Digging in

Analysis: NATO assures over collective defence

Future plan
Chinese research papers point to
PLAN’s next-gen submarine
technologies

Wielding a new tomahawk

US paves the way toward delivering new
nuclear SLCM

Northern response
Nordic states revive defences against
Russian aggression
Headlines
Charles de Gaulle returns to home port following Covid-19 outbreak on board

The Americas
USAF conducts first Transport Isolation System aeromedical evacuation mission

Europe
Luxembourg’s A400M conducts first flight

Asia Pacific
Chinese Y-20 capable of transporting two Type 15 tanks, claim state media

Middle East/Africa
LNA constructing forward airbase south of Tripoli

Business
Seoul to introduce defence industry support measures

Opinion: Huawai 5G
Huawei may be restricted in US 5G, but Wi-Fi is up for grabs

Interview
Air Commodore Dave Bradshaw, Assistant Chief of Staff, Capability Delivery (Combat
Air), Headquarters Air Command, RAF
Headlines

Research papers point to PLAN’s next-

gen submarine technologies
Andrew Tate
London 09/04/2020

Research papers that emerged in early April suggest technologies that may be
incorporated into China’s future submarines
One concept removes noise by eliminating the need for a propulsion sha

Two Chinese research papers that emerged in early April through social
media provide further evidence of significant technological developments
that may be incorporated in the design of the next generation of nuclear
submarines for China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

The first paper relates to the

“optimisation of submarine vertical
missile launchers” and the second to the
“analysis of radiated noise of a no-shaft The PLAN’s next generation of nuclear powered
submarines is likely to incorporate significant
pumpjet”. If these papers reflect technological advances over those of its Type 093-
class SSNs, one of which is seen here.
technology to be incorporated into the [Link]
third generation of Chinese nuclear-
powered submarines it would indicate a much greater advance than was
achieved in progressing from the first-generation submarines to the
second, namely the Type 093 (Shang)-class nuclear-powered attack
submarines (SSNs) and the Type 094 (Jin)-class nuclear-powered ballistic
missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs).

The PLAN’s concept of operations for its attack submarines appears to

prioritise anti-surface ship warfare (ASuW) over antisubmarine warfare
(ASW), so there is widespread anticipation that the next-generation Type
095 SSN will be fitted with vertical launch tubes for anti-ship cruise
missiles (ASCMs) and possibly also land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs).
One of the papers that recently emerged had been published in the Ship
Science and Technology Journal in April 2017, but other research papers
relating to submarine vertical launch systems date back to at least 2005,
reflecting that this has been an active area of research for a considerable
time.

The pumpjet referred to in the second paper, published in the Journal of

Ship Mechanics in November 2018, is an alternative to a conventional
propeller, consisting of a multi-vaned rotor and a stator within a duct,
similar in concept to a single-stage turbine. To date, the PLAN’s
submarines have had propellers, but a pumpjet can reduce submarine
noise levels, particularly noise associated with cavitation, which is a key
characteristic that supports classification of an underwater contact as a
submarine.

Even more significant than the next generation of Chinese nuclear-

powered submarines adopting pumpjet propulsors is that the design may
combine the pumpjet with a rim-drive motor, with the coils that create the
rotating magnetic field embedded within the duct and permanent
magnets embedded within the rotor. This design would eliminate the
need for a propulsion shaft, which normally transfers the rotational power
from a steam turbine or electric motor within the pressure hull and is
another source of noise.

The research work has been undertaken by a team of four scientists at the
College of Marine Power Engineering, part of the Naval Engineering
University in Wuhan, and is likely to come under the direction of Rear
Admiral Ma Weiming, who has been credited with breakthroughs in the
PLAN’s development of electromagnetic catapults, integrated electrical
propulsion systems, and permanent magnet motors.

Further work on “low noise optimisation design of a pumpjet” was

published in the Journal of Huazhong University of Science and
Technology, Wuhan, in March 2019 by another group of four researchers
from the Naval Engineering University. The group looked at the
application of this technology in unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs),
although it is unclear whether this was also a shaftless design.
Headlines

US paves the way toward delivering

new nuclear SLCM
Dr Lee Willett
London 16/04/2020
The US Department of Defense (DoD) has set out further details of the
strategic requirement, deterrence benefits, and initial development
processes for a new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N).

In a March 2020 Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy white
paper on the SLCMN, the DoD stated,
“Developing SLCM-N is an urgent task
and initial steps in the acquisition process
are under way.”

The requirement to reconstitute a nuclear

SLCM capability was defined in the Trump
Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review
The US Navy’s Los Angeles-class nuclear attack
(NPR), published in 2018. As part of an submarine USS Annapolis test launches a Tomahawk
intention to develop a tailored deterrence cruise missile off the coast of southern California on
26 June 2018. The nuclear-armed Block I Tomahawk
posture, the NPR said the US would “in TLAM-N was withdrawn from operational service in
1992, but the US DoD is now looking for a
the longer term pursue a modern nuclear- replacement. USN/Mass Communication Specialist
1stClass RGutridge: 1766206
armed SLCM”.

The white paper summarised the SLCM-N development as delivering a

supplemental, nonduplicative capability designed to restore US
competitive advantage and contribute to US deterrence posture by
playing “an important role in tailored deterrence strategies in both
Europe and Asia”, bringing operational attributes that reinforce regional
deterrence, and providing a capability that “responds in a unique way to
a deteriorating nuclear threat environment and a growing imbalance in
non-strategic nuclear weapons”. Simply, it said, US strategic concern is
that “an adversary will employ a limited number of nuclear weapons –
including low-yield weapons – to deter US military responses to regional
aggression”.

The perceived imbalance in non-strategic nuclear forces – with the white

paper noting that Russia, for example, is modernising anon-strategic
nuclear inventory that numbers up to 2,000 weapons – presents a
challenge for Washington. The situation is exacerbated by increasingly
dynamic threats in the deteriorating security environment and
adversaries’ development of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

In this context, the white paper argued, an SLCM-N capability – likely

deployed on a nuclear-powered submarine – would offer several benefits.
First, such a capability would bolster deterrence, both prior to any crisis
and in the early stages of crisis escalation. Second, it would provide a
more assured response when A2/AD strategies might restrict aircraft-
based operations. Third, given the potential impact of A2/AD constraints
and with the white paper noting “promptness [as] an important
consideration”, the covert, responsive reach provided by a submarine-
based SLCM-N would make a key contribution to the US deterrent
posture.

The timing of the decision to proceed with SLCM-N development has

been driven by a combination of the asymmetry in US and Russian non-
strategic nuclear capabilities, the absence of arms control frameworks for
restricting such weapons, and Russia’s recent conduct, said the white
paper. “The risk posed by this persistent asymmetry in capability was
manageable during a period in which a nuclear crisis seemed a remote
possibility,” it added. Today, with “this possibility … less remote and the
risk therefore higher …, mitigating this risk is now a priority”.
Headlines

South Korea closes in on development

of supersonic ship-launched anti-ship
missile
Dae Young Kim
Seoul 14/04/2020
Officials from South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) have
revealed that the country is set to complete development of a supersonic
ship-launched anti-ship cruise missile system “in the near future” and
that the country is planning to develop an air-launched variant of the
weapon that can be deployed from the Republic of Korea Air Force’s
(RoKAF’s) future KF-X fighter aircraft.

Speaking on condition of anonymity due to the classified nature of the

programme, the officials told Jane’s in late March that the country’s
Agency for Defense Development (ADD) had been in charge of the
development, with the system expected to be capable of targeting larger
ships, such as those in an enemy carrier group.

No further details were provided about the system, including the

designation and whether a submarine-launched variant is also being
developed, but it is possible that the ship-launched variant could be
deployed from the Republic of Korea Navy’s (RoKN’s) second batch of
three Sejong Daewang (KDX-III)-class guided-missile destroyers – the first
of which is currently being designed and built by Hyundai Heavy
Industries – and/or the future Korea Destroyer Next Generation (KDDX),
six units of which are set to be operated by the RoKN by the mid- or late
2030s.

The Yonhap News Agency had reported in 2017 that the missile would
possibly enter service as early as 2020, but South Korean officials would
not confirm that deployment date when recently asked by Jane’s.

According to the officials, the country began conducting research on the

supersonic antiship missile in 2007, with Russia said to have transferred
technology to South Korea related to its P-800 (3M55) Oniks/Yakhont
missile.
Headlines

Charles de Gaulle returns to home port

following Covid-19 outbreak on board
Emmanuel Huberdeau
Paris 15/04/2020

The French Navy’s carrier strike group has cut short its cruise following a
Covid-19 outbreak
Fi y sailors on board the carrier Charles de Gaulle had been infected by the
virus

The French Navy’s carrier strike group (CSG) returned to Toulon, its
homeport, on 12 April, 10 days earlier than planned. Charles de Gaulle’s
deployment was cut short after 50 sailors on board the nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier were diagnosed with Covid-19.

The French Armed Forces Ministry

revealed on 8 April that 40 sailors from
Charles de Gaulle had been placed under
medical observation with symptoms that
could be linked to Covid-19. A team of
four doctors arrived on board the same
day to conduct tests and assess the The French aircra carrier Charles de Gaulle returned
to Toulon on 12 April, 10 days earlier than planned
situation. Fifty of the 66 sailors tested a er 50 of its sailors were diagnosed with Covid-19.
Marine Nationale: 1766739
were declared to have been infected by
the virus, the ministry confirmed on 10
April.

Following these tests a decision was taken to reduce the CSG’s

deployment by 10 days. The Rafale fighters and Hawkeye airborne early
warning aircraft from Charles de Gaulle took off for their naval air stations
in Brittany. The carrier, along with the frigate Chevalier Paul, headed for
Toulon, while the fleet tanker Somme and frigate La Motte-Picquet
headed for Brest. Measures were taken to prevent the virus from
spreading on board, including wearing masks.

On 9 April three sailors were evacuated from Charles de Gaulle by NH90

helicopter to Lisbon, Portugal, from where they were transported to a
military hospital in Toulon by a medicalised Falcon 900 aircraft.

Following the ship’s return to its homeport, health studies are being
conducted and some of the ship’s compartments are being disinfected.
The crew is being quarantined in military facilities for 14 days.

The Charles de Gaulle strike group left Toulon on 21 January. As planned,

the CSG initially deployed in the eastern Mediterranean to participate in
strikes against the so-called Islamic State for a month. It then deployed to
the eastern North Sea for the first time since 2010 to exercise with
Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) off Jutland, Denmark, on 19–
22 March.

The early return of Charles de Gaulle to Toulon came a day before the first
death of a US Navy sailor who had contracted Covid-19 while serving on
the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, which pulled in at Guam on
27 March amid a significant Covid-19 outbreak on board.
Headlines

UK pauses defence and security

review
Tim Ripley
London 16/04/2020
A pause has been ordered on work on the United Kingdom’s Integrated Security,
Defence and Foreign Policy Review until the Covid-19 crisis is over, a government
spokesman confirmed to Jane’s on 15 April.
The review was only formally started in February, but the turmoil caused by the
pandemic led the UK government to make its pause decision on 10 April.
No announcement was made because the UK parliament is still on its Easter break
and a ministerial statement will be made when it returns to London for a formal
sitting, the spokesman said.
Headlines

Maiden flight for Qatari F-15QA

Gareth Jennings
London 14/04/2020
The first of 36 Boeing F-15QA Advanced Eagle combat aircraft for Qatar
has made its maiden flight out of Boeing’s St Louis production facility in
Missouri. The milestone was announced by the Qatari Ministry of Defence
(MoD) on 14 April.

The F-15QA is the Qatari variant of the Advanced Eagle

that, along with the F-15SA for Saudi Arabia and F-15EX
for the US Air Force, improves on earlier models of the
Eagle in that it features a number of hardware and A screenshot from a Qatari
software enhancements. MoD video showing the
conclusion of the maiden
flight of the first F-15QA
Specifically, these comprise two additional underwing for Qatar. Qatari MoD via
Twitter: 1771732
weapons stations (increasing the number of these from 9
to 11); the option of a large-area-display cockpit (Saudi
Arabia has not taken up this option); fly-by-wire controls; the Raytheon
AN/APG-82(V)1 or AN/APG-63(V)3 active electronically scanned-array
radar; General Electric GE F-110-129 engines; digital Joint Helmet-
Mounted Cueing Systems in both cockpits; a digital electronic warfare
system; and other improvements.

Boeing expects to begin delivering the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF) F-
15QAs in the very near future and for deliveries to run through to early
2023. Qatar has options for a further 36 aircraft, which would stretch
production by a further three years out to 2026 if exercised.

As noted by a senior QEAF officer in the Qatari MoD video of the first
flight, this milestone was achieved despite the ongoing coronavirus
pandemic and temporary shutdowns at some of Boeing’s major
manufacturing facilities.
Headlines

North Korea has test-fired salvo of anti-

ship cruise missiles into sea, says South
Korea
Gabriel Dominguez & Dae Young Kim
London & Seoul 14/04/2020
Pyongyang fired what appeared to be a salvo of short-range anti-ship
cruise missiles (ASCMs) into the East Sea (also known as the Sea of Japan)
on 14 April, according to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

In a statement issued that same day the JCS said the as-
yet-unidentified projectiles were fired in a northeasterly
direction from an area near the coastal town of
Munchon in North Korea’s eastern Kangwon Province
at around 07:00 h local time. The projectiles flew a
distance of about 150 km before falling into the sea, said In June 2017 North Korea
the officials. test-fired a salvo of the
country’s version of the
Russian 3M24 ASCM.
A JCS official told Jane’s that Seoul believes North KCNA: 1704196

Korea may have tested the same anti-ship cruise missile

system it tested on 8 June 2017. Referred to as the KN-19 by US Forces
Korea (USFK), this mobile coastal defence system was first publicly
displayed by the communist regime on 15 April 2017 in a parade to mark
the 105th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung. On that day Pyongyang
paraded a number of tracked transporter-erector launchers (TELs) carrying
launch tubes consistent with the North Korean version of the Russian
3M24 ASCM.

The 3M24-like missile had previously been fired from North Korean
missile patrol boats, but the June 2017 test-launch marked the first time
that the missile was shown being fired from a land-based vehicle. The TEL
seen carrying the missile at the time appeared to be based on the 2P19
tracked vehicle clone that North Korea uses as a TEL for R-17 ‘Scud’-
type short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).
This indicates that the missile, which is believed to feature considerably
upgraded seekers with active radar and infrared homing for terminal
guidance, has been adapted for coastal defence, similar to the Russian
3K60 Bal system.

Meanwhile, the JCS said that North Korea also flew several of its Russian-
made Sukhoi and MiG fighter aircraft over the eastern coastal city of
Wonsan, adding that several air-to-surface missiles were fired into the
East Sea.

The latest developments appear to be part of military training manoeuvres

as Pyongyang seeks to enhance the combat readiness and capabilities of
the Korean People’s Army amid stalled denuclearisation talks with the
United States and South Korea.

They also follow a series of testfirings this year of different SRBM systems,
all of which North Korea first unveiled in 2019.

Last year Pyongyang conducted 13 major weapon tests that featured a

total of five new weapon systems: an SRBM referred to as the KN-23
(South Korean/USFK designation); an SRBM similar in appearance to some
of the missiles used by the US ATACMS; a ‘large-calibre multiple-launch
guided rocket system’; a ‘super-large multiple rocket launcher’, and
anew type of submarine-launched ballistic missile called the Pukguksong-
3 (also spelled Pukkuksong-3).

Except for the SLBM, which would have a range of about 2,500 km if fired
on a minimumenergy trajectory, all the other weapon systems are short-
range and road-mobile.
Headlines

China’s transonic wind tunnel achieves

milestone
Andrew Tate
London 14/04/2020
China’s FL-62 large-scale transonic wind tunnel has successfully passed a
major milestone, according to a post on the Aviation Industry Corporation
of China’s (AVIC’s) official Weibo account.

In a 1 April test the tunnel’s 80 MW

compressor was run at full power and
achieved its design performance, marking
a notable success for the domestically-
built 6 maxial compressor.

Information on the design of the wind In a 1 April test the compressor of China’s large-scale
transonic wind tunnel was run at full power and
tunnel, which has been built at AVIC’s achieved its design performance, AVIC announced.
AVIC:1771731
Aerodynamics Research Institute (ARI) in
Shenyang, was made public in October
2018. The tunnel has been configured as a continuous loop, with a test
chamber that can accommodate models up to 2.4×2.4 m and simulate
velocities between Mach 0.3 and 1.6.

Although the cost of the test facility has not been disclosed, AVIC has
stated that it is the largest single-investment construction project
approved by China’s State Administration of Science, Technology, and
Industry for National Defence and is regarded as a strategic facility
essential for the development of China’s aerospace industry.

Unless China aspires to build supersonic commercial aircraft, the primary

function of the FL-62 wind tunnel will be to support the development of
supersonic combat aircraft.

China has invested heavily in wind tunnels, including facilities capable of

testing hypersonic weapons travelling at speeds up to Mach 25.
The Americas

USAF conducts first Transport Isolation

System aeromedical evacuation
mission
Pat Host
Washington, DC 14/04/2020

The USAF has performed its first aeromedical evacuation using its Transport
Isolation System
The system was used to evacuate three Covid-19 patients from Afghanistan

The US Air Force (USAF) conducted the first operational use of its
Transport Isolation System (TIS) on 10 April to perform an aeromedical
evacuation.

The service used a TIS installed on a

Boeing C-17A Globemaster III airlifter to
move three federal government
contractors who tested positive for the
novel coronavirus (Covid-19) from
Afghanistan to Germany. The mission, A USAF C-17 is prepped to transport a Transport
performed by Air Mobility Command Isolation System (TIS) in March last year. On 10 April
the USAF conducted the first operational use of the
(AMC), was the first movement of Covid- TIS to perform an aeromedical evacuation of three
Covid-19 patients. US Air Force: 1751999
19 patients aboard USAF aircraft,
according to a service statement.

The mission comprised a full TIS force package, which includes one C-17
carrying two TIS modules and aircrew. The TIS is an infectious disease
containment unit designed to minimise the risk to aircrew, medical
attendants, and the airframe while enabling medical care to be provided
to patients in-flight.

Upon arrival at Ramstein Air Base in Germany the patients were

transferred to Landstuhl Regional Medical Centre.
The TIS was originally developed during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West
Africa.

“[The mission] is a great demonstration of [the] AMC’s transition to a

warfighting component command with increased flexibility and speed,
enabling our mobility airmen to quickly answer any call for help during
this global campaign to defeat Covid-19,” AMC Commander General
Maryanne Miller said in an 11 April statement.

USAF spokesperson Emma Quirk said on 10 April that the TIS offers
limited capacity and capability for 2–4 patients, but is still a useful tool to
support the potential movement of infected passengers. Each TIS can hold
two litter patients on stretchers, stacked securely for evacuation, or four
ambulatory patients.

Quirk said the pallets are retrofitted with watertight enclosures and high-
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration systems to contain both airborne
and non-airborne pathogens.

The C-17 can transport two TIS units, which, in their basic configuration,
consist of one antechamber module and two isolation modules, each on
its own modified 463L aircraft pallet. The TIS can also be used on the
Lockheed Martin C-130H and C-130J Hercules transport aircraft.

Quirk said AMC is building its TIS capacity and has 12 mission-ready units.

The TIS was developed by Production Products of St Louis, Missouri, and

received flight certification in early January 2015.
The Americas

Pentagon rolls out ventilator contest

and makes Defense Production Act
purchases
Ashley Roque
Washington, DC 14/04/2020
The Pentagon is incrementally moving forward with its Covid19 pandemic
response, both at home and abroad, which now includes the US Army
launching a ‘ventilator challenge’ while the larger Department of
Defense (DoD) begins buying medical supplies under the Defense
Production Act.

For the army’s part the service’s assistant secretary for acquisition,
logistics, and technology, Bruce Jette, directed the Army Expeditionary
Technology Search (xTechSearch) programme to host a competition to
find “rapid ventilator production solutions”. In a 9 April announcement
Zeke Topolosky, the army’s xTechSearch programme manager, said,
“The technology solution must provide a rapid-response breathing
apparatus capable of short-term, rugged field operation in a small
footprint that will support field hospitals.”

The contest is open to all US companies that can produce a “low-cost”,

emergency ventilator that will require “minimal components” and is
designed for “simplified mass production”.

Ventilator solutions deemed “novel” could receive USD5,000 to spend

on a “virtual pitch” presentation to the Army xTech Covid-19 panel of
judges. The panel will then award companies USD100,000 to develop
concept prototypes and potentially select technologies to receive follow-
on production contracts.

Meanwhile, the DoD also announced its first round of Defense Production
Act (DPA) projects, which will include spending USD133 million to
domestically produce N95 masks.
“On the evening of April 10 the Department of Defense received
approval from the White House Task Force to execute the first DPA Title 3
project responding to Covid-19,” DoD spokesman Lieutenant Colonel
Mike Andrews said in an 11 April announcement that did not specify the
companies slated to produce the masks.

On 13 April the DoD announced that the Defense Logistics Agency is also
purchasing 60 Battelle Memorial Institute Critical Care Decontamination
Systems under a USD415 million contract. Each system is expected to
sterilise up to 80,000 used N95 respirators per day.
The Americas

‘Survivability’ against Russian weapons

top priority for US Army’s revamped
OMFV effort
Ashley Roque
Washington, DC 14/04/2020
‘Survivability’ will be the primary requirement in the US Army’s latest
attempt to replace its M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle fleet, with
‘transportability’ coming in at a distant seventh place.

US Army leaders have unveiled additional details of their revamped

Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) competition that will slow
down the development process and delay fielding the first tranche of
vehicles from fiscal year 2026 (FY 2026) until FY 2028.

A key challenge for the service last time around was striking the balance
between survivability and transporting heavily armoured vehicles on
aircraft. This time the service says transportability will take aback seat,
according to a 9 April industry day document that ranks the army’s nine
OMFV ‘characteristics’ starting with the most critical: survivability,
mobility, growth, lethality, weight, logistics, transportability, manning, and
training.

“The OMFV will serve as the army’s infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) tasked
to manoeuvre through the enemy’s disruption zone and deliver soldiers
to their dismount point unharmed,” the service wrote. “The OMFV will
provide direct-fire support to soldiers by detecting and destroying targets
at a range beyond the enemy’s capability.”

Although the document did not detail a list of specifications or cite

previous requirements, the service did provide industry with some initial
guidance to consider.

For the OMFV’s top priority – survivability – the vehicle must be able to
sustain hits from a “pacing threat” at ranges between 1.5 and 2 km
away.

“The OMFV must protect its crew and infantry from enemy IFVs while
maintaining the ability to fight,” the army wrote.

Although the army did not detail its mobility desires for the new fleet, it
has been grappling with striking the right balance between specifying
enough armour to protect against Russian armour-penetrating weapons
and ensuring that the vehicle can be used on European roads and bridges.

When it comes to the issue of growth the service said it is anticipating

future growth in the areas of weight, power management and distribution,
computing power, electrical power, cooling, cyber security, and physical
space.

“The specific manner and cycle of the OMFV upgrade strategy is to be

determined,” the service told industry. “The army intends to make
judicious use of growth margins designed into the initial version of the
OMFV to allow the OMFV to be the best IFV in the world for decades after
first fielding.”

On the lethality front the army also did not detail the desired weapons it
wants for the OMFV or the size of the cannon. However, it noted that the
future vehicle will need to fight alongside main battle tanks (MBTs),
helicopters, and artillery.

“To win our future battles the OMFV must be able to fight as part of a
combined arms team, defeat enemy IFVs and helicopters by itself, and, as
part of a team, defeat enemy MBTs when the M1 Abrams is not in
support,” the army added. “These enemy-defeating capabilities do not
have to exist on every platform but must reside within the formation.”

For OMFV logistics the service noted that it is also “open to

suggestions” on ways to sustain the future vehicle, including
“innovative” technologies to “reduce logistics burden, reduce the time
and cost to repair the OMFV and lower the overall life-cycle cost”.

Slipping into seventh place is OMFV transportability. Under the previous

OMFV effort industry sources told Jane’s that one of the chief challenges
was the army’s requirement to fit two OMFVs inside a C-17 airlifter. This
time around the army said that it “anticipates” that the Armored
Brigade Combat Teams will continue to deploy primarily via rail and ships
“but must maintain the ability to transport via air as an option for
commanders”.

While the service and industry still have a lot to work out for the
revamped programme, the army detailed a rough schedule for fielding the
vehicle two years later than expected under the previous effort.
The Americas

King Stallion demonstrates aerial

refuelling capability
Gareth Jennings
London 14/04/2020
The Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion heavy-
lift helicopter demonstrated its ability to
conduct aerial refuelling during a series of
trials in early April.

The tests, announced by the Naval Air

Systems Command (NAVAIR) on 9 April, A CH-53K conducting aerial refuelling trials with a KC-
saw the helicopter perform connections 130 on 9 April. NAVAIR: 1742532
with a Lockheed Martin KC-130J Hercules
tanker over Chesapeake Bay, near Naval Air Station Patuxent River in
Maryland.

As noted by NAVAIR, the CH-53K test team said the wake survey test
assessed the performance of the helicopter when flying behind the tanker
in strong, turbulent air.

The CH-53K King Stallion is now tracking along a reprogrammed timeline,

moving toward completion of developmental testing, leading to initial
operational testing and evaluation in 2021 and first fleet deployment in
2023–24.
Europe

Polish Navy could be hit by Covid-19

budget cuts
Jakub Link-Lenczowski
Kraków 15/04/2020

The navy could be the first Polish service to suffer budget cuts
Fast attack cra , submarine, and coastal defence vessel programmes could be
affected

The Covid-19 pandemic could affect the Polish Armed Forces’

modernisation process because of the need to review the state budget,
with Poland’s Armament Inspectorate (AI) confirming to Jane’s on 9
April that the navy could be the first Polish service to suffer budget cuts.

Poland’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) is expected to cancel or

postpone some naval programmes, with cuts likely to affect the
modernisation of Orkan-class fast attack craft, which will be delayed or
even cancelled. There were plans to upgrade and overhaul several key
onboard systems on these vessels like their Sea Giraffe 3D radars and
TACTICOS combat management systems. In addition, the Orkans’
propulsion systems and Soviet-era AK-176 76 mm guns were to be
replaced, the latter by the BAE Systems Mk3 57 mm naval gun.

The Polish Navy is also considering cancelling the Murena programme to

replace the Orkans with six fast attack craft. It is not clear how the Orka
submarine and Miecznik coastal defence vessel programmes will be
affected. The MND had planned to procure conventional submarines
equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP), as well as new coastal
defence vessels (corvettes or frigates). The AI told Jane’s that the Polish
Navy is still planning to lease AIP-equipped submarines until Poland is
ready to buy its own vessels.
The Polish Armed Forces Technical Modernisation Plan is one of the most
ambitious since 1990. Under the plan the MND has already signed a
PLN17.9 billion (USD4.6 billion) contract for 32 F-35A Lightning II Joint
Strike Fighters (the Harpy programme), a PLN19.63 billion deal for MIM-
104F Patriot surface-to-air missile systems (the Wisła programme), and a
PLN1.5 billion contract for M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems
(the Homar programme).

It is not clear yet how Covid19 will affect the Polish defence budget but AI
spokesman Major Krzysztof Płatek said, “The Armament Inspectorate is
fulfilling all the tasks according to the official schedule. Neither the Wisła
nor Harpy programmes are planned to be renegotiated and delivery of
the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System is on schedule.”
Europe

Bulgaria eligible for phased FMS fees

Charles Forrester
London 14/04/2020
Bulgaria’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has announced that it has received clearance
from the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to pay in quarterly
instalments for equipment procured through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
programme.
According to the Bulgarian MoD, the agreement “will allow the Ministry of Defence
to implement a flexible financing scheme for the acquisition of defence products
and services and reduce the resource burden of the defence budget in the coming
years”.
Application of the instalment programme will depend on the volume of equipment
ordered and value of the contract, the MoD added.
The agreement covers the country’s 3 April order for F-16V Block 70 fighters that
will be delivered in 2023–24.
Europe

Luxembourg’s A400M conducts first

flight
Nicholas Fiorenza
Brussels 14/04/2020
Luxembourg’s sole A400M airlifter made its first ›ight on 13 April, Airbus
announced in a press release later the same day. The aircraft took off from
Seville, Spain, where the A400M final assembly line is located, at 16:08 h
local time and landed back on the site five hours later, the company
reported.

The aircraft will be operated by the

Belgian Air Component’s 15 Air
Transport Wing out of Melsbroek: the
military part of Brussels’ Zaventem Luxembourg’s A400M landing at the end of its maiden
airport. flight on 13 April. Airbus: 1766740

Belgium is procuring seven A400Ms to replace its C-130s. The Belgian

Ministry of Defence said on its website in January that Luxembourg’s
A400M and the first Belgian aircraft would be delivered during the second
half of June.

A Belgian A400M crew has been attached to the UK Royal Air Force’s 24
Squadron at Brize Norton, which operates the type, to prepare for the
arrival of the aircraft in Melsbroek.

Luxembourg’s A400M is one of three aircraft types the Grand Duchy is

procuring on a bi- or multinational basis. It also intends to acquire up to
three NH90 helicopters as part of a bi-national ›eet with Belgium along
the same lines as the A400M, which includes a proportionate share of an
A400M full ›ight simulator operated by Belgium. Luxembourg will
contribute three A400M crews, consisting of two pilots and two
loadmasters each.

Meanwhile, along with the Netherlands, Luxembourg launched the

Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport ›eet in November 2014, signing
up for 200 ›ying hours a year and contributing eight personnel, including
two pilots, three other crew members, and three technicians.

Luxembourg has also provided aerial capabilities to NATO and EU

missions by leasing aircraft such as two SW3 Merlin III maritime patrol
aircraft for the EU Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med)
Operation ‘Sophia’ counter-human smuggling and trafficking mission
through a public-private partnership with Luxembourg-based CAE. The
mission was replaced by EUNAVFOR Med’s Operation ‘Irini’ at the
end of March to support the UN arms embargo against Libya, which will
use aerial, satellite, and maritime assets and could be an opportunity for
Luxembourg to contribute to.
Europe

Russian MoD receives first T-90M tanks

Dmitry Fediushko
Moscow 15/04/2020
The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has begun receiving upgraded T-
90M main battle tanks (MBTs), the Western Military District’s press
department announced on 13 April.

“In April a Western Military District

Guards tank army, which is deployed in
five Russian regions, began receiving the
modernised T-90M MBTs,” said the press
department.
The Western Military District’s 1st Guards Tank Army
is receiving upgraded T-90M MBTs. Russian MoD:
Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel said a 1771734
batch of T-90M MBTs had been delivered
to the Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division. “The land systems have been
fitted with a new turret, more powerful engine, and new multichannel
day/night sighting system,” said Lt Gen Kisel, adding that the T-90M is
capable of sharing combat information with other vehicles in real time.

The crews of the T-90Ms have been trained to drive, fire, and operate the
new tanks, he noted.

Unofficially dubbed ‘Proryv-3’ (‘Breakthrough III’), the T-90M is the

latest iteration of the T-90 family. The prototype of the tank was unveiled
during Exercise ‘Zapad 2017’ (‘West 2017’).

The export version of the T-90M is designated the T-90MS. The director
general of Rostec’s Rosoboronexport, Alexander Mikheev, told Jane’s
at the DefExpo 2020 defence exhibition in Lucknow, India, in February that
the T-90MS is a brand new vehicle and that the existing T-90S cannot be
updated to this standard. “These tanks are of different generations,” he
said.

The T-90MS carries a roof-mounted remote weapon station with a

Kalashnikov PKTM 7.62 mm machine gun instead of the T-90M’s newest
Kord-MT 12.7 mm heavy machine gun.

Contracts for T-90Ms and vehicles rebuilt from T-90As for the Russian
military were signed at the Armia (Army) 2017, 2018, and 2019 defence
exhibitions.
Europe

Portugal seeks JLTVs

Victor Barreira
Istanbul 09/04/2020
The Portuguese Army is seeking to acquire 4×4 Joint Light Tactical
Vehicles (JLTVs) through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme
starting this year, Lieutenant Colonel Ricardo Manuel dos Santos Camilo,
head of the capabilities branch of the army general staff’s force planning
division, told Jane’s on 3 April.

The JLTV acquisition effort, which is

currently in its initial phase, is for 250 air-
transportable multi-role vehicles in troop
transport and ambulance configurations.

EUR79 million (USD86 million) was

allocated in 2019 to the revised
Portuguese Military Programming Law for Portugal plans to procure 250 JLTVs through the US
FMS programme. Jane’s/DanielWasserbly:1403966
the acquisition of JLTVs by 2030 for
further army modernisation.

However, the total number of vehicles to be procured is currently under

review and a final figure is to be set by June, with other vehicle
configurations being considered, Lt Col Camilo said. Portugal has already
received price and availability information concerning a potential JLTV
buy.

The JLTV is intended to gradually replace Portugal’s unprotected tactical

4×4s, such as the Land Rover Defender series and the Toyota Land Cruiser
HZJ73LV.
Europe

Hungary orders RCWS systems from

Aselsan
Kerry Herschelman
Washington, DC 15/04/2020
An unnamed NATO country has signed a contract with Aselsan for remote-
controlled weapon stations (RCWS) and gunshot detection systems, the company
tweeted on 10 April. Well-informed Turkish defence sources told Jane’s on 13–14
April that the customer is Hungary.
Aselsan did not identify the systems but the image
accompanying the tweet shows the Stabilized Advanced
Remote Weapon Platform (SARP) and SEDA gunshot detection
system.
Aselsan’s SARP
(foreground) and SEDA
Plans call for the Aselsan systems to be installed in Hungarian (background). Aselsan:
1766738
Defence Forces Ejder Yalçın armoured combat vehicles from
Turkish private company Nurol Makina.
The vehicle participated in a parade in Budapest on Hungarian National Defence
Day last May.
SARP can be integrated into tactical vehicles, fixed surveillance posts, towers, and
critical infrastructure and can be equipped with a 12.7 mm machine gun, 40 mm
automatic grenade launcher or 7.62 mm machine gun, according to the Aselsan
website.
The company added that SEDA uses acoustics to detect supersonic projectiles and
calculate the shooter’s location under all environmental conditions and is available
in three configurations: stand-alone, moving vehicle, and wearable.
Asia Pacific

Chinese Y-20 capable of transporting

two Type 15 tanks, claim state media
Gabriel Dominguez & Juan Ju
London & Bonn 09/04/2020

Chinese media claim the Y-20A Kunpeng aircra will be able to transport up to
two Type 15 tanks
The aircra is said to have a range of 4,000 km at maximum payload

Chinese state-owned media have claimed that the Xian Aircraft

Corporation (XAC) Y-20A Kunpeng strategic transport aircraft is capable of
transporting up to two Type 15 (also commonly referred to as ZTQ-15)
lightweight battle tanks.

In a 7 April report about military science

and technology China Central Television 7
(CCTV 7) also released computer-
generated imagery showing two Type 15s
in the cargo bay of the aircraft, which has Computer-generated imagery from a 7April CCTV 7
an estimated maximum payload of 66 report showing two Type 15 tanks in the cargo bay of
a Y-20 transport aircra . CCTV 7: 1729605
tonnes and a maximum take-off weight of
220 tonnes, according to Jane’s All the
World’s Aircraft.
Chinese official sources put the range of the aircraft, which the state-
owned Global Times newspaper claims is also capable of transporting one
52–54-tonne Type 99A-series main battle tank, at 4,000 km at maximum
payload.

The Type 15 lightweight tank, which officially entered service with the
People’s Liberation Army Ground Force in 2018, is believed to weigh 33
tonnes in its basic configuration. This may increase to 36 tonnes if an
improved explosive reactive armour package is added.
The Global Times quoted Fu Qianshao, a Chinese air defence expert, as
saying that “multiple Y-20s can transport a mixture of Type 15s, Type
99As and other kinds of armoured vehicles, leading to a significant
improvement in China’s long-range rapid deployment” and strategic
transport capability. The four turbofan Y-20 officially entered service with
the PLA Air Force in 2016.

The Type 15, which is armed with a 105 mm gun, is protected against
hand-held anti-tank weapons. The gun is thought to be capable of firing
an armour piercing, fin-stabilised, discarding sabot (APFSDS) round that is
probably capable of penetrating 500 mm of armour from typical combat
ranges.

According to Chinese media reports the tank is equipped with a 1,000 hp

engine and has a crew of four, although there is speculation that an
autoloader for its main gun may dispense with one crew member.
Asia Pacific

Japanese MoD eyes AI to counter

cyber attacks
Kosuke Takahashi
Tokyo 08/04/2020
The Japan Ministry of Defense (MoD) has revealed that it will spend JPY25.6 billion
(USD235 million) in fiscal year 2020 on cyber-security-related activities and
programmes, including the development of an artificial intelligence (AI)-based
system to counter cyber attacks.
This system is expected to automatically detect malicious emails and assess the
level of threat by resorting to AI technologies, stated the MoD in a recently released
English-language document, adding that JPY30 million has already been
earmarked for the current fiscal year for the system’s initial design.
The ministry will also spend JPY20 million to conduct research on cybersecurity
measures for 5G-capable network devices used by the MoD and the Japan Self-
Defense Forces (JSDF). It also plans to expand the number of cyber-defence-related
unit members from 220 to 290.
The MoD will invest JPY3.4 billion to acquire a system designed to collect data on
the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) behind any cyber attacks launched
against the MoD and the JSDF.
Asia Pacific

India and Pakistan exchange artillery

and mortar fire along disputed Kashmir
border
Rahul Bedi
New Delhi 14/04/2020
The Indian and Pakistani armies have exchanged artillery and mortar fire
across the disputed Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, killing and injuring
several civilians on each side.

On 12 April the Indian Army (IA) accused the Pakistan Army (PA) of
initiating “unprovoked” artillery firings along the LoC – which divides
Kashmir between the two countries – and, as a result, killing three civilians,
including a seven-year-old child, in the Kupwara sector of Indian-
administered Kashmir.

A day earlier Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations – the media wing

of Pakistan’s armed forces – had accused the IA of breaching the 2003
ceasefire understanding between the two countries along the LoC by
resorting to artillery and mortar fire that struck the Sharda, Dhundial, and
Shakot sectors in Pakistan.

The PA went on to state that four civilians, including a 15-year-old girl,

were seriously injured as a result of the shelling and that PA troops
“responded with matching-calibre weaponry”, targeting the IA posts
they claimed to be responsible.

On 10 April the IA had admitted to firing upon PA gun positions and an

ammunition dump, adding that it had also attacked militant “launch
pads” in the region. Senior officers told Jane’s that the IA’s artillery
and mortar fire was in retaliation for the killing of five Indian special forces
personnel in hand-to-hand combat by an equal number of suspected
militants in the Kupwara area on 6 April. The militants, whom the IA
claimed had infiltrated from Pakistan, were also killed in the encounter.
Asia Pacific

JASDF scrambles up nearly 6% in FY

2019 in response to Chinese military
aircra
Kosuke Takahashi
Tokyo 09/04/2020
The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) scrambled its fighter aircraft a
total of 675 times in fiscal year 2019 (FY 2019) in response to Chinese
military aircraft approaching the country’s airspace: a 5.8% increase
compared with the same period in FY 2018.

The figure, which is the second-highest

registered in response to Chinese aircraft
during a one year period since 1958,
represents 71% of the total number of
JASDF scrambles between 1 April 2019 A Chinese Y-9 airborne early warning and control
and 31 March 2020, according to data aircra spotted by the JASDF flying over the East
China Sea on 23 March 2020. Japanese MoD: 1771695
published by the Ministry of Defense
(MoD) in Tokyo on 9 April.

Japanese fighters also responded 268 times to movements by Russian

military aircraft: down from 343 times during the same period in FY 2018.
The remaining four incidents involved aircraft from other countries.

In total the JASDF scrambled its fighters 947 times in FY 2019 to respond
to foreign aircraft approaching the country’s airspace: down from 999
times the previous fiscal year. The figure represents the third-highest
number of overall scrambles by the service within a year since such
operations began in 1958.

These incidents involved the JASDF’s Northern Air Defense Force (198
scrambles), the Western Air Defense Force (133), the Central Air Defense
Force (35), and the Southwestern Composite Air Division (581), the latter
of which oversees an area that includes the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands in the East China Sea, which are controlled by Japan but also
claimed by China.

The MoD emphasised that the JASDF scrambled its fighters on 23 March
2020 to intercept People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF)
Shaanxi Y-9 intelligence-gathering aircraft that were spotted over the East
China Sea for the first time. Japanese fighters also responded to other
Shaanxi Y-9 aircraft as well as Shaanxi Y-8 and Y-9 airborne early warning
and control platforms crossing the Tsushima Strait, which connects the
Sea of Japan (East Sea), the Yellow Sea (West Sea), and the East China Sea.

Japanese fighters additionally responded to Xian H-6 bombers flying over

the Miyako Strait: a strategic entry into the Western Pacific located
between the southern Japanese islands of Okinawa and Miyako.

According to the data, there were three violations of Japanese airspace in

FY 2019, all of which were committed by Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS)
aircraft (twice by Tu-95 bombers and once by a Beriev A-50 airborne early
warning and control aircraft).
Asia Pacific

Fire breaks out on China’s new Type

075 LHD
Andrew Tate
London 14/04/2020
China’s first Type 075-class landing helicopter dock (LHD) amphibious assault ship
suffered a fire on board on 11 April during fitting-out work alongside at the
Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard in Shanghai.
Photographs circulated on social media showed heavy black smoke shrouding the
island superstructure and emerging through the open stern door from the ship’s
well deck. Smoke was also coming from openings on the port side and a video clip
showed it dri ing several hundred metres from the ship.
The incident was confirmed in a report in the state-owned Global Times newspaper
on 12 April, which played down the fire and stated that it had been brought under
control and extinguished quickly. However, it made no comment on whether there
had been any casualties.
Photographs taken once the smoke had cleared showed the stern covered in black
soot, although a few hours later this had been removed.
The ship was launched on 25 September 2019 and has been fitting out for six
months, so sea trials are likely to commence later this year.
Asia Pacific

India cuts back on defence spending

Rahul Bedi
New Delhi 09/04/2020

India’s federal Ministry of Finance (MoF) has tightened all expenditure,

including that of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), for the first three months
of Fiscal Year 2020/21 (FY 20/21) as a result of the financial and economic
impact of the Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic.

In an 8 April notification the MoF stated that, “in view of the present
situation arising out of Covid-19 and the consequential lockdown, it is
expected that the cash position of the government may be stressed in
Quarter 1 [April-June] of FY20/21”.

Keeping this situation in mind, the MoF added that it is “essential to

regulate government expenditure and to fix the quarterly expenditure
plan of specific ministries and departments”, including that of the MoD.

According to the MoF’s announcement, the MoD’s capital and revenue

expenditure for April is limited to 8% of the overall defence allocation for
FY 20/21 and is set to drop to 6% for May and June. Under normal
circumstances no such limits would be set for capital costs to acquire new
equipment or for revenue expenditure that includes salaries and the
military’s operating expenses.

Senior military officers said they also anticipate strict controls to be set on
MoD spending during the last three-quarters of FY20/21, which ends in
March 2021, based on dismal official projections of India’s economic
prospects due tothe pandemic.

They also warned that the impending recession is likely to adversely

impact the military’s modernisation and overall operational capability.

Amit Cowshish, a former MoD acquisition advisor, told Jane’s it is highly

unlikely that the military will be allocated the funds it wants for an
extended period of time.
Middle East/Africa

LNA constructing forward airbase south

of Tripoli
Jeremy Binnie
London 15/04/2020

A road 60 km from Tripoli has been turned into a runway

The construction of bunkers suggests it will be used by strike aircra

The Libyan National Army (LNA) has converted a road south of Tripoli into
a runway that can be used to bring in supplies and personnel much closer
to the front lines around the capital. Satellite imagery also indicates that
the LNA intends to operate strike aircraft from the new base.

The existence of a new runway in the

Tarhunah area emerged on 5 April when
the Government of National Accord (GNA)
announced that it had carried out an
airstrike that destroyed an aircraft that
was carrying ammunition to the LNA soon
after it landed in the vicinity of the town,
which is about 65 km southeast of Tripoli,
far closer to the capital than any other
known LNA-controlled airfield.

The LNA confirmed the strike on 6 April, claiming a Turkish unmanned

aerial vehicle (UAV) had targeted a civilian cargo aircraft after it landed in
Tarhunah carrying medical supplies related to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Tarhunah does not have an airstrip, but Maxar satellite imagery from 6
April shows a destroyed aircraft on a stretch of road 12 km southwest of
Tarhunah that has been converted into a runway. The aircraft appeared to
have been a twin-engined transport with a wingspan of approximately 30
m, which would match an An-26 or An-32.
The runway conversion was carried out sometime between March and July
2019. This involved levelling the central reservation, paving it over, and
forming turn pads at either end to create a runway that is 2.8 km long.

The transport aircraft was hit close to new buildings that have been
constructed around a cleared area that can be used as a parking apron.

Sometime between 11 January and 7 March work began on three bunkers

that are connected to the runway, indicating they are hardened aircraft
shelters. Two are approximately 20×20 m, making them large enough for
a medium-sized UAV, with the third bunker being smaller and possibly
intended for ammunition storage.

The United Arab Emirates is known to have deployed Wing Loong II UAVs
to Libya to support the LNA, but these would be too large for the new
shelters and there is evidence they have now been redeployed to an
airbase in western Egypt.

The GNA has accused Jordan of supplying the LNA with the original
version of the Wing Loong, which would fit in the new shelters. Amman
has denied the allegation, saying it does not operate the type. The Royal
Jordanian Air Force put its similarly sized CH-4B UAVs on sale in 2019.

The new airbase at Tarhunah is not the first airstrip to be constructed

during Libya’s ongoing civil war. One has been built in GNA-controlled
territory on Tripoli’s southern outskirts. This has uncompleted multi-
storey apartment buildings close to both sides, making it extremely
dangerous for manned aircraft to use. This has fuelled speculation that it
was constructed as an alternative operating location for the Bayraktar TB2
UAVs that Turkey has deployed in support of the GNA and which suffered
heavy losses on the ground to Wing Loong II airstrikes in 2019.

Turkey has now deployed a HAWK air-defence system to Tripoli’s Mitiga

Air Base, a known Bayraktar TB2 operating location, and it is unclear if the
new runway to the south has ever been used.
Middle East/Africa

Morocco to arm F-16s with Harpoon

Block 2missiles
Gareth Jennings
London 15/04/2020
Morocco intends to arm its F-16 combat aircraft with Boeing AGM-84L
Harpoon Block 2 anti-ship missiles, it was announced on 14 April.

The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said the State

Department had approved the sale of 10 Harpoon missiles to the North
African country for use on its F-16s for an estimated USD62 million.

“The proposed sale of the missiles and support will increase the [Royal]
Moroccan Air Force’s maritime partnership potential and align its
capabilities with existing regional baselines. Morocco intends to use the
missiles on its F-16 multirole fighter aircraft to enhance its capabilities in
effective defence of critical sea lanes,” the DSCA notification said.

Boeing will be the prime contractor for a proposed deal that includes
spares, support, training, and other equipment and services.

The Royal Moroccan Air Force currently fields 23 F-16C/D Block 50/52
aircraft that it received from 2011 to 2012 (one was lost over Yemen). The
State Department recently approved the upgrade of these aircraft to the
latest F-16V Block 70/72 standard, as well as the procurement of a further
25 new-build F-16Vs.

The Harpoon Block 2 missile is designed to engage a wide variety of

targets, both on land and at sea, such as coastal batteries, surface-to-air
missile sites, aircraft and airfields, port or industrial facilities, and ships in
harbour. The missile is guided by GPS and an inertial navigation system
and is reported to have a range of 124 km.
Middle East/Africa

Nigeria receives Chinese weapon

systems
Erwan de Cherisey
Paris 16/04/2020
The Nigerian Army has received a consignment of Chinese armoured
vehicles and artillery systems that included Norinco VT4 main battle tanks
(MBTs), ST1 tank destroyers, and self-propelled howitzers.

Nigerian Army Chief of Policy and Plans Lieutenant General Lamidi

Adeosun told local TV news during the unloading of the equipment at
Lagos docks on 8 April that it was part of a large consignment ordered
from China that included two types of “artillery heavy guns”. He added
that the initial consignment included 15 40 ft containers of spares and
accessories.

The Nigerian Army did not identify the type or numbers of platforms
being procured, although the media reported that 17 were delivered in
this consignment, which is the first under a USD152 million contract
signed in 2019 that also includes support and training. The television
coverage and social media photographs showed the consignment
included several examples of the VT4, which is a 52-tonne MBT with a 125
mm main gun that is already in service with Thailand. It joins the T-72, T-
55, and Vickers Mk3 tanks in Nigerian service.

ST1 tank destroyers were also seen: a type based on the VN1 8×8 infantry
fighting vehicle and armed with a 105 mm main gun. The Nigerian Army
already operates lighter armoured fighting vehicles such as the Panhard
AML series and ERC-90.

The self-propelled howitzers were said by some observers to be 105 mm

SH5s, but the few images available appeared to show a very similar 122
mm SH2. Both are 10-tonne 6×6 systems that were not previously known
to have entered series production and for which Nigeria is the first
confirmed customer.
Nigeria has also embarked on several efforts aimed at procuring
domestically manufactured platforms, the most notable being the
Proforce Ara 2 mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle, of which 25
examples have been ordered.

The Ezugwu armoured personnel carrier, which was developed by the

Nigerian Defence Industry Corporation (DICON) and has now evolved into
a more advanced design that appears to offer improved protection, is also
being procured.

Photographs have also shown that Nigerian Army workshops in Maiduguri

have been working on armouring trucks and other unprotected vehicles.

Analysis
The Nigerian Army has made significant use of MBTs in operations against militants
in the northeast of the country, using its Vickers Mk3s and T-72s as highly protected
mobile direct fire-support platforms. It is likely the VT4s and ST1s will fulfil a similar
role.
Indeed, both Chad and Cameroon have used their own wheeled WMA301s armed
with 105 mm guns in combat against the militants, with the Cameroonians using
theirs as highly mobile artillery platforms thanks to their indirect-fire support
capability.
The procurement of the SH2 is more surprising, since this system has yet to be
operationally proven and lacks the firepower and range offered by 155 mm
howitzers. Its calibre, which is the same as the D-30 howitzers used by the Nigerian
Army, as well as its low weight and high mobility may have played a part in its
selection.
Middle East/Africa

Mauritania receives last set of EU-

funded camels
Erwan de Cherisey
Paris 14/04/2020
The Mauritanian National Guard has taken delivery of a final batch of 200
camels that was handed over to its Nomadic Group at Achemim on the
border with Mali by France’s Management Institute for International
Security (THEMIIS).

Peer de Jong, THEMIIS’s senior vice

president for development, told Jane’s
that the company was contracted by the
European Union following an international
tender to purchase and deliver the camels,
as well as equipment such as saddles, for
The Mauritanian National Guard’s Nomadic Group
the National Guard under the Ghawdat now has about 370 camels, allowing it to significantly
extend its coverage of the Mauritanian hinterland.
(Mehari in Arabic) programme of the THEMIIS: 1766411
EU’s Mauritania Security and
Development Support Project (PADSM).

The PADSM aims to strengthen the Mauritanian state’s presence in

remote areas of the country and improve the living conditions of locals by
providing access to water, healthcare, and education.

Increasing the capabilities of the National Guard in general and the

Nomadic Group in particular is one of the key aspects of the PADSM and
the main focus of the Ghawdat programme.

De Jong said its aim is to provide the Nomadic Group with the means to
operate effectively throughout the Mauritanian hinterland, support
development projects, and provide a visible government presence while
conducting patrols to deter terrorist incursions as well as illicit activities.

THEMIIS purchased 270 camels from local breeders throughout

Mauritania, with the first batch of 70 being delivered in December 2019.
These animals join an estimated 100 that the Nomadic Group already
possessed.

The group is currently conducting a recruitment campaign that should

bring its strength to an estimated 500. These will be divided into two
camel-mounted squadrons and a single motorised squadron equipped
with Toyota Land Cruisers. The latter is also to have an engineering
element to support development work, including drilling wells.
Business

Seoul to introduce defence industry

support measures
Jon Grevatt
Bangkok 14/04/2020

South Korea’s DAPA has agreed measures to support companies affected by

the Covid-19 pandemic
The measures are intended to provide support for major companies’ supply
chains

South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) has

proposed a series of measures to support domestic defence companies
affected by the Covid-19 pandemic.

DAPA said on 9 April that the initiatives

were agreed during meetings between
the agency and the CEOs of 15 major
defence companies, including Hanwha,
Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), Korea
Programmes such as KAI’s Light Armed Helicopter
Aerospace Industries (KAI), and LIG Nex1. have been reliant on supplies from Airbus
Helicopters. KAI: 1721068
DAPA said newly proposed mitigation
measures included the establishment of a new inter-ministerial committee
that will look to ensure that affected defence companies – particularly
small businesses – are able to maintain levels of employment through the
pandemic. DAPA also said it would look to support firms by “adjusting”
existing government-led defence programmes in terms of “quantities
and deliveries”. Another priority will be to ensure that imports – to
support military research, development, and manufacturing activity – are
reduced further in favour of locally sourced products.

The measures are intended to provide support mainly for major

companies’ supply chains. DAPA pointed out that Covid-19 is most likely
to affect smaller downstream companies that are involved in both
commercial and defence supply chains. Covid-19related restrictions have
affected these firms’ ability to access employment, raw materials, and
components, it said.

In its statement DAPA cited Na Sang-woong, the vice chairman of the

Korea Defense Industry Association, as saying, “Active support by the
government is urgent as the expected mid- to longer-term economic
slowdown is forecast to affect the industry.” He also called on DAPA to
put more emphasis on local sourcing.

Analysis
South Korean defence firms – including KAI, Hanwha, and LIG Nex1 – have
indicated to Jane’s in recent weeks that, while major programmes for the Republic
of Korea (RoK) Armed Forces have not been majorly affected by Covid-19, efforts to
expand military exports have been hindered.
Despite this Jane’s analysis also suggests that there are likely to be domestic
supply-chain difficulties.
Most major programmes in South Korea rely on imported components and
technologies. Many of these parts and systems are acquired from the United States
and Europe: regions that are experiencing Covid-19-related lockdowns of varying
degrees. For instance, KAI’s development and production of helicopters – including
the Light Armed Helicopter (LAH) and KUH-1 Surion multirole medium helicopter –
both depend on supplies from Airbus Helicopters.
Another longer-term challenge for the government and DAPA is likely to be funding.
DAPA’s parent agency, the Ministry of National Defense, announced in August 2019
that, in order to fulfil the modernisation objectives of the RoK Armed Forces, it will
require KRW290.5 trillion (USD238.8 billion) in defence spending during 2020–24.
The MND said the 2020–24 plan outlines spending of KRW186.7 trillion (or 64% of
proposed expenditure for the period) for operating expenses, with the remaining
KRW103.8 trillion (36%) for modernisation, including procurement and research
and development.
Business

Boeing reopens facilities in Seattle area

Marc Selinger
Washington, DC 14/04/2020
Boeing has begun resuming its Seattle-area defence operations, including
work on the US Air Force KC-46A Pegasus tanker and the US Navy P-8A
Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, after a nearly three-week shutdown
caused by the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic.

Managers returned to work on 13 April and other employees were slated

to do the same as early as 14 April, the aircraft manufacturer said. About
2,500 people are going back to work.

Boeing paused production at its Seattle-area commercial and military

aircraft factories on 25 March to improve its defences against Covid-19.
Most commercial operations will remain closed until further notice.

To protect returning workers against Covid-19 Boeing has instituted

employee wellness checks at the start of every shift, staggered shift start
times to reduce the flow of people arriving at and leaving work,
implemented physical distancing measures, placed hand-washing stations
in high-traffic areas, and ordered employees to wear face masks or
coverings.

Meanwhile, the Boeing Guidance Repair Center in Ohio reopened on 10

April after a two-week suspension. Boeing subsidiary Spectrolab, which is
based in California and makes satellite solar cells, restarted production on
13 April after being closed for almost three days.

Aurora Flight Sciences, a Boeing subsidiary that makes unmanned aircraft

for defence and commercial use, suspended operations at all of its sites
for two weeks starting on 10 April. Aurora has four sites in the United
States as well as one in Switzerland.
Business

Indian defence exports for 2019-2020

reach record high
Jon Grevatt
Bangkok 15/04/2020
New data from the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) shows that the
country registered record-high defence export approvals worth INR86.2
billion (USD1.1 billion) in fiscal year (FY) 2019–20, which concluded at the
end of March.

The figure – which appeared in an online

‘dashboard’ published by the MoD’s
Department of Defence Production –
represents a five-fold increase over the
value of export approvals secured by the The growth in Indian defence exports is attributed
mainly to the private sector and Indian companies
MoD just a few years ago. such as Tata, which co-operates with Lockheed
Martin on producing structures for the US
corporation’s C-130J aircra . Jane’s/Patrick Allen:
The dashboard, which was updated with 1509912
the new figures on 14 April, shows that
the value of defence export approvals in FY 2019–20 was a year-on-year
increase of 4%, compared with the INR83.2 billion recorded in FY 2018–19.
India achieved approved transfers of INR46.8 billion and INR15.2 billion in
2017–18 and 2016–17 respectively. The value of export approvals in FY
2016–17 was INR15.2 billion.

Statistics published on the dashboard also show that the vast majority of
defence export approvals have been secured by India’s private sector.
They also show that the private sector’s growth in exports has increased
strongly in recent years.

In FY 2019–20 India’s private sector was credited with 93% of defence

export approvals in terms of value, with the remainder secured by state-
owned defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs). In FY 2018–19 the
private sector secured 89% of all export approvals. In FY 2017–18 and FY
2016–17 the private sector was attributed with 68% and 13% respectively.
The strong increases are attributed to India’s growing confidence in
defence export markets and expanding government and corporate
marketing efforts.

The Indian government has also rolled out several initiatives to support
exports in recent years – including a ‘strategy for defence exports’ in
2014 – and has sought to encourage partnerships through which foreign
contractors are increasingly expected to provide international supply
chain opportunities to Indian subcontractors.

This latter focus explains some of the major growth that has been secured
by the private sector.

Such firms are providing foreign contractors with a wide range of Indian-
built components, structures, and subsystems that are shipped back to
countries including the United States and France for integration onto
military platforms. One example is a joint venture between Indian
company Tata and Lockheed Martin that produces structures for Lockheed
Martin C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft.
Business

Australia looks to shipbuilding

retraining opportunities
Jon Grevatt
Bangkok 14/04/2020
Australia is looking at opportunities to bolster naval shipbuilding skills by
retraining employees displaced by commercial industries adversely
impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic.

The Australian Department of Defence (DoD) said that the country’s

Naval Shipbuilding College has engaged with organisations from a range
of commercial sectors to support the retraining activity.

Such retraining, said the DoD, would take place through a “virtual suite
of online training courses” in line with Australian social distancing
measures.

The DoD indicated that naval shipbuilding employment opportunities

currently existed for designers and drafters, project managers, schedulers,
logistics support staff, and engineers. Many more roles will be identified
over the coming four years, it added.

Australia’s minister for defence industry, Melissa Price, said, “The Naval
Shipbuilding College is taking a proactive approach to engaging with
organisations from the manufacturing, airline, mining, tourism, and
hospitality industries to identify opportunities to transfer their skills to the
shipbuilding industry.”

The Naval Shipbuilding College was set up in late 2018 in South Australia
to support the skills and workforce requirements linked to the planned
modernisation of the Royal Australian Navy over the coming decades. This
modernisation includes the local construction and sustainment of
platforms including 12 Arafuraclass offshore patrol vessels, nine Hunter-
class frigates, and 12 Attack-class submarines. Analysis Australia’s move
to retrain employees affected by the economic uncertainty that has
resulted from Covid-19 underscores the perceived workforce risks that the
country’s naval shipbuilding sector faces over the coming decade.

These risks were the subject of a brief submitted by the DoD to wider
government in July 2019. In this the DoD stated that a lack of workers to
construct new fleets of warships was the “single biggest threat” to the
Royal Australian Navy’s modernisation. According to the DoD, the naval
shipbuilding sector will require a workforce of about 15,000 people over
the coming 10 years or more.

In response the DoD launched the Science, Technology, Engineering and

Math (STEM) Workforce Strategic Vision 2019–30 in August 2019 to
support the development of defence industry skills, with an emphasis on
shipbuilding.
Analysis

NATO assures over collective defence in

face of Covid-19
NATO is reinforcing its deterrence and collective defence
capabilities during the Covid-19 crisis, but the pandemic
could have longer-term effects on allies’ defence spending
and solidarity. Nicholas Fiorenza reports

In the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic NATO is taking steps to ensure

that the outbreak does not hurt its ability to defend its eastern flank. After
NATO’s first virtual foreign ministers’ meeting on 2 April Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg emphasised to reporters that the alliance’s
primary responsibility “is to deliver security and defence for almost one
billion people”.

Referencing Supreme Allied Commander

Europe (SACEUR) General Tod Wolters’
update to ministers on the state of allied
military preparedness during the Covid-19
crisis, Stoltenberg said that NATO’s
ability to conduct operations had not
been undermined. “Our forces remain
ready and our crucial work goes on,
Royal Scots Dragoon Guards from the British Army
including in our multinational perform acombat-oriented physical fitness challenge
in Bemowo Piskie, Poland, on 6 March, having been
battlegroups in the east of the alliance, deployed in support of NATO’s Enhanced Forward
NATO air policing, and our maritime Presence (EFP). Extra measures have been taken to
protect EFP troops from Covid-19, including
deployments,” he said. “NATO military quarantines. US Army/Sgt Timothy Hamlin: 1766991
medical staff remain vigilant, monitoring
the impact for NATO troops deployed on operations.”

Responding to a question about the effect of Covid-19 on NATO

deterrence and its collective defence capability, particularly with regard to
potential Russian threats to the Baltic states, the secretary general
emphasised that the alliance had maintained its presence in the region,
highlighting its “air policing, the battlegroups, and where we also have …
the ability to reinforce if needed”.
Stoltenberg reported that NATO had observed a Russian military presence
close to alliance borders, a snap exercise in Russia’s Western and Central
Military Districts, and “significant Russian naval presence in the North
Sea”. “Of course, we intercept the flights, we follow military movements
as we always do, and we continue 24/7 to provide credible deterrence and
defence also in the midst of the coronavirus crisis,” he said.

NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) is still on the ground in

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania where extra measures have been taken to
protect troop contingents from Covid-19. For example, Germany, which
leads the EFP multinational battlegroup in Lithuania, now puts its troops
on a 14-day quarantine before they are deployed. After several cases of
Covid-19 in the battlegroup, it has been reinforced by two more Croatian
doctors, six members of the Bundeswehr’s medical service, and a Dutch
doctor and two nurses. The battlegroup’s German Leopard 2 main battle
tanks (MBTs) have also conducted live firing on the Pabradė exercise area
close to Vilnius, Lithuania.

One of the NATO headquarters that could be called on to command

troops on the alliance’s eastern flank is the UK-led Allied Rapid Reaction
Corps (ARRC) in Innsworth, England, which is maintaining readiness during
the Covid-19 crisis while drastically reducing its on-site staff to essentials
like its operations cell. Other personnel are instead working from home,
staying connected through secure mobile communications and the
corps’ remote access system.

Belgium is one country participating in Baltic air policing, with four of its
F-16 Fighting Falcon multi-role fighters deployed to Siauliai, Lithuania. The
detachment is restricted in a ‘quarantine bubble’, only leaving its hotel
to go to the base and isolating itself from the local population, except
when a designated person goes to local shops for necessities for members
of the detachment. To further reduce exposure members of the
detachment have not been rotated. The detachment declared itself
“100% on alert” at the end of March, with its F-16s scrambling to
intercept Russian aircraft, sometimes every day.

The “significant Russian naval presence in the North Sea” referred to by

Stoltenberg consisted of seven warships, which also entered the English
Channel at the end of March. The Royal Navy shadowed them with an
even larger force of nine vessels, with the Russian ships also tracked and
intercepted by Standing NATO Maritime Group One, which currently
comprises ships from Denmark, Germany, Norway, and the United
Kingdom.

Exercises like ‘Cold Response’ in Norway and ‘Defender-Europe 20’

in Central Europe were curtailed because of Covid-19, but soldiers still
practised reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank. US marines picked up heavy
equipment stored in caves in northern Norway before ‘Cold Response’
was cancelled, for example.

For ‘Defender-Europe 20’ 6,000 troops were deployed from the United
States to Europe; 9,000 vehicles and other equipment were drawn from
Army Prepositioned Stocks in Europe; and 3,000 pieces of equipment were
sealifted from the US. The troops deployed from the US included the 3rd
Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade as the current annual rotation of an
armoured brigade combat team to Europe under ‘Atlantic Resolve’,
which will conduct gunnery and other joint training with allied forces in
remaining ‘Defender-Europe 20’ activities.

Former US Army Europe commander Lieutenant General Ben Hodges

(retd), Pershing Chair in strategic studies at the Center for European Policy
Analysis, noted that Covid-19 had “caused the curtailment of exercises
such as ‘Defender 20’, ‘Cold Response’ in Norway”, and some
others. “This leads to an inevitable degradation of readiness if the pauses
in training go on too long,” he said. However, the US still plans to hold
‘Defender-Europe 21’ next year.

If the US was reinforcing Europe in a real crisis, this would not be stopped
by a pandemic like Covid-19, Hodges added. “The alliance would have
responded appropriately if the Kremlin had made the terrible
miscalculation that NATO would not respond within the context of the
coronavirus,” he said. “The mission is always going to come first.”

Greg Melcher, chief operations officer of the Center for the Study of New
Generation Warfare, said that the example of the aircraft carrier USS
Theodore Roosevelt, the crew of which has been affected by the virus,
applies to Europe. Although media coverage of the carrier’s commander,
Captain Brett Crozier, has focused on his efforts to protect his crew, he
began his pleading for isolation resources by stating that, if necessary, the
carrier would embark all crew and be ready to fight.

“The virus would certainly have an impact but in combat we are willing to
take certain risks that are not acceptable in peace-time,” he said.
However, Melcher pointed out that the
3,000-strong EFP could not stop the
Russians, irrespective of the Covid-19
pandemic, if they were to attack in force.

That said, although its exercises and ship

movements are provocative, Russia would An M1A1 Abrams MBT is driven off of the American
Roll-on Roll-off Carrier (ARC) vessel Endurance at
face the same medical problems as its Bremerhaven, Germany, on 20 February, becoming
the first piece of US-shipped equipment for use in
opponents if it exploited the Covid-19 ‘Defender Europe 20’. Covid-19 has caused several
crisis to attack the Baltic states or exercises to be curtailed, hampering military
readiness. US Army/Sgt Dommnique Washington:
undertake another military adventure. 1766990
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu
has repeatedly claimed there are no cases of Covid-19 in the Russian
armed forces, but, even if this was true, Russian military personnel would
be risking infection from any occupied populations or opposing forces in
the event of military action.

“Everyone would be affected similarly,” General Vincenzo Camporini

(retd), a former Italian chief of defence staff and current scientific adviser
to the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome, told Jane’s. He added that
there could be adegradation in operational force readiness as soldiers fall
ill and the military supports the fight against Covid-19.

However, Sven Biscop, director of the Europe in the World programme at

the Egmont Institute, said he sees noimmediate impact from Covid-19 on
NATO’s collective defence capabilities unless “significant numbers of
soldiers” are affected by the virus, rendering certain units unusable.
“That might affect deterrence,” he said. “On the other hand, all
potential aggressors are likely to be much harder hit by the virus than the
European states.”

Hodges added that a Russian attempt to take advantage of Covid-19 to

invade the Baltic states was “a realistic possibility, though not a
probability. That’s why the alliance and our allies in the region continue
to maintain vigilance.”

Another risk is that the cost of recovering from Covid-19 will affect
defence investment, Biscop said. The Czech government has already
publicly stated that procurement projects, such as the programme for a
new infantry fighting vehicle for the army, would be postponed. Carlo
Masala, professor of international politics at the Bundeswehr University,
said countries such as France, Italy, and Spain, “where the economic
damage due to [Covid-19] will be huge”, will cut defence spending and
noted reports that Germany would not increase its defence budget in
2021. Melcher also said Romania would not be able to spend the 2% of
GDP on defence that it did in 2019.

“With regard to NATO I think the issue will be how to prioritise in the
future and where to put the money. I personally see deterrence as the key
priority,” Masala said. Melcher said less money “will require real hard
thinking on how to spend it”, calling for a net assessment to achieve the
right mix and pointing to the importance of countering Russian
information/ hybrid warfare and improving interoperability.

“Maintaining the cohesion of the alliance and the trust between allies is
the most important element of deterrence that must be sustained or
strengthened,” Hodges said. However, Camporini warned about the
degradation of international co-operation and relations with the erosion
of Western solidarity during the Covid-19 crisis, saying this would take
time to rebuild. “It takes a long time to fix something that is broken,” he
said.

Nicholas Fiorenza
is the JDW Europe Editor, currently based in Brussels
First published online: 15/04/2020
Opinion

Huawei may be restricted in US 5G, but

Wi-Fi is up for grabs
US authorities are overlooking how Chinese companies are
influencing IT security through standard-setting and
advocacy organisations that cover technologies less
restricted by national security rules, Roslyn Layton argues

China’s desire for dominance in IT and control of the global data trade
has often been observed in its influence on international standard-setting
organisations. Less attention is paid to how China influences IT standards
through advocacy groups, with such activity carrying implications for
defence.

Although many countries and companies advocate

internationally for their interests, China’s IT companies,
which are partly or wholly owned by the Chinese
government and subject to its draconian laws, take it to
another level. Huawei has already touted its role in Wi-Fi
6: the ostensible futureproofing strategy for the Wi-Fi Image: American
Enterprise Institute:
industry. This important fact appears to have been 1766988
overlooked by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) in its unprecedented proposal to designate 1,200 MHz of the 6 GHz
band for unlicensed use.

Federal restrictions
Restrictions on foreign technologies with security vulnerabilities have long
been enacted in the United States and enjoy bipartisan support. These
federal restrictions protect federal and 5G networks, but do not always
apply to the states, private companies, and Wi-Fi networks, meaning that
many vulnerable technologies proliferate in areas without explicit
restrictions.

Federal bans also do not stop Chinese government-owned companies

from playing important roles in US standard-setting and IT advocacy
organisations. The Wi-Fi Alliance, an IT standards and advocacy
organisation based in Austin, Texas, has more than 800 members,
including hundreds of firms owned by or affiliated with the Chinese
government.

‘Wi-Fi Certified’ seal

Huawei is at the top tier, with its membership enabling it to put the
trusted ‘Wi-Fi Certified’ seal on its products, potentially distracting
users from official US communications about the risks of the company’s
technology. Through its membership the company can also exert direct
influence over Wi-Fi technologies and indirectly influence US
policymakers.

Many of the Chinese-government-owned members of the Wi-Fi Alliance

are listed in the National Vulnerability Database or restricted for use in the
federal government, including ZTE (which supplies network equipment),
Hikvision (surveillance cameras), Lenovo (laptops), Lexmark (printers), and
TCL Corporation (smart TVs). The same does not hold true at lower levels
of government. [Link]’s recent report ‘Stealing from the
States: China’s Power Play in IT Contracts’ documents how these firms
are embedded in state government networks, which are home to treasure
troves of sensitive government data but overseen with fewer controls and
resources than federal networks. The FCC may have denied China Mobile
a licence to operate in the US for national security concerns, but its
daughter company China Mobile Group Device can access US networks
through the country’s standards organisations and Wi-Fi networks.

The official sanction of Huawei by Congress, the Department of

Commerce, the FCC, and other agencies may likewise have stopped the
company from engaging in federal networks and 5G, but it does not
prevent Huawei working through Wi-Fi and other technologies. After
being placed on the US Entity List, which imposes additional licensing
requirements, Huawei was briefly ejected then reinstated as a member of
the Wi-Fi Alliance, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the
SD Association (which deals with memory cards), and JEDEC (micro-
electronics).

Some claim there is no choice but to accept Chinese-government-owned

vendors in standards groups. However, China’s endgame is clear: it has
long been building an alternative version of the internet that excludes US
technology and any pretence of coexistence.
The FCC may have denied operating licences and subsidies for state-
owned Chinese IT firms, but these companies have a workaround by
deploying in unlicensed ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Although the value of Wi-Fi is undisputed, the FCC’s plan would give
restricted Chinese firms free rein across a wide swath of the spectrum
overlaying critical infrastructure for utilities, transport, and public safety.

The unlicensed spectrum

Although some 5G networks have been targeted for ‘rip and replace’
efforts, there is nothing to stop insecure products and services from being
deployed in unlicensed parts of the spectrum, nor can the spectrum be
recovered for greater security or efficiency. Whereas China has about 500
MHz of mid-band spectrum in play for 5G, the US has not even concluded
its mid-band 5G auctions: itself a national security issue raised by security
and defence experts. If the US does not want Huawei in 5G, it should not
be in Wi-Fi either.

Roslyn Layton
is an international internet policy specialist, co-founder of ChinaTech
[Link], and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in
Washington, DC
First published online: 16/04/2020
JDW welcomes receiving the opinions of its readers, which may be
considered for publication. Please write to: Peter Felstead, Editor, JDW,
Sentinel House, 163 Brighton Road, Coulsdon, Surrey, CR5 2YH, UK or
email: jdw@[Link]. JDW reserves the right to amend published letters
for reasons of space, style or for legal considerations. Views expressed in
‘Opinion’ articles are those held by the writer and should not be taken
as a reflection of the editorial stance of Jane’s
Briefing Nordic defence

Northern response
Increased tension with Russia has prompted the Nordic
states to re-assess their defence and security requirements,
increasing their engagement and co-operation with NATO
and other Western partners. Tim Ripley reports

For almost 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall the Nordic states
thought little about direct military threats to their homelands. The end of
the Cold War encouraged the region to participate in United Nations- and
NATO-led peacekeeping, humanitarian, and stabilisation efforts in
Afghanistan, Africa, and the Balkans, while Finland and Sweden joined the
European Union and its foreign and security initiatives, ending long-
established policies of neutrality.

The 2014 conflict in Crimea and the Donbass in Ukraine, however, raised
fears across Europe regarding a resurgent Russia. Nordic states began
reviewing the defence of their borders, sea zones, and air spaces, as well
as looking to enhance their military capabilities. The countries have
realised that to counteract the strength of a Russian military that boasts
large conventional forces and nuclear weapons they need the support of
strong allies through EU, NATO, or bilateral arrangements.

Some enduring factors underpin Nordic security planning, including a

common desire to be self-reliant and build their defence around strong
and effective armed forces. However, the new Russian threat is distinct
from that of the Cold War, leading the Nordic states to adopt new and
individual approaches.
HSwMS Gotland is expected to remain in service to 2030, with a further refit potentially extending this to 2035. Following years of
relative peace, Nordic states have begun reviewing their defence postures in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Saab
Kockums: 1723756

Russia
The Ukrainian conflict has prompted talk of a new Cold War in the Nordic
region but Russian military capabilities and deployments are significantly
smaller than those that existed in the days of the Warsaw Pact.

At the height of Cold War the Soviet Union and its allies close to the Baltic
– namely Poland and the East Germany – fielded forces that could launch
a theatre-level offensive across the land, sea, and air domains against the
Nordic states. Subsequently de-classified Warsaw Pact war plans showed
that several Soviet-led divisions initially planned to seize Denmark to open
naval routes into the North Sea; neutralise Swedish air and naval bases to
prevent military interference; and push along Norway’s long coast from
north and south to secure air and naval bases for use against NATO fleets
in the Atlantic. The final phase of these operations would have

been the physical occupation of most of Scandinavia by Soviet-led forces.

Russia’s current armed forces are a shadow of their Soviet predecessors.

In the Baltic region they are confined to the semi-exclave of Kaliningrad
and a naval base at Kronstadt, situated on an island outside St Petersburg.
Kaliningrad is home to about 25,000 Russian military personnel, including
a naval infantry brigade, a motor rifle brigade, air-defence regiments
equipped with S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and a coastal
defence brigade with K-300P Bastion-P (SSC-5 ‘Stooge’) and 3K60 Bal
(SSC-6 ‘Sennight’) anti-ship missiles.

Air assets include naval aviation regiments, with about 50 Sukhoi Su-27,
Su-30SM, and Su-24 fighters, as well as some 30 Mil Mi-24, Mil Mi-8,
Kamov Ka-27, and Kamov Ka-29 helicopters and Forpost tactical
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Russia’s Baltic Fleet has some 30 naval
vessels, including 10 frigates and large corvettes, four amphibious landing
ships, two large hovercraft, and two conventionally powered submarines.
Berlin, Copenhagen, and Warsaw are also within the range of Iskander-M
tactical ballistic missiles based in Kaliningrad.

The Western Military District’s 6th Combined Arms Army, based in St

Petersburg, has a motorised rifle brigade based just south of the Finnish
border that can be supported by artillery and other specialist units
positioned around the city. There are three Russian Aerospace Forces
(VKS) fighter regiments based around St Petersburg equipped with about
70 Sukhoi Su-27, Su-35S, Su-24, and Mikoyan MiG-31BM fighters. The city
is also protected by a major cluster of SAM regiments with S-400 and S-
300PM systems.

In the Kola Peninsula the Russian Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command
boasts powerful land, naval, and air forces that can intervene across the
Nordic region. Naval forces include about 30 conventionally and nuclear-
powered submarines, as well as the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, with
its air group of two dozen Su-33 and MiG-29K fighters and battlegroup of
12 major surface combatants. These are backed up by coastal defence
forces of some 10 smaller corvettes and missile boats and nine mine
countermeasures vessels, as well as support from anti-submarine
helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft, and fighters based on airfields around
Murmansk.

One naval infantry brigade, two motor rifle brigades, and several Arctic
operations brigades are based at four garrisons on the Kola Peninsula,
supported by transport helicopters and a Forpost UAV detachment. Five
landing ships are also available to move amphibious forces.

Russia has also been upgrading its permanent bases on its island
territories in the Arctic Circle by installing winter-hardened buildings,
positioning air and anti-ship missile detachments, and improving airfields.
These bases have small garrisons but provide jumping-off points if large
forces need to be inserted into the region. Extreme Arctic weather
conditions currently limit military activity to the summer but as global
warming melts the Arctic ice cap there is more potential for shipping to
operate across the region for longer periods.

The collective Russian forces positioned around the Nordic region could
not stage a theatre-level war to overwhelm and occupy a single Nordic
state without major reinforcements from strategic reserves. However, a
surprise Russian attack could lead to limited territorial gains, such as the
seizure of Arctic or Baltic islands or border regions in Finland and Norway.

Russia’s land and amphibious options are constrained by its limited

ground forces near to the Nordic region, consisting of at most seven
brigades or about 30,000 troops. Russia’s air, naval, and missile forces in
the region are far more potent but are geographically split into three main
groups with limited ability to mutually reinforce each other.

The Kaliningrad exclave is home to the Baltic Fleet’s land, naval, and air
forces but has little chance of operating against Finland or northern
Norway, for example. If Russia chose to divert its strategic reserves to
attack an individual Nordic state it would have a better chance of success
but this would take time to organise and might be counteracted by
reinforcements from NATO or other allies.

More realistic scenarios for confrontation with Russia involve the threat of
force or naval and air blockades to secure political or economic
concessions. Potential targets for such a coercive strategy include
Norway’s offshore oil and gas infrastructure, Sweden and Finland’s
Baltic islands, or early warning radar installations in the far north of
Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Russian options include the physical
occupation of these locations through surprise raids by helicopter-borne
or amphibious forces.

The equipping of the Baltic and Northern Fleets’ warships and

submarines with Kalibr cruise missiles gives Russia the option of launching
precision conventional strikes on strategic targets across the Nordic
region with little or no warning, including hitting key government
buildings, communications and power nodes, air and naval bases, and
power plants. SAMs and anti-ship missiles based in Kaliningrad could also
threaten to close most of the southern Baltic to military and civilian
maritime and air traffic. In a situation short of full-scale war, the
threatened use of these weapon systems could make civilian airliners and
shipping companies unwilling to operate in the region, causing significant
economic disruption and potentially isolating Finland.

Finland
Finland has a 1,340 km border with Russia, putting it in a unique position
among the Nordic states. During the Second World War Finland fought
against the Soviet Union, first resisting aSoviet invasion in the 1939–40
Winter War before again fighting the Red Army during the 1941–44
Continuation War. As result the Soviet Union imposed draconian peace
terms on Finland from 1945, limiting its ability to join international
alliances perceived as hostile to Moscow.

In the aftermath of the war the Finns

adopted the concept of total defence to
mobilise their population to resist any
attack. This built on the tactics used
successfully to blunt the Soviet invasion in
1939 by harassing Russian troops in the
country’s mountainous and heavily
forested border regions. Mass Finnish soldiers in their BMP-2MD infantry fighting
vehicles during ‘Arrow 19’, an annual Finnish
mobilisation of reservists was used to multinational exercise, at the Pojankangas Training
Area in Finland on 15 May 2019. Finland has been
create a territorial defence force. steadily increasing its co-operation with NATO on a
technical level and hosting formal alliance exercises.
US Army/Sgt LaShic Patterson:1766983
The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed
Finland to escape from the post-war
restrictions, allowing it to join the EU in 1995 and NATO’s Partnership for
Peace (PfP) initiative in 1994. Finnish peacekeepers served in the Balkans
after 1992 under the EU, NATO, and the UN, while the country’s troops
have served in the EU Battlegroup initiative, putting high-readiness air,
land, and sea forces on alert for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.
The Finnish government also responded to calls from the United States to
provide stabilisation forces in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks,
operating as part of a Nordic battlegroup in the north of the country.

Finland did not follow many other PfP participants when NATO launched
its expansion initiative in 1999 and invited Central and Eastern European
countries to join the alliance. The national view was there was little to be
gained and that Russia would be antagonised. The Finns also never totally
abandoned their total defence concept and maintained their conscription
system, which feeds their reservist manned territorial defence
organisation.

Despite this, Finland has been steadily increasing its co-operation with
NATO on a technical level, joining the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC)
programme, the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), and the
Interoperability Platform, which brings together 24 active partners. The
country also joined the Nordic Defence Co-operation (NORDEFCO)
initiative, which promotes regional co-operation and interoperability, on
its formation in 2009, as well as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)
initiative to stand up a rapid reaction force focused on Northern Europe in
2019.

The most public sign of Finland’s growing links with NATO has been the
hosting of formal NATO exercises inside the country. Individual NATO
nations, including the United Kingdom and the US, have also participated
in bilateral exercises in Finland over the past decade. This would not have
been possible before 1990 as the Soviets would have reacted with
displeasure to Finland co-operating with its Cold War rivals.

Sweden
For nearly two centuries Sweden has followed a policy of neutrality,
avoiding all formal military alliances. Since 1945 the country has been a
member of the UN, regularly deploying soldiers to serve in blue helmet
UN peacekeeping missions.

Throughout the First and Second World Wars and then the Cold War
Sweden followed a policy of ‘armed neutrality’, adopting a total
defence policy to mobilise its population to fight off any aggressors. The
country also built its own domestic defence industry to ensure it could
independently construct fighters, submarines, tanks, radars, artillery, and
most other key defence materiel. Sweden has supported this industry ever
since to help sustain jobs and the country’s technological base, with a
major drive being made to secure export orders.

Meanwhile, the end of Cold War saw Sweden dramatically change its
defence posture. Conscription ended and the Swedish Armed Forces
(Försvarsmakten) were reorganised, with expeditionary peacekeeping
missions taking priority. Territorial defence was also downrated, with the
exception of air policing and maritime operations.

However, Russia’s invasion of Crimea also caused the Swedes to revisit

their defence posture and increase defence budgets, with conscription
being reintroduced in 2018 to boost the land forces’ ability to protect
Swedish territory.

As in Finland, there was considerable debate about joining NATO as

Sweden’s traditional neutral stance remains popular, but the country did
join the alliance’s PfP and other technical co-operation initiatives.
Swedish peacekeepers served under NATO control in Afghanistan and the
Balkans, while Swedish Saab Gripen fighters flew reconnaissance missions
over Libya in 2011 as part of the alliance air campaign to protect civilians.
The country has also regularly hosted alliance exercises.

Sweden’s entry into the EU in 1995 was a major development, involving

the country in the union’s foreign and security initiatives. This has
included moves to impose sanctions on Russia after the invasion of
Crimea, as well as bilateral co-operation such as joining the UK-led JEF
and NORDEFCO.

Sweden’s neutrality was never constrained by any formal treaty with the
Soviet Union and many in the country’s defence and security
establishment consider themselves to be informally allied with the West.
During the Cold War Swedish intelligence covertly co-operated with
several NATO members, including by sharing information from Swedish
electronic eavesdropping flights over the Baltic.

In 2018 the US Air Force (USAF) released details of an incident in 1987 that
involved Swedish Saab JA-37 Viggen fighters protecting a US Lockheed
SR-17 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft on a mission over the Baltic. The
US aircraft suffered engine problems, forcing it go subsonic and drop
down to 25,000 ft where it was being threatened by 20 Soviet fighters. The
Swedish Viggens positioned themselves between the stricken aircraft and
the Soviet fighters until the SR-71 was safely inside NATO airspace.

Intelligence co-operation between Sweden and selected NATO allies

continues. In 2018 and 2019 Swedish Gulfstream S102B Korpen electronic
intelligence (ELINT) aircraft were deployed to the UK air base at RAF
Akrotiri in Cyprus to fly ELINT missions to monitor Russian activity in Syria
and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Norwegian and German military personnel train with a Patriot SAM system in Norway during the ‘Trident Juncture’ exercise in October
2018. Denmark and Norway have been keen participants in NATO since the beginning of the alliance. NATO/Kevin Schrief: 1766984

Denmark and Norway

Denmark and Norway were original NATO signatories in 1949 and have
since been two of the most active participants in alliance operations. Their
experience during the Second World War, when their neutrality was
violated by Germany, made them keen to join collective Western defence
initiatives as the Cold War escalated. Support given to the allies by
Norwegian military units in exile and Danish resistance fighters during the
Second World War laid the foundations for post-war co-operation with
the NATO allies.

During the Cold War Denmark and Norway hosted NATO headquarters
tasked with organising defence of their respective territories, although
both countries prohibited foreign military units or nuclear weapons from
being permanently based on their soil. Major NATO exercises were
routinely held in both countries and allied intelligence agencies used their
territory to monitor the Soviet Union.

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall defence preparations in Denmark and
Norway were reduced and expeditionary operations in Afghanistan, the
Balkans, North Africa, and the Middle East became the two countries’
main priority. This changed following Russia’s invasion of Crimea, which
strained relations with Moscow and led to Copenhagen and Oslo pursuing
defence modernisation as part of efforts to protect NATO territory and
support allies in Eastern Europe.

Each country has specific issues and vulnerabilities. Denmark has concerns
about the security of Bornholm, a Danish island that sits between
Germany and Sweden, as well as incursions by Russian aircraft close to its
airspace. Copenhagen is also responsible for the defence of Greenland
and the Faroe Islands, which are autonomous Danish territories. A handful
of Danish aircraft, patrol vessels, and military personnel are based on both
to protect their territorial integrity but the main military force in
Greenland is provided by the US, which operates the missile early warning
site and airfield at Thule on the territory’s northwest coast.

Norway has a 195 km land border with Russia in its far north that has
been a military focus since the end of the Cold War. As the Soviet Union
started retiring scores of its nuclear submarines in the 1990s, Oslo worried
about pollution on Russia’s Kola Peninsula from submarines graveyards,
joining several international initiatives to prevent contamination.

Moves have also been made since 2014 to increase the number of
Norwegian troops based in this sensitive region. The Norwegians have
additionally stepped up surveillance of the Kola Peninsula, operating two
surveillance ships to monitor Russian naval movements and a radar
station at Honningsvåg in the Finnmark region.

Evidence of such surveillance efforts emerged when a Norwegian man was

arrested in northern Russia in 2017 on suspicion of being part of an
espionage operation aimed at the Northern Fleet submarine force. He was
later returned home through a spy swap in December 2019.

During the Cold War Norway hosted annual winter reinforcement

exercises run by the NATO Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force,
the UK’s 3 Commando Brigade, and a US Marine Corps (USMC) brigade.
The UK and the US respectively positioned equipment at Bardufoss in
Finnmark and Trondheim in central Norway.

These exercises were restarted after the Crimea crisis and the US
continues to keep equipment at Trondheim under Marine Corps
Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N). Since 2017 the USMC has
permanently maintained a battalion-sized unit in Norway, with each unit
spending six months at a time in the country participating in bilateral and
NATO exercises.
In the autumn of 2018 Norway hosted a major NATO exercise dubbed
‘Trident Juncture’, which practised the deployment of the NATO
Response Force (NRF) to the north of the country. This involved 50,000
participants from 31 countries, as well as 10,000 vehicles, 250 aircraft, and
65 vessels. A notable feature was the deployment of the bulk of the land
force by road, via the road bridge and tunnel from Denmark to Sweden,
before the convoys moved into Norway. Other exercise play took place in
Finland and northern Sweden, with such participation being impossible
during the Cold War because of those countries’ neutrality.

Denmark and Norway have outstanding territorial claims against Russia in

the High Arctic relating to Greenland and the Svalbard archipelago. These
claims have gone to international legal arbitration but the strategic region
is still seen as a potential future flashpoint between NATO and Russia.

A US Air Force F-15C Eagle fighter flies over Iceland on 22 April 2015 as part of the Iceland Air Policing initiative. NATO’s mission in
Iceland isnot run year round, as fighters are absent during the winter months. USAF/2nd Lt Meredith Mulvihill: 1766985

Iceland
Iceland was a founding member of NATO in 1949 but because the country
had no armed forces from 1951 to 2006 it instead hosted the US-led
Iceland Defense Force. There has been a revamping of NATO’s air
presence at Keflavik Airbase as a result of the Iceland Air Policing initiative,
which began in 2008 to replace the US fighter presence that had been
withdrawn two years earlier. This saw fighter units from across the alliance
taking turns to deploy to Iceland for several weeks at a time.

As tension between NATO and Russian intensified after the annexation of

Crimea, NATO fighters operating from Keflavik began quick-reaction alert
(QRA) efforts, ready to scramble to intercept hostile aircraft or assist
civilian airliners in trouble. However, unlike in the Baltic states the NATO
mission in Iceland is not run year round, with fighters absent during the
winter months.

The US Navy (USN) has also moved to re-establish its presence at Keflavik,
with Lockheed P-3C Orion and Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol
aircraft based there for occasional deployments. In April 2016 the
Pentagon announced plans to build new hangars and support
infrastructure for P-8A operations at Keflavik.

Modernisation
Even though Nordic armed forces are small by comparison with other
European militaries, they are some of the best resourced on the continent.
The welfare of the personnel became a priority as professionalisation and
Nordic peacekeeping in the Balkans escalated in the 1990s. To attract
quality personnel, salaries and other benefits are high compared to other
European armed forces. Even conscripts have high-quality
accommodation and food.

This investment in personnel has led to officers and other ranks from
Nordic states being held in high regard by their international counterparts
for their capability and professionalism. Nordic officers have held high
positions in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans with both NATO and
the UN. A Swedish officer is currently commanding the UN mission in
Mali, which is currently the third-largest UN peacekeeping mission.

To try to counter the Russian threat since Crimea was annexed, Nordic
armed forces have turned to enhancing the capabilities of their
conventional warfighting equipment, with programmes launched for new
combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, submarines, and warships.

Future plans
Sweden, with the Nordic region’s largest armed forces and defence
industry, has led the way in its response to the Crimea crisis, with defence
spending rising after 2014. The Swedish Air Force (SwAF) is in the process
of fielding 70 upgraded Saab JAS 39 Gripen E fighters with electronically
scanned-array radars. Conscription was reintroduced in Sweden in 2017 to
enable the army to undertake national defence tasks and in 2019
Raytheon MIM-104E GEM-T Patriot missiles were ordered from the US to
enhance the country’s air and ballistic missile defences.

The latest proposals made by the cross-

party Swedish Defence Commission in
May 2019 laid out an ambitious
programme to expand the country’s
defence capabilities between 2021 and
2025. Its proposals, which are predicated
on an increase in defence spending to
1.5% of GDP, are still being considered by Dutch, Norwegian, and US personnel prepare a dive
site at a frozen lake in Skjold, Norway, during the
the Swedish government. For the first ‘Cold Response’ exercise in February. The Nordic
security landscape has been transformed over the
time it proposes that Sweden commit to past decade, with the main players in the region
revamping their defence strategies and hiking
deploying an army brigade to help defend defence spending. USN/Mass Communication
Finland in time of crisis or war. Specialist 2nd Class Mark Andrew Hays: 1766986

At the heart of the plans are proposals to field three mechanised army
combat brigades and expand the reserve forces, which will grow the
wartime mobilisation force from 60,000 to 90,000 personnel. This includes
the doubling of the annual intake of conscripts from 4,000 to 8,000 each
year by 2024. All the army’s main battle tanks (MBTs) and other
armoured vehicles are to be upgraded, while Sweden has also ordered
three battalions of artillery and bought new man-portable SAMs.

The capabilities of the Royal Swedish Navy (RSwN) are also to be

expanded, with the size of the submarine fleet eventually to be increased
from four to five boats. A third Gotland-class boat is to receive an
upgrade and two new A26 submarines are planned to enter service in
2024. Two new corvettes are to be ordered by 2025 and air defence and
anti-submarine capabilities added to current vessels.

Denmark’s latest defence agreement was announced in February 2019,

focusing on creating a deployable army brigade that was earmarked to
reinforce Poland and the Baltic states via NATO’s Multinational Corps
Northeast. This will be funded by a 20% increase in defence spending by
2023.

A DKK2.265 billion (USD330 million) project is underway to equip this new

brigade, including new MBTs, ground-based air defences, artillery, and
armoured vehicles. Denmark’s Home Guard is also being boosted to a
wartime mobilised strength of 20,000 by increasing the annual intake of
conscripts by 500.

The Royal Danish Navy (Søværnet: SVN) is also working towards arming its
frigates with the Raytheon RIM-174 Standard Extended Range Active
Missile (ERAM), also known as the Standard Missile - 6 (SM6). The SVN’s
embarked Sikorsky SH-60R Seahawk helicopters are to be equipped with
dipping sonar and anti-submarine torpedoes.

Norway has also launched a major drive to boost the capabilities of its
land forces, bringing out a new defence acquisition plan in March 2019. A
requirement for three battalions-worth of new MBTs is at the heart of this
project, with NOK4–8 billion (USD390–780 million) set aside from 2024
onwards. NOK2.5–4.5 billion has been allocated for a new tactical
command-and-control information services (C2IS) system for the army to
provide secure communications. Smaller projects include upgrades to
M113 and Sisu armoured personnel carriers (APCs), a bridge-laying tank
programme, and a replacement for the Norwegian Army’s Raytheon
FGM-148 Javelin antitank guided missiles.

To boost the capabilities of the Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN) several

new projects have been launched, including a mine countermeasures
capability and upgrades to Norway’s Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates, as
well as one with Germany to replace Norway’s Ula-class submarines. Up
to NOK5 billion has also been allocated to purchase a new long-range air-
defence system to better protect the country from modern long-range
precision-guided weapons.

An expansion of Finland’s total defence capability has been under way

after it published its governmental Defence Report in 2017. This focused
on expanding the Finnish land forces’ total wartime strength from
230,000 to 280,000 troops.

Finland’s new procurement spending is concentrated on two strategic

programmes in the air and maritime sectors. The flagship air programme
is the HX initiative, valued at EUR7–10 billion (USD7.61–10.87 billion), to
replace Finland’s 64McDonnell Douglas/Boeing F/A-18C/D Hornet
fighters with fifth-generation aircraft by 2025. The Eurofighter Typhoon,
Dassault Rafale, Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter,
Saab Gripen E, and Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet are all contenders,
having undergone evaluation in Finland this year.
The Squadron 2020 programme, meanwhile, aims to recapitalise the
Finnish Navy’s main surface combatants with the procurement of four
multi-role Pohjanmaa-class corvettes by the middle of the decade under a
2019 contract with the Finnish shipbuilder Rauma Marine Constructions,
thus replacing seven older missile craft and minelayers. The existing fleet
is to receive interim upgrades until the new vessels enter service, including
new anti-surface missiles and anti-submarine warfare equipment for the
navy’s Haminaclass fast attack boats.

Tim Ripley
is a JDW Correspondent, based in London
First published online: 14/04/2020

Analysis
The Nordic security landscape has been transformed over the past decade, with
the main players in the region revamping their defence strategies and hiking
defence spending.
Across the region there is the recognition that the threat the Nordic countries face
from Russia is fundamentally different from during the Cold War when they were
confronted by the prospect of massed attacks by overwhelming Soviet forces.
The new strategic landscape requires the capability to defend against high-end
threats such as fi h-generation fighters, ‘super-quiet’ submarines, and precision-
guided munitions. As a result, considerable investment is being made in new fi h-
generation combat aircra , air-defence systems, and anti-submarine warfare
capabilities, rather than the fielding of large land forces.
However, modest improvements in land forces capabilities are under way to
improve the equipment of active-duty units, while conscription is being boosted to
expand the pool of reservists available for mobilisation in a crisis. These so-called
total defence forces are aimed at securing key infrastructure and exposed territory
that might face military or diplomatic pressure, rather than creating large numbers
of manoeuvre units.
The result has been a steady rise in defence spending across the Nordic region. No
Nordic state has yet reached the NATO spending target of 2% of GDP; in 2019
Norway came in at 1.8% and Denmark managed 1.3%, according to NATO data.
Swedish defence spending was 1% of GDP in 2018 and Finland managed 1.27% in
the same year, according to World Bank data.
Nordic armed forces, however, certainly get a good return on their limited defence
budgets, fielding high-quality military units that would be effective if ever called
upon to defend the country against aggression.
Interview

Air Commodore Dave Bradshaw

Assistant Chief of Staff, Capability Delivery (Combat Air),
Headquarters Air Command, RAF

Synthetic training is revolutionising the UK Royal Air

Force’s (RAF’s) move from a two-seat, single-role fleet
to the Eurofighter Typhoon and Lockheed Martin F-35
Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter as single-seat, multirole
air platforms. As such it is a key area of interest for Air
Commodore Dave Bradshaw, the RAF’s assistant chief Crown Copyright: 1766987
of staff for capability delivery (Combat Air) at
Headquarters Air Command, who is charged with maintaining and
updating assets such as the Typhoon and F-35.

“Our shift to a 50:50 live/synthetic balance has been spurred on by

maturing simulator technology,” he explained. “The significant
advantages offered by synthetics are endless, but can only be fully
realised if all forces train together, perfecting their part of the mission with
a full understanding of how they integrate with other UK and coalition
combat air forces, air battlespace managers, ISTAR platforms, surface
forces [and so on].”

The air commodore described Gladiator, also known as the Defence

Operational Training Capability (Air) (DOTC(A)), as “at the sharp end of
this revolution”. Together with Boeing UK and Inzpire, the RAF will during
the spring of 2021 introduce a synthetic collective training system based
in the Air Battlespace Training Centre at RAF Waddington, with
connections to flight simulators at RAF Marham and RAF Lossiemouth.
Gladiator’s initial operating capability (IOC) will be achieved when the
Typhoon future synthetic training system connects to the rear-crew trainer
for the E-3D Sentry Airborne Warning and Control system platform and
the equivalent US Air Force (USAF) system within a facilitated, contested
scenario, Air Cdre Bradshaw said, where “crucially” the aircrew involved
learn together.
Beyond these initiatives Air Cdre Bradshaw’s near-term focus for the
fifth-generation F-35 is its IOC Maritime requirements. “We have to
ensure the Lightning force can fight effectively from the [HMS] Queen
Elizabeth aircraft carrier in time for its first operational deployment later
next year,” he said. Following that the focus will be the standing up of a
second frontline squadron in 2023 and integrating UK weapons like the
SPEAR Capability 3 air-to-surface missile and Meteor beyond-visual-range
air-to-air missile in 2024–25.

As part of the IOC Maritime requirements the F-35 operational conversion

unit, 207 Squadron, deployed to Queen Elizabeth in late January and early
February, the air commodore said, enabling the unit to qualify its staff and
instruct frontline and ab initio pilots. He also confirmed that the unit
qualified five instructor pilots in day and night operations and brought
two pilots with carrier experience up to speed, with other qualifications
including those for landing signals officers who supervised the aircraft
coming in to land safely on the ship’s deck.

“The current plan – ignoring ‘The significant advantages

Covid-19, which is difficult – will
see the Lightning force’s 617
offered by synthetics are
Squadron deploy aboard the HMS endless, but can only be fully
Queen Elizabeth carrier for its realised if all forces train
inaugural operational tour in mid- together’
2021. A [US Marine Corps] F-35B
squadron will join them for what
we are calling Carrier Strike Group 21,” Air Cdre Bradshaw said. The UK is
aiming to have 809 Naval Air Squadron standing up in 2023, with the last
aircraft of the first 48-strong tranche of F-35s arriving shortly afterwards.
Along with 617 Squadron it will provide the UK with two frontline F-35B
units. “We don’t know yet when the next squadron [after 809] will stand
up; that’s an ‘integrated defence review’ question and it wouldn’t
necessarily be an RAF unit,” the air commodore said.

The RAF is also working with BAE Systems on the Typhoon under Project
Janus, which “will provide the aircraft with the continued ability to
interoperate with other coalition partners with the likes, for example, of
the next-gen IFF [identification friend or foe] programme”, Air Cdre
Bradshaw said.

He added that there were other developments in the aircraft’s human-

machine interface and Defensive Aids Sub System (DASS), the latter in
response to changes in the threat environment. “We are rolling Janus out
in small, bitesize tranches, with the first delivery of capability being this
summer and a follow-on six months later,” he added.

Air Cdre Bradshaw is also looking forward to the arrival of the future
active electronically scanned-array (AESA) radar for the Tranche 3
Typhoons in the mid-2020s, providing the UK with “a huge capability
uplift”.

“While the European Common Radar System Mk 1 radar is being

developed predominantly for Spain and Germany, we believe the threat
scenario is such that a higher-spec radar is required and the UK’s Mk 2
will provide this, allowing further growth potential while still providing
value for money,” he said. He explained that this will be part of a bigger
electronic warfare system that fits with the DASS to progress towards the
‘multifunction radar frequency array’, which combines a traditional
radar and defensive aids suite and will be integrated into the RAF’s
Tempest future fighter in 2040.

F-35 and Typhoon integration is also progressing well, said Air Cdre
Bradshaw adding that work had been done with 41 Squadron Typhoons
operating alongside 17 of the testing and evaluation unit’s F-35s based
at Edwards Air Force Base in California. “It makes sense because in the
majority of cases the RAF will be in a coalition, just like the Typhoon force
is over Syria now,” he said.

Alan Warnes
is a JDW Correspondent, based in Prague

First published online: 14/04/2020