TITION 2024

TC – NMCC18

SVVV NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2024

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

IN THE MATTER OF

Maria & Anr. …………………………………………………………… APPELLANT

VERSUS
Shambhu Singh & Anr. ………………………………………………. RESPONDENT

APPEAL FILED UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

DRAWN AND FILED BY COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................. 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................... 4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .................................................................................. 6
SUMMARY OF FACTS ..................................................................................................... 7
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ................................................................................................. 8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................... 9
WRITTEN PLEADINGS ................................................................................................. 10
I. A LIVE-IN PARTNER CANNOT CLAIM MAINTENANCE FROM THE
PARENT OF THE OTHER AFTER THE LATTER’S DEATH ................................ 10
A. NO STATUTORY PROVISION FOR THE CLAIM OF MAINTENANCE
FROM THE FATHER-IN-LAW............................................................................... 10
B. NO PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE CAN BE DRAWN UNDER SECTION
114 OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 ........................................................ 11
II. NO GROUNDS ARE MADE OUT FOR INTERFERENCE UNDER
ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION ................................................................. 12
A. NO EXCEPTIONAL AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST ................ 12
B. NO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW INVOLVED ................................ 13
III. LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIP IS NOT VALID DUE TO WANT OF
LEGISLATION ............................................................................................................. 14
A. LACK OF VALIDATION DOES NOT INFRINGE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS ..................................................................................................................... 14
B. LIVE-IN IS NOT A RELATIONSHIP IN THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE .. 16
C. WANT OF LEGISLATION RECOGNIZING LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIP .... 18
IV. THE CHILDREN BORN OUT OF A LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIP ARE NOT
LEGITIMATE AND ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE INHERITANCE RIGHTS .. 19
A. RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT AMOUNT TO MARRIAGE ........................... 19
B. NOT ENTITLED TO PROPERTY.................................................................... 21
V. A PARTNER OF A LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIP IS NOT ENTITLED TO
INHERITANCE FROM THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER ...................................... 22
PRAYER ........................................................................................................................... 24

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIR All India Reporter

Anr. Another
Ed. Edition
Hon’ble Honourable
CrLJ Criminal Law Journal
Cr.P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
IEA Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Ors. Others
PC Privy Council
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
U.P. Uttar Pradesh
U.O.I Union of India
v Versus
¶ Paragraph
& And
@ Alias
# Number
§ Section

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:
1. Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v State of Gujarat & Ors. AIR 2005 SC 1809
2. Badri Prasad v Dy. Director of Consolidation & Ors. (1978) 3 SCC 527
3. Thakur Gokalchand v Parvin Kumari & Ors. 1952 AIR 231
4. Seema v Aswani Kumar (2006) 2 SCC 578
5. Pritam Singh v The State AIR 1950 SC 169
6. State of U.P. v Ram Manorath (1972) 3 SCC 215 (SC)
7. Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v KGS Bhatt (1989) AIR 1972 (SC)
8. Shivanand Gaurishankar Baswanti v Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills & Ors. 2008 (13)
SCC 323
9. Mathai @ Joby v George & Anr. AIR 2010 (4) SCC 358
10. Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (1962) AIR
1314 (SC)
11. Union of India v Rajeshwari & Co. (1986) 161 ITR 60 (SC)
12. Gurbakhsh Singh v State of Punjab (1955) AIR 320 (SC).
13. EV Chinnaiah v State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2002 SC 162
14. RK Dalmia v Justice Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538
15. Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v Union of India AIR 2018 SC 4321
16. Indra Sarma v VKV Sarma AIR 2014 SC 309
17. Cellular Operators Association of India v Telecom Regulatory Authority of India
2016 (9) SCR 1
18. B.R. Kapur v State of Tamil Nadu 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 191
19. Delhi Transport Corporation v DTC Mazdoor Congress (1990) Supp. 1 SCR 142
20. BS Lokhande v Maharashtra (1965) 2 SCR 837
21. Kanta Yadav v Om Prakash Yadav (2019) 2 CLR 568 (SC)

STATUTES:

1. Constitution of India
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)
3. Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956)

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4. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956)

5. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872)
6. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872)
7. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925)
8. Special Marriage Act, 1954 (43 of 1954)

BOOKS:

1. Avtar Singh’s Principles of the Law of Evidence, Ed. 18th

2. Batuk Lal’s The Law of Evidence, Ed. 22nd
3. I.M. Patel’s Hindu Law of Divorce, Maintenance & Child Custody, Ed. 2nd
4. M.P. Jain’s Indian Constitution Law, Ed. 7th
5. Mulla’s Indian Succession Act, Ed. 1st
6. N.V. Paranjape’s Studies in Jurisprudence & Legal Theory, Ed. 9th
7. Narender Kumar’s Constitutional Law of India, Ed. 10th
8. Paras Diwan’s Modern Hindu Law, Ed. 24th
9. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s The Law of Evidence, Ed. 27th

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Appellants have approached the Supreme Court of India under Article 136(1) 1 of the
Constitution of India. The Respondents humbly submit to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble
Court.

The present memorial on behalf of the respondents sets forth the facts, contentions and
arguments in the present case.

1
136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
(1) Not withstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave
to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made
by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any
court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

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SUMMARY OF FACTS
MARRIAGE OF MR. SANAT KUMAR AND MARIA

Mr. Sanat Kumar, serving as a Managing Director, fell in love with Maria, a Christian woman
working in the same company. The two married in dual ceremonies, first according to Christian
rites in a church and later through Hindu rituals, including the sapthapadi, without converting
their religions or registering the marriage. Despite their religious differences, they continued
practising their respective faiths, and Maria retained her maiden name. This union brought
them a son three years into their marriage.

SEPARATE RESIDENCE FROM PARENTS

Before his marriage, Mr. Sanat Kumar had purchased a bungalow, which was occupied by his
parents, Mr. Shambhu Singh and Mrs. Roopa Devi. Post-marriage, Maria chose to become a
homemaker, a decision that, along with their living arrangements and Maria's independence in
religious practice, was not well-received by Sanat's parents. The family dynamics grew
strained, leading Sanat's parents to live separately.

DEMISE OF MR. SANAT KUMAR

The unfortunate demise of Mr. Sanat Kumar due to illness left behind unresolved issues,
notably concerning his estate. Having died intestate, with no will or power of attorney, a dispute
over his property and the maintenance of his wife and child ensued. Maria sought to claim
succession of Mr. Sanat’s estate and maintenance for herself and their minor child. However,
her claims were contested by Sanat's parents, who questioned the validity of the marriage and
the child's legitimacy.

LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AND APPEALS

Faced with denial from her in-laws, Maria initially approached the trial court, asserting her
relationship with Sanat under the guise of a “live-in relationship,” given their unregistered
marriage. Her attempt to secure rights through this claim, however, was dismissed. Maria
escalated the matter to the High Court through an appeal under section 100 of the Civil
Procedure Code, only to face rejection once more.

In a final bid for justice, she took her case to the Supreme Court of India, challenging the High
Court's decision and seeking recognition of her marriage and her child's legitimacy. Hence this
appeal.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE PRESENTED BEFORE THE HON’BLE

COURT FOR ITS CONSIDERATION:

ISSUE I

WHETHER WIDOW MARIA (SO CALLED WIFE OF SANAT KUMAR ON THE

GROUND OF LIVE IN RELATIONSHIP) IS ENTITLED FOR MAINTENANCE WITH
HER FATHER IN LAW?

ISSUE II

WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF

CONSTITUTION, BROUGHT BEFORE THIS COURT IS MAINTAINABLE?

ISSUE III

WHETHER THE LIVE IN RELATIONSHIP IN MODERN INDIAN SOCIETY IS VALID?

ISSUE IV

WHETHER THE CHILD IS LEGITIMATE AND ENTITLED TO THE PROPERTY OF HIS

FATHER?

ISSUE V

WHETHER MARIA IS ENTITLED TO THE PROPERTY OF HER PARTNER MR. SANAT

KUMAR (DECEASED)?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE I. A LIVE-IN PARTNER CANNOT CLAIM MAINTENANCE FROM THE

PARENT OF THE OTHER AFTER THE LATTER’S DEATH

The submission made before the Hon'ble Supreme Court posits that the appellant lacks
entitlement to maintenance from the respondent based on a purported live-in relationship
between herself and the deceased son of the respondent, as there is no statutory provision
conferring such rights, and no presumption of marriage can be drawn under section 114 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

ISSUE II. NO GROUNDS ARE MADE OUT FOR INTERFERENCE UNDER

ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION

The submission before the Hon’ble Court argues that the appellant has failed to prove that the
appeal falls within the purview of categories of cases under which the Apex Court should
interfere invoking its power under Article 136.

ISSUE III. LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIP IS NOT VALID DUE TO WANT OF

LEGISLATION

The submission before the Court respectfully argues that there is no legislation recognizing the
validity of live-in relationships and the power of interpretation cannot be extended to making
legislation.

ISSUE IV. THE CHILDREN BORN OUT OF A LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIP ARE NOT
LEGITIMATE AND ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE INHERITANCE RIGHTS

The submission before the Hon'ble Supreme Court asserts that the circumstances surrounding
the case do not sufficiently establish a compelling basis to affirm the legitimacy and inheritance
rights of children born out of wedlock.

ISSUE V. A PARTNER OF A LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIP IS NOT ENTITLED TO

INHERITANCE FROM THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER

The submission before the Hon'ble Supreme Court contends that the appellant does not possess
entitlement to the property of the deceased, as their relationship fails to satisfy the essential
requirements of a valid marriage.

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WRITTEN PLEADINGS

I. A LIVE-IN PARTNER CANNOT CLAIM MAINTENANCE FROM THE

PARENT OF THE OTHER AFTER THE LATTER’S DEATH
(¶1.) It is humbly submitted before this Court that the appellant is not entitled to maintenance
from the respondent on the grounds of a live-in relationship between her and the respondent’s
deceased son because there is no provision conferring the right of maintenance on a live-in
partner from another partner’s parents upon the death of the either [A] and no presumption of
marriage can be drawn from the existing circumstances under section 114 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 [B].

A. NO STATUTORY PROVISION FOR THE CLAIM OF MAINTENANCE FROM

THE FATHER-IN-LAW
(¶1.) It is contended that there exists no statutory provision in the Cr.P.C. or personal laws –
secular and religious – that entitles live-in partner maintenance from the deceased partner’s
relatives as a dependant or otherwise.

(¶2.) It is contended that this may be an inadequacy in law, which only the legislature can undo.
Even if it is true that the deceased was treating the appellant as his wife it is really
inconsequential. It is the intention of the legislature which is relevant and not the attitude of
the party. The principle of estoppels cannot be pressed into service to defeat the provision of
section 125 of the Cr.P.C.2 or for that matter any other provision entitling wife maintenance
from husband or father-in-law.

(¶3.) That, section 125 of the said Code cannot be stretched to hold those persons other than
the persons mentioned are also covered by the said provision of law to provide maintenance
from persons, not liable to provide maintenance under that section.

(¶4.) It is contended that the claimant being the wife of the deceased cannot maintain any claim
against the father of the deceased under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. though, of course, had she
been the daughter-in-law of the deceased, she would have a right to claim maintenance from
such person also under any other personal law applicable on them and not under Section 125
of the Cr.P.C.

2
Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v State of Gujarat & Ors. AIR 2005 SC 1809

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(¶5.) Arguendo, the appellant is the daughter-in-law of the deceased, it is contended that the
father-in-law is under no obligation to maintain his daughter-in-law except where there is some
ancestral property in his possession from which the daughter-in-law has not obtained any share.

(¶6.) In the instant case, the appellant has pleaded as the live-in partner3 of the deceased and
not as the wife of the deceased or daughter-in-law of the respondents.

B. NO PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE CAN BE DRAWN UNDER SECTION 114

OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
(7.) It is submitted that if a strong presumption arises in favour of wedlock where the partners
have lived together for a long spell as husband and wife.4 But the presumption is rebuttable and
if there are circumstances which weaken or destroy the presumption, the court cannot ignore
them.5

(8.) It is submitted that this Court has established a significant legal precedent regarding the
recognition of marriages not registered under law that individuals whose marriages are not
officially registered may be deprived of the benefit presumption of marriage in section 114 of
the Indian Evidence Act.6 In the instant case, the purported marriage of the appellant and the
deceased was not registered.7

(9.) It is contended that there exists enough proof of a degree of high standard to rebut the
marriage:

1. Limited attendance during the marriage: Under Section 50 of IEA, when the Court
has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person to another, the opinion,
expressed by conduct, as to the existence of such relationship, of any person who, as a
member of the family or otherwise, has special means of knowledge on the subject, is
a relevant fact. No family member attended their marriage and only one person was
available at each ceremony – the priest of the Church and the pandit of the temple.8
2. Separate residence from parents: After the marriage, Maria quit the job and became a
housewife. All these things were not liked by the parents of Mr. Sanat Kumar and they
were living separately.9

3
Moot Problem. ¶ (6)
4
Badri Prasad v Dy. Director of Consolidation & Ors. (1978) 3 SCC 527
5
Thakur Gokalchand v Parvin Kumari & Ors. 1952 AIR 231
6
Seema v Aswani Kumar (2006) 2 SCC 578
7
Moot Problem. ¶ (2)
8
Clarification. # 4
9
Moot Problem. ¶ (4)

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3. No documentary evidence: There is no documentary evidence that suggests that the

appellant was the wife of the deceased. The deceased did not acknowledge her as his
wife in any official document.10

(10.) It is further contended that because no presumption can be drawn in favour of the marriage
of the appellant and the deceased, the appellant cannot claim any maintenance from the
deceased’s father-in-law under any applicable law as a dependant.

II. NO GROUNDS ARE MADE OUT FOR INTERFERENCE UNDER ARTICLE

136 OF THE CONSTITUTION
(¶1.) It is humbly contended that this appeal by special leave is not maintainable because no
exceptional and special circumstances exist for this appeal to be maintainable [A] and no
substantial question of law is involved that needs to be settled by the Supreme Court [B]. The
impugned decision is not to be interfered with because neither extraordinary flaws nor grave
injustice or other recognized grounds are made out.

A. NO EXCEPTIONAL AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST

(¶2.) It is submitted that this Court has held that the power under Article 136 of the Constitution
is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as far as possible a more or less
uniform standard should be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range of matter which
come up before it and such uniform standard is that special circumstances are shown to exist.11

(¶3.) In the instant appeal, no exceptional circumstances exist. The present case is one of the
many cases involving cohabitation without marriage and subsequently birth of a child. The
appellants have failed to show the existence of any extraordinary circumstances and have
themselves acknowledged the cases bearing nearly identical facts.

(¶4.) It has been held that except where there has been an illegality or an irregularity of
procedure or a violation of the principle of natural justice resulting in the absence of a fair trial
or gross miscarriage of justice, the SC does not permit a third review of evidence with regard
to the question of fact in cases in which two courts of fact have appreciated and assessed the
evidence with regard to such questions.12

10
Clarification. # 2
11
Pritam Singh v The State AIR 1950 SC 169
12
State of U.P. v Ram Manorath (1972) 3 SCC 215 (SC)

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(¶5.) It is contended that there is no illegality or irregularity of procedure while deciding the
case in the District Court and the High Court. That, there was no error in the judgement of
either of the Courts.

(¶6.) It is further contended that this court is not bound to go into the merits and even if it were
to do so, and declare the law or point out the error, still it may not interfere if the justice of the
case on facts doesn’t require interference or if it feels that the relief could be moulded in a
different fashion. Special leave will not be granted when there is no failure of justice or when
substantial justice is done, though the decision suffers from some legal errors. 13 It has been held
that in view of the language of Article 136, this Court is not expected to act as a ‘regular Court
of Appeal’ settling disputes by converting into a ‘Court of Error’. It interferes only when justice
demands intervention by the highest Court of the country.14

B. NO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW INVOLVED

(¶7.) This Court has specified the following categories of cases alone that should be entertained
under Article 13615:

(a) All matters involving substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution;
(b) All matters of National or public importance;
(c) Validity of laws, Central and States;
(d) Judicial review of Constitutional amendments;
(e) To settle differences of opinion on important issues of law between High Courts;
(f) Where the Court is satisfied there has been a miscarriage of justice;
(g) Where a Fundamental Right has prima facie been violated.

(¶8.) This Court had laid down the following tests to determine whether a substantial question
of law is involved16: The tests are:

(a) Whether directly or indirectly it affects the substantial rights of the parties;
(b) The question is of general public importance;

13
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v KGS Bhatt (1989) AIR 1972 (SC)
14
Shivanand Gaurishankar Baswanti v Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills & Ors. 2008 (13) SCC 323
15
Mathai @ Joby v George & Anr. 2010 (4) SCC 358
16
Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (1962) AIR 1314 (SC)

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(c) Whether it is an open question in the sense that there is no scope for interference by the
High Court with a finding recorded when such a finding could be treated to be a finding
of fact.

(¶9.) If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in
determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those
principles the question would not be a substantial question of law. 17

(¶10.) It is contended that the instant appeal does not involve any substantial question of law,
rather it involves a pure question of fact and hence, is not maintainable. Questions of fact cannot
be permitted to be raised unless there is material evidence which has been ignored by the high
court or the finding reached by the court is perverse.18 In a case, it was held that the SC cannot
consistently with its practice convert itself into a third court of facts.19 That, in the instant case
the

(¶11.) Hence, it is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that by reason of the lack of any
specific matter that requires the intervention of this Hon’ble Court, the Court need not entertain
the matter.

III. LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIP IS NOT VALID DUE TO WANT OF

LEGISLATION
(¶1.) It is humbly contended that the live-in relationship is not valid in modern Indian society
for otherwise does not violate fundamental rights [A], it is not in the nature of a marriage [B],
and there is a want of legislation recognizing the live-in relationship [C].

A. LACK OF VALIDATION DOES NOT INFRINGE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

(¶2.) It is contended that drawing a distinction between married couples and unmarried couples
while addressing the question of the validity of their union does not violate the right to equality.

(¶3.) It is submitted that any differential treatment is not amenable to challenge on grounds of
violation of Article 14 when20 –

(I) It is intended to give effect to principles of Article 15 or 16, or

17
Ibid.
18
Union of India v Rajeshwari & Co. (1986) 161 ITR 60 (SC)
19
Gurbakhsh Singh v State of Punjab (1955) AIR 320 (SC).
20
EV Chinnaiah v State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2002 SC 162

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(II) Where the differentiation is not unreasonable or arbitrary.

(¶4.) It is submitted that Article 14 permits reasonable classification. The following tests have
been laid down to determine the reasonableness of classification21:

(a) That, the classification must be founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and
(b) That, the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by
the law.

(¶5.) It is contended that the distinction between married and unmarried couples for enjoyment
of conjugal rights is a reasonable classification because:

1. Based on intelligible differentia: The distinction between married and unmarried

couples is based on intelligible differentia that marriage is a recognised institution not
just by legislation or the sovereign but also by custom and society.
2. Nexus between the differentia and object sought: The classification aims to preserve
the moral fabric of the society by recognizing marriage as an institution and thereby
legitimising sexual intercourse between two persons to form a family, the fundamental
unit of the society. If live-in is validated at par with the marriage.

(¶6.) It is further submitted that the live-in relationship is a wide term connoting cohabitation
between two persons and unlike a valid marriage, extends beyond the marital status of partners
and their sexual orientation. A relationship akin to marriage must either be a sacrament or a
contract.

(¶7.) It is contended that the marriage bearing the nature of a sacrament is subject to the
exceptions under Article 25 of the Constitution namely – public order, morality, health, and
the other provisions of Part III. Arguendo, a live-in relationship is similar to a marital union, it
is prejudicial to morality both social and customary. Live-in relationships sponsor bigamy,
adultery and concubinage while posing a threat to the entire fabric woven out of values and
morals on which the Indian society stands.

21
RK Dalmia v Justice Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538

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(¶8.) It is further contended that the live-in relationships, arguendo akin to sui juris marriage
or common law marriage, bearing the nature of contract are void22 on the account of being
opposed to public policy.

(¶9.) It is further submitted that a right to a union under Article 21 of the Constitution does not
mean the union of marriage, though marriage is a union. 23

B. LIVE-IN IS NOT A RELATIONSHIP IN THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE

(¶10.) It is well-settled law that the presumption of marriage drawn from long cohabitation
under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is rebuttable and if there are circumstances
which weaken or destroy that presumption, the court cannot ignore them. The quantum of
evidence required for the purpose of rebutting them will vary with the circumstances of each
case.24 It is thus contended that mere presumption cannot be a ground to declare live-in
relationships valid to all intents and purposes as a civil union.

(¶11.) Marriage, or for that purpose any civil union of similar nature, grants social recognition
and is a union qualified by the competence of the parties, but there are no rights and obligations
associated with a live-in relationship. Arguendo, the live-in relationships are validated and
certain legal entitlements are provided for the parties, solely on the ground, there would arise
several questions including, but not limited to –

1. Application of personal laws: There will remain an ambiguity over the applicability of
personal laws, whether secular or religious, with respect to their extent and nature as
the cohabitation may be between intra-faith as well as inter-faith couples and should
there be an intra-faith cohabitation despite opposition from families of either of the
parties, the question of severance of ties from family and incidental inheritance would
remain unaddressed.
2. Admissibility and relevance of evidence and facts: A substantive proof of a live-in
relationship is difficult to produce. If the live-in relationship is validated to grant rights
and obligations, the questions of facts will not be certainly determined as the case would
be heavily based on circumstantial evidence and a person can easily deny the fact of a
live-in relationship to evade liability.

22
Indian Contract Act, 1872. § 23
23
Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v Union of India AIR 2018 SC 4321
24
Supra note 5

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3. Matrimonial causes: Arguendo, the live-in relationships are valid, there are several
gaps in law that prevent an ordered conduct of relationship with respect to certain
matrimonial causes, for example:
(a) marital rape and non-consensual intercourse outside the relationship irrespective of
the sexuality of the parties and their marital status;
(b) the question of polygamy or polyandry and adultery during cohabitation in the
nature of marriage preceding or following a solemnised marriage or an already
existing cohabitation in the nature of marriage;
(c) desertion and enforcement restitution of conjugal rights, etc.
4. Constitution and dissolution of the union: Leaving the existence of a live-in
relationship in the nature of marriage on the sole basis of presumption under section
114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 leaves the question of constitution and dissolution
of the union by cohabitation on the circumstances of each case thus creating an
anomalous uncodified set of rules and precedents thereby dismantling the normative
structure of the jurisprudence.

(¶12.) It is submitted that this Court identified some categories of domestic relationships, the
list not being exhaustive:

(a) Domestic relationship between an unmarried adult woman and an unmarried adult
male;
(b) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman and a married adult male;
(c) Domestic relationship between a married adult woman and an unmarried adult male;
(d) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman unknowingly enters into a
relationship with a married adult male; and
(e) Domestic relationship between same-sex partners (Gay and Lesbians).

That only (a) to (d) fall under the domestic relationship in the nature of the marriage.25

(¶13.) It is contended that the validity of a live-in relationship would amount to the construction
of all sorts of cohabitation or domestic relationships in the nature of marriage including the
union of those whose marriage has not been recognised by law, for instance – homosexual
couples or live-in relationship between the parties within the prohibited degrees.

25
Indra Sarma v VKV Sarma AIR 2014 SC 309

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C. WANT OF LEGISLATION RECOGNIZING LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIP

(¶14.) It is submitted that no particular statute validates the live-in relationship at par with the
marriage. A relationship not fulfilling the ingredients of a marriage cannot be held as a valid
marriage within the meaning of family laws unless saved by custom.

(¶15.) It is contended that marriage is a creation of statutes. The State by virtue of Entry 5 of
List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution has the power to regulate the institution of
marriage. In the exercise of this power, the legislature has prescribed various conditions which
must be fulfilled before legal recognition can be given to a union.

(¶17.) It is contended that if the family laws are construed to include the cohabitation parties
in their provisions, the suggested construction would lead the court “to add something to the
provision which does not exist, which would be nothing short of the court itself legislating”26
which has been held, therefore, impermissible.27

(¶18.) It is further contended that as in the present case, inter-faith unions or unions in the
nature of the marriages not solemnized under any religious personal law cannot be validated as
marriage because such unions if validated, would amount to marriage solemnized under SMA.
That would be against the intent of the legislature for any marriage under SMA does not just
require solemnization but also notice of intention, its publication, receipt of objections thereon,
certification, and registration. Such a cohabitation being validated in the guise of an irregular
marriage would mean circumventing the provisions of law enacted by the Parliament.

(¶18.) Arguendo, the marriage laws not validating the live-in relationships are unconstitutional,
it has been held that when the provision is cast in a definite and unambiguous language and its
intention is clear, it is not permissible either to mend or bend it even if such recasting is in
accord with good reason and conscience. In such circumstances, it is not possible for the court
to remake the statute. Its only duty is to strike it down and leave it to the legislature if it so
desires, to amend it.28

(¶19.) It is contended that this Court can use its power under Article 142 to fill legislative
vacuums to the limited extent of laying down procedural guidelines. The court cannot create
substantive rights and obligations to fill a legislative vacuum because it would amount to
judicial legislation. This Court can neither direct the legislature to enact a law nor direct the

26
Cellular Operators Association of India v Telecom Regulatory Authority of India 2016 (9) SCR 1
27
B.R. Kapur v State of Tamil Nadu 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 191
28
Delhi Transport Corporation v DTC Mazdoor Congress (1990) Supp. 1 SCR 142

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legislature when to enact a law. These are established parameters of separation of powers and
must be respected.

IV. THE CHILDREN BORN OUT OF A LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIP ARE NOT

LEGITIMATE AND ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE INHERITANCE
RIGHTS

(¶18.) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the child's legitimacy
remains subject to doubt, negating any entitlement to his father's estate. This assertion is
rooted in a comprehensive analysis of the circumstances surrounding the child's birth, the
legal framework governing familial relations, and the principles of justice inherent in our
legal system.

A. RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT AMOUNT TO MARRIAGE

4.1.1. Non-compliance of statutory formalities

(¶1.) It is submitted that in the appellant’s and the deceased's relationship, it is imperative to
address the legal basis upon which their union should be governed. It is contended that mere
performance of ceremonies does not suffice to establish a marriage under either the Special
Marriage Act, 1954 which is a secular law governing a marriage or any other religious
personal law for the time being in force or any custom.

(¶2.) In the present case, notwithstanding participating in ceremonies, including the

observance of marriage rituals under both Christianity and Hinduism, the union of the
appellant and the deceased has failed to fulfil the other required essentials of a valid marriage
including but not limited to publication of notice of an inter-faith marriage, invitation of
objections thereon and registration.

(¶3.) It is contended that specific statutory formalities must be completed to validate a union
as a marriage. These formalities are not merely procedural but are foundational to the legal
recognition and regulation of marital relationships in India. The absence of adherence to these
formalities proves that there was no marriage between the appellant and the deceased.

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(¶4.) It is submitted that under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, there are several essentials of
a marriage to be considered valid, including the need for parties to give notice of their
intention to marry, the solemnization of the marriage within the specified time frame,
registration of the marriage, etc. However, it is crucial to note that the performance of
ceremonies alone, i.e. fulfilling a single essential does not constitute a valid marriage under
any Act.

(¶5.) It is furthermore contended that in the absence of compliance with the statutory
formalities prescribed by either Act, Maria and Sanat's relationship cannot be deemed to fall
within the purview of either the Hindu Marriage Act or the Special Marriage Act. While the
performance of ceremonies may hold cultural or social significance, it does not confer legal
status upon the relationship in the absence of adherence to the requisite legal formalities.

(¶6.) Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that Maria and Sanat's relationship cannot be
considered as amounting to any form of marriage. The absence of compliance with statutory
requirements renders their union void and unenforceable, precluding any legal recognition or
entitlement to marital rights and benefits under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 or any
applicable law or custom for the time being in force.

4.1.2. Lack of social recognition

(¶7.) It is submitted that for a relationship to be recognized as a marriage, it must entail specific
marital obligations and a domestic understanding between the parties involved. These
obligations typically include mutual support, companionship, and a shared commitment to
building a life together.

(¶8.) In the instant case, there is a conspicuous absence of any evidence or indication of the
existence of such marital obligations and domestic understanding between the appellant and
the deceased.

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(¶9.) It is submitted that when the Court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one
person to another, the opinion, expressed by conduct, as to the existence of such relationship,
of any person who, as a member of the family or otherwise, has special means of knowledge
on the subject, is a relevant fact.29

(¶10.) It is pertinent to note that the appellant and the deceased's alleged marriage was not even
approved by the deceased’s parents, as indicated in the facts of the case. The lack of approval
from the deceased’s family underscores the absence of societal recognition and acceptance of
the purported relationship, further undermining its validity, if any arguendo.

(¶11.) In light of these circumstances, it is evident that the couple’s relationship lacks the
necessary elements to meet the legal requirements for marriage. The absence of specified
marital obligations, domestic understanding, and societal acceptance precludes the recognition
of their union as a valid marriage under Indian law. Consequently, it is respectfully submitted
that their relationship cannot be deemed a legally recognized marriage.

B. NOT ENTITLED TO PROPERTY

(¶12.) It is contended that the child in question is not born out of wedlock, for the union of the
appellant and the deceased lacks legal validity of a marriage due to the absence of compliance
with statutory formalities. As such, the child's legitimacy cannot be presumed solely based on
a union which lacks any sort of recognition in the eyes of law.

(¶13.) It is humbly contended that inheritance and succession are weighty legal matters that
warrant careful consideration and deliberation. Without conclusive proof of paternity,
decisions regarding inheritance and succession cannot be made on the basis of presumption or
assumption. It is incumbent upon the court to uphold the principles of justice and fairness by
requiring substantive evidence to substantiate any claims to inheritance or succession rights.

29
Indian Evidence Act. § 50

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(¶14.) That, there is a glaring absence of conclusive proof regarding the legitimacy of the child
and the paternity of the child. Without substantive evidence to support these assertions, it would
be unjust and legally untenable to make decisions regarding inheritance and succession rights.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the court should refrain from making any
determinations regarding the child's legitimacy or entitlement to inheritance without conclusive
proof, by the principles of justice, fairness, and the best interests of the child.

V. A PARTNER OF A LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIP IS NOT ENTITLED TO

INHERITANCE FROM THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER

(¶1.) It is humbly submitted that the appellant, Maria, is not entitled to the property of the
deceased as she was not legally married to him. The law recognizes marriage as the only legal
relationship for inheritance purposes. Since the appellant’s and the deceased’s relationship does
not fulfil any essentials of a valid marriage, the former cannot claim succession to his property.

(¶2.) It is humbly contended mere cohabitation or living together does not establish a valid
marriage. While the appellant and the deceased may have lived together, this alone is not
sufficient to confer upon Maria the legal status of a spouse for inheritance purposes.

(¶3.) This honourable court in Thakur Gokalchand vs Parvin Kumari30 and S.P.S.
Balasubramanyam v. Suruttayan alias Andali Padayachi and Others31 held that the
presumption of marriage is rebuttable. Therefore, it has been submitted that the appellant
cannot take advantage of legal loopholes by enjoying de facto marriage without undertaking
the corresponding duties and obligations.

(¶4.) The conduct of Maria and Mr. Sanat Kumar after the alleged marriage, such as living
separately from the latter’s parents32, suggests that they did not consider themselves legally
married. This could be seen as evidence that their marriage was not recognized by them or by
society as legally valid.

30
1952 AIR 231
31
AIR 1992 SC 756
32
Moot problem. ¶ (4)

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(¶5.) Arguendo, the relationship between the appellant and the deceased was marriage in
accordance with the general reputation, or is presumed to be a valid marriage, the same cannot
be invoked for granting matrimonial remedies33 and in such cases, strict proof of marriage will
be insisted upon.34

(¶6.) It is further submitted that The appellant’s claim that she was in a "live-in relationship"
with Mr. Sanat Kumar contradicts her earlier claim of a valid marriage. This inconsistency
raises questions about the truthfulness of her claims regarding the nature of her relationship
with Mr. Sanat Kumar. The appellant is therefore herself uncertain or inconsistent about the
nature of her relationship. The appellant's claim to the property of Mr. Sanat Kumar is primarily
based on her assertion of being in a live-in relationship with him. However, there is a lack of
corroborative and circumstantial evidence to support this claim. There is no documentation or
substantial evidence to establish the nature of their relationship or their intent to live as husband
and wife.

(¶7.) It is respectfully contended that matters as important as succession and maintenance

cannot be decided on the basis of presumption on the ground of contended uncorroborated
evidence. In the absence of a testamentary disposition, the property would be inherited
according to the laws of intestate succession35.

(¶8.) For the appellant’s relationship with the deceased does not amount to marriage, she
cannot claim inheritance as a widow under Indian Succession Act. Nor is she an heir by virtue
of kindred.

33
Indian Evidence Act. Proviso to § 50.
34
BS Lokhande v Maharashtra (1965) 2 SCR 837
35
Kanta Yadav v Om Prakash Yadav (2019) 2 CLR 568 (SC)

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PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, reasons given and authorities
cited, it is most humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Court, that it may be pleased to:

A. Declare that this appeal by special leave is not maintainable under Article 136 of
the Constitution.
B. Uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court.
C. Declare that the live-in relationship is not valid in modern Indian society.

AND/OR

Also, pass any other relief that the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant in favour of the
respondents in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience, all of which is respectfully
submitted.

And for this act of kindness, the respondents as are duty bound shall ever pay.

DATE: 15.04.2024 (Sd/-)

PLACE: Supreme Court of India (Counsels for the Respondents)

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