa means Brah-

';'lii£h-r;lyin the! J uru ; i3 (here is norhnij;; and that [Link]
'"*-? the end of all'
(Ka. i, 3, 11). So it is this highest
or the nirgurta Brahman
which was first distinguished
132 VEDANTA EXPIAINED

from the lower or the saguria Brahman, but [Link] was

with the la tc-r identic,?! with
said to be along Orii, ia Cold

afterwards as the object of both meditation and vision.

"That a man becomes free from sin, asa snake becomes free
-
from slough (Pr. 5,5) shows us further that this freedom
from -in mu.=.: proceed a refill of meditation on the high-
,-,:,

est Atman. and not from meditation on anyrhing different

from the highest Atman. Then, again, the man who
meditates on Orii as the aaguna aspect of the Atman
need not be said to receive a small re war J by way of his
being lifted to Brahmaloka rather it is his first reward.
;

For in course of time he may get the highest reward,

[Link] clear vision of the Atman and become free. In

other words, he atrains to moksa by degrees along with

the lord of the Brahmaloka.

^T i^i I *8
JDaharfl -small; uaarebhyai-dtts to what follows.]

THE HIGHEST AtMAn) O

In a passage of the Chandogyopanisad (8, 1) one is

recommended to 'search and understand that small portion
of aka£a, which is inside the small lotus-like palace of the
City of body (Brahmapura).' Now, inasmuch as the
word akasa means both the elemental akasa and Brahman,
we must settle in which of the two senses the word
dahara' is used. Similarly, the word -Brahmapurs"
which means theci ty of Brahma may mean either the city of
the jiva or of the Brahman, and so may give rise to a
further doubt as to whether the jiva or the Brahman is
the lord of the city.

According to purvapak$a, (1) the dahara or the small

akaia means the elemental akasa (the bhutakasa); for that
is the conventional meaning of the word akasa
No
 of
small, because it is located in the heart.
...i And though
there is one akasa, ft is conceived for the purpose of
meditation as two, one inside and the other outside;
and hence a coal p anson :; possible between them and
they are said to De equally large allowing ' heaven and
earth to contain in them (Cha 8, I, 3). (2) Or the word
'

'
dahara '
may mean the individual soul, inasmuch as
the word '
Brahma '
means jiva in a subsidiary manner ;
and hence the word ' Brahma pura " would mean the city
in the form of body of that jiva ; and the jTva in its
turn, would be known as the lord of the city of body,
inasmuch as it has acquired it as a result ofactions.
It dwells in the heart, because it is the seat of mind; and

it is spoken of as small because it is compared to the point

of a goad (Sve. 5, 8), That it is compared with the

all -pervading akasa only shows that it is not different
from Brahman. (3) Or again, the "dahara' may bean attri-
bute of something else residing inside the small akasa.
which itself is inside the heart. But on no account can
it be said that 'dahara
'
means Brahman, because Brahman
is not connected with the body.

In reply to this we say that dahara kas.i means nothing

but the highest Atman for in what follows after the
;

statement of dahara, a possible question regarding the

nature of that which is to be searched and understood
is anticipated on the part of the disciples, and the reply

which the teacher ought to give is stated thus; " the akaSa
Within the heart is as large as the elemental akasa. and
hence contains within it heaven and earth, lire and wind
etc' (Cha. 8, 1,2-3], This means that the teacher's reply
is intended to silence the possible doubt of his disciples

who must have thought that the heart is small,

that the akasa within it must be smaller still, and
that, therefore, it may contain nothing which is to
be searched and understood, in other words, the teacher
first wishes to cancel the erroneous idea that the 'dahara'

is small because the heart inside which it is located is

 ;

134

small, by declaring that it is as large as the elemental

akasa; and secondly, because he compares the inner with
the outer akasa, it can be said that he wishes to cancel the
equally erroneous idea that the dahara means the elemen-
tal akasa, and thereby suggest that the two are different
entities. Comp:irisnn require* two things which have
a real difference between them and which at the same time
arc similar. Akasa being one cannot be compared with
itself; and even supposing that there is a difference between
the inner and outer akasa, the two cannot be compared in
point of extent. We may suppose an imaginary difference,
only when there is no possibility of an actual difference
which, however, is possible if by dahara we mean the
highest A:man. If some one would say on this account
that the highest Atman (supposing dahara to be the
Atman) too cannot be com p. ire J ivirh the .iki'isa, inasmuch
as'
the Atman is greater than akasa (Sat.
' Bra. 10, 6, 3, 2),
we have to reply that the intention of the comparison
of the dahara with the elemental akasa is only to negative
the smallness of the dahara, which is erroneously ascribed
to it on account of its being enclosed by the lotus of the
heart, and not to indicate its extent. Nor can it he
said that the purpose of the comparison is twofold, viz.
to negate the erroneous idea and to indicate the extent
for the science of Mimamsa forbids us to have two mean-
ings of one and the same sentence. Besides, if dahara
means only a small portion ofakisa enclosed by the lotus of
the heart and is so conceived as to be different from the ele-
mental akasa on account of the upadhi, it is impossible :hn.t
itwill contain within itself the heaven and the earth etc.
And finally, the dahara cannot be the bhutakasa, because
the qualities, which belong to the Atman and are ascribed
to the dahara, cannot belong to the n on- intelligent bhuta-
kasa. The dahara, which is, in the immediately following
passage, referred to as the Atman by the pronoun ' this,"
is mentioned as free from sin, old age, death, grief, hunger,

and thirst it is mentioned again as one whose purposes

;

and desires are the embodiment of truth (Cha. 8, 1, 5).

The dahara then is the highest Atman.
 .[Link]. 14 135

Dahara does not mean the individual soul also,

though the word atman may mean it. For, in the first
place, being enclosed in the small lotus of the heart, and
being ej;ceedingly small like the point of a goad, how
can it be compared with the elemental aklsa which is
allpervading and is the support of heaven and earth
etc.? If, to escape this difficulty, it be said that the

individual soul is in reality not different from Brah-

man, and therefore it is that one may ascribe these
attributesto it, the reply would be that they may
be more appropriately attributed directly to the
Brahman itself rather than to the individual soul. The
daharakasa then would connote the Brahman and not
the jiva. Secondly, the word 'Brahmapura' need not
mean the city in which the individual soul resides,
but with reference to the word Brahma ", it means the'

city of Brahman. In the Ptasnopanisad we are told

that the devotee beholds the transcendent Puru?a
'

as Jwellin-.- in the citv of body ' (5,5) ;

'
This Purusa
dwells in the bodies of all ' {Br. 2, 5, IS). learn from We
Sruti, then, that this body is not only the abode of Brah-
man but is useful for its realization. And even supposing
that Brahmapura means the city of jiva, the Sruti passage
intends to inform us primarily that Brahman reside.-; in
the body in close prosimity with the devotee, jusi as the
image of Visnu is said to be available in
the Sahgrama
stone. Add "to this, in the third place, what is rold in
a further passage of the [Link] ?ad
regarding
the imperishable nature of the results which accrue from
the knowledge of the daharakasa, in contrast with the
perishable nature of the results of works, and it becomes
absolutely clear that the dahara means the highest Atman
and not the individual soul. '
Those who, after having
is the only imperishable
object
realised the Atman, which
of desire, depar- from thi world, become tree to move
-

anywhere rhey like (Cha. 8, 1, 6).

'

As regards the further point of the piirvapaksa

that the object to be sought for and understood is not the
136 VIDANTA EXPLAINED

daharakasa but something else contained in it, we have to

point out that the comparison of the outer with the
inner akasa then will not serve any purpose. Instead
of comparing the two aklUas, the teacher might have,
in that case, given some information regarding the contents
of the daharakasa. If the daharakasa is told to he as
large as the bhutakaja for the simple reason we should
become aware that heaven and earth, etc. are held within
it, which is inconceivable on the face of it. the remaining

Eorrjon of the section which deals with the dahara would

'
e entnely out of place. The words ' This ' and ' and
which reftr to the sinless Atman and to persons who
attain fteedom by knowing the Atman and the desires
located w
the Atman, refer necessarily to the previously
mentioned daharakasa and the heaven and earth etc.,
contained in it. In other words, both the beginning and
the end of the Sruti section intimate to us that the
daharakasa means the highest Atman only.

«lT<Hil«^l**H tWT ft TO f?5T[^i d

U FOB IT ARE AVAILABLE);

(TOO > »T«UOO). IS

of the contest of dahara, we are told

i

unto Brahma loka, everyday,

.' because they are attracted

outside by untruth. (Chi. S, 3, 2). It is cleat that here the

wotd ' beings ' is used for individual souls, and the wotd
'
Brahmaloka ' for dahara. So, dahara means Brahman.
In another place of the Chandogyopanisad (6, 8, 1)
weiead that'dunng sleep the jiva becomesone with the
Truth.' In the light of the <jruti meaning, probably,
we say of a man who has gone to sleep, that he is taking
 .iii,!u.l6 137

rest in Brahman. Same may like ta dissolve the compound

Brahmaloka as lie oka of" Brahma
'
I and so mean thereby
!
'

the world of the Brahmadeva. But instead of treating

the compound as rjasfhi-tatpurusa, if we take it as Karma-
dharaya, we shall dissolve it as '
Brahman, the same as
Brahmaloka.' And the reason
not accepting the for
first meaning is that it is absurd to believe that people

go everyday to the world of Brahmadeva. Brahmaloka,

therefore, which is put for dahara is nothing but Brahman.
Dahara then is Brahman.

#« Tfiftfrts?Tl ftH*d H«'q '

: 1
W
{Dhrtt/i-becaus! trf support; [Link]/i-bc&itise of
greati:ejj; asya of this; asinm in him; ubuliblidcA-haiutsc
it is found.]

highest God). 16

The same Jahn]-;it:.!s.i which was first characterised

as Lii'iisi: inside the lotus of the heart, which was compared
then with bhiitakasa, and shown as the support of heaven
and earth etc., and which was then declared as the Atman
and so being free from sins, is further said to be the sup-
port and the bank which prevents the worlds from com-
ing to a chaos (Cha. 8, 4, 1). Just asa dam prevents the
flood of water from carrying away the crops in the fields,
even so, this Atman prevents the various people who
differ in castes, asramas and mental equipment, from being
mixed together and confused. It is this greatness of
dahara which has been shown by 5ruti as belonging to
the highest God It is by the command of this Aksara.
'
;

O Gargi, that the Sun and the moon are held up (Br..
3, 8, 9) '
He is the highest God, the Lord and the pro-
;

tector of all beings, the support and the dam to prevent

the people from falling into confusion' (Br. 4, 4, 22).
fehara, therefore, is the highest God.
 IPrasiddhefi-being welMpioum; ca-an&\.

MAN, DAHARA IS BRAHMAN). 17

Sruti passage like- '[Link] .ibne manifests the names

and forms' {Cha. 8, 14), 'ill these beings spring forth
from akasa (Chi. '
1, 9, 1], show that the word akasa
means Brahman. Ic will lead to no meaning if we take
akasa in the sense of bhiiukasa; for we have already seen
that akasa cannot be compared with itself.

MAY BE THE jI VA). IS

If dahara means the highest God on account of a

reference to the latter in a passage subsequent to the one
in which dahara it discussed, then the word dahara may
mean the individual soul also, on account of a similar
reason. The purvapaksin may say so, and bring forth the
evidence thus It is this
:
'
Saihprasada which after
' '

having risen from this body meets the highest Light arid
appears in one's own form, that is known as the Atman
(Cha. 8, 3, 4). Now the word 'Saihprasada ', which
usually conveys the meaning of deep sleep according to
other Sruti passages, must convey the same meaning
in this passage also, and so refer to the individual soul
who alone is said to be qualified by deep sleep. And just
as wind and other elements ate said to arise from akasa
which is their support, even so the individual soul rises
up from this body; and just as the word Skai* means the
highest God (asshown hy the Vedantin in the previous
Sutra) even though it is not ordinarily done so, bemuse
the word is used along with the qualities of God, even
so, the word dahara may denote the individual soul,
because the qualities of " Sarhprasada etc. (asshown above)
'

refer to it only.

We say in reply that this is not possible. For, in

the first place, the individual soul which falsely thinks
itself to be limited by the adjuncts of buddhi etc. cannot
be compared with the unlimited akasa. And secondly,
qualitiessuch as freedom of sin etc. cannot belong to
a beingwhich erroneously thinks itself bound by upadhis.
This has already been explained, in the first Surra of this
adhikarana (1, 3, H), but we mention it again only to
remove the additional doubt of the soul being thought
of as different from the Atman. That the so-called
reference to the individual •ou] i=. js a matter of fact, a
reference to the Brahman will be shown in Sutra 1, 3, 20.

The aim of the preceding Siitra was to show that

dahara cannot be the jTva inasmuch as qualities such as
freedom from sin etc. which are spoken of as belonging to
dahara, and which are found only in ihe highest Atman,
are not found to belong to the jiva. And yet the argu-
ment of the purvapaksa may be revived, and presented
in anew form, in view of the dialogue which comes aftet
dahara-vidya, between Indta and Virocana on the one
 140 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

hand, and Prajapati on the other. The utterance of Praja-

pati at the outset (Cha. 8, 7, 1) is dealt with reference

to the Atman who is free from sin, old age, death, hunger,
thirst,mourningetc; and it is this Atman, says Prajapati,
who must be sought for and realized. And yet, again
and over again, promising that he would explain the nature
of the Atman, he points to the existence of the individual
soul only. For instance, he first tells Indra and Virocana
that the person seen in the eye is the Atman, thereby
mJuMTint: cliiii it is nothing hut rhj individual soul in
the wakeful condition {8, 7, 4). He again refers to the
same individual soul in its dreaming and sleeping conditions
by pointing out to Indra its joyful wanderings and perfect
repose f«. 10,1, and 8,11, 1), And yet he says that the
[Link] is the immortal, fearless Brahman. Further
when Indra complains that the sleeping soulrecognises
neither itself nor anything else, Prajapati once again
promises to instruct him in the true nature of the Atman
and [Link] else. But once again, censuring the body he
exhibits the jiva alone as the 'excellent Purusa,' inasmuch
as it is the jiva. us he says, which rises in the form of
1

Satiiprasada from the body, meets the highest Light

'

and appears in its own form (8, 11, 3 and 8, 12, 3). From
this it appears that the qualities of the highest God are
possible in the individual soul; and so one may say that
the daharakasa within the heart means the individual

Wesay in reply that what Prajapati means to convey

is not that individual soul which, as the purvapaksin
has understood, is qualified by the three states of wakeful,
dreaming and sleeping consciousness, butthat individual
soul which has manifested in its real nature, or its own form,
after rising beyond the consciousness of body and after
coming in contact with the highest Light, vis. the Brahman,
which is free from sin etc. The individual soul referred
to in this Sutra (and in the preceding Sutra as against
the purvapaksin) is nothing hut the nighest Brahman,
the nature of which is eternal, unchanging consciousness
 ADHVAYA I, FA. III. SU. 19 141

or pure intelliRerx-i' .inJ ; ciipr-.-s.v-J by such [>ro positions

i.

as ' I am Brahman.' and That art thou.' It is not the

'

false individual, the aggrejpte of body, sense and mind,

the notion of which arises on account of avidyii. and which
therefore can be compared to the wrong notion arising
out of illusion. The person who has ' known the Brahman
and has therefore ' become the Brahman' as theMundako-
panisad says (3, 2, 9), is the only type of the individual
soul as meant by Prajlipati.

One may raise an objection here. If the individual

soul in its original real status is Brahman itself, what
then is meant by saying that it gets its own real nature?
Itcannot be said that its real nature is concealed, so that
it should be revealed afterwards for what can there be
;

which will outshine the eternal light of the consciousness

of the Atman ? Then, again, like akasa the Atman
remains ever unaffected by anything. It cannot be
compared with gold which shines in its true lustre after
it has been separated from dross by means of acid; nor
with the stars, which though self-effulgent become in-
visible on account of the outshining light of the sun,
but again re-appear in their own glory by night. The

tics of seeing, hearing, thinking etc , and it is not necessary

that it should rise beyond the body in order to exhibit
this nature. The whole practical life will be impossible
without these activities of the soul, and without its con-
nection with the body. What then is meant by the so-
called rising of the soul beyond the body ? And what
is meant by the appearing of the soul in its own form?

We meet the questions by saying that just as a

piece of crystal which is white and transparent is not
discerned to be separate from the upadhi of the
red or blue colour, even so the individual soul which
isin reality pure consciousness or light appears to be of
the nature of the upadhis of body, sense and mind, and
so to be endowed with the activities of hearing, seeing
 ;

[42

etc.,on account of absence of discnmi nation. But the

moment the discriminative knowledge arises, the crystal
which was already white and transparent appears so,
asif for the first time; even so, the rising of the individual
soul beyond the body is nothing but the dawning of the
ative knowledge on the part of the soul, whereby
it understand itself any more as made up of body,

rid etc., but undi-rsr.^nd. :.• i che pure Atman,

I r ..;
:

It of this knowledge, the individual soul appears,

i
in its original form of the Atman.

the Atman. For as the Bhagawadgita declares (11, 31),

1

The Atman is not affected by anything, even though it

resides in the body '. '
It has no body, though it dwells
within the bodies' (Ka. 1, 2, 22). Notwithstanding the
possession of body, the soul is without the body, only if
it has the knowledge that it is one with the Brahman and

has nothing to do with the upadhis. It manifests in its

real, original nature of the Atman if it possesses this
knowledge: it remains as an individual soul, different
from Atman and bound up with the upadhis. if it has no
such knowledge, And though due to ignorance, the
individual soul and the highest God appear as separate
and two, from the view-point of the highest God, they
are identically the same. Whether manifest or unmani-
fest, there is only one Atman; the distinction between
the jiva and the Atman as two is false.

All this becomes clear from what Prajapati has told

Indra and Virocana. Having first referred to the jiva as
the person in the eye, Piajapati characterises it as the
fearless,immortal Brahman, meaning thereby that the
two are not different. That Prajapati has refrained from
saying that the reflection in the eye is the symbol of
Brahman only speaks about his honesty of purpose. And
 . m, au. 19 143

so, when he goes on to describe as to what happens in

the dreaming condition, he refers to the same

person in
(he eye, U
is clear from the assurance he gives to Indra

that he would explain the nature of the self-same jiva

further. And this need not be doubted because, it is a
common experience that a man who does not claim to
see in waking life the elephant he saw in the dream,
claim*, however, that he is the same person who conti-

nuestoexist inthetwo states. Therefore what Prajapati

means is that the person in the dream, being
the same
Brahmin.
person in the eye, cannot be different from
when he passeson to the descriptions rh.: sleeping
Ag.-,iri.

tnndir'cn. the' destruction' he -peaks of is the destruction

S specific knowledge of a thing during sleep and not of
the knower or the Self. As Sruti says, There is ' no
destruction of the Knower 's capacity to know
'
(Br- 4, 3,

30). And finally, when Prajapati repeats the assurance

being, and
that he would explain the nature of the same
censuring the body as mortal, describe, the
Sampta-yda '

beyond the body and appearing in us own

form
ft rising
when approaches the highest Light, he refers co the
it

self-same jiva of the earlier stages as being

always in
essence identical with the highest Brahman.

the
Some people are of opinion that instead of taking
individual soul as the topic of what Prajapati
had said on
the first three occasions, and the highest At man
as the

topic of what he said on the fourth occasion, it

would be
appropriate to consider that the highest Atman
alone
topic of the
..-hid! :s -.poker, oi .is free from sin etc. is the
whole n: his sneech from the first to the end of fourth
[Link] this is incorrect. For, in the first place, the
spoke,
pronoun this in the sentence which Prajapati
' '

refers to ttic
Mt, This 1 shall explain to you again
' .

proximate substantive ets. the jiva. Secondly, the word

and does
refers hack to the topic once discussed,
' '
again
not indicate a new Co P ic each time. Had Prajapati done
deceit.
so he would have been accused of practising
topic
Hence what we hold stands correct, via. that the
144

of the speech of Prajapati is the individual soul. The

only thing to note is that the individual soul is gradually
being shown as nothing but the highest Atman. Just
as the knowledge of the rope destroys the serpent which
appears on it through ignorance, even so, the illusory
nature of the individual soul, so far as it is erroneously
understood to be separate and distinct from the highest
God, and on account of which various evils and distinc-
tions of desires, doers etc. arise, vanishes the moment
there arises the true knowledge. The so-called individual
soul then is nothing but the highest God, who possesses
the qualities of sinlessness and others.

In the opinion of some others still, (Mimaihsakas as

well as Vedantins of a different school), the individual
soul is a real entity by itself. In order to silence such
people by expounding unto them the unity of the Atman,
the Sutrakara has begun this Sarlraka-sastra. It aims at
teaching that there is one eternal unchanging highest God;
there is none else except him who is knowledge incarnate
(Br. 3, 7, 23); and yet, like a magician, he appears in diverse
forms on account avidya or maya. Sruti may hold this
view; but what about the .Sutrakara, one may ask, who
has suggested the existence of difference between the
individual soul and the Brahman, when, c. g. he says
that daharakasa is not jiva, but the highest Atman (Sutras;
1, 3, IS; 1, I, 16) ? The Sutrakara, we reply, makes this
difference only because he has to disprove the erroneous
doctrine of duality. He believes that the highest Atman
isone, eternal, pure, intelli^r.r. ,'r;.-. in-.: kinging, formless
:

and unaffected by anything; and yet he finds that opposite

characteristics of the individual soul are erroneously
ascribed to it, just as blue colour is ascribed to the colourless
atasa. It is to refute the current dualism of the practical
world that the Sutrakara makes use of such arguments and
of Sruti sentences such as "That thou art", 'there is nothing
else but theAtman And though he makes the difference
'.

of the highest Atman from the individual soul, he does

not make the difference of the individual soul from the
 .. in, au. 20 145

Atman. TheAtmnn as thesupport is certainly different

from the thing; imagined to be existing; but the ima-
gined things cannot exist apart from the support, on
account of which, they are imagined. The rope exists
by itself and is different from the serpent. The serpent,
however, which is imaginary cannot exist apart from the
rope. The difference, then, which the Sutrakara allows
between the highest Atman and the jiva (and not vice
versa) is only with the view oi ranking people aware that
the whole of Karma-kanda with its prohibitions and
injunctions implies a dualism which is purely imagined
and non-existent, and therefore does not affect the Vedanta
Eition that there is one Atman alone. The Sutrakara
already referred to this unity of the Atman in Sutra
1, 1, 30i and to the difference in spheres of Karma-kanda

and jnana-ksnda in Sutra 1, 1,4. Performance of sacrifice

may be said to affect the soul so long as the consciousness
,

of body etc. exists; but the same learned man, if he comes

to know that the Atman is not at all affected by action,
may, without performing a sacrifice, remain content with
the knowledge of the Atman.

3FTT& <KIHy '•

I ^°

<. (viz. the Atman 4). 20

Having pointed out that the purpose of the Prajapati

passages is not to describe the nature of the individual
soul,but to prove that the individual soul is nothing but
the Brahman, the Sutrakara points out now that in the
subsequent sentence to the ' daharakasa ' too, the refe-
rence to the individual soul is intended to mean the Brah-
man. The individual soul, which is described by the
weed ' Sarhprasada ' becomes tired with the activities
during the waking and the dreaming conditions of life.
]46 VEDA1

and so being desirous of taking rest goes beyond the

consciousness ol the gross and subtle bodies, during deep
sleep; it then reaches the highest Light or Brahman, and

so appears in its own real nature. Here too, the reference

to the individual soul is for the purpose of making us
aware of its real nature, which is maml'ef ;oJ by rt',;ch]ns;
the highest Light and reappearing through it in its own
form as the very sinless Brahman.

[Alpa (smail)STutefi-being mentioned by Sruti; iti-thiu;

eet-if; tat-that; u\la?h'Said.\

The argument of the piirvapaksin thai the bugrHMl

God cannot be meant by dahara, because of his all-perva-
it may mean the individual soul
sive character, but that
because of i(s comparison, with the point of the goad,
has already been met with while dealing with the Sutra,
I, 2, 7- It was shown there that God, though all-pervad-
ing, is capable of being meditated even in the small heart.

Besides, Sruti itself has contradicted the smallnesf, by

saying that the internal akasa is as large as the external
one. So the dahara means the Brahman.

i s^safagm 1 («.-**)

lAnukftc/f-Becaiuc of action after; tasya -his: ca-and.]

-:ng (i. e. shinino)

;", (Brahman a
 i. in, t& 22 147

The Munijaka and the Kathaka Upanisads give us

the verse: 'The sun does not shine there, not do the
moon and the stars and the lightnings, much less the fire.
After he shines, evervihirii; .'•i .shines ill this is lighted
1

by his light (Mu. 2, 2, 10: Ka. 2, 3, 15).

'
The doubt
that arises here is whether that being, which when shining
everything else shines, is some luminous entity or the
Prljiia Atman.

According to purvapaksa it must be some luminous

substance other than the sun. moon etc. For, firstly,
it cannot be anyone of the latter, since it is said in the
above mentioned verse itself that these do not shine
*
there '. Secondly, just as the moon and the stars do
not shine when the sun is shining, even so there must be
something else which when shining, the sun too does not
shine. And thirdly, the words '
shining after' indicate
that imitation is possible only when there is somebody
else whom to imitate. One can imitate walking
when another walks. Therefore, there must be some
luminous body other than the sun, moon etc. referred to
in the passage.

To this we reply that it must be thePrajfia Atman; for

as the Sruti says, '
Light is his nature; and his thoughts
are true"
(Cha. 3, 14, 2). On the other hand, experience
does not show that the sun, the moon, etc. shine after
some other luminous body. Besides, luminosity being
the common nature of all, there is no need that one should
shine first and the rest should shine afterwards. One
lamp need not shine after another lamp. It is not a rule,
again, that imitation should depend upon similarity of
things. Iron is different from fire, dust is different from
wind and yet a red-hot iron ball burns things like the fire;
the dust on the ground blows after the blowing wind.
The word '
his ' (tasya] in the fourth part of the verse,
makes us aware that the Prljiia Atman is the cause of the
light of the sun and the moon etc. As the Sruti says,
'
the gods worship Him as the light of lights, as the im-
mortal Being ' (Br. 4, 4, 16). This obviously does not
refer to the physical light of the sun, the moon, etc.; nor,
as said above, does experience show that these physical
lights are there on account of some other physical light.
As a matter of fact, on the other hand, one physical light
is surpassed by another physical light.

Or we may not restrict the meaning of the verse as

referring to the cause of the light and the shining of the
heavenly bodies, but understand it as referring to the cause
of 'all this' (Sarvarii idarii) world which consists of names
and forms, and of persons and their actions and fruits
thereof. Just as the sun's light is the cause of the mani-
festation of colour, even so the light of Brahman is the
cause of this all, including the light of the sun etc. Besides,
the wordthere" in the verse shows us the context on
'

account of which also we take the Brahman as the source

of all. The word ' there ' is used by way of a reply
to the question, ' How is Brahman the light of lights'?
which arises in view of an earlier verse in the Upanisad
(Mu. 2, 2, 9) '
In that transcendent golden sheath,
:

there is that passionless and partless Brahman ;

it is the
stainless light of lights, and is known by those who hive
realized the Atman.' That Brahman is the topic under
discussion is shown by an earlier verse still (Mu. 2, 2, 5)
where it is mentioned as that, '
in whom the heaven
the earth and the intervening space are woven."

So Brahman being the only self-luminous entity

beyond the sun, and the moon etc., every thing that
eiistsandshinesdoessoonaccountofthe light of Brahman.
Itmanifests everything, but is not manifested or perceived
by any other light. For,' The Atman is incomprehensible';
by the light of the Atman, that a man sits, and goes
'
It is
etc" (Br. 4, 2, 4 ; 4, 3, 6).

3*ft ^ffl^ll =U

SAMEWA?). M
 i. m,sC24 149

We
read in the Bhagavadgita, 'That is my highest
abode, reaching which none returns; neither the sun,
nor the moon nor the fire illumines that.' And yet,
'
that light of the sun which shines all over the world,
and that light which is in the moon, and in the fire, know
that all to be mine' (IS, 6and 12).

a sftgiftwmi &«'*H)
5^T^uPra:i \u
[Sabdai-duc to AVuti; cva-only; pramilafi-is measured.]

the (person) u

.er). 24

The Kajhopanisadtells us that " the person of the

siie of a thumb stands
in the middle of the body, and is
lite smokeless light. He is the controller of the present
and the future; he is eternal the same, today and tomorrow.
This is that (Brahman) ' (2, 4, 12, 13).

According to purvapatsa, the person referred to is

the indiwidua soul ; for
I no measure can be predicated of the
Atman who has infinite length and breadth. But the
Vijnanatman or the jlva being limited by Upadhis can
be spoken of as somehow being measured by a thumb.
In the Smrti too, Yama is told to have dragged out forcibly
by his noose the thumb. -siied, helpless person out of
thebodyofSatyavan (M. B. 3, 297, 17)- It is impossible
forYnma to have taken out the Atman, as Yama himself
admits that Visnu is his controller. So, the Smfti, too,
is in favour of taking the thumb-siled person in the sense
of '
saifisari-jiva."

The person must be the Atman alone, we say in

reply. For there is none else who can ceaselessly control
the present and the future. Besides, the words ' this
is that ' in the end of the passage, come as a reply to
150 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

Naciketa's question as to what it may be which is neither

'

this nor that which is seen, which is neither the effect

nor the cause, and which is neither the past, nor future'
(1, 2, 14). This means that Brahman was the topic
under discussion and so the word controller as used
' '
;

evidence than the words

in the Sruti itself is a far greater
L
rhumb-sLsed person' to indicate that the person is the
highest God and not the individual soul.

Ufarci g tr-jmirn-hiMia;! w

HAVE A RIGHT (TO STUDY THr VEDAs). 25

have seen above that though the siae of a thumb

We
can more appropriately belong to the finite jiva and not to
the infinite Brahman, yet the word
'
controller ' as used
hy Srut; is indicative of" Brahman and not of jiva. There-
fore, the small dimensions of a thumb can be said to belong
to Brahman in a secondary way, with reference to its lodg'
ment in the heart, just as theakasa is spoken of as having
the measure of a cubit with reference to a portion of
a bamboo stick. The hearts of different animals may be
varying in dimensions, but by heart,' here, we mean
'

the heart of man; for men alone have a right to the study
of the Vedas. They alone have got the capacity to
learn, have certain desires, and are not prohibited to
learn. The upanayana ceremony can be performed only
amongst men. Aa Jaimini has examined the question
as to who has got a right, (Piirva Mi. Su. 6, 1), we need
not say anything further. The heart then of a man
has the size of his thumb.
 ;. m, «fr. 26 151

In view of such statements, then, as That is the '

Brahman' '
That thou art etc., we have to understand
'

(fat the iivn. or the sariisari soul which is of the sise of a

thumb is in reality the Brahman. The aim of the passage
under discussion is not to describe the dimension of any
thing in particular, but to bring hometheidentity of the
jiva with the Brahman, by reference to the abode
of the latter in the heart. A
Vedanta -passage of this
type has therefor,- a J [[',*[ ::u aim from another whose aim
i

is to make us aware of the Nirguria Brahman directly;

this makes us aware of it by reference to individual soul
which is nothing but Brahman in reality. That is why
recommends one ' to draw out with courage that
[Link] i
Person from inside his body as one would take out the
delicate fibre from inside the blade of grass, and to know
it as the pure immortal thumb-sised Atman residing in
the heart of people' (Ka.2,6,17).

p (similar reasons). 26

Gods too, as Badarayana holds, have a right to the

knowledge of Brahman, for they too may become disgusted
with indulgence in sensual pleasures, and may hanker
after moksa. They are known to be endowed with
[Link] the di-t-.-ript ions we read about them mltihasa,
Puranas, maiiiiio, and arrhavada, and from paintings and
images in ordinary expenenc :.' They are not prohibited like
.Sndraii'rom ha vingthe knowledge. Vedas beinemanifest
to them, no upan a vana- ceremony is needed in their case.
They accept discipleship ; e.g., Indra lived as a disciple
of Prajapati for one hundred and one years (Cha. 8, 11,3) ;

Bhrgu approached his father Varuna with the request

to teach him the knowledge of Brahman (Tai 3, 1). Gods
and sages may be incapable of action such as a sacrifice,
as Jaimini holds (PQrva MI. Su. 6, 1, 5), because either
there ate no further gods whom they should please, or
there are no other sages to whosefamily they may belong.
But so fax as knowledge of Brahman is concerned, no
action is to be performed either with reference to any
god or by the help of any sage. So far as the size of the
Person is concerned, it may be measured by the thumb
of a god, just as in the case of men, it is to be measured
by the thumb of a man.

{VnodhaA—ohs\

be present like priests on the occasion of a sacrifice. But

how will it be possible for the god Indra, for example, to
remain present at many sacrifices, if chey are performed at
the same time?

The reply to this is contained in a passage from the

Bfhadliranyakopanisad (3, 9, 1, 2), which beginning with
the number of gods as 303, and again as 3003 declares
a little afterwards that these are nothing but the powers
of gods, who, however, number thirty-three only.
:
These
thirty-three gods are again reduced to six, then to five
and finally to one God vis. the Prina. This means that
it is the one God of Prana who assumes
various forms.
In the Smrti also, it is mentioned that the yogin, who
acquires supernatural powers like possession of subtle
body etc., can divide himself in thousand forms, and can
have various experiences in life, such as enjoyment, penance
etc. at one and the same time, and can collect back all
these forms into himself, just as the sun takes back all
his ays. within himself (Ma. Bha. 12, 110, 62). If this

is possible for a man, how much more it

should be in the
case of a god who has naturally got all these powers?
So, a god may divide himself in many forms and remain
present at various sacrifices at one and the same time,
himself remaining unseen.

Or we may offer another explanation. Just as a

Brahmana who cannot be fed by different people at the
same time, can nevertheless be bowed by them all simul-
taneously, even so, one God can, without leaving his
, be the common
object of reverence of several perso
wtio may, at the same time, give their offerings to hiiu.
The cmbodiedness of gods then is in no way a hinderance
to the sacrificial activity.

[Sabda— word;iti— that;at— if; no— no£;atajl—from this;

ptabhavat—baaase it originate; pratyalya—fliiumona-
bhyaih—from perception and inference.}

In

Even though there may be no hindrance to sacrifi-

cial activity, the supposition that gods have bodies may

k» «„._.= J , -.. i^,„„ inimiiirrnr with the position
 LS4 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

Siicra' of PurvaMTmimiiai!, 1
:
Vedas are considered
5) the
to hive self- validity ; for the words which constitute
the Vedas are said to be eternally related with their
meanings. Names of gods such as, Vasus, Rudras, Adityas
etc. being word, m
the Vedas, they too must therefore
be supposed to be eternal. But i[ gods possess bodies,
they become subject to birth and death just as men
are. That is, the names of gods being connected with
transitory meanings will themselves be untrustworthy.
In other words, the Vedas will lose their self validity,
and shall have to depend on something else for being
authoritative. Even if we reply that the whole world,
along with the ;/oJ> springs forth from "word" it may be
pointed out that, in the firs', place. :i~ against our present
position. Brahman was once said to be the origin of the
world (B. S. 1, 1, 2) ; and that secondly, as is seen in
common experience, the wordor name come: into esrsr-
enceafter the thing which is given that name. child A
is born first, and then the name Yajfiadatta is given to
him. And just as the things are transitory even so
the words or names denoting them will not only be not
self-valid but non-eternal too.

Theobjection cannot stand. For there wouldarise

from Substance, Quality" and Action, individuals only
and not species. The jati or the species is eternal, and
the words are connected with the species and not with
individual objects, which may be infinite in number and
transitory in nature. Words like' Vasu,' Aditya ' etc,'

are names of eternal species, and not of transitory objects.

Besides, the words connote some permanent meanings
on account of the presence of which they may be extended
to new individual objects. Whoever leads the army
is the ' army-leader.' The name will be applied to the
individual object, if it presents the jati or holds the per-
manent meaning ;and it is in this sense that the individuals
are said to originate from the words, and not in the sense
that the word is. like Brahman the material cause of
the universe.
 I. in, ifi. 28 155

The evident. htrAvv-.']-. \oi ivlifViiigihiL the universe

arises on account of the efficient cause S
the word lies in
perception and inference, fly '
perception we mean '

Sruii, for rhe validiiy of perception is not dependent on

anything else and by inference we mean Smrti
;
' for
'
;

though inference is based on an invasiable sign, yet

bo far as the origin of the universe is concerned, inference
or Smrti must be backed by perception or Sruti. The
ggveda describes (9,62) how the god Brahmadeva pro-
duced the different deities, because the word "etc." (these)
reminded him of the deities who preside over and do good
to the various senses, how he produced men on account
of the word 'asjg' (blood), and how he produced the manes,
the planets, the hymns, the weapons and the beings
from the words ' Indu ' (moon),' [Link] v triJ ' (Concealer '

of holy things! '

iisu (which includes), ViSva
'
(which ' '

enters)and';ihh:>[Link];;! '[Link];> respectively. 'The

Brhadaranyaka mentions him as having thought over the
union of 'mind and speech ft, 2, 4) meaning^ thereby ;

that thinking is impossible without word. The ^.inriparva

-

(M. B. S. P! 233, 24) roo mentions the Selt'-born Being

as having first produced the eternal, celestial Vedic word

which ajyin. in its turn, produced all activities.' What
is meant by production of this beginningless and endless
Vedic speech is that it is being imparted orally from the
teacher to rhe disciple So it is the Vedic words through
'

wiudi Mnhcsvara has produced the names and forms of

;ii: hcine;--. '1l. has set forth activity (M. fl &ntiparva '
;

:.-3.25;andManuSm.I,21). As in common experience

we find that a ]"ar is made after conceiving the meaning
of the word jar even so, there occurred in the mind of
,

the Creator first the Vedic words and then corresponding

to them, he created the universe. He created the earth,
for instance, after uttering and knowing the meaning of
word bhiir ', the heaven after the bhuvah (Tai
- ' '
the
Bra. 2,2,42).
156 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

What then must be the nature of the word, and how

may it be said to cause the universe ? According to
grammarians, it is the 'sphota' which first arises in the
mind after a word is uttered, and it is on account of this
that the sense of the word becomes known. To them,
the sphota which is different from the letcersis the eternal
entity ;
the word made up of letters is not eternal, for
as soon as the letters are uttered, they perish. Gods
etc. cannot arise from the perishable words, but from
the imperishable sphota. That the letters are perishable
can be seen from the fact that on different occasions they
are perceived in different ways. The voiceof Devadatta
sounds differently from the voice of Yajnadatta;the letters
uttered by one person vanish, though similar letters are
uttered by another afterwards. As for the meaning of
the word, we get it from the sphota and not frnm
the letters of the word. For, (1) if every letter is to
give us a meaning, the letters * go * in lit and gotra
ought to give us the same meaning ; and if we have it,
then the letters which follow would be useless. (2) Nor
can all the letters taken together be said to produce one
meaning, for the letters come one after another. (3) Nor
again can it be said that the perception of the last letter
combines with the mental impressions of the previous
letters and produces the sense ; for in order to understand
the meaning of a word, it is necessary to become aware
of the connection between them, just as we understand
first the smoke that exists, and then from the knowledge
of the connection which the smoke has with fire, know the
meaning of fire too. But the impressions on the mind
are incapable of being perceived, and as such, except the
last letter of the word, there will be no perceptual know-
ledge of the word. (4) Though not perceivable, the
impressions can still be inferred, one may say, from the
fact of their being remembered and so it may be maintain-
;

ed that the meaning of the word becomes manifest on

account of inference when the impressions become combin-
ed with the last letter. But this too i3 impossible. For
the remembering of the s
a single event which happens in r>r.f moment of time ;
but, on the contrary it is made up ni different events
of remembering the successive different impressions of
letters. As such, the inferred impressions too cannot
BBtdtaneouafjr be combined with 'he last letter and
produce the meaning of the word.

The word then is of the nature of sphop and the

;

manner in which it presents itself to buddhi is this. The

several letterssow, as it were, the seed of impressions in
the mind, and when with the combination of percep-
tion of the last letter,it becomes mature, there appears

allof a sudden the sphota in the form of one single mental

VF-'l' r-'i <m
,,
which however, is not the remembering
.

of the several succeeding letters. The difference that

appears between two or more voices of men is due to the
letters of the word, and not to sphota which is recognised
as eternally the same. It is sphota therefore, and not
letters, which manifest the meanings of the word and

it is sphota, therefore, which can be considered as the

cause of this world, consisting of actions and the doersand
results of actions.

As against this view of the grammariaos, Upavaraa

holds that the word is made up of letters only, inasmuch
asthere is no separate perception of the sphota over and
above the perception of the letters; The letters too are
not short-lived, because they are recognised to be
the
[Link] because this fact of recognition is neither based
on similarity, as in the case of hairs, nor contradicted
by any other means of knowledge. Again it ia not the
that we
recognition of the species or jati of a letter, so
may say that we hear a letter similar to the
one heard
before, both of which belong to a class. On the contrary,
we hear the same letter as being uttered more than once.
The word 'cow', when uttered twice, can never mean
that two different words belonging to the same class
are uttered- The letters are not different individuals
 15S VEDA]

that go to form a class, just ;ls tht'rc ar-_- different individual

cows which belong to one class. The letters c, o, and w,
ate each one of them the same on different occasions.
That they appear to he different on account of pronoun-
ciation of different men is not thus due to their own inher-
ent nature, hut 'o . lac; thai
t ]
i hey are dependent for the
i

sake of pronounciation on the contact or otherwise of the

wind with the palate, teeth etc. The grammarians too
who maintain that letters are different individually have to
admit, for the sake of explaining the fact of their being
recognized as similar, the esistence of a species or [Link]
to which they belong : they have to admit again that the
differences, such as ' udatta ' and anudatra " in the '

manner of uttering them, are due to external conditions

such as contact etc. Instead of mating these two admis-
sions, is it not a simpler way of explanation that the
individual letters have their own intrinsic nature on
account of which they are recognized as the same, and that
'
they appear to be different in point of being udatta '

'
anudatta etc. by external conditions ?
'

Recognition of a letter as the same is thus the re-

futationofita being conceived as beiniTdifft-Kni on different
occasions. And yet, the same ' ga when pronounced '

hydifferentpersonsatthesametime, appears to bedifferent

as udatta, anudatta, svarita, nasal and non-nasal, because
the expression of it is connected with the contact of the
abdominal wind with the various parts of the mouth,
such as palate, teeth etc. Or else, the difference may be
attributed to the difference in dhvani or tone. sound, A
which is indistinct because it is far off, becomes clear and
distinct as it comes nearer. Though recognized as the
same, it is differentiated aa '
soft ' or ' harsh." So the
better wayof explaining be would that the distinctions
of udatta, anudatta etc. are due to dhvani rather than to
the process of conjunction and disjunction, which is not
a matter of perception. In any case, the letters are re-
cognised as the same in spite of their appearing different
on account of difference in dhvani.
 . IB, su.28 159

Besides being recognized as the same, it is the letters

which have got h.e moan mi; ot die word, and so there is
i

no necessity to imagine the existence of sphota.

The uKed oi' coalition i~ not sphnia. ;;n : J Jirinnal some-
thing which is suddenly perceived at'ter the accumulation
of the successive impressions of the letters as the
grammarian supposes ; it is the letters themselves which
constitute the word. For if sphota, which is something
different from the letters of a word were to be the object
then the meaning of these letters or word
rsnt; ling of any other word or groupof letters
would not ne apprehended at all. But this is against
experience. So what appears to the grammarian as the
sphota is in reality nothing but an act of remembrance
of the lettersof the word. Besides, experience tells us
that we may have one single cognition of a number of
objects grouped together ; e.g. we speak of numbers as
ten, hundred, thousand etc. Similarly, the many letters
in a word go to express one meaning only. This does not
however mean that the letters ina word if written in the
reverse order wo; mean
idt identically the same. For then
the word "
raja (ting) would mean the same thine as
'

theword'jata' (aprofhgate); onheword pita' (cuckoo)

'

would mean the same thing as kapi (monkey). The

'
'

letters though many, will have one meaning only when

;hey angered some fixe J order.

The theory then that the letters of a word which

succeed each other in a certain order give all the meaning
they have .hrect.y :o trie buddhi in one single act of cogni-
tion is simpler than the sphota theory which disregards
that which is [Link] in perception directly, vil. the
letter; ir.j ,01-1 -hing new which is never perceived,

-vil the sphota. It is unnecessary to imagine the

addition/ fj.:ot ol *phofa to explain the manifestation
of meaning from the lettersof the word. Anyway,
whether the word is ot the nature of letters, jati Dr sphota
the theory that the gods originate from the eternal words
remains unaffected.
 m vz ^ ft^r^n n i

(or the Vedas). 29

The preceding Sutra was devoted to meet an objection

against the theoryofthe Piirva-Mimaiiisa, via. the eternity
of the Vedas. The objection that the word (Veda)
too must have been produced in the same manner in which
the world of gods etc. has been produced from the word,
was refuted by pointing out that the eternal species of
gods etc. came out of the eternal words. The present
Sutra too confirms the same conclusion, vii. that the Veda
is not merely the source but the eternal soutce of the
universe. The Rg-Veda (10, 71, 3) tells us how the
eternal speech which was dwelling in the sages was found
out by those who performed the sacrifice. Vedavyasa
too says that being permitted by Svayarhbhu, the sages
'

obtained by means of penance the Vedas and the Itihasa

which were hidden at the close of yuga '(M. B. Slnti-Parva)

{Somalia (similoO-nama— rilpotvot because of name! —

deaths; api— even;
; —
and forms; ca~and avfttau repeated cydes of births and
avirodkai—fyeeio>n {torn cuntradiction
daridnit—from Sruti Sm r tei- /ro«i Smrtt CO- and.}
; ;

Notwithstanding
DISSOLUTION fop THE UNIVERSE)
WORD IS NOT CONTRADICTED ON
OF NAMES AND FORMS; AS (b CIJ A3 I PROM&tUM AND
SURTI. 30

TheeternityoftheVedaswillnotindeed beafiected
if words like Indra etc. would connote not the individuals
 .. Hi, su. 30 161

but the eternal species, and consequently tbere would be

an unceasing succession of severs! Indras and other gods
one after another. But and
if, as Sruti Smrti tell us, all
the three worlds of names and forms including Indra and
other gods are sometime to undergo complete dissolution
and are to be born again, how indeed can there remain the
same meaning attached to words like 'Indra,' and how
an Vedas be believed to be eternal? The reply to this is
also foundin &uti and Smrti. The eternity of the Vedaa
is not affected, because the names and forms of each new
creation are the same as those of the preceding world
that was dissolved. The wheel of Samsara is a whole
is eternal, in spite of dissolutions and creations, —
a point
to be explained later on in Sutra 2, 1, 36. Just as a man
who has awakened from sleep goes on with the affairs
of the world as he was going on before he slept, even so
one creation of the world is connected with the pre-
viousane without being hindered by the intervening dis-
solution of the same. That dissolution and creationare
like the sleeping and wakeful conditions of man is seen
from what the Kausitaki Upanisad tells us (3, 3), vij.
that when a man is in dreamless sleep, he becomes one
with prana and that all his senses and the objects of the
senses become merged in prana, but when the same man
awakes, the pranas and everything else spring forth from
the Atman, Eke sparks from fire, and occupy their respec-
tive places.

It may be said that the mahapralaya ° r clle uctcr

annihilation of the universe resembles death rather than
the sleeping condition of man ; and so the idea that a new
creation should be continuous with the old seems as im-
probable as the idea that the present life of a man is con-
tinuing with his life in the previous birth. Besides all

men do not sleep at the same time so that when a few

;

ofthembecomeawake, they areremindedof their rpeceding

wakeful life by looking to the person who are already
awake and are busy in doing something. The pralaya,
on the other hand, destroys everything at the same time.
 Theobjection is invalid. For we must remember
tbat the higher beings and gods cannot he said to hive
the same deficiency as men have. Though all the beings
including men are animated, knowledge and power are
seen to decrease as we pass downwards from men to
animals, and from animals to trees or what is the same
;

thing from another point of view, they increase as we

rise up from man to Hiranyagarbha. It is possible there-
fore that the Hiranyagarbha and other gods may remember
all that was going on in the preceding Kalpa, and so,
having received the grace of the highest God, may continue
their existence, as if they are coming in the wakeful con-
dition after sleep. We are told in the following ,fruti
tbat this is possible : Being anxious to be released, I sur-
'

render untoGod, who delivered the Vedasto the Brahma-

deva after having first created him, and who illumines the
'

buddhi in order to impart the knowledge of the Atman

fSve. 6, 18). '
The hymns of the ten mandalas of Rg-veda
were seen by Madhuchandas and other sages, as Siunaka '

and other rsis tell us. This vision of the Vcdas by the gods
and f sis appears to be so indisputable a fact, that a person,
who performs a sacrifice by means of n mantra, without
knowing the rsis, the metre and the deity of that mantra,
is said to fall into a pit, or be born as a pillar or a

Having discussed so far that lapse of time involvedin

the period of dissolution or death of the universe does not
stop the continuation of the same, inasmuch as there is the
certainty of the perpetual vision of the Vedas by Hiraijya-
garbha and by other gods and rsis on account of the grace
of the highest God, we give the additional reason
of Adrsfa. Dharma enjoins and prohibits actions in order
that man should get pleasure and ward off pain. The
desireforhavingpleasuresandavoiding pains is therefore
the motive which leads men to act. The present world
thus is nothing but the result of actions of beings done
in the preceding creation ; secondly, it allows them to
reap the fruits of their actions in the fotm of pleasures
 ADHYAVA 1, PA. Ill, IU. 31 163

and pains ; and thirdly, it induces the beings again to do

certain actions and prepares thereby the way for a fresh
creation of the same nature. So, the whole of samsara
including the worlds, gods, animals, men, castes, airamE,
duties and their fruits, appears in the same form again
and again, because it moves perpetually from desires to
actions, from actions to pleasures and pains, and from
pleasures and pains to desires again. Like actions produce
like results ; and according as they are right or wrong,
harmless or cruel, there arise like desires or impressions
todosimilaractsagain. So there remains always a potentia-
lity of the world to rise again into actuality by the same
names and forms, and by the same desires and actions,
in spite of its apparent dissolution. The new creation
is not an effect without a cause. Just asthere is a necess-

ity that governs the relation of the Eve senses with their
objects, even so, the actuality of the present creation is
bound up with the potentiality of the earlier creation
which is hidden in the period of dissolution. That is
why the whole world including the sun, the moon etc.,
is arranged by the highest God, on the pattern of the
arrangement of the previous world (Rk. Sam -10, 190, 3).
That the names and farms of thiscreated world are esactly
those of the previous one is seen from what the Taittiriyo-
god of Fire
Snisad tells us regarding the genesis of the
1, 4, 1).
i
The person who desired to become Agni
in a succeeding world offers oblations of cooked rice
by placing them on eight earthen pots to the god Agni
presiding over the Krttika stars. This means that the
names and forms of the two Agnis are the same. Similar
gods. In short, like
is the case with rsts and other
the seasons coming after one another with the same
chatac tens tics, things of the world too appear and
reappear with identical names and forms.

[Mfldhvadiju— in Mad/iu-vidja andasathbhavat— others;

king impossible a nodJiifcir<»fi- without fitness; Jaimim&.$
;
 j) MaDHU-VIDYA ETC. 3!

In the third chapter of the Chandogyopanisad, we

read that the sun is conceived as the honey of gods, the
akafa as the beehive, the Vedic hymns as the bees, the
sacrifices as the flowers, and the offerings of Soma, milk,
etc. as the honey itself. The sacrifices are conceived
as producing five kinds of honey or nectar which get
themselves deposited in the different portions of the sun
as red, white, blackish, dark and pearl-like in colours.,
Led by Agnijndra and others, the gods like [Link].
Adityas, Maruts and Sadhyas live upon this nectar.
We are further told that whoever thus meditates on the
sun becomes satisfied even by the sight of the nectar, and
is endowed with all the glory of gods like Vasu. Now
this is possible only for men and not for those who are
already gods; for this will involve theconcept ion of anoth-
er sun or another Vasu as the objects of meditation for
the existing sun and rhe existing Vasu. How can gads
themselves become at once the meditators and the objects
of meditation?And again, when certain divinities, such
as Fire, Wind, Sun, Directions, ace each declared to bea
pada (one foot) of Brahman, and as such, are recommended
to be the objects of meditation for the sake of men (Cha.3,
18,2 3,19,1 ;4,3,l),itisnotpossibleforthem to meditate
;

on themselves. Similarly, the right and the left ears are

to be meditated upon as Gautama and Bharadvaja respec-
tively (Br. Up. 2, 4, 2); but it is not possible that these
rtis ^houid meditate on themselves. Therefore it is that
jaimini holds that gods and rsis are incapable of learning
the Brahma-vidyf.

sfrfofa mure i
^
Uyotiji- — luminous bodies ; bhiivat— cm account of being
w«d ; w— oral.]
 It is known from ordinary experience as well as from
Vedic usage that the words aditya and others refer to the
sphere of luminous bodies, which are revolving day and
night and illuminating the world. ' The aditya rises in
the east and sets in the west "; so says the 5ruti in the
laterportion of Madhvi-vidyi (Cha. 3, 6. 4). This clearly
shows thai aditya means the sphere of light or of the sun,
which being non-intelligent like clay, has no connection
whatsoever either with the body or heart of a god, or
with intelligence or wish of any being. Similarly, the
word Agni means fire only,

it is said, no doubt, that mantra, arthavada. itibisa,

Eurana and ordinary experience ate all in favour of the

elief that gods have a body. Indra, e.g. has the thunder
boli in his hand, says the mantra ; 'the fire wept' is the
wthivadi the itihasa and puranas describe gods as
.

be^j'. |>!.. -:.-d by sacrifices and men draw the painting,

;

of Yama or Varuga as having a staff or a noose in hand.

But II :s to ne noted that what goes by the name of ordinary

experience is not an independent means of knowledge:

rather :ts value depends on perception, inference etc.,

which, however, are not available with reference to the
SMoiptions of gods. Itihasa and puranas are human
works, and so must be tested by independent means of
knowledge again. The arthavada is nothing but the praise
of certain Vedic passages which recommend the doing or
non-doing of actions, and, as such, have nothing to do
with the embodiedness or otherwise of gods. And lastly,

of performance and the various things involved directly

in the performance of sacrifice. The mantras therefore
have no authority to say whether the gods are embodied
or not. In short, the gods and other beings have no capa-
city to have the knowledge of Brahman.
{Bhavath — Existence ; tu —on the other hand ; B/idn< ,i</dna :

Mf-frjUt-CMNftfe]
Badarayana* on the other hand, holes (that
gods and others) ak!? capable of (having the know-
LEDGE of Brahman); fok there is (evidence to show
TH»). S3

It may be that gods and others are incapable of

participating in the Madhu-vidya etc., because they
themselves happen to be the objects of meditation
or warship in those vidyis ; but so far as knowledge
of pure Brahman is concerned, there is no reason why
they should not be capable of having it. For as Bada-
rayan.i holds, their capacity for the knowledge of Brah-
man is revealed by several facts such as their wish
in know it, the vow of celibacy and non -attachment
which Rome of them could keep, the necessary strength
which they possess, and the absence of any mention that
they ate not fit for Brahma-vidya. Because they are
excluded in one sphere, it does not follow that they are
excluded in all spheres. A
Brahmin, for instance,is

not allowed to perform the Rajasuya sacrifice, but is not

prohibited on this account to perform all the sacrifices.
Besides, the Brhadaranyrika makes ,in explicit statement
with reference to gods and rsis along with men that
whoever amongst them, whether, god, rsi or man,
knows himself as the Brahman, becomes one with it (1,4.
10). The Chandogya goes a step further and describes
the gods and the demons too as hankering after the know-
ledge of the Atman which would fulfil all their desires,
and mentions how Indra and Virocana, the representa-
tives of gods and demons respectively, went to Prajapati
for this purpose (8, 7, 2). Smpri too describes, for the
same purpose, the Gandharva-Yajnavalkya-sarhvida.

As for the objection that the words aditya etc.

mean only the non-intelligent spheres of light, we say
in reply that over and above this meaning, they also
 ADHVAVA I, PA. II!, sC\ 33 167

stand tor the intelligent and powerful divinities who

reside in the form of light. This is possible because
gods can assume any form they lite. Indra, for example,
assumed the form of ram and earned jway [Link].
11

the descendant of Kanva (Sidviriisa Bra. 1, 1). Aditya

approached Kunti after having assumed the form of a man.
Even such substances as earth are regarded as being
ruled over by intelligent heings. as is clear from the earth
'

To deal now with another objection regarding

mantra and arthavada: It was pointed out by the purva-
paksin that they cannot be looked upon as trustworthy
evidence for believing in the embodiedness of gods,
because what they refer to is not their own meaning but
some thing other than that, vi:. the things mentioned
in the sacrifice, or the eulogy of some action. We
say in
reply that the question, whether a sentence has its own
primary meaning ot not, is not necessarily determined
by the reference or other wi^ of that sentence (o something
else. Rather, it is determined by the fact whether or not its
alleged primary meaning is contradicted by some other
experience. In other words, it is not the absence of
reference to something else, but the uncontradicted pre-
sence of meaning, which gives the reality to a sentence.
As opposed to this, it is not the presence of reference to
something else but the absence ofanv meaning (or which
is the same thing as contradicted meaning) which
give-
unreality to the sentence. The grass and the leaves seen
by a traveller by the side of a road and given exprtttjtM
to in a proposition, have all the reality and meaning, even
though the purpose of the traveller is something else, viz

the journey.

The objector may intervene, and say that the grass

and the leaves become the objects of direct perception;
but this is not possible in the case of an arthavada type ot
sentence, because its purpose being merely to say aome^
thing by way of eulogy, is so intimately connected with
the vidhi-vakya or the main sentence which recommends
168

an action, that the meaning of one is included in the

meaning of the other. Just as the words one should '

drink wine cannot be detached from the word not'

' '

in the given sentence one should not drink wine ', and
'

then interpreted as if they have a separate affirmative

meaning over and above the given negative meaning, even
so the arthavada ha= no separate meaning of its own over
and above the meaning of the vidhi-vakya.

To this we reply. The prohibitive sentence quoted

above cannot be split into two parts, because all the wards
in that sentence together make up one meaning. The words
of the arthavada sentence, on the other hand, can have
a distinct and complete meaning of their own inasmuch as
they describe a thing which already exists. It is only after-
wards, when we think about the purpose which they
subserve, that the same words are seen to be used in order
to glorify some vidhi-vakya. To illustrate what we mean;
Every word in the vidhi-vakya, 'He who desires
to have prosperity, should offer a white animal to Vavu'
(Tai. 2, 1), is connected with the intended action. But
the words in the arthavada sentences, such as, Vayu is '

a very swift deity, towards which he approaches fast;

Vayu leads him on to prosperity (Tai. 2, 1), are not in
'

like manner directly connected with the action. The

words of the two types of sentences are not so connected
with each ether as will enable us to have such absurd
sentences out of them as ' Vayu should offer \ or the '

swift deity rbould offer '. Rather they form two inde-
pendent unities of their own, which in their turn get
related in order to serve some additional purpose. The
arthaviii sentence, in other words, which has an
independent and complete meaning of its own and which
refers to an already existing fact, is found to be related in
a subordinate manner to the vidhi-vakya, because it
fulfils the additional purpose of glorifying the intended

ection. The arthavada sentence referred to above, for

arample, has got a complete meaning of its own, inasmuch
sa it refers to the swift nature of Vayu; it is only after-
wards that it cameo in relation to the vidhi-vakya when

itserves the purpose of praising the Vayu and making

an offering to that divinity.

Further, the irthavada sentence may be of two types

Either it is a statement of fact which already exists and is
known through other means of knowledge; or it is a
statement of some quality only, because the factual know-
ledge which is conveyed by it is contradicted by experi-
ence. '
Fire is the medicine of cold is an example of the
'

first variety known as 'anuvada experience confirms

';

that fire is a remedy against cold. The sacrificial post

'

is the sun is an example of the second variety known ae

"

'
gunavada '
fot this makes us aware only of the guija
;

or quality of luminosity of the sun which is seen on the

post. The sentence is not to he interpreted literally
for it runs contrary to experience; the sun is not the post.
Where however experience is not contradicted, or what
is told is not proved by any means of knowledge, it is

better to interpret the arthavada sentence as belonging

to the first variety rather than to the second. It is not
gunavada, because it is not contraty to experience; but the
freedom from contradicting other means of knowledge
leaves room for supposing that such means though not
known must be available, inasmuch as the sentence is
from Sruti. For example, ' Indra has a thunder-bolt in
his hand is a statement which can neither be proved nor
'

disproved by the ordinary means of knowledge. And yet,

as it is a Sruti statement, it leaves room far supposing
that there must be some other means of knowledge for
taking r as a fact; and 30 construed, it is an
;
'
anuvada '.

'
The thunder-bolt in the hand," therefore, suggests that
India is a god having body. The mantra sentences too,
in short, have meanings of their own corresponding to
facts (c. g. the embodiedness of godsj, though they fall
beyond the ordinary means of knowledge.

There another reason still for believing that gods

is
*re embodied. The very injunctions which recommend
170 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

certain offerings to Indra and other gods imply that gods

have some features. The sacrificer is asked to take in
"

his hand the offering and remember the god to whom it in

to be given at the time of uttering vasat (Ai. Bri. J, 8, 1).
'

Without this mental representation, there would be no

offering? to gods. The mantras by themselves cannot be
considered as constituting the features or the forms of
gods; for the mantras are merely words. It is the meaning of
the words which convey to us the forms which the gods
possess. Therefore all those who believe in the autbo-
ritativeness of the word cannot but admit the embo-
diedness etc. of gods like Indra. which is spoken of in
mantra and arthavida. And inasmuch as mantra and
arthavada are the foundation of itihasa and purina,
the latter too are trustworthy evidence. Besides, they
owe their origin :o the perceptual knowledge of Vyasa
and other Mges who. it is told in Smrtis, were holding
conveiaa::cn with gods. To deny this is to deny the
variety of ihe wurld There is at present no single ruler
of the whole earth: from this it does not follow that there
was no such ruler in the past too. For in that case, the
rajasuya sacrifice which is to be performed by one who
desires to be the ruler of the whole earth, will be without
any purpose. The whole of the Dharmasastra too will
be useless, if one were
to argue from the disorderly condi-
tion of varna and aSrama at the present time that they
must have been so even in ancient times. It is therefore
appropriate to hold that on account of their dharmic
excellence, people of the ancient times were capable of
conversing with gods, which fact is also vouchsafed by
the yoga-sutras (2, 44). That yoga enables one to acquire
extraordinary powers cannot simply be denied. The
Svetasvataropanisad speaks of the greatness of yogaj
'
When the five qualities of earth, water, fire, wind and
akasa arise in the body by the power and fire of yoga-
then no more will illness, old age or pain overtake that
body (2, 12).' It is wrong to infer from our ability the
ability n*" rsis who had the power to visualise the mantras.
Naturally, the itihasa and puranas which have been
 —

composed by them must be trustworthy. Our ordinary

if based on itihasa and puranas, can also
experience too,
be possibly taken as true.

The result is go
that mantra, arthavada etc. to prove
that gods and others have got bodily forms; and being
endowed with desires etc. they can be considered as
having the capacity to know tbe Brahman. Besides the
conception of gradual release, viz. that after death roan
firstbecomes Gandharva, then Pitara, and then god, is —
possible only on the view that gods too get the release or
are capable of having Braku s-jiVina, otherwise even after
attaining godhood, man would be deprived of moksa.

(Svfertaf; «.
disrespectful words; rad-tlut; ,jdrj-, [Link] -due- '.:

sucyatc-is indicated." hi-on\y.}

The sorrow which he (Janasbuti) felt

(iORKQW) MAOE HJM RUN (TOWARDS RaIKVA). 34

If gods can learn Brahma-vidya, what can we say

about the .Sudras? Or are the twice-born alone capable
of doing so? According to purvapaksa, the 5udra has a
claim to it; because he has got a desire and capacity to
learn. Besides, nowhere has he been debarred from
learning it, just as he has been debarred from performing
sacrifice because he does not preserve sacred fire (Tai.
Swta. 7, 1, 1, 6). So far as Brahma -j nana is concerned, the
preservation of ahavaniya and other fires is not necessary.
Besides, the circumstance that Raikvacallsjaniruti by the
epithet Stidra (Chi. 4, 2, 3) in connection with Sam-
'

varge-vidya or Vayu-vidya (a part of Brahma-vidya), and

asks him to take away the chariot, wealth and cows which
172 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

he had brought as presents shows that the Sudra is fit to

have the knowledge of the Brahman. Sudra = like Vidura
too are spoken of by Smrti as possessing Brahma-jfiana.

reply that the Sudra cannot be conside red capable

We
of studying and understanding the Vedas even though
he may be physically sound and has a desire to learn. For
he in not allowed to undergo the upanayana ceremony
which is considered as the necessary condition of the
studying of the Vedas, which again in its turn, if not
properly done under the guidance of a Guru, makes him
unfit both for sacrifice and knowledge. Besides, tht
mere presence of the word "Sudra'. without any backing
of argument will not enable us to say that the SiJtlra _as
such will be considered fit for sarhvnrg and other Vidyiu
At best, he may be fit for Saiiivarg-Vidya alone ; but this
too is not possible, because the word ' Sudra' occurs in
the arthavada sentence alone vis. ' This vidya cannot be
obtained by money.' Or the word Sudra ' may be
'

nterpreted in altogether a different manner. ?o that it

may refer to a twice-born and not a Sudra by caste.
The word may refer to the grief of Janaiiuti and not to
Janasruti himself. Raikva alludes to it only to show that
he had the knowledge of the grief, though JanaSruti was
far away when he felt it at the disrespectful words of
the hamsa bird. 'Sudra' means the adravana, the rushing
forth of "sue' or grief. Whether Janasruti came to grief
on him, or whether he rushed unto Raikva on
or grief fell
account of grief, the word ' Sudra ' points to one of the
three things and not to the caste.

->tr^bbeing Ipioi
IKfatriyatvagatei-casUof' a Kjatriya .

utturJTa- later on; Caitratathena-uiith

;iiJ -iriff Caitraraiha; hnggt
sign.]

E OF THE SIGN (HE IS MENTIONED) 1

Caitraratha, IT IS KNOWN
IATK1YA (AND NOT SuOEA). 35
 In the arthavada sentence of Saiiivarga-Vidy.i. Jam
iruti is mentioned along with one Ksatriya Abhirr.i ravin
fcnownasCaitraratha. As equals are mentioned together,
we gather that Janasruti also is a Ksatriya. hav; We
the same inference, from the power and riocy wind)
JinaSruti exhibited hy sending men in search of Raikva,
as also by the numerous presents he sent to him.

In various places, where the vidyas are being dis-

cussed, mention has been made of saiiiskaras like
upanayana
etc. in the case of the twice born. For example. Sat.
Bra. U.S. 3, 13; Chi. 7, 1.1 ;Pra.l,l. IntheChando-
gyopanisad (5, 11, 7), the King Asvapati, we are told
Jidnr.i <i~i-- on tbn'iipiiniiviir:!ceremony being performed
in the case of certainBrahmins. An exception like this
troves on!v ihc existence of a rule which applies to the
twice born. The Sudra, on the other hand, is said to be
born once only, and not a second time because there is
no upanayana in his case (Manu. 10, 41- He is said not
to incur sinjust as the twice-born incurs by eating
what
ought not to be eaten (Manu. 10, 126).

a^viraPraK"! siffc *»*

ITadabhava. nvcOiara nc— being convinced; ca: pravrttcj,—
due to being attire.]

proceeded (to initiate

_ And because (Gautama)
Jabala) after being convinced that (he) was not
that (vra,, a Sudra). 37
 174 VEDA

The Chandogyopanijad tells us that Gautama was

pleased to know that Jabala spoke the truth when he
said that he did not know his gotra or the family name.
and that Gautama concluded from this that inasmuch as
jabala possessed the quality of speaking the truth, he
must have come from Brahmin parents. So after
being convinced that he was not a Sudra, Gautama showed
his willingness to initiate Jabala (4, 4, 5).

a—mcmm
i ; a.}

From the prohibition to hear the Vedas follows

the prohibition to study and to know their meaning.
For how will one know the meaning without study
and how again one will study without hearing what
he studies ? Wefind however explicit statements re-
garding these things in Gautama-Dharmasasrra. 'The
ears of the £udra who hears the Vedas are to be filled
with molten lead and lac ' (12, 4). *
If he utters a
Vedic word , his tongue should becut,etc.' (12, 5,6).
'
The twice-horn alone are entitled to study, sacrifice and
to the receiving or giving of gifts ' (10, 1). '
Knowledge
should not be imparted to the .fiidra ' (Manu. 4, 80).
Vidura and Dharmavyadha had knowledge, but it

was the result of deeds in their previous births; and the

fruit of knowledge too is inevitable. Though the Sudras
are prohibited to study the Vedas. they may however
get the knowledge through itlhasa and puranas.

? J *Hlfil*W( I
(H)

IKaudpdtwt — On account of trembling.]

prana ib Brahman). 39

After having incidentally considered as to who il lit

for receiving Brahma; nana, let us return to our main topic

of the inquiry into the purpose of the ved an la -passages.
We read in KSthakopanisad (2, 6, 6) that The whole '

world trembles in the prSna that this prana is a great

;

thunderbolt as it were, and that those who

terror, a raised
know it become immortal' Now the purvapaksin main-
tains that praija means the air we breathe with its five
modifications; and that the thunderbolt too is a manifesta-
tion of wind when ft assumes the form of rain and
lightn-
ing. And he citesftuti to explain immortality: One who
'

knows that air is everything, conquers death "(Br. 3. 3- J).

We reply that prana means Brahman, because both

before and after the passage under discussion, Brahman
is the topic of enquiry. How can, all of a sudden, air
intervene as a relevant topic? The preceding
passage describes the Brahman as the immortal, resplen-
dent support of all beings, transgressing which none can
go (Ka. 2, 5, H). So on account of proximity, a; also on
account of its being the support of all, Brahman atone can
be the topic in the passage under discussion. "The whole
world trembles n> prana.' rnw.« tint ;ir:ir.::i sr [he Brahman
15 the -[Link] of ;he world. That praiia means Brahman
or the highest Atman fa 6tatcd in the expression '[Link]
of prana " (Br/. 4, 4, IS). To cause the whole world
tremble i= possible for the highest Atman, and not for the
mere wind; for it is not by means of the wind, "prarja and
apina, that anyone live; ; we live on account of another
being in whom these two prana and apina find rest'
OCa. 2, 5, 5). In the passage subsequent to the one under
discussion, the wind, rhe fire and the sun, as also indra
and Death, are spoken of as doing their dntfee through
the fear of Brahman. The [Link] say*
exactly the same thing (2,8,1 ). So, once again, on account
176 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

of proximity and on account of the cause of fear, the

raised thunderbolt and the terror referred to in the passage
under discussion denote the general fear of Brahman
which may fall on the heads of the disobedient beings.
That praga means Brahman is due to one more reason
mentioned in the passage, viz., the knowledge of it leads
one to moksa. This is borne out by another jruti passage,
'
A man who knows him alone goes beyond death; there
is no other way
'
tfve. 6, 15). The immortality of the
wind spoken of by the purvapaksin is not absolute but
relative only with reference to the life-span of man; for
immediately in the next chapter of the Brhadaranyaka,
the wind and other elements are said to be perishable.
And, finally, the subject-matter of the passage under dis-
cussion, started by Naciketas in his request to tell him
that '
which is neither this nor that, neither efFect nor
cause, neither past nor future,' makes us aware that the
word prlria means the highest Atman, and not wind.

S'ltirHSRT^ I V'
Uyotib — light; darsanal — being KM.]

Because (Brahman) is seen, thb light (means

Brahman). 40

A passage in the Chandogyopanisad tells us 'that

the serene being or the saitiprasada rises from the body,
and appears in its own form as soon as it meets the highest
light ' (8, 12, 3). Now
the word ' light ' in this passage
is understood by the purvapaksin as meaning the ordinary
physical light of the sun which dispels darkness. No
doubt, the word " light ' from the third chapter of the
same Upanisad was decided (Sutra 1, 1, 24) to mean
Brahman, because the topic of the Gayatri-passage is
Brahman: but there is no such reason to take that word
here too in the same sense. Beside?, in the chapter known
is
as the Natfikhanda of the Chandogyopanisad, it
stated that when a man aspiring for release,' departs
from his body he is drawn upwards by the rays to the
Sun' (8,6,5).

We reply that the word 'light' means Brahman only.

For in the whole chapter Brahman is the topic of discus-
sion. It is introduced in 8, 7, 1, as the Atman which '

is free from sin,' and is said to be the object of inquiry.

It is again referred to (8, 9, 3 fF) as the object requiring

explanation, and so is told to be the disembodied being to
which pleasure and pain do not touch (8, 12, 1). Now
this disembodied condition is not possible except in the
case of Brahman. The sun, on the other hand, is an
embodied divinity. Finally, the light is spoken of as the
'
highest light ', and as 'the highest person' (8, 12, 3).
True release, as we shall see later on, does not involve
departing upwards to the Sun.

'
What is known as akasa is the cause of the manifesta-
tion of names and forms. That in which these are con-
tained is the immortal Brahman, the Atman '
(Cha.
8, 14, 1).

According to purvapaksin, the word akasa stands for

the bhutakasa because this is the accepted conventional
meaning. The bhutakiia can be said to be the cause of
the manifestation of names and forms, because it affords
them room to exist. Besides, there is no clear and distinct
indication on account of which the akasa can be said to
 We reply chat the container must be different from
the contained. The Brahman contains within it the names
and forms therefore the akasa must he nothing else but
;

Brahman. Nothing except 8rahman_ can be different

from names and forms. The bhiitakasa too is included
in the world of created things having names and forms ;

and so itcannot he different from them. Besides for the

marsiieslntion too of names and forms, the creative power
is ulnnvitcly responsible, as is clear from
of Brahman the
Jruti,
'
Let me enter into them in the form of jlvatman
and manifest thename-- and forms '
(Chi. 6, 3, 2). Though
rhc Hifitakisa is said to afford room for all the objects
of names and forms and so to manifest them, yet this is
poesibfe only in the case of objects which have been
already created by the highest Atman, and not in the case
of those which have not been created. The mention
of jlvatman in the Sluti passage is only to show that the
jlvatman is not different from the Brahman. Besides
the words Brahman, Immortal, and Atman 'are indicative
'

of Brahman alone. The present Sutra is only an addi-

tional ,-Nplanation of what was told in Sutra 1, I, 22.

{Susupti-utkrantyoji during sleep and departure; hhedena

— bemuse o/ difference J

'body)™
A passage in the Brhadaranyaka describes the Atman
as '
he who is within the heart and the pranas, and the
person consisting of light and knowledge ' (4, 3, 7)- Now
the pranas being theupaiihis of the jlvatman, the reference
 . [Link]. 42 179

to the person having knowledge in this as well as in the

concluding pawi^e, "(-his grw. unborn Atman, consisting
of knowledge and residing in the praijas ' (4, 4, 22) is.
3CL>[Link]
li to purvapaksa, the reference to the jivatman
only. The intermediate passages too which deal with
the waking and other states must be taken as referring to
the embodied soul.

Wesay in reply that the passage does not give any

additional information regarding the jivatman, but tells
us only about the nature of the highest God. In the first
place, the God is pointed out as being different from the
individual soul by reference to what happens to the latter
in deep sleep. '
Being embraced by the prajna Atman,
this person knows nothing either inside or outside.' In
other words, it is during the condition of sleep, that the

jivatman forgets everything o{ the nature of un-atman.

It forgets itselfand becomes one with God, who is always
intelligence or knowledge. Similarly, the jivatman is
spoken of as groaning while he is passing away from the
body, because he is heing presided over by the highest
God. Here too God is mentioned as distinguished from
the embodied soul.

The so-called characteristics which, according to

[Link]. indicate the nature ofjiva are, as a matter of
f;:.:r. merely used to indicate, the jlva as identical with

the highest God. Sruti gains nothing by describing

the nature of jlva which is already so well known Its ;

aim is to make us aware of the unknown nature of the

Brahman from the known nature of the jiva, and of the
fact that the jiva is nothing else but Brahman, That
is why immediately in the subsequent p.i -.-;[£•. the Atman
is described (o he thinking as if ' or ' moving as if '.when
'

as a matter of fact the Atman neither thinks nor moves.

That which thinks is the buddhi, and that which moves
are the indriyas. Similarly, in the concluding passage,
the words which appear to indicate the jivatman, viz.
'
the person consisting of knowledge and residing in the
 i

[Link],' indicate, as a matter of fact, the highest God, be-

cause the same person is referred to as being the 'great, un-

born Atman.' And if both in the beginning and in the end
of the chapter, the aim of ,fruti is to describe the nature
c* the highest Atman, then to say that in the intermediate
portion of (he sime [tie j:v;> 1111:111 i.= described is to allow
.

the possibility of a man who has gone in the east being

found in the west. The description of the wakeful
and other conditions is not intended to refer to jiva, but
to the highest (Jo J who 1; tree from juejh conditions. The
reference to these only serves the purpose of denying these
in the case of the highest Atman. So here too .fruti
makes the progress from the known nature 0/ the jiva to
the unknown nature of the Atman. This is further
evident not only from the repeated request of Janaka
In tell him only what concerns mokjia ; but also from the
repeated answer of Yiijnavalkya that " the purusa being
unattached to anything is not, affected hy any of these
enjoyments (Br. 4, 3, 14-16). The Atman is further
'

described as having nothing to do with merit or demerit,

'

because it then overcomes all the sorrows.' We therefore

conclude that the aim of the passage is to describe the nature
of the Atman alone.

IStfNP^ttft I H3

{Patyadt— like Lord and alders; Sabdcbhya/i -on account. 0/

words.

fORt>s like 'Loud' etc. 43

The words '

pari," '
vasr,' and iiana used in the
' '

Brhadaranyaka (4, 4, 22) further make us aware that it is the

highest God who is spoken of as the Lord, the controller
and protector of all. Obviously they cannot refer to
jiva, because it is not possible for him to control and pro-
tect all beings. Similarly, the quality of being neither
greater by good deeds nor smaller by evil deeds is not
ascribable to any being except God.
 —

ADHYAYA first
PAD A FOURTH

\[Link]\\am— that which is inferred; afii— eurn; efjeioiA

0/ jome ; fti cct—if it be said na— not ; Jflrim— body
—
;

riipakp. simile ; uinynsto referred ;g/-fiite£— because it is

mentioned ;
[Link] — .Vru:: uvj; ca — ^flnd.]

Starting with the inquiry into the nature of Brahman

we defined it as the cau:v nr the ongiii. subsistence and
dissolution of the world (55. 1, 1, 2), then noticed We
that pradhana can not be defined in this manner, because
.frutidoes not mention the 'seeing' in its case, as it men-
tion;it in the case of Brahman. (SCi. 1,1,5). And further
we proved that the common purpose of all the Vedanta
passages is to show that Brahman, and not pradhana,
isthe cause of the world (S5. 1, 1, 10) And yet so long
as the view that there are still some Sruti words which
appear to favour the doctrine that pradhana is the cause,
has not been shown to be erroneous, our own theory
that the omniscient Brahman is the cause of the universe
cannot be said to be firmly established. So, we now
proceed to show in thischaptet that the passages containing
such words really have a different meaning than that
which is sought by the Sankhyas.
 ;

182

The doctrine of pradhana is said to have gat the

authority of Sruti because the three entities admitted by
the Sankhya Smrti, vi:. the mahat, the avyakta and the
purusa are exactly the entities which are named and
mentioned in the same order in Sruti. The Kariiaka,
for example, read; :
'
Beyond mahat, there is the avyatta
and beyond avyakta, there is the Purusa ' (1, 3, 11).
Now, the word 'avyakta' is accepted to mean pradhina
according to the Sankhya Sm^ti ; and pradhana being
without the qualities of sound, touch etc. is said to be
the meaning of avyakta.

We say in reply that the passage from the Kafhaka

does not refer to pradhana though the word 'avyakta' may
refer to anything subtle and difficult to discern. Besides
the meaning of a thing does not depend upon the mere
position it occupies or the order in which it comes. It
is fooiish to argue that a cow is a horse, because it is tied
in the place of a horse. On the contrary, if we judge
from the general subject matter, we shall find that avyakta
does not refer to the imagined entity of pradhana but to
the body mentioned in the metaphor of the chariot.

The passage under discussion comes after another

passage in which there occurs the metaphor of the chariot
and the various entities, vii. the soul, the body, the buddhi,
the mind the senses and their objects are respectively
,

conceived as the lord of the chariot, the chariot, chario-

teer, the reins, the horses and their way of going (I, 3, 3,4)-
It is told that a man who has no control over his mind
and senses returns to samsara, but that a man who has
got it goes to the excellent abode of Visnu. Then, while
describing this abode of Visnu as the end of all, it has
been further mentioned that 'beyond the senses are their
objects, beyond objects the mind, beyond mind the buddhi
beyond buddhi the great atman, beyond the great the
avyakta, and beyond avyakta the Purusa but that beyond
;

Purusa there is nothing, and that Purusa is the highest

goal, the end of the journey '
(Ka. 1, 3, 10, 11). Now if
we arc to avoid the mistake of leaving the topic in hand
and pursuing a new one, we must suppose that we are
dealing with the same entities in this passage as were
previously mentioned in she metaphor of' the chariot.
The senses, the mind and the buddhi are commonly re-
ferred to in both the passages, under the same names.
The objects of the senses refer to the ways of the horses.
That the objects go beyond the senses is confirmed by
what Sruti has told, viz. ' The senses are grahas,' i.e.
those which catch hold of ; but the objects of the sen-
ses are greatet still in this respect, because the senses
are dependent for their attractive power on the presence
of the objects (Br. ?, 2]. In the same way, mind issuperior
to both the sensi-ii ,inJ their ohj-.v-s. 'of both these depend
on the presence of the mind. The mind too, in its turn,
befios dependent on the discriminative power of buddhi
ihi- [Link] superior to or goes beyond mind. Higher
than buddhi is the great atman or the soul, which is re-

ferred to in the earlier passage as the lord of the chariot.

It is natural that the bhokta of the soul that enjoys should
go beyond the means ol enjoyment he is like the master
.

to his servants. Or the words ' mahan atman may mean '

the buddhi of Brahmadeva or Hiranyagarbha who was

the first to be created, and was given the vedas (Sve.
6,18) ; for it is his
buddhi which can truly be considered
the support of all the intellects of beings. So though
in the former passage, the word ' buddhi ' comes once
here it is referred to twice and so by
;
'
buddhi we may '

mean the human intellect, and by mahan atman the

" '

intellect of
"
Hitanyagarbha. Then the word soul or
i! vat ma in the former passage his its corresponding word
'
Purusa '
in the second passage, because jivatma and par-
amatma are in reality one and the same. Eliminating the
five words from rhe first passage with the corresponding
five words,—as a matter of fact six words as shown
above— from the second passage, we get only one word
as the remainder from the first passage, vis. the '
body"
which must be equated with the one word which remain,
from the second passage vis. the -avyakta.' It will be im-
 possible therefore to bring out any meaning of the Srub*
passages, if according to the Sankhya. view, the avyakta

The aim of the entire section of the Upanisad is to

show how owing to avidyj -h L I'[Link].m i; hound to the
-

body, senses, mind etc., but how in reality it is nothing

but Brahman. The metaphor of the chariot shows
us the sariisara of the eoul, but we know its final destiny
too, vii. the highest and the excellent abode of Vijiju
which 'though hidden in all beings is seen hy those who
have a subtle and one-pointed intellect (Ka. 1, 3, 12),
The way to know him is through the practice of yoga ;

It consists first in controlling rhe activities of speech

and othersensesandrestinginmindonly thento control ;

and stop the doubtful mental activities too and rest in

the decision of the intellect; then again restrain the
personal buddhi into the fundamental, great intellect
of the Hiranyagarbha, and finally to compose this too in
the calm of the highest Atman, the end of all. If we
thus consider the full context, we find that there is no
place for the hypothesis of pradhana.

BSPT 3 ^5^1^ I

ISGlymajti —subtle ; tad— that ; arhatvat— because it is

Proper.}

(The word avyaeta means) however, the subtle

(body); because this
is the proper (meaning) OE THAT

(woin). 2

So, with the help of the context and the process of

elimination employed while comparing the two passages
regarding the chariot and the abode of Visiju, it has been
shown in the preceding Sutra that avyakta means the body
and not pradhana. Yet it may be suggested that the
actual physical body being perceptible, it ought to have
been denoted by the word vyakta and not avyakta.
' '
 '

. iv, tu. 3 185

To this the reply at' the Siitrakara ib that the word

avyakta means the subtle causal body, which consists of
the subtle pares of the elements, and as such is further
applied to the effect thereof viz. the gross, physical body.
This usage of naming the effect by the same term by which
the cause is denoted is not uncommon. Mix the soma '

with cows (8g. 9 46. 4) means mix the soma with

'
,
'

milk of the cows \ Here cows means the milk of the "

cows '. Similarly, all this was then not manifest'

'

(Br. 1. 4, 7) means all this world of names and forms was

'

in a former condition merely potential or seminal, i. e.,

devoid of names and forms'. In other words, the present
manifest world is referred to by the former non-
manifest condition of the world.

«9&ra^N3 i

May not this antecedent condition of the world in

which nothing is manifest be called as pradhana ?

It is not pradhana, we reply. For the previous

condition of the world is not an independent cause. It is,

on the other hand, dependent on the highest Gad. It is

the power of God, with which he creates the world. It

is this potential, premordial power of the highest God

which is known by several names, such as, "avidyi ',

'maya', "avyakta', akasa, and aksara. It is the great
sleep on account of which the individual souls being
ignorant of their real nature become engrossed in samsara
It is known as akasa, because of its unlimited extent, or

because of its being the cause of akaia. It is akaara

because it does not ira se to exist until there is knowledge.

 186 VEDA NT A EXPLAINED

It is known as tnaya on account of its wonderful creation;

and finally it is known as avyakta because being the power
of Brahman cannot be
it from different Brahman; nor can
it be non- different from Brahman, because Brahman is
knowledge, while its power is of the nature of ignorance
(Br.3,8, 11; mu 2, 12; Sve 4, 10).

The avyakta is said to be beyond ma hat according to

the Kjtt'ukoriinisaii, because ma hat, in the sense of the
intellect of the Hiranyagarbha, originates from the avyakta.
Or even if we understand by mahat the individual soul,
the avyakta is beyond it, because the soul is dependent
on avyakta or avidya. The very being and continuation
of the soul is on accoun; of its relation io avidya. Now
as the cause and the effect are identical, the quality of
transcending the mahat: has [Link] transferred from avyakta
(the cause), to the body (the effect of it,), and so the word
avyakta too is mentioned in the sense of body. Such a
DassftXence of quality and name from cause to the effect
it not made in the case of other products of avyakta
because the senses etc. are mentioned by their own
names in the two passages of the chariot and the abode of
Visnu. It is body alone which has not been so shown by its
own name, and so has to be denoted by the word avyakta.

Some people give a different interpretation of the last

two Sutras. According to them, both the gross and the
subtle bodies are previously compared to a chariot. But
the word avyakta means here the subtle body only.
' '

The bondage and release of the soul again are possible

on account of this subtle body. For it is due to the
subtle body that desires bind the soul after death, and it
isdue to the destruction of the subtle body by means of
knowledge that the soul gets its release.
,

To this we reply that just as the word chariot would

atand for both the gross and the subtle bodies, even so,
the word avyakta may stand for both of them. There
seems no sufficient reason, escepting the word avyakta
 .iv,s0.4 187

meaning subtle as to why both the bodies, gross and

subtle, should have been mentioned first, and only one of
them, uiz. the subtle, be mentioned afterwards. The
conteit is the same: and if we are to avoid the fault of
leaving the subject in hand and taking to a new one at
will, we must so interpret the two gruti passages as to
make a complete whole of meaning. And this can be
achieved only when the passages concerned give a common
topic. Therefore it is that both the bodies must have
beer. rei erred id by
'
nvyiikia
'.
just as they were referred
to by '
chariot'. Besides, the quir»:ion is not regarding
the distinction between the gross body and the subtle
body; it is rather to point out a series of things in order
o: execUe've. j:iJ :hu- ir> show that beyond the highest

abode of Visnu. rhriuijf hid Jen, ihere is nothing superior.

j

And yet, even taking for granted that the word avyakta
'
'

denotes the subtle body, the one conclusion, about which

there is no uncertainty, is that the Kafhaka passage has
no reference to pradhana.

According to the Sankhyas, the knowledge of

pradhana or the constituent gunas as distinct trom Purusa
isconsidered to be essential for achieving the liberation of
the soul. Or else, as held by them sometimes, the pra-
dhana is to be meditated upon for the sake of obtaining
extraordinary powers. But, so far as the passage under
discussion is concerned, the avyakta is not mentioned
either as an object of knowledge or meditation. In other
words, the knowledge of it serves no human end,
Avyakta therefore cannot be said to mean pradhana. On
our view, on the other hand, the word avyakta has been
merely incidentally used for body after the passage of
[he ihinot is over to show the nature of the highest
abode of Visnu.

The Silrikhya may again quote a passage from the

same Upanisad and say that the entity described therein
as that which goes beyond mahat is nothing but pradhana.
E. g., He who perceives that which is without sound,
'

touch, form, decay, taste, or smell, which has neither

beginning not end, and which is beyond the mahat and
isconstant, is freed from the jaws of death ' (Ka. 2, 3, 15).

. We
reply that the object of perception described in
the passage is not pradhana but the intelligent highest
Atman, which alone goes to form the general subject-
matter. The Purusa alone is said to be the goal; for
there is nothing beyond him. Though he is hidden and
therefore difficult to be known, the wise people can have
a vision of him by resorting to the control of senses and
other means, and thus achieve the liberation from the
jaws of death. On the Sarikhya theory, too, liberation
is not possible by merely perceiving the pradhana; they
too believe that the release from death is possible after
the knowledge of the intelligent Purusa, as distinct from
pradhana. Besides qualities such as being without taste
smell etc. are said to belong to the highest Atman alone
in all the Vedanta — passages. Pradhana, therefore, is
neither spoken of as the object of knowledge, nor referred
to by the word ' avyakta '.
[Trayanaih—of three \ cva —only ; at — and ; nail: — thus
upanyasati- reply ;
praSnafi — question; ca.]

In Ka[havalli there occurs the story of Naciketa sand

Death. Being sent by his father, Naciketas approached
Death and got three boons. In this connection, Naciketas
asks him three questions regarding the sacrificial tiro
(1, 1, 13), the individual soul and the highest Atman.
The second question seeks to know as to what happens
regarding the individual soul after death (1,1, 20),
and the third is a query regarding that 'which is neither
this nor that, neither cause nor effect, neither again past
nor future' (1, 2, 14). The god of Death, we are told,
has given three corresponding answers to these questions.
Firstly, he tells Naciketas that fire is the beginning of the
world, and so tells him the number of bricks etc. required
for the sacrificial alter. SecoriJ'v. premiums; him to reveal
the hidden knowledge of Brahman, he tells Naciketas
that according :<" ;v,er:r= or Jc-iiwritis, some souls enter the
womb in order to have a new body after death, and that
others appear in the form of trees or stones (2,5,6,7). And
thirdly, he answers the third question by sayingthatthe
Atman has no birth or death etc. ('., 2, 18) There
being therefore no separate question or answer regarding
pradhana, it cannot be said rh;it ir is cipher !he object of
knowledge or is indicated by the word avyakta.

An objection may be raised at this point. If the

second question is resumed as the third, then there are
only two questions and not three and if the third is a
;

distinctand new question from the second, then taking

into consideration Naciketas' first boon regarding his
lather, there will be four questions and not three. And
if it is no mistake to ask a question in addition to the
three
 To this we reply that the number of question!
indeed is in no way greater than the number of boons.

The first boon does refer to the wtshed-for kindness

to him from his father; the second refers to the fire, and
the third to the nature of the soul and Atman. Now
so far as the three questions are concerned, the first refers
to the fire, and the second and the third refer to the soul
and the Atman taken together as the subject-matter of the
third boon. Nacike'tas himself says after miking inquiry
about the destiny of the soul after death, that it constitutes
his third boon. So, the first boon takes the form of a
demand and the second and the third boons the forms
;

of three questions, as explained above. This means

that the second and the third questions relate to the
single topic, only with this difference that the second
deals with it under the aspect of individual soul, and the
third undet the aspect of the Atman. And this is possible
because the individual soul and the Atman are really one
and not two.

We see the proof of this unity ol the :iva and Atman

in a number of ways, (1) Passages like 'That thou art'
affirm it. (2) In the present Upamsad j^.iin, the denial
of birth and death in the case of the individual soul is
itselfan assertion of the non -difference of the soul and
Atman. For there is no point in denying them nf the
highest God where there is no po-ssi;-'i!:iy oi their existence.
Denial of something has got meaning only when that
something has the possibility of existence somewhere.
The embodied soul, for example, has got the possibility
of birth and death on account of its connection with the
body. Therefore the denial of these in the case of the
individual soul means that the real nature of the individual
soul is to be disembodied. The denial, in other words,
points out the unity of the soul and the highest God.
(3)Similarly, another passage, which declares the cessation
 .iv, [Link] 191

of all sorrow by knowing that the real perceiver of all '

the objects in the waking and the dreaming conditions is

the great and omnipresent Atman itself,' clearly suggests
that the jiva is not different from the Priijna (2, 4,), It is
a doctrine of In: VodinTa ihav the knowledge of Priijria
i

puts an end to all sorrow ; and thisachieved by the

is
knowledge of the real nature of the jiva. !4.) A^ain, the
Esage (2.4,10). "what is here is there and what is there is
e he who finds any difference goes from death to
;

death, contains a censure of a person who holds that the

jiva and Priijna are different. (5) The fact that Naciketas
remains firm regard in*; the choice ci hi* iliird boon. viz.
the question r,-ia;:nc the conJiiion iifthe snul after death,
in spite of the various temptations offered by the god of
Death, and the fact of subsequent praise of Nacikevasar.d
bis question, and the form of answer given by the latter,
show that the jiva and Prajna are not different from each
other Knowing that Naciketas was not moved by desires
for pleasures, the god of Death imparts him the knowledge
Vidyii .in J avidyii, and of the pleasant
of [he drsiiriL-iicir. of
iiinJ the iood, and tells him how by the process of medita-
i

tion the wi;e people find out with great difficulty that
ancient and hidden God and go beyond both joy and
sorrow (1, 2, 4 ; 1, I, 12). (6) If Naciketas had' left the
question which had earned him so much praise, and asked
a fresh question, it would have simply meant that the
praise was wasted on him. His sticking on to the same
question only means that the third question about the
highest Atman is rc:i Ny he carrying fotwardof the second
:

question regarding the individual soul. (7) And, finally,

a slight difference in language need not be construed as
a difference in the subject-matter of the two questions.
For we hold that whereas the second question is with
reference to the existence of thesoulasaparr from the body,
the third is merely with reference to its being or not being
subject to samsara. So long as avidyii is there, the jiva
appears to be endowed with attribute* etc. but the ;

moment avidyii vanishes the soul too is seen to be one

-
with the Priijna, as is told by the Sruti, That thou art '.
 « '

192

As a matter of fact the thing itself does not undergo any

change by the presence or absence of avidyii. The rape
itself remains a? rope whether it appears as a snake or not.
Even so, the jiva 13, in its real nature, one with the highest
Atman, though it appears to be different in connection
with the attributes, the body and the Sarfisara.

In short, in the Siitra as well as in the Sruti, the

questions and the answers are said to refer to three thing!
only, viz. the fire, the individual soul and the highest

Atman. As against this, there is neither the mention of a

question, nor of an answer, which may favour the theory
of pradhana.

ICBt-N 1

{Mahafvat — li^e mahat- ; ca —and.}

And (the wour, avyakta is) lice (the word) *A- .

HAT ( IN NOT BEING ABLE TO REKR TO -RAOHAKa). 7

The Sarikhyas have used the word mahat in the sense

ofsatta or buddhi because it is the first product of pra-
dhana and because it is buddhi which enables a man to
achieve both prosperity and moksa. The vedic meaning of
mahat, however, is Purusa or Atman knowing whom
there is an end to all sorrow. This is clear from the
'The great Atman is beyond the intellect
passages,
'I know that great Person' (Sve. 3, 8).
(Ka. 1. 2, 22) ;

The Vedic word avyakta too like wise cannot mean

Just as the word avyakta is shown to have been

put forits effect, viz. the body, and not pradhana, ejen
so, the attributes, red, white and black indicate fire,
water and food respectively, and not pradhana.
 The followers of Kapib may yet find the support
of Sruti for their theory of pndhSna in the mantra (Sve. 4
5), which speaks of " one aj."i (She-goat) of red, white and
Hack colours and of her innumerable similar offspring."
We are further told that she ii loved by one goat but
'

abandoned by another." Now. obviously, the word

'
aja docs not mean a she-goat."
' '
It means the un-born

source of all, the pradhana or prakrri, which on account

of attachment to it deludes some souls into believing that
they are subject to pleasure and pain of sarrisara, but
which cannot affect the other souls because they achieve
their release through discrimination and non-attachment
to it. The sattva is said to be white, because it is pureor
shining: the rajas is red because it colours the mind,
and tamas is black because ir envelopes the mind like
darkness.

We reply that taken by itself the mantra is unable to

justify any particular doctrine. For the words, 'aja' etc.
have different meanings, and there is no special reason,
like context for instance, why any particular meaning
can be selected and shown to he favourable to any particular
doctorine, A parallal example of this occurs in the
Brhadarariyakopanisad (2, 2, 3); 'Camasa is a cup
with its mouth below and bottom upwards." Taken
by itself, the mantra cannot determine any particular cup.
But the sentence that follows determines this, and we get
the sense that the so-called cup is the head.'
'
Even
so, may we not be able to determine the meaning of the
word 'aja' with reference to some other passage? The
next Sutra comes as a reply. :
 — —

{Jyot-ib-upahyamd — fcegirming imtfc light: tu — but; tatha

in that manner ; fit because ; adhiyate— study ; e^e—
.oma.)

As said above, we can determine the meaning of the

word 'aja' in the ivetasvataropanisad by reference to
what has been said in the Chandogyopanisad (6, 4, 1) vil.
that the colours, red, white and black are the colours of
the three elements of (ire, water and earth and that these
elements have sprung forth from the highest God. The
words red, white and black are used to denote their
primary meanings, viz. the colours or the elementsanii
not the secondary meanings, viz. gunas that go to form
the pradhiina. The same conclusion is therefore possi-
ble to be inferred in the £vetaivataropanisad. For
generallya doubtful passage is interpreted in the light of
another passage whose meaning is accepted as beyond
doubt. Starting with the question of the Brahman aE
the cause of the world, the Upanisad tells us, just pre-
vious to the passage under consideration, how those
who had taken resort to meditation could see the power
of the highest God, though it is hidden by his quali-
ties. It is this power which is described in this passage
(Sve. 1, 1) as creating the entire universe, and sub-
sequently described as rnaya or prakrti, and as belong-
ing to the Mayavin or the Maheivara. He is the one
lord and support of not only the original yoni or Maya
but of several mayas which are the effects of the original
one(4,10-ll>. Naturally, in the passage which intervenes
(4, the
5) word '
aja"
'
the cannot mean Sarhkhya P™^
or pradhana as the independent cause of the world.
Rather, the context or the subject-matter shows that.
;"
asintheajTt passagealso, the samedivine power fl which
 —
iv, su. 10 195

the names and forms have not become manifest is the cause
or the antecedent condition of the world of namee and
forma Now this divine power or maya is said ta possess
three colours because the three element; of fire, water and
earth, which are the effects of m!iya, possess the three
colours of red, white and black respectively. Just as is the
effect ao also is the cause.

If 'aja' is taken to mean the three elements according

to the Cbandogyopanisad, and not original maya
which is really (aja) unproduced, a doubt may arise as
to how the three elements can either be conceived as
having the form of the she-goat or be thought of as tin-
produced, inasmuch as the three elements are the pro-
ducts of maya. To this the Siitrakara replies :

ing mentioned under the image of;

— lilje (intieyatidothcTj; a-virodkaft

— not contradictory.]

Like the (metaphor of) honey etc. there is no-

thing CONTRADICTORY IN MENTIONING (THE DIVINE FOWZ&)
CTNDEH THE IMAGE (OF AJA). 10

Just as the sun is imagined as honey, or the speech

as cow. or the heavenly world as fire (cha. 3. 1 Br- 5, 8; 6,
;

2, 9), even so, the prakrti which consists of fire, water and

earth, is imagined as she -goat. The prakrti can neither be

conceived as having the form of a she-goat, nor as un-
produced. This original aja is simply imagined like an
ordinary she-goat to produce all the inanimate and animate
beings possessing the three colours of the elements like
herself, and as being loved by some ignorant souls who
are held in bondage by avidyfi, but abandoned by those
who have attained true knowledge. This distinction
between souls and souls does not however mean the
doctrine of the multiplicity of souls as the SSrhkhyas
believe, but is merely meant to distinguish bondage
 — !

from release. The distinction itself is not real but is

due to upadhis, which are there on account of false know*
ledge. Aa the Sruti says, He is the one all-pervading
'

Goo who is hidden in

beings as the inner
all Arman of
all' (Sve. fi, 11). Jt stands to reason then that aja" means
firewater and earth taken together.

i tt£4tainft4i*) aWfflWWOT ' !

{J>Jo— not ; sanl(nyi7- numbet; upainngroliivt- -being

mentioned; api even; >iHnabhavat~on flitoum "( naty
difference* ; atirekat—due to MOM
at- and j
;

"

TflB KUUMT). 11
To show that his doctrine of pradhana has got the
authority of Sruii. the Sarhkhya again, cites the mantra,
'I believe him alone to be the Atman, in whom the akafe

and the panca pancajanas live; knowing him as the im-

mortal Brahman, I become immortal (Br. 4, 4,17). '
Here
the word 'panca' comes twice, and so, the two wards
together mean five groups of five, i.e. twenty-five. This,
says the SSUikhya, is exactly the number of the principles
as mentioned in the Sariikhya-Karita, 3—" The original
prakrti or pradhana is not an effect; mahat, ahankara
and the five tanmatras are the seven effects of prakrti,
but are causes too of the sinteen which are effects only,
viz. the five gross elements and eleven indriyas and the ;

purusa who is neither the effect nor the cause. Thus the '

common element of the number twenty-five in both the

5ruti-pas;age and the Sarbkhya-Karikis is taken to mean
as the ground tor believing that pradhana has got the
support cf 5ruti.

To this we reply:
 .iv,.u. 11 197

Sruti cannot be shown to be the authoritative ource

of the pradh ana -theory in this way For (1) each one .

of the twenty-live principles of the Samkhyas is different

from the others. (2) They cannot be classified into five
groups of five principles, there being no common quality
in the members of any group; for, a classification into
groups presupposes that the members ot a group, whether
two or three or more, must have some common quality. (3>
The words 'panca, panca'arenottobesaid as forming the
number twenty-five by multiplication, just as the words
'
five and seven in the statement, 'India did not rain
' ' '

for Eve and seven years," can be said to indicate the number
of twelve years by the addition of five and seven. For
where it is possible to mention the number directly as
twenty-five, it is not correct to say that it has beenindica-
•eJ indirectly as rive groups of five. (4) Besides, the second
word '
panca '
if not independent lite the first word
'
panca,' so that we can mean by both of them the number
'Eve.' The second word "panca," on the other hand,
enters as a member in the compound word pancajana'
'

as in the passage ^aHi 31 ftnOTt (Tai. Sam 1,6,

2, 2), and therefore has not got a separate
genetive
case -termination as the first word panca ' has got it. '

The word panca ' then is not alone repeated twice so

'

as to indicate five times five. Not can the first word

be an adjective of the second word panca."
" '
panca '

which also is an adjective. (5) Nor can it be said that

inasmuch as the word '
panca qualifies the compound
'

word 'pancajana,' the expression 'panca pancajana' would

suggest the number twenty-five on the analogy of the
expression ' panca pancapuli," which means twenty-five
wooden or other similar vessels. For the word" pancapuli'
is a 'samahara-dvigu' compound and means a collection

of five vessels ; and so, if some one were to ask as to how

many ' panchpulis ' are mentioned, the answer that there
are five (panca) such groupsor twenty-five vessels in all

would naturally take the form of the expression panca

pancapulis." But the word 'pancajana,' on the other hand,
instead ofmdicaunga 'dvigu' compound indicates directly
 198

the idea of five distinct persons. In other words, there

being no idea of groups, there arises no occasion to know
the number of groups, and so the word panca' cannot be
'

said to be an adjective of another compound word panca'

"

jana meaning a group of five persons. The expression

'

"
panca pancajana '
does not indicate then even indirectly
the number twenty-five which may be useful for the
Samkhyas to denote the number of their principles. (6)
Besides, in the passage where the expression panca
'

pancajana occurs, the words Acman and akata, which

'

are already included in the twenty-five principlesof the

Sarhkhyas, are again mentioned separately. So if the
intelligent principle of the Atman as also the akasa are
to be counted again along with the supposed number
of twenty-five indicated by the expression 'panca panca-
jana," the total number would be twenty-seven. The
Atman which is mentioned as the immortal abode in
which the ' panca pancajana' live cannot itself be taken
again as one which iives in rlie .i' Sitnilirly, the separ-
r.> .:-."-
.

ate mention of •akasa* would increase the number of the

Sarrikhya categories. (7) Again, the bare reference to a
certain possible number as mentioned in the expression
"panca pancajana' can in no way lead us to the number
twenty-five of the Samkhyas, for the simple reason that
it has been mentioned nowhere else in the Sruti. Besides

the word jana' does not mean a principle or a category.

(8) And if arbitrarily we are to interpret the expression
'panca pancajana," then it may mean any other group of
twenty-five things, and not necessarily the Sarhkhya
principles.

How, then, it may be asked, are we to interpret the

word pancajana
'
'? It is a name, we reply. For, ac-
cording to Pacini (2, 1, 50) words indicating direction
or number are compounded with other wards and then
mean only a name of something or person. So the word
'pancajanab' does not indicate the number five, but
indicates only a particular class of beings; and so again,
the expression 'panca pancajanar/ does not indicate the
 number twenty -five of [he Saiiikhya principles, but indi-
cates that beings known by the name "pancajana" arc
fine in number, just as the beings known as Saptarsr'
'

are seven in number.

ia and
wdayd/i-prana otheri; valgak/at-fm
<ind others; vah
mttltaty sentence.}
ce.f

With a view to describe the nature of Brahman, the

mantra which comes immediately after (Br. 4, 4, lSj she
mantra in which the pancajaniih are mentioned (4, 4, 17)
tells us that those who know the breath of breath, the
'

eye ol the eye, the ear of ear, the food of food, and the
mind of mind, are alone able to ascertain the nature of
that eternal Brahman. So it is clear that the pancajaniih
are no other but the beings which are mentioned so
closely upon them, vis., the breath, the eye, the ear, the
'

food and the mind. The argument that the word jana '

does not mean breath etc. tells equally against the word
'jana being taken in the sense of the SSrhkhya categories
But our interpretation has this much in its favour, viz., (I)
the two mantras as shown above are in close proximity.
©The breath, the eye, etc. have got an actual connection
with jana i. e..a beingor a person: (3) The word purusa"
• '
'

which is a synonym for iana is used in the Upanisads

" '

to denote prana etc.; e. g. These are the five Brahma-

"

purusas ', ' Breath is father, mother etc. '. (Cba. 3, 13, 6;
7, IS, 1); and finally (4) The word jana can, without any
contradiction, be taken in its conventional meaning. \ur
as we do in the case of the words Udbhid'. 'Yijpa *, and
'

'
Vedi '.
A
word of unknown meaning becomes known
as possessing some meaning because we see it used in
200

connection with another ward of known meaning. For

instance, the word 'udbhid' in the sentence, "he it
to sacrifice with udbhid ', enables us to know that
'
udbhid ' is the name of a sacrifice; the word 'yupa' in
'
he cuts the yupa ', means a wooden post; and the word
'vedf in he makes the vedi ', means the alter of sacrifice.
'

So once we decide that th? word pancajana is a com-' '

pouod which is formed according to the above mentioned

rule of Paijini and therefore means the name of a thing or
person, it is very easy to show, as is shown in the above
that the name refers to prana and other beings.
,

The word pancajanab has been taken by some

' '

commentators to mean the five beings of gods, fathers'

gandharva, asuras and raksasas. Others say that it
means the four castes of Brahmins etc. with [Link]
added to them. We find it used in Bgveda to denote
the created beings in general (8, 53, 7). may take We
any meaning we like, but what the Sutrakaia intends by
choosing the meaning as prima etc., is only to show that
(whatever else may be the meaning) the word " pancajana'
does not mean the Samkhya category.

Now it is a fact that the Kinva recension of the Upa-

nisad does not mention the being of food, while the
Madhyandina mentions it along with the other four.
To this the next Sutra comes as a reply.

Notwithstanding food being not (mentioned)

br some, jyotl being (mentioned, the number of beinos
ii still five). 13

it remember that jut

 ABHYAYA I, PA. IV, (0. 14 201

preceding mantra, thejyoti or the light of the sun his been

mentioned only to remind us of the nature of Brahman and
the way of devotion to it. But it may be pointed o
that if jyoti refers to Brahman, it cannot at the sai
'
'

time refer to the light of the sun; and that there is

reason why the Madhyandina recension should n
include it to mate the number five, but that the Kanva
one should include it, even if both the recensions refer to
jyoti. The reply is that the choice to include the jyoti
or not to include it isdependent on the requirement of
the followers of the two branches. The Madhyandina
get all the five beings of priina and others in one and the

same mantra, while the Kanvas do not; and so it is that

though the former do not, the latter do require to include
the jyoti in order to make the number five. This is con^
sistent with a similar MimariisS usage of either
accepting or not the Scd^' n ' cu P at the atirStra sacrifi

It has been proved so fat that pradhana is not mi

tioned in £ruti. That the doctrine of pradhana I

neither been backed up by Smrti nor by reasoning v

be shown later on.

and others;
mentioned.]

What we have seen so far from the very beginning is:

(i>The nature- of Brahman, as stated in the Sutra 'Janmii-
dyasya yatah (I, 1, 1); (ii) That Brahman is the uniform
topic of all the Vedanta-passages which we have so far
considered while jj-cussiiiu from
Sf;!ras 1, 1, 2 to 1,3,43;
and thatfiii} the doctrine or" pradbina is not at all mentioned
in Sruti, as has been clear from the last thirteen Sutras
of this plda.

Now, however, there comes forth a new objection.

It may be said that it is neither proved that Brahman is
the cause nor that it is the uniform topic of all the Vedfmta-
passage?, inasmuch as they are seen to contradict each
other. For instance the order in which the creation has
been mentioned to have taken place varies from place to
place. In one place, we ale told thatakaSa has come forth
from the Atman (Tai. 2, 1); in another the Sat is said to
have produced the fire (Cha. 6, 2, 3) in another place still,
;

the Purusa is said to have produced the pranas, and the

pranas the belief etc. (Pra. 6,4). As against all theEe state-
ments in which some order of creation is mentioned,
we get also an account of creation in which there is no
mention oforder; for instance, in the Aitareyopanigadjj
weare told that the Atrnan has produced the three worlds
of heaven, earth and [Link]. The creation is also said
to have begun from non-existence (Tai. 2, J: Cha. 3 19, 1).
As opposed to this, non-existence is discredited, and
existence mentioned as the beginning of the wurld (Cha.
6, 2, 1 — 2). Spontaneously, again, the world is said to
have come into existence. That which was merely un-
developed originally has itself become developed by the
means of namesand forms (Br. 1, 4, 7)- Thus, there being
various contradictions rc*<!!"Ji:iu creation, and inasmuch
as Brahman is already an accomplished fact, the Vedanta-
passages cannot be trusted so far as they claim that Brah-
man is the caure of the world. Rather, taking our stand
on Emrti and reasoning, we should accept pradhana of
some other entity as the cause of the world.

To this we reply. Though there may exist contra-

dictions in the Vedanta -passages regarding the order or
otherwise of the created things, such as akasa and others,
there is no such contradiction regarding the creator. For,
 X. iv. su. 14 203

as in one passage, bo in all other Vedanta-pasaages, the

creator is described as one who is omniscient, the lord of
all, the inner Atman of everything, and as the one and
the only cause, without a second. Consider, for instance,
the description of Brahman as the cause in the Taittiriyo-
'
pani^ad. The words ' knowledge ' and "
desired
which are used with reference to Brahman, indicate that
it is endowed with intelligence. The description that
it is ' independent ' of anything else applies only to God.

The fact that it is this God who has further been referred
to as the Atman and as residing in the innermost sheaths
known as made up of body, prana etc. clearly indicates
that he is the internal soul of all. The statements Let'

me be many ', ' Let me produce the beings ', show us

how the Atman himself has become many and is [Link]
not different from what he has become. And finally,
the passage, ' He created all this ', tells us that before the
creation of the world, he alone existed as the
cause (Tai. 2, 1, tV 6). Now as in this passage, so
in other passages too Brahman is described as
possessing the same characteristics. For instance, in the
Chandogya, " Being alone, and nothing else ' is said to
have been ' in the beginning; it thought to become
many and to grow; it produced fire' (Cha. 6,2, 1, 3). —
We have the same idea in another passage of the Airareyo-
panisad : "All this was the Atman in the beginning;
there was nothing else neither movable nor immovable
he thought to produce worlds '( 1, 1: ). So, even if
there are conflicting statements regarding rhe order of
creation, all the Vedanta-passages are thus seen to agree
in saying that Brahman if the cause of the world. No
doubt, these contradiction; regarding creation will be
reconciled by the Siitrakara later on, in the first Sutra of
the third pada of the second adhyaya. For the present,
we are, in no way, concerned with these contradictions.
For to describe the order or nature of creation is not at
alltheaimofSruti. The welfare of man does not depend
on these matters. Taking into consideration both the
introduction and conclusion of several such passages, we
 204

find that they are only subservient to the main topic of

Brahman.. The passage, for instance, which asks 'to seek
after the root of food, nil., water, and then to seek after
the root of water , wis, fire, and then again to seek after
the root of fire, vis. the truth ' (Cha. 6, 8, 4), ends in the
search of Brahman alone. All account; of creation, which
involve the illustrations of clay, iron, sparks etc., are in
the opinion of the experts who have the knowledge of
Sruti, only the means for the acquisition of the knowledge
of Brahman, in which there is no difference whatever
(Ma. Gauda. Ka. 3, 5). Knowledge of Brahman, on the
other hand, is mentioned to carry its own fruit '
He
:

who realises it reaches the highest ' (Tai, 2, 1): 'He who
realises the At man overcomes grief' (Cha. 7, 1, 3); 'One
who realises him goes beyond death ' (Sve. 3, 8). Direct
ia the fruit of the experience of this knowledge; for, the
moment the truth of the statement, 'That thou art,' is
realised and the Atman is seen to be not affected by the
rounds of birth and death, that very moment, vanishes
the illusion of the Samsara.

As for the assertion that there esist conttadictoiy

statements even with the nature of the cause, e.g whether
itwas existent or non-existent in the beginning, we shall
refuteit in our discussion of the next Sutra.

«fllWi9. i t"i

§[Link]-bting linked up.J

LINKED WITH THE WORD SAT IN THE NEXT PASSAQE,

' '

'
A5AT ' INDICATES BrAHMAN AND NOT NON-BEING. 15.
A
passage in the Taittiriyopanisad (2, 1) tells us
that "all this, verily, was in the beginning, non-being
(asat)'. But the ' asat ' need not mean absolute non-
existence; for, in the preceding passage of the same Upa-
nisad, we
are told the on authority
of those who have
realised the Brahman that ' one who knows the Brahman
as non-existing becomes himself non-existing; while
one
who knows it to he existing exists himself ' (2, 6, I). This
 .

.IV, to. 15 205

is at once a clear denial of the absolute

non-beine like

that of the horn of a hare and the affirmation of the

being
of Brahman alone. It is this same Being or Brahman

which is further referred to as the innermost Atman of

the various sheaths of food, prana etc., as the creator
because he '
desired to become many ',
and as the ultimate
It is only after this narration of the nature
of
Truth
Brahman, and therefore as connected with it, that we
get

the mantra non-being indeed was this in the beginning".

:
'

If, instead of the generally accepted necessary connection

ret'-vccn the Ernhmara portion and the mantra of the
n

tipamsad, the word 'asat were to mean absolute non-

b&ttnce, there will be no continuity of contest at all.
Tkt -[Link]'hision therefore, would be that if the word
'sat' indicates ihe heme oi Brahman with all the
manifest
forms and names, the word "asat" indicates the same
being of Brahman without the names and forms. It

n other words, the condition of the world pr

: if t
ir-Jic-'tt-i

origination, the condition in which Brahman

to its
appears to be '
asat ', as if.

The passage in the Chindogyopanisad too must be

construed in the same manner. The statement, This
was originally asat ', is immediately followed by it then
became sat'' It means therefore that the non-being
-
it ' cannot be the
absolute
referred to by the pronoun
sat or the
non-being, hut on the contrary, means the
Brahman 19, I).
(3, Similarly, the reference to the opinion
of others in another passage of the same Upanisad
vtf
does
that 'non-being was this in the beginning (6, 2, 1),
non-existence,
not mean the optional assertion of absolute
such a
but means, on the contrary, the refutation of
vulgar doctrine with a view to strengthen the position
there
that Brahman alone was in the beginning. For
reality, as
cannot be any optional view with regard to
there can be with regard to action.

passage still
This enables us to interpret another
from the Brhadaranyakopanisad (1, 4. 7) which
may
 ,

EXPLAINED

appear to favour the view that the world came into exis-
tence without a creator. The reference to the world
which wasoriginally without names and forms, but which
developed in course of time fnto one with names and form*
is not a reference to the world which came into being nf
its own accord and without a ruler. It if rather a reference
to the world in which the author of it is said to have
entered to the ' very tips of the nails of the fingers.' If
the world is to be supposed as having come into existence
by way of natural evolution, and if the authorship of
the Atman is to be denied, the pronoun "he' in the
sentence ' be entered into the effects ' would serve no
purpose. On the contrary, we are immediately told
that the being which has so entered is known by various
names, such as, the eye, the ear and the mind, because
it does the junction of seeing, hearing and thinking.
We
are told, in other words, that the being which has
entered is no other than the intelligent Atman ; and it is
clear that the authorship of the Almanisas much necessary
for the manifestation of names;in, forms at the k-cmnng
i

of the world as it is today, if at all we are not to assume

something against experience. The Chandogyopanisad
also tells ub that the evolution of the world has taken placq
under the supervision of the omniscient seer. 'Let me
evolve the names and forms by entering into the beings by
means of the jivatman (6, 3, 2). No doubt we have
'

the intransitive expression, The world evolved itself,

but it only shows the ease with which the Lord must
have created the universe. We know it is the farmer
who reaps the field, and yet we sometimes say that the
'
field rc:>p?: Or else, the expression 'the world evolves'
may be said to imply an author who evolves it, just as,
rhe expression, ' the village is being approached' implies
some person who approaches the village.

3nm%t^ i
\\
IJagat—worU ;
vacitvat— being denoted. J
 Because (the word '
Kahma ') means the world.

There if a dialogue in the Kausitaki-Brahmatia bet-

ween the ting Aptaiatru and a brahmin, by name Balaki:
and in the course of it the king tells the brahmin that
"verily he is fit to be known, who is the maker of the
persons and of this work ' (4, IS). Now the eju-.-stion ro
solve is whether the object to he known is the individual
soul, or the chief prana or the highest Atman.

The piirvapaksin holds that what is meant is the

chief Pnlria: for, in the first place. prana is the support of
'
'

the activity or mowincnt which it said to be its work.

Secondly, theword prana which is used in the immedi-
' '

complemenrary sentence, vi=.

ately following The jiva '

becomes one with prana, daring sleep (4, 20), is well-

'

known as denoting the chief breath. Thirdly, u BMTik:

hadalreadyueckireJ, prima ij the creator of the persona in
the sun, the moon etc.; or as the Brhadaranyaka says,
(3, 9.9) the sun and the other deities ..re nothing but the
•noditicjtiona of the one God, viz. prana or Brahman.

Or else, according ro the piirvapaksin, rhe being'

fir ro be known raav he the individual soul. The ' work
of [.he soul then v.'oiilJ men; :hc deeds of merit or demerit

and rhe 5 oul itself will be considered as the cause of the

persons in the sun etc.. inasmuch at the sun, the moon
etc. can be said to be the sources of pleasure and
pain to
be experienced hv the soul. Besides, a little further
we get a characteristic mark of the individual soul. In
order to instruct Balaki th,,( '.he being w_hich reallyexpe-
riences the pleasures and pains is not prana but the soul.
AjataSatru went near a sleeping man and shouted at him
'. dilTerent name's of nriin.i to wake him up.
;
But the
nan was not awakened at all. Ajatasatru then pushed
the sleeping man with a stick and woke him up, and
thus proved that the iiva is different from the prana.
Again, a little farther, in action 20, we get another
characteristic mark of the individual soul. The individual
208

self as well as the other selves in the sun and the moon
etc. are doing mutual obligations on Each other. The
individual aoul is known as prana only in a secondary
manner, inasmuch as it is the support of prana. And
as there are no characteristic marts of the highest God.
we must conclude that it is either the individual soul
ot the prana that should be considered as the fit object
of knowledge.

To this we reply . The bisisniiiii^ i:=ol; of the section

is sufficient to show that God is the author of the persona
mentioned in the sun. the moon etc. and is therefore the
object of knowledge. It is Baliiki who begins the con'

veisation with the statement that he would tell what

Brahman is, but remains silent only after mentioning the
person* residing in the sun, the moon etc. (4, 1). Ajata-
satni thereupon ridiculed Baliiki for having vainly said
that he would describe the Brahman, and told him in
return that the creator of these persons must be somebody
else, viz the Brahman. If AjiiEaSatm too, who censured
BalSki for his boast, were also simply to mention some
non-Brahmanjc persons and remain silent, then there
would be no point in the censure and the introductory
statement of Balaki regarding Brahman. Therefore it is
that the creator of these persons is none else but God.
Besides, God alone, unlike prima and jiva, can be said to
be truly independent in creating the persons in the sun
etc. The word ' Karma ' too doe; neither indicate the
movement nor the merit and demerit accruing from
it, so that we may refer to it as prana or jiva. For neither
of the twomeanings, movement or merit etc. is the topic
under discussion. Nor can the word" 'Karma' denote the
person; in the sun etc. for the word purusa' is masculine
and is used in genetive plural, while the word 'karma'
isof neuter gender and is used in the singular number.
Neither, again, the activity of producing the persons nor
the result of that activity can be the meaning of the
word ' karma ' for both these are included in the agent
or the author without whom they would not exiat.
 ;. [Link]. 17 209

Examinating. then, all the possible alternatives, we

conclude that the pronoun' this and the word 'karman'
'

in the sentence, 'He of whom this is the karman,' point

out the world that we see before us, even though there is
no explicit reference to it. For the reference to the entire
world can be inferred, not only from the esplicit reference
to a part of it, as constituted by the persons in the sun
etc, but also by the additional words in the Sruti, vii. 'Or,
this karman.' The reference to the 'persons' in the sun
i'tc. as being created is meant to exclude the possibility

of their being construed as Brahman, as Raliiki suggested,

and to make them only a part of the entire world which
is nothing hue the work of God. When one says that
both the Parivrajakas (i.e. the Brahmins who have reno-
unced the world) and the Brahmins should be fed, what
hemeansisthatalltheBrahminsshould be fed. Similarly,
the reference to a specific part of the world, and again to
the entire world, is to affirm only emphatically that
the highest God alone, as indicated by all the Vedanta-
passages, is the creator of the whole world.

sfNrgijTirroffenSira ta*gi^n(i * a
{fivo — soul; muJ;fiya— principal; prana— breath; lirigat—

vyakhyitwrfi — already rej"u«d.[

As already explained while discussing Sutra 31 of the

firstpada, there may arise three objects for meditation, viz.
the jiva, the prana and the Brahman, if along with our view
the view of the [Link] i~ also to be adopted. But
this isnot acceptable to us. For, as seen in the paxedj ag
Sutra, the beginning of the Sruti passage shows that the
topic under discussion is Brahman and nothing else. The
conclusion of that section too shows that Brahman is
che topic; for he who knows Brahman is said to have been
receiving the highest reward, viz. eminence ^among ill
beings, supremacy over all, and independence (Kau. 4, 20).

If the refutation has already been made in 1. 1, 31,

while dealing with the statement of Pratardana, where
then, it may be asked, is the necessity of this Sutra?
The reply is that the work ', viz. the creation of this
'

world, was not referred there to Brahman. But as the

doubt may arise whether the work is referred to prana,
' '

on account of its one meaning viz. movement, or to jiva

on account of its other meaning viz. the unseen fruit
of it, it was felt necessary to have this Siitra, and settle
that the word work ' refers to Brahman. As for the
'

word prana in a subsequent passage, we have to re-

' '

member that it is used in the sense of Brahman, as in the

passage, the mind becomes tied with the praiia (Chi. 6.
'
'

8, 2). And similarly, if the beginning and conclusion

of the passage justify us to say that the topic deals with
Brahman, then, whatever characteristics we may have
about jiva, we shall be justified in considering them as
indicative of Brahman, inasmuch as the jiva is identical
with Brahman.

*HJlJf 3 $I%fa: J[W'><JK"?HI*'lRft-^*l» I \ £

tu — but; Jdiminii;

e question and answer (the reference

ki(readtheirtej;tto indicate this purpose). 18

There is no reason, according to Jaimini, to dispute

whether the topic under discussion is the individual soul
or Brahman. For he holds that even accepting that
there is a reference to the individual soul, it is to indicate
 L. iv, lu. 19 211

the knowledge of Brahman. And

the reason for his opini-
on is the nature of the question and the answer in this con-

nection. After having proved to Baliiki that the soul is

different from prana, Ajatasatru asked as to where the
person was asleep and whence he came back to the waking
life. And the reply we get is that ' during dreamless
sleep a person becomes one with this prana (Brahman)
alone '; and that it is 'from this Atman alone that all the
pranas depart to their abode: and that from prarja depart
the gods, and from gods the beings' (Kau. 4, 19 and 20).
Andit it the Vedanta doctrine that during sleep the soul
becomes one with Brahman, and that from Brahman it is
that the world and the prima proceed. Therefore
that, in which the sleeping soul becomes devoid of
cognitions of the waking life and enjoys a tranquil life,
is Brahman itself and so it is the only object fit ro be
;

known. The [Link]. especially, in their rest of the

dialogue between Balaki and Ajatasatru, ask a similar
question regarding the vijfianamaya or the soul as distinct
from the highest Atman, and have the reply that it lies
in the akasa within the heart (Br- 2, 1, 16 and 17). Now
this small akasa is nothing but the highest Atman (Cha.8,
1, 1) ; and because the empirical selves are said to ha«e
come forth from the Atman (Br. 2, 1, 20), the Vajasaniyas
suggest that the Atman alone if the source of all. Thus,
the question and the answer are not only able to intimate
itence of the soul beyond tie prana, but also
of the Atman beyond both prana and jiva.

S fl+mH^lfaoMT^ I
( IVW )
flfWfMl^l ?*.
{Vakya— sentence; anvayat— on acount o/ connection.}

BE SEEN' ETC. IS THE HIGHEST AtMAN ALONE). W

In the Maitreyi-brahmana of the Brhadaranyako pa-
id, we are told that nothing becomes dear for its own
 .

sake, but that everything becomes dear for the sake of the
Atman, and that therefore all this becomes known when
the Atman heard, thought about and meditated
is seen,
(Br. 3. 5, 6). there arises the doubt whether the
Now
object to be seen etc. is the individual soul, on account
of the dear things such as, husband, etc., with which it
is connected as the subject of experience, or
the Atman
on account of the fact that everything else becomes
known when the Atman is known.

The piirvapabsin maintains, as indicated above,

that all enjoyment
the objects of in this world,
such as, husband, wife, riches and son, are dear
on account of the individual soul, and therefore it
is the object of sight, etc. Besides, the section
begin* with the discussion of the individual soul
j

and if, in spite of this, the object is to be considered

as something else, there would be no sense in making the
beginning with the topic of the individual soul. Towards
the middle of the dialogue, again, the great being or the
Atman which is endless, unlimited and full of knowledge
is shown as springing forth from the five
elements in
the form of the individual soul, and meeting with destruc-
tion after them, so that there remains not a trace of know-
ledge in it after death (Br. 2, 4, 12). What this means is
that the object of sight, etc. is the individual soul endowed
with cognitions and not the highest Atman. And further
at the end of the dialogue, Yajiiavalkya refers to the in-
dividual soul again, when he raises the question as to how
one should ' know the knower' ; for the knowing involves
the cognitional aspect of the individual soul alone. As
the
to how one may know everything else by knowing
individual soul, the piirvanaksin says that this is not to
as
be taken in a literal sense, but must be understood
meaning that the world of objects is to be known through
its relation to the soul

To this we reply. If we look to the mutual connec-

tion of the passages in the dialogue, we shall find that the
 .iv, su. fi 213

object of sight etc. is the highest Atman. We must

remember that it is only after Maitreyi was found Co be

thoroughly dissatisfied with riches which she thought

was unable to carry her to immortality, that her husband
Yajnavalkya imparted her the knowledge of the Atman
(Br. 2, 4, 2 and 3). And as Sruti and Smrti tell us, im-
mortality cannot he attained without the knowledge
of the Atman. Norcan everything el ;e iv ..iiown without
?uch knowledge for the Atman is the highest cause of
.

ill. Therefore the view of tie piirvapaksin, that it is

not a literal truth that everything else becomes known
when the Atman is known, is not adequate. On the con-
trary, it is to point out that it is a literal truth, and that
therefore it is inadequate, to hold that the objects of the
world arc different from the Atman, that we are told in the
subsequent passage, that those who erroneously think that
the castes of Brahmins etc an J the objects of the world
are different from the Atman are abandoned by them all.
This means what is immediately stated further in the
passage, rit. that all these things in the world are non-
distinct from the Atman (2, 4, 6). Just as the different
sounds of the'musical instrument scati he said to he included
in the prominent sound of the drum, even so. all these
things are the Atman. To say that Rgveda is the breath
'

of this great Being ' (2, 4, 10) is only to point out that
the Atman is the cause of names, forms and actions. It
is this Atman again which is lurcher declared as the
support or the destination of the whole world including
the cheers, the senses and the mind, and is characterised
as neitherhaving inside nor outside, and as one, full,
homogeneous mass of intuitive knowledge. From all
this it is clear that the object of sight etc. is the highest
Atman alone.

As for the argument of the piirvapaksin that the

introductory part of the dialogue contains a reference
examine it in the next three
to the individual soul, let us
 ufadwwinKR** i *°

20

If the individual soul Living cognitions were to be

different from the highest Atman, then the knowledge
of the latter will not involve the knowledge of the former
ae aim nf the other things in the world; nor will the
other statement, 'all this is the Atman,' will be fulfilled.
It is therefore to secure the fulfilment of this statement
a9 well jf of the knowledge of all other things by the
knowledge of the Atman, that Asmarathya thinks that
the individual soul mentioned in the beginning is
intended to imply its non-difference from the highest
Atman.

VMgm
AUDULOMl (THINKS THAT THE t ACT THAT THE INDIV1-

IE SECTION)

THE BODY). 21

In view of the Upanisadic statement that Theserene

Being appears in its own form, as it departs from the body
and meets the resplendent light' (Cha. 8, 12, 3), as also
the statement that Like rivers running into the sea,
'

the wise man loses his name and form and becomes
united with the highest Person' (Mu. 3, 2, 8), Audulomi
thinks, that the reference to the individual soulasnon-
diiferent from the highest Atman, in the beginning at
the Maitreyi-brahmana is appropriate. The individual
 ADHTATA I, VA. IV, SU. 22 21 S

soul is contaminated by the upadhis of body, senses

mind etc. but when it becomes pure by means of know-
;

ledge, devotion etc., it leaves behind all the adjuncts of bo-

dy and other thinos and is united with the highest Atman.

It is in view of this future condition which is acquired by
the individual soul, that it is described in the Lvyimnni!
as non-different from the highest Atman, in spite of the
fact that the soul is described as if possessing name and
form, only to make it comparable with the river which
loses its name and form when it runs into the sea.

aHKNidltfa *iy$tW l
^
[Avasihiief: — because of existence; iti -thus; Kaia-

Inview of the Brahmana-text that The divinity '

of the Atman wished to manifest the names and forms

by entering into the created elements under the form
of the individual soul (Chi, 6, J, 2), and in view of
'

the mantras, such as, "The omniscient Atman, having

created the names and forms of things after first entering
into them as the individual soul, calls them by these
names' (Tai. \ 12, 7), Kasakrtsna thinks that the
individual soul is nothing else but the highest Atman.
The soul it neither a modification of the Atman,
nor a created thing like the five elements. The name*
and forms do not in reality belong to the soul, but
are imposed upon it on account of the upadhis of
avidya. Asmarathya, too, it may be said, believes in the
non-difference of the individual soul from the highest
Atman; but he believes so for the sake of believing in
something else, viz. the possibility of the knowledge of
all things consequent on the knowledge of the Atman,

md the unity of the Atman in spite of apparent diversity.

Besides, his belief in the non-difference is not absolute
 216 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

but relative for, he does believe to some extent at least

;

in the relation of cause and effect between the highest

Atman and the individual soul, and not in their identity.
Audulomi goes a step further and admit* that the aouland
the Atman are different in the condition of ignorance,
though they become identical when knowledge arises.
Kasakrtsna alone puts forth the correct view of Sruti viz.
'Thouart that'; and it is on tflif view alone that immortali-
ty can be said to follow fror: :h.- realisation of the Atman.
For if the soul were a modification of the Atman, it will
simply be lost by being merged in :is caus^.and there would
be left no soul to experience the immortal lift. Similarly,
if immortality is to be construed m ths vanishing of the
names and forms, they ought to have truly belonged to
the individual soul but it is seen that they disappear
;

with the body, the senses etc., meaning thereby, that they
are falsely attached to the soul. Nay, the very creation
of the souls from the highest Atman, as if they are sparks
emanating from the fire, has no basis in reality but refers
to the work of the upadhisof avidya.

As for the refutation of the second point of the piirvi-

paskin, viz., the great Being which emerges in the formof
the individual soul from the elements, and which, in the
form of the sou! itself, is therefore declared in the middle
of the Maitreyi-Briihmana, as the object to be seen, etc.,
the three Sutras will again give three different answers
thus. According to Asmarathya, the emergence of the
highest Atman in the form of the soul is an indication of
the proof of the statements that all the things of
the world arise and dissolve in the Atman, and soare
known through the knowledge of the Atman, and that
they are non-different from the Atman, as their cause.
To Aujulomi, it is the future possible condition of the
soul which is responsible for its being described asnon-
different from the Atman. The soul becomes purified
by means of knowledge, devotion, etc. and becomes one
with Atman, at the time of its departure from the body.
It is with reference to this future, non-different condition
 ADHYAYA I, PA. IV, SU. 22 21?

of the soul that it is conceived that the Atman emerges

as the soul. Kasakrtnsa, on [he other hand, thinks that
the ;oul is described an non-different (rem the Atman,
because it is verily the Atman itself who lives in the
form of the soul.

One may say however, tlm :he iujI is described as

vanishing after the elements and as being destitude of all
knowledge after death. How, then, it may be asked, can
the soul be said to be non-different from the Atman ?
But the reply is that it is the destruction of the specific
cognitions of the soul, and not of the soul or the Atman.
This reply comes from Yajnavalkya himself when he finds
that his wife was similarly bewildered at the extinction
of knowledge and the consequent destruction of the soul
after its departure from the body. 'The eternal, stead-
fast, ever-conscious Atman is imperishable ; what was

conjoined by avidya is merely disjoined by vidya. It is

simply the dissolution oi the individual soul from the miit-

raB, i.e., the elements and the sense-organs' (Br. 2, 4, 13).

The third point of the purvapak$in should also

be refuted only by what Kiisakrtsna says. The argument
of the purvapaksin was that the word 'knower' in, how
'

should one know the knower?' in the concluding portion

of the dialogue, implies a subject as the knower as
distinct from the object known, and therefore the action
of knowing etc. must be ascribed to the individual soul.
But as the Brhadaranyakopanisad says, One can see
'

the other, so long as there is duality '; there will exist

till then the various specific cognitions of the individual

soul. But when, on account of vidyn. 'all this becomes

the Atman, then who should see whom ?" (2, 4, 14).
Except the fact that the word ' knower ' is used to mean
the great Being or the Atman or the Self-con sciou?ness it-
self, there remains in this non-dualistic condition, no spe-

cific cognition, not the empirical distinction of the subject

and object, nor again the difference of the individual soul

from the highest Atman.
 '

218 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

This view of the Vedlnta ia fully supported by Sruti

and Smrti. Being only was in the beginning
' one ;

without a second
'
(Cha". 6, 2, 1) The Atman alone is
;
'

all this
'
(Cha. 7, 25, 2) ;Brahman alone is all this
'

(Mu.2,2, 11) ;' There is no other seer but he' (Br 3,7,23;
3, 8, II)- Smrti too say; :Know me to be the knowir
'

in all bodies' (B. G. 13, 27). There are other Sruti

passages which support the above view by denying all
difference : ' He who considers himself and Atman as
different is like a beast who does not know anything'
(Br. 1, 4, 10) ;
'
He who sees mere multiplicity moves
from death to death' (Br. 4, 4. 19). The same conclusion
is again strengthened by dcnyiiK every kind of action

or modification on the part of the Atman. This great

'

unborn Atman is without old age and death; he is the

fearless immortal Brahman" (Br. 4, 4, 24). Besides, there
will be no certain knowledge, release or satisfaction of
desires, as are vouchsafed for those who have "
fixed

themselves in the knowledge of the .-[Link]' |Mu. 3, 2, fi).

'What infatuation, or what sorrow will there be for him
who sees the unity of the Atman in all ?' (Is. 7). The
Bhagavadgita too mention; similar clur-ic'eristics of one
who is fixed in the higher knowledge of the Brahman
(2,54-©).

If, therefore, right knowledge, according to us, is the

absolute identity of the individual soul and the highest

Atman, there would be no fense in admitting the plurality
of souls, or difference, except in name, between the soul
and the Atman. That is why the cave in which the real,
infinite, omniscient Brahman is said to reside (Tai. 2, 1).
does not refer to any other cave except the heart of the soul.
Neither can it be said that something other than the
Brahman resides in the cave; for we are further told that
the 'creator himself entered into the things after creating
them' (Tai. 2, 6). Those therefore who insist on miking
a difference between the soul and the Brahman not only
go against right knowledge, but also make the _
final

beatitude impossible. Release to them is the fruit of

aetions. Naturally release to them is temporary; or,
aflsumedto be eternal, they will contradict their previa
position vil. that it is the fruit of action.

We have already said that an inquiry about the

nature of Brahman is essential, because it leads to moksa,

just asan inquiry about religious duty is essential because

itleads to prosperity. We have also characterised the
Brahman as that from which the world has come, and in
which it rests and is absorbed. But a question may arise
aa to whether the Brahman is the efficient cause of the
world lite a potter of the vessels of clay, or the material
cause like the clay itself.

The purvapaksin holds that Brahman is the efficient

causeonly. For just asa potter, who is merely an efficient
cause of the vessels, reflects before producing the vessels,
Brahman too is regarded as having first ' reflected
before creating prana' (Pra, 6, 3 ; 4). Or, bke kings of
different places, Brahman too can be considered as the
Lord of this world and so possessing only efficient
power. Besides, this world, which is the effect or the
creator's activity, is non-intelligent, impure and consists
of parts therefore, its cause too must be of the same
;

nature. But as we learn from Sruti, Brahman is 'without

parts, inactive, faultless and taintless ' (Sve. 6, 19).
Brahman therefore is not the material cause of the world.
So, the only alternative that remains is to say, in the first
place, that something different from Brahman, vn. the
 pradhuna of the Sa&khyas is the material cause of the
world: and that secondly, Brahman is the efficient cause

As againjt ihis, ivc .-jy in reply thai Brahman is net

merely the efficient but the roaterialcausealso^foritisonly
(hen that there will be no contradiction with wtvic is given
as illustration. When Aruni asks his son, 5vetatetu,
if he had inquired from his preceptor a; to 'what it
was, which when known, one hears that which was not
previously heard, and perceives and knows that which
was not previously perceived or known (Cha. 6 1, 3),
'

he gives us the knowledge of the truth, that to know the

Atman is to know everything else. And this possible
i.=

only in the case of the material cause for the effect is

;

say the fame thing with reference to the efficient cause;

for we find that the p.. lace is different from the carpenter
who constructed it. The illustrative examples too have
a reference to the material cause alone. '
It is by one
clod of clay that all that is made of clay is known ; for
whatever the modifications or the effects are. they are
only names and have their origin in speech ' (Cha. 6, I, 4);
or again, all that is made of gold or iron is known by one
lump of gold or iron. Just as ' the plants grow in their
cause, viz. the earth," so there is the Atman as the cause
of all (Mu. I, 1, 3 and 7) ; or just as '
when the drum
isseized the sound is seized," even so, ' everything else
is known when the Atman is known '
(Br. -I. 5, G and S).
All these and similar examples prove that Brahman is the
material cause of the world. The ablative case also in
'That from which (yjtah) these beings are born' indicates
the material cause of the beings (Tai. 3, 1).

That, besides being the material cause. Brahman is

also the efficient cause of the world, can be inferred from
the fact that there is no other agent or operative cause
responsible for guiding the creation, just as over and above
clay or gold as the material cause, thereare the pottersand
 ;. tv, sC. 25 221

goldsmiths as efficient causes responsible for turning the

clay or gold into vessels or ornaments. Sruti also says
that prior to creation Brahman was one, without a second,
a-, the other hand, if there were some additional guiding
principle dittinct from the material cause, both [he State-
incntjn.l the illustrative examples would [Link].-[Link]
as, the knowledge of everything else would net
follow
from the knowledge of one thing. So in the absence
of any othtt operative or material cause. Brahman alone
u both the efficientand the material cause of the world.

Other reasons which support this vieware :

[ Afahidhw— volition; upadefat because of sratemeiil.l}

The freedom to desire to "become many etc' shows

that the Atman is the efficient cauje. And since the
growth and the manifold nature of the world spring
forth from the Atman it is also the material cause
(Tai. 2, 6, I;Cha.6,2, 3).

(AS THE MAT^A L CAUSE Or) BOTH (Tt-

HE WORLD). 25

It is said that that from which something co

into being and in which it is reabsorbed, is the m;
rialcauseof that thing. Theearthisconsideredasthem
rialcause of rice and barley for the same reason. Ever
the Akasa, which means the Brahman, is said to j
rise to and absorb all these beings in it (Cha. 1, 9,
andthereforetheAkasaortheBrahmanaloneisthemati:
 '

cause of the world. Besides, it must be remembered

that the effects can never be absorbed by anything else
but their material cause.

{Atraakfltk —on account of action concerning itself;

26
'
The Atman transformed itself into its own self
(Tai. 2, 7), and thus being itself the agent, became its

own effect. No
doubt the Atman was full and perfect
before its activity, but just as the clay is changed into
effects, even so, the Atman has simply got itself modified
intothethingsoftheworld. The word 'itself excludes
the possibility of any other cause.

The word 'parinamat' may be taken to constitute a

separate Sutra by itself, —
and then it means that Brahman
became ' sat,' and 'tyat', i.e. the visible beings of earth,
water and light, and the invisible beings of wind and Skiia,
or the defined and the undefined risings. In short, it
isthe Brahman alone which has become all this world of
effects.

«ftSw ft ifNrt I ^
[Ton$ —origin; ca —and; — because; hi giyate—is Jung.]

SOURCE (VONl) AliO. 27

We
ate told that ' The wise regard the Brahman as
the source of all beings, and as the maker and the lord of
all (Mu, 1, 1, 6
' ; 3, 1, 3) ;
and we know from usage that
the word source '
means the material cause. The earth,
'

for instance, is said to be the source of plants and herbs.

No doubt, in some passages, the word yoni means a ' '

 i. iv, «i, 28 223

place ; for instance, Indra is Cold tbat a yoni was made

for him to sic upon (gg. 1, 104, 1). But in Che same
passage quoted above, the word ' yoni ' means the material
cause; forintheexample given a Iittlefurther(Mu. I. 1,7),
the spider is said to be the cause of the threads which he
send: forth and draws in.

It is not, however, true that whatever is observed in

everydav experience must hold true in Vedanta also.
So the argument that Brahman must, like the potter, be
the efficient cause only, because its activity is preceded
by reflection, is not adequate. The evidence of Sruti
md not of inference is the final word regarding the
nature of Brahman.

C U^KHIdllQ+WI, &<) I

{Elena — bj this : same— nil ;

vya^iyiitdi—aTC refuted.]

REPUTED. 28

We had several occasions to refute the Samkhya

doctrine of [Link] and we gave special attention to it
because the le;s intelligent people are likely to be attracted
by it. The doctrine comes close to the Vedanta doctrine

something which may mislead some people,

re other non-Vedantic doctrines such as, atomism
•ere. But the adherents of these are virtually
hed by the vanquishing of the greatest of the
ists, viz. the Samkhya. These doctrines too are
nded on Sruti and are contradicted by Vedanta"
;. The repetition of the phrase ' are refuted'
a the end of the first adhyaya.
 ADHYAYA SECOND
PADA FIRST
In the first adhyaya known as 'Samanvaya', it was
shown that the omniscient Lord of all is not only the
u-tfkiunt hut also the materia] cause of the universe,
just

as gold and clay are the material causes of the

vessels

made out of them. Likea magician of his world of magic

He was shown to be the controller of the universe, and
of
like the earth which takes back within it the bodies
.ill [he living creatures. He was shown to be the ab-

sorber of it in himself. It was further established that

He alone is the Atman of us all. This is indeed the

samanvaya, the cumulative effect of all the Sruti-pass-
ages. Besides, opinions like pradhana is the cause of
'

the universe, ' were shown to lack the authority of

Sruti. Now, in this second adhyaya, known as
'
Avirodha ', will first be discounted, in the first pada,
the apparent contradictions of the conclusions of the
first

adhyaya with what is stated in certain Smrtis; secondly,

it will be shown, in the second pada, that
opinions W
garding pradhana and others are based on false reason-
ing and thirdly, it will be shown, in the third and
;

the fourth padas, that the Sruti- pas sages do not at

all

contradict when they deal with the cosmology, the incV

vidual soul and the organs of sense.

fSmrti; an— nut; auakaia— room; do/a— defect: praiflng^

—that ; cet— if; na— not : anya— other;
Jot
adosabrasangst— there being occasion
 The purvapaksin says : If the o
is accepted aa the cause of the universe, then Kapila 'a

SamkhyaSmrtiasalso the Smrtis of Asuri and Pancaiikhi

which are written after its model and which propound
that the cause of the universe is the non -intelligent,
independent pradhana, will be useless. These Sm[tis
are not composed like the Manu Smrti in order to make us
aware of our various duties and rules in life, regarding
the thread- ceremony, study, marriage, the keeping of
sacrificial fire, the four-fold
'
end of human life and the
diSerent castes and Ftagesof life. They are composeed
with the deliberate intention of imparting the know-
ledge of liberation; and so, if as the Vedantin would show
that they contain no reference to Brahman, they would
all have to be admitted as useless. But if, as we hold,
they serve the purpose of liberation, the Sruti passages
must be so interpreted as will not contradict their
philosophical import.

The Vedantin may contend that an objection of thi--

aort is out of place when it has been already proved by
reference to the word " seeing", (Adhyaya 1, Pida 1,
Sutra 5) that Sruti is emphatic on the paint that the
omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the universe.
But we submit that some extraordinary persons may
intetpret the Sruti by the mere aid of their intellect; the
ordinary persons however have to fall back upon Smftis
and puranas for a proper interpretation of it. They
do so because they have a great regard for the sages like
Kapila for their intuitive, unhindered knowledge, Kapila,
for instance, is considered even by the author of the
226 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

Svetasvatara Upanisad (S, 2)as the first among the created

beings and as one who was seer and instructed by God,
Therefore it is that we say that the Vedanta- passages
must be interpreted in accordance with the teachings of
Smrtis.

To this we reply. This is not correct. For if

certain Smrtis become useless, if Brahman is the cause of
the universe, certain other very important Smrtis would
be useless if pradhana is accepted as the cause of the uni-
verse. The Santiparva of the Mahabharata (334,29)
tells us that the avyakta or pradhana which consists of
three qualities comes into being and is absorbed in tint
nirguna Purusa who alone is the Atman and the knower
of all that is created. In the Bhagavadgita again, we
are told that the Lord Sri Krsria is the cause of the origin
and the dissolution of the whole world. Similarly, in
many other Smrtis it has been maintained that God is
both the efficient and the material cause of the

As to the question, which of the conflicting Smrtis

should be accepted and which rejected, Jaimini tells us
in the Mimamsa Sutras (1, 3, 3) that we should reject
that Smrti which is in conflict with Sruti and if there is
;

no conflict, because there is no Sruti with which it should

be in conflict, we should suppose that there must have
been a corresponding prior Sruti as once lending its autho-
rity and support to the Smrti in question, though un-
fortunately that Sruti is lost to us. Kapila-Smrti however
not only has not got a corresponding Sruti prior to it
but also goes against the existing Srutis, and so deserves
to be rejected. Kapila's own intuitive experience &""?*
be said to be the authority for his Smrti; for it is to be
remembered that this intuitive experience of the supra-
sensuous reality is itself the result of religious practice?
based on the Sruti injunctions. So we can never. dis-
pense with the authority of the Sruti.
 ft. i. au. X 227

'
Again, the word '
Kapila occuring in the
'

Sv-.-::";,v,iCrirs Upanisad need not necessarily mean the

author of Kapila -Smrti. It may mean another person known
in
as Kapila or Vasudeva by name, who,as the story goes
the Mahabharata, burnt the sons of Sahara. So, when,
on the one hand, the reference to Kapila, as the author
of the dualistic Samkhya philosophy is doubtful, Manu
on the other hand, is mentioned with honour by the
Taittiriya Samhita (2, 2, 10,2) as one whose words
are as beneficial as medicine. And Manu himself appears
to have cesured the opinion of Kapila while he is eulogising
the person who has realized the Atman in all things (Manu
Smr. 12, 91). The Mahabharata too (1, 2, 360, 1-3 and
361, 4-5) goes against the Saitikhya-yoga doctrine of the
plurality of souls, and holds that the one highest Attnan
alone is the internal self of all beings, and that it is he who
is all-heads, all-arms, all-feet, all-eyes, and who moves
through all beings and goes wherever he likes. The
liavasyopanisad also (7) declares the unity of the universal
Self, realizing which there will be neither sorrow
not in-
fatuation. These and similar passages go to prove that the
doctiine cf Kapila is faulty in every way, It contradicts
the Veda and contradicts the Manu Smrti which follows
theVeda, by assuming not only the hypothesis of indepen-
dent pradhana but also that of the plurality of selves.

As to the validity of The Sruti it is as direct and

independent as that of the Sun due to whose light we
get the knowledge
of form and colour. The validity
of human statements, Smrlis and puranas, on the other
hand, is dependent on the validity of the Sruti. The
authors of Sm[tis were endowed with sound memory.
They wrote from what they learntandremembered from
Sruti. So, the objection that certain Smrtis which
 spirit ^igro*^: I R
\ltaresiith-of others; ca ; dimpfllabdhc^-not being /ound.]

And on account of ajhuke of onn» (i.b. or

iKtarmirnmarnAvnAM). 2

Another reason for helieving that the objection is

futile is giver in the second Sutra. A
Smrti is believed
if it tells about the five elements and the organs of sense
for we have an experience of these in our daily life, and we
find them mentioned in the Veda. The Kapila Smrti,
on the other hand, is not believable because the principles
such as, mahat and aharfikara to which it refers as the
products of pradhana, are unknown to the Veda arid to
experience. They are as impossible as the objects of the
sixth sense, which if assumed to exist, contradict both
experience and the Veda.

If the purvapaksin points out that in the Kafhaka

Upanisad there is a reference (1, 3, II) to the technical
Samkhya terms, mahat and avyafcta, we reply that we have
already shown in our discussion of Sutra 1, 4, 1, that the
words "
mahat,' and ' avyakta ' denote the intellect of
the Hiraijyagarbha, and the body respectively, and not
the Great one and pradhana of the Samkhya philosophy.
So if the Kapila Smrti is not to be trusted in its treatment
of the effects (e.g. mahat and ahamkara), it follows that it
cannot be trusted in its treatment of the cause also
(viz. the pradhana).

[Etena— by (his ;jogd£ p ratyulffiif

;
— is refuted.}
AUO- 3

Like theSamkhya, the yogs -philosophy also maintains

that pradhiina is the independent cause of the universe
and "
that the great principle ' etc. are its effects. This
is, as we have already seen, contrary to both experience

and the Vedas and therefore stands refuted by our ar-

guments in Adhikarana 1. Where then, it may be asked,
is the necessity of pointing this out explicitly in this
Sutra?

The reply is that we are able to remove thereby an

additional doubt that may arise, viz. whether we should
accept or not the doctrine of the yoga-system, which
it has in common with the Samkhya, that ptarlhin la i

thecausc of the universe. The yoga-Smrtiandits teaching

of the eight-fold discipline are not only not contrary to
the Vedas, but are also considered as pointing out the
way of realizing the Real. The Brhadaraijyaka {2, 4, 5)
recommends that the Atman is to he heard, thought and
meditated upon. The SvetaSvatara (2, 8), speaks of
the erect posture of the body with the head, the neck
and thechestin a straight line. Kafhopamsad (2,6,11, 18)
refers to yoga a6 the unswerving one-pointedness of the
senses. The position of yoga, and that of Samkhya-
have been strengthened by Svetasvataropanisad (6,13)
when it says that it is the knowledge of God as the cause
of the universe, which can be had by the study of Samkhya-
yoga, and which makes a man free from all bondage, in
view of this, one is likely to conclude that because there
is partial agreement between yoga and the Veda, the

whole of the yoga may be relied upon just as ihe Smrti

known asastaki,is relied upon. ButasthesameUpanisad
'
 —
230 veda

says impossible
(five- 3, 8), it is to get at the highest
bliss by the mete knowledge of the Samkhya philosophy
Ot by the mere yc.i'ic pr-ioti ::.:. without at the same time
being helped by the Sruti. The way to go beyond
'

death is to know the Atman; there is no other way.'

In this passage, there is the definite mention of the unity
of the Atman, a fact which is denied by the Samkhya-
yoga. Therefore it is that the Sutra refers to the
refutation of the Yoga philosophy too, so far as iti
teachings are contrary to those of Sruti.

In short, if the Samkhya^yoga philosophies tell us

something which is also found in Sruti, we do admit their
authority but if they go against it, we reject them.
;

The Samkhya description of the Purusa as pure and free

from qualities is acceptable to us, because the Brhadaraij-
yakaako mentions the Punifa as 'unattached' to anything
In its prescription of rules for sanyiisin and in
(4, 3, 16),
commending the path of renunciation, the yoga too has
followed the Sruti, according to which it is passible
for a man who has worn discoloured dress, is shaven,
and is without any possession to attain liberation.
(Jabala, 4).

All that we have said above is also applicable to

other Smrtis which have a claim to truth. It may be that
they are useful to us in the discovery of truth, but the
knowledge of that truth, we assert, can only be had from
the Vedantic passages, such as, 'No one who does not
know the Veda knows the highest Self (Tai. Bra. 3, 1.2,
9, 7), "I ask about that Purusa who is described in the
Upanisads '
(Br. 3, 9, 26).

* farfyuifm^ flWvi ^ y*$n i

h

[?&— not ; uilaffliidti'at— fifing different in nature; aiya

—
—
of this; tathalvam- its feeing li^e chat; ca —
and; fotdfll
 (Brahman) cannot (be
because (theworld) diffi
Brahman); and that it is ?

The purvapak^in holds that over and above th; autho-

rity o* ^EtLn. [Link]:i:is ::!a:"' :s possible as a means of know-
ledge in the case of Brahman ; for it is already a fact that
exists and is not to come into existence as a result of some
religious duties, in which case we may depend entirely
on Sruti alone. The conflict between several Sruti" passages
ought to be resolved by making them consistent all with
a particular passage; and this is possible if we resort to
means of knowledge other than Sruti, such as reasoning.
Besides, reasoning appears to come very near to experience
because it enables us to know an unseen object on the
strength of its having some similarly with a seen object ;
Sruti, on the other hand, appears to be removed from
experience, because it conveys its meaning by reference

to tradition only. Reasoning, then, is applicable to

Brahman, because the knowledge of Brahman is said to
culminate in an actual experience which dispels all ignor-
ance and causes release. It does not simply end inageneral
knowledge about an unseen result, like that of a religi jus
practice, and is therefore not based on the k lowledge
of Sruti only. The Brhadaranyaka recommends reasoning
inaddition to hearing in the passage (2, 4, 5) " The Atman
is to be heard, to be thought etc." Hence the objection
to the theory that Brahman is the cause of the universe
is Bet forth as based on reasoning, in the following manner.

Brahman cannot be the cause of the universe for ;

whereas Brahman i6 conscious and pure, the universe

lacks consciousness and is impure. Cause and effect
cannot be different in nature. Golden ornaments are the
effects of gold and not of earth; and earthen pots are the
effects of earth and not of gold. The universe is impure,
because it consists of pleasure, pain and infatuation, and
 -

232 VECANTA EXPLAINED

as sucb is the cause of joy, sorrow and gloom. Besides

it consists of different grades of abodes such as heaven,
hell, mortal world etc. It lacks i

r like ihe physical body and the senses, it is useful ai

"it for the conscious soul. Had the u.-'-—

been equally conscious, it would not have been of any
u*e to the other, ju-t as one lamp cannot be of any use to
another wtnp. Even in the case of a servant and a master,
where both are alike on account of their being human
beings, it is the non-intelligent part of the servant, viz;
his body, senses etc. which are of any use to the master.
The consciousness of one person by itself cannot be
of any service or disservice to the consciousness of an-
other person. Th-:- ,'0!-..^:oii-j pniuipii; :• iiK-jpable of growth
or decay, of service or disservice, and is therefore devoid
of any activity. Hence it follows that what is non-
intelligent can be useful as an instrument to the intelligent
being. Neither is there any evidence of common experience
to show that (hings like wood or clod of earth are of the
nature of consciousness. The world therefore being
heterogeneous in nature, cannot have Brahman as its

A Vedantinmay bringanobjectiontothis. Accepting

what the Sruti tells viz. that the material cause of the worla
is intelligence,he may infer that the world too is intelligent
in nature like its cause. The apparent absence of intelli-
gence in the world may be said to be due to a sort of
modification in the intelligence itself, as may occur during
the conditions of sleep and swoon. Things like wood
and clod of earth may not exhibit intelligence, even though
thete is as much intelligence in them as in the individual
souls. It is on account of this modification of intelligence
that the souls appear to be endowed with intelligence
but devoid of form and qualities, and the things of the
world appear as endowed with form and qualities but
devoid of intelligence. So, it is not necessary that the
things of the world must be absolutely rion-intelHgent
in order that they should be useful to the soule as
 —
s, i, so. s m
Just as cooked rice, flesh and soup ate usefully combined,
even so the two apparently distinct but really homogene-
ous parts, vi: the things of the world including the body
:

and the senses, and the souls may have between them
the relation of the subordinate to the superior.

Such a reasoning may do away with the distinction

to a certain extent between the intelligent Brahman and
the non-intelligent world: but it will not, says thepurva-
paksin do [Link] with the distinction between the purity
of the one and the impurity of the other. Nay, it will
not, as a matter of fact, explain away even the first kind
of distinction. For, as stated in the Sutra, '5ruti itself
tells us that the world is such", that is, different from
Brahman. For example, in the Taittiriyopanisad (2, 6),
the Brahman is spoken of as manifesting itself in two
forms, the intelligent and the non-intelligenl. This may,
no doubt, be objected by a Vedantin. He may quote
the Sruti and try to prove intelligence on the part of
bodily organs and the elements which are generally con-
sidered as non-intelligent. For example, the passages:
'
The earth spoke ', ' the waters spoke ' (£at. Bra. 6, 1, 3
2; 4), " Fire thought \ Waters thought ", (Cha. 6, 2, 3, 4)
'

The pranas quarrelled and went to Brahman to decide

who of them was the best ' (Br. 6, 1, 7), ' Do thou, oh
speech, sing for us' (Br. 1, 3, 2], All these speak directly
about the intelligence of the elements and the orgin*,and
nut about the manifestation or otherwise of intelligence.

lAhhimdni—yjatjadesai—reference to presiding deities;

til— but; viicsa — flnugatibJiyafft because of dijtinctiue
nature and rebtednejj.J
The reference however is to i

(deities op the elements etc.) e-ecaube oi

s. 5
214 VBDA

The intelligence implied in the activities of speaking,

discussing etc. refers however not to the physical elements
and the sense-organs buttothe deities which govern them.
For, as was pointed out already, there is the clear distinc-
tion between souls and the elements etc. in point of
intelligence itself, is present in the one and absent
which
in the other. Besides, the Kaushitaki Upanisad expressly
uses the word "deities' to denote the intelligent governing
souls and not the material elements or organs. ' After
disputing as to who among them was the best, all the
deities recognised prapa as the most prominent of them
all ' (Kan. 2, 14). And we learn from mantra, arthavada,
itihasa and purapas that these governing deities are in-

timately connected with the elements and the organs.

The passage, for example, ' Agni became speech and
entered into the mouth ' (Ait. Ai. 2, 4, 2, 4), shows that
a particular organ is favoured by a particular deity. In
another passage we read how, after being advised by
Prajiiran, the sense-organs left the body oneafter another,
and yet the activity of the body continued because
pranas had not left the body; but how when the pranai
left the body, it ceased to be active even though the
sense-organs continued tostay init. (Cha.5,1,7). -This
shows by the method of agreement and difference not
only the superiority of prarjas over the indriyas but alio
the relation of the governing deities with the sense-organs.
This is confirmed in another passage which refers to the
offerings made to prana by the organs of speech and
Others (Br. 6, I, 13). Similarly, the 'seeing' done by
the fire (Chi. 6, 2, 3.-4) indicates that it is an act done
by the highest governing deity, viz. the Brahman, with
reference to its effects, the world. In short, the world
being different in nature, the Brahman cannot be its
 ewcirji

[DrSyate-is seen

That the world cannot proceed from the Brahman

because the two are different in nature, cannot be accepted
as a universal rule. For it ia a common experience that
non-intelligent hair and nails proceed from intelligent
beings like men, and that scorpions and other animals
come into being cut of cowdung. Even granting that
the hair and the nails come out ofthe bodies and not out
of the souls themselves, and that it is the bodies of scor-
pions and not their souls which come out ofthe cow-dung,
the difference in nature still remains between the cause
and the effect, inasmuch as it is the non-intelligent body
which is the abode of the intelligent soul, though neither
the cow-dung nor the hair and nails are the a bodes of it.
Besides, it is due to the presence of the soul that the body
is seen to undergo a vaft change in colour, form etc.
before it manifests as the hair and nails, or the cow-dung
changes into the body of the scorpion. Further, there
would be no distinction of cause and effect, if there were
complete identity of nature between the two. If a
partial identity is allowed, as for example, the identity of
the element of earth in the body of the scorpion and the
cow-dung, then a similar identity in nature can he esta-
blished between the world and the Brahman, tiiz. that of

the feet of e;

But what after all does the opponent mean by the

difference in nature between the world and the Brahman?
Does he meao that there is no characteristic of Brahman
which reappears in the world or does he mean that some
characteristics are present in the one but absent in the
other, or that the two are different only in the point of
intelligence? To accept the first alternative is to negate
J3fi VEDA

the very existence of causal relation; for unless there is

some difference between two things they will not be
causally connected. The second alternative cannot be
proved in the presence of an actual fact, vtz. the reappear-
ance of the quality of existence from the Brahman into
the world. The third is incapable of proof because no
instance which will be admitted by the Vedantin can be
shown to illustrate the absence of intelligence so that
may not be produced from Brahman.
that particular thing
For the Vedantin does hold that everything that exists
whether intelligent or not is the effect of Brahman as its
material cause. Besides, the view of the opponent is
against the teaching of Smti according to which, as we
hive already seen. Brahman 13 both the efficient and the
material cause of the world.

As for the contention that, unlike religious duty.

Brahman being an existing ('act, there should he available
other means of proof besides the Sruti, we reply that it is
merely a wishful thinking. For Brahman being devoid
of form and other sensible qualities cannot be the object
of perception. Nor can it be the object of inference or
comparison, because there is no perceivable sign or simi-
larity in it. Brahman also, like religious duty, is to be
known solely through the vedic teachings. This is wbat
the Lord of Death tells Naciketas; "This knowledgeof
the Atman cannot be achieved by argument; it is achieved
only after another person speaks about it (Ka. 1, 2, 9).
'

Or, as the Rgveda pute it, who indeed can know it or

'

say whence this world comes ?• (10, 130, 6) It is clear

from these two mantras that the cause of the world remains
incomprehensible even to gods who have acquired great
power and knowledge. Smrti too says the same thing.
'
One should not employ reasoning with reference to
things which go beyond cognition *, He is said to be
'

unmanifest, unknowable and unchangeable '. Not all

the gods and rsis have known my origin (B. G. 2, 25,
'

10, 2).
 adhtaya ii, pa. i, sO. 6 237

As for the opponent's view that chinking also is

explicitly mentioned in Sruti after Sravana or hearing as
useful for attaining the knowledge of the Atman ?Br.
2, 4, 5), we say not the mere dry, independent
that it is
reasoning which we can introduce under some guise.
On the contrary, it is such reasoning which comes after
the hearing of Sruti and i; thciviure rivourable to its
teaching that is recommended in the above passage. It is
reasoning which is subservient to anuhhjvii or fpiriiual
experience. We
can see this illustrated in the following
manner: (1) Since the states of dream and wakeful life
|R oclmtve of each other, the Atman is not connected
with either of them; (2) Inasmuch as during deep sleep the
jiva becomes one with the Atman after leaving
the consciousness of the world, the jiva is in
reality the Atman itself; (3) The world has come
out of Brahman; and because the effect is not ^different
from the cause, the world cannot be different from the
Brahman. All ilicsi reasonings are useful to know the
import of the Sruti, vis. the Atman or the Brahman is
one, without a second and that it transcends the pheno-
menal world and the three states of dream, sleep and
wakefulness. Futility of mere independent reasoning,
on the other hand, will be also shown further in Sutra
11 of this Pada.

Now, if an opponent were to believe in an intelligent

cause of the world and thereby infer that the world too
is intelligent, then itwould be possible for him to inter-
pret the Sruti passage (Tai. 2, 6) The Brahman itself
'

became divided into two portions, intelligent and non-

intelligent ', as meaning the manifestation and the non-
manifestation of intelligence in the two portions. But
the Sirhkhyas who believe that the non -intelligent pra-
dhana is the cause, will not be able to make any sense of
the Sruti passage, because it mentions that the ultimate
cause of ali remains steadfast as the Atman of all.
238

from it, tiii. the nan -intelligent world, cao be equally bid
at the door of the Sarnkhyas who believe that the non-
intelligent pradhana assumes the form of whit is different
from it, viz. the intelligent souls. But, as seen above, and
in conformity with Sruti, the cause of the world can be
said to be an intelligent one, in spite of its being different
from its effect.

The piirvapaksin may say that to suppose that

Brahman which is intelligent, pure and without qualities
it the cause of a world which is non-intelligent, impure

and full of qualities, is to suppose, against the satkarya

theory of the Vedantio, that the effect did not exist.

We reply that the objection is baseless. It is a mere

negation without any object to be negatived; i. (., when
the effect does not east prior to its origination in its own
form, there is nothing which can be negatived. For prior
to its coming into being, the effect does exist in the fond
of its cause, and so cannot be negatived at all. And even
after its coming into being the effect has no separate,
independent existence of its own except being in the
form of the cause. In other words, at any moment in
the past or in the present, the effect by itself isa non-entity
without the cause. Hence, to say that the effect was
non-existent in the form in which it appears (prior to it
so appearing), is meaningless. On the other hand, the
being alwaysan existential fact, so fat as it is looked
effect
upon as the one or the other form of the cause, it «i"
 .. u, bd. 8 239

never be negatived. Hence, the world which is full of

qualities, neither existed before nor exists now without
its being a form of cause. It is therefore, in truth, tost
we hold that the intelligent Brahman alone is the cause
of the world. Or else 'Whoever will think this all

to be separate from the Atman will be forsaken by all'

(Br. 2, 4, 6) !

We shall deal with this topic in derails while dealing

, the non-difference of the effect from the cause in

3T<fial dSr'H+Mll^alH'i; 1

(Afilau-in disiolutioi
giil-becaus/ of ar

:w) IS INADEQUATE,
,
(Brahman will e

3f the world). 8

The purvapaksin says that, in the first place, it is

inadequate to hold the Vedanta-view that the cause of
the world is the omniscient Brahman, because at the time
of the dissolution when the effect becomes one with the
cause. Brahman will be polluted by the impurity, grossness,
non -intelligence and limitation of the world. How can
we call such a defective Brahman as omniscient ? Secondly,
if all the distinctions ate wiped out, and there remains

one Brahman at the time of dissolution, there is left no

special cause due to which again a new world with its
distinctions of souls and objects should arise. Thirdly,
when the souls become merged in the Brahman, their
actions and the fruits thereof also become merged and so
If, in spite of this, we believe
cease to be active. that
souls are born again, we may as well believe that the
liberated souls too are bom again. And finally, if, in
order to get away from these defects in his theory, the
Vedantin would say that the world remains separate from
 VTDANTA EXPLAINED

hman even during ita dissolution, then he contradict!

own view viz., the effect is non-different from the
Me. Besides, tbere would be no dissolution worth

To this we get the reply in the next Sutra.

The Vedanta-view is not inadequate; for, just as

pots of clay or ornaments of gold do not impart their
and shape to the clay or gold in which
qualities of size,
they are absorbed, or just as the fourfold beings which
come into being from the ealth do not impart their
qualities to the earthwhen they are finally absorbed in it,
even so, in dissolution the world will not affect the
Brahman in any way. The purvapaksin, on the other hand,
will not be able to advance any instance in favour of
his statement. As a matter of fact, if we speak of dis-
solution, we cannot speak of the effect retaining its own
qualities apart from the cause. How
the effect is non-
different from the cause, (though not vice verta) is a point
which shall be made clear while dc;iline with Sutra II,
1,14.

The objection of the purvapaksin that the cause may

be polluted by the effect need not have been restricted
to the period of dissolution only. It could have been
extended to the period of the subsistence of the world
also; because our doctrine of the identity of cause and
effect holds good at all times, as is clear from the Sruti
passages :
' All this is what this Atman is; (Br. 2, 4, 6)
 I. i, su. 9 241

'The Atman alone is this all" (Cha. 7. 25. 2); 'The

'

immortal Brahman alone is all this that is before us

(Mu. 2, 2, II); 'Verily all this is Brahman' (Cha. 3, 14, 1).
And the refutation coo of the objection is the same on
both the occasions. The effect and the qualities are
mere false appearances due to avidya, and so do not affect
the cause in any way, either during dissolution or sub-
sistence of the world in Brahman. Just as a magician is
himself never affected by the illusion he creates for others,
even so the highest Atman is not affected by the illusions
of this worldly existence. Or, just as a person does not
become affected by the illusions of his dream, because they
do not continue to exist either in his dreamless sleep or
wakeful life, even so, the one Atman who is the eternal
witness of the three states of the world, is not affected
by any one of them, because tVidi is exclusive of" the other
two. That he appears to be connected with the three
conditions of the world is as illusory as the appearance
of a snake on a rope. This traditional truth of the
Vedanta has been espressed by some well-known teachers
thus :
'
The moment the individual soul is aroused from
the beginningless slumber of Maya, that very moment
he realizes she non-dual condition which is beyond birth,
dream and sleep' (Gauda. Ka. 1, 16).

As for the second objection, we offer the explanation

that just as in the case of a man who goes into deep sleep
it yopc [Link] [here remains no consciousness of any
worldly distinctions, and yet he becomes conscious of
them all the moment he comes out of sleep or samadbi,
even so there may arise a new creation and all the dis-
tinctions theieof, although they seem to disappear in
Brahman during tbe dissolution of the world. Ignorance
persists both in sleep and in dissolution; and so arise the
false distinctions of the phenomenal world even after
dissolutioo. It is due to ignorance that in spite of '

their being merged in the one Reality, the creatures do

not realiie that they are so merged, and are therefore born
again as li „, wolf, etc.' (Cha. 6, 9, 2-3). This removes
 —

the further doubt regarding the rebitth of the liberated

souls. They are not born again, because their false
knowledge is wiped out by the knowledge of the Real.
And finally the suggestion, that the Vedantin may hold
the view, that the world remains distinct from Brahman
even in dissolution, is to be simply rejected because the
Vedantin will never accept the dualistic position implied
by the suggestion. Hence the Upanisadic doctrine is
free from every objection.

!
;
(w^a side ; — due
dojat to defect

Besides the objections are as much against the Ve-

dantaas against the Samkhya doctrine. For even supposing
pradhana to be the cause, we do find that the world which
possesses form, sound, etc. is altogether different in nature
from pradhana which does not possess form and other
qualities. This means that the objection that the effect
was non-enistent before its origination, is common to
both the Samkhya and Vediinta schools, both of which
are Satkaryavadins. Secondly, inasmuch as the Samkhya
too believes that in dissolution the effect becomes one
with the cause, he shall have also to accept that the cause
becomes polluted by the qualities of the effect. And
thirdly, the specific reasons which are responsible for the
joys and sorrows of different persons being all destroyed
in dissolution, there remains no reason why a new creation
should arise; or if there can be a creation without any
cause, there can as well be the rebirth of those who
have

achieved their release. And in order to avoid these

objections, it be said that some distinctions
remain
if
unabsorhed even in dissolution, then, we say that it a
 —

these very distinctions which must not have been the

effectsof pradhana', for otherwise they would have been
non-distinct from pradhana.

The objections being common cannot be brought

apinst the Vedanta view alone. And yet we have
answered them and shown that they are not teal
objections at all.

[Tfli^i-redjDTiing; aprati/fhandt —being unsound; api

even; anyatliu — in another way; anumtyaih—bc in/erred;
iti at— if so; euart; api; avimokja— absence of release;

Notwithstanding t

There being no hindrance to human imagination

mere reasoning cannot be depended upon in matters
which must be understood in the light of Sruti statements
alone. The thoughts of some clever men are pointed out
as fallacious by some other clever persone; while the
thoughts of these latter too are turned down by some
others cleverer still. Even men of eminence and philoso-
phical importance, such as Kapilaand Kanada, are seen to
contradict one another.

It may be contended that not all reasoning is un-

sound; for even this contention must be proved by
reasoning alone. And unless we admit the soundness of
some kind of reasoning, our whole practical life will be
of no value. Menseek pleasure and avoid pain on the
supposition that nature is uniform in the past, the present
and the future. Even in the Vedic sphere, whenever
there arises a conflict among different interpretations of
244 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

Sruti- passages, it is reasoning alone which ends the conflict

hy refuting the unreal and by fixing the correct meanings
of words and sentences. Manu asks us 'to know well
three things, tiiz. perception, inference .ni.l iiUira. and
to apply such reasoning as cannot be contradicted hy
Veda', in order that we should know what Dharma is
(Manu Smr. 12, 10f-106). In a way, the fallacy is a point of
attraction in reasoning. For we require reasoning bath
for detecting and avoiding fallacies. It does not follow
that because the argument of the purvapaksa is fallacious,
therefore the argument of the siddhan tin is Jlso fallacious,
just as a man does not become stupid because his fore-
fathers were so.

Reasoning may appear to hold good in

To this we reply.
certain cases; but with regard to the unfathomable nature
of Reality upon the knowledge of which depends the final
release of man, there will be no use of reason unless it is
backed up by Sruti. For, as already noticed. Brahman is
neither the object of perception nor of inference; it has
neither form nor sound to be seen or heard, nor any sign
on account of which it is to be inferred.

Besides, all those who believe in the doctrine ofmoksa

say that it is the result of the right kind of knowledge
which has a constant and uniform nature. It is know-
ledge about which there will be no different opinions; a
knowledge like that of fire iriz. 'that it is hot. A mere
inference may take different forms, and so may leave us in
doubt as to the exact nature of object. It need not
be

universal and constant like the perception of heat in fire-

The Samkhya who puts his faith in reasoning is not
accepted by all as the best among logician?, so that we
can trust in what he tells, irrespective of space and time-
The Vedic knowledge, on the other hand, being self-
evident and eternally the same is incapable of being
challenged by any logician. Moksa therefore is impossible
the
to be attained by any other means except through
right kind of knowledge given to us by the Upanijaas-
We have thus proved by means of 5tuti and by reasoning
which is faithful to Sruti that the intelligent Brahman
isboth the efficient and the material cause of the

na—hy this; si jtba— authority; aparigraafr

— —
things
ot accepted by-, api— even; vyatfrydtalf art re/uted.]

12

So far we have refuted the objections against the

Vedanta doctrine, as aha refuted the Slmkhya theory
that pradhana is the cause of the world. We refuted the
latter because, in the first place, it come3 very close to
Vedanta in the account it gives of certain of its beliefs,
such as the satkaryavada, the identity of cause and effect,
and the independent existence of the Atman; secondly,
beciuse it lias used in its support some powerful argu-
ments; and thirdly, because some conpetent auihoritios
who follow the Vedas, like Devah for example, are
atnongst Its adherents. But when other half-witted
persons, ouch as the atomises or the naturalists, also raise
theirheads jnd bring forth their arguments, the Sutrakara
-i^c-;; [Link] he has [Link] vanquished them all, inas-
much as he has already vanquished the most powerful
of the opponents.

\&ia\tr— mjoycr, dpatte/t— being reduced to plight; avi-

bhagafi— no distinction; cet--ij, sydt may — be; loljatiat—

W(e oTiirutry experience.]

 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

J THAT (ON THE VeDANTIC V

AND THEIR OBJECTS

ENJOYERS (l. C THE SOULS)
DITION (OF THE OBJECTS Ah

There comes another objection from the side of

reason alone against the view that Brahman is the cause
of the world. It is true, says the purvapaksin, that 5ruti

is authoritative in its own sphere; but where the meaning

of a Sruti-passage is to be ascertained, and where, according

to the available other means of knowledge, the meaning
appear" to be different, we have to construe the passage
as not having the primary meaning but only the secondary.
For example, when it is said that the ' sacrificial post is
the sun ', we have to understand that the post is lie the
sun and not the sun itself, because it is contrary to actual
perception. It is in this way that mantra and arthavada
are to be explained. Reasoning too is not authoritative
except in its own sphere. For example, it is lot com-
petent to say what is dharma and what is adharma.
Suggesting, therefore, that reasoning and Sruti have got
equal claims to discuss the nature of Brahmavidya, the
purvapaksin tells us that if there is a conflict between
Sruti and reasoning or between Sruti and some other
means of knowledge, it is not proper that Sruti should
refute what has been established by reason or other
means; otherwise it may lead to some absurd conclusion.
The purvapaksin illustrates what he means. The distinc-
tion between the intelligent, embodied souls and the
objects of experience is so obvious and persisting from
the viewpoint of ordinary experience, that any attempt
to remove it will be objected to. But this exactly is
being done on the theory that the world is non-different
from Brahman. Even the distinction between the subject
and the object, between Devadatta and the cooked rice
he eats would be removed, because both Devadatta and
the cooked rice are identical with Brahman. The
view that Brahman is the cause would make the subjects
and objects pa?s into each other.

To this we reply that the distinctions may remain

from the phenraienal point of view even though we accept
Brahman as the cause of the world. Modifications of
the sea, such as waves, foam and bubbles are not different
from the water and yet they do not pass over into each
other ; they are all related to each other, inasmuch as
all of them are in essence water only, and yet they are
distinct from each other. Even so the subjects and the
objects may remain distinct without passing into ooe
another, and yet be non-different from Brahman. No
doubt, the souls cannot be said to be the effects of Brahman
in the sense in which the modifications of water are ;
for as Stuti tells [Link] it is 'which enters into them
after having created them" (Tai 2, o). Just as the one
akaia appears to be many on account of jars and other
limiting adjuncts, even so the effects i.e. the subjects
and the objects appear to be many and distinct although
they are in essence nothing but Brahman.

[Tad — that; anaiiyatwuli— non-difference;

and
drarhbharm-
others.]
fceginmng; iabdddibhyafi—from wards

Words like 'ara^e-ha' and others (prove) the

IMNTIT* RETWWN THEM (viz. THE CAUSE ANt> THE
mn). 14

The distinction we allowed to exist in the previous

Sutra between the subjects and the objects, from the view-
point of ordinary experience, does not however exist
as a matter of fact. For both the subjects and the objects
along with 5kasa and other things are included in the world
which is non-distinct from namely, the Brahman.
its cause,
The effect cannot exist, in other words, apart from and
in the absence of the cause. In the Chandogyopanisad
we are told that all the modifications of clay, such as jars
and dishes, are in reality nothing but clay, and are real
only when looked at from the view-point of clay. But
so far as they appear to exist as different individual things
apart from clay, they are names only as originating'

from speech,' and as such are unreal. It is therefore said

that to know one clod of clay is to know all its modifica-

tions; for there is nothing else but clay (6, 1, 4).
Similarly, apart from Brahman existing in it as its cause,
the world cannot have its independent existence. Other
Sruti -passages where the word ' iirambha is not used,
'

tell us about the unity of the Atman. The effects oi

fire, water and earth do not exist apart from them; natural-

ly, these elements too represented by the colours red,

white and black, in their turn ' do not exist apart from
Brahman which is their cause' (Cha. 6". 4, 1). ' All this
is the Atman, the Real thou art that ';
; the Atman ii
'

,
allthi5 (ChH.6,S,7;7,25,2). ' All this isthe Atman',
'There is no diversity m
it' (Br. 2, 4, 6 ; 4, 4, 25); ' Brah-

man alone is all this ' (Mu. 2, 2, II). In no other way,

then, except believing in the theory that the things of this
world have no existence apart from Brahman, can we prove
our thesis that to know one thing is to know everything
else. So just as the several portions of akasa. limited as
they are by iars and other things, are not different from
one universal akasa, or just as the appearance and disap-
pearance of water in a mirage' are not different from
the salty expanse of a desert, even so, the innumerable
things of the world, including the experiencing subjects
and their objects, have no independent existence apart
from Brahman at any time.

Objection 1. It may be said that just as a tree,

though one, presents the aspect of many branches, or the
one sea of many waves, or one clay of many jars, even so,
the Brahman may present both the aspects of unity
and multiplicity. Its unity will be useful from the
view-point of achieving moksa, and its multiplicity vir.
its various activities and power? will be useful to explain
the activities of human lite as r,\:o:ii mended by the Vedic
Karma-kapda.

We reply that the theory that Brahman may be both one

andmanyisnot tenable. Forthe proposition 'clay alone is
real', asserts not only the reality of the cause vi:. the
clay, but also the unreality of things other than clay. All
[Link]'r things [Link] ii>;iY "origin' in [Link]. are mere names,
and so are unreal. And again, the passage, '
That is
the Atman ; that is the Reality ; thou art that, oh
Svetaketu', tells us that the highest cause or the Brahman
is the only Reality and that the individual soul is nothing

elsebutBrahman. Especially, the sentence 'Thou art that,'

shows that the identity between jiva and Brahman is a
(act which is already existing and not one which is to
become on account of some efforts on the part of jiva.
Hence it is that this Vedanta doctrine will do away with
the idea of the independent existence of the jiva, just as
the recognition of the rope will remove the illusion of
the snake on it. And then, alongwith the idea of the
independent existence of rhe jiva, also goes away, ipso
facto, the independent existence ol the entire phenomenal
world and its dealings and efforts which, according to
our opponent, constitute the aspect of manifoldness
of Brahman. 'When in the case of some one all this becomes
one with the Atman, who should see whom, and by what
means ?' (Br. 2, 4, 11). This is a fact which is eternally
true and it does not point to any particular state. Sruti
tells us that the unity of the Brahman is the reality, and
that the manifoldness of it is unreal. It warns us
further by telling us that while a truth speaking man is
released, a liar is punished. If now the unity and plurality
be both real, how can Sruti call that man who is engrossed
with the manifold dealing of this world, as a liar? Nay
250 VEDA NT A

it declares chat 'one who see.» that there is diversity

moves from death to death (Br. 4, 4, 19).
'
Again, if
unity and multiplicity are both true, there will neither
be bondage as the result of multiplicity, nor release
as the result of the removal of multiplicity by the
knowledge of the unity of Brahman.

Objections 2-5.-(2) If unity alone is real and multiplicity

unreal, preception and other means of knowledge will be
nulland void, recjiu:^ [!i-~re will he. nn nbiecls with which
they will be counted. i\, The em ire Knrm:ikSnda too will
prohibits
be impossible, because what it enjoins and
is related with the plural aspect of things. 4) Even
moksa is, in a way, dependent on the recognition of more
(ban one thing, vn. ;he teacher, the disciple, etc. (5> And
therefore, finally, if moksa too becomes impossible in
the absence of the aspect of manifoldness, what guarantee
there for the trustworthiness of the science of moksa
bo
is
Atmanis concerned?
far as its teaching of the unity of the

Wereply that our position is in no way disturbed

by the objections. For so long as the real knowledge of
the identity of the jiva and the Brahman has not dawned,
it isinevitable that the course of the world should goon
undisturbed both with reference to mundane and extra-
mundane or Vedic activities. A
man who dreams never
of
doubts, so long as the dream lasts, that his experience
the
the various perceptions is false. Similarly, it is under
influence of avidya that a man forgets that he is Brahman
in reality, that Brahman alone is all this ; and so he identi-
fies himself with everything he calls as belonging to
him.
this
It isnatural therefore that he should never think of
world of distinctions and eflects, and of the means and
obj cts of ordinary knowledge as unreal.

the
Objection 6. If Brahman alone is teal, how can
Vedanta-passages, which are then presumably false, lead
ana
one to the knowledge of the identity of the jiva
' "'o one dies on account of being bitten by tne
illusory snake which appears on a rope; nor is anybody
seen using the water in a mira"e tor the purpose of
drinking or bathing.

We reply that the objection ;i iuiilc For we do see

that death occurs sometimes as a consequence of the
mere suspicion 'ha; a venomous snake lias hitten.
And ibe snake-bile and drinking of wa:er in a
dream, from the view-point of the dreamer himself,
are real so long as the dteam lists. Nay, even after
the [Link]. is over, and the events of ihe dream ate
rnmiadicied by the wak-ng
Lie =een
4.-.d ;u be false, the
knowledge about ihem as e rents in the dream persists in
the waking life also without being contradicted. This
, :::i'ir....". •>' consciousness or knowledge shows not only

»;.• emergence of truth from falsehood but also the futility

1

of the view of the Laukayatikas that the Atman is nothing

but the body; for on that theory, the disappearance of
the subtle body in the dream would mean the dis-
appearance of the knowledge of the dream. Events in
the dream, though unreal, are sometimes, we are told indi-
cations of actual future events in life. The sight of a woman
in a dream is a sign of prosperity for one who undertakes
to perform a sacrifice to fulfil some desire (Cha. 5, 2, 8).
Similarly, the sight of a black man with black teeth indicates
death (Ait. Ara, 3, 2, 4, 7). That dreams are further
causally connected with happy or unhappy consequences
is shown by some experts by means of positive and nega-

tive instances. The written representation of an alphabet,

though conventional and unreal, is able to make us pro-
nounce the eternal sound of that alphabet.

This Upanisa die statement of the unity of the Atman

ismoreover the crown of all other arguments ; for there
is left nothing else with reference to which we may raise
questions in order to get ourselves satisfied. The state-
ment '
one should perform a sacrifice ' makes us desirous
252

to know the purposeastowhyorhowit should be perform-

ed; but the statements 'thou art that', 'Jam the Brahma n' r

leave us in no doubt regarding the unity of the Atman ;

for there is nothing else which remains to be known ovet

and above this unity. Nor can it be said that no one
can have such a knowledge for ^vetaketu, for example,
;

did possess it and did realize what his father had told
him (Chi. 6, 7, 6), viz. that Brahman is Ananda. Even
the way to the realization of this knowledge is mentioned;
for instance, the hearingand the readingof the Vedas. It
is not useless, for it removes all avidya. Nor is it of an
illusory nature, for there is nothing else which can sublate
it. No doubt, so long as there is no awakening of it,
there will continue to exist the ordinary con sciouKlwi
which will recognise all the distinctions of the world.
But the moment there arises the knowledge of the unity
of the Atman, all the distinctions of the Vedic or the
ordinary life vanish, and there remains no room for the
supposed aspect of multiplicity in the Brahman.
Objection 7. It appears from the illustration of clay
cited by Sruti that, like clay, Brahman too is capable of
being modified into other things.

Not ho, we reply. Brahman is not capable of

modilications, for it has been declared to be
"
the great unborn Atman which is without decay
r death, is fearless and immortal', and is described
only in negative terms as not big, not small etc. ' (Bf. 4i
'

4, 25; 3, 9, 26; 3, 8, 8). Passages like this deny activity

and change on the part of Brahman. Capacity to become
modified and change lessness being contradictory in nature
cannot belong to Brahman at the same time nor can they ;

be conceived to belong to it in succession,— changeless-

[Link], and moda-
lity during subsistence of the world. For change lessness
alone being true, all modality isappearance on the Brahman.
Besides, in the Vedic passages, which deal with the nature
of Brahman as changeless and as devoid of attributes
and
distinctions, it is clearly stated that the vision of it as the
 i. i, su. 14 253

universal Atman leads to moksa. Janaka, for example,

is stated
'
to have attained the condition of feark'sstijsi'
in the same paysiiy in which '.he Atm:m is first dc/crik'J
in negative terms (Br. 4, 2, 4). No
such result nor any
orhcr"i? li;ve followed from the knowledge
mentioned to
h:i: [Link]^n modified in the form of this world.
j-. This
t:c;i-it that the latter kind of knowledge must be supposed

to be only subservient to the former ; for we have the

Mim rin.5;l rule that a thing or act which has no result of
its own but is mentioned in connection with something
else which has its own specific result, must be supposed as
subservient to the other. Still, if some one were to say

that the knowledge that Brahman iscapableof being modi-

fied mayresult in a corresponding usui [Link] ion or the in- I

dividual soul, because the soul is said to become that

which it worships or believes, we say that it will be a
very poor substitute for the moksa which can be had
from the knowledge that Brahman is changeless and with-
out qualities.'

Objections. The doctrineof thechangelessBrahman

allows no room for the distinction of a God who rules,
and the world and the souls as ruled by Him. How then
can it be maintained that God is the cause of the

We reply that there is no contradiction betweeruhe

original assertion we made while discussing the Sutra
'l-iiimJJvBiy-ii varah" (Brah. SG. I, 1,4) and the present
assertion of the fir lid-passages regarding the unity of the
Brahman. We
do maintain even nowthe original slate
merit we made in connection with the Sruti-passage,
'
From that Atman alone has sprung the akasa' (Tai. 2, 1),
that the creation, subsistence and absorption of the world
is due not to pradhiina but to the omniscient and omni-

potent Lord at the same time eternally pure.

wio is
 intelligent and free. And we have now said nothing to
contradict this, even though we hold the doctrine of the
unity of the changeless Brahman.

To explain the same. The infinite names and forms

are born ofavidya and are no doubt the root-cause of the
phenomenal world; but they cannot be said to be of the
nature of God, for while God is intelligent, they are non-
intelligent. Nor can they be said to be different from
him; for if they are supposed to exist apart from him,
they will lose their non-intelligent nature. They are
therefore said to be indescribable ; or as Sruti and Smiti
would call them, they are the mays, the sakti or the prakrti
of the omniscient God. And yet God is different from
them as is clear from the passages : 'Akata (Brahman)
indeed is the revealer of name and form that is Brahman ;

in which these are contained (Cha. 8, 14, 1);

'
Let me '

produce name and form (Cha. 6, 3, 2); The wise Atman

' '

produced the forms and after giving them names, is calling

them by these names' (Tai. Ar. J, 12, 7); 'He who turns
one seed into many' (Sve. 6, 12). Just as akasa, which
is independent and different from jars, appears to he
limited on account of them, even so, God who is indepen-
dent and different from names and forms only appears to
be dependent on them for the purpose of rulingover them.
And just as the portions of akasa, notwithstanding their
being one with the universal akasa, are limited by the
walls of the jars, even so, the individual souls, though
one with the Atman, appear different on account of the
bodies or the names and forms of avidya. Naturally,
God too appears in relation to them in the phenomenal
worldasa ruler, and as being omniscient and omnipotent.
Otherwise, from the view-point of one who is liberated
from upadhis by means of knowledge, the Atman will
never be conceived as presenting the distinction of the
ruler and the ruled, or appear as omniscient, omnipotent,
etc. 'Where one sees, hears or understands nothing else,
that is the infinite' (Cha. 7, 24, I) ;
'
When the
Atman only has become all this, what else should
 ADHYAYA IT. PA, 1, SU. IS 255

onesee, and by what means?' (Br. 2, 4,14). As is clear from

these passages, the entire phenomenal world does not
^stici-himwhohasrealijedtheAtman, TheBhagavad-
gitl too tells us that in reality there is no such relation of
the ruler and the ruled.
"
God is not the author of the
actions or the fruits thereof, nor does he receive anybody's
sinsotmerits People are deluded because their knowledge
is enveloped by ignorance
'
(B. G. 5, 14-15). The practical
rw.r of view, on the other hand, admits the distinctions
of the phenomenal world. God is spoken of as ' the
king and the protector of all things ; the support and the'
bridge of the worlds, so that they may not be confounded
(Br. 4, 4. 2). "He resides in the hearts of all beings, and
pv hi; power turns them all, as if they are mounted on a
machine (B. G. 18, 61).
'
It is from the viewpoint of
thehighest reality, then, that the SGtrakSra too has estab-
lished the identity of cause and effect. What was asserted
hy him in the previous Suttas, vii Brahman is the ocean
and the world is the waves, was with reference ti
the phenomenal world ; and this was allowed to be con
fidered as real from the practical point of view. _ Tht
parinSmavada is accepted by the Sutrakara (Brah. SCI, 4,
46 ; 1, I, 24), so far as it i~ sur^rnont ror :he purpose of
devotion to saguna Brahman. For it is only then that
the world becomes real and God is considered as
lipotent and omnipresent.

: exists; m —and; upalahdkch — because it

is found.}

possible for a jar to east only wheo the clay

It is
exists and not otherwise ; similarly a piece of cloth can
e*ist only when the threads exist and not otherwise.
The effect, in other words, is non-different from the
 256

material cause. The presence or absence of a thing,

on the other hand, which has no causal connection with
another, is not at all dependent on the presence or
absence of that other thing. The presence of a horse is
equally possible whether the bull is present or not.
The potter is the efficient cause of the jar, but the Jar
can exist in the absence of the potter. The effect can
never, however, be independent and different from its
material cause.

It may be said that fire and smoke continue to be

[Link] different things, though smoke is seen only when
the fire exists. But this is wrong; for smoke may be
observed in a jar in which it is collected even though
fire is extinguished. The argument is not improved
even if it be said that a particular kind of smoke which,
for example, i; seen springing forth from an object does
not exist unless fire exists. For what is required in es-
tablishing identity is not only the presence of the cause,
but also the presence of the consciousness of the came
along with the presence of the consciousness of the effect.
The jar inevitably make? us aware of its material cause,
the clay ;smoke, on the other hand, does not make us

Or the Sutra may be taken to read as fflHW 3<I<**ty I

(Bhavat ca upalabdheh), and then it means that the nnn-

difference of effect from cause is not only to be believed ai
true because 5ruti says so, but also because it is a feet of
perception. What we call cloth is nothing but threads
which we perceive crossing each other breadth-wise and
length-wise. The threads againarenothingbut collections
of finer threads which we can perceive; and the fine
threads again, in their turn, are made up of still finer
threads, and so on. It is these perceived facts which
enable us further to infer that the smallest parts of things
are ultimately nothing but the three elements of fire,
water, and earth, represented by the three colours of red,
white and black (Chii. 6, 4). These three colours further
 — —
ADBYATA II, PA. I, it, 17 257

arenothingbut their cause, the wind: the wind is nothing

but ikasa; and finally the akiisa is nothing but the highest
cause v\z. the one, non-dual Brahman. Therefore Brah-
man alone and not pradhiina or any other thing is the
object of all the means of proof.

u
ca-ani, awasya of
irdi.]

mou). 16

The effect, the present world referred to in the Sruti

passages, ' AH this was existing before (Cha. 6, 2, [J,
'

"
'
In the beginning, this was verily the one Atman only
(Ait. Ar. 2, 4, 1, :), is stated to have existed before its
appearance in the form of its cause, the Atman only.
In other words, Sruti tells us that the effect is non-different
from its cause. Reasoning also favours this conclusion.
How can one thing emerge from another unless it is
present in that other in some form ? Can oil be produced
by crushing the sand ? If the world did not exist in
the Atman prior to its beginning, it would never have
existed in the form in which it is. Besides, just as the
Brahman remains the same in all times, even so, the world
which was one with Brahman before, will also continue
to be one with it after its emergence from the Brahman,
What exists now as before is the only one Reality viz. the
Brahman; the world,' in other words, is non-different
from its cause, the Brahman.

[Ajat — non-existence; vyabadejat— being mentioned; na

nor; iti cet if so; rw; dharmantarena—duc
to another
quality; vafyosefat- on Account of complementary sentence.)
 HOALrrv. 17

When the Chandogyopani $ad speaks of 'none sis tenet

alone in the beginnine'(3, 19, I), it does not mean absolute
non-existence of the effect, but means the non-existence of
only names and forms which evolve later on in course of
time. For that which was first referred to as non-existent,
was afterwards referred to as existent. A
thing which
is absolutely non-existent can never become an existent;
nor can it assume any form. But a thing which is non-
existent on account of the unevolved condition of name
and form, can exist later on, on account of the evolution
of some name and form. When the effect therefore it
said to be non-existent, it only means that the name and
form of the effect was non-existent during the time when
the effect was existing in the form of cause. Besides,
the words ' this ' and ' was ' clearly ooint out that pre-
dication made in the Sruti passage is not with reference to
absolute non -existence, but with reference to the world
of names and forms.

Similarly, the being which is spoken of as ' non-

existent '
in the Taittjriyopanisad (2, 7, 1) does not
[Link]-existenceifontisfurthersaidaboutthit
non-existent being that it got itself manifested into the
world. This means that there was something, vix- the
Brahman, before the world of names and forms came
into existence. In short, if by the word ' sat ' we mean
the world of names and forms, by the word ' asat ' we
do not mean the non-exi6tence of it, but the existence of
it without the names and forms.
 9tB :
Jp^RTO^ I ( <

[ruktcl:-f>

That the production and that

effect exists before its
it is not different from the cause can be ascertained from

reasoning as well as from Sruti. To proceed tc reasoning

Our ordinary experience tells us that milk, clay and

gold are taken by people in order to produce out of the m
curds, jars and oriianiivit:;. respectively. No one who
wants curds will expect to have ir cut of clay, nor will
any one expect to have jars out of milk. This means that
the effect esists in the cause prior to its production. For
had the effect been really non-existent before its produc-
tion, there is no reason why curds be produced out of
milk alone or jars out of clay. Besides, all the effects
being equally non-existent, anything might come out of
anything else.

In order to explain the origin of effects, an asatkarya-

vadin may say that there exists in each cause a special
power to produce a special effect ; e.g., milk has the
specific capacity to produce curds ; clay has got the
specific capacity to produce jars. But this is to abandon
the asatkaryavada and to assume something prior to the
effect which forthwith becomes the effect. Jf, on the

other hand, the specific power also is conceived as non-

existent before its appearance, or as different from both
the cause and the effect, then as said above, anything may
come out of anything else. In other words, just as there
is why a jar only may be produced out of clay,
no reason
wen so, there would be no reason why it should be
produced on account of the specific power, if the lattet is
either non-existent before its appearance or is different
360

from both cause and effect, viz. the clay and the jar. So,
once again, we are led to believe that the effect is nothing
but the cause, even though we introduce a third some-
thing viz. the causal power between the two. No one,
asa matter of fact, is ever conscious of the cause and effect
or of substance and qualities etc. in the manner in which
one is conscious of two distinct and separate things lib i
horse and a buffalo.

It may be said that the cause and the effect or the

substance and the qualities etc. do not appear different
because they ate held together by the connection known
as samavaya, and not because they are identical with
each other. But the so-called samavaya must itself either
be connected with the terms between which it exists or
be independent of them entirely. In the first case, to
explain the one connection of samavaya we have to
postulate a second connection; and in order to explain the
second connection we have to postulate a third, and so on
ud mjimtiijn. In the second case, the cause and the effect
ot the substance and the qualities will fall apart from each
other, and appear as totally disconnected. To avoid this,
if it be said that samavaya can act alone without being

further connected, then samyoga too being a connectinn

between two things may not likewise require the further
support of samavaya, as the Nyaya-Vaisesikas hold.
As a matter of fact, the notion of the relation of samavaya
is useless because experience tells us that substance and
qualities, cause and effect etc. are identical in essence.

Again, if the relation between the cause and effect

is considered as that which exists between the parts and
the whole, and the two are said to be held up together by
samiivaya, we may very well raise the question regarding
the manner in which this takes place. If the who!? resides
in all the parts simultaneously, then the whole may not
be perceptible at all; for instance, the other side of a jar
will not be in contact with the eye at all. If, on the
other
hand, the whole is said to reside in some portions or the
 261

vely, then no doubt the knowledge of die

is inferrable from the perception of a part; for
:, the knowledge of a part of a sword held in hand
is aware of the whole of it, even though we have
il knowledge of it, on account of the

of the sheath are admittedly different from those o

sheath. This means that we introduce a new series 01
parts between the original parts and the whole, or between
the cause and the effect. To pervade the second series
of parts, the whole will again have to be conceived as
consisting of a third series of parts of its own, and so on
ad infinitum. In short, the effect will be further and
further removed from the cause.

The effect as a whole cannot be said to reside in

each one of the parts, simultaneously; for otherwise it
will be more than one whole. Devadatta cannot reside
in Srughna and Pataliputra at the same time; that is pos-
sible only when there are two men, Devadatta and
lajfsdatta. Nor can the whole reside in each one of the
parts simultaneously, in the manner in which the one
samanya or jati of cow is said to reside in each of the
cows at the same time. For just as every cow manifests
the samanya, every part of the cause might manifest the
whole of the effect. But thisisnot invariably experienced
Besides if the whole were to reside fully in each part, one
may as well have the milk of cow from her horns.

Morever, if the effect be non-existent before its

origination, there would be no action of origination itself

because origination implies a reference to the particular
effect and to the substratum in which it takes place.
Walking is understood as an action with reference to the
man who walks. The origination of a jar implies that the
jar alone being produced out of clay; it does not imply
ia
that the efficient cause like potter is being originated.
Por it is there already as a fact. So unless the existence
 262

of the jar is assumed hen-re it is produced, in the form of

its cause, viz., the clay, the very sentence '

the jar u
originated '
will have absolutely no meaning. To say,
in reply, that ori^inntinn instead of" being an action in
some substratum is simply the fact of the effect's being
connected with existence, is to speak what is impossible.
For, as experience tells us, there can be some connection
between two existing things, and not between two thinp
which do not exist at all, nor K_;-.veen two things one of
which exists and the other does not. How can a jar
which has not come into existence be connected, in a
moment prior to its existence, with clay which already
exists? Moreover, existing things alone, such as fields
arid houses, can be snoken of as having certain limitations.
But how can absolute nonexistence or that which ia
absolutely featureless be spoken of as ' being prior to'
origination ? To say that the son of a barren woman
was the king before the coronation of Purvavarman, has
no meaning. For the son of a barren woman is not only
non-existent, but is an unreality; and therefore no tempo-
ral limitation ran be set to him. Even so, at no time, will
the absolute non-existence of the effect, e. g. a jar, be a
reality, though there may be the efforts of the potter.

If the non-existent can never become existent, then the

asatkaryavSdin may say that there would be no purpose
for the operative causes lite potter and others which
bring the effect into existence. If the effect exists in the
cause and is non-different from it, where is the need of the
potter to bring out a jar into existence, just as there is
no need of him to bring into existence the clay which
already exists without any reference to him ? But what
happens as a matter of fact is that people do strive to
bring about the effects, and so it is that one must assume
the non-existence of the effect prior to its origination.

We reply that the purpose of the operative agents is

simply to arrange the cause in the form of the effect. No
doubt, the form of the effect too is present in the cause;
 ADHVAVA It, PA. I, sO. 18 263

far we have already said that there cannot be any effect

without a cause. The form too is rot altogether new;
and so a mere change in form does not transform one
thing into an altogether ditfetent thing Devadatta may
bring his arms ana legs close to his body, or may stretch
them out, and yet he is recogniied as the same man.
SiiTi]!:iriv, people may he seen in changing moods and
condition*, and yet they are always recognized as the
rame, whether as, father, mother, or brother. It may be
said that they are recognized i- the .-am; p.-rsons because
their different conditions are not separated by death; the
jar on the other hand is said to be different because the
clay is as good as being destroyed. But we reply that
this is not correct. Milk continues to exist under a
different form, when we say that it has become curd.
And even where this continued existence of the cause is
not rtxeeivahk. tor inaunce, when the seed is not seen
to exist in the tree, we have to direct our att ntion to the
earlier ?[;!£«$ of the tree, such as the sprouts, and find
that they are nothing but the later stages of the seed.
Because we choose to call arbitrarily the appearance and
the disappearance of the sprouts as birth and death of
'.he seed respectively, it does not follow that the seed

really dies and the sprouts come into existence as some-

thing altogether new. What takes place, as a matter of
fact, is that it is the seed which becomes visible in the
form of sprout, with the accumulation of particles of
matter; and it is the seed again which becomes invisible
and not non-existent, when the sprouts or the particles
of matter change into something else. If, in spite of this,
we believe that the non-existent becomes existent, and
the existent becomes non-existent, wemayas well believe
that the unborn child in the womb of the mother and
the same child in the ctadle after it is bom are altogeth-
er two different children or that the same person is
different altogether in his childhood, youth and oldaee.
Hereby we have incidentally refuted the Bauddha
doctrine of momentary existence; for we have proved
the eternal, continued existence of cause.
264 VBDANTA EWIAINSD

That the operative agents have no purpose

isa charge which can be laid at the door of the as
vridin himself. For non-existence cannot he the object
oi any activity. It cannot be modified in any way by
activity, just as the sky is not modified in any way by

weapons. Nor can the cause c. g., the clay, which is

said to be samavayi and existent, be the object of the acti-
vity of the operative agents; for if the effect, which was
non-existent, is to arise from a cause which is different in
nature, then anything may arise from anything else. And
if to avoid these unpleasant conclusions, the asatkarya-
vadin would say that the effect is nothing but a
specific power of the cause, then he would thereby
only accept the position of the satkaryavadin. The
conclusion we reach, therefore, is that causes
like milk and clay become known as effects when
they assume the form of curds and jars, and that it is
iirpof-sibie to establish even after hundreds of years that
the effect is different from the cause. This leads us to
the further conclusion that Brahman is the ultimate cause
of all, and that it is Brahman alone which appears like an
actor in this or that form of effect and so becomes the
explanation of the whole of the phenomena! world.

We have proved so far by means of reasoning that

the effect exists prior to its origination and that it is non-

different from the cause. A passage from theChandc-
gyopanisad, unlike the passage referred to in the preceding
Sutra, relets directly to the 'existence of the Being which
alone was in the beginning, without a second' (6, 2, 1).
Then a subsidiary reference is made to the opinion of
others who call the Beingas non-existent, but it is immedi-

ately pointed out that the existent cannot come out of the
ncnexistent, and that therefore ' all this was existent
alone in the beginning ". But the word ' this ' which
indicates the world refers by way o( identity to the word
"existent '
which mtans the Being or the cause of the
the
world. In other words, this passage also shows that
effect exists prior to its origination in the form of cause
 [, pa. I, so. 20 26$

and is identical with it, and proves thereby the earlier

assertion made in the same Upamsad (6, 1,3) that the Brah-
man or the cause being known, everything else becomes
known. On the [Link] theory, on the other
hand, the cause may be known, but the effect being
different will remain unknown.

[Pa/aunt— li^e a piece of doth; ca—ani}

Just as a rolled piece of cloth is not different from

what it becomes when it i spread out, similarly the effect

is not different from the cause. The only difference

between the two conditions is that whit is not manifest
in the cause becomes manifest in the effect. The length
and breadth of the rolled piece of cloth which were not
manifest, become manifest only after it is spread out.
Similarly, the piece of cloth which is not manifest in the
threads becomes manifest on account of the operative
agents such as the shuttle, the loom and the weaver.

*m ^ wifo. i
\ °

[Taiha— just as; ca— and; prayaii- brearh and other*.}

J DIFFERENT CONDITIONS). 20

The different prlnas such as prana, apana vyana

:c. are not really different from their causal condition
z. the wind; yet, so long as they are contained within

lei'r cause, their only function is to keep the body

alive,

nt when they manifest as separate from one another,

ley not only keep the body alive, but also cause the
ubs to move. This means that movement which was
Jtmanifest in the cause becomes so in the effect. The
 O

whole world then being an effect nf the Brahman is not

different from it: and ao Brahman being known, every-
thing else becomes known (Cha. 6, 1, 3).

a <tH s4 iK$nr£w imx I (^t ^

{Itara-the nth:;, i-vj h .id-.\;!: -heiv.g [Link].-: .1: hita (benefit)-

akw:7iJ: :'mni-:.;' ili^ ;^-.l-J,.-,: L')-lJl.j jj (deftcfi-prtutAtii
(would follow).}

(Brahman). 21

Whether ' the other ' means the individual soul

according to the passage ' That thou art, oh Svetaketu,'
(Cha. 6. 8, 7) or the Brahman according to the passage,
having entered into the products, such as, earth, water
and light, in the form of jiva, it thought of conceiving
names and forms' (Cha. 6, 3, 2), what Sruti wants
to convey is that the individual soul and the Brahman
are identical. It follows from this identity therefore that
the power of creation helongs to the individual soul also.
But instead of producing things which might be beneficial,
how is it that the individual soul has produced a net-
work of suffering, viz., birth, death, oldage and disease?
No free person would like to build a prison as his house.
How would that pure Atman loot upon the physical
impure body as part of itself ? Would it not free itself
of the evil consequences of its actions and enjoy only the
rewards ? The individual soul would have remembered
itself as the author of creation, and therefore withdrawn
into itself the entire magical illusion of creation. But
the pity is that the individual soul cannot withdraw bis
own body even. All this therefore goes against the view
that the world has been created by an intelligent cause.
[Adhikfliii-what is more; tu-but; bheda-diflctcncc; nirdeidt-

But as against tbe view of the piirvapaksin, the

creator of the world as we oonsiJe-r him :s no; the jiva but
the Btahman which is declared by Sruti as different from
the jiva, and as being omniscient, omnipotent, eternal,
pure, intelligent and free. From the view-point of such
Brahman, there is nothing beneficial to be done or harmfol
to be avoided. There is nothing which it cannot know
oc do; creation or destruction it can do with great ease.
The individual soul, on the other hand, being different in
nature, the various defects mentioned by the pGrvapaksin
belong to it. That jiva and Brahman are different is
evident from various Sniti passages, such as, ' The Atman
indeed is to be seen, heard, thought of and meditated
upon '(Br. 2,4, 5); " He should be the object of the desire
to know, and of careful seeking ' (Cha, 8, 7, 1); Then, '

'

during sleep, the jiva becomes one with the Btahman

(Cha. 6, 8, 1): • The embodied soul becomes lodged in the
prajiia Atman' (Br. 4, 3, 35). Jn all these and similar
other passages, actions such as seeking, seeing, and me-
ditating on the part of the jiviitman point to him as the
subject and the Paramatman as the object.

It may be pointed out that non-difference also of the

Jivaand Brahman is stated by Sruti in the passage " That
thou art '; and so difference and non-difference being
contradictory, they cannot both be true. But, we say
in reply that they can co-exis: ln S F>^ °' rne appatent
contradiction. Just as the false limited 5kasa in the jar
can co-exist with it3 contradictory viz. the one unlimited
akaia, even so as explained already more than once, the
limiting adjuncts of the self such as body, manas and
 268 VEDANTA EIFLA1NED

senses, which arise out of the names and forms of ividya,

are felt to be real. But they arc seen to be mere illusions,
the moment the consciousness of the non-difference of tie
jiva and Brahman arises in us. Then there comes an end
to all the practical distinct ioii> of wrong knowledge, and
with them vanish also the samsaric condition of the soul
and the notion of creation on the part of Brahman.
Where is the room, then, for the defect of not doing what
isbeneficial ? And where is the room for the creation of
the world at all ? But so long as the illusion lasts, there
isroom for the wrong notions such as the self is hurt, or
the soul dies. So long too Brahman is different from the
jiva,and becomes the object of inquiry and search. So
long, too, the jiva is only a creature and not the creator.
The defects therefore do not belong to the Brahman.

23

Just as stones present a great variety among them,

some of them being more or less valuable like diamonds,
lapis laiuli, ar.d siiryakanta ', and some so ordinary and
'

value'ess as can be thrown at dogs and crows; or just as

the same piece of ground yields different trees like sandal
and cucumber, which have different leaves, flowers,
fruits, fragrance and juice; or just as the same food assumes
the form of blood, hair etc; even so. within the same
Brahnju there may seem to arise thedistinctionsofjvarious
effects, such as the jiva and the livara. Brahman however
i» not at dll affected by the defects of the jiva and the
world; for as Sruti declares all these distinctions have
their origin in speech only, and are like the phantoms
of a dreaming person.
[UtoaifthoTO— collect ion, &alanat-bcv\%i&xenit&\ na-nat
,£«*->/ it .J «ul m; l^Mat-Iifr mil*; K-jbr-l
:

BICAUSE IT IS (ELSEWHERE) OBSERVED THAT (INSTRUMENTS)

AM BEING COLLECTED (TOR PRODUCTION Of SOMETHING). (WE

Potters and weavers are seen to collect the material

md the means such as clay, wheels, thread and shuttle
before they produce the iurs ,inJ cloth. But Brahman, on
the other hand, though intelligent like a potter, cannot be
thought of as first providing itself with material and
instruments, because it is conceived to be without a
second. Brahman, therefore, it may be said, cannot be

the cause of the world

To this we reply. Brahman can be conceived to be

the cause in much the same way as milk or water can be
raid to be of curds or ice. !t may appear that milk must
be heated first before it is turned into curds. But had
there been no original capacity in milk whereby it changes
into curds, no amount of heat will be able to do so.
Otherwise one could have turned [Link] or wind into
curds by heating it. What heat does is only to hasten
the process of turning milk into curds. Brahman on
the other hand, does not even require this much help ol
extraneous circumstances to transform itself into mani-
fold effects. For as Sruti says.
'
Nothing remains to be
done by him, for He is already perfect! nor does He req uire
there can be none else who is eq
ual
any instrument, for
unto him, much less superior to him. Various and
supreme ire His powers; knowledge and strength are
natural with him' (£ve. •>. 8)-
 api —alio

Tbe opponent may admit thatnon -intelligent things

like milt may change of themv?[vi.-s without nny extraneous
help into curds and other things; hut he may point out
that Brahman being intelligent like potter cannot be
conceived to create without other external means. We
reply that just as gods and sages are reported to
have the ability to produce palaces and chariots by the
power of their mere will; or just as the spider creates tie
web of the thrills he eirnt- our of his body; or just as the
female crane conceives without the contact of the male;
or just as, without being transplanted, the lotus travels
from one pond to another, even so, Brahman may create
the world without any extraneous means.

Our opponent may find flaw in our reply and say,

that :ht material causes of the things produced in all the
above inst-inces are not the intelligent souls but the non-
inte^ger-t bodies. The palaces and chariots are due to
the bodies of gods etc; the web of the spider due to its
hardened saliva, the conception of the female crane as
due to [he hearing of the sound of thunder, and the
wanderuig of the lotus from pond to pond is like the
chmbtng up of the creeper on a tree. To this we reply
that Brihnian is intelligent like potters and gods, but
unlike them is not dependent on any extraneous means
foe the act of creation. Brahman is unconditionally free
to create.

«. $ ewnrfsifoa;^ (%-%) i

[Krtsna (entire)- prasaktifr (urg'Il result); miavayiilva— with-

out parts: iabda (.9riui)- JjopdA (isolation); va— »'-}
 1

There win result either (the change) of the

ES'TIRE(BbAHMAN) OK THE VIOLATION OP THE >RUT1
WHICH TELLS THAT (BRAHMAN) 13 WITHOUT PARTS. 26

To emphasize Vivarta as against Parinama, the

SQtrakSra raises another objection. Quoting Sruti the
Brahman.
objector says that there are no distinctions in
'
It is partless, actionless, tranquil,
faultless and taintless

(Sve. 6, 19); 'That heavenly Purusa is without body is

both in-ideor cutsidc. and is unborn (Mu. 2, 1, 2);

' This
peat being is endless, unlimited, and consists oi
knowledge
only, as
alone '; He is to be described in negative terms
'

neither big nor small ' (Br. 2, 4, 12; 3, 9, 26; 3, 8,8).

As
Brahman is partless. it cannot be said that it undergoes a
change in one part alone; therefore it may be painted out
chat the entireBrahman undergoes the change. But this
would mean that Brahman as the cause of all will cease lo
exhorta-
Mist; and then there would be no meaning in the
tion that one should "see" the Brahman.
There would
the
also be no meaning in the exhortation, if by seeing
Brahman we are to understand seeing the world or the
transformed Brahman; for the world is seen even without
anybody's telling. If the world alone esists, then what
does Sruti mean by saying that Brahman is unborn ?
If
entire
to escape the faults due to transformation of the
Brahman the Vedantin would accept that Brahman
tonsil of parts, he would contradict all the Sruti p^aycs
which deny parts to Brahman. Besides, that which
consists of parts is of a perishable nature The Vedanta
doctrine therefore appears to be wholly untenable.

[SruttJ-o/ Sruri; lit-but; SabiamutiUtvat- because Sruti

is the ground.

(being
But (it is not so) on account of Sruti
IN
AVAILABLE AND) BEING THE GROUND (OF BELIEF
Bhahuan). 27
 272

We discard the objection. In the first place, the

entire Brahman cannot undergo transfer mi t ion Far
Brahman is not only spoken of by Sruli as the source d
the world, but as existing apart from the world. E, g.:
'the Divine Being thought of entering into the other
three divinities by its own self and manifest their name*
and forms' (Chi, 6,3,?); 'Such is the greatness ol Glyatri;
greater than it is the Purusa; for one foot of him is ill
these bhutas, while his three other feet are in the immortal
heaven (Chi. 3; 12, 6).
'
Again, had the whole of the
Brahman been transformed, there would have been no
meaning in its being described as ' residing in the heart'
and the jiva being described as being one with it during
'

sleep" (Cha. 6, 8, 1), Besides, if Brahman were complete!?

transformed, it would have been visible, just as the
world is; but that it is not the object of perception prove)
that it exists in an unmodified form.

Secondly, we do not eee any contradiction between the

part less nature of Brahman and its not undergoing trans-
formation as a whole, though both these facts are declared
by Sruti, and though Sruti is the only infallible
source which will make us know the nature of Brahman.
For even when the ordinary things such as gems and herbs
produce different and opposite effects on different occasion!
and in different places and times, and thereby baffle the
intellect of man if it is not properly instructed, how much
more difficult it must be to fathom the powers of Brahman
by mere intellect? Reasoning cannot be applied to what
is unthinkable; we must resort to Sruti alone to know
the supra-s

The opponent may then wish the Sruti itself to

remove the contradiction. The contradiction, he may
point out, is not of the nature of two alternatives suggested
in Karma-Kanda so that the adoption of one of them would
remove the contradiction altogether. For instance,
to accept or not the Sodaain-cup at the ati«t»
"
 ADHYAYA II. PA. I, £U 27 273

it left to the option of the man; and so there is

no contradiction between the two Vedic injunctions. But
there is real contradiction between the [Link] [Link]? of
Brahman and its bring transformed in the form ol this
world. Brahman is either partless or is transfoimed
pirtially; if it is parties? then it must 5ft itself wholly
transformed or not at all; and if it is only partiilly trans-
formed, then it consists of parts. The contradictory
statements are not like alternative actions which may be
dependent on the choice of man. but relite to the nature
of an already accomplished fact, VtX. the Brahman, and
therefore present a real difficulty.

But this is no real difficulty, we say in reply. A

man of defective vision may see more than one moon; but
there is only one moon. Similarly, though, in reality,
Brahman ever remains the same, without any change,
it is still the ground of the multiplicity of name and
form
of the phenomenal world. [Link] distinctions of names
and forms are the effects of avidya. and originate from
speech alone. They are so illusory that they appear now
as manifest, and now as unmanifest; now as different from
Brahman and now as non-different from it; and yet they
cannot change the nature of Brahman as being without
Even the Sruri-paasages which refer to the
mation of Brahman have the only aim of directing
us beyond the fact of creation or transformation to the
knowledge of Brahman as being the Atman of all; for
it is only this knowledge which will carry us beyond the
samsara. The knowledge of the mere transformation by
itself, on the other hand, will lead us nowhere. It is this

interest in the Atman rather than in any particular effect

of creation or transformation which is obviously seen in
such a passage of the Sruti : ' He is not this, He is not
that, etc' The negative description is useful to draw our
attention from the phenomenal world, and fix it on the
Brahman, which when known will make us fearless like
Janaka (Br. 4, 2, 4).
 —

i onei jelf; ca— and; evaili— thus; vicivafr

—wonderful; ca; hi men.}

UKS THIS {l3 MENTIONED}. 28

Welearn from Sruti that ' There are no chariots,

horses and roads '
during the stare of dream, but that tie
dreamer creates them (Br. 4, 3, 10). Gods and magicians
too create elephants etc. without losing their own unity
of being. Even so, there may exist a manifold creation
in Brahman, without affecting its real nature and unity.

ISva-oum;- paly aside; dojdt-due to defects; ca— and.]

The pradhana of" the Sarnkhyas, too, it may be said,

must either change into the world wholly or 'partially;
and then there remains either no pradhana ar all, or the
view that it is partiess must he given up. If, to avoid this
difficulty, it be 5a ;d that the
three gunas themselves are
the three parts of pradhana. we say in reply that in no
way it saves the position. For, in the first place as the
Snmlhyas believe, the creation
is the combination of all
the three gunas; and so it cannot he said that some one
or two of them evolve, and the remaining do not. Secondly,
none of the three gunas is considered by the Sarnkhyas as
consisting of parts, so that we may say that some of the
partsevolue andsome do not. Thirdly, pradhana will not
be eternal, if it consists of parts. And finally to say that
pradhana may be considered as consisting of various
power.- is only to say what the Vedantin believes and
not anything special.
 5. i, au. 31 275

The same is the case with the atomists. On the

one hand, if two partless atoms combine, they can do so
only by entering into each other and by occupying the
same space, i. e. together they would form one atom again.
If. on the other hand, the atom be conceived as coming in

con:,!..-! with another in some of its parta, the atomists

shall have to give up their own view that the atom is
partless.

And (Brahman) n
for (SrutO TELLS OS so. 30

The following Sruti- passages describe Him as en-

dowed with all powers. He is the doer of all and
'

desires all, he fragrance and all tastes, he enve-

is all
lopes this all, he is without organs of sense or action,
and he is fearless' (ChS. 3, 14, 4); 'Whatever he wishes
and desires is alwiys true' (Cha. 8, 7. 1); ' He is omnis-
cient' (Tvlu. 1, 1, 9); 'It is by the command of the im-
perishable Heine that the sun and the moon are held up'
(ft. 3. 8, 9).

{VMrwtwt-on account of absence/ organ* ; no-

not;it! cet— i/it be said, tad —
then; ii^ta* —
has beensflid.J

IF ORGANS, (WB REPLY T

 276

How can Brahman, it may be asked, be endowed with

all power, if it is described only in negative terms ? And
granting thai it pos^-Mir? such powers, how can it produce
the world, because it is " without eyes, ears, speech or
mind '
(Br. 3, 8, 9)7

We have already considered this objection while

discussingAdhyIyaiPa.2,[Link]-20, and Adhyn. II Pa- 1,
Sii. 4. The capacity of one being may not be the tame
as that of another. Brahman cannot be fathomed b?
mere reasoning; we must know it by means of .jrmi alone.
Besides we have already seen that in spite of its being
without qualities. Brahman can beconceived as being
endowed with powers so long as it is wroogly believed
that Brahman is connected with the various distinctions
of names and forms of avidya. Sruti says in support of
this: He holds the things, even though he has no hands,
"

runs without feet, sees without eyes, and hears without

ears' (Sve. 3, io).

{Ha — not; prayojanatviit— there being the motive]

(Creation is) not (possible for Brahman) bfcaii;i

there must be motive (for the activity of 1ntiiu'
gent beings). 32

The objector may again point out that no intelligent

and thoughtful person begins even an unimportant work
without some selfish motive; much less will it be in such
a very important wort as creating the universe with all
the varied contents in it. Sruti tells us that everything
'

becomes dear to us for the sake of the self (Br. 2, 4, 5).

'

If therefore we attribute some selfish motive to the

intelligent highestAtmsn for his act of creation, we shall
be doing violence to his self content nature; if, on the
other hand, we say that there is no such motive, there ww
 ;

be no activity at all except the activity of a mad man,

,

which ol course can never belong to the Atman on account

of his admitted omniscience. Hence, it follow? that
creation cannot proceed from the intelligent Atman.

[Lohpvat-as in experience; lila-spon; kaivalya7h--mne.\

Just as tings are sporting tot no social reason, or

just as the breathing goes on naturally (even during sleep],
even »u, UoJ's acvivii y in [Link] is a natural sport with
btm a.l *n cannot be shown to be due to any other motive,
even if we resort to Sruti or reasoning. Nor can we
assign any special reason for this peculiar nature or
[Link] of (.jfiJ. It i; twtble that one may find some

motive, however trifling or unconscious, even in the sport

ofkingsorin breathing: bur there may not beany motive
for the activity of God. For the Sruti says that he has
no desire which is unfulfilled. And yet, we cannot
compare his activity to that of a senseless man; for the
Sruti says that he is both omniscient and creator. The
following points must not therefore be forgotten in this
connection :-( I) That creation is not real from the point
of view of the highest Reality; (2) That it is only an
appearance, and so consists of the names and forms of
vidy.l; and (3.) that the only purpose, which the Smti-
ri

passages dealing with creation serve, is to show that

Brahman alone is the soul of all the created things.

lyaija-mya-nairghrnye— inequality and cruelty; na-nat

—
dependent; tatha same: hi— also;
sa£el(jatiMt— being
dariayati— Sruti Mys.J
 Inequality /
to Gar); foMhb

Just as a pole is shaken in order to see it it is firmly

fixed or not, even so, an objection is again raised to mate
the Vedanta theory unshakeable. It is pointed out that
because God has made the deities extremely happy, ani-
mals estremcly unhappy, and men pattly happy and un-
happy it appears that he too like ordinary persons possesses
passion and malice; but this is contrary to the goodness
which is ascribed to him by Sruti and Smrti. He may be
considered as being very cruel beciuse he causes pain and
the ultimate destruction of all creatures. Brahman
therefore need not be considered as the cause of
the world.

The blame could have been ascribed to him, we say

in reply, had God created the inequality without any
refetence to anything outside him. But being dependent
on the unequal merits and demerits of the cteatures, he is
free from it. God is like rain, the uniform cause of pro-
duction. The difference lies in the various seeds of rice
barley etc. and not in the rain. Similarly, the various
beings have differences among them on account of differ-
ences in their merits and demetits, and not on account of
inequality on the part of God. Sruti tells us that 'whom-
soever he wishes to take up from this world, God
makes him do good deeds and whomsoever he
wishes to take down makes him do bad deeds
(Kau. 3, 8). But once again, it is not the unequal
wishes of God, but the unequal previous deeds
of merit and dement and the desires of beings that
make them good or bad (Br. 3, 2, 13). Smrti too inform*
us that the punishment or the grace, coming from God,
depends on the quality of the deeds of men, and not on
God; for he treats men in the way in which they show
'

their attitude ' towards him (B. G. 4, 11)-

 —

^ +nifafliiTftR( <nn^i \^

If, prior to creation, there was only One being, '

without a second ', then it may be pointed out that there

ii.;d 0:1 ...-.:.•. [:!!•. ri:-[
]
-:.

be unequal. And to say that God is guided by the

merits of the actions is to argue in a circle; viz.. action is
dependent on body and other conditions, and that the
body and other conditions are dependent on action.
Indeed, God can be said to depend on the merits, once
the distinctions are granted to be there; but the first
creation, at least, must be perfectly uniform, because
there was no action or merit prior to it.

But the objection is not valid; because the world

has no beginning. The seed and sprout appear to be
dependent on each other; yet there is no logical flaw
because both of them have no beginning. Similarly
merits and inequality may continue to operate upon each
other because both are without any beginning.

Ulbabadyate— is ascertained ; ca — and ;

iipdlflbliyate is
 280 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

and no reason why the souls once released may not te

born again. And there being again no reason for
the inequality of pleasure and pain, rewards and
punishments may come without merit or demerit of
previous actions. That God is not the cause of this
inequality we have already seen. Avidya also cannot
by itself be the cause for it remains the same in all the
;

conditions of life, such as sleep, swoon etc. But the

cause of inequality may be avidya, provided it comes
in contact with the merits or demerits of actions which
the people are urged to do owing to anger, hatred
and desires. Moreover to assume that the cause of
inequality is the body, is to fall into a circular
reasoning for there will be no physical body without
:

action, and no action without physical body. But if

we believe the sathsara to be without any begin-
ning, like the seed and the sprout, the causa! connec-
tion between actions and the inequality appears
reasonable.

Sruti and Smrti also favour the view that the world
is without a beginning. The very word "jiva' used
for the Atman in the passage, ' Let me enter with this
jiva etc' (Cha. 6, 3, 2), shows that it has been used to
denote the function of sustaining the pranas in the body
of an individual being. It is clear therefore thit the
pranas and along with them the bodies of the creatutes
ever existed without a beginning, if at all the use of the
word jiva is to be justified. The word is not used in
' ""

order to indicate a future relation with the pranas fit ;

the future is only a possibility, while the pist is already

a fact. Si-nilarly, the mantra, As the creator thought
'

of the former creation, he created the sun and the moon

etc' (Ftg. 10, 190, 3) ; and the passage, ' Neither the sure
fort and form (vir the Brahman), nor the beginning nor
the end of this is known ' (B. G. 15, 3), show us that the
saihsiira is without a beginning.
 So far, the Siitrakara has removed all the objections,
juch as the difference in the nature of the world and [he
Brahman, and has proved I hat Brahman a lone is the efficient
and thematerialcauseofthe world. That this cause is
it once, omniscient and omnipolent, and the ground of
Maya, it sufficient to show that no further doubt ba
entertained regarding the Upanisadic foundations of the
Vedanta doctrine.

He will now proceed to the Second Pada where

the main concern will be to refute the opinions held by
other teachers.
 t

ADRYAYA second
PADA second

1 WIS-W»r-WW<t «-t »)

WORLD) IS NOT POSSIBLE, THE INFERENCE (OFTHESAlSKHVAf

The purpose of the Vedanta system is lo expound

the meaning of :ii.: pI
!
;
:j_
,!.. ui j not to support
i
.
1 1
.
.

orrefutebymeansof logic any particular view. Andyet,

it is the duty of every student of the Vedanta to relate

the Samkhya and other systems of thought, because they

are merely obstacles to right knowledge. Therefore it is

that a newpada is begun, after having, so far, established

ourown position, which affords the means of moksa to
(hosewho desire it. One may counsel us to remain satisfied
with our own position and not to incite hate and anger
hy refuting other views. But the refutation too has i
purpose of its own. It is to prevent the ordinary people
of no great intellect from putting their faith in systems
which are intriii.-~1c.1lJv worth le..-s. The Siimkhya system,
for instance, is very likely to mislead the ignorant people
into believing that it contains right knowledge, because
it appears weighty on account of subtle reasoning used by

competent authorities. No doubt, we have already refuted

the Samkhya and some others on different occasions
(while dealing with, 1, 1,5 and 1,4,23). But this was
done onlv to show that the interpretations which they
put on the Ve da nta-pas sages, which they too advanced
 i. h,b 0. 1 283

tor esul:!ish:ng their position, were al] fallacious. The

refutation, n-liich we are now going to do will exclusively
deal with the reasonings which they have adopted, and
not with [he Sruti- passages which they have taken for
suppoi t

To begin with the arguments of the Samkhyas.

Just as vessels made of clay haveclay alone as their cause
even so, the external or the internal world of effects,
whether house, body, or mind, endowed as it is with the
characteristic marks of pleasure, pain and infatuation
must be supposed to have arisen from a cause which
must also possess these three characteristics. It is
these three qualities which together go to forr;i >.-
:

known as the three-fold pradhana. Like clay, it is non-

intelligent but it evolves spontaneously into various
;

modifications, for the sake of fulfilling the purposes of the

soul, via. the enjoyment of worldly pleasures and moksa.
That pradhana is the cause can also be inferred on acc-
ount of other reasons,' such as the characteristic that
things have measurement or dimensions.

• Tbr SSmktyj KiirikS (1J> moioau Bk riJi rHD»:

i inCrBigniti chertfine the nm-toifllierflt pridhHoj nuK bt It

 284 VEOANTA EXPLAINED

To this we reply. It is nowhere observed in the

world that a n on -intelligent thing like a stone produce!
of its own accord anything which may he of use, unless
it is guided by some intelligent being. Palaces and plea-
sure-grounds are prepared by intelligent workmen, and
do not come into being of their own accord.
How then cm this wonderful world which consist!
of the five elements, and of the internal things such as
mind, intellect etc., and which baffles the imagination
of even the most talented architects on accounl of the
various species of beings and the arrangement of their
organs, and the appropriate fruit? for them cosiriincd in
it. be created by a non-intelligent principle? Vessels
of particular form and size are produced out of clay, only
if a potter is there ; even so, the pradhSna must be
araumed to evolve only under the guidance of an intelligent
being. For the production of a jar, it is not simply the
material cause, viz. the clay that is responsible; the efficient
cause too, viz. the potter is equally required. Even bo
the original cause of the world need not be taken to be
simply the non-intelligent mixture of pleasure, painand
infatuation; it is rather the efficient cause of an intelli-
gent being. To say so is not to offend any canon of
reasoning,' On the contrary, we are in agreement with
the teaching of Sruti which tells us that there is aa
intelligent cause oi the world.

The word 'and' in the Sutra is intended to slate

additional reasons for not believing in pradhana as the
cause. In the first place, the external and the internal
objects of the world cannot be said to be of the nature of
pleasure, pain and infatuation, because the latter are
mental states while the former ate the causes o! these.
Sound, for instance, as a sense-object is one and the sane.
 i; [Link]: 2 285

itself; yet it affects

It is neither pleasant nor painful in

cne persin as pleasant, another "as painful, and a tbiid as

neither pleasant nor painful, onaccount of the mental con'
dition of the persons. In other words, it only means thit
objects such as sound, are only the occasions of rousing
the feelings on account of the desires and mental dispose
ticn of men. The objects themselves do not consist' of
pleasure, pain and infatuation, which correspond to the
three gunas of the pradhana. Secondly, if the Sartikhyas
can argue from the partial observation that some
distinct

and limited things like roots, sprouts etc. are the result
of conjunction of several things, to a generalisation that
all the objects of the world are the effects of
conjunction
of several things, we too can say against them that the
three constituent qualities of the pradhana, viz. the sattva-
rajas and tamas, also arise on account ol previous conjunc-
tion of several things; for they too are distinct and separ-
ate, and therefore limit one another.
1
Thirdly, as alrea-
dy pointed out, not all the effects are due to a nOO-flrteU
gen! prior condition they are also due to an intelligent
;

principle beyond it.

IPravrtxc/i— because of tendency to activity; ca— and.)

 286 Veda

Let us leave aside the consideration of the orderly

arrangement of the world. Even the original disturbance
of the three gunas from their equipoised condition during
the dissolution of the world, and the consequent subordin-
ation of two of them to the third one, so necessary for the
production of the things of the world as classified into
sattvika, rajasa and tiimasa, cannot be attributed to the
non-intelligent, independent pradhana. We never see
the clay changing itself into pots without the help of a
potter, nor a chariot moving itself without a horse. So
we say that unless there is an ultimate intelligent
principle, pradhana can never be the cause of the

No doubt, it is true that the intelligent principle also IE

not actuallyseento be active; but it is a matter of common
observation that the non -intelligent chariot is seen to be
moving only when it is joined with an intelligent being,
such as a horse. And yet it may be said by the Samkhyas
that we see the activity in the non -intelligent chariot
as certainly as we see the chariot itself, and that, on the
other hand, we neither see the intelligent principle nor tie
activity located in that principle. At best, according
to them, only the esistence of the intelligent principle,
and not its activity, is inferredon account of the actions
which take place in a living body, which is dissimilar in
nature to inanimate things like chariots. And so far as the
existence of the intelligence also is concerned, it is fou-
nd only when there exists a body; but when there oasts
no physical body, no intelligence too is found. In other
words, as the Lokayatikas consider, intelligence is a
mere attribute of the body. Activity therefore belongs
only to what is non-intelligent.

To this we reply. We do not mean to deny activity

to non-intelligent things where it is observed. Let it

belong to them. What we want to assert is that it is

 JLii, au. 3 2S7

due to an intelligent principle. For just as the capacity

toburn and shine which exists in wood, and which is not
manifested in mere fire as such, requires lot its manifesta-
tion wood with fire, even so, the
the conjunction of
activity of any non-intelligent thing is seen only when
the intelligent principle is present and not otherwise.

That is why, as the Lokayitikas also admit, it is present

in a living body and not in a corpse present in a chariot ;

drawn by a horse, and not in a mere chariot. Intelligence

therefore possesses the power to move, without any
contradiction.

It may still be said that because the Atman is, ac-

cording to the Vedlmtms, pure consciousness and nothing
else, it must itself be incapable of activity and incapable
of making others active. Hut the objection does not
stand. For a thing may be devoid of motion and yet
capable of moving other things. magnet may not move A
itself, but moves a piece of iron; colours and other objects

of sense do not move themselves, but make the eyes and

other senses active. So, the omnipresent; omnipotent,
amnipcient God too, being the Atman of all, can move
the universe, himself remaining unmoved. It is no objec-
tion to suggest that there being only one Brahman and
nothing else, there can be no motion at all. For we
have repeatedly said that inasmuch as the entire world
consisting of names and forms has been the work of Maya
or avidya, God too is imagined to be connected with it
;
;!'-.' i.;i- :
T.-ri!r-.-. i. : •.'
i
.: :];: ;'.'•
-y -<: - ! u
there is room for activity if the ultimate cause of all is

taken to be the all-knowing Brahman; but not when it is

taken to be the non-intelligent pradhana.

wpjp^srfoi \

{Payai— mtffc artbu— luatcr; wit— lifc; ta— if; tatra—

then; api — even.
 f THAT) then, TOO, (th,
;e). 3

Citing further instances of the non-intelligent mill

and water which flew themselves naturally for the nou-
rishment of the calf and for the benefit of mankind, the
SSmkhya may wish to prove that the pradhana also, in
like manner, transforms itself into the world so thatmen
should achieve the highest end of life.

The argument however is not adequate ; for both

thepartiesnowagreein saying that activity is not observed
in merely n on -intelligent things such as chariots. The
activity of the non-intelligent milk and water like that of
the non-intelligent chariot, must be said to beequaUj
guided by intelligence, and therefore cannot be cited as
affording a new argument. Besides, it is the loving wish
of the intelligent cow for the calf, and the sucking of
milk by the intelligent calf, which make possible the flow
of the milk. The flowing of water too is dependent on
the low level of the ground. Besides, in a general way, it
is dependent on the intelligent principle viz. the Brahman
which is present everywhere. Sruti also supports what
we say :
'
He dwells and rules the water from within'
(Br- 3, 7, 4) ; ' By the command of the Aksara some riven
flow to the east ' (Br. 3, 8, 9).

The present Sutra may be shown to contradict

Siitra 24 of adhyaya second, pada first. For there, the
natural change of milk into curds without any extraneous
cause was used by us as an illustration to show that God
can create the universe out of himself without the helpof
any other instrument; while here we say that all activity
is guided by intelligence. But there is no contradiction
between the practical way of explaining things, as we did
on the former occasion, and the logical way of explaining
them, as in the present Sutra. For even the natural
way of the changing of milk into curds rcquiies the guid-
ance of God.
 inavasthitefr— there being nothing I

ijxlyatvat— there being no purpose

(a»d ncam Tim mnao

» bffoii, (i
A. IB, CAU.F OF AGIIVrrT. THE FRADlisA) CAOT HAFT
ANY HJHF05E (TO BE ACTIVE OR INACTIVE). 4

According to the view of the Samkhyas, pradhana

means the equipoised condition of the three gunas. And
there being no other principle beyond pradh ana, t bete is
nothing which could make it active or inactive. For
purusa, in their view, is indiiferent and so cannot be said
either to cause action or the cessation of action. Pradhana
thus l-L'ii! - utterly independent, it is impossible tc know
why it should sometimes transform itself into mahat
and other things, and why at other times it shouH not. :
God, on the other hand, can be active or not as he pleases,
because he is omniscient and omnipotent and can make
use of his maya .whenever he wants.

sn-^nwi^ 5. tcni^a; i
*.

[Anjatr d-ehewhere ; abhavat- because aj absence, ca ,

na ; t]-$a-a&i-vat-\<itc grass and otfiei things ]

The Samkhya may again argue that just as grass, herb*

d water get themselves naturally transformed into milk,
en so the pradhana may transform itself into mahat
 290

and other things. For had there been any other cause
responsible for transforming grass into milk, men could
have employed it to produce as much milk as they
liked. But as this is not done, the process must be
considered as natural; and so one may eipect the same in
the ease of pradhana.

We do not admit this because we know that seme

;

other cause is responsible for changing grass into milk,

It is only that grass, which is eaten by a cow, that changes

into milk, and not that which is not eaten, nor that which

to be natural, simply because man cannot accomplish it.

For things not brought about by men, are brought abou!
by divine activity. And we do find that men too feed
the cows with plenty of grass etc, if they want plenty
of milk. Hence it is not correct to say that pradhana
modifies itself spontaneously like grass and other things.

4*9i'i«^ w*«ifflMi3 b
i
%
{Abhyupagame-admitting; api-even: ortha-abhavot—tlie"
being 110 purpose.}

NO PURPOSE (FOB SUCH ACTIVITY). 6

Now, if by saying that pradhana is spontaneously

active, it is meant that it is not in need ofany other principle
beyond it, it must also mean that it acts independently
of any purpose. But to say so is to go against the very
tenet of the Sarhkhya view that the pradhilna becomes
active for fulfilling the purposes of man. If, on the

other hand, theSarhkhya says that the spontaneous activity

of pradhana is necessarily purposive, though not dependent

on some other principle, we must search what that purpose

is. If, in the first place, that purpose is to provide with

appropriate pleasures and pains to the Purusa, we have

 ;.ii,bu. 6 291

to suppose, what is impossible on the Samkhya hypothesis,

that the Purusa who is eternally unchanging undergoes

corresponding modifications of increase or decrease in

hisnature '. Besides, there would he no release, because
experience of pleasure and pain has been now accepted
aa the only motive for the activity of pradhana. If,

in the second place, the purpose is to achieve the liberation

of the purusa, it is merely to conceive the superfluous

that is, something which has already been realized ;
for the purusa was in the condition of liberation even
before the activity of pradhana. Besides, if the motive
is not to provide with the pleasures and pains of life,
there would be no empirical experience of worldly life,
such as sounds, colours etc. If, again, in the third place
the purposes be conceived as both mundane pleasures
and pains, and liberation, we shall find that in reality
neither is possible Liberation is not possible' because
the objects produced by pradhana are infinite and so there
would he no occasion at all for final release. Satisfaction
of the desire to fulfil the human ends cannot, as a matter
of fact, be attributed to pradhana, because it is not
intelligent ; nor can any desire be attributed to the purusa
because he is said to be pure and partless, 1

[Link] all these difficulties, the pradhana is said to

be active on account of its inherent power to produce, and
on account of the inherent power of the puru$a to 'look
on ' at things produced, we observe that there will be
endless existence of this saipsara on account of the
imperishable nature of these two powers, in other words'
once again, there will be no liberation at all. Hence
it is incorrect to say that pradhana becomes active for
the sake of fulfi Hint; the purposes of the purusa.

{Puruja; fljmauat-KJte magnet : in ; eft ; tatk6-api—even

CU1TY REMAINS). 7

If the purusa is said to move the pradhana, then, in

the first place, the Sarhkhya has to abandon his own
position, viz., that the pradhana is active on its own
account, and that the purusa possesses no moving power.
How indeed should the indifferent, inactive purusa move
the pradhana ? A lame man, no doubt, may lead a blind
man by mounting on his back; but he leads him by meani
of words etc. How can the purusa who is devoid of
action and qualities be expected to move the pradhana?
Similarly, the magnet comes near the iron and then att-
racts it. But the purusa and the pradhana a re permanently
near each other; and so there would be perpetual activrv
and no final release. Besides, the magnet is requited
to be made clean before it can be expected to attract iron.
The purusa, on the othet hand, is already pure. Hence
the illustrations are inadequate. So, between the non-
intelligent prjjhfinr. :ind [Link] purusa, there being no
third principle, there can be no connection at all between
the two. Besides, as proved in the preceding Sutra,
there can be no purpose of the activity of pradhana, even
though it is now assumed that that activity is caused by
purusa. The highest Atman, on the Vedantic doctrine,
is only indifferent so far as its own nature is concerned.

Still it is considered as active in its relation to mayal

 « '

vftntgvrat i

Pradhana means the equipoised, eternal condition

gunas of sattra
of the three co-ordinate, independent
rajas and tamas. So, the moment any one of them becomes
superior to others, the very characteristic nature of the
gugaa and therefore of the pradhana will
itself be lost.
And as there exists no external principle to disturb the
gunas, the evolution of the universe will not be possible.

DEJECTS REMAIN) BECAUSE (PRADHANA) IB DEVOID OF IN-

TELLIGENCE. 9

The Samkhya may say that as he has no proof to

hold that qualities are unchangeable and without relation.
 294

he may infer from the nature of the effects that the quali-
ties have got, in 6pite of their equipoise, the capacity tn
change and produce the effects. Even then, we reply
that the argument will contain the defect we have already
pointed out, viz., that there will be no orderly arrange-
ment of the world, if the pradhana is non-intellieent.

And if, to avoid this difficulty, the Sarhkhya would say

that pradhana too is intelligent, then he will not differ
from us at all. For what we call Brahman, he will call
pradhana. And there will he only one intelligent principle
which will also be the material cause of this multifoim
universe. Granting further that the gunas are capable
of undergoing inequality in spite of their equipoise, they
will never be unequal in the absence of an adequate came.
So there may not be any evolution of the world at all.
Or if the gunas somehow happen to be unequal without
any cause, they will always remain so, and there will be
perpetual samsaraand no release.

A*lP|iWMTHHaHH I
?

The Sarhkhya doctrine, moreover, contains man?

contradictions. Sometimes, they say that there ate seven
senses, sometimes eleven.' In some places, they tell us
that the five subtle elements (tanmatras) evolve from the
great principle (mahat), while in other places, they_ are-
said to evolve from the consciousness of the ego (ahamksra).
Sometimes, they speak of one internal organ viz., the
intellect(antahkarana), sometimes of three vis. mind,
intellectand egoism. Besides, it is well known that

««
Fivi ieiuci of action, fi™ of tqowltdH. ind Blind; or five "J™
°{
mind, nuJ the hisc of mien which Auction for the fin teiati of huowhStt
 At this, the Slrhkhya too, brings a counter attack.
The Vedanta doctrine aha, says he, cannot be accepted,
because even the practical distinction which the whole
world is making between a person who suflers and his
suffering is not possibleon the Brahmanic theory. The
suffererand the suffering will be considered as the attri-
butes of Brahman itself, and therefore the teaching of
the 5ruti that knowledge should be attained for the
purpose of putting an end to all suffering, loses it; signi-
ficance. A
little consideration however will show that
these are different though connected. Just as the
Same though distinct cannot exist apart lroti its light
and heat, or just as, even in the illustration used by the
Vedantin,' the sea-water, can never be conceived to be
permanently different from the waves and foam, which
are sometimes manifest and sometimes not, even so the
Atman must be thought of as essentially connected with
its attributes of jiva and samsara, or which is the same

thing, as the sufferer and the suffering. In other words,

if the Atman is essentially and permanently bound up
with the sufferer and the suffering, though not the same
as the latter, there will be no release at all.

That the sufferer and the suffering are two different

things from the practical point of view can be seen in
another way also. An object of desire isd:fterent from
the person who desires it; otherwise there wi!l be on
desire at all. A flame c. g., does not desire to have light,
for it possesses it already. Nor can it be said :har the
object of desire desires itself; for this is nowhere seen.
The relation implied in desire, cannot be established with
reference to one thing or person only; it reqiures two
terms to relate, viz., the object of desite anJ rhe person
 296

desiring it. The same holds good if instead of desire

there is aversion. Now there being a far greatsr number
of objects ol aversion 01 dislike than thai of like both of
them are general ly known as the objects that came
suffering to man. ' To return to the point, if both the
sufferer and the suffering go to form one self, there would
be no release. But if they are two, then theie is the
possibility of release, inasmuch as the cause oi bondage,
viz., wrong knowledge may be removed.

We reply that all this reasoning is pointless. Fot

Brahman being the only reality, there can neither be the
sufferer and the suffering as two distinct things, nor any
relation between them. Fire can neither burn not illumine
itself, even though it may be said that it possesses the
attributes of heat and light, and grows in volume etc.
No doubt from the practical point of view, it may be said
that the Sun is the cause of suffering, while the living body
which is scorched by the heat is the sufferer. Yet we
cannot admit the argument of the Sitmkhya that the
suffering or pain may in reality belong to the intelligent
being alone, and not to the nan- intelligent body, on the
ground, as he says, that if it were to belong to the latter,
it would, as the Carvakas hold, cease with the cessation

of the body, and that there would therefore be no need

to search for the means of liberation of the soul. For,
apart from the fact that nobody can ever imagine a
disembodied being becoming the object of suffering, the
Samihya too, on his own theory, cannot admit the soul
or purusa who is essentially pure to be affected by pain,
either directly by itself or indirectly through the con-
nection of the body. Nor, again, can the connection cf
pain and purusa be established through the cennerrion
of purusa and sattvaguna, and through the aflectionof
 ii, pa. ii, su. 10 297

sattva by rajas. For there can be no connection between

the non-intelligent gunas and the intelligent and partless
purusa. And finally if the purusa be supposed to suffer
as were, simply fvciu.-t- hi is said to be reflected in the
it

sattva, we have no objection to his being so imagined to

suffer, as it were. But to suppose that an amphisbena
is like a serpent is not to make it poisonous, nor is it to
make a serpent non-poisonous by supposing it to be like
an amphisbena. Thus, on the theoty of the Siiihkhyas,
too, the relation between the sufferer and the suffering is
not real; or which is the same thing as the Vedantin says,
it is the effect of avidya. The fact of suffering and the
distinction between the sufferer and the suffering are
in other words, inexplicable and unreal.

The Samkhya may again take a new line of thought

and argue th iit ilie viinis,! is j^tmHi- o: suiting on account
of the non-discrimination of the fact that he is different
from pradhana, and that therefore there will be release
for him as soon as there will be the separation from him of
the cause of non-discrimination, viz. the tamoguna. But
this is to make the release all the more impossible. For,
as ihe Samkhya believes, the tamoguna, which is the root
cause of non-discrimination and non-release, is as eternal
ss sattva; and as the conquest or defeat of one guna by
the other is neither fixed nor everlasting, the tamas may
at anytime again overpower the sattva, and thus clouding
the intellect of man may again bind him.'

To the Vedantin, on the other hand, moksa, or final

release is an undoubted fact. For the Atman alone being
theone existing entity, and the so-called plurality having
its origin in speech, as the Chandogyopanisad says
there cannot be any such distinction or relation as exists
 I

between subject and object or between sufferer ana"

suffering in spite of the cognition of these in practical
life.

To refute now the atomic theory of the Vaiaesikai

who argue as follows: White threads produce a whitf
piece of cloth, and not of any other colour. From this
we can infer that qualities which are found in the cauie
reappear in the effect. So, if we assume the intelligent
Brahman as the cause of the world, we should expect the
same quality o*" mti'LUgonci ;n the world also. But, as
this is not, we conclude that Brahman is not the cause of
the world.

It is this reasoning which the Siitrakara shows to bt

fallacious, by talcing his stand on the theory of the Vaiie-
fikas themselves.

\tAahat-d\rgka~vat — as having dimension! ipiouti as

'
tnahat ' and dirghd; va-or; fhsva-parimandalabyaAi—
from what is minute and spherical.

And, just as (dyads and triads possessing dimen-

sions OF) ' MAHAT *
AND '
BTRGHA '
(ARISE PROW ATOM!

WORLD MAY ARISE OUT OF BRAHMAn). 11

The theory of the VaiSesikas is as follows ;-'The atoms

1

are spherical; though specific got atoms have specific

qualities. During the time of dissolution, they do not
produce anything; but at the time of a new creation,
they come together on account of the force of the unseen
 ADHYATA II, FA. II, SU. 11 299

merits and demerits of the actions of the souls, and being

combined with the will of God, produce the entire world
of effects. Along with this production, the qualities of
the causes are reproduced in the effects. Thus w hen
two atoms produce a dyad, the white colour of theatcms
is produced in the dyad, but not the original sphericity

or parimarjdalya of the atom.

' '
For the dyad is said to
assume the new dimensions of anutva' (smallness) and
'

'rhasvatva' (shortness). When two {four) dyads, in

their turn, combine to produce a tetrad, it is the whiteness
of the cause which is found to be repeated in the effect,
but not the dimensions; for the tetrad assumes the new
dimensions of 'mahatva' (largeness) and 'dirghatvs'
(length). Similar is the case when many simple atoms,
or many dyads, or an atom and a dyad combine to produce

So, if at every stage, while passing frcm atom to dyad,

or from dyad to triad and tetrad, dissimilar qualities are
produced on the Vais"esika theory, we have to say that
on the Vedanta theory also, there may arise the non-
world from the intelligent Brahman.
intelligent

At this, the Vaiiesika may say that the products like

dyads, triads etc. being endowed with qualities opposed
innature to those of the causes, it is not possible for the
latter to overcome the former and reappear in their place.
But non-intelligence is not a quality opposed in nature to
intelligence; it is merely the negation or absence of intel-
ligence, and so there is nothing to prevent the Brahman
from reproducing its quality of intelligence in the world.

But the argument is not correct. Fnr, in the first

place, the intelligence of 'the Brahman is not produced in

the world Just as sphericity of the atoms is not produced
in their effects. It cannot be said, in the second place,
that the old qualities cannot be repeated because the
effect isbeing endowed with new qualities. For, as
the Vaisesikas hold, substances ate, in the first instant,
300 VEDA

devoid of qualities, but become endowed with them only

in the second instant; and so, it is possible that the old
qualities can reproduce themselves in the effects during
the period in which the latter are without any qualities.
Nor can it lie said, in the third place, that the old qualities

likesr-her;dty etc. are incapable of reproducing themselves

inasmuch <is it is these which create new and dissimilar
qualities in new effects. As Karjada says, the new
qualities such as 'mahatva' (largeness), and 'dirghatva'
(length) arise out of plurality or largeness contained in
the cause, anutva (smallnessj and rhasvatva (shortness),
on the other hand, arise when there is neither plurality
nor largeness in the cause. In other words as Kanida
,

himself tells, these new qualities do not come out of the

original qualities of sphericity etc. (Vai. Su. 7, 1,9 and 10
and 17). Nor finally can it be said that the plurality of
the constituent members of a cause or the duality of them
being contiguous' with the effects produces the 'mahatva'
or 'anutva* in them, though it is not so with sphericity
etc. because these qualities of the cause instead of being
contiguous with the effects, are, on the contrary, remote
from them. As a matter of fact, all the qualities of the
cause must reside in it in exactly the same manner, that
is, either on all or on some of the parts of the cause, and
are therefore equally contiguous or not with the effect.
The reason then why sphericity etc. are not seen repro-
duced in the effects is not that they are not contiguous.
but that they have this natural mode of behaving. Why
then can we not say with reference to the intelligence of
the Brahman that it has the natural way of not being
reproduced in the world ?

Besides, we do find that from the quality known as

conjunction, (samyoga) of the threads, there results the
substance vis. a piece of cloth ;and so the statement that
the cause and effect are similar in nature is not true. If
the Vaisesita would object to comparing a quality with
substance and thereby prevent us from saying that the
Brahman, as substance, can producea dissimilar effect, we
we are only interested in pointing out that the
reply that
effect is dissimilar from the cause. Besides, there is no
rule that while adducing eiamplea one must choose the
eiampleofa quality, when the quality is under discission
or choose that of a substance when the substance is under
discussion. Kanada himself cites the example of a quality
when substance is under di^'.ifs:,-,n. a? in iuira, 4,2,2, 'In-
asmuchas the conjunction of things perceivable and things
im perceivable, is itself im perceivable, the body is jiot
composed of the five elements.' The meaningof the Sutra
is that just as the quality of conjunction which U laid to

be inhetent in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible

akasa, is itself imperceptible, even so, if the physical
body were to reside or inhere initsconstituent five elements
some of which (vn. the earth, water and fire) are percepti-
ble, and some (viz. air and akSsa) are not, it too would have
been imperceptible. But the body is perceived, and hence
it is not composed of the five elements. It is thus that

Kanada himself has given the lead in comparing the quality

of conjunction with the substance, vil. the body.
Besides in Sutra 6 of Pada I of Adhyaya 2, we have
shown that the effect may be different from the cause.
And though is a repetition and we could
have
this
avoided it (as we once did avoid a repetition while
dealing with II, 1, 3 and 12) what we wished
thetr own
to do here is to refute the Vaiiesikas on
ground.
 lUbhayathapi — both ways; na; \arma —
hence; tat-abhdvafi — absence of—activity;
that.]
ata)}

NO ACTIVITY (lS KISSIBLb) NOTWITHSTANDING BOTE

WAyB HENCB THE ABSFNCE OF THAT
; (viz. THE CREATION
Of THE WORLD). 12

Now begins the refutation of the atomic theory

which can be stated thus. A
piece of cloth is connected
with the threads which are contained in it by the relation
known as 'samavaya'; and the several threads are brought
together by 'sainyoga '. In general, we may saythatthe
parts inherent in any whole are brought together by
conjunction ; and that all things which consist of parts
such as mountains and seas, or the four elements of earth,
water, fire and air come out of the different combina-
tions of four kinds of atoms. It is these things which ran
be considered as wholes cf partsand which can ultimately
be said to be produced out of atoms and disintegrated
back into the atoms, at the time of the dissolution of the
universe. But the atom being the limit of divisibility
cannot be dissolved or destroyed. At the time ofcreation
therefore the atoms of air first come together on account
of the motion caused in them by the unseen merits
and demerits of the souls, and thus it is that dyads, triads
etc. of the element of air are produced only to give rise
to the air itself. Similar is the production of the other
three elements of fire, water and earth in succession, and
of the physical body and the senses. This is how the
whole universe has come out of atoms. As for the
qualities of the successive products, they are, as already
seen, like those of the earlier causes. The quality of
whiteness for instance of a piece of cloth is the same as
that of the threads. Such, in brief, is the view of
Kanada and his followers.
 t be ad-
between
the several separate a tome at
the time creation
of isdue to
some action, like the one required in bringing about the
conjunction of threads into a piece of cloth. Theaction,
in its turn, implies some effort on the part of the soul,
or some impact of one thing against another, like the
impact, for instance, of wind with the tree, or of the hand
with the thing which is moved by it. The effort of
the soul is possible only when the mind is joined with the
soul, and the impact only after the creation of the
products
like wind etc. But neither is possible during the condition
of dissolution, because there is neither the physical body,
nor any evolved product or thing eicept in its atomic
condition. Therefore the causes which are only poasi
ble to eiist after the creation of the world cannot be
thought of as existing before it and producing the initial
action necessary for the conjunction of the atoms.
Creation therefore out of the atoms is inexplicable.

If,inthesecondplace,itissaidthatitis the principle

of unseen ' accumulation of merits and dements that
'

causes the original motion of the atoms, we reply that

this

is not possible at all, whether the principle resides in

the
soul or in the atoms. For it is a non-intelligent principle;
and as already shown in our examination of the Samkhya
view, a non-intelligent thing cannot of itself be the cause
of any action. Nor can we suppose that the principle
is

guided by the soul, because the soul too is not intelligent

on the Vaisesika view. Even if the unseen principle
' '

is said to reside in the soul there will be no connection

between the principle and the atom and if the scul is

;

Baid to be connected with the atoms and so indirectly,

if the unseen principle in the soul is said to be
connected
with them, there will be perpetual activity and perpetual
creation and therefore no dissolution at all-
1 Hence.
 in the absence of any definite cause of action, there wilf
be no activity in the atoms. Hence, further, there will be
no conjunction of different atoms and no for -Tuition of
dyads, triads etc. In other words, there will be no
creation at all.

Supposing the atoms combine, do they interpenetrate

each other or are joined only partially ? In the former
case, there would be no increase in volume or siie and ;

in the latter, the atoms shall have to be conceived as con-

sisting of parts.' And even if they are imagined to be
made up of parts, due to their posirion and direction in
space, their conjunction will be an unreal thin j of iTiaaina
tion, and so will not be useful as an efficient cause in pro'
ducing dyads, triads, etc. And finally, as seen above,
<u.= r as creation of things becomes impossible on account
of any visible cause of motion and the consequent conjunc-
tion of the atoms, even so, the dissolution of the world
will be impossible in the absence of any visible cause for
*
the separation of the atoms. Nor can thi
saved by resortingtothe unseen principle ;

dissolution; for it may eiplain the i

pleasures and pains in this world, but not the state of

complete dissolution in which there is neither pleasure
nor pain. In short, in the absence of any cause, seen or
unseen, for the motion and conjunction of the atoms
there will be neither creation nor dissolution possible on
the Vaisesika theory. It must therefore be rejected.

{Samavaya; abhyupagamat— being admitted; ca; samyat—

owing to resemblance; anavasthilefy —on account of regress
ad infinitum.}
And because the inclusion of Samavaya which
resembles (the dvad in its relation to the atom!)
leads to regress ad infinitum (there will be neither
creation nor dissolution). 13

dmincl t:;",-,:'. il„ lai , ,.|.. „,. ,.u =n lHc VliKflli bHicElM-
— f
, .
.
\

ii. Rilnipnbba.
 a. ii, iu. 13 305

The relation of samavaya (inherence) too in the doc-

trine of theVaUeaila will not be sufficient to explain the i

world. For just .is a

oration and the dissolution of the
Jv...Jwhich resides or inheres in two atoms is jbso!uc-ly
of inherence
different from them, even so the relation
rcav5ya which is equally different
from the two atoms
Kk relation ot
secon,:
must reside in them on account of ,.

similarly requite
samavaya. But this second relation will
It may be said that
a third, and so on a& infinitum.
Rm»aya is never seen as an unconnected relation or
that it may
as depending on some other connection, so
contrary, it msv
ultimately lead to the regress. On the
things [Link] arc
be shown to be eternally present in the
seen here and before us.' But in that case, samyoga
eternally
Conjunction) also, we reply, can be said to be
ana
connected with things which are joined together,
need not therefore depend on a further connection
viz.

s,!ir.;iv;1v;i. as the Vaisesikn supposes. Like samyoga

vmivjv.i is rehtion.
a distinct and so ought to depend
samyoga
on some other relation. Nor can it be said that
is dependent on another relation
because samyoga is
self- sufficient
the name of a quality, while samavaya is
for
because it is not a quality. But this is no
proof,
quality, such as
categories other than the category of
r.-lacion of sama-
'karma and 'sSrmirivj' ;ire in need oi ihs
-

vaya. The one thing which is common to both samyoga

and samavaya. and on account of wh !L-h Mrhyoga is de-
pendent on another relation, is the fact that both
of

them are absolutely different from the terms they

relate;

and so samavaya too is dependent on a second sarravfiltt

makes
Now at seen above, this involves the regress and there
the last term of the series mesrllraH.: in.-much
as

k no relation beyond it with which it must be connected

to have its own hrma P o,s,bl,-. But connect.^
all the
Wm
with this inexplicable last relation of samavaya
as naught.
ndter relations of samavaya also areas good
So absence of samavaya there wih
oeno
ultimately, in the
"Ok" to ' "4• ^,,"• <*
h OP flliadli quiliCH ""J
 '

ft?*Tfa *r rni$ * a

A»„ .,ca U « o, .on

(o, ,„, »„ui
ACTTVU, O, NO!.-*™,, OF ATOM,) T»E», will „ ,„
CONTINUATION OF IT. 14

Now the Vaisesika may resorf to four possibilities.

Either the atoms are naturally endowed with activity,
or with non-activity, or with both or with neither. If
the first, there will be perpetual creation and no dis-
solution; if the second, there will be perpetual dis-
solution, and no creation, the third is a statement of
contradiction; and if the fourth, the activity or other-
wise of the atoms must he due to some other cause.
Now if" this cause be the "unseen' accumulation of merits
and demerits, the very proximity of it with the atoms
will cause permanent activity; otherwise there will be
inactivity again.

wrf^i^iw fWhrt t$m^ i

t^
IRSpadi- malvtit— on Account of possessing colour and
others ; —
viparyaya// opposite; dar lariat —
becflust it is

observed]

And opposite conclusion (win follow) tf atoms

DAILY FKPBRIENCe), 15

Our ordinary experience tells us that things possess-

ing colour and other qualities are more transitory »"d
gross than their causes. A
piece of white cloth i"
 having valour, taste, smell and touch, must tie due to
some other cause, and must be gross and transitory in

comparison with that cause.

And if atoms have a cause, then Kanada's definition

of a permanent thing as 'That which has existence but
no cause", (Vai. Su. 4, 1, 1) cannot be made applicable
to atoms. The second reason also which {Canada gives
for the permanency of the atoms, rat, that
if they too, as causes, are not permanent then there would
te no meaning in making a specific reference to the im-
permanence of the effects (4, 1, 4), is not at all adequate.
Ns doubt the prefix ' im ' (a) can never be applied to the
word permanent (nitya) and the word 'impermanent'
' '

can mean anything unless there is something which is

permanent. But this is no reason to suppose that the
atoms alone are permanent, for as we, the Vedantms,
hold the Brahman is the permanent cause. Besides,
the mere use of a word need not be taken as a sufficient
pound for the existence of a thing implied by that word;
on the contrary, the thing which is the content or meaning
of the word must be first established as existing by other
means of knowledge. And if " ignorance ' of cause, that is
the ' non-perception of the cause of atoms which exist
themselves and which produce perceptible effects by their
being combined,' is given as the third reason (4, 15) for
believing that theatoms are permanent, we may say tint
this is too wide. For thereby we may believe that lite
atoms the dyads also are permanent, because they exist
and produce perceptible effects like jars and cloth,
and are themselves produced by atoms which are non-
perceived. If to avoid this difficulty, the Vaisesika would
-
say thathe means by -ignorance '
or non -percept ion
of cause only the non-existence of a material substance
responsible for the production of the effects, and that
thereby he would prevent the dyads from being consi-
dered as permanent on account of atoms being there as
ibstance out of which the dyads hive c<™»
1

3 being, then this is nothing but a repetition of

the
earlier Sutra (4, 1, 1) which speaks of the
absence of cause
as the ground of permanence of the
atoms. In athrr
words, the Sutra, 4, 15, is superfluous.

The avidya
' '
or non
-perception in the Sutra 4 1 S
may again be interpreted by the Vaisesika in a new
wiy'
According to him a thing can be destroyed either
bytbe'
destruction of its cause or by the disintegration
of it.
1 he atoms having no further cause cannot be
destroyed
to either of these two ways. And there is no third
reason of destruction known to exist.
So it is tint
absence of any additional reason of destruction
that i»
meant by the word 'avidya,' And because there is no
such reason, the atoms are said by him to be
permanent.

This reasoning of the Vais"ejika may be said to be

correct provided the thing that
comes into being is tin
result of combination of several
substances. In thatcase
alone, that particular thing will
be said to perish, if the
several substance; become separate
from each other «
.ire iheaiiii'ives destroyed.
In either case, in other words,
as
1
cular Y
a! ^
ika hD ' ds there wi " be the en<1 ° f t|,at
'

thing on account of the end of the conjunction'

p" '
rr the several substances.
But as the VedSntins view
it, destruction of the
effect is possible only by a modifies-
non in its condition, just as the solidity of ghee is <fes-
roved by:(s peing transformed into the liquid condition.
Similarly atoms may not be
destroyed or disintegrated
but may be transformed into a prior non-atomic condi-
tion, which is the condition of the being of Brahman.

3»nrai^£m^i \%
iUhhayathd-botk ways; ca-and; do/ar-due to defect].
 The four elements of earth, water, fire and air are
sciMi tn posse?! in Jo ireasing number from four Co one, the
qualities of smell, taste, colour and touch, and are therefore
endowed with increasing fineness' Water is subtler
than earth because it does not contain smell; fire is subtler
g£H because it lacks both smell and taste ; and air is the
subtlest of all becauseit lacks all thequalities except touch.
Now the specific atoms abo are likewise supposed to
if
(£HKM qualities in decreasing number, the atoms which
have the largest number of qualities will, necessarily,
in view of the principle just observed, be larger in volume
and grosser in quality than those which have a small number
f qualities. But, in that case, they will cease to be called
atoms. And if, on the other hand, in order to maintain
the equality of all kiods of atoms we suppose that they
have each only one specific quality, the effect too will
have only one quality. Fire will be devoid of touch,
water of colour and touch, and earth of touch, colour
and taste. Or again, to maintain the equality, we suppose
that each kind of atom is endowed with four qualities,
then contrary to actual experience, we shall have to believe
that water has smell, or that fire has smell and [Link]
that air has smell, taste and colour. Hence we conclude
that the atomic theory is not acceptable.

[Aparigrahal —because not accepted; ca —

and; oxyantaiii —
completely; imapeJyfl disregard}. —
And as it is not accepted (by j
310

The Soffikhya theory of pradhiina is at least accept-

able to a certain extent to some of the VedSntins like
Matiu, because both the Samkhya and the Vedanti
accept the satkSryaviida theory of causation and the nature
of the self or purusa a6 being essentially transcendent,
pure and conscious But the atomic theory has not been
accepted by any competent authority, and therefore
deserves to be completely disregarded.

Besides, the Vaisesika contradicts himself when ht

maintains that the six categories of substance, quality,
activity, generality, particularity and inherence are absolu-
tely as separate from each other, as a man is from a horse,
'

or a hare from grass, and at the same time holds, the view
that it is on the first category of substance that all the re-
maining five are dependent.
1
Or if the dependence of

qualities and other categories is to mean their presence

or absence subsequent to the presence or absence or
the substance, then like the [Link] (and the Veiian-
tins) the Vaisesika too may be supposed to believe that
the qualities etc. are nothing but the different forms
and conditions of one and the same substance, just as
Devadatta is the same person in spite of changes in con-
ditions. But this is to abandon the Vaisesika viewpoint.

Upon this the Vaisesika may point out that mere

dependence of one thing upon another is not sufficient
to show that both are one and the same thing. Smoke
is

dependent on fire and yet is distinct and separate from it.

But we reply that smoke is believed to be separate becau*
it is actually seen to be so. This is not however the case
with substance and quality. A blanket which is white.
 i. [Link]. 17 311

or a cow which is red, or a lotus which is hlue, is not at

all seen separately without at the same time being white
red, or blue. In other words, the adjective, white, red
or blue can have its being only in some substance. Similar'
ly, action, generality, particularity and inherence belong
to and are found in substance or dravya alone.

Now what appears to the Vedantin as an instance

of nan -difference or identity may appear to the V iii;:-ikj
asan instance of mutual dependence or ayutasiddhatva.
But what after all does the Vafsesika mean by it? If
he means thereby the existence i^ two things in one and
the same place, he will contradict the authority of Kaniida,
according to whom ' a substance begets a substance,
and a quality begets a quality" (Vai. Su. 1, 1, 10): the
threads produce a piece of cloth and the colour of the
;

threads produces the colour of the cloth. But this means

that the piece of cloth occupies the space covered by the
threads, while the colour of the cloth occupies the space
covered by the cloth and not that covered by the threads ;
whereas by the hypothesis of ayutasiddha. the colour of
the cloth and the cloth if elf ought to have occupied
one and the same Space covered bv *h.' [breads. If he
were to mean by ayuuisiddh i. the cvsicnce or two things

of a cow would be an illustration of it. And finally, if

he means by it identity in character, there would be no
difference between substance and quality.

Equally fallacious is the view of the Vaisesib regard-

ing the relations of conjunction and inherence between
things which are separate and between things which are
mutually dependent respectively. For the cause (e.g. a
piece ol cloth) which exists one moment at least prior
to its effect (viz. a quality) cannot be said to be insepar-
able from it. The Vaisesita may say that it is the effect
which is inherent in the cause; the quality, for instance,
cannot exist independently and apart from a piece of cloth.
But how can the quality which has not come into
312

existence (and which, as the effect of cloth, comes into

existence at least one moment afterwards) be related to
the cause at all? Nor can it be said that the effect comes
Into OBSteaX first and is then related with the cause.
For this is to admit that the effect exists prior to its
coming into existence, and therefore to admit that the
effect is not incapable of separate existence. This
necessitates in spite of hi.- belief the further admission
that the connection between the two independent,
separate terms of cause and effect is conjunction and
not inherence. And if the Sttaia can be said to be
related to all other things means
by samyoga and not
of
samavaya, even if there is no activity on the part
of the things to be so related, it will also, contrary to
his belief, be readily accepted that there would likewise
be the connection of samyoga and not samavaya bet'
ween the cause and the effect also.

Besides, there exists no sound proof to show that

samyoga andsjn:,;vlv:i ;-.:? rhemseivi." sosr.t- actual entifiep
beyond the things in which they exist as relations. That
they have names of their own and produce peculiar cogni-
tions in us. just as pots and other things are named and
produce cognitior.s jvculiar ro rhem, is no sufficient reason
to believe that they are actual things. For things in this
world have first got an original nature of their own, before
they acquire a name and a new nature on account of their
being related with other things. Devadatta, for instance
has always got one and the same original meaning, viz.
that he is a man, though he may acquire new names and

meanings on account of his social relations. He becomes

known Brahmin,
as a learned as a young or old man, or
as father, son, brother etc. A
numeral remains the
same, though it may have different meanings when it
occupies different positions such as the Tenth or the
hundrcdelh place. Samyoga and samavaya, on the
other hand, do not indicate anything by which we can
discern their ownnature, apart the nature from which
they accrue from the relatedness of the things. Deva-
datta is discerned and known distinctly as a 'man even
 ABHYAYA II, PA. II, SU. 1? 313

apart from his social relations or contest. The names

and meanings of saihyog.i an J [Link].i .irise only out of
the relatedness of things; apart from this relatedness or
apart from the things related, they have no permanent
meanings of their own, which might continue even in the
absence of things so related.

An additional reason why the samyoga cannot exist

between the atoms and the soul, or between the soul and
the mind is that these are, as the Vaiicsika holds, without
any parts.' And if, for the purpose of the theory, the
existence of the parte, is to be assumed, then anything can
be assumed toexist. One may even assume that a hundred
or a thousand rhi:-.L^ e\:.~: inirosd o! riKToly ^i>: categories.
Moved by compassion, a man may assume that this
miserable worldly life may come to an end; a wicked
person, on the other hand, may assume that even the
liberated souls come back to safiuara.

And just any intimate ct

as there cannot be
or saihavaya between a diad and the partless iikasa,
as is conceivable between wood and varnish even so there
can be no such connection between a partite diad and
impartite atoms. If in spite of this, the relation of sama-
vfiya is presume] to account for the dependence of effect
on cause, there will creep in the defect of mutual depen-
dence. For it is only when the difference between cause
and effect is ascertained that there occurs the dependence
of one on the other, and it is only when the dependence of
effecton cause is ascertained that it indicates that there is
difference between the two. Thus will arise the defect
of mutual dependence or what is known as 'explanation
in a circled The Vedantm, on the other hand, is free
from this defect because he neither believes in any differ-
ence between cause and effect nor in the dependence of
one on the other. To him, the effect is nothing but a
state of the cause.

Besides the atoms being limited they must have as

many limbs as there are directions, six, eight or ten';and
if they have limbs or parts, they are perishable, in spite of
the Vaisegiki claim that they are eternal and partless. Tosay
that these parts themselves are the atoms does not improve
the argument. For the atoms too being of the nature of
the four e'ements must ultimately perish, just as the gross
elements and the diads etc. perish. Nowthis destruction
of the atoms, as we have already pointed out, need not
t»ke place by the disjunction of the parts.

it may tike place by mere transformation into the

[Link] condition of the highest cause, viz. the
Brahman ;> the way in which the solid nature of ghee or
gold is destroyed by mere change into liquid form.
Similarly, things may come into being not by conjunction
of parts, but in the manner in which curds and ice come
into being out of the original condition of milk and water.

The atomic theory, in short, is based on weak argu-

ments, is against the teaching of the 5ruti that Gad is the
highest cause, and is not accepted by competent
authorities like Manu and others. Hence those who Kt
intent on having their spiritual good should disregard
it completely.

{SamudayaA- -collection; ubhoyfl detune— due to both the

reasons:api—even, tad-apraptih—they cannot be had-]
 '

P COLLJCTtONS
IOVFD. 18

Having shown the inadequacy of the semi-nihilistic

doctrine of the Vaisesikas, we now proceed to show that
the thoroughly nihilistic doctrine of the Buddhists is all
the more unworthy of being taken into consideration.
The doctrine assumes three main forms, either because
Buddha himself held different opinions on different occa-
sions, or because it was taught to three types of disciples

who differed in their intellectual capacity. The Scawtl

1

(Sautrantikas, and Vaibhasikas] are those who believe in

the reality of every thing; the Idealists or the VijiiiinjvJJirjs
arc those who hold that thought alone is real; and the
Nihilists or Siinyavadins are those to whom everything is

To refute the realists first. According to them both

the external world of elements, sense organs and qualities
and the internal mental world are real. The external
World arises out of four kind? or lit. it.;., which are either
hard, fluid, hot or mobile, according - they are of earth,
,:

water, fire and air, respectively. The internal world

which constitutes the experience of man consists of the
five groups (skandha) or icv.-:^-ioi;~. kiirnvjcdue, feelings,
names and impressions (i. e. theskandhas of rupa, vijfiana.
vedana, samjna and samskara).

As against this we observe that neither the atoms

nor theskandhas areable to achieve the two-fold groupings
as assumed by these realists. For the atoms as well as
the skandhas are non -intelligent; and if at all they are
assumed to be active of their own accord they will never
316

cease to be so, and hence there will be no nirvana. Even

the activity of the mind, which might be supposed to be
the cause of the groupings, will not be possible on the
Buddhist view, without the accomplishment of the
groupings, that is, without the presence of the body.
Nor does the theory allow the existence of any other
permanent and intelligent being such as the soul which
enjoys, or the Lord who governs. Nor again can a chain
of cognitions of one's own self as I am' be the cause.
'

For if the chain is different in character from the several

momentary cognitions of which it is made, it is to admit
the permanent Atman of the Vedantin. But if the chain
too is momentary, there is left no scope for it to be active
and to bring into being the external and the interna!
worlds.

:; pratyayatvat — because of causal linlfs,"

:id, via; Mpatti-origin; mdtra —only;
nittatvdt — being the cause.}

N (of new SUCCESSIVE LINKS,

HE GROUPINGS). 1°

It may be said that even in the absence of a permanent

ruling principle, -.he ~.i:[Link]:! i> ni. •:!-; possible, on account
of the causal force of a series' which begins with iviJy; 1

and ends with death and return to life. These links in

the chain follow upon each other as surely as water-pots
on a wheel and explain the samsara.
 ashtata n, Pi. t^, »B. 20 3 17

But the argument cannot be accepted, because it

merely accounts for the origination of the several members
in the series by reference to the preceding members in the
same. It does not explain how the external and the
internal groupings are formed. If, as we have already

pointed out. it cannot be proved even on the Vaisesika

theory how the atoms are combined, in spite of the fact
that the theory admits the existence of permanent atoms
and of souls in which the unseen fruits of actions reside.
how much more improbable it must be for the Buddhists
to explain the combinations, when the atoms are said to
be momentary, and are devoid of any connection with the
souls and with the unseen fruit ? The series of avidya
and other things, being itself dependent on the iiswmhhsje
of atoms and skandhas, cannot be the cause of the latter.
Avoiding these difficulties, if it be said that the series of
avidyil and others as well as that of atoms and skimdhas
on which it depends are simultaneously responsible for
the continued existence of saiiisSra, we have to ask a
further question, whether the successive groupings of
.:' ';-:, l:i:-0 C [Link] .!:,":k-.'

In the first case, in spite of his good or bad actions, man

will never be able to obtain the bodies of birds and animals
or of angels and gods; in the second case, man may change,
at any time, even while living, into an elephant or a god.
Besides, if even the souls have got a momentary EHWHilKfti
it is inconceivable bow they can wait till the objects of

enjoyment are formed for their sake or till the time of

final release Release or enjoyment too serves no purpose.

jflOrti^ ^ iftWroi^ i ^°
It/ttflr — subsequent ; utpiide — as it arises: ca —and;
twva— preceding ; nnodhat—on the destruction.J
318

There cannot exist any causal relation between

any two momentary things because it is only after the
first has ceased to be that the second comes into existence.

Howsoever the antecedent may become developed and

possess power, it cannot produce the consequent unless
contrary to the theory of universal momenfariness, it is
assumed that the antecedent lives for the second moment
and actually e\erts influence in order to be connected with
the second thing. The existence of the antecedent by
itself is not again sufficient to produce the consequent; for
there can be no consequent worth the name which has
not in it the essence of the antecedent. But to admit
this is to give up the view of momenfariness and to say
rhat the essence of the antecedent continues to remain
the same till the moment of the production of the
consequent.

Besides what does the Buddhist mean by origin and

destruction of things ? If thereby we understand the
nature of a thing, then whether the thing i; destroyed or
not, it is as good as saying that the thing is maintaining its
own nature, in spite of the view of momentariness. If
origin and destruction are the earlier and later stages of
one and the same intermediate thing, even then it is as
good as admitting that the thing lives at least during three
moments of time. And finally, if they are absolutely
distinct and separate from the thing just as a horse is
different from a buffalo, even then we reach the same
conclusion The thing is eternal because it :s no: .ufec-e',
either by origin or destruction. And further, if origin
and destruction were merely to imply the perception and
the non- perception of a thing, they would then refer to
a percipient being and not to the thing at all. Hence it
isthat the Bauddha view is untenable.

srafri ntrtsjtaiWi (nffPn ' ^t

[Asati— when absent; prati/na —statement; uparodha^—
the contradiction.- yaugapadyarii — simultaneity; anyatha—
othernrtse.]
 IEBE WILL RESULT THE CONTRADICTION OF THE
NC,PL*° REMB1MULTANE,TY AWD
men). 21

If it be said that there may be an effect even if then-

is no cause, the original principle of the school that the

mind and its states arise on account of four different causes '

will have to be given up Besides anything may com."

into being at any time, if no cause is required. If, on

the other band, it is said that the antecedent may continue

to exist till the consequent is produced, it \vi*l nimply

mean the giving up of the theory of universal momentary

ness and the acceptance of the simultaneous exiMencc of
cauae and effect.

[Pratisariitytya— voluntary :
aprdrisaiii\hy,i—invoiw\taiy
nirodhfl -destruction : apiiipti — not to have ; avichedat
—being not discontinuous.]

The nihilists further maintain that all the objects of

knowledge except akasa and the voluntary and the in-
voluntary types of destruction, are produced and are
momentary in character. The three excepted thing; ure
not only non-substantial but are also negative in character.
Akasa. which will be considered in Sutra 24, indicates the
absence of anything which will occupy space. Destruc-
tion, whether voluntary as in the case of a jar which is
intentionally broken by means of a stick, or natural,
which takes place on account of continual decay of things,
 h . '

320 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

must refer either to the stream of things as a whole or to

the things themselves. But the stream or the series of
things and events cannot be destroyed, because the
members in the series are connected together is cause and
effect in an unbroken manner. Nor are the things them-
selves capable of being destroyed. For in the various
conditions or states oi j thing 'here i:[Link]= o-nerhmt'
by which that thing itself is recognized, either actually or
by inference. Hence, there is no kind of destruction
possible, as is upheld by the nihilists.

3>mi ^ ^qig.i r\
[Ubbayatha — both mays; co—and; doj,it — due w defect.]

1 ways. 23

Besides, li trie dc^ructior or'aviJv.T arid c;h?r r l :i gs

as involved in the two kinds or JiV^triirrinn, were to rcsulr
on account of perfect knowledge and other ethical means,
the Bauddha teaching rhac desrrii..'! ion !.:kc» place without
any cause will have to be given up. And if avidya etc
are destroyed of their own accord, what then is the use of
the path to salvation which consists in knowing, that
everything is momentary, painful, and void ?

srora ^rfMrai^i ^»
[Akdse— in the case of n\aia; at: aviitsiit— there bring «>

N ACCOUNT OF ITS BEING NOT DISSIMILAR (wITI

INDS OP DESTRUCTION) Alt ASA (TOD CANNOT El
A NON-ENTITY). 24

J* (Tr. Bad Ihc 1 <&*. « ** fa t«« .ictt^rffe pw*pto of. J"-

s?H!i X rlinr, rhff flower

5f5 ~J£ *£23 2:
 —
ADHIAtA II, PA. II, (5. 25 321

Akasa too cannot be said tc be devoid ol positive

characteristics, and therefore a non-entity. That it ii a
teal thing can, of all, he seen from the Sruti passage,
first
'
From Atman came forth the akasa '(Tai. 2, 1), Secondly,
it can be inferred from the specific quality of sound, just
as earth and other elements are considered to be real on
account cf smell and other qualities. Besides, it iikaia
means simply tin-covered space, the existence of any
flying bird in the sky would render the space covered, an d
so may prevent any other bird from flying in the sky. If,

in reply to this, it be said that another bird may Sy in

another portion of the sky, then this is nothing but to
adm^t. with reference to that second portion of the sky,
that rh'tc i- first a portion of the sky or akasa which exists
indepf :..- -ly of its being coveted or not by the body of
the flying bird, and that it is not simply the uncovered
space And if akaia is to be defined only negatively, it
will contradict Buddha's own reply, in another place,
that ali& :s the support of wind. If, according to him,

a positive entity like wind is the support of the earth,

how is it possible that the wind should have its support
in a non-entity like akasa ? Besides, there is a further
contradiction involved in saying that akasa, like the two
kinds of destruction, is a non-entity and is at the same
time eternal. How can that which is unreal be either
eternal or non-eternal ? For the attributes can be pre-
dicated or not of real things only.

3T3^*I SH
[Anuimrie^ On account of tux>\ lection; ca —and.}
,o). 25

The nihilist wim iviio'.v.-. in the tiniv

ness of things shall have consistently to relieve i

momentary existence of the experiencing subject. Bi

fact of recollecting makes this impossible. For lecollt
322 VEDA NT A EXPLAINED

or recognition of a thing belongs to the same person

who has first cognized that thing. never observeWe
that one man cognizes things and another recognizes
them. Even the distinction between a thing seen today
and a thing seen yesterday cannot he noticed, unless both
the things are seen by one and the same person. Even
the nihilist cannot possibly deny that the perceptions
which he now remembers belonged to himself in the past;
he is ascertain ofthisas of the fact that fire is hot and gives
light. If then the nihilist must connect in himself the two
moments of perception and rememberance, and must think
that from his cradle to the grave all his perceptions and the
subsequent recollection of them must belong to himself
as one and the same person, will he not be ashamed of having
held the view that everything is momentary in character?

Should he argue that the belief in one and the same

experiencing subject arises from similarity of two or
mote cognitions of the self, we reply that even for the
cognition of similarity there is required a person who will
be permanent enough to discern the similarity of two succes-
sive things. But from the point of view of the nihilist,
-' - .-,-.
;
,; ;. --::-.., ;.-; .:,,... •;.-' 'i ."'...' .'. !''

is based onsimilarity istouttershecrnonserse. Shouldhe

again argue that the knowledge of similarity is altogether
a new cognition, and is therefore neither based on the
prior cognitions of two things occupying two different
moments of time, nor on the existence of a pctmanent
experiencing subject, we reply that the expression this '

is similar to that ' not only points to the '

this '
and the
'
that ' as two distinct things but also to the common
third thing of the similarity between them expressed in
one single act of judgment. If similarity were to be
altogether a distinct object of knowledge and unconnected
' this
with things which are similar, then the expression
is similar to that ' would serve no purpose ; we
should
be able in that case to speak of ' similarity ' only without
any reference to the ' this ' or the ' that '. To refuse
ot
to admit a well-known fact, whether for the purpose
 AOHIATA I[, PA. U, SD. 26 323

establishing one's own position or for the purpose oi

refuting the position of others, is not only not to cany
conviction to oneself or others, but also to expose oneself
to the charge of being vainly talkative. It is therefore
not proper to say, if we attach any value to our everyday
life and thought, that what we apprehend
due to is
similarity only; for in recognition, what we are aware of
is the sameness of the thing apprehended before and not

oi similarity of one thing with another. No doubt,

it is likely that with reference to external things, a doubt

may sometimes arise whether a thing is the same as seen

before or as simply similar. But there cannot arise any
such doubt with reference to the conscious subject;
for everyone is distinctly and clearly aware that he is the
same subject who remembers today what he has app-
rchendi'J yesterday.

RTCRrt-Seayi^ i *.$

(>{it-not ; asatafr-fram jion-eiiatence , a-dftfato&tsincc it

26

The nihilists must further believe t

arises from non -existence, because they propound the

view thai the effect does not arise withoit the destruc-
tion of the cause. There comes forth the sprout after
the seed is destroyed; curds i= formed only when milk
ceases to be milk, and the clay ceases to be a mere lump
of clay, before we see a jar out of it. If changeless causes
were to produce effects, then we may, says the Buddhist,
as well expect all the effects at once and without any
delay.

o meaning in assigning
324

special causes for special effects, such as seed for sprouts,

clay for pre or milk for cards. For there will be no differ-
ence between non-existence as indicated by the expression
'The horn of a hare' and the non-existence indicated by
the destruction of clay or seed We need not even posit
so much that there is first the non-existence of seed and
then the existence of sprout for a sprout may come out of
;

the non-existence indicated by ' The horn of a hare.'

If, on the other hand, we assume that different kinds of
non-existence have different characteristics of their own,
then like several things with their peculiar properties,
non existence too will lose its character of being a nonen-
tity. It will be an entity with a quality r i- own. |Uit

as a lotus has the quality of being blue. [Link]. wii!

not the effects of non-existence participate in the nature
? But we do
of their cause and become non-existent
not find this in our experience. On th:' contrary, w*
find every effect wearing a peculiar aspect -M existence.
The jars of clay are like clay and not like rhre ids uf rotton,
indicating thereby that the tars participate :n their ap-
propriate existing cause viz. the clay and not in their
non-existent cause viz., .the threads of cotton. So
the Baudha view that nothing which does not change can
become a cause, is false. Gold does not change, though
it is made into ornaments. Even in the case of seeds,
where there is apparent change, the seed is not destroyed;
the small particles of the seed are not destroyed and it is
these which are the real cause of the sprout. In short,
because we see that nothing originates from non-existence
which is like the idea of the horn of a hare, and that,
on the contrary, every entity originates from some other
entity which has an enduring nature like gold or clay
we conclude that the Baudha doctrine is fit to be rejected.
It is to be rejected for the additional reason that the
Baudhas contradict themselves by saying first that the
mind and its modifications arise from four skandhas,
and
the material things from atoms, and by saying again that
existence is due to non-existence. Their doctrine is
nothing but bewilderment to others.
 a^rafarcrnft #* fi

ENDS). 27

Ifthe doctrine 'entity arises from non-entity'

were admitted, lazy persons also would achieve their ends;
for n on -existence can be hid without any effort. Corn
would grow even if the farmer did r.o' -ill ~bc land; vessels
would come into being without the moulding of day
by the potter and cloth will be available even if the
;

weaver was lazy and did not weave. No body will be

required to put in any efforts for the attainment of the
heaven or of release. All this is absurd and unacceptable.
1 herefore the doctrine referred to is false.

"1 3rwfrET»^l £**«)

^WR nwi i ^<:

{Hfl— nor; abhd^-

OMilaWe.]

(toeh)bi

Now that
the Baudha view that the external world is
real though momentary is refuted on the ground that it is
impossible to account for the groupings of atoms and
skandhas. there comes forward for consideration another
view known as the Subjective idealism of the Viinio;
vadins. The reality of the external world is believed
to have been adopted by Buddha, in order to make
it suitable tosome of his disciples who were, accor-
ding to him, too much attached to the things of the
external world. His teal view however was different.
It was to maintain the reality of cognitions or ideas and
326 VEDANTA EXPLAINED

According to this doctrine known as Vijfllnavlda

all experience, whether in the form of cognition, or in the
form of the subject, the object and the means of cognitio™
is mental in character. Supposing that things exist in the
outside world, we can have no experience of them unless
they assume the form as determined by intellect. And
if the externa! rhtr.i;.-; .ire to he admitted, they must either
he of the n.-.iur;- of loins' nr 0: th-ir grouping. Obviously,
.1

th i like pillars cannot be apprehended as atoms, because

r. l.;-

the latter are imperceptible. Nor can they be apprehended

as aggregates of atoms for if these aggregates are different
;

from atoms, they can be no longer considered as made up

of atoms and if they are non-different, they will be as
;

imperceptible as the atoms, and hence there will be no

cognition of pillars as pillars, or of any other groj: objects
In the same way, one can show that the external objects
have neither universality nor any other category.
'

Now
the various differences we feel in our general,
uniform awareiicsj or experience. 011 account of the various

references to objects of knowledge such as, a pillar, a wall

or a pot, are, as a matter of fact, mental in character.
They are differences in our ideas or cognitions, and are
found to conform to things. This is to admit, in other
words, that the forms of objects of our knowledge are
determined by our ideas,' and not given by the reality
of the external world. Besides, our knowledge of objects
in the form of ideas and of the objects themselves being
always simul;,ineoi:;k' presented, they must in reality
be one and the same. For had they been different, we
!
 might hive been c
but this is never the case, nence, too, we may say tnat
the world of external things is not real.

One more reason for not believing in the external

world is the similarity of the perceptions of our waking
life to our experience in dreams and illusions. If our

(JjJOaenc* of the latter type appears to 111 aa twolold,

that as, as made up of subject and object, inspite of the
feet that there is no e stern, world in droaais and illusions,
i

'

our experience of the waking life also may be independent

of the external world. Our perceptions of objects are
nothing but simple ideas. As for the reason of the variety
of ideas, it need not be sought in the existence of the exter-
nal world, but in the sarhskaras or the imprescions of past
ideas. The ideal and the impressions succeed ' each
other as necessarily as the seed and the sprout succeed
and cause this endless Satfisara. That the ideas or
cognitions are caused not by external object? but by
impressions can be proved by reference to positive and
negative assertions we can make regarding the relation
between them. The Vedantins too admit with us that
in dreams, when there are no external objects, knowledge
or ideas arise on account of prior mental impressions.
But in the absence of impressions, there cannot be as we
hold, any knowledge or ideas. We therefore conlude
that there is no external world of things.

To we, the Vedantins, make the following reply.

this
It is wtong world does not exist
to hold that the external ;

for we are aware that corresponding to our ideas our

perceptions point out to us external things like pillars
and walls. Nobody will listen to a man who, while he
isenjoying his dinner, says that he is neither eating any-
thing nor having any satisfaction out of it. LettbeBaudha
 '

358

arbitrarily explain that what he means by saying that

there is no object is that there is no consciousness of object
apart from the act of consciousness. But the truth is
that consciousness itself points out to us that what we
are aware of in perception, for instance, is not the perception
itself, but the objects of perception. The Baudhas them-
selves tacitly acknowledge this fact when they say that
the internal object of cognition appears 'like something
external." How can there be something ' like external
if there is really nothing external ? Is it possible that
Viinumitra should ever appear like the son of a barren
mother ? Besides, whether objects of perception are possi'
ble to be external or not is to be judged by reference to
the means of knowledge ; the means of knowledge are
never said to exist or not to enst by reference to our
preconceived ' notions about things. That is possible
which is capable of being apprehended by perception or
other means of knowledge; that is impossible which is not
so capable. So when, as a matter of fact, the external
things are apprehended by means of knowledge, to say
that they are only mental on the ground that they are
neither different nor non-different from atoms, is to indu'ge
in idle talk.

Again, if there are no external objects how can the

ideas have the form of objects? And, if the ideas have the
forms of the objects, does it mean that forthwith the objects
whose forms the ideas have, are all reduced to the^-e re: rr.

only ? The truth is that objects are apprehended as ex-

ternal and distinct from ideas; and therefore the invariable
concomitance oftheideaand the object should be construed
as the expression of the causal connection between them
and not as that of identity. That the idea and the object
are distinct from each other can moreover be shown by
reference to the difference between a substantive and the
attributes or aspects which belong to it. The perception
 *. n, lu. 23 329

of a white ox differs from the perception of a black

oi, though the knowledge of an ox in general is the
same. The two kinds of knowledge as specified
by the differing attributes '
white and
'
'
black '
are
also further different from the generic knowledge of an ox
as such. Similar it the distinction between the percep-
tions of a jar and a pot, or between the perception and
rememberance of a jar, or between the smell and taste of
milk, even though the generic knowledge in each case may
be simply some indefinite thing, or simply a jar of milk.
Neither the attributes nor the substantive be said to be
non-distinct and non-separate from each other. And if
the ideas occupy different moments of time, and vanish
immediately after they have been felt in consciousness, it
will not be said about any one of them that it is either
the known or known. If the idea does not last even
for two consecutive moments, then there ought not to
be any talk about the ideas being different from each other,
about everything being momentary and void, about the
distinction between individuals and classes, or between
existence and non-existence due to avidya, and about
bondage and release.
'

The vijnanavadin may further argue that while an

idea illumines by itself as a lamp, the externa! objects do
not, and hence we becomeconscious of the idea and not
of the external world. But it looks strange that he should
readily believe insomething absurd enough like " fire
hums itself," and not believe in the altogether common
and rational view that the ideas make us aware of the
external things. He may object to this by saying ibat
this involves the regress ad infinitum for -if the idea
;

is to depend for its apprehension on something else,

that something also has to be dependent for its
330

apprehension on something else and so on. But so far as

the knowledge of ideas, is concerned he may tell us, that
just as a lamp does not require another lamp to illumine it,
even so one cognition may not require another cognition
to cognize it. But we reply that both the arguments
are wrong. The regress need not arise for, there is ;

no other ccgniser of the self who cognizes the ideas

'
;

and the self and the cognitions are of different nature.

They are related to each other as the knower and the
known, Mas thesubjectand object. As for the witnessing
self, he exists- by himself and cannot be doubted.

The lamphkc. -:); idea of the vijfiam-

il:i!inir.a:ing
vfidtr. sppfjirs ;K-.'i-c.:)i-^ neither in need of any means of
Eroof nor of any other being beyond it. But this is like
elieving that a thousand lamp? ;ir-.' Hirni::;,-; in the interior
of an impenetrable rock. To say that the self-consckXM
nature resembles the view of the Vedantrn is not correct;
for just as the light of a lamp is dependent for its being
known on the eye of ,'n intelligent bcniLi, even so the
idea manifests itself through some intelligent principle
beyond it. Besides, whereas the witnessing sell of the
Vedantin is one, permanent and self-illuminating, the
ideas of the Vijnavavadin are transitory and many, and
therefore require for their manifestation an intelligent
principle beyond them.

^Wh^T * SfM fa^

l I ^
IVaidkarmyat-an account of difference in nature; ca-and:
tia-not; svapna-adi vat— iilje dream and other).]

And on account of difference in nature (ideas

of the waking life) cannot be like those in a dfjav
ETC. 29
 1

8u. 30 33

We now refute the Buddhist view that the ideas

ot the waking life may arise, in the absence of the ex-
terna] objects, in thesame manner in which the ideas in
a dream The two kinds of ideas, we contend,
arise.
are different in nature. The ideas in a dream arise
falsely because the mind is infatuated by sleep. That is
why the experience of having met a great person in a
dream is cancelled in the waking life. Similat is the
case with illusory experience. But the things of which
we become conscious in the waking life continue to exist
without being negated. Besides, what we experience in
dreams is due to memory, while what we experience in
the waking life is immediate apprehension. The differ-
ence between the two states is the difference marked by
the presence or absence of objects. Notwithstanding
this obvious, self-evident truth regarding the difference
between the two states, if the Baudha proceeds to infer
that the knowledge of the waking life is like that of the
dreaming state, simply on the ground that there is a
kind of knowledge in both the states, he will thereby
show that he has neither logic nor wisdom. What is
contrary to experience, viz. the knowledge of the exter-
nal world without the existence of the external world,
he hopes to demonstrate by reference to a partial resemb-
lance of consciousness between the wakeful and dream-
ing states. But how can an attribute which does not
ally belong to a thing, be ascribed to it, simply he-
some other
'

{Hi— not; hhavati— existence; an— upalakdhc/t— being not

aantaMeJ
332 vedSnta explained

To refute now the possibility of knowledge due to

impressions, even if there is no exterral world. We
may ask, in the first place, as to how the impressioni
may arise at all if there are no external objects as their
causes. To say that they are due to prior cogni-
tions in addition to the belief that cognitions are due to
prior impressions, and to say that this has been going on
without any beginning, is to rest satisfied with a fruit-
lets regress ad infinitum. ' Like one blind man leading
another, it will only cut the entire practical life. It
will no: also help the Buddhist to uphold his position,
vii. that cognitions are due to impressions and not to
external objects. The anvaya and vyatireka, that is the
positive dr.d the negative method of argument which he
uses in really in our favour. For cognitions arise if
there euol the external objects; and they do not arise if
there are no such objects. As opposed to this, people
believe in the existence of the external world even in the
absence of the impressions. 1 Moreover the impressions
do require a substratum ' in which they reside, though
such a substratum from the view-point of the Buddhist
cannot be cognized by any means of knowledge.

'dtasmwr I U
{KfC Diia vol— en account 0/ being mamcntaiy; ca— and.]
i

And c

«y. (it
nsJ. 31
 £• n, «u. 31 333

If the pravpttivijnana or the cognitions having the

form of external things cannot be the substratum of im-
pressions, the alayavijnana '
also, that is, the cognitions
which have the form of 1 am ', cannot be the substratum
'

because it is also momentary in character. Unless there

be something which continues to exist and is therefore
connected wi(h rlv p.!.-;. h." present and the future, or
i

unless there is the absolutely permanent on-loolier of all

things, there will be no proper explanation of the whole
of the practical life which consists of memory, recogni-
tion and the various impressions. The alayavijnana
being as momentary in character as any other thing in
the Buddhist scheme, the objections we raised against
the realists in Sutra 20 (adhyaya 2, pada 2) can afso be

As for the refutation of the Sunyavada, which goes

against all means of knowledge, no regard may be
shown. For a complete denial of everything is not
ffOtriblc Except on the recognition of some truth which
cannot be denied.

fl&ii-sgn'ta i
fts

AMD a
To say in short, the more we search tn find out
some good point in the Buddhist system, the more it
gives way on all hands, as the sandy walls of a well fall
when we begin to dig it deep. By propounding the
different views of realism, idealism and nihilism, Buddha
has merely exposed himself as a man given to teach con-
tradictory things. Or thereby he has shown his hatred
to all people, so that they may be hewildered and lost.
Therefore what the Siitra indicates is that the Baudha
doctrine should be compku'Iy ,"li.-oirded by (hose who
wish to achieve their spiritual good.

^ ^iwrsnnHTiHTDi^ i
C^-W-)

CANNOT (liE ACCEPTED), 33

Having refuted the Buddhists, we now turn to the

Jainaa. According to them there are seven' entities,
vij. jiva, ajlva, asrava, sarhvara, nirjara, bandha and
moksa. Or subsuming 1 the last five under the first
two, they may be said to believe only in two entities,
vis. the soul and the objects (jiva and ajiva). Or they
may be said to believe in five entities which they con-
sider as varieties of these two, and which they call as
'astikayas', with reference to jiva, pudgala.'dharma, adbar-
ma and akasa. All these varieties, they again subdivide
in various imaginary ways. ' And to alfthese things
 '

i. it, sO. 33 335

the? apply the reason/tig known as 'saptabhanginaya'

which is:-6omehow it is; somehow it is not: somehow is
isand is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is
and yet is indescribable; somehow it is not and yet is
fadeBcnbable; somehow it is and is not, and yet is
indescribable. They apply this reasoning even to such
conceptions as unity and eternity.

Against this doctrine we say the following. The

reasoning itselF is faulty; for it is impossible that contra-
dictory attributes, like hot and cold, may belong to the
same thing at one and the same time. To apply the
saptabhanginaya to the seven entities is to have confused
an indefinite knowledge about them; for they may
either have a particular nature or not have it. In other
words, all assertions about them will end in doubt ar.d
not in any definite knowledge. To say that the cogni-
tion of a thing can assume more than one nature and is a
definite piece of knowledge, is itself unture; for applying
the same reasoning this so-called definite knowledge
may or may not be definite. If, in short, this indefinite-
ness belongs to all things without eiception, that is,
if it belongs to knowledge and the means of knowledge,

as also to the knowing iuhj>:r an J the [Link]'iVts of know-

ledge, how indeed can it be said that the Jain Tirtha-
kam reaches anything which is undouhrablc or definite?
Ot how indeed can his followers be said to accept his
words, which bring thoroughly indefinite, appear to be
uttered hy a madman or a drunken person?
 —
336

than five. To call them indescribable and yet to describe

them is to contradict oneself. And to go on saying
that they can be known or not known, that their
knowledge is perfect or imperfect, inspite of its
being imperfect or not, is certainly to talk like a
drunken or a mad person. Nobody will ever act to
achieve his release or to ascend the heaven, if these
[hings mean nothing definite, so far as their existence or
duration are concerned. As a matter of fact, being
excludes non-being, and non-being excludes being; but
if nothing definite can be said regarding soul or unity,

whether it is one or many, permanent or non-perma-

nent, separate or non-separate, we must reject the
doctrine of the Arhat. As for the Jain doctrine of the
atoms or pudgalas, we need not refute it again, as
we have already refuted the atomic dectrine of the
Vaiaeeikas.

si Vtinsw^i^ i
3a
{Evam — thuj ; ca and ; alma— the soul ; aljartftijurt—

The Jains believe that the soul has the same sise as
that of the body. But this means that being limited in
extension, the soul is as non-eternal as jars and other
things. Besides, if the soul of man were to enter into
the body of an elephant as a consequence of its previous
deeds, it will not occupy the whole of it; nor will it find
sufficient space for it in [he body of an ant. Similar
will be the difficulty if we take into consideration the
bodies of one and the same person, in his childhood,
youth and oldage. The Jain may explain away the
difficulty by saying that the soul consists of infinite
number of parts, which are capable of being compressed
in a small body, and of being expanded to fill the space
 i. n, sir. 35 317

in body. But if the infinite particles occupy

a large
different places, they cannot be contained in a small
body; and if they occupy the same place, that is the
place occupied by one panicle only, the si;e of the soul
will always, in all cases, be very minute. Besides, there
will be no reason why be =h>. -.:!•! ivikve in cbe particles
being infinite in number, when the soul has a limited
extent of the body.

The Jain may say in reply that the particles join or

fall away as the ccciiion for ;he soul is to enter into a
large or a small body. To this the reply a given in the

OF (defects like) change etc 35

The Jain theory that the soul has the size of the
body cannot be shown to be free from contradiction,
even if it is supported by another ih^-jry. vi;. according
as the siie of the body is large or small, the soul gains
new particles or loses som-- of those which are already
there. For this new theory implies that the soul is
capable of undergoing ctanje, and is therefore non-
permanent lite the sain of bndy. But this goes against
the Jain doctrine of the soul's release which is likened
to die coming up to the surface of water of a gourd
{freed from dirt) which was previously immersed in
sadisara on account of the eightfold bonds of karma.
Besides, like the body which comes into being and is
destroyed, these particles too have got origin and des-
truction, and therefore cannot be said to be of the nature
of the self. If some one permanent part is to be said as
 . ;

the self, we do not know which one is meant. Nor do

we know whence the particles come when they join the
soul, and whither they go when they fall away. The scul
being immaterial, thev cannot be said to have sprung
from the material elements so that they may return back
into them. Nor do we know any storehouse of these
particles. Besides, on the Jain view, the soul and the
particles of it will both be indefinite in character. For
all these reasons, the theory that the particles
join and
fall away from the soul cannot be accepted.

The Sutra may be interpreted differently. To the

objection that the soul will not be permanent
if it is to
be considered as having the size of the body,
the Jain
may be supposed to reply that the soul may be const
dered to be permanent m spite of its changes; just as a
stream of water is said to be permanent in spite of the
changing water, or just as, in the opinion of the Rak-
tarhbaras, a stream of ideas is permanent,
though indivi-
dual ideas pass away. To this the present Sutra con-
tains the reply: if the stream is not real,
there will be
the theory of the void; and if the
stream is real, the
defects such as the changing nature of
the soul, etc. will
follow. The Jain view, in short, will be inadequate

{Antya-awuthitcit-on account of permanency of the final

ca-and; ubhaya-nitytxvat-dut to permanence
of both; OVi-
ie/a^-uhtJiont difference.]!

Moreover, because the Jains believe that the final

size of the soul is permanent during its condition of
release, it follows that the initial and the intervening
 —
1. «, so. 37 339

sties also must be permanent; otherwise there will be

three different conditions of one and the same soul.
But this means that the different bodies of the soul will
have one and the same size, and that the soul will not
be required to enter into bigger and smaller bodies.

Or the Sutra may be explained in a different way.

The dimensions of the soul being the same in its three
conditions, as noted above, the soul must be either small
or large, and most not vary according to the size of the
body. Hence the doctrine of the Arhat, lite that of the Bud-
dhist, is inadequate and therefore deserves to be rejected.

[Pa(yu£ of the Lord; asamanjasyat— because inadequate.]

{It is impossible to think) of the Lord (a» only

THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF THE WORLD), B2CAUSE THIS IS
INADEQUATE. 37

In the Sutras 23 and 24 of the fourth pada of the

firBt adhyaya, it was shown that God is both the mate-
rial and the efficient cause of the world. And if thi
SStrakara is not inconsistent, the present SQtra cannot
be meant to show that God is neither the efficient nor
the material cause. It should therefore be understood
that the Sutra intends to attack what is contrary to the
unity of Brahman, vis. the view that God is merely rhe
efficient and not the material cause of the world.

There are many who are opposed to the Veda-

nta view regarding the nature of God, Some rely
on the Sarhkhya and the yoga systems and say that God
is only the efficient cause, and that be is therefore differ-

ent from both pradhana and purusa. The Maheivaras

bold that Pasupati (Siva) is the efficient cause, and say
340

chat there are four other things as taught by Pafaipatl

himself, viz. the effect, the yoga, the ritual and the end
of pain'. In a like manner, the Naiyayikas, the Vaisep-
kas and others have told us that God is only the efficient
cause of the world.

All these opinions are howeva inadequate for in

sopposing that the Lord is the cause <j! the [Link]
in the various beings, such as low, xteru:eii:.ite Jnd the
best, we shall merely ascribe to hizi hunun motives of
hatted and passion. Then he will be no real God,
but like one of us. If, in order to get over this difficulty,
it is said that God's choice is determined by the merits

and demerits of the beings themselves, then it is to fall

in another difficulty, viz. that God's choice and the
works of beings will be mutually dependent on each
other. To suggest that this mutual dependence is with-
out any beginning is no solution of the difficulty.' lor
this mutual dependence was as much a fault " in the
past as it is the present time. Like one blind man
leading other blind men, it will lead us nowhere. More
over, the Naiyayika canon that " it is some kind of im-
perfection that leads to action ' (Nya. Su. 1, 1, 18), and
cur experience that all persons, whether egoistic or al-

truistic, become active because they are imperfect, lead

us to believe in a God who in spite of his benevolence
and the consequent activity is imperfect still. The
inadequacy of such a view becomes all the more apparent
when the Patanjala-yoga tells us that Cod is a peculiar
indifferent type of purusa.

.
: fr.:'^. il-.'u^Ei mutu-Hv dc-
{Sflrtbdndhfl -connection ; anubapattdf-being impossible;
ca-and.)
AND IB! CONNECTION BEING IMPOSSIBLE. 38

Moreover the doctrine we are considering is not

satisfactory farsome additional reasons. The God, the
pradhana and the soul being all infinite and without
parts, no one can be related with the other two by the
connection known as saruyoga; for sariiyoga can take
place only between objects which consist of parts. It
cannot be samyaya also; for we do not know which of
them is the substratum. Nor can we establish any special
kind of relation between God and the world. For this
would have been possible, if the world were admitted
tobethe product of pradhana; butas yet this has not
been proved.

It may be suggested that the Vedantin also is

sailing in the same boat; because according to him
Maya which is the cause of this world is in no way
connected with the Brahman. But this is wrong;
because the relation hetween the Mayii and the
Brahman, according to him, is that of identity. He
comes to know that Brahman is the cause of the
world, because be relies upon ^ruti, and does not
think it necessary that what he believes must always
conform to what he observes. His opponents, on the
other hand, rely upon only what is observed and
upon inference which is conformable to it. Besides,
there is a fundamental difference between what the
Vedantin thinks about the nature of Sruti and what
the opponents think. According to the former, the autho-
rity of Sruti or ' Agarna' is valid by itself; while according
to the latter, it is due to some omniscient being'. This
 —
342

however creates a logical difficulty for the opponent, viz.

the authority of the agama i a to be referred to an omnis-
cient being, and the omniscience is to be inferred by
reference to agoma. For all these reasons, the Samkhya-
yoga view about the nature of God', as also other
theories which make no reference to the Vedaa, are to
be rejected.

People who resort to inference only may put forth

the argument that just as the potter deals with clay while
producing the jars, even so the Lord may be doing with
reference to pradhiina. Butthis is not possible; because
pradhana being devoid of colour and other qualities is
not capable of being preceived just as clay is, and will
therefore not be a fit object to be dealt with and shaped
into the world by the Lord.

— the senses —net; bhogadi-

— because of enjoyment of no
[Karaptoiat like ; cet if ;

bkyah fruits etc.]

nay be supposed that the Lord guides the pra-

the same way in which the soul guides

i
the
if sight etc., even though the organs lack colour
 a. [Link].41 343

and other qualities and are not objects of perception.

The supposition however proves nothing. For whereas
the soul is pleased or displeased on account
of the acti-
vity of the senses, and affords us reason to
infer that
it must be guiding the senses, we do not get any
such evidence ior believing that the Lord derives
pleasure or pain by the activity of the pradbana
to
enable us to infer that he rules over it.

Or this and the preceding Sutra may be explained

in a different way. Sutra 39: If kings can rule
over a
country only if they are endowed with a body and
not otherwise, even so the Lord of all must have got
some kind of body to which his senses must belong
and on account of which he should be able to rule!
But bodies can exist only subsequent to creation and
not prior to it. So a body can never be said to belong
to the Lord, and therefore it can never be
said that
he is able to act and rule. Sutra 40 And if we assume
:

that the Lord possesses a hody which he can create

for
himself even before creation, and which he can utilise
for guiding his own senses as well as the pradhana,
he
remains no longer the [Link], but becomes like one of us
subject to pleasure and pain.

JAntavattt'jrfi — liable to perish; asHTvaJTiata— non-omni-

41

For an additional reason too, the theoty of those who

rely on mere inference becomes invalid. They teach
that God is eternal and omniscient, and that pradhana
and the souls also live for infinite duration. Now let U3
suppose, in the
first place, thai the omniscient God must
nave measured the duration, the extent and the number
 —
344

of himself, of pradhana and of the souls. But as experience

tells us all measured things, like jars and the like, are
of finite duration only. No doubt the number of souls
is too great; still it is limited from the view-point of
the omniscient Lord. That is why, gradually and one
after another, the souls get the release from saiiisara.
But when all of them ?et released, the [Link].i itseii
comes to an end. In ether words, it is nothing but the
end of pradhana itself; for 11 is the pradhana which,
under the guidance of the Lord, had modified and
manifested itself as ihe sarhstra, for the good of the
souls. And when the pradhana thus comes to an end,
what remains there for the Lord to supervise or to rule?
It is as good as saying that he too comes to an end;
and then, we are landed in a general void. If to avoid
these unpleasant conclusions, we suppose, in the second
place, that God did not or could not measure himself
or the pradhana or the souls, we shall deprive him of
his omniscience. Thus the, doctrine that God is only
the efficient cause of the world, is untenable.

^srasrais; i si

The origination (

Having refuted the Saiva doctrine that God is only

the efficient and not the material cause of the world, we
shall now refute the doctrine of the flhagavatas or the
Vaisnavas. Their smrti is no doubt faithful to Sruti in
believing that God is both the efficient and the material
cause of the world, but differs from it in certain res-
pects; and it is in these respects that we have to examine
the doctrine.
 ADHIATA II, Pi. n, «0. 43 345

Their theory can be stated thus : Vasudeva is the

highest reality; he alone exists and is pure knowledge.
Dividing himself in four form? this Vasudeva or Nari-
yana appears as Vasudeva, Safikarsana, Pradyunwa and
Aniruddha, or appears, in other words, as the highest
Atman, the individual soul the mind and ahaitiira,
respectively. [Link].i represents the primal cause, and
the three others are the effects. If a man goes to the
temple and worships this Vasudeva for hundred years
by means of offerings, prayers and meditation, he v. ill
thereby be able to overcome affliction and reach the
Vasudeva himself.

Now we have no desire to dispute over the

doctrine that Nariiyana who transcends the avyakta,
and who is the highest and the internal Atman of all
divides himself and manifests in various forms. For
Sruti also tells us that the highest Atman appears
in many forms, that 'he is one, he becomes three' [Cha.
7, 26, 2), Nor do we wish to contend against the devo-
tional approach and the unceasing one-pointed medita-
tion on God; for this has been recommended both by
Sruti and Smrti.i But we do take objection to the
origination of the individual soul (Safikarsana) from the
highest Atman (Vasudeva), as also to the origination
of mind and ahariikara from the soul and the mind
respectively. For in that case, like all other things
which are originated, the soul also will be perishable
in nature. Besides there will be no moksa for the soul,
because it will be simply destroyed and will not there-
fore reach the highest Being. That the soul does not
originate will be shown later on in II, 3, 17- Hence it
is that the doctrine of the Bhagavatas is untenable.

.
cfl~ and; \anuh~ oj the do
instrument.]
CID ) FROM THE DOER. 43

We never observe that an instrument of doing some

work, springs forth by itself from the doer' of that
work. Devadatta may use an axe, but the axe does not
come out of Devadatta. The Bhagavatas teach us
however that the mind (Pradyumna) arises out of the
individual soul ( Saiitarsana ), and that ahamkara
(Aniruddha) arises out of the mind. But as said above,
experience goes against their teaching. Nor have they
any support from Sruti.

IVijnana-adi-bkdvt —
ivhen ^nouiledge and other rhingj
txiil;vo—ot; tat-a-prMifedha/,— non-exclusion of that.]

And therb will be no exclusion op that ( defect

of non-origination.) even if (all of them are supposed
a<) possessing knowledge and other (qualities.) 44

The Bhagavatas may now take a different Line of

thought and say that Sankarjarja etc. are not the soul, the
mind or the ahamkara, but are, all of them, gods endowed
with the divine qualities of knowledge, glory, might,
power, valour and lustre. They are, in other words,
prototypes of Vasudeva, all of them being without any
defects, self-supporting and permanent. Therefore the
Bhagavatas may think that the defect regarding origina-
tion (referred to, in Surra 42) does not at all apply to
these divinities.

To this we reply that objection does remain in

•pite of this argument. Does the Bhagavata mean, in
the first place, that the four divinities have the same
attributes, but are different in form? If so, it isa
useless addition of multiple forms when the act of
 amtyava ii, A A n. 45 347

governance car be performed by one only. Besides, it

is only to relinquish his own hypothesis, viz, that
Vasudeva alone is the one real Being. Or if, in the
second place, the [Link] means that the divinities,
though possessing the same attributes, have sprung in
succession from one highest Being, then, as shown
already while discussing Sutra 42, the objection does
remain valid. Besides, we learn from experience that
there must be some kind of difference' between the
cause and the effect; or to put it negatively, wherever
such difference does not exist, there exists no causal
relation. Accordingly we should expect some kind of
difference between one divinity and another, because
one springs forth from another. But the Pancaratrikas 2
acknowledge no such difference; They say, on the cont-
rary, that all the divinities are forms of Vasudeva.

Further, there is no reason why the forma of

Vasudeva be limited only to four in number. As a
matter of fact, the whole world, from Brahmadeva
down to a blade of grass, is the manifestation of God.

ftjrfato^ i si
IVipratijcdhat —on account of contradiction!; ca— and.j
And on account of contradictions. 45
The qualities mentioned above as belonging to the
divinities are also mentioned, by way of contradiction,
elsewhere as different selves or forms of Vasudeva.*
Besides the statement that Sandilya acquired this know-
ledge of the Paiicaratra school, when he became despaired
of winning the highest bliss by the study of the four
Vedas, is certainly an obloquy of the Vedaa. Hence
too the doctrine of the Bhagavaras cannot be accepted .
 SUMMARY
ADHYAYA FIRST

The nature of Adhyasa: Extreme opposition of the

asmad and yusmad, the subject and the object in ex-
perience. Yet the mutual superim position, i.e., the
apprehension of something in something else, does take
place on account of avidya. Adhyasa is the root cause
of all evil; knowledge of the unity of the Atman will
remove this evil.

1 The word 'now' indicates succession and not

a mere auspicious beginning. This antecedent condi-
tion is neither the study of the Vedas, nor the
knowledge of dharma. For Brahma-jnana may be had
without that of dharma. The real antecedents are the
discrimination between the real and the unreal, non-
attachment, possession af tranquility and desire to have
liberation. Brahma-jnana is the Summum Bonum of life.
Different opinions a bou t the nature of self.

2 Origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world

»re due to Brahman. Difference between Dharma-
jijnisa and Brahma-jijfiasa.

3 Stuti is the means of knowing that Brahman is

4 If as Jaimini holds no Vedic passage has any

meaning unless it is subservient to action, there is no
direct reference to Brahman as an accomplished fact.
350 SUMMARY

But the Sutrakara holds that the direct cumulative and

harmonious result of all the Ved-Inta passages is that
Brahman is the cause of the world. Brahman is not in
object of perception or other means of knowledge, not
of meditation. Difference between Karma-vidya and
Brahma- vidya. Moksa is KG fas t ha- nit ya, and is die
same as Brahma -j nana. The knowledge of the identity
Of jiva and Brahman is neither a make-believe, nor due to
auperim posit ion; neither the result of actr of purifica-
tion nor the indication of any functional resemblance.
The Atman is not amenable to change. To deny it it
to posit it. It is the in-dwelling witness of all. The
connection of a thing with action does not change that
thing into action. Function of a negative proposition
it to indicate the neutral condition of indifference to

actions. Propositions like, This is a rope, not a snake',

are useful in removing fear. Disembodied condition is
possible on this side of death; description of this
condition. Had Brahman been subservient to action,
Jaimini would have incorporated it in Purva-Mimarhsa.

5 Non-intelligent pradhana cannot posseis

|
'seeing', i.e. intelligence, knowledge etc. Nor it is
omniscient, because sattva is equipoised by rajas and
tamas. A
yogin is omniscient, because he is a conscious
subject, and not due to excess of sattva. By deriving
causal activity from Brahman, pradhana cannot be said
to be the cause. Omniscience and freedem of Brahman
are not incompatible. Contradictory predicates re-
conciled in God. Difference of soul from God, due to
ignorance. Cannot pradhana be said to be the cause
in a secondary or figurative sense?

6 Not figurative also; for the word 'jivatman'

which means intelligent ruler cannot refer to pradhana,
but to Brahman, Cannot pradhana be the cause if it
helps the soul in having bhoga or moksa? Cannot the
word Atman refer to both intelligent and non-intelli-
gent beings?
 351

7 Moksa is possible on account of devotion to

Atman as recommended by spiritual teacher, and not
due lo pra dhana. The word Atman refers to Svetaketu
and to 'sat' according to content, and so cannot be
transferred to pradhana.

8 The word 'sat' is not used to denote pradhana

even as a preliminary step, so that this may be discarded
afterwards, used
and 'sat' Brahman,
to denote Beside*,
knowledge of pradhana as the cause would mean
knowledge of souls as effects; but this is impossible
because pradhana is nonintelligent, and the soul is
intelligent.

9 The conscious soul will find no rest in the

11 Is Brahman the object of knowledge or

devotion ?

12 Anandamaya, according to purpapalsa, is the

jivatman. because it is the last of the series and has joy
as its head. The Vedantin holds that it is Brahman, be-
cause it is of the nature of flavour which if once tasted,
makes one fearless. The mention of the various fabe
atmans is simply an aid to understand the real ananda-
maya Atman. To conceive the Atman as having limbs
isonly an imagination.

IS Anandamaya means 'abounding in bliss', and

not 'made up of bliss'. Various blisses upto that of
Brahman measured in ascending degrees.

14 Knowledge of Atman results in bhss because

the Atman is full of bliss.
 '

IS. The mantra, the Brahmaija and the Bhartpvi

Varuni vidya, are a]] consistent m
saying that Brahman
t Atman and is blissful.

16 Creation of the world on the pattern

thought and non-different from hii blefor
the high eat Atman only.

17 The anandmaya Atman is to be searched and

The individual soul though illusory is non-
distil from God; but God being the ground of avidya
s is different from either.

18 Neithei the desire ; and become may.

nor the belongs to
'/Ii^inJ;;' "SS
'

19 Anandamaya is not jiva, because salvation

occurs when the jiva is joined with the anandamaya.
Anandamaya is one of the five sheaths." the tail or
support of anandamaya is the Brahman. Anandamaya
is Saguna Brahman, which no doubt must be first
attained, in order to reach the Nirgurja Brahman.

21 Even the sun does not know who dwells in

him and controls him.

22 Ak3Sa means Brahman; for the latter is the

cause- of all the elements including that of akasa.

Words 'only" and "air would be akafa would
useless, if

mean the element. Infinity, exculsive mark of Brahman.

The Udgirha or Om
owes its eternity or greatness to
Akasa or Brahman. Synonyms for akSsa are used for
Brahman.

23 Does prSna mean the breath in which organs

of sense and action merge during sleep ? As the
beings themselves who have the senses merge, prapJ
 means Brahman. Mete contiguity of words viz the prii
na, thesun and the food 15 no key to interpret the mean-
ing. Grammatical position and context will be useful.

24 Can jyoti mean the physical light? "Heaven" in

the Gayam passage and m rhis ivon p. i*;nge is the same.
Brahman is the topic of the [Link] C'[Link] in J the latter
Sandilya passages. Brahman is the meaning of the
word jyoti. Brahman spoken of as jyoti for purpose of
meditation.

26 The passage following that of Gay

the door-keepers of the heart in which Brahman with
four feet resides.

28 means Brahman.
Prana It cannot he the
breath; for the highest Good of man cannot be of the
changing nature. BIjsb and immortality are the marks
of Brahman and not of air. Plana is Brahman because
it is unaffected by good and bad actions.

29 Can prana mean Indra, because he is the resident

of heaven and so lias ananda, and because he is the object
of devotion and unaffected by oldage, death and
It is Brahman, because it has the power
action? of
bestowing and taking away life; it is described as the
nave with the spokes of senses etc. fined in it.

30 Indra's reference to himself is the awareness

of intuitive knowledge of Brahman. Reference to
killing the son of Tvasta glorifies the redeeming nature
of Serf-realization.

31 Brahman is the of knowledge

topic and
devotion; it is neither the prana nor the jiva.
 ADHYAYA FIRST
Pa da Second

1-8 The resplendent Atman described as mano

ft, with prana as its body; and as the object a
Citation it is Brahman and not the individual soul

11 The two beings in the cave of the heart arc

the jiva and Brahman ; for both are intelligent as
indicated by 'Rtaplna'.

12 One eats the sweet fruit, and the other toots

on. Or, the two birds may be considered as buddhi and
the released soul.

13-17 The person in the eye is the stainless

highest Atman, and is recommended as the object of
meditation. He is not the perishable reflection of
some person in the eyes of another; for he is said
to be immortal and fearless. The person is one's own
eye is capable of being seen by meditation,

IS The internal ruler must be the Atman.

19-20 It cannot be pradhana, because though

the

Atman is itselfunseen like pradhana, it sees the enure

world. Neither ean it be the individual jrva whose
 the highest God; for c

22 The I 'r"jn:j.i.!i.- p.T'^n who is the same as

bhutayoni is described, unlike ;iva and pradhara, as
effulgent, bodiless unprndurei!, without ind or prlna
i

24-25 In view of its description as 'lustrous heaven'

and of the result of meditation on it, viz the eating of
allthe food, Vaisvanara means the Atman and not the
abdominal ice or the jiva.

26-27 Vaiivanara is said to be the Purusa and

at the same time inside the body of man; so it is neither
the deity nor the element of fire.

28J2 Jaimini and Asmarathya think him to be

the object of meditation and as measured from
chin to
 ADHYAYA FIRST
Pada Third

1. The word'setu' (bridge) with reference en

Brahman does not indicate that there is another bank
which is to be reached. It indicates the idea of
holding together or lending support ot of attaining

:
bis mind on the Alman;
o talk much fl weariness.

8 Bhiiman means Brahman and not prana. The

quality of heing an aiiradin refers to Brahman, ana
not to pr aria on account of the series of 'truth' and
other things. Prana is not the last word ofSanaf
kumara's teaching.

9 The bliss of deep sleep does not refer to praoa.

Similarly, qualities such as immortality, truth, omnipre-
sence etc. belong to Brahman or Bhuman.

10-12 Akjara being imperishable and all-perrad-

ing means Brahman. Qualities ot aksara such as
'unseen', 'unheard' etc. may be common with pradbana,
but the other qualities of seeing', 'heating" etc. do not
belong to pradhana but to Brahman.
 13 Nirguna Brahman alone is the object of
medication on and Om of sight; it transcends the
transcendent jiva-ghana.

14-17 DaharakaAa, though located in the heart,

is as large as the elemental akasa; and yet it is not the
elemental fik'isa because qualities belonging to the
Atman arc ascribed to it.

18-21 Dahara also does not mean the individual

soul; for the qualities like freedom (torn sin belong to the
Atman. It refers to the real nature of the jlva which
it gradually being shown to he identical with Brahman,
and which is therefore described as rising beyond the
body and as appearing in its own form. The bearing
of this on Karma-Kancja.

s the cause of the light

24-25 The Atman is

thumb, only with the view
and Brahman.

3 have got the capacity to have the

28. Words like 'va

with the eternal specie!
objects. The words conno
According to grammarians, the words perish, and it is the
'sphota' which manifests the meaning of words and
which alone is real. As opposed to this, Upavarsa
holds that it is not necessary to imagine the eiistence
of sphota to explain the manifestation of meaning from
the letters of the word.

29 The Veda ( or the word ) is the source of

 A. FtRST-PADA T

30 The Veda is as eternal as [Link], and it wai

available to Hinnyagarbha by the grace of the highesl

31-32 .laimini's opinion regarding incapacity of

gods.

33 The Upanisadic testimony regarding the hanker,

ingofgods after knowledge of the Atman;Indra and Viro.
cana as instances. The arthavada is 33 comp'ete a unity
as vidhi-valtya, but has got the additional function of
praising some thing or person. It is from these that
we know thai gods have bodily forms and that they
desire to have the knowledge of Brahman.

34 The word Sudra may mean the grief and not

the caste.

35 Janairuti may be a Kjatriya.

36-38 A Sudra is unfit, because he is not a

twice-born. Yet they may leam through itihasa and
pur ana 3.

39 Praia is Brahman; for to make the whole

world tremble through fear is possible for the latter;
and again, mofcja is due to knowledge of Brahman.

40 Similarly, light means Brahman; for release

and disembodied condition can belong to Brahman and not
to the sun and other luminous bodies,

42-43 The conditions of sleep and of departure

of the soul show it to be different from the Brahman
or Atman who is really the Lord.
 ADHYAYA first
Pada Foatth

1 Avyakta does not mean the

pradhiina; it means
the body mentioned in the metaphor of the chariot.
which aims at showing us the final destiny of the soul,
viz. the abode of Visnu.

3 It is premordial power of God known as avidya,

maya, akasa, aksara etc.

4 Not being mentioned as subject of knowledge

or meditation, it serves no human purpose.

5 The object of perception referred to in the

same Upam'sad ( Katha, 2,3,15) is the intelligent,
highest Atman.

6 The dialogue between Naciketas and Death

refers to three things alone, viz.. the fire, the indivi-
dual soul- and the highest Atman, and does in no way
mention the pradhina.

it the cup may mean the 'head'

an pradbana, but may mean
 11-13 'Paficapafica [Link]' does not mean the cate-
gories of toe Samkhyas, but particular types of beings.
Various reasons far holding this view.

14 There may be contradictions regarding the

accounts of creation; but inasmuch as the welfare of
man does not depend on this, all the Ved an [Link]
are directed in the search of Brahman alone.

15 If theword 'sat' indicates the world or the

Brahman with names and forms, the word 'asat" indicates
the same Brahman, without any names and forms.
Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of
the world.

16-18 The work nf creation refers to God as

19-22 The object of sight is the Atman alone.

While ASmarathya believes in relative non-difference
of the jiva and the Brahman, while Audulomi
thinks they are identical in the condition of knowledge,
Karsakntsnya voices forth the correct view embodied
in 'Thou art that.' The Atman, as the object of
sight, is not some future condition of the ?ouL On
the contrary, the soul is a form of the Atman.

23-28 Brahman is also the material cause of the

 ADHYAYA SECOND
Pdda First

1 To accept pradhana as the came ia to mate

Smrtis like the Bhagavadgita as useless; for nirguna
Brahman is considered by them as the efficient and
material cause. A
Smrti which goes against Sruti is
to be rejected. Reference to Kapila is ambiguious
and incidental; the main fact is the "seeing of God'.

2 Kapila Smrti cannot be trusted in its reference

to mahat, avyakta etc. because these are unknown to
the Veda and to experience.

3 Because yoga Smrti is useful and partially true,

especially in its
it cannot be accepted as wholly true,
reference to pradhana as the independent cause.

near to
4 Believing that reasoning comes very
eiperience, the purvapaksa contends that
Brahman
which is pure and conscious cannot be the cause of the
universe which is impure and unconscious.
Absence ol
he
intelligence in the things of the world cannot simply
said to be apparent.

5 Though the elements are represented **H|*fc

ing. 'seeing' etc. the purvapaksin points
out that tne
the non-
reference is to the presiding deities and not to
intelligent elements.

6 To the Vedantin, whatever easts, whether

Experience
intelligent or not, is the effect of Brahman.
 362 A. KCOND-pflDA FIMT

corroborates this! As for the knowledge oi Brahman,

argument cannot achieve it; it is achieved only when
another person speaks about it. Reasoning which is
favourable to Sruti is welcome: illustrations of this.
Disparity of nature is no reason why Brahman should
not be the cause, especially when pradhana can be said
to be the cause of intelligent souls.

7 To say that the effect was nonesi stent (in the

form in which it appears) is meaningless. For it is a
negation of nothing. The effect always exists in some
form of the cause.

8-9 Size and shape of a jar can never he iound in

clay; the world therefore will never make the Brahman
impure. The effect and its qualities are due to
avidya. The Atman is the eternal spectator of the three
states, and so is not affected by avidyit. New
creation
is due to the persistence of avid ya even in dissolution;

in the case of the liberated souls, false knowledge is

completely wiped out.

10 Objections against the Vedlnta can be equally

levelled against the Samkhya, if pradhana is without
form and qualities.

11-12 One may say that reasoning is faulty

is itself proved by reason, and
i
that fallacy is a
point of attraction which leads to more reason. But
reasoning may not lead to right knowledge, and so may
not lead one to moksa.

13 From the practical point of view, there re-

mains the distinction between subjects and objects,

though they are, in reality, non-different from the
Brahman, just as waves, foam etc. are distinct from each
other, though they are, in essence, nothing but water.

14 Nothing easts apart from Brahman; names

and forms have their origin in speech only, To know
 363

the Brahman is to know all. Multiplicity is unreal,

yet it is believed as true so long as the knowledge of
the identity of jiva and Brahman does not arise. Not-
withstanding the fact that nothing is real except
Brahman, the Vedic knowledge is useful to point out
what is real. Though the dream is unreal, the know-
ledge that there: was a dream continues to be real in
the waking life. We
need not be sceptic about having
such knowledge; for Svetaketu did possess it and
realized that Brahman is ananda. The motive in having
the knowledge of Brahman as the cause of the world
is not to know that it is modifiable, but to know that if
alone is the realityi In order lo negate this trotyl
character, Brahman is described negatively know-
ing which, Janaka is said to have achieved moksa.
In no way the unily of Brahman contradicts its being
the cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution, or
its being the ruler and protecter. The parinamavada too
is accepted by the SutraBra so farasitis subservient; to

the purpose of devotion to Saguna Brahman.

15 The perception of the far makes us inevitably

aware of the clay. Besides it will not eiist apatt
from clay.

16 Either before or after its coming into being, the

world is one with its cause viz. the Brahman.

17 The no [Link] of the effect before

so-called
its origination means only a relative and not absolute
nonexistence; it means that during the period when the
effect was in 'the form of the cause, it bad not got its

present names and forms.

before
18 the effect been really nonexistent
Had
its is no reason why
origination, there curds should be
produced out of milk alone; as a matter of fact, anything
may come out of anything else. To say that curds has
a specific power is to abandon asatkiryavsda and to
 364

admit (he immediate prior condition of effect. Diffi-

culties of aamavaya and samyoga; the catcogory of whole
and parts. Absolute non-enstence, such as the
existence of the son of a barren woman, can never be-
come a reality in spite of the efforts of patters etc ,

The operative agents arrange the cause in the form of

effect. Devadatta is the same person, whether with
limbs stretched out or drawn in.

fScient to produce tl

26-29 Notparinama but vivarta is the correi

view. Besides Brahman is both immanent and tran
cendent. it is the ground of Dames and forms which si
both duterent and non-different from it The negatii
description leads us from phenomena to God.

30-31 Contradictions reconciled in lirahman.

32-33 Rational activity may be motivated by ti

desire to sport merely. Creation
is not real from tfc
view-point of the highest reality.
 ADHYAYA SECOND
Pada Second

Sutra

1 A is necessary
potter to produce a jar; mere
clay is not sufficient. Even so, the pradhana will
require an intelligent principle for its guidance.

2 Intelligence possesses the power to move a non-

intelligent thing like a chariot, though itself it may

3 The love of the cow for the calf and the suck-
ing of the milk are responsible for the flow of milk. God
is the ultimate intelligent principle.

4 there is
If
dhlna, neither aci
explained.

5 Neither is there the spontaneous transformation

cf pradhana into the world, like grass into milk. For that
grass alonewhich is eaten by a cow changes into milk.

6 Either there is no purpose for the activity of

pradhana which is against the Safflkbya hypothesis,
or

7 the Purusa is inactive, it cannot move

If
i

pradhana; the inadequacy of the illustration of the la

and the blind.

 8-9 The moment the equipoised condition o! the
three gunas in disturbed, pradhana itself is in danger
or being lost. Either there will be perpetual Samsara or
no evolution at all.

10 Besides, the Sarhkhya doctrine is full of coo.

traditions. On the Vedantic view, the distinction
between sufferer and suffering' is due to avidya; but
when the Sathkhya makes tamoguna the cause of non.
discrimination, release is impossible; for the tamo,
guna is as eternal as the sattva and may overtake a man
at any time.

11 Atomism explained and criticized. Intelligence

of Brahman is not produced in the world, just as apheri.
city of the atoms is not produced in their effects.

12 The original motion of the atoms is neither

explained by some impact which can take pUce after
creation, nor by the principle of 'unseen accumulation of
merits' which is non -intelligent.

13 The relation of samavaya like sariiyoga

must depend on another samavlya and so on ad
infinitum.

14 If atoms possess qualities like colour and sound,

they must be grcss and transitory. Besides, they may
not be destroyed or disintegrated, but be transformed
into a prior tion-atomic condtiion.

16 Atoms will not be atoms if they increase in

volume and possess many qualities. And to maintain
uniformity, if the four kinds of atoms have onlyoneor
four qualities, we shall have
to say something against
experience.

17 The Vaisesika contradicts himself when he

says that the six categories
are independent, and that
 A. SECOND-FADA SICOND 367

five of them are dependent on one of them, viz. the

''' - : '-. :
:

. " : :
-.' .' ';;
.:
.-
.
,•: ;: -

time or character, is equally faulty; for he will thereby

go aainst the authority of Kaniida, or say that there
is no difference between substance and quality. His
view about samyoga and samavaya is riddled with
contradictions, and involves mutual dependence.

s and skandhis. And if there is no mind, there is

no chain of mental cognitions; nor a lord who will
govern. Nirvana is impossible.

19 The series of avidya, saihskaras etc., being

dependent on atoms and skandhas, cannot be the cause
of the latter.

20 If everything is momentary, there will be no

causal connection at all; and words like origin, destruc-
tion will have no meaning.

21 If the effect were to exist without cause,

anything may come into existence; and if it hasa cause,
the view that everything is momentary shall have to be
given up.

22 The voluntary and the involuntary tvpes of

destruction as well as akasa are non-substantial and
negative in character.

23 Akasa cannot be a non-entity, its existence i=

inferrable irom the quality of sound. Buddha himself

accepts it as the support of wind. Besidesa nonentity
cannot be etemal-

Recollection and recognition of things as same

24
will impossible, if the experiencing subjects are
be
momentary in character. The belief in the experienc-
ing subjects as the same cannot be the result of
 t, EtCOND-PACA SECOND

28 The external world is not mental in character;

for our ideas point to perceptions and the perceptions
point to external things. No one will be satisfied by
a mental dinner. If ideasare only momentary in charac-
ter, all practical life will be robbed of its meaning. It
will be more reasonable for the VijnanavSdms tD believe
in the commonsense external world than in the self-
luminous ideas. Besides, as against the Vedlinta view,
such ideasare transitory and many.

29 Wakinglife is real and is to be distinguished

from the dream, because it consists of immediate enperi.
ence and is not due to memory, and because it consists of
objects and is not capable of being negated by any other

30 Cognitions are not, unlike the Buddhist opin:

due to impressions, but are due to external objects; fo
the absence of objects cognitions do not arise.

34 To consider that the soul has got the size of

the body is to mate it limited and perishable. Difficul-
ties of considering it as having pans.
 35-36 The particles too like the body have got
origin and decay and so are not of the nature of self: or,
the soul may
have different bodies of the same dimen-

37 The God of the Maiyayikas and the Mihes-

varas is only imperfect like us, howsoever benevolent
he may be. God is not merely the efficient cause.

38 God, souls and pndhana being, all of them,

infinite and partless, neither satliyoga nor samavaya will
establish any relation amongst them.

39 Pradhana is not to God as clay is to the potter.

40 Nor is there any evidence to show that the

Lord guides the pradhana and is therefore pleased or
displeased.

41 With the release of all souls there will be no

purpose left either for pradhana or for the Lord,

42 Notwithstanding the manifestation of the

Atman in several forms and the devotional approach to
it, the soul, on the Bhagavata view, will he perishable

43 Experience does not bear testimony to the

production of ahaiiikara out of the mind and of the
mind out the soul.

44 To suppose that the soul, themind and abadi-

kara are, all of them, divinities like the highest Atman, is
to rest satis6ed with an arbitrary multiplication of unity.

45 To say that Sandilya got knowledge from the

Paficariitra school is only to cast doubt on the Vedic lore.
 m

Extracts from Vpanishads and other

sources as found in Samkara's
commentary
Aitareya Araoyaka

2, 1, 2, 6-
2
'
4
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M. lcU Alm Up - •* O-tow m *&«

2,4,2,4 — aJ^rmpiT gij aiftn^i

3. 2, 4, 7 — mi ffi i^rit grt W»f $wr^ '
jvjh a
Ait. Brahmana, 3, 8, 1 sn& a^mt fffojpt* Rjrar
wren un<ig<<<«R.«M, ^«ri nror wraq.i i

Bhagavadgita
2, 24-25 — 4lMjalS'J Ui Bllil B J l
Wi'
sfl "J "TO W I

fiw: a^rrai ^argrawtrf wrrrai li « mhAi nR*i«itiini-

2, 55 — lid; ft
i o^i VHMnwt "alTTR. I *h<-ihI-

*, 11 — >t fir Hi iMa-rt di+rwt trarnisui nn ra^-

9W ajpirs ira Mm II

4. 37-
14-15
— VPffffel s4%nllili
— s *^
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5, «r wiifif wt*w iwf?t ngi i t

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a&fer:
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I
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ii irftn-'ra

fagrasn'safi'jail
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i^ini^r(*iirf'rjiB ; waron; wtMtW afe'snj^n *r

8, 12, l — vi^pw^ qt ?f srfttnra I'li'W a^wi^-icti-

^ifiTPHvm!ft-t*is mm Til a HsriK; Rrarfiratwri f K ** *wOt*«i
Tii [ii«ii[iy'4k )airtJ.+r^;!i<T<
i
qra *?-if ff ftrarfilii V&W i

H, 12, 3 — <m rfirenff s «l -ssjfl* lt« ilMIl it wifow-

S, 14, 1— ail+HTl % 5TH iflHfeUtithM&H ft ^q«*u.l

Gaudapridakiirika
i, 16 — wgi fcmqqi gm ^ sfR -
- ag^i aranfinrw-

3, IS — j^nft^feJH^: ^fe?n g^BIS-^W I 3115:

liiivasyopanisad
?-8 TKJF*^riPit ijai^^naPjfSEJIHa: I W Wlf «:

irim«ffMH»rayi h*h Ei^a* WW

-
JTR: WWBHWfWR I H I

Jabalopanijad

ft _*w rawpftirftfir B si^R S.K" '^fr i

3q
^ g

=3i«fEH tfii i mmraf sireai a nw nraiH-i rfo '

tmiftfa^ -

srcnftfa !W =n*ft *rafa I *aii *iw err* jraffia SJJ*01 ^1 i

a it fife s on otsnwi i»w a afetH^ft I "wt aft

^sri ssiRn -j 4i*i(i sfa ii
 4— wi iFwnsft*W«r yuiliiRuu: gfer^reliism

Jaimin; S5cra { Piirva-MimSmsa }:

!. 1.1-2 !,Aik:jT-;=.-[Link] giJt ff 3T7PJ: WlHratoiH)

^ ^
*5Wi8 ffenTTr: srawK vnp{ i

I, 5, 3 — I^Tj fgjuj^ «n?*r£t sgnran i

Kathopanisad :

1, 1, 1
3 — g anni ^giqn^ft ^fW q^f? ^ »-r?ai3ii

crfta m-jisi y*r-«t5 ^mnaT ^T^cfk: n

U 2, 4 - !|^- igijflS Nf^t sfer ^r ^ firafa mar i

1, 2, o—^pji 3^Dr nfeiiq^J7f niTfrrs^Ira gsrRnr as i

1,2,12 — a^5r "isngafae gEifpr *rarg gowr

1, 2, 14 — v^ra r
!TO i^rariri<^ ^ *h kirn i
w^l i 3* a*3

l, 2, 18 —a stpra feua ^i Hifirara fafea *^

9JHH. I aral ftp*]: msa^-JJ gn«ft 3 5»Sff ^IBIff 5PTK
1, 2, 22 — arnflj; CTtft<£R^R*r^f*s]tm;
II

— ^wagr s g^
- I

1, 2, 25 Jjaii «=ifr wl^a: i

ij^ct-
I^TRUt^iRB: II

1> 3, 1 — ^5S fro=Br g*aw bi* 351 nra^l 'TC'i <ra«r i

1
r. U^
3 3 ~~l — WrW * *$& ftfe srfK «w=i g ^Sr 3 i

> -*, "-12 — NWHUKRl^fJ qiPMSI^W" I

HISW 1

wmnfh fnlr*ft: fH ti^n ii

 at to ifci! ii

f s ^3 ^?3 qpssBB a n^rara 1 ??gj( rgiw ganr

(Ncte. The Vallis of chapter second of the Kaf ha are

sometimes counted as 1, 2, 3 etc. or as 4, 5, 6 etc. heca'
use they ate subsequent to three vallis at" the first

chapter. So, 2, 1, 10 -2, 4, 10).

-j 4, 4 — w-fM tflMpHW ^tflt *RTga»?lfrt I BBM

2, 4, 10 — <FJttz •T^ira 3^g* <1?frtl5t g^te CT

2, 4, 12-13 an-gsjirs: gOT! — irJ» Wl^rRr ftsfa I

?51RI ^flaiPT a a^j R^gpt || mbjjbhih: JPJt

^JlPlR=ll'|JI*: I

2, 5, 5 —a sii^<i Hnias flr^r jftgfrr saia i ffRt g

2, 5, 15 —a 33 t^ti wi^r a ^STm* snr i^at mfcr

yntsTORi: I ato stragnrlri a^Tfl^ fawiPt II

2, 6, 2— iri^ fia ai'ic*M niw qafct r;^hi hsjpi

^^rg^-i % "wfA'^'ijrtr^i *ratfei ii

2, <j, 3 ( Cf. Tai. 2, M, 1 )

— H'-IHWlljlWufrf M<llTllft

=^: i tpnf^ns ^ppa Jj^gwigfil "raw ii

2, (j, 11 — *i ^iiriiild *hi*h feraft^freimrrq i

 2, 6, 1 8 — JJSJTRfif -nRj+dtesi sstot RpTTR'ri ;hirfi]ra

Kau?itak - Briihimna - Upmisad:

2, 14 — rTT3iqrn: Q^i: ^tTT: snot fasiSS fat^NI mmfe

3, 1-3— HHsNri irara ^ nf raatftararafei s

*hii st^r ift^ict s Hitj^as =r fifjg^pr 3 cAsr * ^i^en
aim ^ Mrafiifg^ wig: upm nrW gr hi^; mm i^mjan.1

^tlTO^rfqifl; gjirifFt gig: gf $ft- g^r^ffcl KIS S^: 51^:

r*ji f^sit t^jfeir faun i>».iwi ;-&htttt; t& : sunn: 3*nqgg

feifaE==r 3™^ ?gr ^sr-'ir JMr 11

3, 8 —
*rar TOWKg Bferrear arm^t strrar mii«h i

frorei: uaimsit-jfiidi: nararar: aiatsffar: ti g nr npr us

nwrnaf^msqaT 3 si^bt ^norr ^prar qai q Tgar zzm
^^ti rain ai^ *$ ^wTifit s jjit^r hAmt afa iflra us a

iforr ^'?r: «h srt?^% fern, n

4, 1 9-20 — )ft g UK HBTT ^+.'J|U|i Tctf 1^1 4ffiVM
B g g^ft^ti ii ragr sltft*lg% jtoi *rr ^i: arfipi ga^ns-
t

^
n*r JwitikirMfliij* qgitla --waw- bhubHBI gafs* 11

Kenopani$ad;
I, 3-5 — »pt^q Blil^rtniyl wrafijfn^fiil II nrfWHig^ii
iff im w^ijii traggt * b# ffcngwst jkw. i^isa
o«mi aw nfi na *re*r ^ ^ wi wfa*ra

Mahabhnrata (Santiparva)
4/, 68 — IwiliKI*'} ?in|^ S Jfrfil Tnufl I
 1 — *

233, 2<-25 — «Mli4ftrtnr tew Sig^BT I^ggi I HtTT

3 °j. nj — 3raaa'HifJiji^5EaBiTRrjnBqfiif |nm:i

r

^ ^J
36 '
2S-30 — JrafqpTJrf^fllJ! H WTOrRT qBRf

HflrarFmjra g wi^%?Bfe]<n: 1 ^tt sr^ft^tim turn--

;, 3,397,1 fl «T*J13UTra*f ERr

Wanu Smfti :

l> 2—aScrf
3 siriRt wntSr ^ 3«^»^ ^i^w: I

wr^ qtjTOFara raiS 11

10 ^— SKsrgat gor q^earfo:

i 1

10, 12fi — 5§ qiir* ft£ra ^ HWiKJJifiti

sr I

graf^ sii miyfeiirftHiai 11 m^ wif^a v^ntnAJtffea 1

Muijqlakapanisad :

l| li l — HHgifiai w^ft^jiuPibiny=(i*i MMwn unr I

1,1, 3 *Rmm ww nfn *i<fl*i^ nrow flsra 1

'j 1, S, 6— s^uro w^t i^S?: snM^nri^! Tnsn

*»ii 54i+<ar ft*,*
i«a
g^- j4iftt|(ijft
yTJ^^WHildli'il^HMum-j^KiH SQWRcilQI],
1 qn
ara w
a^rnrfa
1
-

II I Mfi
rag ?igiiri gqgn (r^wi i^jwfS yRiwf^i $tw- 11

1, ( —
7 flliulsjlfii: ^aS £Sft ^ *TOI |fMlMM
www 1 wi ro smnudni ft froissiiTirawacftir fijwii 11
 1 1

am stow s apift li

i, 2, 7
—;pi an 1

s^rr Titbit 'TO^te'nt *ig *h i

i/reSJ 'fsiira^f^
l jjjct ari^g B |Ji*«f>i «Rl II

1, 2, 13 — fre« h rasrgrsrara Hi^Fsin^if^ra sim-

2, 1, 2-10 — f^ojl SHE?: JW g-TTSIP^RlTt S3:

araiait vmn< spar iwuntui "h wwarat aunt -
; ll w
H^fnfar s ci di^jiiiRniT: {fMt rkipi ariVtfin iBtVt
^
i

«^ft nnpi **'^ SltWasiTH g^i

:
^ig: HT"n STl : |

ftNNM i^wri 'jfatfi sft h4 ^ntram n rem™" bthot..-.

tWHR^': *rra ^r ftsn n»ra a^i . . ^r 35m w^an isra . .

;
-

hh stop • Myi.i rtik . . [I 5^1 "k% few S3? frit sg

2, 2, 5 — jjrh=3t: gfa^i qfflrSqtBtg jh: be sfIh

*w 1 ?isfii 3tR!t HT'araii i'iT grat Rrg^iFgaOTT gg: 11

2, 2, 8—
Rraa ^'jHF>jti33^ aWswr 1 Site
aiw «HTm n fareg i^pre Cf B. G. 4, 37 11 —Mtitt
<OTTM Wttmii^W:^? I

2| 2, 9 — ffefqV ir Sljl RT3 =TiS R l *3J£ 1 a^s

xjih'jt TOB^M^WBWfl iw^- 1

2, Z, 10-11 (Cf. Ka. 2, 5, 15) —

3 35 R>if Wife —
a -M-Srd'* aw fa^r wrira jats info: aira aisgngsnfr 1

«Sawnrar*?^Sitratnraii ag ^mia [Link] a iiii^aFS i

i

3, 1, 1 - J —
gj gtmi agar wsrm hwr ?£ qfts^WB 1

crarrar S«ik wigrfwiMHii «iilm«Hfk|{i

W
11

otr ?w 3^n fir«iiis;nmiT stwPi gsuiR: 1 gs

iiinumAiuiIuj afsuRfirfrr %Rrh^: 1
 —

\^> 6 —
-irra fas waft fararat ^^itratoracrir: g^- 1

wsir: 1
a agtwiEg in^^rs imjaj: nl<[Link] fr§
—
11

3. -. s qu i ro BPmrar: «gjre«i ini^A wfa

wrfcTII

1, 1. - — ^y-H'tw-gtTi^i'jRiwnsnflRTgautiJjijiy ar-

TTf^3Isfi|jl'J-1 I
affe aTOTRBTraafffl
raira 3*4.1 ciM 1

-, -' -rraftrj: um 3^ra 1 m 4iB«m««ii8«lrtr"/*

yi-^w nRtDsksqjRmmw ftwoafe 1

mbh it arni sima

3j 3 1

i—t*n ijpk nfl»jy|5%«iFa nssn: apr n?rfJs*a-

4, l,
wPVB n^M^fs* Tt: 53: g^*?ia a^4."jjti 5 »} awar ijt
1 =

V* BgW5?to 3PT "rR *T#T gtfTt if Sjuftfr * HWft ff RTElPf 3

I

i?* i aioniw QteAPJt: flreri^ il

*rafti
5, 2— na& «t4*IH <rt Wi 3 «fi JIT™*: I
1 +M [(«£-
•H-Hfl '4 ri ri >) *d [Link] II

"=raftr gif «qg: oar

t iK"l^t*t5T(r ranges 03 s^HTicflar
 :

fafaij-*: a WWft MWg asnits B

^Sraraaifin^ffr iasi^fl *rf i Tmawnjaowr it afi-r 11

6, 2, 4— l%4l«KSrift BtCT«g5^ 1T*Hfl1[: q^ST^tn:

6 8 — ft dH*l"!Hfl fit f' PTfTT 'nS^flraHN'UHII: 1*

qtf snsralfa i

Rgveds-Saihhita:

1, 98, 1 —Wim Burfr wru nar ft * g^iTOTftrwr: i

],iOt, 1— *ft? p=r Tfrar a^lft I

1,161,39 — 9i^[ siyt TOi sjtusifttB^ir *tra Rl>a

firi$:l
8, 53, 7 — (iftiiTijwmi feir i

9, 46, )— iftfii: rfhTfiw jpsthi

10, 71, 3 — niu wgj m Jl<j«u!iirBRn%%ftg nraHR.i
10,88,3— $t Htgsu ^firaf gr^Rrarafm ^tb'i

10, 88, 12 — ftrawT wffi ga^ra ?^i %sarai ignsrn-

sro^i
10, 00 — ql^IWl agf Hdllrf fifqpjaatrgH f^fa I

10, 121, 1— fawn}: an^cTBT *JrT¥l ara: licF*

10, 129, 6— *[sgr ^ w.

55 n^rag,! t* fe^few

10, 190, 3— yyfasutHt qrat im^n^sqqq.! f^f «

fftrfl ^RtfajBiw ^ :
II

S Smith ya- Karika

3 — %MI *fi<ly tidJJM 1(1 1: Sl&fasfW S^i I OraSWH

Sat a paths Brahmana:

6, 1, l, 2, 4 — TO*Al t airitsgtR I
 — :

10, 3, 3, 6 iri k gi;rj: ssfafa mi nfif wr^fii art

sjg: nrt atf nmr im a i%t njs^ u i«ni ^wRt jjwftipft
i II

10, 6,1, ll-wnrcfta^iimi

10, 6, 3, 2 — 1TOI M|il|4l irai 31 VfflHJI 31 Wl«l*ct^?fl

S Ve t a£va tar apani?ad

1, 1 and 3 — Hgsjifijsit Mflftd I ft 1W« ew 5?T W
*ini Stam WE9 MuidBI ft WIMWTI^JHI ^IW-^^l'ISlft.
II

«fly»ilrt«isiq I q: WGnJfe ftfiwifn sift WJJIrWJsEI-

"ifylrlJiW*: II

2, H — fewr wr^T ot aifli n"[Link] israt *ifirie?i I

aalg^w n-rect fegrerlgife wflfr wmqt ft i

" Cf. b. g. 6-13.
2, 12
— ^udiktiixtef^BV Hgffcrr <Hir*rii 3V*3»r n$w I

* asjg TTOT =i srn a Jpg: oifRT •ffWinM sifl'tH II

3, 8 —^T5ti!t g^ ngnritMi sura; wwn i

3, 19 — arqiftin^t aram m/En iwwj h srnnwwn l

« Bifir %a sj riwifw
sj g^ mwi Srai dnr£«.<-«i >

4, 3 — si jjft ;(j Bwfe fq 5nrr 33 m pirft N *«ft i

f*JM qaftr fsj grat *rafti fewtjigssi: n

4, 5 — araiiwii slftnspfsoni *nit: aai ifjinn ws*H! i

»rat siii ^HiuiH^aid asjiFRt sjjkhVvHMM< h

4, 10-11— nwf g agiS tanaM g Hawaii

MmwqJkQ °ntt a^ftr «( 4 AtSr stRwfyftn-u*!
«f»jtftit e sj ft sUji jjsJui euftwi s*t Vwftw ft^wai

5, 2— q) jftiS q ftnlwPie fii »5t

| faiaifir sjTiiftr «htft»a

54uW^ irM jjut-i 4hi flKiunrat bthSsw sj^: n

 — —

6, 8-9 — am si wir vrH a feia T a^nar^r^iaa

w™ i 4on ?ilrh!a[^'sit( ?gn^ wimfa*t ntnafcm a w 11

6, 11-13 — q^r ^i traijag jjs: srawrfl «ripi-

^TFFHt i nhov wtitiiKiNiw! snft ^ip ^bsti ikigtiv
WR
it

nft'inirr =r<ii i 3 5 ^WRi^ppiwI gg^ irnl II

6, 15 — Refer 6, 8.

6. 18 — in njip* w^iiilri q^ it g ^tm nljuiilri frail

— <TO asft Mluhiflwi iffnai agar it
wtsi *rftfti I

fl»tir«w' 4sMffW 4ttiwl s« Itiw* Jrar^m ji wrat

tNinwRHf msi^ g^t BTjrJt: i

6, 19 — iVkw ftrtsrs stri rerca Mr^ I MBffl)

Tailtiriya Aranyaka:
h 12, 7— ggtfDt wnfor ftraw >ftrt mnft $tgrsfira?-

Taittiriya Brahmaija:

2, 2, 4, 2— « qftp* c<ji«<*<i qft wi3FT I

^t 1| 4, 1 — «IJjt<5 sraupj?! mbi?1 ^Ri wrftiftr I s

3, 12, 3, 7 — HM^fe"*!^ A f5n=i ^R mJWIRf

Taittiriya Ra mhi fa-—

2, 1 -Avi--n AaarrfHri qprero: i srga %firer ^sr

at^ra *^r wra*wlviiraR a nt# ijfft notn i

2, 2, 10, 2 — is ft g HgM^fJt%Wt I

7, i, i,6— tran^^i TOSw+Ti'^i ^t firswrw-

 — '

TaittirJyopanisad :

Hip: I oH*HilH'3 ! I •WKBP I

Mm ' (Hijwi gftrfj l "jmjji
MHvv i sta*ft»nCTn i mnjni i

2, 5, 9 — iTbfiSli <W?WlftWHIWHll*<ftS"HSFflJW(im:|
TO fillip fiilT! I nl^T ?fij8|: T?T. I IffllT 3TTC! TO ! I "JMJ^

sra^g « jrefa srw^jisfn ^t %a. wfta nsriti ilin i I I

wvtt frar fiij'- ii

fnsama 1
wi u«iiij«lft s jto1hto(i pj i I
Mvw I

WWB tnvjnnKI^ a^gnfew WB swwraq. few i I i

Unto! ^ Sra^ ^iftaia ^ ftwR iifiurR 3 bbi ^t^n

I I 1

a mwnq. I ify% $53 I asrafiiwra^ra u

3RI5I RWW snfftaj 3& I ar»WB II (C£. Cha. 3, 19, 1)

iwt^ 9i i rrriWrt a«n)iH-^ nsftr i wit IWmB nr*nqj

fa^i* i *ra *fts<ra »rat *raft I i^i »ft« "CiRflmiwi* $5^ i

*ra aw *w mfrt n

4t*UWIU(Hi <rati i »ft"ntfii ^ !

' *flii^»Hnfli«Wr*
<jfg*ira[s 4wi: II

Jwra^si ifturat traft ' gsr •wapwuw i aiftisl

irfygt^fes'i^'r^firitgWtft^giyftginii tr<*ft nra^

5i*»« to Rrawfo 3r «* srt» ^raf" 5t % wa° WtW*i

^pfi: o, iamb- " % % n*° * *• *"**= h

« iHrt jt£ nraaftd • ILJaS?* ^^fo^*'' i

,
i

i
^
^ '

awro (raw w* mrt "5°if tan* * f**^ i '

!•( II
strain wra|^ ant ra strata I ws^ tra^rfiTONratfo i am
nfHt ani«ft raor li

3, 10, S-6 — «aosf^rJ.I W*«l(51*IMiW I UrBIHlBlBI-

jHMtywfrhw i la arama", mfm«j fatrawi*, mnTipwira-

^PRn^Jiai^Kmnf wrasrt ;
«taf^.l mnfei touw

M^Ss«i| sipiHiigwH^flflftr i ms raw

jjri siraV li

Vaisciska-Sutras

nwrftr sajFrnnTCHST jgsm yiHWl. i

.Sutra - wise Index of Upanisadic and
other References.

ADHYAYA FIRST
Pdda First

SCtra.

Chi 8, 1, 6; Eg 1,3; 1,445; 2. 3;

Tai. 2, 1; 3. 1; Ma 1,9; 2,1.2;

2,2,11;
Tai. 3, 1; 3, l, B; 2,2,8;
Br. 2,4, 10; 3,1,1; 3,2, B;

Ait. Ar. 2.41.1; Nya, 3u 1,1,2;

Ait. BrS 3,8,1; Pr. 0,8;
Br . 1,4,10; 1,4,15, Pq. Mim
1,7, 8; 2,4, 5; Gai-sa.) 1,2.:
2.4,14; 2,5, IB; 1,2,40; 4,1, 1;

Sit. Bra 1,1.1 -2;

S, 9, 26; ii. 9, 28; Sve. 3, 11; 8, 11;

42. k 4,3,15; Tai. 2. 0;

4,4, T; 4,4.12; Ya;. SaiB 1.1.1;

Cha. 3,18,1; 3,19,1; 5 Ait. 1.1,1;

4, 3,3; 4, 3.7; B. G. 14.17;
5, 7, I; 5, S, 1; Br .
3,7,23;
5,10,5; 6, 2,1; CM. 4,6.23;
fl, 8,7; 7, 1,3; Mu. 1,1,9;

7,28,2; 8, 7,1; Pr. 0,3;

8,12,1; S*e. 3,19; 8,8;

7; 8 6 ChS. 6.1; 8,8,7;

U.
1,2.14; 1,3,11; 7 Ait. Ar. 2,1; 2,6;
Ka.
2,22; Cha. 0, 8,7; 8,14.2
2,18;
3,1, 4;
0,10,3;
 1, 164. 39.
Rg. Sarfi
Tai. 2. 1; 2.7; 3,8;
4.4,18;
h.
Cha. 1,10,9;
a 1,11. 4-5; 6, 8, 3;
12 Ait. Ar. 3. 3,

Kan. 3,3;

Nit. Br:l. 10,3,3.8;

3,9,28; 45,15; Br .
4,3,5; 4,4,1ft
1, B,4; 3.12;
Chi.
Tai. Ar 3,12,7; 3,12.8; a 13, 7;
3.13.3; 6, 3,3;
2,5,15:
Ka.
3,12,9.7;
Taj. BrS
1,9,3.1
Alt. At. [Link];
3.11.3; 3.12,8;

10,43;
B. G.
3,12,7-8;
a
3.13,9-7;
 ADHYAYA first
Fade Second

Chi. 3.14:3.143;
3,14,4,
Mu. 2,1,2;
B. G. 13,13;

Cha. 3,14,2; 3.14,4;

8, 7,1;

Mu. 2,1,2;
five. 43;
Cba. 3,14,3;
Cha. 3,H4;
Sat. Br5. 10,3,3,2;
B. G. 13,2; 18,81;

Br- 3,7,23;

Br. 3,7,23;

Br- 1,4,6;
Kafhaval. 1.2.25;
Mu. 3,1,1;
Ka. 1,2.18;
Br- 4,4.23;
Ka.
1,2.14;
KafhavaJl 1,3,1;
Mu. 3.1,1;

Tai. 2,1;

B. G. 13,2;

Br. 4,5,15;
 Rg. 1.88,1!
JO. 83. 12;

25 Ma. Bhi. 41,88;

26 Cha. 3.14.2; 3,18.1;
5,18,2; 5,19,1;
Rg. Sam. 10,88,3;
5at. Bta. 10,8,1,11;
&t, BtS. 10,8,1.";
31 ChS. S,U, t D 5,l&

[Link]. 10,6,1,11;

ADHYAYA FIRST
Pade. Third

4,5,13; Pra. 4, 2-3; 4, 8;

0,8,4; Sve. 8. IS;
2,1,10; Tai. 2,1;
2. 1,10; 2,2,5; 9 Br- 3.4,2; 4,3,32
a, 2,11;
4,4.7:4,4,21; cha. 7,23,1; 7,24.1
2.2,8; 10 Br- 3,8.7-8;
1, 1, 9;
Cha. 2,23,4;
1, 1, 3; 11 Br .
8,8,9;
1,1,5-8; 2.2.5; 12 3,8,8; 8,3,11;
Br-
3.1.1: 13 Ka. 1,8,11;
4,3,15; Pra. 5,2; 5,5;
14 Br. 2,5.181
7, 1,3; 7,15,1; Cha. 8.1; 8,1,3
7,15,4; 7,18,1; 8,1,5; 8,1,8
7. 23: 7, 84; a 23;
7.24,1; 7,S8,1; Pra.
7,28,51; Sat. Bra 10,8,3,2;
 Sve. 5.8; S|I1 1,21;
IS Cha. 6,81; B.3.2; PQ. Mim 1.1. 5;
16 Be. Rg- 9,62;
Chi. 8.4,1; Tai. Bra 2,2,42.
17 Cha. 1,9,1; 8,14; 29 Rg- 10.71,3;
is Cha. 8,8,4 30 Kau.
19 B.G. 18,31! Rg. Sam 10,190,3;
0!-. 3,7,23; 4.3.30; Sve, 6,18-,

Cha. 8,7,1; 8, 7. 4 Tai. 3,). 4,1;

8,10,1; 8,11,1; 31 Br. 2,42;
8,11,3; 8,12,3; Cha. 3,18.2; 3,19.1

Ka. 1,2,22; 4, 3,1,

Mu. 3,2,9; 33 Cha. 3,6,4;

22 4.2,4; 4.3,6; 33 Air. Bra. 3,8,1;

Br-
4,4-18; Br- 1,4,10;

Chi. 3, 14, 2; Chi. 8.7,2;

Ka. 2,5,15; Sadviiiisa

Mu. 2,2,5; Bra.
2,2,9-10; Tai. 2.1;

23 B. G. Yoga SG-
1,2.14; 2,12; 2,44;
24 Ka.
2, 4, 12, 13; 34 Cha. 4.2,3;

Ma. Bha 3, 297, 17; Tai. Sam 7.1.1,8;

36 Cha.
[Link]. Mmu. Sm 10,4; 10,126;

Su. 6,1; Pra.

Sat. Bra. 11,5, 3, 3;
26 Cha. 8,11,3;
37 Chi. 4.4.5;
PC. Mim 10,1; 12.4
SO. 6,1,5; 38 Gau. dha
a.1; rm:-.s:s;:r
Tai
27 Br. 3,9,1,2; Manu. 4 80;
39 3,3.2; 4,418
Ma. Bha. 12, 110.62; Br.
Ka. 2,5.5; 2,5, 8
28 Br. 1,2,4;- -
Sutra.

40 Chi. 8,6,5; I

8,9,3; 8,

8,12.3;

[Link] FIRST
Pada Fouith

12 Br.
Chn.

Br. i.*.7 :

Rg. B.W.4;
Bf. 3,8,11;
Ml. S.1,*
£ve. 4.10;
Ka. 2,3.15;
Kathavalli 1,1,13-13;
1,1,20; 1,2, 4 Sve.
2, 1; 2, ft 2,7;
Tai.

3.B;
& 1.4,7;
3,19,1; 6,3.1;

2,2,3;
8,4.1; 16 Br.
1.1; 4,3; Kan. Bra.
4,10-11; 17 Cha.
5,8; 6,2,9;

8,11;
2,4,13; 2,4,6 Tai. 2,1; 2,6;
2,4,10; 2,4.12 3,12,7;
4B.6J 23 %. 4.5.6* a
8, 12, 3; Chi. 6,1.3; 6,

3,2,8; Mo. 1.1,347,

2,54-99; 13,17 Pra. 6,3-4;

1,4,10; five. 6,19;

2,4,13-14; Tai. 3,1;
3,7,23; 24 Chi 6,2,3;
3,8,11; 4,4,19, Tai. 2,8,1;
4,4,24; 25 Chi. 1,9.1;

8.8,1; 6,3,2; 26 Tai,

7,25,2; 27 Mu. 1.1. ft

itVi 3,3.6; |
Rg. L 104,1;

ADRYAYA SECOND
P,ida Firs

SStraa,

T .
Tai. Bri 3, 12, B, T;

Br- 1,3,2; 2.4

12,334.29; 8, 1, 7;

12,360.1-3 Ch£. 0,2.364;

It 361; 45; Sit. Bri 6.1,3,2*
Tai. Br5 3.12.9,7;

S Ait. At. M,M.

B[.
Ka.
Rg-
ADHYAYA second
PSda Second

17 Vai. 35. 1,1, 10;

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Cti B.8,7
Ko. 1, 3, 4
B. G. 17, 14 B. G. 14, 17
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.. „ Ait. Ar. 2, 3, El Aa. Ar. t, 3, E,

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fmm below Squ. 2. 1 K.u.3, 1

„ - iP^f $l*d
Kau. 1. 3 Kati. 3, 1

from below Br- 3. B, lfl Br. S, fl, 10

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HriJ^

ill below and something

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