Journal of Social Studies Education Research

SosyalBilgilerEğitimiAraştırmalarıDergisi 2021:12 (4), 64-92

[Link]

Viewing Pancasila in the Eyes of Nationalists in Indonesian New Order Era

Zainal A. Rahawarin1

Abstract
Indonesian political thinking is divided in two: political Islam and secular politics. Soekarno and
Mohammad Natsir were dominant political figures in Indonesia, with the former being a secular
nationalist, and the latter being an Islamist. Both these leaders inherited ideological disparities, and
these distinctions separate political Islam from secular nationalism. This presents an academic
opportunity, because such a phenomenon can act as material for research to invent and develop
new ideas. This study took a qualitative approach and used both primary and secondary data
sources, and a collection of publications and documents were examined to inform this research.
The primary and secondary data were therefore analyzed qualitatively to construct a theory. Due to
the national arguments during the early years of independence, both Islamic and secular nationalist
ideologies emerged. Soekarno and Muhammad Yamin’s version of Pancasila (the Five Basic
Principles) was advocated as the national principle by the nationalist circle. This ideological issue
has been debated since the presidential decree legalized the Jakarta Charter, which established an
ideal constitutional vision for the country and state. As a result, the Jakarta Charter was
implemented in law as part of the 1945 Constitution.

Keywords: Thought identity, Secular politics, Islamic politics, Pancasila, Religion

Introduction
In terms of demographics, the Indonesian nation is an amalgamation of several ethnic groups. The
distinctiveness of Indonesian political philosophy is framed by a political and cultural divide into
two camps, namely the Islamists and nationalists, with the latter having little regard for religious
beliefs (Anshari, 1986), and this national issue that has not been resolved to date. For various
reasons, Islam, as the most-common faith, appears to have been hampered in implementing a
political structure based on Islamic doctrine. At the very least, multiculturalism, on the one hand,
and the strong history of Islam on the archipelago, on the other hand, mark the meeting point of
political thoughts, giving rise to Islamist and secular nationalist movements (i.e., Islamic ideology
versus Pancasila) (Aswar, 2021).
Political Islam and secular politics are the two main aspects that have emerged in Indonesian
political thinking (Jamilah, 2021). Soekarno and Muhammad Natsir emerged as pivotal figures in
Indonesian political philosophy. Soekarno represented secular nationalism, while Natsir

1
Dr. State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Ambon, Indonesia; Email: za.rahawarin20@[Link]
Journal of Social Studies Education Research 2021: 12(4), 64-92

represented political Islamism. These ideological differences have been passed down to
subsequent generations, thus dividing political thought into two camps. On March 1, 1945, the
BPUPKI committee, presided over by Mr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat, was created to address this
ideological dispute (Christenson, 1971; Natsir, 2004). This committee’s primary responsibility
was to develop a constitution, and their discussions were flavored by arguments about national
ideas. It was unable to establish a national principle, so a small committee was established called
the PPKI (the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence). Its mission was to find a
proper solution to the national principle. As a result, on June 22, 1945, a compromise was struck
in agreeing the “Preamble” wording of the Constitution, which became known as the Jakarta
Charter (Anshari, 1986; Platzdasch, 2009). The Jakarta Charter was therefore a political settlement
between secular and Islamic nationalists.
The meeting of the Indonesian Constitutional Assembly on November 12, 1957 was a high point
in the political discussion over the national principle. Natsir spoke on behalf of the Islamic group
(Manik et al., 2021) and rejected Pancasila as the national philosophy because it is secular, so he
kept supporting Islam as the national principle. Two Islamic political groups, Masyumi (the
Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) and NU (the Ulema Council), both rejected Pancasila
at the meeting. Kyai Wahab Abdullah, a prominent NU figure, was a little more moderate in stating
that Islam provided ideals that bolstered the nation’s principles.

Research Questions
Taking into consideration the general development of political thought in Indonesia, and
particularly since Indonesia gained independence, the pertinent question about the politics of
Islamists and nationalists can be defined into the main research questions: “What are the positions
of Islam and Pancasila as national principles in the views of political Islam and secular nationalism,
and how can these ideological differences be addressed?”
 Rahawarin

Sub-research Questions
To explore the research into in-depth study, the main research questions were elaborated into the
following five sub-research questions below:
1) What is the political perspective of Islam in Indonesia is a vise to Pancasila as the state
ideology?
2) How is the implementation of Islamic politics during the Indonesian revolution period?
3) How is the perception of political Islamic ideology with regards to Pancasila as the state
ideology of Indonesia?
4) How is Pancasila vis a vis Islamic thoughts about state ideology is applied in the state
practices in Indonesia?
5) How is the polemic between Natsir and Soekarno during the process of self-dependence?

Literature Review
Some books closely related to the current study were reviewed to reveal how Islamic political
thinking and secular nationalism tend to contradict each other. These books served as the
foundation for reviewing literature about Islamic political thought in Indonesia and how it fits with
secular philosophy (Ka’bah, 2005).
The book Pemikiran Politik Islam Tematik was published in 2013 and dedicated to issues such as
the rule of law, justice, human rights, freedom, democracy, violence, and corruption. A work this
like cannot capture the entirety of Islamic political thinking, but this theme is prevalent throughout
political science (Mahfud, 1998). In addition, it does not provide precise opinions about Islamic
sharia, so it is not considered authoritative (Black, 2006; Khomeini, 2002). Abdullah (1987) wrote
a book titled Pemikiran Politik Islam Indonesia that focuses on two major subjects, namely the
political challenges in Indonesia and the nexus of the state, the caliphate, civil society, and
democracy (Pemikiran Politik Islam Indonesia). The themes presented pertain to political
movements that shed some light on historical features of Islamic political movements in Indonesia,
with little emphasis being placed on the formation of political beliefs. However, the focus of its
arguments seems to be based on the conflict between symbolic and substantive politics.
The various debates about the national principle, which led to the Jakarta Charter, were described
in depth by Anshari (1986) in his book Piagam Indonesia 22 Juni 1945. Here, Pancasila was first

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presented by the PPKI as the national principle, with this being a compromise between the Islamist
and secular nationalist advocates.
Indonesian political thinking can be explained through ideology, because this best describes how
notions of political thought have developed in the country, especially within the purview of Islamic
political institutions (Khaled, 2004). There are different schools of Islamic political thought, such
as the formal ideas that advocate the concept of an Islamic state or Islam Din ad Daulah. There is
another school of thought that sees a symbiotic relationship between Islam and politics, resulting
in the birth of an Islamic society. The theory of ideology first manifested in the aftermath of the
French Revolution. Destutt de Tracy was the first to apply this phrase in a specific context, namely
for the science of ideas (Mandan, 2009). In another sense, ideologies can be defined as a collection
of perspectives and ideals, and such fundamental values and beliefs serve as normative guidelines
in the social life of a state or nation, as well as the system that governs it (Abidin, 2012;
Mahyuddin, 2009).
The ideology of Islamic political and social movements reflects Islam’s religious teachings. The
concept of struggle is common among Islamic movements like Egypt’s Ikhwanul Muslimin,
Pakistan’s Jamaat el-Islami, and Indonesia’s Masyumi (Al-Chaidar. 2002; Maududi, 1990).
Therefore, all Islamic groups, whether they are social or semi-political like Hizb ut Tahrir or highly
political like Hamas and Hezbollah, adopt ideology as a form of self-identification. Due to the
Quran and hadiths being the major pillars of Islamic philosophy, the phrase “Islamic ideology”
has come to be accepted in everyday language (Efriza, 2008; Firmanzah, 2008).

Methods
This study applied a historical research as the research design (Brundage, 2014), a method for
studying historical facts with the stages of heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and
historiography (Brundage, 2014; McCaffrey et al., 2012). Historical research was carried out
through 5 stages, namely: topic selection, heuristics (source collection), verification (source
criticism), interpretation, and historiography (writing) (Brundage, 2014; Gunn & Faire, 2016;
McCaffrey et al., 2012;). This study was qualitative because it has data in the form of words,
sentences, arguments, narrative logic and researchers express meaning based on the intent of the
source (Creswell et al., 2011). This study examines the historical aspect of the role of Islam in
developing Pancasila in the political dynamic of Indonesia during the independence (Garcia, et al.,
 Rahawarin

2009). Qualitative research aims to investigate or describe an unquantifiable event or social

manifestation. Such research focuses on theory development, whereby the data gathered about a
phenomenon are used by researchers to identify and generate new hypotheses (Satori & Komariah,
2010).
Data were collected from documents in the form of books, journals, papers, theses, dissertations,
and research reports that were systematized as references to increase this research’s pool of
available data. Qualitatively, data were collected in the form of selected themes from historical
documents, published articles and dissertations. After that, the data were analyzed using five stages
of historical research, namely: choosing a topic, collecting sources (heuristics), verification,
interpretation and historical rewriting (historiography) (Brundage, 2014; Gunn & Faire, 2016;
McCaffrey et al., 2012).

Results and Discussion

Political Perspective of Islam in Indonesia
It is important to note that three powerful elements played roles in the history of the Indonesian
people, namely colonialism, the ummah of Islam (the Islamic community), and the Majapahit
empire. Islam existed in Indonesia before the colonial occupations of the Portuguese, Spanish,
Dutch, Japanese, and their allies, such that it was the dominant religion in the archipelago. Indeed,
the history of the Indonesian Muslim community dates back to the beginning of the 14th century,
somewhat before the arrival of the Portuguese and Dutch in 1596 (Anshari, 1986).
The formation of several Islamic kingdoms across the archipelago sparked the Indonesian national
political movement. According to Anshari, after the decline of Majapahit and the development of
Malaka (1389–1950), Islamic kingdoms emerged beginning with Perlak and Samudera Pasai,
followed by governance under Sultan Alauddin Syah (1477–1488), the Demak Sultanate (1500–
1546), Sultan Baab Ulah’s Ternate (1570–1587), and the kingdom of Aceh (Ansari, 2004).
Since the decline of Hinduism, Islam has grown into the national religion of Indonesia. Slamet
Muljana wrote in his book Runtuhnya Kerajaan Hindu—Jawa dan Timbulnya Negara-Negara
Islam di Nusantara that Islamic power was demonstrated by the kingdom of Perlak, which was the
first Islamic kingdom to exist in 1186 A.D., and later by the kingdom of Samudera Pasai, which
was established in 1297 A.D. As far as Islamic political institutions or Islamic governments are
concerned, these two kingdoms can be considered as examples of them. They acted as forerunners

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to the establishment of other Islamic kingdoms throughout the archipelago, which in turn served
as the foundation for developing modern Indonesian nationalism (Santoso, 2004; Taimiyah, 1999).
Islam spread, leading to more Islamic government institutions being built throughout the
archipelago, including on Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Irian. In terms of geopolitics,
the conversion of this archipelago into the nation of Indonesia represents the most visible
manifestation of Islam’s role in Indonesia’s inception (Rahardjo, 2001; Ritzer, 1992).
Islam continued to grow on Java until it eventually became strong enough to overthrow the
Majapahit empire. The Demak Sultanate was Java’s first Islamic political institution. King Raden
Patah ruled from 1500 to 1518 B.C.E. His son Pati Unus launched an attack against the Portuguese
colony in Malaka during his reign (Anshari, 1986). Pati Unus later took Raden Patah’s place
following his death. The Demak Sultanate (1500–1550), Banten (1524–1813), Cirebon (1552–
1677), Pajang (1568–1618), and Mataram (1568–1618) were among the Islamic states that
controlled Java, having inherited the greatness of the Majapahit empire, while resisting
imperialism and colonialism (1596–1755).
Some Islamic kingdoms existed on Sulawesi, such as in South and Southeast Sulawesi, including
the Sultanate of Gowa (1593–1669), Bone (17th century), the Kingdom of Banggai (16th century),
and the Sultanate of Buton (1332–1911). In Sulawesi, the strategic position of these Islamic
kingdoms played a significant role in the expansion of Islam into the eastern section of the
archipelago.
Karaeng Matoaya, the King of Gowa, was the first king of Makassar to convert to Islam, and he
was helped by Daeng Manrabia, the King of Tallo, as well as the Mangkubumi (high administrator)
with the title of Sultan Abdullah. Around 1593–1639 A.D., he controlled Makassar, and this
kingdom quickly grew into a maritime power under the reign of King Malekul Said (1639–1653).
Small and large Islamic kingdoms in Kalimantan, including the Sultanates of Pasir (1516) and
Banjar (1526–1905); Korawaringin with the Kingdom of Pagatan (1750); and the Sultanates of
Sambas (1671), Kutai Kartanegara (1400), Sambaliung (1810), Gunung Tabur (1820), Pontianak
(1771), and Bulungan (1771) spread across the entire Kalimantan region (731), making
Kalimantan an Islamic stronghold. The smaller kingdoms in Kalimantan paid homage to Banjar,
which was the most powerful of the island’s Islamic kingdoms, which in turn gave Kalimantan
enormous influence.
 Rahawarin

From 1526 to 1905 A.D., the kingdom of South Kalimantan existed. The Hindu kingdom of Negara
Daha was an ancestor of the Banjar dynasty. Sultan Samudera, commonly known as Sunan Batu
Habang, was the Sultanate of Banjar’s first ruler. He was also the grandson of Maharaja Sukarama
of the Hindu Negara Daha dynasty. Sultan Samudera converted to Islam and received the title
Suryanullah or Suriansyah. The Sultanate of Demak had charge of this procedure for Islamizing
the Sultanate of Banjar (Lapidus, 2000).
Islam ruled Maluku and Irian from Sabang to Merauke, with sultanates being established in Tidore,
Jailolo, Bacan, and the Kingdom of Tanah Hitu in Ambon, as well as the kingdoms of Misol and
Patipi in Irian. Ternate’s kingdom had a significant impact on Maluku and Irian, as well as the
entire archipelago. According to Nanulaitta’s writings, Ternate was one of the archipelago’s four
major kingdoms, along with Aceh, Mataram, and Makassar (Nashir, 2007). Sultan Hairun and his
son Sultan Babullah reigned in Ternate, ushering in a golden age for the sultanate.
The establishment of Islamic kingdoms in the archipelago, as well as the wars led by the ulema,
such as the Diponegara and Paderi wars, were precursors to the notion of the nationalism that
would ultimately lead to the Republic of Indonesia in the 20th century. According to Shobron
(2003), the engagement of the ulema in politics can be traced back to the beginnings of Islamic
civilization itself. In the context of Indonesia, the ulema’s participation in the politics of the Islamic
kingdoms, most notably as advisors to rulers, was strategic enough to warrant their inclusion in
this section.
The ulema later stepped in to fill the void left when the Islamic kingdoms collapsed in the face of
European colonialism, rallying the Muslim community to stand firm against the invaders. To
reaffirm the ummah’s commitment to fighting the interlopers, the fatwa of jihad and martyrdom
gained power. This political lesson was noted in the Diponegoro War (1825–1830) and the later
Kiai Mojo War (1873–1904), where the mobilization of Islam stoked nationalist and anti-colonial
sentiments. The ulema’s jihad fatwa and the Sabil War laid the groundwork for building a powerful
ummah for fighting the colonizers until Indonesian sovereignty could be achieved (Lapidus, 2000).
Islamic Politics during the Indonesian Revolution Period
The Colonial Period before Independence
Before and after independence, during colonial and foreign assaults and domestic rebellions, the
Indonesian revolution can be divided into two periods as follows: The first phase of the revolution
was a revolt in response to the oppression from colonizing powers (the Portuguese, Dutch, and

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Japanese). It was carried out using the strength of the Islamic kingdoms throughout the
archipelago, and it subsequently evolved into a spirit of national revolution, which ultimately
culminated in independence for the Republic of Indonesia.
In order to deal with the power of the Islamic sultanates in the archipelago from Sabang to
Merauke, the Dutch began to use imperial tactics by establishing a commercial organization called
the East India Company (Dutch: Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC) on March 20,
1620. It was the first trade organization in the world (Nanulaitta, 1966). The Islamic kingdoms in
the archipelago, together with the ummah, began to rise in opposition to the Dutch due to the
VOC’s trade monopoly and desire for territorial expansion through the use of military force
(Ricklefs, 2005).
The preponderance of the Islamic ummah in the archipelago, according to Aqib Suminto, is
something the Dutch encountered. The conflicts against the Dutch—particularly the Paderi (1821–
1827), Diponegoro (1825–1830), and Aceh (1873–1903) wars—were another hindrance according
to Suminto (1996). Anshari went on to describe the aforementioned reality in further detail while
disputing Clifford Gertz’s assertion that the Paderi and Diponegoro conflicts, the fight in the Java
Sea, and the battle in Aceh were all essentially just student insurgencies against Dutch imperialism.
As a result, Geertz accidentally, or even intentionally, politically localized these conflicts by
claiming that they were sectarian actions carried out by a few Muslims who felt antipathy to the
Dutch monopoly, a crusade of sorts, so they lacked national legitimacy.
Anshari asserted that the first war in West Sumatera (1821–1828), which Gertz referred to as a
“student revolt,” was in fact the Paderi War rather than a student insurrection. The war came to a
conclusion in 1837. The second conflict took place in Central Java (1926–1830). Geertz simply
stated that Mahdi’s movement was responsible for the student revolt, because it was fighting the
war against infidel Dutch imperialism and its allies at the time. This fight, which was led by
Pangeran Diponegoro, is unquestionably referred to as the Diponegoro war. A third conflict took
place in northwest Java (1840 and 1880). Geertz did not clarify the location or the figures involved
in the rebellion, but it was carried out by the ummah in Banten, who burned European homes and
civil administration buildings. Aceh was the site of the fourth conflict (1837–1903). Geertz again
did not identify any of the leading figures of the insurrection, instead just stating that the movement
was successful in beating Dutch imperialism, which had been in control in Aceh for thirty years at
the time.
 Rahawarin

Various points of view are offered to support the justification of the Islamic kingdoms’ resistance
against the colonizers and Islam’s status as a symbol of national unity in the archipelago. For
example, in his book Islam and the Rise of Nationalism in Indonesia, Fred R. Von der Mehden
asserted:
Whether it is to foster a sense of national unity or to distinguish the Indonesian
people from the Dutch colonialists, Islam is the most obvious means of
accomplishing these goals. The islands, which included the Dutch East Indies, did
not exist as a linguistic, cultural, or historical entity until very recently. Until the
beginning of the twentieth century, the final places under the control of Dutch power
were never completely surrendered. As a result, because it is made up of a diverse
range of traditions, histories, languages, cultures, and geographical shapes, Islam
is the only global tie that can be found outside of the colonial power structure
(Effendy, 1998).
Islam, according to Madjid (1987) and Amir (2003), is one of the most prominent symbols of
national unity. In the fight against the colonialists, Islam became a symbol of the nation’s
awakening. In their fight against the Dutch, the Indonesians positioned Islam as their shared
identity and ideology for struggle. Throughout history, Islam has always intersected with power.
Even at the time, the Dutch government attempted to separate Islam from politics through
Hurgronje’s teaching. His doctrine divided Islam into two categories, namely “worship Islam” and
“political Islam.” The goal was to limit this arena for the Muslim ummah, so that it could never
evolve a political institution. However, Islam came to serve as a political concept for national
identity (Effendy, 1998; Suminto, 1996).
It served as a thesis upon which to build a movement for the ummah, led by the archipelago’s
kingdoms, to resist colonialism. Thus, a sense of Indonesian nationality among the archipelago
was created, with a view toward achieving Indonesian independence. We discuss below some of
the hypotheses that are debated:
As a religion capable of freeing people from slavery, Islamic teachings are inherently autonomous.
As such, Islam was a politically independent religion free from colonial control and its political
institutions. Initially, the Islamic sultanate that had ruled Indonesia for centuries acted as a
historical basis for the current unitary state of Indonesia.

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Moreover, it also served as a starting point for building the foundations upon which to develop the
Indonesian state, because the Islamic kingdoms wielded considerable power in the archipelago.
According to Kahin (1996), the Diponegoro War was the catalyst for Indonesian nationalism, not
the other way around.

Revolution after Independence

The second stage was the revolution that occurred after independence. It could be said that this
occurred due to the military aggression carried out by the Dutch and NICA, as well as domestic
uprisings. As an example, consider the following explanation for the second stage of revolution.
The Military Aggression of the NICA. Indonesia was not immediately acknowledged by the
international community following its proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945,
particularly by Western countries and especially the Dutch. “The State of Indonesia is a Unitary
State in the Form of a Republic, and its territory is the entire former Dutch Indies region,” stated
Article 1, Verse 1 of the 1945 Constitution (Halim, 2005). The Dutch, however, did not respect
the boundaries established in the 1945 Constitution because they still wanted to retain some
territory in the east. The Dutch then invaded Indonesia with the help of the Allies.
On September 29, 1945, the NICA and its allies attacked Indonesia under the command of Admiral
Peterson. The Dutch occupied most of Indonesia from 1945 to 1949 and totally dominated eastern
Indonesia. On July 15, 1946, in Ujung Pandang, the Allied army commander handed over
responsibility for Kalimantan, Timur Besar, Bangka, and Belitong to H. J. Van Mook, a Dutch
government agent (Halim, 2005). On December 19, 1948, the Dutch and KNIL took control of
Yogyakarta and detained some revolutionary leaders. Soekarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, Mr. Assaat, Mr.
Abdul Gafar Pringgodogdo, Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, and Air Commodore Suriadarma were held
up on Bangka Island. On December 19, 1948, at 10:00 a.m., Soekarno and Hatta met with their
cabinet, and Syafruddin Prawiranegara was chosen to form an emergency administration for the
Republic of Indonesia. Syafruddin fulfilled this objective by relocating the Indonesian capital to
Sumatera, along with ministers of finance and social affairs including Colonel Hidayat, Colonel
Kawilarang, Lieutenant Commander Oetarjo, Colonel Soejono, and Colonel Subiakto (Hilmy,
2010).
Guerrilla warfare tactics and strategies finally compelled the Dutch to engage in negotiations. In
this case, the Islamic leaders who chaired the negotiations played significant roles. KH. Agus
 Rahawarin

Salim led the Indonesian delegation in the round table conference in The Hague, and the name
Muhammad Roem is immortalized in the name of one of the Dutch–Indonesian negotiations,
namely the Roem-Royen negotiation.
Linggarjati, Renville, and Roem-Royen were just two of the Netherlands–Indonesia agreements.
By implementing a federal government system that divided Indonesia into states, the Dutch
employed divide-and-conquer politics. The Dutch, however, acknowledged the Republic of
Indonesia’s full sovereignty as a united country, with the exception of West Irian, as a result of the
round table conference in The Hague on August 23 to November 2, 1949. The Netherlands
therefore formed the Republic of Indonesia as comprising East Indonesia Country, Pasundan
(including Jakarta), East Java, Madura, East Sumatera, and Autonomous State Units, such as
Central Java, Bangka Belitung, Riau, West Kalimantan, Bayak, Banjar, Central Kalimantan, and
East Kalimantan (Hilmi, 2010).
On October 22, 1945, in response to the Dutch invasion, the ulemma of NU gathered in Surabaya
to pass the “Djihad fi Sabilillah” resolution, which declared a state of war against both the Dutch
and Allied forces. Kyai Hasyim Asy’ari was a direct contributor to the financing of the Hizbullah
and Sabillilah forces (Feillard, 1999). To demonstrate to the nation that they were not waiting for
a call from Indonesian leaders or any other group to defend the state from colonialism, Islamic
figures marched in the streets of Jakarta. In the first or maybe the second year following
independence, Soekarno issued what was essentially an official statement of his intention to fight
the Dutch and the Allies. His address at the celebrations of the first and second years of
independence reflected the call he made in the previous year. He stated the following:
“What a huge challenge we're up against!” After we wrested power from Japan’s
hands, the challenge will not reduce, but rather intensify. Allied forces have landed
thousands of troops, including Dutch troops…Our entire nation—rich, poor, old,
young, men, women, educated, illiterate—rises, moves, and struggles to justify and
materialize the proclamation of August 17 with one steely desire to become one
(Soekarno, 1965 in Soyomukti 2012).

Domestic Rebellions. The internal uprisings were instigated by various factions in national
society. The problem was unusually intricate, and it came dangerously close to bringing down the
newly independent government body. Indonesia’s government was confronted with international

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power in the form of the Dutch/NICA and the Allies, domestic political tensions in terms of
ideology and geography, and other obstacles. Three domestic revolts took place in Indonesia
during the leadership of Soekarno and Hatta. Two of these were ideological revolutions by the DI
(Darul Islam)/TII (Indonesian Islamic Army) and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), while
the third was a pragmatic regional revolution, also involving the PKI (Indonesian Communist
Party). These are explained below.
The first was the DI/TII ideological revolution, which was the most significant conflict in
Indonesia’s sociopolitical field and government system throughout the history of the ummah’s
struggle for independence, both before and after independence. It was also the most persistent
ideological conflict. The armed classes associated with the DI/TII due to this ideological war.
Kartosoewirjo proclaimed the foundation of the Indonesian Islamic State by reading the “NII
Proclamation Text” on August 7, 1949 after Soekarno and Hatta had proclaimed Indonesia’s
independence (Kartosoewirjo, 1949 in Al-Chaidar, 2002). Central Java, South Sulawesi, South
Kalimantan, and Aceh were among the places where the DI/TII movement was strongest.
Kartosoewirjo, a native of West Java, was a pivotal figure in the DI/TII movement (Rahawarin,
2003).
The intellectual fight between secular nationalists, Islamists, and Marxists that occurred prior to
the Japanese and Dutch occupations had a great influence on Kartosoewirjo's determination to
build an Islamic state. His Islamic political thinking was both radical and coherent, which made
him a formidable opponent. He was unaware of any political compromise between the ideology of
a secular state and the ideology of a religious state (e.g., Pancasila). The following are some pieces
that were originally published by Fajar Asia, a publication where he served as editor, as well as
vice president and general manager:
Darmo Kondo thinks we're strange because of our nationality. Don't believe that
since we are Muslims, we don't want Indonesia to be independent. In Darmo Kondo,
our colleagues do not have a monopoly on the ideal. Also, don’t assume that as
Muslims, we don't strive to achieve our vision, so that we can have control over our
own country. But the difference between our colleagues in Darmo Kondo and us is
that for nationalists, the Indonesian national independence of the Indonesian
people, as stated by Darmo Kondo’s editor, is the highest peak, whereas for us, the
independence of our homeland is merely one condition, one bridge that we must
 Rahawarin

cross. Instead of enacting Islam in its true and broadest sense in our birthplace
Indonesia, we must achieve independence to achieve our greater and nobler ideal.
“For us, there is only one criteria,” says the editor of Darmo Kondo. “For the editor
of Darmo Kondo, it is the lofty purpose and objective” (Al-Chaidar, 2002).

This scathing condemnation was aimed at the secular nationalists and intended to be taken literally.
Kartosoewirjo developed a dislike for secular nationalists due to their reactions to his actions. The
concept of Darul Islam, on the other hand, was still being fought over. The following shows how
the concept of Darul Islam was expressed:
....the Indonesian national community directs its movements and acts toward the big
Indonesia in order to commit to its country, to its mother-Indonesia, but Muslims in
the Islamic community, or Daroel-Islam, “do not desire to devote to Indonesia or
anyone, but only to Almighty God.” Their goal is to create the most perfect Daroel-
Islam, where every Muslim can experience Allah’s laws (Islam) as widely as
possible, whether they are dealing with sjahsiah or idjtima'iyah (Al-Chaidar, 2002).

The second revolt was the PKI’s ideological revolution, which took place in 1989. This political
group had a Marxist–socialist ideology, and its name translates as the Indonesian Communist
Party. It was initially founded in May 1914 under the name ISDV (Indische Sosial Demokratische
Vereniging) by three Dutchmen, namely Sneevelit, Bransterder, and Bergsma. It transformed into
the PKI on May 23, 1920. Semaun, Darsono, Alimin, Muso, and D.N. Aidit were some of the most
notable PKI members. As the left-wing communist Tan Malaka was not included in this
organization, he was disqualified from participating in it. The PKI progressed rapidly and
successfully in a short period of time.
The PKI brought a political ideological mission to the table as a Marxist organization. Its
constitutional purpose was to construct a communist-dominated Indonesian state. There were at
least four major examples of the PKI’s efforts to accomplish this aim. The first was the Madiun
Affair, which took place on September 18, 1948. The G.30.S/PKI revolt of 1965 was the second.
The third was the general election of 1955, and their manifesto of political ideology was the fourth.
The PKI, with the support of the Soviet Union, staged a coup against the Indonesian Government
and established Madiun as its state capital. The political rivalry between Musso and Soekarno over

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the Madiun Affair was reflected in their respective speeches on the subject. On September 19,
Soekarno delivered the following address, which was broadcast on radio at 10 p.m.:
His Communist Party took over Madiun yesterday morning and installed a Soviet-
style administration led by Musso. They see this as a prelude to seizing power
throughout the Republic of Indonesia. From this, it is apparent that the events in
Solo (Surakarta) and Madiun are interconnected and are part of a larger plan to
overthrow the Indonesian government. To do this, the rebels used units of the 29 th
Brigade, led by Lieutenant Colonel Dahlan. Dahlan has betrayed the state and the
soldier’s oath, so I dismiss Dahlan from the army. Ladies and gentlemen, Musso's
Communist Party is seeking to capture the Republic of Indonesia, which we adore.
In the name of the Indonesian independence struggle, I visit you at a critical time,
when you and I must choose between joining Musso and his Communist Party, who
will hinder the establishment of an independent Indonesia, or Soekarno–Hatta, who
will, with Allah SWT’s help, make the Republic of Indonesia an independent
Indonesian nation free from foreign colonization…Support your government, help
the government battle the rebels and restore the rightful government in the troubled
regions. Madiun should be returned to our hands immediately (Kahin, 1966).

Musso responded to Soekarno’s speech at 11.30 p.m. with the following speech:
When the citizens of Madiun regained control of the city on September 18, 1948,
they did so fast and with their own hands. As a result, they have completed their
mission in the national revolution, which should be led by the people rather than by
any other groups or individuals.
Our revolution has lasted three years under the leadership of a national bourgeois
class full of misgivings and ambiguous attitudes toward imperialist countries,
particularly the United States of America. It is one of the reasons why the Republic’s
political and economic situation continues to deteriorate. This is why the general
public, particularly the labor movement, has been unable to distinguish between the
current situation and that which existed under the Dutch or Japanese regimes. In
fact, people in power have enriched themselves by taking advantage of our
movement. People became quislings, traitors, romusha (forced labor) dealers, and
 Rahawarin

heiho (working body) propagandists during the Japanese occupation. Since their
spouses were forced to join romusha, there are more than two million widows. Now,
the same people will sell Indonesia and its people to imperialist America once more.
Soekarno accused FDR and Musso’s PKI of being rebels, and he backed up his
claims with bogus evidence. Are the traitors and disciples of Trotsky, which he
employed in Solo (Surakarta) to terrorize and kidnap all communists, something
Soekarno seems to have completely forgotten? He seems to have forgotten about the
fact that he increased and supported the crimes committed by the Siliwangi division
and by the terrorists in the area. Is it really his intention, as a former ramusha
merchant, to free Tan Malaka, a criminal who is plotting to oust him from his
position as President? Clearly, three years ago, Soekarno–Hatta and two ramusha
businessmen, the vile traitors, engaged in a capitulation policy with the Dutch and
English, knowing well that they were about to sell Indonesia and its people to
imperialist America, as evidenced by their actions. Is it possible for people of this
caliber to claim that they have legitimate rights to run our Republic? Indonesians
are not deaf or blind. They see that these romusha dealers are unfit to be in charge
of this country’s affairs. It is the people of Madiun and other areas who are
attempting to break away from their ties with the imperialist satellite states.
It is not Soekarno or Hatta who is against the Netherlands, England, and now
America but the Indonesian people themselves. Therefore, the incidents in Madiun,
and in other places, are the sign for all Indonesian people to seize the state’s power
with their own hands. It is one of the guarantees that the Republic will be sovereign
and able to face all attacks in the domestic region and free themselves from the
satellites of the imperialist.
The Indonesian people are being asked by Soekarno to choose “Soekarno or
Musso!” The people should answer “Soekarno–Hatta, the slaves of Japan and
America! The traitors should die!”
We are sure that the people will say: “Musso is always devoted to the Indonesian
people!”
According to a radio report in Moscow, which was triggered by Musso’s
announcement and supported the Madiun regime, a people’s government had been

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established in Madiun and People’s Commissions were being formed in other

prominent cities. It was the people’s rebellion against the quisling (betrayer) of the
government of Japanese fascists, Soekarno and Hatta (Kahin, 1966).

Musso’s speech was aimed at Soekarno and Hatta, claiming the two were romusha traders and the
traitorous minions of Japan and America. Musso tried to use his words to convince the Indonesian
people, especially the residents of Madiun, as much as possible to support the PKI’s revolution
(Soekarno, 1965). The Madiun Affair was ultimately unsuccessful, but it was not buried. A more
systematic revolutionary movement was orchestrated by the PKI in the form of a generals’ coup
known as the G.30.S/PKI incident. Before this incident broke out, the nation was in a precarious
situation. According to the PKI, “The motherland is in an old pregnant state.” The PKI tried to
oust Soekarno and Hatta by presenting a negative political image of them to the Indonesian
National Army, pointing to how the nation was a state of chaos (Maa’rif, 1988; Suhelmi, 1999).
The National Indonesian Army was suspected of plotting to hold a coup against the government
and form a military junta. The army’s generals were accused by the PKI of forming a “General
Council” with the mission of deposing the president. According to the PKI’s interpretation of the
Gilchrist document (named after a British ambassador in Indonesia), it related to a confrontation
with Malaysia, but it was really about limited attacks on Indonesia by our “local army partners”
orchestrated by America and England. The PKI interpreted “local army friends” as referring to the
“General Council.” The General Council's principal goal, however, was to remove the PKI from
the political scene. The PKI formed a Revolutionary Council in response with the goal of
sabotaging the Council’s agenda.
The second type of revolution was politically motivated rioting. Through a variety of incitements
and provocations, the PKI was able to break the peace of the Indonesian people during these
political protests. The PKI attempted to recruit farmers to its ranks in addition to its already large
base of supporters. Its initiative to free and distribute land to farmers was referred to as the land
reform movement, and the goal of this was to delegitimize Islam and its adherents, because Islam
and the army were the PKI’s primary adversaries. The PKI launched an open attack on the Islamic
ummah, referring to Muslim landowners as “village evils” or “bourgeois” in order to denigrate
them. The PKI’s revolution triggered widespread mobilization of the Muslim community to wage
jihad against the organization, however. Islamist youths set fire to the PKI’s headquarters in
 Rahawarin

Jakarta on October 8 and demanded that the organization be dismantled throughout Java and the
rest of Indonesia (Feilard, 1999).
Political Islamic Ideology with regards to Pancasila
Islam and Pancasila as the State Ideology
In terms of politics, Islam and Pancasila represent two distinct ideas. It is not uncommon for these
two to be at odds, yet some people manage to bring them together. At the very least, the two come
from different sources: Pancasila is based on logic, while Islam is based on revelation. Since the
1920s, there have been ideological and political clashes between Indonesia’s Islamic and secular
elites. In the arguments about ideology, the national principle, and the 1945 Constitution that
resulted from the PPKI (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence), particularly the
Jakarta Charter, history would repeatedly replicate the Indonesian situation. Below, we explain
how the historical cycle occurred for the debate in question.
First and foremost, Islam is a political ideology. As defined by Qardhawy (2008), Siyasah
Islamiyah is a political entity that is descended from sharia, such that the concepts, aims, and
methods of implementation are all dictated by sharia law. Qardhawy held the viewpoint described
above, and this was used to explain a political point of view held in Indonesian Islamic circles
around the time of independence. Such people wanted Islam to become the national principle of
Indonesia. This was reflected in two debates about the national principle, namely the negotiations
conducted by the PPKI following the failure of the BPUPKI (Investigating Committee for
Preparatory Work for Independence) session in 1945 and the session of the Constitutional
Assembly held following the 1955 general election.
Pancasila, which had been continuously debated as a national principle prior to the Islamic
faction’s efforts to make Islam the state ideology, was legitimized by the Islamic circle at two
significant events, namely the work of the PPKI resulting in the Jakarta Charter and the debates in
the Constitutional Assembly following the election results of 1955, which gave rise to Presidential
Decree No. 5 of July 5, 1959.
Pancasila could be accepted by both parties because it is consistent with a typical understanding
of Islam’s teachings and objectives. However, this does not mean that Pancasila supplanted Islam
as a political doctrine. Pancasila is an ideology that was created within the context of Islamic
thought, so it just possesses a symbiotic relationship with Islam. It accords with Amien Rais’s

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point of view about when an assumption is made about the relationship between democracy and
Islam.
Pancasila and Islam could be compared in terms of democracy and Islam. Amien Rais said in this
regard, “I believe in democracy 100 percent.” Indeed, democracy and fundamental Islamic
teachings are inextricably linked. This statement does not legitimize Siyasah Islamiyah, but it does
demonstrate the symbiotic link that exists between democracy and Islam, as evidenced by
Pancasila’s position in Siyasah Islamiyah (Afandi, 1999). Islamic ideology—which was proposed
as a national concept in the BPUPKI and PPKI meetings, the Constitutional Assembly, and other
forums throughout Indonesia’s history—will never ignore the substance of Islam and politics. Due
to geopolitical and diversity constraints, the Islamic circle’s adoption of Pancasila is conditional
on political considerations. Furthermore, Pancasila is not a final and binding state ideology, both
legally and historically, but rather a result of two formulations in the 1945 Constitution that are
still in effect.
Although the 1945 Constitution was a temporary political compromise, it was a necessary one
because the country’s situation was precarious due to domestic unrest and the ideological struggle
between the Islamists and the secular nationalists. As a result, the debates on the national principle
were temporarily put on hold. In light of the provisional nature of the 1945 Constitution, from a
legal and legislative perspective, should it no longer be consistent with spirit of the Jakarta Charter,
Pancasila as the national principle would become naive and vulnerable.
What follows are Natsir’s and Soepomo’s reactions to the Presidential Decree. According to
Soepomo, its views and dicta could be viewed as lofty aspirations and the moral foundation of
Islam (Anshari, 1986). Meanwhile, according to Natsir, the Jakarta Charter ensouls the 1945
Constitution, implying that Pancasila, as formulated by the PPKI, can be adopted as long as its
interpretation does not contradict Islamic principles, notably tawhid. Although Pancasila
incorporates Islamic ideals, this does not mean that it is equal or superior to Islamic doctrine.
Indeed, its five principles were constructed so as to not contradict Quranic doctrine (Natsir, 2008b).
Pancasila was established as a state concept only after a long and difficult process of discussion
and argument. History notes that the outcomes of these debates, which included Islamists and
secular nationalists, about Indonesia’s national principle resulted in Pancasila being revised and
reinterpreted as a result. When considering the various reinterpretations that Pancasila has
undergone throughout its history, there are five kinds of official formulations for Pancasila that
 Rahawarin

may be identified in Indonesian history. These five official formulations were developed by
government agencies rather than proposed individually.
Only one of the five formulations will be presented in this article, however, namely the Pancasila
of the 1945 Constitution, which was legitimized by Presidential Decree on July 5, 1959, thus
recognizing the Jakarta Charter as an integral part of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia,
both legally and constitutionally.
The results of the debate in the Constitutional Assembly after the 1955 general election are
reflected in the fifth formulation. The argument raged between the Islamists, who wanted Islam to
be the national principle, and the secular nationalists, who wanted Pancasila to be the national
principle. As a result, the Constitutional Assembly was at an impasse, so a Presidential Decree was
issued on July 5, 1959 to end the process. The decree’s text mandated, among other things, the
dissolution of the Constitutional Assembly and the reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution as
“ensouled by the Jakarta Charter.”
The following five goals were based on the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959 and specified in
the 1945 Constitution:
• One and only God
• A just and civilized humanity
• The unity of Indonesia
• A democratic life guided by wisdom in deliberation and representation,
• Social justice for all the people of Indonesia
(Ensouled by the Jakarta Charter on June 22, 1945) (Text of Decrit)

According to the Decree, which includes the words “ensouled by the Jakarta Charter on June 22,
1945,” it served as a compromise of legal legitimacy that was acceptable to the entire Indonesian
people, including both the Islamists and secular nationalists. It essentially restored the Jakarta
Charter’s legal status, and political activities received official state approval once again. According
to Endang Syaifuddin Ansyhari, as referenced by Haedar Nashir:
Why could the “Jakarta Charter” formulations, which had been hotly debated and
consumed much intellect and power for days by significant representatives of our
nation, be revised in minutes at the “PPKI” conference on August 18, 1945? Why,
why, why?

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What power pushed from behind to make the change? The author is unsure if the
question can still be answered correctly. Why did Ir. Soekarno, who was present at
the BPUPKI meetings, call the committee to amend the Jakarta Charter? The author
is unsure (Nashir, 2008b).

Thoughts about State Ideology

Soekarno’s Thoughts
State ideology in the form of Pancasila is officially enforced, and it is thought to be a mirror of
Pancasila as presented by Soekarno and Muhammad Yamin, as stated in the section on Islam and
Pancasila. However, to separate Muhammad Natsir’s thesis of state political thought from
Soekarno’s, the following text discusses the notions behind each’s thoughts and arguments.
In terms of characteristics and identities, Soekarno’s beliefs on state politics can be explored
through three pillars of ideological politics: Pancasila, Marhaenism, and Nasakom.
Soekarno’s Pancasila was a basic formulation of the state, and it differs from the one officially
used as the national principle now, as mentioned above. Pancasila proposed by Soekarno goes as
follows: “Indonesian nationality, Internationalism and humanity, Consensus and democracy,
Social welfare, and Divinity” (Down, 1957; Thomson, 2003).
To paraphrase Soekarno, the five pillars of Indonesian culture are manifestations of the country’s
individuality. It follows that the five pillars were derived from the high levels of trust and
confidence that were held by the Indonesian people for a long period of time. If these five pillars
are a manifestation of the Three Pillars—namely divinity, sociationalism, and sociodemocracy—
and the Three Pillars are a manifestation of the One Pillar, namely mutual cooperation, then the
Five Pillars must also be a manifestation of the One Pillar (Soekarno, 1965). Thus, on June 1,
1945, Soekarno delivered his version of Pancasila, and this day is regarded as Pancasila’s birthday
and celebrated as Pancasila Day. The question of who was the real creator of Pancasila, Soekarno
or Yamin, continues to be debated, however. A disagreement arose, because on May 29, 1944,
before Soekarno delivered his address on June 1, 1945, Yamin proposed the concept of five pillars
of national principles to the BPUPKI, thus sparking a debate. According to the text, nationality,
humanity, divinity, democracy, and the welfare of the people are all important (Anshari, 1986).
According to Roem, the five principles offered by Yamin and Soekarno are essentially no different.
Boland (1971) stated that the similarities between the two lead to the conclusion that “the Pancasila
 Rahawarin

was in fact a product of Yamin and not Soekarno.” It is entirely possible that Yamin’s philosophy
inspired the five national principles, and Soekarno created Pancasila by altering the language.
Soekano's next line of thinking was Marhaenism. Marhaenism is a political ideology that he found,
being motivated by a farmer’s beliefs. Soekarno took the name Marhaen from a farmer named
Marhaen in the 1920s, and he used it from that point on. Another variant of the word “Marhaen”
derives from the name of a farmer from Bandung, West Java, who went by the given name “Aen.”
The political turmoil resulting from ideological and political conflicts—particularly among the
Islamists, nationalists, and communists—prompted the birth of a political ideology. This came in
the form of Nasakom, with the goal of accommodating and consolidating the various ideological
differences (Ranuwiharja, 2001).
Nasakom, as a political ideology, combines religion, nationalism-secularism, and communism in
a single package. Religious figures that saw communism subjectively reacted strongly to Nasakom
and opposed it. What is more, Soekarno undoubtedly argued against the anti-communist stance, as
demonstrated below:
Those whose soul is negative will suffer from a disease “being afraid of being called
left,” namely communist. Left- and communist-phobias make them become
conservative and reactionary in matters of politics and socioeconomic development
(Soekarno, 1965).

When one considers the political philosophies of Pancasila, Marhaenism, and Nasakom, it does
not seem inappropriate to label him a genuine secularist-nationalist, based on his respective
philosophy. This idea is based on Soekarno himself, who referred to the Divine circle in the
Nasakom as a “religious group,” something that is synonymous with Islamists, regardless of
whether they were nationalists or communists at the time. Soekarno also referred to the Divine
circle as those who adhered to Islamic doctrine, a statement that hints at his status as someone who
did not adhere to Islamic ideology (Sadzali, 1993).
The notions of Pancasila, Marhaenism, and Nasakom are considered to be very problematic as an
ideology, because they blend a wide range of ideas and thoughts, life experiences, and opinions in
a highly controversial manner. Soekarno presented the Nasakom ideology in his autobiography
Penyambung Lidah Rakjat. This was reported by Nurani Soyomukti in her book Soekarno dan
Nasakom as follows:

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My politics is not the same as others. It is because my background is not the same
as any others. My grandfather gave Javanese culture and mysticism. From my
Father, theosufism and Islamism came. From my mother, Hinduism and Buddhism.
Sarinah gave me humanism. From Pak Cokro, socialism came. From my friends,
nationalism.
I add reflections from Karl Marx and Thomas Jefferson. I learn economy from Sun
Yat Sen. I learn goodness from Gandhi. I can synthesize education in a modern way
with ancient animist culture, and I take from its product to make messages of life
hope that may be inhaled in line with the understanding of the villagers. The results
of all these are called “Soekarnoism” by ordinary people (Soyomukti, 2012).

Muhammad Natsir’s Thought

Some of Natsir’s political thoughts can be traced back to “Agama dan Negara,” “Islam dan
Demokrasi,” “Agama dan Politik,” “Qur'an dan Negara,” and “Ideologi Islam.” Below are some
possible explanations for Natsir’s thoughts on various topics: Religion and Government.
Each religion, including Islam and Christianity, has a philosophy for life and an ideology.
According to Natsir, Islamic philosophy is defined by the surah Addzariyat, verse 56 of the Quran:
“I created the jinn and humanity solely for the purpose of worshiping Me” (Departemen Agama
RI, 1995). The verse therefore cannot be taken to mean that the goal of a Muslim’s life on earth is
to achieve happiness in both the present and the hereafter (Natsir, 2008a).
Islam cannot be explained in terms of the one and only hereafter because it is based on devotion.
Muamalat (social society) is covered by Islam, including all applicable norms and hududs (legal
punishments). The Quran and hadiths largely outline such rules, but because they contain orders
and prohibitions, it is difficult for these two major works to be used as references. Consequently,
an entity with authority is needed to carry out such functions, namely the state (Natsir, 2008b;
Noer, 1988).
Islam and ideology are two terms that often come to mind. To initiate the conversation in Islam
dan Ideologi, Natsir offered the following statement from H. A. R. Gibb, an orientalist:
“Islam is much more than a religious system. It is a complete civilization” (Natsir,
2008a).
 Rahawarin

According to Natsir, Islam is a single life philosophy, ideology, and way of life for humanity in
this world and the next. Politics was part of his life as a Muslim, and Islamic philosophy presents
a democratic theistic ideology that is neither secular nor theocratic. Islam is not understood in the
same way that democracy is understood, however, because Islam is Islam with its own nature
(Natsir, 2008b). As a result, preserving Islam is something that is inextricably linked to the state.
Natsir remained committed to his political position, namely to fight to establish Islam as the
national principle, as expressed in the following statement:
It is no use for us to spend time with angry and annoyed feelings when we meet
resistance in terms of ideology. With a cool head and big soul, a Muslim should
always be able to place oneself with definite stances and attitudes. Qul i’malu ‘ala
makanatikum inni ‘amil—“work according to your position; [for] indeed, I am
working” (The Qur’an Surah Al-An’am verse 135).

Several counterarguments were raised in response to Natsir’s viewpoint, thus calling into question
the link between Islam and state. For example, one person asked, “How can Islam dominate the
country when there are so many intricate issues?” Natsir responded to the hesitancy by stating that
Islam had established fundamental ideals for the state, and anything that seems outdated can be
modified to meet the needs and advancements of modern times.
The Polemic between Natsir and Soekarno
Natsir and Soekarno were Indonesian nationalist theorists with opposing views on nationalism.
Due to their differences, they were forced to confront each other, not just in terms of ideas and
practical politics but also in terms of physical intimidation, which ultimately led to Natsir being
jailed. The collapse of the Masyumi Party and the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party), together with
the arrest of Islamic officials, marked the height of political animosity between Natsir and
Soekarno. This inevitably affected political Islam, because Soekarno viewed it as a dangerous
ideology (Soekarno, 1965).
To distinguish Muhammad Natsir’s Islam from Soekarno’s secular Pancasila, the following
arguments are offered. Natsir positioned Islam as a set of principles and an ideology and opposed
Pancasila as a national principle (Santosa, 2004). The first commission put forward three national
principles: Pancasila, Islam, and the social-economy. When Natsir and his friends were asked to
address the plenary session, Natsir claimed that history provided a definitive conclusion for a state

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ideology, namely that there were only two options for a state’s base: secularism (la-diniyah) and
religiosity (diniyah). He questioned what Pancasila’s position was in la-diniyah and diniyah and
labelled it secularism. This presumption came from Soekarno’s explanation of Pancasila’s first
pillar (One and only one God). On June 17, 1954, before the Pancasila Defenders Movement,
Soekarno said:
The Divinity (Divinity I use here means religiosity) has lived in the Indonesian
nation’s heart for tens, hundreds, and even thousands of years. I dug it from the
land of the Indonesian people, and the first thing I saw is religiosity. Why? It is
because Indonesian people are a nation that lives above the agrarian level, the
agricultural level. All nations live above the agrarian level, certainly, because they
are religious. I have not used One and only one God, but I just use the word
religiosity, or a belief in something unseen that rules all of our lives…People who
are still farming feel that all of their efforts to look for something to eat is greatly
dependent upon something magical…Such a nation that still lives above the
agrarian level must be religious. On the other hand, in a nation that is hard to live
in, industrialism mostly leaves religiosity…but why? Since it faces a lot of certainty.
It needs electricity, not, “Oh supernatural! Oh supernatural!” Press the button,
and…bright light!

According to Natsir, Soekarno’s point of view was unsuitable, because it is inappropriate to speak
about the hearts of believers in Allah SWT, regardless of whether they are farmers or industrialists.
Natsir’s sole intention was to demonstrate that his speech was merely a manifestation of the
secularism that had been created. The existence of God had been relativized in accordance with
the development of a community from one level to another. Santosa (2004) defined this formally.
Natsir came to the conclusion that according to secularism, a person who lives at the agrarian level
requires God, but if he rises to become an industrialist, he will no longer require Him. Thus, what
is the role of revelation as a source of belief and faith in God, and where does it fit in? A secularist
believes that the existence of One and Only One God has nothing to do with revelation; instead,
he believes that divinity is constructed by humans and subject to change (Mahendra, 1999; Haq,
2001).
 Rahawarin

Second, Pancasila is agnostic. Religion is a manner of living that moves the soul. Most Indonesians
follow Islam, so Natsir believed Islam must become the national principle rather than an ideology.
Soekarno’s idea of Pancasila is plainly secular, because the other pillars do not allude to the one
and only God. Indeed, it can be interpreted according to the reader’s inclinations. It is therefore
regarded as a compromise or gemene-deler (lowest common denominator), borrowing words after
considerable engineering. Soekarno, the founder of Pancasila, defined it as five pillars that covered
many Indonesian factions, including the communists (Ranuwiharja et al., 2001). Natsir criticized
Pancasilah as follows:

In addition, because Pancasila is neutral and will not stray from its neutral posture,
it will not be willing to absorb any of the positive ingredients. It will not be
considered a “pure concept” in and of itself. As a “pure concept,” it is not a reality
in the positive sense, and as a result, it has no effect on anything. The tragedy of the
secular (la-diniyah) and neutral Pancasila can be summarized as follows: Thus, it
is possible to apply Pancasila as a national principle in this manner. So Pancasila
as the state philosophy for us is hazy and can say nothing about the spirit of Islam’s
ummah, which has always had a clear and comprehensive ideology that exists in the
minds of Indonesian people as their life guide and the source of inner and outer
strength, namely Islam. For the ummah of Islam, the transition from Islamic
doctrine to Pancasila is analogous to jumping from the ground on which they are
standing to a vacuum, an empty space devoid of air. That is the story told in the
parable (Natsir, 2008b).

Conclusion
In summary, debates about the national principle, from the BPUPKI meetings through to the
Constitutional Assembly, gave rise to two main schools of thought: Islamism and secular
nationalism. Soekarno’s, or Muhammad Yamin’s, version of Pancasila and its five basic principles
were not accepted as the national principle by the Islamists. As a result of a political compromise,
the PPKI made the following decision: Soekarno or Yamin may have offered Pancasila as a
national principle, but the meanings and substance should be applicable to Islam. In addition, the
PPKI version of Pancasila is contained in the Jakarta Charter, which incorporates the Islamic

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worldview into the constitutional framework, especially with the Seven Words: “with the
commitment to implement Islamic sharia for its believers.
Its purpose was to respond to how ideological matters had been polemicized up to that point,
particularly following the decree that legalized the Jakarta Charter, in order to build an ideal
constitutional vision of the country and state. It provided a constitutional settlement for the
implementation of the Jakarta Charter as part of the 1945 Constitution, because it was a key
demand of many Indonesians who believed in Islam.

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