CONFESSIONS

A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime

stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime; Section 28 EA. In
other words, anything said or done by a suspect or an accused person, from which it
may be inferred that he committed a crime, is regarded as a confession. One of the
important duties of the police is the investigation of crimes and interrogation of
suspects. In the course of interrogation, a suspect may make a confessional
statement. Such statement may be tendered as evidence against the suspect while
being tried for the offence, Section 29(1) EA. This connotes that confessions are
generally relevant in criminal proceedings. According to the Supreme Court in
SAIDU vs. STATE [1982] 4 SC 41, the evidential value of a confession is very great;
it lightens the burden of proof on the prosecution by dispensing with the need to call
a host of witnesses, especially in cases where there are no witnesses, or there are
very few witnesses.
Hence, once a confession meets the test of admissibility, it alone without more is
sufficient to ground a conviction for the offence which was admitted by it; STATE vs.
JIMOH SALAWU [2011] 18 NWLR (PT. 1279) 883, OSHO vs. STATE [2012] 8
NWLR (PT. 1302) 243. According to the Court in OSHO vs. STATE, in such
instances, the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases would
have been completely and fully satisfied by such confession.
NOTE: Although a confession is generally made in writing, it could however be made
orally and would have as much weight as a written confession; ISMAIL vs. STATE
[2008] 15 NWLR (PT. 1111) 593. Also, a confession may be made at any time after
the commission of a crime. In SUNDAY ONUGWA vs. STATE [1976] 2 SC 169, the
appellant was convicted of murder. It appears from the evidence that the trial judge
accepted that during investigation by the police and prior to him being charged, the
appellant admitted to the ownership of the blood stained matchet recovered at the
scene of murder, adding that he had killed the deceased as a result of the devil’s
work. It was argued at the trial Court that this admission should have been rejected
because when it was made, it was not decided that the appellant should be charged
with any offence. Overruling this submission, the Supreme Court held that an
admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime suggesting the
inference that he committed the crime is a relevant fact against the maker and if
made voluntarily, is admissible in evidence.
Note the wordings of Section 28 in regard to the above.

RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS

Some basic rules for the admission of a confession in evidence are provided for in
the Evidence Act, and some others may be inferred from case law. These rules
attempt to ensure the authenticity, legitimacy and reliability of confessions. While
authenticity has to do with whether a confession was made at all, legitimacy has to
do with whether the statement was obtained voluntarily or not, and reliability has to
do with whether a confession is correct or true. According to the Supreme Court in
SAIDU vs. STATE (supra), the rules of admissibility of confessions are stringent
hence, a confession cannot be admitted if it is in breach of these rules, even where
no objection is being taken to its admissibility by the defence. In other words, a lack
of objection by the defence is incapable of rendering an otherwise inadmissible
confession admissible.
The rules for admitting confessions generally include:
a) Relevance: Pursuant to the general rule of relevancy of facts, before a
confession may be admitted in evidence, it must be relevant to the crime
charged; Section 29(1) EA.
b) Voluntariness: For a confession to be admissible, it must be made
voluntarily by a suspect or an accused person; Section 29(2) EA.
Voluntariness refers to a choice being made of a person’s free will, as
opposed to being made as a result of coercion or duress. Thus, Section
29(2)(a) renders inadmissible any confession obtained by oppression of the
person who made it. Such oppression includes torture, inhuman or
degrading treatment, use or threat of violence; Section 29(5) EA. Section
29(2)(b) renders inadmissible any confession made in consequence of
anything said or done, which was likely in the circumstances existing at the
time it was made, to render unreliable any confession which might be made.
Hence, Section 29(2)(b) is an omnibus provision which will embrace such
acts as inducement, promise, and such other acts that may render a
confession unreliable. An exception is however with regard to a promise of
secrecy, Section 31 EA.
Note that such act or statement of inducement envisaged in Section 29(2)(b)
must be such that is sufficient to ground a supposition by an accused that he
would gain any advantage or avoid any evil by making a confession. Thus, in
FATUMANI vs R [1949] 12 WACA 483, the appellant was caught soon after
killing the deceased in an attempt to steal from him. He was taken to the
scene of the crime and told by the village chief not to trouble his people, and
so if he killed the deceased, he should say so. The accused then made a
statement confessing to killing the deceased. The statement was objected to
at the trial as being an inducement to speak. It was held that the remark by
the village head was a mere moral adjuration and do not therefore render
the confession inadmissible.
NOTE: Where the voluntariness of a confession is in contention, the burden is on
the prosecution to prove the admissibility of the confession. This burden is
discharged by proof beyond reasonable doubt; Section 29(2)(b). Notwithstanding
that the voluntariness of a confession is not in contention, the Court may suo motu
require the prosecution to prove its admissibility as a prerequisite condition for
tendering such confession in evidence, Section 29(3).
Where there is more than one accused person charged jointly, any confession made
by one co-accused in the presence of one or more of other co-accused is not
admissible against such other co-accused unless it is adopted by words or conduct;
Section 29(4).
A promise of secrecy, deception, intoxication, or procedural irregularities, do not
vitiate the admissibility of otherwise relevant confessions; Section 31.
c) Confessions must be positive, direct and unequivocal with regards to the
offence charged. This connotes that a confession must admit the elements
of the offence charged positively, directly and unequivocally. In AFOLABI
vs. COP [1961] 1 ALL NLR 654, the appellant who was a store keeper was
convicted on twelve counts of stealing specific items which were the
properties of his employer. The evidence by the prosecution showed that a
document had been prepared by the employer listing twenty-three items as
missing. The document was shown to the appellant by the manager inquiring
of him hoe the items became missing. The manager gave evidence that the
appellant told him that he had been busy with his election campaign and had
taken certain stock and sold them to assist his campaign expenses. There
was no evidence of which particular items were sold by the appellant. The
twelve items constituting the charge were taken from the twenty-three items
listed in the document prepared by the employer. The appellant denied the
purported confession at the trial. It was held that the confession was neither
direct nor equivocal on the items contained in the charge and the conviction
was quashed. This was because the appellant confessed to have taken
some of the twenty-three items missing and the charge related to twelve
items, there was no means of knowing whether the appellant confessed to
those twelve items or the other items on the list not included in the charge.
Thus, mere narrative statements do not amount to confessions. In BOB-
DANIELS vs. STATE [1991] 8 NWLR (PT. 212) 715, the appellant was
charged for the murder of his father. He made a statement to the police
narrating series of problems he had with his father in the past. The
statement was admitted and the appellant was convicted on it. It was held on
appeal that for a confessional statement to be used to convict, it must be
positive, direct and unequivocal on the admission of guilt and since the
appellant’s statement consists of only narrations, it is inadmissible.
In NIGERIAN NAVY & ORS vs. LAMBERT [2007] 18NWLR (PT. 1066)
300, the respondent who is a naval officer was alleged to have contravened
a standing order prohibiting all naval personnel from visiting any foreign
embassy in Nigeria except through the Navy headquarters. The respondent
was alleged to have traveled to London and Paris and thereby contravened
the standing order. There was no evidence at the trial to show that the
respondent visited any foreign embassy, but she made a statement where
she admitted traveling to London and Paris but stated that it was her
husband who procured her visa through his business partners. It was held
that the statement was not positive enough to convict the respondent that
she visited any of the relevant embassies.
The requirement for confessions to be positive, direct and unequivocal is
also relevant with regard to judicial confession; which is, confession made in
open Court. The Court in KAYODE vs. STATE [2008] 1 NWLR (PT. 1068)
281, accepted that a judicial conviction may be relied upon to convict an
accused. However, before an accused is so convicted, the elements of the
offence charged must have been explained to him and he must have
admitted to the commission of the offence as explained. In this case, on the
charge of being involved in cultism, four of the accused persons pleaded
guilty but it was not apparent from the records that the trial Court confronted
the accused with the requisite elements establishing the offence, and the
response of the accused to it in order to test the unequivocal admission of
guilt. The Court of Appeal set aside their conviction as their plea of guilt
could not be taken to be an unequivocal admission of guilt.