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Chapter

Temporary Works in Construction

of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
Ganga Kasi V. Prakhya

Abstract

This paper gives a summary of the temporary works and methods applied to
enable the construction of bridges near third party assets. The temporary structures
have a significant impact on the cost, construction method and construction safety
of the supported permanent structures. In the literature, there are many examples
of how the temporary works could fail catastrophically and could endanger public
life if hazard identification, risk assessment and quality checks are not carried out
by competent people or organisations. A brief literature survey of the construction
techniques is outlined here. This paper looks at more recent failures and draws
some more lessons with a re-emphasis on the use of industry established processes,
guidelines for preventing catastrophic events. The paper also describes case his-
tories, where mitigation measures are implemented in order to ensure safety by
means of independent checks, monitoring and back analysis.

Keywords: temporary works, monitoring, safety in construction, method

statements, risk assessment, back analysis

1. Introduction

Most forms of bridge construction, whether preassembled or cast in-situ will

require temporary works on site. These may include, depending on the type of
bridge, temporary supports for precast girders or beams, box structures, and
temporary staging for cast in-situ construction of the deck, and may also involve
specialist operations for complex forms of bridge, e.g., post-tensioning. Many
projects focus on optimising the concrete volumes and steel tonnage but a very few
focus on how best to integrate temporary works and buildability concepts into the
permanent design at the early stages.
Temporary works (TW) are the parts of a construction project that are needed to
enable the permanent works to be built. Usually the TW are removed after use—e.g.
access scaffolds, props, shoring, excavation support, falsework, and formwork, etc.
It may be possible that sometimes the TW an integral part of the permanent works—
e.g. props for excavation can be used as part of permanent steelworks, haul road
foundations and crane or piling platforms may be used for hard standing or road
foundations. In view of safety, it is very important that the same degree of care and
attention is given to the design and construction of temporary works (TW) as to the
design and construction of the permanent works. As TW may be in place for only a
short during the construction phase of the project, there is a tendency to assume they
are less important. Lack of care with design, selection, assembly, etc. leaves TW liable
to fail or collapse [1]. This places people at risk of injury and can cause the project to be

1
Structural Integrity and Failure

delayed. Therefore it is important to ensure that the methods, materials, and sequence
of construction is thought through with the construction team during early stages and
that the risks to the structure as well as the third-party asset owners are resolved.
Where bridges form features of modern infrastructure in densely populated
cities and urban areas, the designers will be challenged with site logistics, narrow
and busy streets, and third party assets such as railways, underground tunnels,
and buried services and it is extremely important in these cases to be more diligent
about designing for safety of the temporary works. While the principles can be
applied to all bridges, this paper does not cover large suspension bridges on water.

2. Background and UK scenario

Although there were bridge failures in 1950s in USA, Canada and other parts
of the world, much of the development in temporary works design in UK was
improved when Barton Bridge, Lodden Bridge [2–4] in 1960s and 1970s collapsed
during construction and the government was moved to determine whether the
industry was in a fit state to manage falsework. Following these major failures in the
UK, Professor Stephen Bragg report [4], helped to set the standard for temporary
works design and management in the UK. Major failures of UK temporary works
have almost disappeared since BS 5975 [5] was published in 1982, following the
Bragg report in 1975 into recent falsework disasters in which many lost their lives.
In the UK, the design of temporary support trestles would normally comply with
the requirements of BS 5975 [6] unless the use of Eurocode 12811 [6] and EN 12812
[7], is stipulated as a contractual requirement. More recently, a Temporary Works
forum (TWf) was formed in 2009 [8] in the UK as an independent, non-profit
company that operates on a limited cost base. Useful guidance and toolkit and guid-
ance documents are produced by TWf that address the issues of temporary works
and applicability of Eurocodes for safer construction in the UK [9]. The general
principles of these tool kits generated by the TWf are applicable worldwide.
More recently, the Institutions of Civil Engineers and Institution of Structural
Engineers (UK) formed an independent body called SCOSS/CROSS [10] Structural
Safety Body in 2005. This Structural-Safety Body is a body devoted to evaluating,
and anticipating where possible, trends in the construction industry and issuing
warnings where necessary. A confidential (anonymous) reporting system called
‘CROSS [10]’ broadcasts events which it believes should be more widely known.
While UK standards are developed to a fuller extent to eliminate the catastrophic
events in temporary work through the introduction codes, guidance documents
[11, 12] we still see that failures occur for various reasons. A publication in ICE
Forensic Engineering summarised failures in bridges until 2012 [13] and more than
60 major catastrophic failures across the world have been reported since 2012 to
date [14] including the most recent failure in Florida. A few more recent failures
are reviewed from the literature survey in this paper to highlight the importance of
temporary works.
This paper describes briefly the existing construction techniques of bridges, and
reviews more recent failures. There are many types of bridges and but this paper
summarises a brief literature survey of current construction methods for precast,
prefabricated, and cast-in-situ bridges.
This paper summarises typical scenarios in urban and rural environments and
considers a few case histories with a view on how to safely manage the risks associ-
ated with the construction of bridges in an urban environment. Most forms of
bridge construction, whether preassembled or cast-in-situ will require temporary
works on site. These may include, depending on the type of bridge, temporary

2
Temporary Works in Construction of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
DOI: [Link]

supports for precast girders or beams, box structures, and temporary staging for
cast-in-situ construction of the deck, and may also involve specialist operations for
complex forms of bridge, e.g. post-tensioning. Many projects focus on optimising
the concrete volumes and steel tonnage but a very few focus on how best to inte-
grate temporary works and buildability concepts into the permanent design at the
early stages.

3. Bridge construction techniques: a brief survey

3.1 Precast bridges

Precast concrete members in bridge systems are appealing because they lend
themselves well to incorporating Accelerated Bridge Construction (ABC) methods.
In some cases, ABC also includes integral column and cap beam systems for bridges
utilising precast concrete girders which have several advantages over structures
consisting of steel girders or cast-in-place concrete alternatives as shown in
Figure 1 [15, 16].
For single-span bridge decks, temporary support is normally undertaken
directly from the abutment bearing shelf or equivalent and this is relatively
straightforward. Beams to multi-span bridge decks may require a more complex
temporary support system. If the beams are designed in short lengths until they
stitched, they will require a temporary support. A common solution is to provide a
temporary trestle support either on a temporary foundation or on the permanent
foundation of the piers. Beams are landed on the trestle that supports the bridge
deck structure until such time that it becomes self-supporting. These trestles can
cost significant sums and involve extensive working at height.
Given the consequences of failure and the difficulty of correcting issues that
manifest themselves following landing of bridge beams, a robust temporary support
structure is a necessity. Factors of safety (as per permissible stress design, e.g. BS
5975) and design factors (as per limit state design, e.g. Eurocodes [17, 18]) can be
used amended by the designer to reflect the above. Safety can also be enhanced by
building redundancy into the structure. Unless reasonable calculations are made of
the specifics, there should be reasonable margins in the design for uneven distribu-
tion of load, accidental load and out-of-tolerance assembly.

Figure 1.
Precast girders with GRP deck panels for in situ deck.

3
Structural Integrity and Failure

In the case of steel structures, and launching steel bridge girders, we may need
temporary trestles on temporary foundations. These trestles will require careful
consideration due to the launching operations as their stability under dynamic
conditions is of utmost importance.
The trestles are generally designed for dead loads, live loads, moving dynamic
loads, notional horizontal loads, secondary forces from mis-alignment and will in
some cases have impact loads if they are near a live highway.

3.2 Segmental

Segmental construction is one of the most important developments in con-

struction in the last century and is a very well proven method for delivering
durable, long span, and repetitive structures that are both cost-effective and
visually appealing.
Segmental concrete construction can be executed in two ways: using precast
elements or through cast-in-place construction.
The advantages offered by precast elements are mainly related to fabrication,
conducted in a plant that produces more consistency in quality products and where
segments can be fabricated in parallel with early field construction activities, thus
improving scheduling. The main challenges involved with precast segmental con-
struction lie in the logistics and the setup process between the casting yard and the
construction site. This includes a large temporary work system involving specialist
materials and jacks, and large movable gantry parts.
Alternatively, cast-in-place construction requires that a substructure be com-
pleted prior to fabrication of the superstructure. Cast-in-place segmental construc-
tion is used when precast segments are too heavy to be shipped or access to the site
is too restrictive, which can occur as spans get longer or bridges get wider.
Construction time is a key factor for projects in urban areas which require lane
closures, detours, and traffic interruptions to be minimised. Precast concrete seg-
ments are often optimal as they can be built and stored until needed for erection,
thus reducing the on-site time of large equipment and construction activities, thus
increasing the pace of construction. Figure 2 shows a multi span bridge over a busy
highway built using precast and GRP panels for deck.
The choice between precast or cast-in-place primarily depends upon project
size, construction schedule, weight of segments, and site access.

Figure 2.
Precast beams and cats in situ deck with GRP panels for formwork over existing highway–4 span bridge.

4
Temporary Works in Construction of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
DOI: [Link]

3.3 Balanced cantilever construction

The balanced cantilever construction method is used when several spans rang-
ing from 50 to 250 m exist. Bridges using this method can be either precast or cast-
in-place. Once the piers are built, they are used as an erection platform for precast
segments, or to support a form traveller for cast-in-place segments.
This method can also be easily adapted to irregular and long span lengths,
congested project sites, rough and water terrain, rail crossings, and environmentally
sensitive areas.
The cantilever method is the preferred method for building cable-stayed
bridges. Once segments are installed, they are supported by new cable-stays in each
erection stage. Since no auxiliary supports are required, it is both an economical and
practical solution for long cable-stayed bridges.
As can be seen from the above, all of the techniques will require sophisticated
forms of temporary works to enable safe construction. Despite much regulation and
improvement in methods/processes in temporary works design, we are still, unfor-
tunately, experiencing catastrophic accidents in bridges (examples include Barton
bridge in Manchester in 2016 failure of lifting systems revealed and a 2019 failure in
Norway failure of bolts). The failures of temporary works can be grouped into the
following main areas;

• Scaffold collapse

• Failure of the lifting equipment, or temporary bearings

• Insufficient design capacity of a cantilevered arm of the cantilevered

construction

• Girder and connection failures

• Design and detailing errors

• Incorrect construction sequence

• Negligence and construction errors

If the temporary structures are located close to third party assets, there are
further risks that are very expensive to correct there are explained in the following
section. The paper covers bridges on land and in populated areas and will not cover
large suspension bridges on water.

4. Hazards from and to third party assets

At bridge construction sites in the urban environment, it is not uncommon to

come across: party walls, railways, existing grade listed buildings, existing under-
ground utilities and live highways and riverways. The bridge design and con-
struction will have to address how these asset owners can be protected including
the safety of public road and railway users where applicable. The requirements
of the asset owners may vary but the fundamental aspect of the construction
logistics is to ensure that all assets and owners are protected and public safety
is ensured. As per the CDM regulations in UK [18], the design and construction
should also address life cycle management and also demolition at the end of
design life [19].

5
Structural Integrity and Failure

4.1 Electricity cables and overhead lines

Injuries are usually caused by the explosive effects of arcing current, and by any
associated fire or flames that may result, when a live cable is penetrated by a sharp
object such as the point of a tool. Such effects can also occur when a cable is crushed
severely enough to cause internal contact between the conductors. Injuries are typi-
cally severe, potentially fatal, burns to the hands, face and body. There is also a risk
of electric shock.
Inadvertent contact or being in close proximity to overhead electricity lines with
equipment such as scaffold tubes, irrigation pipes, metal ladders or vehicles, such
as cranes, poses a risk of electric shock. Direct contact with overhead lines is not
necessary as electrical current can arc or flashover any gap between the overhead
lines and the object. It is therefore important to ensure sufficient clearances for
overhead lines are maintained and plant/surcharge loading is restricted from trestle
foundations.

4.2 Gas pipes

Damage to underground gas pipes can cause leaks that immediate or time related
that may lead to fire or explosion. The ground pressure from trestles or crane mats
or outrigger could pose a risk to the stability of the gas pipes and therefore a risk
assessment is required from the surcharge loading.

4.3 Water pipes, sewers and drains

Although damage to water pipes is less likely to result in injury, the following
may occur;

• A jet of water from a main can injure a person.

• Leaks of water from underground pipes can affect adjacent services and reduce
support for other structures.

• Damage to, or removal of thrust blocks can result in sudden loss of contain-
ment and the movement of pipe fittings that may travel some distance or
cause impact damage. While some sewage is pumped at pressure, sewers are
generally gravity-fed, and the main hazards from damage to a sewer are the
possibilities of contamination and subsidence.

The type of materials for these water/sewage pipes, will include brick, cast
iron, ductile iron, clay or concrete. Some asset owners, will give limitations on the
surcharge loading and acceptance criterion for ground settlements or strain, an
example of which is shown below from Thames water UK [20]. Current regulations
in UK will require a risk assessment before placing any temporary foundations or
surcharge on these assets (Tables 1 and 2).

4.4 Telecommunications cables, broadband and fibre optics

Damage to telecommunication and TV cables may require expensive repairs and

can cause considerable disruption to those relying on the system, especially emer-
gency or essential services. The risks of direct personal injury are normally low, but
claims for consequential losses may be substantial.

6
Temporary Works in Construction of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
DOI: [Link]

Table 1.
Assessment criteria for existing Thames Water pipeline and sewer assets (reproduced from Ref. [20]).

Table 2.
Maximum rotation for vitrified clay and concrete pipes.

It is important to ensure that surcharge loading from temporary foundation on

buried cables is limited.
In addition to the above utility services, the presence of other pipes and cables
should be anticipated. These include fuel oil pipes at States housing developments
and private/security electricity and telecommunications cables. Risk assessment
will be required on a case by case basis to suit to owners’ requirement.

4.5 Underground or above ground railway or cable tunnels

Any movement of tunnels if they are underground or above ground (cut and
cover) is very critical for the performance and therefore the asset owners will have
very stringent requirements for the movement temporary works plant around these
structures. Generally clearances need to be maintained between the plant and the
assets and this will vary depending on the depth of the asset below the ground. No
plant can operate within these zones while constructing the bridges. An example of
the Cross Rail exclusion zone in London [20] is shown in Figure 3.

7
Structural Integrity and Failure

Figure 3.
Exclusion zone limits for crossrail underground lines ( figure reproduced from Ref. [21]).

4.6 Party walls or other grade listed buildings

These include third party buildings, existing walls of private owners, and grade
listed buildings. Generally, if the temporary works for bridge construction works
are carried out by the contractor near these assets, he will have to ensure that the
damage to either Partywalls or nearby listed grade buildings is minimal. In UK,
there are party wall agreements on movements and crackwidths as per Boscardin
guidelines [22].
In order to manage the risks from bridge construction operations, it is neces-
sary to prepare a carefully coordinated construction method statement with all the
supply chain involved and which includes the sequence, hazard identification, and
a risk assessment. A management procedure is required to manage the residual risks
on site and contingency measures to mitigate or control the risks.

5. Dealing with hazards: construction method statements, and risk

assessments

Catastrophic events in construction are real issues which require proper consid-
eration by all stakeholders, led by directors and senior staff.
These potentially catastrophic events are sometimes referred to as ‘Top Events’. It
is appreciated that they can have a disastrous impact on a company’s reputation and
well-being and upon society. The process of examining the risk of a catastrophic
event requires that a ‘safety case’ is prepared, based upon a safety risk assessment.

8
Temporary Works in Construction of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
DOI: [Link]

CIRIA and HSE UK reports [23, 24] have looked at the risks of ‘Catastrophic
Events’ in the UK construction industry and summarised its findings in the report.
This report identified the types of events, reason for occurrence, and control
measures and included:

• The types of catastrophic event which have occurred or which might occur
during construction

• The reasons for occurrence when there have been (or could have been)
catastrophic events during construction, including an examination of the
underlying factors

• The controls which would contribute to an avoidance of a catastrophic event

• Where the UK construction industry could improve

It was clear that there have been Catastrophic Events with major consequences.
Their importance was recognised by the industry, although it is considered that
in their day-to-day work few people realised the severity of what might happen if
things went seriously wrong.
The key issues proposed in this reports are as follows:

• Issue 1: The industry should recognise that catastrophic events need further
attention

• Issue 2: Corporate risk management systems should be improved

• Issue 3: Knowledge, skills and experience of safety risk management should be

raised

• Issue 4: Communication and interface management should be improved

• Issue 5: Competence is key

• Issue 6: Effective management of temporary works is crucial to success

• Issue 7: Independent reviews should be employed

• Issue 8: The industry should learn from experience.

Method statements and drawings need to fully detail all aspects of the works. All
safety critical items and hold points/permits to load should be identified.

• Low likelihood/high severity items are to be given careful consideration with

appropriate monitoring at all levels.

• More invasive questioning and understanding of sub-contractor’s Method

Statements and Risk Assessments

5.1 Risk assessments

The terms used in risk assessment vary considerably in the literature. In this
report, a harm is defined as an adverse effect on a person. It might be, for example,

9
Structural Integrity and Failure

a serious illness or injury, but effects on well-being are also taken into account. A
hazard is a potential cause of harm to a person, for example a faulty staircase. A haz-
ardous situation exists when a person is exposed to a hazard, for example by using a
faulty staircase. The risk associated with a hazard is a function of (a) the likelihood
of the hazard causing harm and (b) the severity of the harms or their consequences.
Safe systems of work shall comprise:

• Assess the risks.

• Plan the work - obtain all information relating to the work carried out.

• Check that the plans are accurate.

• Carry out the work in a safe manner.

• At all stages THINK and REVIEW.

The assessment of risk should be considered at all stages of the work, from
planning through to final reinstatement. This may be accomplished by the use of
formal risk assessments coupled, where necessary, with a work permit system. Risk
assessment should include all related work activities and identify training and com-
petency needs as well as the level of supervision required for the risks involved [10].

6. Need for construction: pre trials, tests and other monitoring

Sometimes, it is necessary to carry out trials on site before the bridge structure
construction begins. This may take include some mock structures to be built on
site to validate all the assumptions in the design. The purpose is to ensure that the
sequence of construction can be carried out safely. Examples include test loading
on the trestles or surcharge loading, and monitoring of displacements etc. and
mock assembly in case of structural steel joints. Eurocodes can be implemented to
optimise the temporary works design if suitable testing is carried out.
In the following section, we give more recent literature survey of failures in the
temporary works that involved public and third party asset owners and give addi-
tional examples of how we have managed the risks (as explained in Sections 3 and 4)
during the construction for the projects in which Sir Robert McAlpine and their
joint partners were involved. Our recent project also demonstrate how we have used
trials on site for back analysis and how monitoring was carried out to improve the
confidence in predictions and stakeholder assurances.

7. Survey of lessons learnt from recent failures

7.1 Barton Bridge, Eccles, Feb 1959 & 2016

In the UK the First Barton bridge collapsed in 1959 whilst erecting 4 No,
200 ton steel girders, 80 ft. above the ground [3, 14]. The supporting scaffolding
collapsed bringing down the girders and killing 4 men. Sixty men, that would
normally have been on the girders, were lining up for their pay at the time.
Ironically after 57 years, at the same location in 2016, temporary lifting system
failed collapsing a major chunk of the new bridge span across the river as shown in
Figure 4a and b.

10
Temporary Works in Construction of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
DOI: [Link]

7.2 GE 19 bridge on East London Line

GE19 is an 84 m long, single span Warren truss girder bridge on a 3.3% gradi-
ent from East to West with a bridge weighed 1300 tonnes post launch and had an
In-situ deck on ‘Omnia’ permanent formwork [25]. Minimum clearance of 650 mm
to overhead lines. It was found that the bridge had moved longitudinally 38 mm out
of position post launch. This necessitated corrective plan jacking that had not been
envisaged during pre-planning. At approximately 19:15 hours on 28th May 2008, an
hour after work had stopped, the site security guard heard three loud bangs. The
Bridge deck had dropped by approx. 200 mm resulting in damage to scaffolding and
bearings. Five planks fell onto the live rail below the bridge, ponded water onto the
overhead lines and track and the track had to be closed. There were no injuries to
any members of the public or employees. PTFE material had been placed on a slope,

Figure 4.
(a) Barton bridge scaffold collapse (1959) and (b) lifting failure of a modern bridge (2016) ( figures
reproduced from Refs. [3, 14]).

Figure 5.
Temporary bearing.

11
Structural Integrity and Failure

the vertical load of the bridge generated a horizontal force component. The pres-
ence of a second slip plane allowed the wedge of packing between the PTFE surface
and bearing surface to be ejected as in Figure 5. A similar incident did not occur at
the West abutment because the permanent bearings were of a fixed type and hence
did not fail (see Figure 6).

7.3 Motorway bridge temporary works collapse Colombian Bridge

In March 2019 the temporary works of a motorway bridge near Ancona, Italy,
shown in Figure 7 [26] failed with the immediate collapse of the bridge deck onto
cars passing below sadly killing two members of the public [14, 26]. The motorway
was subsequently closed. An example of both the human and financial consequences
of errors in construction. A design error was blamed for the collapse of the bridge.

7.4 Grayston Drive collapse (Johannesburg)

Two people were killed and 19 injured when the formwork supporting the
under-construction bridge collapsed unexpectedly in 2016 shown in Figure 8 [27].
The initial inquiry showed that some of the site inspection registers for the period
just before the collapse were not available [27].

Figure 6.
Bridge launch over railway (reproduced from Ref. [25]).

Figure 7.
Colombian bridge failure (reproduced from Ref. [26]).

12
Temporary Works in Construction of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
DOI: [Link]

7.5 Norway Bridge Collapse 2018

A Hydrogen embrittlement crack has been identified as causing the failure of

one of the cable anchor bolts of the Norway Halogaland Bridge shortly after instal-
lation shown in Figure 9 [28]. The initial enquiry showed that that the root cause of
the cracking is the hydrogen exposure of the bolts. It is not known if the bolts were
exposed to Hydrogen during manufacturing, transportation or at the site.

7.6 Injaka Bridge, South Africa 1998

Incorrect positioning of temporary bearings during incremental launching was

identified as the primary cause of the fatal 1998 Injaka Bridge collapse in South
Africa [29].
Inexperienced design and construction staff, poor construction quality control
and a failure to react to a ‘clear warning that all was not well’ with the structure,
led to the disaster. At 300 m long, 14 m wide and up to 37 m above the river
bed, Injaka Bridge was a major structure and the consultant and contractor had
extensive experience with such incrementally launched post-tensioned structures.
The collapse occurred after the contractor had slid out five of the 20, 15 m long
sections of the 3 m deep box section deck. The sixth segment was being jacked as
the structure collapsed. At that point the concrete deck extended 24.4 m beyond
pier 2 with the leading edge of the 27 m long launching nose projecting 7.1 m
beyond pier 3.

Figure 8.
Collapse of temporary supports 2018 ( figure reproduced from Ref. [27]).

Figure 9.
Hydrogen cracking in bolts ( figure reproduced from Ref. [28]).

13
Structural Integrity and Failure

The primary cause of the collapse was found to have been the positioning of
temporary bearings on which the deck structure slid out during construction as
shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10.
Failure of a multi span bridge ( figure reproduced from Ref. [29]).

Figure 11.
Florida Bridge collapse, 2019 (reproduced from Ref. [25]).

Figure 12.
Node 11 failure (reproduced from Ref. [30]).

14
Temporary Works in Construction of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
DOI: [Link]

7.7 Florida Bridge collapse 2019

The initial investigation showed that where the tow truss members meet, at joint
11, there was overestimation of the capacity and under estimation of the loads as
shown in Figures 11 and 12 [25, 30, 31].

8. Case studies of mitigation

Examples of case studies from our recent project experience published by the
author in various reports (internal and external) are outlined below. These case
studies show how the temporary works design should address the stake holder’s
expectations in managing risks. Five case histories discussed here show the impor-
tance of design, checking, and monitoring and back analysis.

8.1 Case Study 1: Arsenal bridges, London, UK

An example of assets affected by the bridge launch—temporary trestle founda-

tions next to network rail assets, and piling plant and movement of construction
plant on the sensitive underground railway tunnels (Figure 13).
Assessments were carried out to ensure that the settlements, and movements and
surcharge loadings were managed. Monitoring was carried out to gain confidence in
the predictions and to ensure that mitigation measures can be placed (Figure 14).

8.2 Case Study 2: Gogarburn Bridge, Scotland

The road bridge is on the new spur off the A8 into the new headquarters for
the Royal Bank of Scotland. The bridge deck was being erected on temporary
trestles, located on either side of the road and in the central reservation. The box
girders will be lifted into place in half span sections, each weighing approximately
73 T. Secondary beams span between the box girders to support the deck. The
deck was cast on ‘omnia plank’ permanent formwork. The sequence is depicted
in Figure 15 and the temporary trestles that required design for impact loads are
shown in Figure 16.

Figure 13.
Bridge launch.

15
Structural Integrity and Failure

Figure 14.
General arrangement plan and section showing trestles, UG services, tunnels, and network rail.

Figure 15.
Erection sequence of the bridge, trestle.

The arch was being erected in three sections. Each of the two outer pieces
was supported by the bearing plate at one end and a trestle on top of the deck at
the other.
Finally the centre section was dropped in to complete the arch. The arch was
welded together, 25 m above the road. Ten tension rods support the bridge in
the centre.

16
Temporary Works in Construction of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
DOI: [Link]

Figure 16.
Temporary trestles near live highway.

8.3 Case Study 3: Motorway M74, UK, Bridge Launch from the temporary
trestles

As a part of the M74 completion project in Glasgow, Sir Robert McAlpine

Design group, working closely with the site based Joint Venture, has been responsi-
ble for many elements of design and checking for the West section of the work [31].
Included in the West section is a 1350 m length of an elevated structure formed
of trapezoidal steel girders with in-situ concrete deck and parapets. This section
passes over three sections of the overground line which are a part of Network Rails
assets; the Paisley Line, the Cook Street Link, and the West Coast Mainline. Parts
are also close to a section of the Strathclyde Passenger Transport (SPT) under-
ground line.
With the exception of the West Coast Mainline section, the steel sections were
lifted in place using mobile cranes. These sections were supported on temporary
trestles whilst they were welded. The section of superstructure spanning over a
65 m wide cutting containing the West Coast mainline was installed by launching
the bridge as shown in Figure 17a. A 235 m long, 4200 tonne section was formed
to the West of the cutting, complete with a section of in situ deck and parapet, and
then launched a total of 166 m during a series of short night-time possessions. The

Figure 17.
(a) Launch of the bridge over the live highway and railway, (b) aerial photo of the launch (extract from
Ref. [31]).

17
Structural Integrity and Failure

cantilever distance to the first temporary trestle support beyond the cutting is 89 m.
In order to ensure safety to both Public and the existing network rail assets, the
temporary works design included the following and was developed collaboratively
with the supply chain partners in the joint venture project.

i. Assessment of the ground was necessary for designing working platforms for
all the plant and craneage required for the steel lifts. Outrigger loads from
the cranes were up to 4200 kN, with 6000 kN of superlift loadings.

ii. Assessing the effect of the applied loads on the Scotland Public Transport
(SPT) infrastructure.

iii. Design of frames and anchored rock netting to protect Network Rail assets
during piling and pier construction operations adjacent to the railway cutting.

iv. Design of temporary support trestles and their support piles to take the
vertical and horizontal loads applied during the bridge launch operations.
The calculated vertical loads were up to 18,000 kN on a single temporary
leg under the worst case loading. The design of the trestles evolved as work
proceeded as exploratory works were carried out in advance of the piling and
services or obstructions were encountered:
One pair of temporary trestle bases was cast adjacent to a Network Rail
Retaining and within a main road. The design had to take account of the
need to avoid unacceptable movements to the nearby masonry retain-
ing wall.

v. The six 1200 mm piles to each base had to be installed in locations which
avoided impacting on three gas mains, electric cables and a brick sewer.

vi. Design of additional support walls to take the bridge launch loads on the pile
caps under the temporary loading conditions.

Working collaboratively with our supply chain partners, loads on each of the
trestles for the launching operations were derived and were used in the analysis of
temporary trestles. Trestles foundations included piles where space was restricted
and pad foundation where space was not restricted. The analysis for various combi-
nations of normal loads and accidental loads were carried out in ANSYS and typical
results from the analysis were summarised in Table 3. These were used for monitor-
ing the loads and the movements of the foundations using targets on trestles and
foundations.

8.4 Case Study 4: construction of a segmental arch bridge over a railway,

Dobwalls Bypass, UK

This case study, published in detail in Ref. 32 by the author, shows how the tem-
porary works were managed by the project team in order to ensure that there was
no repeat of ‘Gerrards cross failure’. The failure at Gerrards Cross, reported in 2005,
demonstrated the importance of controlling the backfill and carefully controlling
and monitoring the deflections of the arch bridges during construction. The 87 m
long arch unit spanning 15.5 m with a rise of 5.6 m was built on the monolithic
principle, which means it acts as one single structure. The radius of the curved track
underneath is 500 m, which proved a challenging aspect of the project.

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Temporary Works in Construction of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
DOI: [Link]

Item Trestle 1 Trestle 2 Trestle 3

Vertical settlement 8 mm 8 mm 0 mm (under

lifting strut). 6 mm
elsewhere.
Anticipated lateral movement (at pile cap). 10 mm 10 mm 9 mm
Parallel to launch

Maximum lateral movement (worst case soils) — — 21 mm

at pile cap. Parallel to launch
Maximum lateral movement (worst case) at — — 14 mm
pile cap. Perpendicular to NR retaining wall

Worst case lateral movement at network rail — — 3 to 5 mm

wall for worst case soils and bridge being pulled
back (westwards)
Total maximum vertical load on support +5000 kN 34,500 kN 20,000 kN

Total minimum vertical load on support −4350 kN — —

Table 3.
Amber trigger levels for movements and loads on trestles.

The structure was in the form of a short tunnel, a proprietary system by Asset
International, comprising pre-cast concrete arch segments springing from an RC
slab and upstand, supported on piled foundations. The arch was formed from
pre-cast concrete elements using a proprietary arch system with an elliptical cross-
section. The two ends of the tunnel consisted of portal sections which are bevelled
to follow the slope of the new embankment for the realigned section of road. Since
the bridge structure is made up of arch-shaped pre-cast elements, the elements at
the ends of the tunnel are cut-off, and no longer form a full arch. These truncated
elements, therefore, are connected to each other by means of cast-in-situ reinforced
concrete collars to form a monolithic reinforced concrete shell. This monolithic
shell includes the two outermost full arch rings which allow all loads acting on one
side of the bevel to be transferred to the other side and to the foundations. Working
collaboratively with the project team, we have developed a safe system of construc-
tion as described below.
In order to predict the behaviour of the tunnels during construction and to
advise the construction teams on the methodology, it was necessary to model each
stage both in 2D and 3D models. The construction sequence was represented in the
analysis by a total of 15 stages as shown in Figure 18. Full details of the FE model,
assumptions, approach, and the sequence including sensitivity analyses were pub-
lished in a separate paper Ref. [32] by the author(s). Only extracts from Ref. [32] are
presented in this paper.
The construction phases are summarised below.
Phase 1: Establish initial conditions for existing ground and railway
embankment;
Phase 2: Place new fill up to the level of the existing railway embankment, and
install piles and pile caps;
Phase 3: Construct arch;
Phase 4: Place fill for the new road embankment away from the arch structure up
to 75% of the overall height of the arch segments;
Phases 5–13: Place backfill against the arch with a maximum differential
between sides of 600 mm, with compaction load of 11.5 kN/m2 on the surface of
the fill;

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Structural Integrity and Failure

Figure 18.
Construction sequence model analysed in the finite difference software (FLAC).

Phase 14: Place final layer of fill over the arch, with compaction load of
11.5 kN/m2 over the full width of the model on the top surface;
Phase 15: Remove compaction load of 11.5 kN/m2 on top surface of the model.
It was important to carry out sensitivity studies with respect to soil stiffness,
backfill characteristics, interface stiffness, and initial conditions of the arch to
establish lower and upper bounds of movements. These sensitivity studies helped
us to develop a safe and robust scheme of backfilling sequence and helped us to set
new trigger limits for safe construction. Closed-form solutions predict the move-
ments for a fully backfilled scenario however they will not predict the movements
for unsymmetrical backfilling on either side of the arches and therefore numerical
models in 2D and 3D will give insight to real behaviour. The models developed
here in 2D and 3D, therefore, gave insight into the development of the movement
throughout the construction process. The power of the modelling is demonstrated
by comparing the analytical results with observations on site. The site observations
matched well with the numerical predictions from 2D and 3D models as shown in
Figure 19.

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Temporary Works in Construction of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
DOI: [Link]

Figure 19.
Movement of the crown of the arch while backfilling sequence is progressed to build the highway bridge over the
railway.

8.5 Case Study 5: construction of a hanging building from the truss over railway,
Bull Ring, Birmingham, UK

The Bull Ring Redevelopment in Birmingham consisted of demolishing the

existing 1960s concrete shopping centre and replacing it with a new one. The
northern part of this new complex lies directly above the New Street South railway
tunnels, which carry the main lines to London and the West Country through them.
During the redevelopment work there was the potential to affect the railway tunnels
at various stages of construction.
To maximise the available retail space at the northern end of the development, 2
No. hanging structures were to be constructed to extend the development over the
Northern Arm road, with the pedestrian footbridge described above providing the
‘sandwich’ between the hanging structures. To support these hanging structures a
structural steelwork bowstring truss is positioned at either end of each structure,
spanning across the Northern Arm to carry all other intermediate steelwork,
reinforced concrete floor slabs, roof, cladding, etc.
The western hanging structure is supported by trusses T1 and T2, which are sup-
ported at their northern end by double columns supported off a reinforced concrete
pile cap founded on a cluster of mini piles constructed within the basement of the
Rotunda. At its southern end these trusses are again supported by a twin steel column
section founded behind the contiguous piled wall and thus forming part of the main
development structural frame. The brick arch railway tunnels are not continuous
for the full length of the Northern Arm. At its western end the brick arch tunnels
give way to a reinforced concrete road bridge, built 1961–1962. This road bridge
continues in a westerly direction towards the New Street station junction, noting that
immediately northwest of truss T1 the road bridge deck slab is discontinuous with an
open section of railway exposed and only protected by a 1.8 m high concrete parapet
wall constructed around the opening. Working collaboratively with our supply chain
partners, we have developed a safe erection methodology as described below.
Once the fabrication location was established, crane sizes and locations were
firmed up, thus allowing a detailed crane analysis to be carried out to produce
theoretical outrigger loads, including any redistribution of loads resulting from any
crane slewing, jibbing in/out, etc. during the lifts. The Railtrack structures were
then assessed under these loads, with feedback to the site team accordingly if the

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Structural Integrity and Failure

Figure 20.
Erection of 140 T truss over the railway with a soil cover of 3 m.

structures were likely to be overstressed, with recommendations to relocate cranes,

increase outrigger mats, distribute outrigger loads onto twin mats, etc.
Once craneage locations were finalised, craneage layouts were firmed up,
structural checks were completed, scaffold layouts finalised and method statements
produced. Craneage used for the fabrication of the trusses and associated erection
of the temporary works support scaffold varied from truss to truss, but for each
truss one of the cranes used for the tandem lift of that truss was utilised as the
service crane for the above works. Therefore, for trusses T1 and T2 a 400 T crane
was used with an 800 T crane used for trusses T3 and T4. As part of the checks
undertaken during the initial piling works to establish constraints for the piling
plant, its location, and associated excavations, a considerable amount of design
checks using finite element analysis had been undertaken on the brick arch tunnels.
To satisfy railtrack/network rail requirements the following monitoring equipment
had been installed into the tunnels before works started and included, electro level
beam surveys, vibration sensors, tilt meters, and tape extensometers.
Temporary works design checks undertaken were based on theoretical outrigger
loads prepared by the crane manufacturers following assessment of the different
lifts by the different cranes. On the basis that these outrigger loads did not cause
distress to the structures below, it was essential that outrigger loads were checked
to ensure that the theoretical maximum loads were not exceeded. Hence use was
made of the crane digital outrigger load readout indicator to monitor these loads.
The details of the finite element analysis and the assumptions are presented in a full
paper in Ref. [33] and only extracts from Ref. 33 are presented in this paper.
During each lift and at various times during the fabrication of the trusses, the
tunnel monitoring system PC was attended full time by one of our site engineers to
observe any changes, notably deformation movements. A site engineer would also
monitor the full time the crane outrigger load indicator during major lifts.
During the crane lifts and during the fabrication of the trusses no discernible
deformation to the tunnel was recorded—noting that, when the tunnel monitoring
system PC was not being observed full time, the system did activate a telephone
alarm once a deformation of 7 mm occurred.

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Temporary Works in Construction of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
DOI: [Link]

The crane outrigger loads, as observed on the outrigger load indicator, were
generally well inside the theoretical figures. On truss T1 lift the 800 T crane on the
bridge beams had a maximum outrigger load of 74 T against a predicted value of
106 T. On truss T2 lift the 800 T crane on the tunnel central wall had a maximum
outrigger load of 92 T against a predicted value of 98 T.
One the same lift the 400 T crane on the transfer beams spanning across the
beams had a maximum outrigger load of 99 T against a predicted value of 120 T.
Figure 20 shows the truss T1 over the tunnels.
Immediately following each lift on the first available track possession/isolation a
visual inspection of the tunnel was undertaken and no visible signs of distress and

Figure 21.
Non-linear finite element analysis of soil structure interaction for the loads from erection of the truss over the
live railway.

Table 4.
Measured and observed movements of the arch for 70 T rig on the tunnels.

23
Structural Integrity and Failure

movement were ever observed. Tape extensometer checks were also undertaken
and again no significant movement attributable to the crane lifts was ever recorded.
Finite element models were developed in ANSYS (commercially available
software) in view of the above. In particular, two-dimensional linear and non-
linear global analysis and a three-dimensional non-linear local analysis were carried
out. Figure 21 shows the finite element model. Planar elements were used for
two-dimensional analysis whereas solid elements with no tension were used in the
three-dimensional analysis.
ANSYS results were calibrated against site observations by making test trails
on-site by surcharging pile plant loading on the tunnels and results are shown in
Table 4.
Analysis method, assumptions, and further details of the finite elements are
presented in the detailed paper by the authors in CIRIA report on tunnelling [33].
Only extracts are presented in this paper.

9. Summary

Temporary works are an integral part of the safe construction of bridges and
should be designed by competent bodies. Independent checks, and balances are to
be in place to ensure that the public and asset owners are protected by the con-
struction method, construction sequence of bridges. This paper summarises more
recent failures and draws the conclusion that some of the best practice guidelines
as developed in the UK can be adopted outside the UK. Early engagement by the
contractor and communication to all the parties involved play a significant role in
the safe delivery of the works at the site. Every aspect of the temporary work should
be looked into in detail with reasonable margins of safety. Regular monitoring
during the construction to ensure that the early warnings are not exceeded and are
vital to verify the performance is as predicted and that no unsafe condition is being
approached.

Acknowledgements

The author is thankful to Parsons Brickenhoff for supply of the data and Asset
International for sharing site measurements and photos. The author is thankful to
our JV team of M74 and Paul Doughty of Sir Robert McAlpine Design Group for
sharing data and photographs.

Conflict of interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

24
Temporary Works in Construction of Bridges Near Third Party Assets
DOI: [Link]

Author details

Ganga Kasi V. Prakhya

Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd, Eaton Court, United Kingdom

*Address all correspondence to: [Link]@[Link]

© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License ([Link]
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.

25
Structural Integrity and Failure

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