THE HINDU THEORY OF THE STATE

I. The Doctrine of Mdtsya-ny4ya

(The Logic of the Fish)
A T the back of political thinking in India there was the
process of dichotomy at work. The Hindu thinkers
tried to understandthe state by differentiatingit from
the non-state. Their method was logical as well as historical.
That is, in the first place, they tried to investigate in what
particularsthe state analyticallydiffers from the non-state; and
in the second place, they tried to picture to themselves how
the pre-statal condition developed into the statal, i. e., how the
state grew out of the non-state. The chief solution of both
these problems they found in the doctrine of mdtsya-ny4yaor
the logic of the fish.
What, now, is the non-state according to the Hindus? The
same question was asked by the philosophers of Europe in the
form of the query, "What is the state of nature?" And the
Hindu answer was identical with the European.
According to Hooker (I554-I6oo) in the Ecclesiastical
Polity the state of nature is a state of strife. The Leviathan
of Hobbes (I588-I679) declares similarly that the state of
nature is a state of war and of no rights. Spinoza (I632-77),
also, expressed the opinion in his TractatusTheologicoPoliticus,
that the state of nature is a state of war and a state of the right
of might. The non-state is thus conceived to be a war of " all
against all "' an " anarchy of birds and beasts ", and a r6gime
of vultures and harpies, as John Stuart Mill would have re-
marked.
It is interesting to observe that in China also the state of
nature was analyzed by Moh-Ti (c. 500-420 B. C.) in almost
identical terms. In the non-state, as Su Hu explains in The
Development of Logic in Ancient China, " each man has his
own notion of right. Therefore one man has one notion of
right, two men have two notions of right, and ten men have
79
80 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. XXXVI

ten notions of right. The more men there are, the more con-
ceptions of right will there be. Consequently each man ap-
proves his own notion of right and denounces every other
man's. So they denounce one another."
The Hobbesian "'law of beasts and birds" or the Naturprozess
of Gumplowicz is the logic (ny4ya) of the fish (m2tsya) in
India. Should there be no ruler to wield punishment on earth,
says the Mahabharata' (c. B. C. 6oo-A. D. 200), " the
stronger would devour the weak like fishes in water. It is re-
lated that in days of yore people were ruined through sover-
eignlessness, devouring one another like the stronger fishes
preying upon the feebler". In the Manu Samhita2 likewise
we are told that " the strong would devour the weak like fishes "
if there were a virtual reversion to the non-state (if, for ex-
ample, the king were not vigilant in meting out punishment to
those that should be punished). The Ramayana3 also de-
scribes the non-state region as one in which " people ever de-
vour one another like fishes". And a few details about the
conditions in this non state are furnished in the Matsya-Purana,4
"The child, the old, the sick, the ascetic, the priest, the woman
and the widow would be preyed upon", as we read, "accord-
ing to the logic of the fish " (should danda or punishment fail
to be operative at the proper time).
The idea of the fish-like struggle for existence or self-asser-
tion was thus a generally accepted notion in the " floating liter-
ature" of Hindustan. It found an important place in the ex-
clusively political treatises also. It was exploited as early as
the latter half of the fourth century B. C. by Kautilya, one of
the first among the historical names in Hindu political science.
According to his Artha-shastras the logic of the fish prevails
'Shanti-Parva, LXVII, T6-17; LXVIII, II-12. For a brief account of the
Sanskrit literature on political philosophy see the present author's " Hindu Political
Philosophy " in the POLTTICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (December, 19I8) or D. R.
Bhandarkar's Ancient History of England (Calcutta, I9I9), pp. 87-II3.
2VII, 20.
3Ayodhya-Kanda, LXVII, 3I.
CCCXXV, 9.
5I, 4 (Eng. trans. by R. Shamasastry).
No. I] THE HINDU THEORY OF THE STATE 8i

while the state is unformed. " In the absence of the wielder

of punishment the powerful swallows the powerless". And
Kamandaka also, who followed several centuries after Kautilya,
writes in his Neeti-sara (Digest of Politics) that in the ab-
X

sence of punishment (danda) the destructive or ruinous logic

of the fish operates through mutual animosities of the people
and leads to the disruption of the world.
Nor was the doctrine confined within the circle of academi-
cians and theorists alone. We find it prevalent even among
the diplomatists and practical statesmen, e. g. of the ninth cen-
tury. In the declarations of the Bengali emperor Dharmapala 2
we are informed that his illustrious dynasty owed its origin to
an " election " by the people. We are told further that it was
"in order to escape from the logic of the fish", i. e. in order
to escape from being absorbed into another kingdom, or to
avoid being swallowed like a fish, that the people of Bengal
",made his father Gopala accept the sovereignty". The
medieval Hindu monarch was here using almost the same meta-
phor as was employed in the nineteenth century by Mill in his
essay On Liberty when he explained how " in order to prevent
the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon
by innumerable vultures it wa3 needful that there should be an
animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep
them down ".
This theory of the non-state or the state of nature has had
important bearings on other doctrines of Hindu political phil-
osophy. For the present we have only to note that in India
political speculation was not divorced from the general intel-
lectual currents in the society. The Hindu political philoso-
phers kept themselves abreast of the contemporary thought in
other branches of inquiry. The logical apparatus and dialecti-
cal machinery used in political discussions were familiar instru-
ments in the cultural milieu of the Hindu scientific world.
Mdtsya-ny2ya, for instance, is an expressive technical term in
Hindu legal phraseology. In Raghunatha's fifteenth-century
l II, 40 (Eng. trans. by M. N. Dutt).
2 Epigraphia Indica, vol. iv, p. 248; Rakhaldas Banerji's History of Bengal (in
Bengali), pp. I47-I49-
82 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. XXXVI

Laukika-Nydya-Samgraha (Compilation of Popular Legal

I

Maximns) we find the "logic of the fish" coupled with the

" logic of the monsters". The logic of the monsters is known
as Shoondo-pashoonda Nydya. Shoonda and Upashoonda are
two monster-brothers like Pyrochles and Cymochles in Spenser's
Faerie Queene. They are said to have quarreled over the
nymph Tilottama and destroyed each other in the contest.
Thus when two contradictory facts are equally strong, they
neutralize each other. But when they are of unequal strength,
i. e. when the one can overpower the other, there is generated
a field for the operation of the logic of the fish and the sur-
vival of the fittest.
The logic of the fish arises, as Raghunatha explains, under a
double set of conditions. First, there must be a conflict be-
tween a powerful and a powerless unit. And secondly, the
latter must have been crushed and obliterated by the former.
It is frequently referred to, says he, in the Itihasas (treatises
on history) and the Puranas, and he quotes the following pas-
sage from Vashistha :2 "1By this time that Rasatala region had
become extremely sovereignless, i. e. an anarchic non-state,
characterized by the ignoble logic of the fish". Vashistha's
verse is elucidated by Raghunatha with the gloss that " strong
fishes began to make an end of the weaker ones ".
The non-state is then a state of anarchy, one in which the
"tyranny of robbers " has full play, " justice is non-existent ",
and the "people prey upon one another". It is " the greatest
evil ".3 "Enjoyment of wealth and wives is impossible" under
it.4 Only the robber is then happy. Even his happiness is
precarious, because " the one is deprived of his loot by two,
the two are robbed of theirs by several combined ".5 " A free
man is made a slave " and the " women are raped ".6
I Kishori Lal Sarkar's Rules of Interpretation in Hindu Law, Tagore Law Lec -

tures at the University of Calcutta, Lecture VI.

2Cited in Akshaya Kumar Maitra's Ganda-lekha-mala (Inscriptions of the Ben-
gali Imperial Dynasties) in Bengali, p. I9.
8Maha., Shanti, LXVII, I-3.
4 Ibid., LXVII, I 2.

5lIbid., LXVII, 14.

zlbid., LXVII, '5.
No. i] THE HINDU THEORY OF THE STATE 83

The psychology of men in the state of nature is brought out

in the Book of Shanti (Peace) of the Mahabharata in relation
to the following causal nexus: "'Then foolishness or stupidity
(moha)' seized their minds. Their intelligence being thus
eclipsed, the sense of justice (dharma) was lost. Cupidity or
temptation (lobha) overpowered them next. Thus arose the
desire (kama) for possessing things not yet possessed. And
this led to their being stubjugated by an affection (raga) under
which they began to ignore the distinction between what should
and what should not be done.2 Consequently there appeared
sexual license, libertinism in speech and diet, and indifference
to morals. When such a revolution 3 set in among men, Brah-
man (the idea of Godhead) disappeared, and with it, law
(dharna)".
It is thus with the negation of morals and manners, the nulli-
fication of property, the very antithesis of law and justice, that
the non-state is identified. And this appears to have been the
fundamental position of the Hindu theorists on the state.
From this negative analysis it requires but a logical " conver-
sion " according to the law of " contraries " to establish posi-
tively the philosophy of the state. To this we shall now ad-
dress ourselves.

II. The Doctrine of Danda

(Punishment, Coercion, Sanction)
Two "inseparable accidents" of the Hindu theory of the
state are, first, the doctrine of mamatva (" mine "-ness) or
svatva (suum), i. e. "one's own"-ness, proprium or property,
and secondly, the doctrine of dharma (i. e. law, justice and
duty). And behind them both lies the doctrine of danda (pun-
ishment, restraint, or sanction). Herein is to be sought the
nucleus of the whole Hindu philosophy of sovereignty.
I Shanti, LIXt, I5.
'I bid., LIX, 19-I9.
3 bid, LIX, 20-21. For the bearing of m4/sya nydya on world politics vide the
present author's " Hindu Theory of International Relations " in the American Pol-
itical Science Review (August, 9I9i).
84 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. XXXVI

A state is a state because it can coerce, restrain, compel.

Eliminate control or the coercive element from social life, and
the state as an entity vanishes. Danda is iberkaupt the very
essence of statal relations. No danda, no state. A danda-
less, i. e. sanctionless, state is a contradiction in terms.
We have noticed above that the absence of danda is tanta-
mount to mdtsya-nyc2ya or the state of nature. It is clear also
that property and dharma do not exist in that non-state. These
entities can have their roots only in the state. The whole
theory thus consists of two formulae:
I. No danda, no state.
II. (a) No state, no dharma.
(b) No state, no property.
What, then, is the rationale of this danda? What is it that
makes coercion the sine qua non of the state? Why is it that
the very idea of government should imply a restraint, a check,
a control, a sanction? In Hindu political philosophy the an-
swer to these questions is to be found in the " original nature
of man".
The phenomena of government are founded on the data of
human psychology. And in regard to them the general trend
of thought all the world over seems to have been the same.
In ancient China Hsun Tze (B. C. 305-235?) strongly con-
demned the doctrine of Mencius (B. C. 373-289) who had
postulated the " original goodness'" of human nature. Accord-
ing to him (Book XXIII)' " man is by nature wicked, his good-
ness is the result of nurture ". " A curved twig needs straight-
ening and heating and bending in order to become straight.
* ** And man who is by nature wicked needs teaching and
discipline in order to be right and requires the influence of Li
and Yi [Sittlichkeit] in order to be good. The ancient rulers
understood the native viciousness of man, . . . and therefore
created morals, laws and institutions in order that human in-
stincts and impulses might be disciplined and transformed ".
Let us now turn to the Western world. Seneca, the Stoic
philosopher of the first century A. D., " looked upon the insti-

1 Cited and translated by Su Hu, Part IV, ch. iii.

No. I] THE HINDU THEORY OF THE STATE 85

tutions of society as being the results of vice, of the corruption

of human nature. They are conventional institutions made
necessary by the actual defects of human nature". The phil-
osophical " anarchists " of modern times may make use of this
doctrine. Men indeed had known a previous period of inno-
cence; but after a time, according to this Roman thinker, they
became avaricious. " Avarice rent the first happy society
asunder. It resulted that even those who were made wealthy
became poor, for desiring to possess things for their own, they
ceased to possess all things. The rulers grew dissatisfied with
their paternal rule; the lust of authority seized upon them ".}
This doctrine of human depravity and the natural wicked-
ness of man was entertained by the Church Fathers also. St.
Irenwus (second century A. D.) in discussing the causes which
have made government necessary holds the view that " men de-
parted from God and hated their fellow men, and fell into con-
fusion and disorder of every kind; and so God set men over
each other imposing the fear of man upon man, and subjecting
men to the authority of men, that by this means they might be
compelled to some measure of righteousness and just dealing" *2

The idea that " the institution of government was made

necessary by sin and is a divinely appointed remedy for sin"
was continued and developed by St. Augustine and St. Gregory
the Great. It was " emphatically restated by the ecclesiastical
and political writers" of the period from the ninth to the thir-
teenth century, and found a champion in Hildebrand, Pope
Gregory VII (1073-lo85 ) .3
The verdict of Hindu thinkers on the nature of man is iden-
tical. According to Kamandaka,4 men are by nature subject to
passions and are covetous of one another's wealth and wives.
" Rare ", says Manu,s " is the man pure or sinless" (by nature).
Doorlabho hi shoochirnarah. The lower ones tend to usurp
I Carlyle's Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, vol. i, p. 24.

' Ibid., vol. i, p. 129.

8 Ibid., vol. ii, 143-446, vol. iii, 97, 105, I87.
4 II, 42.
'5VII, 22.
86 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. XXXVI

the places of the higher. People are prone to interfere with

the rights of othersI and violate morals and manners.2
Not that there was no Saturnian golden age of pristine purity
and bliss. For, says the Mahabharata,3 anticipating by over a
millennium the dogmas of Father Lactantius and others, "at
first there was neither state nor ruler, neither punishment nor
anybody to exercise it. The people used to protect one an-
other through innate righteousness [dharma] and sense of
justice ". But, as among the Stoics and the Canonists, the
"'fall" of mankind is accounted for by the Hindus also on the
basis of a postulate of sin, loss of true religion, moha, stupidity,
and what not.
On the whole, therefore, it is not a roseate, romantic concep-
tion of human tendencies and instincts that the Mahabharata
offers. The dictum, " spare the rod, and spoil the child ", pro-
verbial in Western pedagogics, might be duplicated by the
Hindu thinkers also. For, as we read in the Book of Shanti,
by nature "men tend to overthrow4 one another." Left to itself
the " whole world would be in a mess " like a devil's workshop.
As a rule men are used to behaving like " the creatures 5 that
cannot see one another when the sun and moon do not shine ",
or like the " fishes in shallow waters ", or " birds in places safe
from molestation where they can fly at each other's throats in
a suicidal strife".
Men, we are told, normally acknowledge only one right, and
that is the right of might. Those who do not part with their
property for the asking run the risk of being killed.6 Wives,
children, food etc. of the weak are liable to be seized perforce
by the strong. "Murder, confinement and persecution consti-
tute the eternal lot of the propertied classes ".7 The very
I
Manu, VII, 21.
21bid., VII, 24.
8 Shanti, LIX, I4.
4Ibid., LXVIII, 8.
5 Ibid., LXVIII, 10-12.
6 Ibid., LXVIII, 14.

IIbid., LXVIII, I9.

No. I] THE HINDU THEORY OF THE STATE 87

phrase, "this is mine" (Mamedam), may be lost from the

vocabulary, and mamatva or property become extinct.
The natural tendency of human relations," according to the
Mahabharata, is toward sexual promiscuity (yonidosa). The
formation of marriage alliances or of stable societies is not
based upon instinctive promptings, man being as he is. And
if possible, he would shirk even agriculture, commerce, and
other means of livelihood, preferring a state of slothful ease
and the " primrose path of dalliance ".
Such is the man natural, or man as nature made him, in the
political anthropology of the Mahabharata. This state of
license is the furthest removed not only from a Wordsworthian
" Nature's holy plan " but also from the picture of original man
governed by a law of "' reason " as exhibited in Locke's treatises
on Civil Government. Nor is it anything but antipodal to the
Rousseauesque faith in man's natural impulses and idealization
of the " human heart by which we live ". Instead, therefore,
of postulating with the writer of Stmile that " all things are
good as their Author made them, but everything degenerates
in the hands of man ", or finding " reason to complain what
man has made of man ", the Hindu students of political theory
set a high premium on the institutions and conventions that
make up the artificial thing called civilization. In fact, it is to
educate man out of the deplorable mire of primitive license and
brutish freedom that government has been instituted, say they.
The state is designed to correct human vices or restrain them
and open up the avenues to a fuller and higher life. And all
this is possible only because of danda.
In all discussions of political theory, therefore, the doctrine
of danda occupies a foremost place. Some writers have even
called their treatises on politics and statecraft Danda-neeti
(Laws of Sanction, or Science of Danda). In the Manu
Samhita, at any rate, no other category is calculated to com-
mand greater attention. For, is not danda " divine, God's own
son, the protector of all beings, and as powerful as law itself " ? 2

' Shanti,LXVIII, 21-22.

X Manu, VII, I4.

88 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. XXXVI

Indeed, it keeps all created beings to their respective duties

(svadharma), the "virtues" of Plato or the "functions" of
neo-Hegelians, and makes them cooperate to promote bhoga or
happiness., Nay, it is in reality "the king, the male (com-
pared with which all other things are female), the manager of
affairs, the ruler, the surety for the four orders' pursuit of their
own duties in life .2 Furthermore, it governs, protects and
watches. Last but not least, it is identical with law.3 To
crown all, the whole world is rectified by danda4 and even the
gods and demigods are subject to its authority.5
Danda, as interpreted by Manu, is obviously the very princi-
ple of omnipotence, comparable to the majestas of Bodin or
the sum ma potestas of Grotius. It is the abstraction of that
power whose concrete embodiment is sovereignty in a state.
It is absolute, with jurisdiction over all, uncontrolled by any
entity.
A ruler in office personifies this danda, but the ruler as a per-
son is subject to it as every other individual is. Hence the in-
evitable dilemma of kingship in the Hindu theory of the state.
It is by wielding this terrible weapon that the king is to preside
over and regulate the state. He is the danda-dhara, i. e. holder
or bearer of the torch of sovereignty, but he is himself liable
to be scorched by it and may be one of its first victims, for he
is not " infallible".
In Hindu political thought, therefore, danda is a two-handed
sword and cuts both ways. On the one hand, it is a terror to
the people and is a corrective of social abuses. It is a moral-
izer, purifier and civilizing agent. As Kamandaka6 observes,
it is by the administration of danda that the state can be saved
from a reversion to the logic of the fish and utter annihilation.
It is through fear of punishment, according to the Shookra-neeti,7
'Manu, VII, 15.
'Ibid, VII, 17.
'Ibid., VII, i8.
4lbid., VII, 22.
S Ibid., VII, 23.

OII, 40-42.
7 IV, i, lines 92-97 (Madras Text, edited by Oppert and translated by the present
author for the Panini Office, Allahabad).
No. I] THE HINDU THEORY OF THE STATE 89

that people become virtuous and refrain from committing ag-

gression or indulging in untruths. Danda is efficacious, more-
over, in causing the cruel to become mild, the wicked to give
up their crimes, and the garrulous to beware of loquacity. It
can subdue even beasts. It frightens the thieves and terrifies
enemies into submission as tributaries, demoralizing all those
that are wayward. It is good also for preceptors and can bring
them to their senses, should they happen to be addicted to in-
ordinate vanity or should they become unmindful of their own
avocations.' Finally, it is the foundation of civic life, being
the " great stay of all virtues"; and all the "Imethods and
means of statecraft" would be fruitless without a judicious ex-
ercise of danda.2 Its uses as a beneficent agency in social life
are, therefore, unequivocally recommended by Shookra in his
Politics.3
But, on the other hand, danda is also a most potent instru-
ment of danger to the ruler himself, to the powers that be.
For, "uneasy lies the head that wears the crown ", in more
senses than one. The maladministration of danda, says Kaman-
daka,4 leads to the fall of the ruler. If the ruler is wise enough
to manipulate it carefully, as Manu observes,S it is surely con-
ducive to the greatest good of the people. But what is the
guarantee that the holder of the weapon will not bungle with it
and handle it thoughtlessly or arbitrarily? In that case, the
danda will lead to ruin of the state. And will the office-holder,
the king, for instance, go scot-free? By no means. Manu is
an advocate of regicide. He does not hesitate to declare that
danda would smite the king who deviated from his duty.6 It
would smite his relatives as well, together with his castles,
territories and possessions. The commonweal depends, there-
fore, on the proper exercise of the summa potestas.

' IV, i, lines 99-IOO.

2 IV, i, lines IOI-102.
8 IV, i, line 98.

"II, 39.
s VII, 19.
" VII, 28-29.
90 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Danda thus carries with it its own nemesis, and we are at

once reminded of Mill who says in his essay on Liberty that
"^as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon prey-
ing on the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispen-
sable to be in a perpetual attitude of defense against his beak
and claws ". A like bulwark of the people's rights as against
the ruler is furnished by the Hindu doctrine of danda, in so far
as its efficacy is conditional on its proper use. In the first
place, Manu would not allow any ill-disciplined man 1 to be the
administrator of the danda. In the second place, the " great-
est amount of wisdom ", derived in part from the " help of
councillors and others," is held to be the essential prerequisite
2

for the handling of this instrument. Herein is discovered the

logical check on the possible absolutism of the danda-dhara in
the Hindu theory of sovereignty.
In accordance with the doctrine of danda, then, the state is
conceived as a pedagogic institution or moral laboratory, so to
speak. It is an organization in and through which men's nat-
ural vices are purged, and it thereby becomes an effective
means to the general uplifting of mankind.3 The Hindu theo-
rists therefore consider the state to be an institution " necessary "
to the human race if man is not to grovel in the condition of
mdtsya-nydya under the law of beasts. Man, if he is to be man,
cannot do without political organization. He must have a state;
and must submit to sanction, coercion and punishment-in a
word, to danda.
BENOY KUMAR SARKAR.
PARIS.

'VII 28.
2 VII, 30.

3 Vide the present author's " Theory of Property, Law and Social Order in Hindu
Political Philosophy" in the International 7ournal of Ethics (April, 1920), for the
Indian conception of the state as the means for the furtherance of the highest good.
 HINDU POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 311

THE THEORY OF PROPERTY, LAW, AND SOCIAL

ORDER IN HINDU POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.
BENOY KUMAR SARKAR.

I. THE DOCTRINE OF MAMATVA (PROPERTY).

ACCORDING to the Mahabharata, Manu Samhita,

Shookra-neeti and other texts of Hindu political
theory, government is by nature coercive because man is
by nature vicious. The state can thus be born only in and
through danda, i.e., punishment or sanction. It is out of a
condition of the "logic of the fish" (matsya-nyhya) or the
Hobbesian and Spinozistic "state of nature," that dandai
brings into existence a well-regulated civil society, called
the state. In Aristotelian terminology danda would be
the "efficient cause" of the state.
What, now, are the marks of the state? How does it
declare its existence? What are its functions? In what
manner does it make itself felt among the people? In
Hindu theory the state, as soon as it crystallizes itself into
shape, conj ures up mamatva ("mine "-ness, Eigentum, pro-
prium) or svatva (suum), i.e., property, and dharma (law,
justice and duty) out of primitive chaos or socioplasmic
anarchy. Both these institutions are creations of the state.
The state functions itself by generating them, and people
recognize it in its activities fostering their nurture. Mam-
atva and dharma are, therefore, two fundamental categories
in the political speculation of the Hindus.
Property does not exist in the non-state2 (matsya-nyaya),
i.e., in the condition of men left to the pursuit of their "own
sweet will." In the non-state, of course, men can possess
or enjoy, but they do not "own." Property, however, is
not mere bhoga, t.e., enjoying or possessing, its essence con-
1 Manu, VII, 20; Kautilya's Antha-shastra,I, 4 (ed. and trans. by R. Shama-
sastry). For a brief account of Sanskrit literature on politics see the author's
article on "Hindu Political Philosophy," in the Political Science Quarterlyfor
December, 1918, pp. 488-491.
2 Mahabharata,Shanti Parva, LXVII, 12-14.
312 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.
sists in mamatvaor svatva, i.e., ownership.3 It is "one's
own"-ness that underlies the "magic of property." To
be able to say mamedam4(This is mine) about something
constitutes the very soul of owning or appropriation.
This proprietaryconsciousnessis created in men for the
first time by the state through its sanction, the danda.
For it enjoins5 that vehicles, apparel, ornaments, and
jewels must be "enjoyed by those to whom they belong,"
and that one's wives, children,-and food must "not be
encroached upon by others." And it is only through
bhaya6 or fear of the state that the people observe these
injunctions, and the sanctity of property is kept entire.
A distinction is here brought out between mere bhoga
and mamatvaas the basis of the difference between the
non-state and the state. In Europe the identical dis-
crimination has been made by Rousseau in his Social
Contract. "In the state of nature," says he, "there is but
possession which is only the effect of the force or right of
the first occupant"; whereas "ownership which is founded
only upon a positive title" is an incident of "civil society."
Property (bhoga plus mamatva), then, is a differentium
between the non-state and the state. And juridically
speaking, the property taken cognizance of by the state is
laukika, i.e., worldly, material, or secular, as the Mitakshara,
the Sarasvati-vilasa,and other law-books7make it clear.
Thus considered, it is necessarily also a differentiumbe-
tween the state and the extra-state, e.g., a SookhAvati,8
the transcendentalLand of Bliss in Buddhist metaphysical
lore. For in that super-sensual region "beings are not
3 Ibid., LXVIII, 19.
4 Ibid., LXVIII, 15.
5 Ibid., LXVIII, 16.
6 Ibid., LXVIII, 8. For mdtsya-nydyaand danda see the author's "Hindu
Theory of International Relations," in the American Political Science Review
(Aug. 1919), p. 307.
7 Cited in Jolly's Recht und Sitte, p. 91; Svatvamlaukikam (das Eigentum
ist weltlich); Sarasvativilas"geht vieUeichtam weitesten in dieser Richtung,"
"in demes die Entstehungdes Eigentumsaus rein weltlichenAkten betont."
8 BuddhistMahayanaTexts,Part II, pp. 13, 43, 55, in the SacredBooks of the

East Series.
 HINDU POLITICALPHILOSOPHY. 313
born with any idea of property even with regard to their
own body." Besides, according to the Geeta,property is
not to be acquired by ascetics and monks who desire to
live, like the Senecan "wise man" or the Catholic Ca-
puchin, an extra-statal or super-politicallife, in which, as
the proverb goes, man is either a beast or a god.
We are not concerned here, however, with property,
laukika as it is, in its bearings as a legal institution. The
Hindu analysis of the distinction between real and per-
sonal property or discussion of the rights to use, destroy,
transfer, bequeath and sell each species of property, need
not, therefore, detain us. We are interested for the
present in the concept of property as a political category
only, i.e., as influencing the theory of the state. But it
may be remarked, in passing, that it is the state backed
by danda that gives validity to the "seven modes"9 of
acquiring property and to its "three titles"'0 as well as
to other legal incidents."
Nor does it fall within our scope to discuss the concept
of property as an economic entity. Obviously, of course,
the property generated by the state is Aristotelian in its
exclusiveness, as the phrase mamedamsignifies. It does
not contemplate the communismof Plato or of More. "A
field," says Manu,12 "belongs to him who cleared away
the forests, and a deer to him who first wounded it."
This is individualistic tenure and jurisdiction in their
primitive form.', But no matter whether held in common
or private, it is pertinent to observe that the sacredness of
property can be established only by the state through its
danda.
Two miraculous changes are effected in social life, once
private property is thus ushered into existence. First,
people can sleep at night without anxiety "with doors
9 Manu, X, 115.
10 Vashishtha,XVI, 10 (S. B. E. Series).
11Jolly, 90-92.
12 IX, 44.
1sLetourneau's Property: Its Originand Development,p. 72.
314 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.
open."14 And secondly, women decked with ornaments
may walk without fear though "unattended by men.""5
This sense of security as regards property is, therefore,
the first great achievement in the humanization of Caliban.
This is the first item in the civilizing of man by danda
out of the mdtsya-nydya or "law of beasts and birds."
II. THE DOCTRINE OF DHARMA (LAW, JUSTICE, AND
DUTY).
Property is the first acquisition of man through the
state. His second acquisition is dharma. The doctrine of
dharma is like the doctrine of mamatva, an essential factor
in the theory of the state, and both have their foundations
in the doctrine of danda.
There is no dharma in the non-state,16 i.e., in the condi-
tion of men left to themselves.17 It comes into existence
with the state. Dharma is created by the state or rather
by its sanction, danda.18 No state, no dharma. Dharma
does not flourish where "politics" is not; it flourishes only
as long as there is the state. In other words, dharma
appears as matsya-nyaya disappears, and dharma ceases to
exist with the extinction of the state. Logically, therefore,
a people can have no dharma when its statal life is abolished,
e.g., through loss of freedom, revolution or anarchy.
We shall now proceed to analyze this dharma. What is
that category in Hindu thought, which, besides property,
serves to differentiate the state from the non-state? What
is that characteristic, shorn of which, as shorn of mamatva,
the state would revert to the condition of matsya-nyaya?
The answer to these questions lies in the doctrine of dharma.
Dharma is a very elastic term. Like jus, Recht and
droit it has more than one meaning. It really admits of
almost all the ambiguities associated with the term "law"

14Maha, Shanti, LXVIII, 30.

15Ibid., LXVIII, 32.
LXVII, 1.
18 Ibid.,
LXVIII, 22.
17 Ibid.,
18Manu, VII, 14, 15, 18.
 HINDU POLITICALPHILOSOPHY. 315
as analyzed by Holland in his Jurisprudence. Thus there
are at least five senses in which dharma is used in scien-
tific treatises as well as in common parlance;viz.,
1. Religion, a category of theology, e.g., Confucian
dharma, Mohammedan dharma, Christian dharma, Hindu
dharma, etc.
2. Virtue, as opposed to vice or sin, a category of ethics.
3. Law, as a category of jurisprudence.
4. Justice.
5. Duty.
For purposes of political 'theory we have to neglect 1
and 2 and confine ourselves to the import of dharma as
law, justice, and duty. The doctrine of dharma then
enunciates three propositions: First, that the state differs
from the non-state as a law-giving institution; secondly,
that the state differs from the non-state as a justice-dis-
pensing institution; and thirdly, that the state differsfrom
the non-state as a duty-enforcinginstitution.
In the matsya-nyayathere is no law, no justice, no duty.
The state is the originatorof law, justice and duty.
A. Dharma as Law.
Dharma (law) is the creation of the state, and the state,
as such, has the sanction of danda. Theoretically, there-
fore, every dharma, if it is nothing but dharma, is ipso
facto what should be called "positive" in the Austinian
sense. Dharma is obeyed as dharmaonly because of the
coercive might of the state. All Dharma-shastras,i.e., the
legal text books, e.g., those of Manu, Yajnavalkya, Narada,
Brihaspati, and others, would thus automatically acquire
the character of "statute"-books simply because their
validity, provided they have any validity, depends on the
authority of the state. The Yajnavalkyas and Manus
would obviously have no "sanction" in a condition of
matsya-nyaya.
But probably, so far as actual practice is concerned,the
dharma-shastrasof India had no greater sanctity than as
treatises embodying the "positive morality" of the dif-
316 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.
ferent ages. Let us, therefore, examine how the nature
of dharma(as law) was understood by the theorists them-
selves. As is well known, law as a category of jurispru-
dence, has passed through two stages in Europeanthought.
The same two concepts we notice in Hindu political
philosophy also.
In ancient European theory law is the embodiment of
eternal justice. Thus, according to Demosthenes (fourth
century B. C.), laws are the gifts of the gods and the dis-
covery of the sages. In Aristotle's conception law is the
rule of god and reason. Stoics, like Cicero and Seneca,
believed that law lies in the hearts of all men.
This doctrine of "natural law," of law as the "king of
all things," was maintained by the jurists such as Gaius
and others whose views are codified in the Digest of Jus-
tinian. It was the theory also of Celsus and other Church
Fathers. In medieval European (Teutonic)19theory, so
far as there was any theory independent of the tradition
of Roman jurisprudence,law was not something "made"
or created at all, but something which existed as a part of
the national, or local or tribal life.
The moderntheory of law in Europe may be said to have
originated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
with Bodin and Hobbes in their analysis of sovereignty.
It has since become classical, however, as the handiworkof
Austin,20 the father of analytical jurisprudence. Accord-
ing to this view, law is the command of the sovereign en-
forced by a sanction.
Thus there are two theories of law,-first, law as untreated
or original, existing either as a part of the universal human
conscience, taught by "natural reason," or as a custom
among the people; and secondly, law as created by the fiat
of a law-maker, as something which is to be obeyed not
because it is just, good or eternal, but because it has been
enacted by the state. Both these conceptions are to be
19Carlyle's Medieval Political Theory in the West, Vol. I, p.. 235; Macken-
zie's Studies in RomanLaw; Gomme'sFolkloreas an HistoricalScience,84-100.
20 Lectureson Jurisprudence,VI.
 HINDU POLITICALPHILOSOPHY. 317
found among the speculations of Hindu political philos-
ophers. The distinction between positive law and ethics
is clearly set forth by Vijnaneshvara (eleventh century)
in his notes on the text of Yajnavalkya2'in regard to the
judicial duties of the king.
The ethical conception of law as the dictate of con-
science, i.e., as jus natrale has a long tradition in Hindu
thought. In the Brihadaranyak-opanishat22law is identical
with truth and is as powerful as king. It is of course the
creation of God. Brahman (God), we are told, "was not
strong enough." So he "created still further the most
excellent dharma. . . . There is nothing higher than
law. Thenceforth even a weak man rules a stronger with
the help of the law, as with the help of a king. Thus the
law is what is called the true. And if a man declareswhat
is truth, they say he declaresthe law; and if he declaresthe
law, they say he declares what is true. Thus both are
the same." According to Apastamba,23law is what is
"unanimously approved in all countries by men of the
Aryan society, who have been properly obedient to their
teachers, who are aged, of subdued senses, neither given to
avarice, nor hypocrites." In Manu-Samhita,24 again, law
is whatever is practised and cherished at heart by the
virtuous and the learned, who are devoid of prejudicesand
passions. Vashishtha25and Baudhayana26also hold the
view that law is the practice of the shishtas, i.e., those
whose hearts are free from desire. The shishtas, rishis,
passionlessand unavariciouspersons of India are obviously
the "sages" of Demosthenes. And in Yajnavalkya's
Code27accordingto which law is sadachdra, i.e., the "prac-
tice-or conduct of good men," what "seems pleasant or good
21 T. N. Mitra's Tagore Law Lectures, pp.
32-33; Kishori Lal Sarkar's
Rules of Interpretationin Hindu Law, Lect. IX, p. 116.
= 1, 4, 14, The Upanisads,Vol. II, p. 89, in the S. B. E. Series.
23 1, 7, 20, 8, in the S. B. E. Series.
24I1, 1.
25 -6
26sI 1 1n 4o on.t
27 I, i,
Introduction, 7.
318 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.
to one's self," and the "desire that springs from mature
consideration," as well as in the Vyavahara Darpana,
where law is described as something "eternal and self-
existent, the king of kings," far "more powerful and right "
than they, we have once more the Oriental counterpart of
the Greek, Stoic, Roman and Patristic conceptions of law
as morality.
In Hindu analysis dharma came to be defined as posi-
tive law also. The conception of law as rajnam djna in
Kautilya's language, i.e., as command enforced by sanction,
finds clear expression in the writings of Narada, Shookra,
Jaimini and his commentator Shabara Swami. In Narada's
Smriti28 we are informed that the performance of duty
having fallen into disuse, positive law (vyavahara) has been
introduced, and that the king as superintending the law is
known as danda-dhara or wielder of danda (the power to
punish). The sanction is definitely mentioned in the
Shookra-neeti,29 according to which the sovereign should
categorically state in his commands that he would "surely
destroy by severe punishment those offenders who after
having heard these his decrees would act contrary to them."
In order that the law may be seriously recognized as com-
mand Shookra stipulates that the greatest amount of pub-
licity should be given to it. For instance, it is the duty of
the sovereign to have the laws announced by the state
drum3o or have them inscribed in esplanades as written
notices. The documents embodying these commands
(shasana-patra)3I are to bear the king's signature, date, etc.
Laws thus being the promulgations of the state, we read
further in the Shookra-neeti32that the king is the " maker of
the age," the "cause of time" and of the good and evil
practices, and that since the ruler is the dictator of virtues
and vices, people make it a point to practise that by which
28 Introduction, I, 2.
291, lines 623-624.
30 Shookra-neeti,I, 625-626 (B. K. Sarkar'strans. in the Panini OfficeSeries,
Allahabad).
31Ibid., II, 607-608.
32 IV, i, lines 116-119.
 HINDU POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 319
he is satisfied. Besides, as law is upheld by sanction we
can easily understand why Shookra advises the sovereign
to make use of his terrible weapon33 in order to maintain
the people each in his proper sphere.
The same idea of positive law is expressed by Jaimini in
the very definition of dharma. As we find in his Mimamsa-
Sootra, chodandlakshanortho dharmah.34 Dharma is that
desired-for object (artha) which is characterized by com-
mand (chodana). Jaimini has also examined the reason as
to why that which is determined by a command should be
obligatory. He analyzes the reason as lying in the fact
that "the relation between the word of command and the
purpose to which it is directed is eternally efficacious."35
The doctrine of dharma as law introduces into the theory
of the state the cardinal element of sovereignty. Whether
dharma be taken as equivalent to the dictates of a moral
sense, or as the observance of a tribal or some other estab-
lished usage or as the deliberate order issued by an authority
with threat of punishment in case of violation, it is clear
enough that dharma is like danda the most awe-inspiring
fact in the state's life. Danda and dharma are, indeed, the
two faces of the political Janus, so to speak, the one look-
ing to the failures, the other to the triumphs. Or, to
express the same thing in a different way, danda is the root
of a tree which flowers in dharma. The state can be
recognized positively by dharma which is in evidence,
while danda maintains its vitality from behind.
B. Dharma as Justice.
We have now to understand the doctrine of dharma as
justice in its bearing on the theory of the state. Justice
does not exist in the matsya-nyaya; if, therefore, a reversion
to matsya-nyaya is to be avoided, i.e., if the state is to be
maintained, justice must not be tampered with. Justice
-33
Ibid.) I, 120.
34 Ganganath Jha's Shabara Swami's Commentaryon Jaimini's Mimamsa
in the Indian Thoughtfor 1910 (A~lahabad).
3 K. L. Sarkar, Lect. I, pp. 23-24.
320 INTERNATIONALJOURNALOF ETHICS.
is necessarily as integral a branch of sovereignty in Hindu
conception as law.
The dignity of justice has been declared by Manu36
in the following terms: "If justice is violated, it destroys
the state, if preserved, it maintains the state. Therefore
justice must not be destroyed." Such sentiments in the
Manu Samhitacould be bodily incorporatedin the writings
of a Jonas or an Alcuin of the ninth century and other
medieval Europeantheorists7 with whom the maintenance
of justice is the sine qua non of the state and kingship.
But what is justice? It is a most practical or pragmatic
definition that the Hindu theorists offer. According to
Manu38justice consists in the application of law to the
cases arising between the membersof the state. And that
law is to be known from the customs and from the Insti-
tutes, e.g., those of Gautama, Yajnavalkya, and others.
Justice, as interpreted by Shookra,39consists of two ele-
ments: First, it consists in a discrimination of the good
from the bad (of course, accordingto the laws). Secondly,
it has a utilitarian basis, in as much as it is calculated to
minister to the virtues of the rulers and the ruled and
promote the common weal.
The doctrine of dharma as justice is thus organically
connected with the theory of the state as contrasted with
the non-state.
C. Dharma as Duty.
Matsya-nyaya is a condition in which duties are nil.
Men left to themselves tend even to persecute4 their
mothers, fathers, the aged, the teachers, the guests and
the preceptors. It is the fear of danda that brings about
an order among men, each man minding his own duty
(sva-dharma).41 The doctrine of dharma as duty is thus
3' VIII, 15.
37 Carlyle, Vol. III, 109.
38 VIII, 3.
39 IV, v, lines 7-11.
40Maha,Shanti, LXVIII, 16.
41 Ibid., LXVIII, 8; Manu, VII, 21, 22, 24; Shookra,I, lines 45-51.
 HINDU POLITICALPHILOSOPHY. 321
like that of dharmaas justice, naturally a doctrine of the
conservation of the state. It is only from this standpoint
that the theory of duties has a bearing on the theory of
the state.
The doctrine of duty as stated in the Geeta42runs thus:
"One's own duty, though defective, is better than another's
duty well performed. Death in performing one's own
duty is preferable;the performanceof the duties of others
is dangerous." The passage here has no mere metaphysi-
cal significance. This theory of sva-dharma(one's own
duty) has a political significance as well. It has the
sanction of the state behind it; for, says Manu,43 "neither
a father, nor a teacher, nor a friend, nor a mother, nor a
wife, nor a son, nor a domestic priest must be left unpun-
ished if they do not keep within their duty." Accord-
ing to Shookra44 also the people should be kept each in
his proper sphere by a "terrible use" of the weapon of
sovereignty.
Duties are thus enforcedby danda, which also backs the
laws. Indeed, from the angle of the prajd or prakriti (the
people in the state), dharmaas duty is but the obverse of
dharmaas law. What the state calls "laws " are recognized
as "duties" by its members as a matter of course. The
doctrine of duty is thus identical with that of law, turned
inside out.
Altogether, then, the doctrine of dharmain its entirety
imparts to the state the character of an institution for the
advancement of "culture." The state elevates man out of
the law of beasts by instituting legislation, adjudication,
and enforcement of duties. The functions of the state
are thus in keeping with the ideas involved in the doctrine
of danda. The state as a pedagogic or purgatorial or
moral training institution is not merely a mamatva-in-
suring instrument, i.e., a property-securingagency, but a
dharma-promotingSamooka or public association, i.e., a
42SacredBooks of the East, Vol. VIII, ch. III, pp. 56, 127.
43 VIII, 335.
" I, line 120; IV, iii, 15.
322 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS.
Kultur-staat or the "virtue"-state of Plato. And herein
the Hindu theory meets Aristotle's conception of the state
as the means to the furtherance of the "highest good" of
man.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF VARNAkSHRAMA (CLASSES AND
STAGES).
Out of matsya-nyaya evolves dharma through the fiat
of danda. Now dharma has need to be embodied, i.e., the
Kultur-staat must have to materialize itself in space and
time. This is accomplished in the rashtra, which provides
sovereignty with "a local habitation and a name." It is
in and for the rashtra that the state institutes mamatva
and dharma. Property, law, justice and duty are con-
cretely realized through this medium. The doctrine of
rashtra thus furnishes the crowning arch in the Hindu
theory of the state.
What is this rashtra? It signifies "the country." Both
"movable and immovable things" are indicated by the
term.45 It is a territorial concept comprehending an
aggregate of human beings and material possessions and
thus constitutes the "physical basis" of the state. It may
be taken almost as equivalent to res publica. The doctrine
of rashtra would, therefore, naturally consist of two parts:
(1) the doctrine of property, and (2) the doctrine of prajd
prakriti or population. The doctrine of property has
already been investigated. Let us now examine the doc-
trine of population in its bearing on the theory of the state.
In the martsya-nydyacondition there is the people, but
no state, because there is no danda to enforce dharma. If
the praja is not to remain ad infinitum an amorphous mass
of selbstandig atoms, it must have to follow sva-dharma, i.e.,
the members of the society must perform their respective
"duties," which, as we have seen, are really "laws" turned
inside out. The observance of these duties would neces-
sarily imply the organization of the people into a unified
state, a samooha or a polis.
45 IV, iii, line 2.
 HINDU POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 323
Now, communally speaking, the prajd or members of a
society naturally fall into economic and professional
groups, classes or orders, the so-called castes of India.
The alleged classification of a society into four occupational
groups, e.g., Brahmana, Kshatriya, etc., is, however, a
conventional myth, at best a legal fiction. Students of
Realpolitik like Shookra46are aware that the actual number
of these orders or castes is "unlimited." The reason, as
may be guessed, is stated in the Shookra-neeti to be the
"intermixture of blood through marriages." These orders
of praja or classes of members of the state are known as
varnas,47 i.e., colors, probably designated after some typical
(or hypothetical?) ethnic complexion. Further, from the
standpoint of the individual, we have to notice that people
pass through well-marked physiological stages, e.g., infancy,
adolescence, etc. These stages or periods of life in every
person are called the ashramas.8 They are arbitrarily
known to be four in the span of human existence.
The total population with all its interests and problems
of all the different periods of life is then comprehended by
the two categories, varnas (classes) and ashramas (stages).
If, therefore, the people is to constitute a state, all members
of each of the varnas (no matter what their number and
what their occupations) must have to perform the duties
(svadharma) at each of the four ashramas or periods of life.
Thus, the soldier at the front must "do or die," the young
man while at school must not marry, the king must keep
to the coronation oath, and so forth. This is the doctrine
of varnashrama,49 the counterpart of the Platonic correla-
tion of "virtue" and status.
As soon, therefore, as the praja is organized into a state,
be it in any part of the world or in any epoch of history, a
varnashrama spontaneously emerges into being as a matter

40 IV, iii, lines 22-23.

47Kamandaka,II, 18-21 (Text in the BibliothecaIndica Series, Trans. by
M. N. Dutt).
48 Ibid., II, 22-31.

49Kamandaka, II, 35.

324 INTERNATIONALJOURNALOF ETHICS.
of course. It is inconceivable, in this theory, that there
should be a state and yet no varndshrama. To say that
the state has been born and yet the various orders or
classes of the people do not follow dharmawould, indeed,
be a contradiction in terms, a logical absurdity. Sva-
dharma leads inevitably to varn4shrama,the two are
"relative" terms. They indicate coexistent phenomena
in the social world. In other words, the doctrine of
varndshrama is a corollary to that of dharma as duty,
varnashrama is but sva-dharma "writ large."
The non-existence of varnashramais possible only under
conditions of non-performance of duty. Suppose the
varnasdo not follow dharma,e.g., the soldier flies from the
enemy in a cowardly manner, the husband does not main-
tain the wife, the judge encouragesthe fabrication of false
evidence, the king violates the samaya or compact with the
praja, and so forth. Accordingto Shookra50the offenders
are to be rectified by the danda of the state. This is the
supreme moment for the exercise of sovereignty. Why,
even the king is not immune from penalty. Rather, as
Manu5l declares, "the settled rule," where "a common
man would be fined one karshapana,the king shall be fined
one thousand." Really, a state is no state unless it can
enforce as duty the dharma that it has enacted as law.
This should be postulated in the irreducibleminimumof the
state's functions. One can, therefore, easily understand
with Kamandaka52why if dharmais violated by the mem-
bers of the state there is bound to be a pralaya or dissolu-
tion of the world. Verily, with the extinction of varna-
shrama,there is a reversionto matsya-nyaya. The violation
of sva-dharma and of varnashrama brings back the "state
of nature," and the state automatically ceases to exist.
Varnashrama,though obviously a socio-pedagogic and
ethnico-economic term, is thus fundamentally a political
concept. It is an indispensable category in an organic
50 Iv, iv, 6, 82-83.
61VIIIY,336.
62 II, 34.
 HINDU POLITICALPHILOSOPHY. 325
theory of the state. It is identical with rashtrafrom the
demographic (praj4 or population) aspect. The doctrine
of varndshramais, therefore, the doctrine of rashtraminus
the doctrine of property; and further, the doctrine of
dharma(as law and duty) applied to the total prakriti (or
membersof the state) coincideswith the doctrine of classes
and stages. The doctrine of varnashramathen is clearly
an integral part in a consistent philosophy of politics.
BENOY KUMAR SARKAR.
NEW YORK.

Vol. XXX.-No. 3 7