Pls1502 Exam Pack Study Scene PDF
Pls1502 Exam Pack Study Scene PDF
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PLS1502
EXAM PACK
FINAL EXAMINATION
20 November 2021
PLS 1502
100 Marks
Duration: 4 Hours
Instructions:
You can choose to answer ANY TWO of the THREE QUESTIONS under SECTION B
1. What does Ramose mean by , “The struggle for reason in Africa” in his
essay of the same title and what does this struggle have to do with African
philosophy according to him ? [30 marks] [maximum 700 words]
[30 marks]
2. Dladla’s essay Racism and the Marginality of African philosophy suggests there is a
general link between the marginalisation of Africans in general society and the
marginalisation of their philosophy in the universities. Do you agree with this claim?
3. Write an essay {maximum 1000 words} in which in light of your studies this semester,
provide a detailed answer to the following interrelated questions (which must form the
main sections of your essay). (i) What is African philosophy? (ii) What value, if any,
can it in your opinion contribute to South African society? [in answering this question,
you are encouraged to make recourse to etymology, branches, history as well as
figures and schools or movements within the history of African philosophy
PLS1502 EXAM
Section A
1 “African philosophy”
African philosophy refers to the philosophical discourse which originated from indigenous
Africans and their progenies including African Americans. Africa is at the very least the
descriptor of a geographical location, a continent of various peoples and the undisputed
birth place of human civilisation. There are numerous interesting debates in relation to
the cultural unity of Africa itself. Whereas theoreticians like Diop, Obenga and Chami
maintain that despite the various so described ethnic and linguistic groups, there
nevertheless subsists throughout the African continent a unity both linguistic and cultural
which makes it meaningful to describe its people and their philosophical tradition as
“African philosophy”.
2. “Ethnophilosophy”
Ethnophilosophy involves the recording of the beliefs found in African cultures. Such an
approach treats African philosophy as consisting in a set of shared beliefs, a shared
world-view an item of communal property rather than an activity for the individual.
Ethnophilosophers attempt to show that African philosophy is distinctive by treading
heavily on the ‘African’ and almost losing the ‘philosophy’, that is, by making clear the
differentiation between African and European philosophy.
Ethnophilosophy swaps logic and individuality with emotion and community. In this way
the community as a whole is responsible for the philosophy and it is accepted by everyone
as truth. The philosophies are based on dance, African customs, poems, taboos, religion,
etcetera, and so African philosophy is identified with folk philosophy. The whole
community as a group can philosophise. One of the greatest inadequacies of
ethnophilosophy is that it is derived from the uncritical aspects of African philosophy.
Where the critical parts are works of individual man, and women, philosophers, poets,
etcetera, and the uncritical parts constitutes of beliefs and activities found in religion,
legend, folk tales, customs, superstition etcetera.
3. “Philosophical Sagacity”
professional philosopher can visit the rural areas and identify people reputed for their
wisdom and knowledge of African culture. The second approach that was used by Odera
Oruka and his team. They recorded the philosophy of individual Kenyan sages who were
uninfluenced by modern education. Oruka and his team were not recording the “common
thought of the Kenyan Luo tribe” but ideas of particular individual philosophers
This trend consists of thoughts, thinkers who are trained students or teachers of
philosophy in Africa. They believe that philosophy is philosophy no matter what part of
the world you are from. They do not believe that philosophy is motivated of region or race.
Philosophy is taken in the strict sense which involves critical, reflective and logical inquiry.
They, however, do believe in slight differences between African and European philosophy
based on cultural dissimilarities.
Most of African professional philosophers are academic philosophers who are trained in
the western academy. African professional philosophers reject the assumptions of ethno-
philosophy. Philosophy is conceived as a discipline or an activity whose meaning cannot
depend just on racial or regional make-up. In other words, philosophy is here taken in the
strict sense in which it involves critical, reflective, and logical inquiry.
Section B
Question 1: What does Ramose mean by , “The struggle for reason in Africa” in his essay
of the same title and what does this struggle have to do with African philosophy according
to him ?
Introduction
For centuries, African discourses have been dominated by non-Africans (Ramose 2002:
1). Philosophy was largely dominated by the West and so seemed by definition
Eurocentric. This has led to African scholars challenging the Eurocentrism of Philosophy,
and Ramose’s article is no different. In his essay, Ramose questions the commonly held
view by the colonisers that only rationality is the distinguishing factor of humans. Ramose
locates this arrogance and the prejudices of Western thought in what he termed “the
struggle for reason in Africa.” In this work, which attempts to debunk philosophical racism,
Ramose traces the problem back to its colonial roots, and Eurocentric superiority.
Armed with Aristotle’s famous definition of ‘man’ as ‘a rational animal’, harmless as this
quote might at first glance, colonisation preferred a restricted interpretation of this so that
the peoples of Africa, the Amerindians and the Australasians were excluded as well as
women from the definition. The effect of the exclusion was to render these peoples
subhuman and therefore deserving of slavery.
The idea of conquering is informed by the understanding that the supremacy of reason
and/or rationality defines who is human and who is not human. African where seen as
those people as supposedly irrational or devoid to reason. It is also for this reason that
those in the periphery are regarded as people who cannot think because they are non-
beings. African people are incapable of rationality and reason. The violence of
colonisation and the enslavement of the colonised were justified on the questionable
Western philosophic classification and hierarchisation of human beings. Ramose x-rays
the structure as well as the politics of reason in philosophy and presents the struggle to
which African thought had been inordinately condemned to by Eurocentric forces.
Despite the success of many ethical and scientific theories arguing against the restrictive
interpretation of Aristotle, the conviction of the non-Africans that the African is not a
human being proper continues to live with us even in our time, The residual impact of the
belief that Africans were not rational, remains in Africa today, and Ramose’s essay
addresses this.
There is no doubt that colonisation was deeply traumatic and life changing for the African
people (Ramose, 2009:2). Their way of life was completely changed, and, by being forced
to adapt to the Western way of living, they were plunged into poverty (ibid.). Arguably,
Africa and her indigenous people have been struggling ever since to claim their rightful
place in Africa.
Ramose (2002: 3) asks ‘why is it that the African’s right to life continues to be denied,
derecognised, and remains practically unprotected by the beneficiaries of the violence,
irrationality and the inhumanity of colonisation?’ As an example of how the West
continues to dominate within African thought, Ramose looks at how the West ‘insisted
that the prevailing inhumanity of the global structural violence and poverty should be
maintained’ (ibid.) at the United Nations conference on racism, held in South Africa in
2001. This is a paramount example of how the African still struggles for reason, which,
Ramose believes, is the basis of racism.
Ramose believes that ‘despite democracy and the culture of human rights in our time, the
foundation of the struggle for reason remains unshaken’. Biological attributes were often
used as the basis for rationality, and so anyone whose skin, hair and eyes were not a
certain colour, were disqualified from being ‘rational’. The colonised were thus seen as
slaves, sub-humans, lacking in reason and the subsequent ability to be educated. Even
though this faulty logic was later denied, it failed to ‘eradicate the struggle for reasons
from the social consciousness of successive generations of former colonisers’ (Ramose,
2002:4). Ramose argues that it is only after many generations that racial lines will
eventually be blurred due to the increasing interaction between different countries and
cultures.
This struggle for reason also still persists in African universities, says Ramose, and in
Philosophy in particular. Ramose continues to say that the teaching of philosophy in Africa
has not been contextualised i.e., ‘it has ignored and excluded the experience of being-
an-African in Africa’. To remedy this, the teaching of Western philosophy in African needs
a ‘radical overhaul of the whole epistemological paradigm underlying the current
educational system’.
‘The struggle for reason in Africa’ picks up the point of letting Africans speak for
themselves in their own right. Africans do not wish to entertain any doubt about their being
human. The humanity of the African is second to none. Therefore, we have to redeem
our status of sub-human beings and elevate ourselves to the parity with human beings
and affirm that all human beings are rational animals. In doing so, our struggle is to re-
write the history and deal with the disfigurement as well as the distortion of the African
identity. Our “African” culture is distinct from whatever might be termed Western. The
European and American ways of doing things are not the “yardsticks” by which Africa
should be measured.
In Person and Community in African Traditional Thought, Menkiti introduces the African
view on identifying an individual, supported by Kenya’s John Mbtiti, where the criteria
involve the “environing community” (communitarianism) (Menkiti, 1984:171). According
to him, since Africans see communities as prior existences than individuals,
communitarianism has ontological precedence over any individual. He also claims it has
epistemological precedence since similar languages, mental dispositions, and attitudes
are identifiable by reference to a community (Menkiti, 1984:172). It is important to note
that the adjective use of “African” does not imply that all African communities are
homogenous. It is supposed to be used in the same manner that scholars of African
philosophy have used the term (Manzini, 2017:4).
Menkiti saw personhood, not as a biological status, but as a quality that could be gradually
nurtured over time. Thus, he referred to communitarianism as having a “processual
nature,” meaning that an individual only becomes a person once they have undergone a
community’s social incorporation, thus making personhood an achievement rather than
an endowment. Therefore, an individual could also fail at personhood if the individual
were to go against the community’s social rules and structures; for example, committing
a crime could incur inhumane capital punishment. (Menkiti, 1984:173). Menkiti referred
to this communitarian African view as a ‘maximal’ definition on personhood and rejected
the Western ‘minimal’ view where any individual with a “soul, or rationality, or will, or
memory” would be considered a person.
He used the word ‘maximal’ because the African view considered other criteria rather
than just ones listed in the Western definition, such as the vital role of the community’s
social incorporation as a “catalyst and prescriber of norms” to obtain selfhood. (Menkiti,
1984:173). This African ‘maximal’ view was Menkiti’s principal argument on how
communities help us understand ourselves as individuals, as the community would
ultimately define, and take priority over, the individual.
However, Menkiti’s examples to support his claims are often subjects of debate. He cites
an old Igbo proverb “What an old man sees sitting down, a young man cannot see
standing up” as evidence to why personhood is an acquired quality that develops over
time (Menkiti, 1984:173). The proverb does hint towards the idea that older people will
have different perspectives than that of the younger generation, thus proving that there is
a development of some sort through age. However, it also hints that both individuals, old
and young, are still persons, thus contradicting Menkiti’s claim. To support his claim that
individuals acquire personhood as they carry out their obligations, Menkiti quotes John
Rawls’s argument on how a moral person is owed justice,
“Equal justice is’ owed to those who have the capacity to take part in and to act in
accordance with the public understanding of the initial situation.” (Menkiti, 1984:176).
While this argument may support Menkiti’s claim in the idea that mortal acts develop an
individual’s personhood, it is also possible that Rawl’s was merely stating that every
individual was already a person, but had the potential to become a moral person as well.
Menkiti defended the communitarian ethos by referencing how, when children die, they
are referred to as ‘it’ rather than ‘him’ or ‘her’ because the children have yet to obtain
personhood. He viewed it as important that there was a choice between pronouns when
referring to children when such a choice did not exist for older people (Menkiti, 1984:173).
Menkiti follows this argument with an eschatological defense by mentioning how funeral
ceremonies for a child are brief in comparison to an older person’s more elaborate funeral.
He claims this is because the older individual has achieved personhood and now lives on
in the “ancestral community” as the “living dead” while the child has yet even to enter the
“community of living men and women” and thus lacks personhood (Menkiti, 1984:174).
Elias Bongmba (2001) contested these arguments by stating that differences in grieving
and flexible linguistics were not a viable method to prove Menkiti’s claims.
References
Manzini, N.Z. 2017. African conceptions of person as gender, ableist and anti-queer.
Unpublished Masters Dissertation. http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/24215
Bongmba, E.K. 2001. African witchcraft and otherness: a philosophical and theological
critique of intersubjective relations. Albany: State University of New York Press
May/June 2020
PLS1502
100 Marks
(13 Hours)
Section 1
Instructions: Answer ALL Question in the mark reading sheet.
1.2 The Question, ‘How do we study African Philosophy?’ can be answered in the following
manner.
1. African Philosophy must be studied in isolation to other world philosophies.
2. African Philosophy cannot be studied as a professional discipline.
1.3 Fill in the missing word: According to Osuagwu, ‘African Philosophy is at the same time,
basically philosophical and typically _________’.
1. African
2. Western
3. Oriental
4. None of the above.
1.6 Fill in the missing word: ‘The Africanity of African Philosophy refers to the ___________ of
African Philosophy.’
1. Universality
2. Particularity
3. Density
4. Rigor
1.7 Fill in the missing words: The word ‘Philosophy’ is derived from the following two Greek
words:
1. Philo and Agape.
2. Philo and Eros.
3. Philo and Sophia.
4. Sophy and Philemon.
1.14 Anglophone and Francophone African Philosophies represent the following, respectively:
1. English and French traditions of African Philosophies.
2. French and English traditions of African Philosophies.
3. English and American traditions of African Philosophies.
4. None of the above.
1.15 Odera H. Oruka’s famous four-fold classification of African Philosophy are the
following:
1. Ethno, Sage, traditional and contemporary philosophies.
2. Ideological, traditional, critical and synthetic philosophies.
3. Professional, Nationalist-ideological, Sage and Ethno-philosophy.
4. Ethno, lego, geo and techno philosophy.
1.18 Kwame Gyekye and Ifeanyi Menkiti offer contending views on African communitarianism.
Which of the following statements does not represent Gyekye’s position accurately?
1. Anyone can fail in becoming a person.
2. Although a person is by nature a social being, he/she is by nature also other things.
3. A human person is a person whatever his/her age or social status.
4. One is a person because of what one is, not because of what one has
acquired.
[Sub-Total = 20]
SECTION 2
Instructions: Answer ALL Questions
2.1. Ali Mazrui distinguishes between ‘Africans of the blood’ and ‘Africans of the soil.’ Briefly
describe each of these terms. (8 marks)
2.2. Anglophone and Francophone African Philosophy are the two most general classifications
of African philosophy. Briefly describe each of them. (8 marks)
2.3. E. Biakolo identified 5 (five) categories of cross-cultural cognition which he claims are often
used to distinguish Africans from Europeans. For instance, one of the categories is savage
versus civilized. Briefly describe each of the five categories. (10 marks)
2.4. From the study of this module, how would you describe African Philosophy? Give an
answer of not more than 5 lines. (4 marks)
[Sub-Total = 30]
SECTION 3
Instructions: CHOOSE ONE question and answer in Essay Format
3.1 Odera H. Oruka discusses four trends of African Philosophy, namely, Ethno, Sage,
Nationalist-ideological and Professional philosophy.
Compare and contrast any two of the trends above.
OR
3.2 Mogobe B. Ramose argues that the denial of the existence of African Philosophy is
tantamount to the denial of the presence of rationality or reason in African people.
Critically discuss Ramose’s argument.
OR
3.3 In this Module we have argued that the term ‘Africa’ was not a home- grown term, but an
imposition from European explorers who were describing their climatic experience of this
strange geographical space that they came to call ‘Africa’. Discuss the term ‘Africa’
critically.
[Sub-Total = 50]
TOTAL: Section 1 = 20
Section 2 = 30
Section 3 = 50
= 100 marks
©
UNISA 2020
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Section 1:
1.1) 3
1.2) 4
1.3) 1
1.4) 2
1.5) 4
1.6) 2
1.7) 3
1.8) 4
1.9) 4
1.10) 4
1.11) 1
1.12) 4
1.13) 4
1.14) 1
1.15) 3
1.16) 2
1.17) 3
1.18) 2
1.19) 1
1.20) 1
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Section 2:
2.1) Africans of the blood are defined in racial and genealogical terms;
they are identified with the black race, genealogically belonging to the
African race.
Africans of the soil, on the other hand, are defined in geographical terms;
they are identified with the African continent in nationality and ancestral
location, geographically located in, or belonging to, the African continent.
2.2) Anglophone:
This philosophy is propounded by philosophers from previously English
colonial lands in Africa. It emerged from a more turbulent intellectual
climate than its Francophone equivalent. It is influenced by the analytical
style of philosophising, which, according to Wiredu provide for a
narrower conception of philosophy than its Continental counterpart.
Early philosophers of this trend were critical of the ethnocentrism (and
Eurocentrism in particular) of many Western philosophers which was
expressed in what became known derogatively as the “primitive”
mentality of Africans. Accordingly, African philosophers embarked on an
“apologetic” philosophy, explaining alternative worldviews of African
people.
Generally, one can identify a two-fold movement in Anglophone African
philosophy.
The first movement is a reaction against colonialism. As a result, African
philosophical discourses in this movement were dominated by
ideological and political postures which were intended to lead to the
decolonisation of Africa. The second movement is the struggle for the
professionalisation of African philosophy.
Through this movement departments and conferences of African
philosophy were opened.
Francophone:
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There are two perspectives that dominate philosophical thought and
discourse in contemporary French-speaking Africa: the question of
identity and
the dilemma of modernity.
On the question of identity: Since the era of colonialism Africans have
struggled to understand themselves and their place in the world.
Colonialism was seen as a violent confrontation between Europe and
Africa which led to an emotional response concretised in negritude. In
the post-colonial era the policy of assimilation, together with the
characterisation of Africa and Africans in European literature, led to
alienation – which became the dominant theme in Francophone African
literature and which culminated in the problem of identity as a central
philosophical theme.
2.3)
Savage vs civilised
Biakolo submits that the division between savage and civilised
was the dominant Western paradigm in understanding the “other”. The
African was seen as “savage” and the Westerner as “civilised”. The
savage African was seen as unable to have individual genius, whereas
the civilised Westerner was capable of possessing individual genius.
Pre-logical vs logical
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logic of the “underdeveloped peoples”, their submission to the “law
of participation” which must now be used as the key to
understanding these peoples.
Perceptual vs conceptual
Oral vs written
Biakolo notes that the distinction between orality and literacy has
been elaborated on in such a manner that only the literary has
been elevated to the status of “science” and civilisation. Contrary
to this position, Biakolo argues, that there is no scientific basis for
the claim that writing is the essence of culture. Therefore, the
distinction between the written and the spoken word should not be
exaggerated.
Religious vs scientific
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of Africanity refer to a set of members: to the person, place, time event
or actions, culture, language, doctrine and method, involved in the
philosophic enterprise.
Section 3:
Topic: 3.3
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occurred at a particular time, why they will recur or why they will not
happen again. The study of the human sciences – and, for our purposes,
political and social history in particular – explains why, for example, the
Kingdom of Basutoland was renamed Lesotho. Accordingly, the
geographical meaning of “Africa” must be complemented by the
historical meaning.
From the above it is reasonable to suspect that perhaps the name
“Africa” arose at a particular time under specific historical circumstances.
Regarding the historical meaning, we read the following:
In antiquity, the Greeks are said to have called the continent Libya and
the Romans Africa, perhaps from the Latin aprica (sunny), or the Greek
aphrike (without cold). The name Africa, however, was chiefly applied to
the northern coast of the continent, which was in effect regarded as a
southern extension of Europe. The Romans, who for a time ruled the
North African coast, are also said to have called the area south of their
settlements, Afriga, or the Land of the Afrigs – the name of a Berber
community south of Carthage. Another explanation occasionally offered
is that the name applied to a productive region of what is now Tunisia
meant Ears of Corn. The word Ifriqiyah is apparently the Arabic
transliteration of Africa (“Encyclopaedia Britannica” 1974:117).
From this citation we note three things:
First, the Mediterranean provided a platform for cultural interaction
between and among the Romans and the Greeks and the peoples of
what was later to be called North Africa. It was also the platform for
cultural interaction between and among the Romans and the Greeks, the
peoples of “North Africa” and the Arabs. It is in the course of this cultural
interaction in the Mediterranean cultural space that the name Africa
emerged; first with regard to the northern part of the continent only and
later applied to the whole continent as it is today.
Secondly, in terms of the interaction and relations between the Greeks
and the Romans on the one hand and the peoples of “North Africa” on
the other, it is clear that the name “Africa” is a description of the Greek
and Roman experiences of the continent’s climate. In view of the Roman
“rule” of “North Africa” and the “settlements” the Romans had established
there, it is reasonable to infer that the name Africa was not given by the
continent’s indigenous, conquered inhabitants. On the contrary, it is a
description based initially on the Roman conquest – “Carthago delenda
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est”, Carthage has been destroyed – of “North Africa”. (Does the name
of the Roman general Scipio Africanus come to mind?) Over time, this
description became part of the everyday vocabulary of the peoples of
southern Europe. It later spread to other parts of Western Europe,
including England. The conquest of Africa through the unjust wars of
colonisation then reaffirmed this description, making it possible to speak
of Africa as if it comprised only one ethnic group of people having a
single common culture. The name Africa therefore ought to be
questioned.
According to Ali Mazrui (1986:25, 29, 38):
The name Africa may have originally been either Semitic or Greco-
Roman. The application of the name in more recent centuries has been
due almost entirely to Western Europe we should question Europe’s
decisions about boundaries of Africa and the identity of Africans.
Names and naming comprise one of the on-going problems about the
identity of Africa. Most African countries changed their names at
independence – for example Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. This
name changing illustrates the on-going problem. The situation that gave
rise to the name changing is comparable to that of a child who lived for a
long time with foster parents who deliberately and systematically
concealed the fact that they were not the child’s biological parents.
Surely, when the child ultimately discovers its biological parents, its
relationship with the foster parents will change for better or worse? The
same is true of its relationship with its newly discovered biological
parents. The term “Africa”, applied to the entire continent, could have
had a different significance if the “Afrigs” were responsible for its
reference to the entire continent. Against this background, the discovery
that “Africa” is not only a description by an outsider but also an
imposition by the same outsider generates many problems. One of the
problems is that it is rather funny that the study of “African” philosophy
simply means the study of “sunny” or solar philosophy! No doubt anyone
interested in the impact of a climate “without cold” on the philosophy of a
people living in such a climate may propound a theory about that
climate. But this is not the same thing as the philosophy expressed by
the peoples of this climatic region in their own right. In other words, it is
one thing to talk about the philosophy of the Bantu, the San or the Akan
peoples and quite another to theorise on solar philosophy. This is not an
idle point because some of the critics of “African” philosophy argue that it
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is impossible to speak of such a philosophy, precisely because the
peoples of Africa belong to complex and diverse ethnic groups. Of
course, the critics take the meaning of the term “Africa” for granted,
whereas we in this instance do not. Similarly, they accept the term
“European” philosophy or the “European” Union at face value.
Thirdly, the term “Africa” speaks more of the West European historical
experience with the peoples of the continent and much less of these
peoples’ experience of their own selfunderstanding. In other words, the
history of “Africa” is mainly the history of the West European experience
of “Africa” and only incidentally the story of the peoples of the continent
about themselves. Let us take one example to illustrate this. In the sixth
volume of Encyclopaedia Britannica (1974:461) under the rubric “History
of Egypt” we read:
The Egyptians were a practical people, and they reveal through the
products of their arts and crafts their particular genius. In classical times
these early Egyptians were also credited by the Greeks with great
knowledge and wisdom; but the evidence provided by Egyptian writings
does not support this Greek opinion. It is probable that Greek travellers
in Egypt, impressed by the grandeur and antiquity of the monuments of
the land and misled by the accounts of past ages given to them by their
priestly guides, grossly misinterpreted the evidence and jumped to
unwarranted conclusions. Unlike the Greeks, the Egyptians were not
philosophically inclined, intellectually inquisitive, or prone to theorising ...
First, the author here contradicts “Greek opinion” on facts which he or
she does not care to bring to light – except to refer to them vaguely as
“Egyptian writings”. The second problem is that not only “Greek
travellers” visited and sojourned in Egypt, but also people from other
parts of the world. Nor was it only the “priestly guides” who passed on
information about Egyptian “knowledge and wisdom”. In fact, some of
the “priestly guides” actually received their priestly training from the
Egyptians. For this they had to stay in Egypt for much longer than a
fleeting visit. Aristotle, by his own admission (Metaphysics 1.1981b:14–
24), acknowledged the Egyptian origin of the sciences of mathematics
and astronomy. Apparently, it is testimony like this which the author of
the entry cited either ignores deliberately or denies. He or she is by no
means alone in this approach. Even Copleston, a towering figure in the
history of Western philosophy, has shown similar disregard and implicit
denial of first-hand testimony from the ancient Greeks.
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Commenting on this, Osuagwu (1999:87, 94, 95, 96) argues thus:
Copleston totally rejects a historical and scientific African philosophy of
ancient Black Egypt and its subsequent influence on and relation with
early Greek philosophy ... F.C. Copleston (1907–1985), an American
Catholic clergyman, is a typical 20th century European representative of
the view which denies and severs all historical philosophical links of
ancient Egypt with Greece and Rome. Furthermore, Copleston would not
accept even the personally documented testimonies of the ancient
Greek philosophers.
If Copleston ignores the personal and first hand literary testimonies of
ancient Greek philosophers, he would certainly be less ready to accept
the secondary reports of later past authors like Herodotus.
It goes without saying that the author of the encyclopaedia entry just
cited falls within the same category as Copleston. Both the entry in
Encyclopaedia Britannica and Copleston’s rejection, denial, disregard or
even misinterpretation of ancient black Egypt arrogate philosophy and
reason exclusively to the West. The will to appropriate impels the author
of the Encyclopaedia Britannica entry to assign “wisdom” but not thought
or reason to ancient black Egypt. The same
will to appropriate reason permits the author to give himself or herself
the licence to ascribe, later in the same paragraph of the above citation,
“magic” to the body of knowledge of ancient black Egypt. This will to
appropriate reason as the exclusive quality and right of the Western
European is one of the robust pillars of Western philosophy.
Aristotle’s definition of the human being as “a rational animal” seems to
have inspired the philosophy of colonisation and has survived
decolonisation. In effect, the notion that humanity is exclusively Western
is alive in our time, although in somewhat subtler manifestations. Please
study Ramose’s essay “The struggle for reason in Africa” (2002) against
this background.
Once you have worked through the second learning unit entitled
“Discourses on Africa”, you will understand why and how some people
still continue to raise one or both of the following questions:
- Is there an African philosophy?
- Can there be an African philosophy?
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In his celebrated essay on these questions in relation to Latin America,
and indeed colonised peoples the world over, Bondy has argued that
these are by no means empirical questions. Other contrary, they are
based on doubt that the African, the Amerindian and the Australasian are
also genuine and authentic members of the “rational animal” category.
Bondy (1986:240–243) argues:
Where is the cause, the determining complex of this condition of
Hispanic America as an entity and also of each of its constituent
nations? If we are aware that this condition is not peculiar to Hispanic
American countries, but is largely similar to that of other communities
and regional groups of nations, belonging to what today is called the
Third World, then it is clear that, to explain it, we must utilize the concept
of underdevelopment, with the correlative concept of
domination.Philosophy in Hispanic America has a possibility of being
authentic in the midst of the unauthenticity that surrounds and consumes
it, and to convert itself into the lucid awareness of this condition and into
the thought capable of unleashing the process to overcome it. It must be
a mediation about our anthropological status and from our own negative
status, with a view to its cancellation. Consequently, Hispanic American
philosophy has before it – as a possibility of its own recuperation – a
destructive task that, in the long run, will be destructive to its current
form. It must be an awareness that cancels prejudice, myths, idols; an
awareness that will awaken us to our subjection as peoples and our
depression as men. In consequence, it must be an awareness that
liberates us from the obstacles that impede our anthropological
expansion, which is also the anthropological expansion of the world. It
must be, in addition, a critical and analytical awareness of the
potentialities and demands of our affirmation as humanity.
It is important to note that Onyewuenyi, Cheikh Anta Diop, Obenga and
especially Osuagwu take the meaning of the term “science” for granted.
Yet it is precisely “science” that gave rise to the problems in African
history in general and the history of philosophy in particular. It is
therefore necessary to examine the meaning of “science” as a prelude to
espousing the African perspective on history in general and the history of
philosophy in particular. For example, “science” is not “neutral”, as it
purports to be. Nor is it entirely “objective” and free of attachment to
specific values. In the light of this, to take the concept of “science” for
granted means admitting there is nothing problematic about the
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definition of “science” by others on behalf of Africa. Once this admission
is made, by assuming the concept of “science” is unproblematic, it is
clear that African philosophy is yearning for some space – to be
integrated into the already existing body of “science”. Its philosophers
demand to be allowed to do “science” just like those who defined it on
behalf of Africans. But this is contrary to the demand to speak for oneself
in one’s own right. Therefore, we need to critically examine the meaning
of “science” and determine its meaning according to the exigencies of
the African experience as a critique of the concept of “science”. We may
extract two crucial points from the preceding paragraph. One is that, for
Bondy, the affirmation of our “humanity” means that the question “Can
there be a Latin American philosophy?”, or, for that matter, “Can there be
an African philosophy?” is pre-eminently an ontological, not an empirical
question. It is predicated on the premise that the defect in the ontology
of the Amerindian, the African and the Australasian lies in the putative
fact that, by their very nature, these peoples do not qualify for the status
of “rational animal”. A counter to this is indeed the ethical/political
imperative to affirm their humanity, which is to leave no doubt that any
ontological defect stands in the way of these peoples to qualify as
“rational animals”.
Another point is that the disregard, rejection or misrepresentation of the
histories and cultures of the indigenous peoples of the continent known
today as Africa points out a problem with the writing and presentation of
“African” histories and cultures. This is the problem pertaining to
historiography, the writing and presentation of history. The problem here
is that the standard of “objectivity” was not allowed to prevail. Instead, it
was subjected to the writers’ interests. The result was and, to a very
large extent remains, the disfigurement and distortion of the image and
identity of the indigenous peoples of the continent known today as
Africa. This aspect is discussed, for example, in the introduction as well
as the first chapter of the first volume of UNESCO’s eight volume
General history of Africa (1978–1993). The point of the discussion is to
underline the need to deal with the disfigurement as well as the distortion
of the African identity.
It is, in other words, the recognition of the ethical-political duty to put the
record straight by assuring that the indigenous peoples speak for
themselves in their own right. On this basis it may not be necessary to
abolish the term “Africa”. The retention of the term shall, however, not
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exclude specific foci such as the Rwandan Bantu Philosophy of Being,
the Akan Conceptual Scheme, the Yoruba Concept of a Person, the
Human Person and Immortality in Ibo Metaphysics, and the philosophy
of Ubuntu.
Question
1 .1 1
1.2 3
1.34
1.43
1.5 3
1.6.2
1.73
1.8 3
1.9 2
1.10 1
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1.143
1.15 4
1.161
1.171
1.182
1.19 3
1.20 1
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Question 2.1
SECTION B
African philosophy can be formally defined as a
critical thinking by Africans on their experiences of reality. African
philosophy is "that which concerns itself with the way in which
African people of the past and present make sense of their
destiny and of the world in which they live." In this regard, African
philosophy is a critical reflection on African leaderships in the
administration of their duties towards their citizens, the morally
blameworthiness or praiseworthiness of it. It will also provide
possible solutions to the problems experienced in African
governance.
Much of the modern African philosophy has been concerned with
defining the ethnophilosophical parameters of African philosophy
and identifying what differentiates it from other philosophical
traditions. One of the implicit assumptions of ethnophilosophy is
that a specific culture can have a philosophy that is not
applicable and accessible to all peoples and cultures in the world,
however this concept is disputed by traditional philosophers.
Furthermore, ethnophilosophical approach to African philosophy
is a static group property which is is highly problematic. Research
on Ubuntu presents an alternative collective discourse on African
philosophy ("collective" in the sense that it does not focus on any
individual in particular) that takes differences, historical
developments, and social contexts seriously.
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2.3. The politics attached to the definition of the term Africa are
based on the 3 main philosophical questions one would ask
today.
The question of who named the continent? Many African
philosophers argue that the name Africa was given to us through
the imposition of the most powerful nations on us. Others say the
name Africa is named by our own self after a great consideration
of our capacities and weaknesses.
There is still a great debate on the question, what influenced the
naming of the continent? While others say it’s the geographic
state of the continent, others say it is the values of the people
living in that continent, lifestyles, beliefs and the practices of the
kind.
Today, we say Africa mean unity, peace and harmony while
others say Africa is characterised by all features of the opposite.
So that is the politics attached in the definition of the African
politics.
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Section 3
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For Gyekye, (p. 30) the community and the individual exist
for each other. He further believes that the community
shapes and forms the individual thus making the individual
to thrive. But at the same time the community is constituted
by individuals. This suggests that the individual is prior to the
community. The individual is therefore both a communal and
an autonomous being capable of self-determination.
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2
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3
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4
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6
TOBE
in a way that does not allow anyonc philosophy to reign supremeThe usual way of
implicitly claiming superiority is. for example, by claiming or implying that non-
Western intellectual contributions could not be original but had to he borrowed from
Greece. This, we Shall see, is an approach to philosophy vigorously opposed by
many Africans. Postmodernists call rather for an inclusive approach that allows the
different experiences of humanity to construct complementary narratives.
The coming and going of these movements within philosophy shows us clearly that
no philosophical school ever captures the truth once and for all. Another school
always comes up to correct oversights and blind spots, to revise erroneous
observations and and to elaborate on insights previously offered as timeless.
The history of philosophy shows thet when a philosopher constructs a theory to
explain some social or natural fact; it will not be long beforc altemative theories are
offered that question its assumptions. Attempting to explain things can lead to new
ways of looking at and thinking about old problems, Philosophers are therefore
original in the Of taking fresh approaches to recurring problems, False starts and a
regress of explanat•ons thus contribute to overall advances and progress
Clearly, then, there is no one philosophical school or method that is always
dominant, completely confident in its conclusions. There is simply no Single method
Of dealing with philosophical problems, Some philosophers are analytic,
concentrating on careiial analysis Of ordinary speech to discover therein
pseudoprohlems caused by faulty language usage. Other philosophers are
prescriptive, believing that it is possible for people to influence one another+s
actions and emotions, and thus they outline ways in which people should act. Yet
others are dialectical, always working their way into contradictions from which they
attempt to glean new insights. Some philosophers adapt none of these methods.
What philosophers share is an open, mindedness which allows far the digging up of
unacknowledged presuppositions, an openness that allows for the existence of
competing and alternative explanations of possibilities, end a willingness to suspend
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1.1 3
1.2 1
1.3 2
1.4 2
1.5 1
1.6 4
1.7 2
1.8 3
1.9 1
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1.1 3
1.2 1
1.3 2
1.4 2
1.5 1
1.6 4
1.7 2
1.8 3
1.9 1
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1.10 3
1.11 1
1.12 4
1.13 3
1.14 1
1.15 2
1.16 3
1.17 1
1.18 1
1.19 2
1.20 4
[Sub-Total = 20]
SECTION 2
(Short Questions)
Instructions: Answer ALL Questions
2.1 In your study guide Anglophone and Francophone are stated to be the most
general form of classifying African Philosophy. Briefly describe each. (4 x 2
= 8 marks)
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2.2 Identify 4 four factors determined by Osuagwa and how they explain what
makes an African Philosophy. (4 x 2 = 8 marks)
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2.3 Identify and briefly describe any three (3) of the five (5) categories of
crosscultural given by E Biakolo (2002). (3 x 3 = 9 marks)
Biakolo provides an explanation of the ways in which the Western world, with its
ever increasing contact with peoples of new found colonies, would build their
understandings of non-Caucasian people – or what he refers to as “the other”. This
task is already hinted at in the title of Biakolo’s paper – the “cross cultural cognition”
refers to an understanding of those outside of one’s cultural understandings.
Specifically, it refers to the “African condition” which would now be understood in
terms of “the other”.
Biakolo identifies the following 5 categories: (Note: students have been asked to
discuss any three of the five. Hereunder, is the summary version of each category).
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2.4 Using the knowledge gained from your course texts, explain why it is
problematic to assume that an African philosophy does not exist. (5 marks)
SECTION 3
(Essay Questions)
Instructions: CHOOSE ONE question and answer in Essay Format.
3.1 In his paper “Ethics and Morality in Africa” John AI Bewaji (2002) argues that
[African] Morality is predicated falsely on a religious foundation. When these suppositions
are meant as derogatory commentaries on the moral universe in which Africans live, they
are based on an improper understanding of the principles that fashion the moral and
social fabric of African societies.
In your essay discuss how Bewaji comes to this conclusion when defining
an African morality and whether you agree with his critique. (50 marks)
Introduction
One of the aims of Bewaji’s essay is to address the fallacy that ‘morality in Africa has a
religious foundation.’ According to Bewaji, ethics or morality in Africa is rather humanistic.
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According to Bewaji ethics in African society permeates all spheres of life (56). In fact,
even the gods who may be in different sphere of life are expected to be ethical in their
behaviour. The private and the public domains are equally subject to ethical norms.
Religion, like ethics plays a social cohesion role and brings order to society (Bewaji, 56).
One is not religious so as to gain entry into heaven.
One is religious so that one can better function in society and bring order and well-being
to others. So, even religion in African societies has humanistic interests. Put differently,
one is religious so that one can be a better human being who lives in peace and harmony
with others and the entire cosmos.
In order to underline the importance of ethics in human affairs, Bewaji explores some
Yoruba ethical concepts that cut across religion in their meaning. For instance, the
concept of ese or sin. Ese which is roughly translated as sin goes beyond religion in
meaning. In Yoruba to sin is to commit a wrong act not only against God/gods or
ancestors, but also against one’s fellow human beings. Thus, sin damages
anthropological relationships and hence causes disorder in the cosmos. To turn away
from sin means to leave behind that which damages and poisons human relationships.
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prevail if Africa is governed by such a marvelous ethics? This is one of the key issues
that can be raised to critique African ethics.
In the concluding remarks of his essay, Bewaji also attempted to answer this question.
His answer suggests that most of the troubles in Africa could be alluded to the breakdown
in the indigenous ethic (59). Many Africans have turned away from their culture and
embraced a foreign culture which does not nourish and regulate their ethical life. Do you
agree with Bewaji? Did Africans really turn away from their culture? How can one be
African and modern at the same time without turning away from their African culture?
Conclusion
Bewaji describes African ethics as being humanistic. We have seen that this means that
human interest is at the centre of every action and behavior. Even the so-called religious
actions and rituals are intended to facilitate a humane society rather than to please some
divine being out there.
3.2 Compare and contrast any two (2) of the four (4) trends identified by H Odera
Oruka (2002). (50 Marks)
Please find below, a summary of 4 trends of Oruka. Students are free to compare any
two of these trends.
a) Ethnophilosophy
Ethnophilosophy is the recorded beliefs and practices found in African cultures. Viewed
as such, African philosophy then becomes a set of shared beliefs, a shared world-view
– an item of communal property rather than an activity for the individual. It is an
philosophy without philosophers. This view of philosophy attracted a lot of critics to
African philosophy.
b) Philosophic Sagacity
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c) Professional Philosophy
Professional philosophy is a philosophy that promotes a particular way of thinking,
reflecting, and reasoning. Most of African professional philosophers are academic
philosophers who are trained in the western academy. African professional philosophers
reject the assumptions of ethno-philosophy. Philosophy is conceived as a discipline or
an activity whose meaning cannot depend just on racial or regional make-up. In other
words, philosophy is here taken in the strict sense in which it involves critical, reflective,
and logical inquiry.
d) Nationalist-ideological Philosophy
Nationalist-ideological philosophy can be seen as a special case of philosophic sagacity,
in which not sages, but ideologues and their pronouncers are the subjects. Alternatively,
we might see it as a case of professional political philosophy. Most of the contributions
to this trend of African philosophical literature have so far been politicians or statesmen.
For instance, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Leopold Senghor,
Jomo Kenyatta, and many others, would fall under this category of philosophers.
However, some of their works are not in the strict sense, philosophical.
3.3 In his paper “Person and community in African thought” Kwame Gyekye (2002)
uses the concept of a moderate communitarianism. In your paper discuss this
concept and what makes it so different from an extreme form of
communitarianism. (50 Marks)
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Menkiti, observes Gyekye, reasoned his idea of an acquisition of personhood from the
use of the pronoun ‘it’ in many languages, including English, to refer to children and new
borns in society (p. 23). This implies that new borns and children are not yet human
persons. Gyekye is critical of this as he observes that the many languages that Menkiti
refers to, do not include African languages. As a result, Menkiti commits a category
mistake because he applies an idea taken from a European language to African
languages (p. 27).
For Gyekye, (p. 30) the community and the individual exist for each other. He further
believes that the community shapes and forms the individual thus making the individual
to thrive. But at the same time the community is constituted by individuals. This suggests
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that the individual is prior to the community. The individual is therefore both a communal
and an autonomous being capable of self-determination.
Whether Gyekye succeeded in bridging the tension between individual rights and
duties to the community or others, is a matter for continual debate.
Every student must decide for himself or herself whether Gyekye has successfully
managed to strike a healthy balance between individual rights and duties to the
community. Dr Koenane, who is my colleague in the department has the following to say
about Gyeke:
Although Gyekye advocated for a balance between individual rights and the
community it becomes clear on close evaluation that his argument seriously
focuses on the theory of the common good for which he believes must be what
everyone is striving for and all sacrifices must be made in order to promote the
common good. In this way, he makes it clear that the community is more
important than the individual – thus failing to maintain the balance he so much
wanted to establish. Gyekye criticised radical communitarianism for placing
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more emphasis on the importance of the community over that of the individual
while he does the same. Therefore, Gyekye fails to show how the individual
can prosper outside the community and still ties the individual to the
community in the same way radical communitarianism has done (verbal
exchange).
Do you agree with Dr Koenane or not? However, some students may argue that Gyekye
succeeded in his defending his thesis of moderate communitarianism especially when
taking into account Menkiti’s radical communitarianism which gives the community
absolute dominance over the individual.
1.1 4
1.2 3
1.3 1
1.4 1
1.5 2
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more emphasis on the importance of the community over that of the individual
while he does the same. Therefore, Gyekye fails to show how the individual
can prosper outside the community and still ties the individual to the
community in the same way radical communitarianism has done (verbal
exchange).
Do you agree with Dr Koenane or not? However, some students may argue that Gyekye
succeeded in his defending his thesis of moderate communitarianism especially when
taking into account Menkiti’s radical communitarianism which gives the community
absolute dominance over the individual.
1.1 4
1.2 3
1.3 1
1.4 1
1.5 2
1.6 4
1.7 4
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1.14 3
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1.16 2
1.17 4
1.18 2
1.19 1
1.20 2
Section 2
Question 2.1
The intra-personal pole: A human person is conceived as a composite
substance, made up of body and soul. In Western philosophical anthropologies,
this view raised many philosophical problems as philosophers attempted to
understand the very nature of these two entities and how the two co-exist. In
African philosophy, the problem of the nature of both substances and their
coexistence does not arise. The concern arises on the concern on how to
maintain a healthy balance between one’s bodily (material) and spiritual needs.
The concern stems from the belief that persons who are overly concerned about
their bodily well-being at the expense of the spiritual dimension of their being, are
in fact not in touch with their real selves, and are likely to care less about other
persons. Thus according to Gbadegesin corroborates this view as follows: The
idea is that a selfish person is concerned with the well-being of his/her body only
(as opposed to the spirit. This suggests that if human beings were to be
concerned with their spirits, they would not be selfish” . That a human person is
body soul
implies that they are more than just a body or material entity. A human person is
enlivened by a principle that has its origin from a being beyond this world. That,
in itself shows the dignity and preciousness of the human person. Thus, failure to
maintain a balance between one’s physical and spiritual needs has ethical
implications.
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benefit others who fall within the community. Without others or the community,
the individual’s existence is almost incomplete. The human person is therefore
never an independent and an isolated being. He or she is always “a being-with-
others,” or “a person-in relation-toothers”.
2.2 The basis of morality in Africa is human welfare whereas Western morality is
largely based on earning a reward from some divine or metaphysical being
.Moral obligations in Africa are social or communal while western morality is
based on individual . African morality is organic whereas Western is abstract in
nature .In African morality moral virtues are rewarded by society .An act is
viewed as good provided it enhances both the good society and the individual .In
western morality, it is possible for an act to be viewed as good when it enhance
only the good of the individual .
2.3 The four trends of Oruka are ethnophilosophy, professional philosophy ,sage
philosophy and the national-ideological philosophy .Thus his four trends came
into existence as a response to the debate of the Africa four trends .Therefore, he
made an effort to describe the nationalist- ideological philosophy which brings in
line the African concepts which brings about philosophers of education who now
link with the democratic views of African identity of concepts like the Ubuntu .
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information among the Africans was orally transferred and there is need to gloss
over the differences .
Apart from that there was the nationalistic ideological philosophy .This theory
came from the political thinkers for example Kwame Nkrumah and this liberators
also came up with education for liberation and self-reliance .Thus this theory is
determined with African humanity and also consider a new African socialism that
would be favourable for the conditions of people .Thus these ideas were also
viewed up in liberations of self-reliance ,Thus this concept supports the view of
education but it has to be put into practise .
Apart from that he also has the sage philosophy .This theory is based on the view
that thoughts belong to individuals who are concerned with the society
.Therefore, the sage are people who are wise and have solutions for their
societies .Thus this idea supports the culture .This sage philosophy was a
reaction of the Europeans who came up with a view that Africans thy did not have
their own philosophy .Thus he indicated that African people were there to
invalidate the idea of African being logical and critical thinking.
2.4 African philosophy can be formally defined as a critical thinking by Africans on their
experiences of reality.
It concerns itself with the way in which African people of the past and present make
sense of their destiny and of the world in which they live.
African philosophy is the work of philosophers of African descent and others whose
work deals with the subject matter of the African diaspora.
African philosophy is communitarian in nature as opposed to individualistic.
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It is traditionally presented through proverbs, maxims, tales, myths, poetry, lyrics, art
and the like, and has evolved to be mediated through written text, classroom teaching
and conferences. It also takes in consideration argumentation ,criticizing and analyzing .
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Some scholars argue that Western civilization owes its origin to writing. Without
the invention of writing there could not have been Western civilization. Writing, as
a new method of communication, had some consequences. Before the invention
of writing, humans relied on speech. Time was an important point of reference in
the sense that speech was often linked to a particular event or events. However,
this linkage with regard to events that had already happened relied exclusively on
memory. There was thus a living interconnection of time and memory. With the
introduction of writing, a shift occurred. Memory was no longer very important
because what had to be remembered was readily available in the form of writing.
Conclusively , l agree with the statement since the categories show the primitive
nature of Africans as show by the oral, savage nature of Africans .
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What makes moral dictates so powerful is not the mere rationality of the grounds for
their determination. What gives moral notions the imperativeness of their purport is the
fact that persons and communities feel that infractions of the demands of morality
constitute serious challenges to the survival of human life and culture. Moral education
consists in both prescriptions and proscriptions. The concepts discussed above form the
basis of various proscriptions. Together they give a vivid, though incomplete, portrayal
of Yoruba morality. In a more extended discussion one would not only cover more
concepts for proscriptions but also treat of those concepts that motivate the
prescriptions that help to define the Yoruba ethics.
3.3 It seems that there are many shades of communitarianism. However, Gyekye
distinguishes between two, namely, radical and modernernism .
Radical communitarianism, which is also known as unrestricted or extreme
communitarianism, overemphasizes the importance of community life at the expense
of individual rights, argues Gyekye. He cites Menkiti as one of the proponents of this
communitarianism.
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For Menkiti It is the community that defines the person as person. This is because the
community has priority over the individual person. Personhood is something that must
be acquired in community. In other words you become a person if you fulfil all the norms
and values laid down by the community. This implies that personhood is achieved and
not given simply because one is born of a man and a woman. Thus, one can fail in his
or her attempt to become a person.
Menkiti, observes Gyekye, reasoned his idea of an acquisition of personhood from the
usage of the pronoun “it” in many languages, including English. He asserts that children
and new-borns in many human communities are referred to by the pronoun “it” (2002:
23). This implies that newborns and children are not yet human persons. As they grow
they are evolving towards personhood. Gyekye is critical of Menkiti’s idea in this regard.
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There are numerous and varied ways to approach this question, African philosophy can be
based on linguistic considerations, it suggests that African philosophy was coined by, defined
and elaborated by African s themselves. This includes their culture, moral values , ethics,
community living and others that affect African per se. this even boils down to the literature
written by African that are philosophically oriented, thus it can never be limited to one single
aspect, it is very broad and deep.
Oruka’s classification comes from the English –speaking side and does not represent
Francophone African philosophy in his classification. The four-fold classification is as follows,
(1) ethno philosophy (ideas of philosophers who try to reconstruct a traditional Bantu or
indigenous world view. (2) Sage philosophy (ideas of African sages on selected philosophical
issues) (3) nationalist ideological philosophers (ideas of politicians on the social , cultural and
economic reconstruction of African countries in a post-colonial era and (4) professional
philosophy(ideas of professionally trained students and teachers of philosophy in Africa.
Oruka’s shortcomings are dealt with in an abstract way..He does not give examples and thus
does not classify specific philosophers. This leads to a further problem, of who belongs to which
category. For instance ‘negritude’ looks as if it belongs under ethno philosophy, but Senghor can
be seen as a professional philosopher. The category of professional philosopher may thus be
questioned because it is a different kind of category from the others and too hospitable.
Different approaches are put there in spite of radical differences.
According to Oruka, there is no radical difference between European and African philosophy –
philosophy remains, irrespective of where it is being practiced. This is off course not an
acceptable view. Oruka distinguishes between philosophy and what he sees as quasi-philosophy.
They think that ethno philosophers can present to the discourse of African philosophy both
interesting and useful material on which to draw for analysis of the traditional and cultural
manifestation of African existence. They indirectly suggest that the ethno philosophy category
should have had the more positive label of cultural philosophy.
Furthermore at the time that this article was written originally, sage philosophy was not much of
a trend.
SAVAGE VS CIVILISED
This was the dominant western paradigm in understanding the ‘other’. The African was seen as
savage and the western as civilized. The savage African was seen as unable to have individual
genius whereas the civilized westerner was capable of possessing individual genius. the story of
creation in the Bible was the basis for this debate . The monogenists argued that God created
only one race and this race was the only true race. The polygenists argued that if God created
many races , then all other races were inferior to Westerners. Another view is that because of
their inferiority based on their sub-humanity, it was rational and justified to treat those races as
sub-humans for example by colonizing and enslaving them.
PRE-LOGICAL VS LOGICAL
Levy-Bruhl focused on what he called the psychological foundations of primitive culture, this
marked a turning point in understanding the other . He describes people’s material culture and
way of life as manifestations of the pre-logical mentality , a mentality which does not have a
logical character. Instead, it is this mentality which simply associates one thing with another
even when associations are logically impossible. This is called the mentality of participation in
being. It is incapable of standing back and logically as being from a distance. According to
Levy_Bruhl it is precisely the indifference of logic of the ‘underdeveloped peoples’, their
submission to the ‘ law of participation’ which must now be seen as understanding these people.
PERCEPTUAL VS CONCEPTUAL
Claude Levi Strauss introduced the categories ‘perceptual’ and ‘conceptual’ as a response to
levy-Bruhl. His purpose was to show that the primitive mind logical and that its conceptual
schemes were structured in orderly fashion. For Levi Strauss, the ‘primitive’ mind was ‘magical’
whereas the ‘civilised’ was ‘scientific’. The difference is that mythical thought borrows from a
diversity of sources whenever it expresses itself. The point is that the sources are limited and
mythical thought has to rely only on them because it cannot conceive or contrive alternatives .
spiritual dimension of their being are not in touch with their real selves, and are likely to care
less about other persons. Gbdadegesin corroborates this view as follows, the idea is that a selfish
person is concerned with the well-being of his or her own body as opposed to the spirit. This
suggests that if human beings were to be concerned with their spirits, they would not be selfish.
That a human person is body-soul implies that they are more than just a body or material entity.
A human person is enlivened by a principle that has its origin from a being beyond this world.
The second one is known as the Inter-personal pole…according to this view, a person is not only
related to himself, and a person is not an isolated, individuated being. A human being is an
ontological relationship with other human beings and also with the rest of hierarchy of beings
and as such is only real in relationship with others. According to Shutte who draws from
Tempels and Mbiti, a human only exists by being shared. Without others or the community, the
individual’s existence is almost incomplete. The human person is therefore never an independent
and isolated being. He or she is always ‘a being with others’ . He is also a social being in relation
to others.
philosophy in the world, namely, African, Arabic, Chinese, western among others. African
philosophy thus comes from an experience of Africans themselves, it does not however confine
the philosophical tenants to a geographical area in Africa only but carries with it a very broad
perspective since African nationals are found in almost any part of the world. Thus African
philosophy would basically be seen as philosophy that is typically African. Thus anything that
has to do with the wisdom that concern Africans per se can be regarded as philosophy in a very
broad context.
SECTION B
THE TERM ‘AFRICA’ OR ‘AFRICAN’ CAN BE CONTROVERSIAL ,
PHILOSOPHICALLY SPEAKING. DISCUSS WHAT THIS CONTROVERSY
ENTAILS. IN YOUR OPINION DOES IT MAKE SENSE TO CONTINUE USING THIS
TERM? (50)
The linguistic, historical and philosophical meaning of the term ‘Africa’ is by no means beyond
dispute. The nature and significance of the dispute are just simple matters of academic curiosity
that so often solidifies into academism that is often found in academic spheres. On the contrary,
the nature and significance of the dispute ultimately pertains to the question of natural and
historical justice. Because of this reason, the term Africa must be problematical despite its
popularity in its usage on a daily basis. The indigenous people of the continent designated
geographically as Africa may therefore not take it for granted whenever others refer to them as
Africans or when they refer to themselves as such. The following are some of the reasons why
Africa is controversial,
it is unclear who named this continent
What influenced the naming of the continent?
What is the connotation today of the term ‘Africa’
Even though the geographical meaning of the term Africa is widely accepted as settled, questions
and problems arise as soon as expressions such as “Arab Africa”, Maghreb Africa or Sub
Saharan Africa are used. This definitely causes a lot of confusion, despondency and the continent
as such thus does not seem to be level-headed in its outlook because of all the controversies that
surround it.
MAY/JUNE 2017
MAY/JUNE 2017
Oruka’s classification comes from the English –speaking side and does not represent
Francophone African philosophy in his classification. The four-fold classification is as follows,
(1) ethno philosophy (ideas of philosophers who try to reconstruct a traditional Bantu or
indigenous world view. (2) Sage philosophy (ideas of African sages on selected philosophical
issues) (3) nationalist ideological philosophers (ideas of politicians on the social , cultural and
economic reconstruction of African countries in a post-colonial era and (4) professional
philosophy(ideas of professionally trained students and teachers of philosophy in Africa.
Oruka’s shortcomings are dealt with in an abstract way..He does not give examples and thus
does not classify specific philosophers. This leads to a further problem, of who belongs to which
category. For instance ‘negritude’ looks as if it belongs under ethno philosophy, but Senghor can
be seen as a professional philosopher. The category of professional philosopher may thus be
questioned because it is a different kind of category from the others and too hospitable.
Different approaches are put there in spite of radical differences.
According to Oruka, there is no radical difference between European and African philosophy –
philosophy remains, irrespective of where it is being practiced. This is off course not an
acceptable view. Oruka distinguishes between philosophy and what he sees as quasi-philosophy.
They think that ethno philosophers can present to the discourse of African philosophy both
interesting and useful material on which to draw for analysis of the traditional and cultural
manifestation of African existence. They indirectly suggest that the ethno philosophy category
should have had the more positive label of cultural philosophy.
Furthermore at the time that this article was written originally, sage philosophy was not much of
a trend.
SAVAGE VS CIVILISED
This was the dominant western paradigm in understanding the ‘other’. The African was seen as
savage and the western as civilized. The savage African was seen as unable to have individual
genius whereas the civilized westerner was capable of possessing individual genius. The story of
creation in the Bible was the basis for this debate . The monogenists argued that God created
only one race and this race was the only true race. The polygenists argued that if God created
many races , then all other races were inferior to Westerners. Another view is that because of
their inferiority based on their sub-humanity, it was rational and justified to treat those races as
sub-humans for example by colonizing and enslaving them.
PRE-LOGICAL VS LOGICAL
Levy-Bruhl focused on what he called the psychological foundations of primitive culture, this
marked a turning point in understanding the other . He describes people’s material culture and
way of life as manifestations of the pre-logical mentality , a mentality which does not have a
logical character. Instead, it is this mentality which simply associates one thing with another
even when associations are logically impossible. This is called the mentality of participation in
being. It is incapable of standing back and logically as being from a distance. According to
Levy_Bruhl it is precisely the indifference of logic of the ‘underdeveloped peoples’, their
submission to the ‘ law of participation’ which must now be seen as understanding these people.
PERCEPTUAL VS CONCEPTUAL
Claude Levi Strauss introduced the categories ‘perceptual’ and ‘conceptual’ as a response to
levy-Bruhl. His purpose was to show that the primitive mind logical and that its conceptual
schemes were structured in orderly fashion. For Levi Strauss, the ‘primitive’ mind was ‘magical’
whereas the ‘civilised’ was ‘scientific’. The difference is that mythical thought borrows from a
diversity of sources whenever it expresses itself. The point is that the sources are limited and
mythical thought has to rely only on them because it cannot conceive or contrive alternatives .
ORAL VS WRITTEN
Some scholars argue that western civilization owes its origin to writing. Without the invention of
writing, there could not have been civilization. Writing as a new method of communication, has
some consequences. Before the invention of writing, humans relied on speech. Time was an
important fact of reference in the sense that speech was often linked to a particular event . This
linkage with regard to events that had already happened relied exclusively on memory. Memory
was no longer important because what had to be remembered was readily available in the form of
writing. Following the invention of writing, presentation of written knowledge was dominated by
description, definition and analysis.
RELIGIOUS VS SCIENTIFIC
Here Biakolo focused on the question, ‘primitive thought’ is rational at all ? May we say that?
Three positions are distinguishable (1) ‘primitive thought’ is irrational, illogical and unscientific,
(2) it is thought to be rational and logical but not scientific or alternatively, it is rational but
illogical and unscientific and (3) ‘primitive thought’ is as rational as scientific thought within its
own cultural context. Biakolo concludes that in the final analysis ‘science’ is no more than a
human convention. In the language of post-modern philosophy, science may be described as
faith, a grand belief in a particular model of knowledge construction and presentation
They are as follows, The Intra-personal pole. This relates as to whom or what is a human
person. In philosophical anthropology, a human person is conceived as a composite substance,
made up of body and soul. In western philosophical anthrolopologies, this view raised many
philosophical problems as philosophers attempted to understand the very nature of these two
entities and how the two co-exist. In African philosophy, the problem of the nature of both
substance and their co-existence does not arise. What arises is the concern on how to maintain a
healthy balance between one’s body(material) and spiritual needs. The concern stems from the
belief that persons who are overly concerned about their bodily well-being at the expense of the
spiritual dimension of their being are not in touch with their real selves, and are likely to care
less about other persons. Gbdadegesin corroborates this view as follows, the idea is that a selfish
person is concerned with the well-being of his or her own body as opposed to the spirit. This
suggests that if human beings were to be concerned with their spirits, they would not be selfish.
That a human person is body-soul implies that they are more than just a body or material entity.
A human person is enlivened by a principle that has its origin from a being beyond this world.
The second one is known as the Inter-personal pole…according to this view, a person is not only
related to himself, and a person is not an isolated, individuated being. A human being is an
ontological relationship with other human beings and also with the rest of hierarchy of beings
and as such is only real in relationship with others. According to Shutte who draws from
Tempels and Mbiti, a human only exists by being shared. Without others or the community, the
individual’s existence is almost incomplete. The human person is therefore never an independent
and isolated being. He or she is always ‘a being with others’ . He is also a social being in relation
to others.
SECTION B
The linguistic,historical and philosophical meaning of the term ‘Africa’ is by no means beyond
dispute. The nature and significance of the dispute are just simple matters of academic curiosity
that so often solidifies into academism that is often found in academic spheres. On the contrary,
the nature and significance of the dispute ultimately pertains to the question of natural and
historical justice. Because of this reason, the term Africa must be problematical despite its
popularity in its usage on a daily basis. The indigenous people of the continent designated
geographically as Africa may therefore not take it for granted whenever others refer to them as
Africans or when they refer to themselves as such. The following are some of the reasons why
Africa is controversial,
it is unclear who named this continent
What influenced the naming of the continent?
What is the connotation today of the term ‘Africa’
Even though the geographical meaning of the term Africa is widely accepted as settled, questions
and problems arise as soon as expressions such as “Arab Africa”, Maghreb Africa or Sub
Saharan Africa are used. This definitely causes a lot of confusion, despondency and the continent
as such thus does not seem to be level-headed in its outlook because of all the controversies that
surround it.
In terms of geographical location, it is reasonable to accept the geographical meaning of Africa.
The bone of contention that can thus be raised is from the point of view of history. Continents of
this planet earth were once a single, compact, undivided whole, called Pangea. According to
geologists our planet with its geographical divisions did not always exist as such. The
geographical divisions evolved over millennia.
At a particular point in the course of the evolutionary process, the separation into the various
continents of the Americas, Africa, Asia and Europe as well as numerous islands occurred by
natural means. Not nature as such but human beings though part of nature too gave specific
names to the continents. The naming of the continents is therefore one of the reasons why we
may question the reasonableness of accepting the geographical meaning of Africa. This ground
forms the bridge between understanding the term Africa as purely geographical term and the
meaning of Africa in history.
In my view it does not make sense considering the afore mentioned reasons to continue using the
term Africa. It is shrouded in a lot of controversies that are so numerous to mention.
Furthermore, this term is also associated with sarcasm from the western world who still views it
as a dark continent.
OCT/NOV 2016
SECTION A
1.1 Identify 3 sources for the term Africa as discussed in Study unit 1. (6)
The Mediterranean provided a platform for cultural interaction between and among the Romans
and the Greeks..That was to be known as North Africa. This was the platform for cultural
interaction between and among the Romans and Greeks, the peoples of North Africa and the
Arabs. This cultural interaction in the Mediterranean cultural space that the name Africa imaged.
Secondly, it was in terms of the interaction and relations between the Greeks and the Romans on
the one hand and the people of North Africa on the other. Thus it is clear that the name Africa is
a description of the Greek and roman experiences of the continent’s climate.
Lastly the term Africa speaks more of the west European historical experience with the people of
the continent and much less of these people’s experience of their own self understanding. In
other words, the history of Africa is mainly the history of the story of the peoples of the
continent about themselves.
Oruka’s shortcomings are dealt with in an abstract way..He does not give examples and thus
does not classify specific philosophers. This leads to a further problem, of who belongs to which
category. For instance ‘negritude’ looks as if it belongs under ethno philosophy, but Senghor can
be seen as a professional philosopher. The category of professional philosopher may thus be
questioned because it is a different kind of category from the others and too hospitable.
Different approaches are put there in spite of radical differences.
According to Oruka, there is no radical difference between European and African philosophy –
philosophy remains, irrespective of where it is being practiced. This is off course not an
acceptable view. Oruka distinguishes between philosophy and what he sees as quasi-philosophy.
They think that ethno philosophers can present to the discourse of African philosophy both
interesting and useful material on which to draw for analysis of the traditional and cultural
manifestation of African existence. They indirectly suggest that the ethno philosophy category
should have had the more positive label of cultural philosophy.
Furthermore at the time that this article was written originally, sage philosophy was not much of
a trend.
Oruka’s classification comes from the English –speaking side and does not represent
Francophone African philosophy in his classification. The four-fold classification is as follows,
(1) ethno philosophy (ideas of philosophers who try to reconstruct a traditional Bantu or
indigenous world view. (2) Sage philosophy (ideas of African sages on selected philosophical
issues) (3) nationalist ideological philosophers (ideas of politicians on the social, cultural and
economic reconstruction of African countries in a post-colonial era and (4) professional
philosophy (ideas of professionally trained students and teachers of philosophy in Africa.
Oruka’s shortcomings are dealt with in an abstract way..He does not give examples and thus
does not classify specific philosophers. This leads to a further problem, of who belongs to which
category. For instance ‘negritude’ looks as if it belongs under ethno philosophy, but Senghor can
be seen as a professional philosopher. The category of professional philosopher may thus be
questioned because it is a different kind of category from the others and too hospitable.
Different approaches are put there in spite of radical differences.
According to Oruka, there is no radical difference between European and African philosophy –
philosophy remains, irrespective of where it is being practiced. This is off course not an
acceptable view. Oruka distinguishes between philosophy and what he sees as quasi-philosophy.
They think that ethno philosophers can present to the discourse of African philosophy both
interesting and useful material on which to draw for analysis of the traditional and cultural
manifestation of African existence. They indirectly suggest that the ethno philosophy category
should have had the more positive label of cultural philosophy.
Furthermore at the time that this article was written originally, sage philosophy was not much of
a trend.
Biakolo’s investigation serves two purposes. Firstly, he wants to present and analyse the
descriptions provided by the Western world in order to make sense of the non-Caucasian races.
Secondly, he wants to determine whether the answers provided by the Western world are useful
to illuminate and understand the African condition. “Cross cultural cognition” is understood as
the question about the meaning and function of knowledge, in this case across western and
African cultures and the subsequent ideas about the “African condition”.
Western cross-cultural paradigms provide no key to understanding and knowing the African past
and present. Instead, they have served the colonialisation of Africa well and continue to ensure
the exploitation of Africa.
His approach is to study specific text attributed to particular thinkers from the Western world.
The author identifies the categories of cognition that each thinker or group of thinkers is
associated with. Five categories are identified, savage vs civilized, pre-logical vs logical,
perceptual vs conceptual, oral vs written, religious vs scientific. The study goes on to show how
and why specific texts are interconnected, even if they deal with different categories of cognition
or knowledge
SAVAGE VS CIVILISED
This was the dominant western paradigm in understanding the ‘other’. The African was seen as
savage and the western as civilized. The savage African was seen as unable to have individual
genius whereas the civilized westerner was capable of possessing individual genius. The story of
creation in the Bible was the basis for this debate. The monogenists argued that God created only
one race and this race was the only true race. The polygenists argued that if God created many
races, then all other races were inferior to Westerners. Another view is that because of their
inferiority based on their sub-humanity, it was rational and justified to treat those races as sub-
humans for example by colonizing and enslaving them.
PRE-LOGICAL VS LOGICAL
Levy-Bruhl focused on what he called the psychological foundations of primitive culture, this
marked a turning point in understanding the other. He describes people’s material culture and
way of life as manifestations of the pre-logical mentality, a mentality which does not have a
logical character. Instead, it is this mentality which simply associates one thing with another
even when associations are logically impossible. This is called the mentality of participation in
being. It is incapable of standing back and logically as being from a distance. According to
Levy_Bruhl it is precisely the indifference of logic of the ‘underdeveloped peoples’, their
submission to the law of participation’ which must now be seen as understanding these people.
PERCEPTUAL VS CONCEPTUAL
Claude Levi Strauss introduced the categories ‘perceptual’ and ‘conceptual’ as a response to
levy-Bruhl. His purpose was to show that the primitive mind logical and that its conceptual
schemes were structured in orderly fashion. For Levi Strauss, the ‘primitive’ mind was ‘magical’
whereas the ‘civilised’ was ‘scientific’. The difference is that mythical thought borrows from a
diversity of sources whenever it expresses itself. The point is that the sources are limited and
mythical thought has to rely only on them because it cannot conceive or contrive alternatives.
ORAL VS WRITTEN
Some scholars argue that western civilization owes its origin to writing. Without the invention of
writing, there could not have been civilization. Writing as a new method of communication, has
some consequences. Before the invention of writing, humans relied on speech. Time was an
important fact of reference in the sense that speech was often linked to a particular event. This
linkage with regard to events that had already happened relied exclusively on memory. Memory
was no longer important because what had to be remembered was readily available in the form of
writing. Following the invention of writing, presentation of written knowledge was dominated by
description, definition and analysis.
RELIGIOUS VS SCIENTIFIC
Here Biakolo focused on the question, ‘primitive thought’ is rational at all? May we say that?
Three positions are distinguishable (1) ‘primitive thought’ is irrational, illogical and unscientific,
(2) it is thought to be rational and logical but not scientific or alternatively, it is rational but
illogical and unscientific and (3) ‘primitive thought’ is as rational as scientific thought within its
own cultural context. Biakolo concludes that in the final analysis ‘science’ is no more than a
human convention. In the language of post-modern philosophy, science may be described as
faith, a grand belief in a particular model of knowledge construction and presentation.
SECTION B
USING AT LEAST ONE OF THE THEORISTS AS DISCUSSED IN THE READER AND
TUTORIAL LETTER 501, HOW WILL YOU GO ABOUT DEFINING AFRICAN
PHILOSOPHY? (50)
The term philosophy is derived from the Greek word ‘philosophia’ which means literally the
love of wisdom. The fact that this particular term is derived from the Greek language does not
necessarily mean philosophy originated in Greece. Philosophy is thus a necessary part of a
human being as an individual and as part of a group.
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Biakolo’s investigation serves two purposes. Firstly, he wants to present and analyse the
descriptions provided by the Western world in order to make sense of the non-Caucasian races.
Secondly, he wants to determine whether the answers provided by the Western world are useful
to illuminate and understand the African condition. “Cross cultural cognition” is understood as
the question about the meaning and function of knowledge, in this case across western and
African cultures and the subsequent ideas about the “African condition”.
Western cross-cultural paradigms provide no key to understanding and knowing the African past
and present. Instead, they have served the colonialisation of Africa well and continue to ensure
the exploitation of Africa.
His approach is to study specific text attributed to particular thinkers from the Western world.
The author identifies the categories of cognition that each thinker or group of thinkers is
associated with. Five categories are identified, savage vs. civilized, pre-logical vs. logical,
perceptual vs conceptual, oral vs written, religious vs scientific. The study goes on to show how
and why specific texts are interconnected, even if they deal with different categories of cognition
or knowledge
SAVAGE VS CIVILISED
This was the dominant western paradigm in understanding the ‘other’. The African was seen as
savage and the western as civilized. The savage African was seen as unable to have individual
genius whereas the civilized westerner was capable of possessing individual genius. The story of
creation in the Bible was the basis for this debate. The monogenists argued that God created only
one race and this race was the only true race. The polygenists argued that if God created many
races, then all other races were inferior to Westerners. Another view is that because of their
inferiority based on their sub-humanity, it was rational and justified to treat those races as sub-
humans for example by colonizing and enslaving them.
PRE-LOGICAL VS LOGICAL
Levy-Bruhl focused on what he called the psychological foundations of primitive culture, this
marked a turning point in understanding the other. He describes people’s material culture and
way of life as manifestations of the pre-logical mentality, a mentality which does not have a
logical character. Instead, it is this mentality which simply associates one thing with another
even when associations are logically impossible. This is called the mentality of participation in
being. It is incapable of standing back and logically as being from a distance. According to
Levy_Bruhl it is precisely the indifference of logic of the ‘underdeveloped peoples’, their
submission to the ‘ law of participation’ which must now be seen as understanding these people.
PERCEPTUAL VS CONCEPTUAL
Claude Levi Strauss introduced the categories ‘perceptual’ and ‘conceptual’ as a response to
levy-Bruhl. His purpose was to show that the primitive mind logical and that its conceptual
schemes were structured in orderly fashion. For Levi Strauss, the ‘primitive’ mind was ‘magical’
whereas the ‘civilised’ was ‘scientific’. The difference is that mythical thought borrows from a
diversity of sources whenever it expresses itself. The point is that the sources are limited and
mythical thought has to rely only on them because it cannot conceive or contrive alternatives.
ORAL VS WRITTEN
Some scholars argue that western civilization owes its origin to writing. Without the invention of
writing, there could not have been civilization. Writing as a new method of communication, has
some consequences. Before the invention of writing, humans relied on speech. Time was an
important fact of reference in the sense that speech was often linked to a particular event. This
linkage with regard to events that had already happened relied exclusively on memory. Memory
was no longer important because what had to be remembered was readily available in the form of
writing. Following the invention of writing, presentation of written knowledge was dominated by
description, definition and analysis.
RELIGIOUS VS SCIENTIFIC
Here Biakolo focused on the question, ‘primitive thought’ is rational at all? May we say that?
Three positions are distinguishable (1) ‘primitive thought’ is irrational, illogical and unscientific,
(2) it is thought to be rational and logical but not scientific or alternatively, it is rational but
illogical and unscientific and (3) ‘primitive thought’ is as rational as scientific thought within its
own cultural context. Biakolo concludes that in the final analysis ‘science’ is no more than a
human convention. In the language of post-modern philosophy, science may be described as
faith, a grand belief in a particular model of knowledge construction and presentation.
Oruka’s classification comes from the English –speaking side and does not represent
Francophone African philosophy in his classification. The four-fold classification is as follows,
(1) ethno philosophy (ideas of philosophers who try to reconstruct a traditional Bantu or
indigenous world view. (2) Sage philosophy (ideas of African sages on selected philosophical
issues) (3) nationalist ideological philosophers (ideas of politicians on the social, cultural and
economic reconstruction of African countries in a post-colonial era and (4) professional
philosophy (ideas of professionally trained students and teachers of philosophy in Africa.
Oruka’s shortcomings are dealt with in an abstract way..He does not give examples and thus
does not classify specific philosophers. This leads to a further problem, of who belongs to which
category. For instance ‘negritude’ looks as if it belongs under ethno philosophy, but Senghor can
be seen as a professional philosopher. The category of professional philosopher may thus be
questioned because it is a different kind of category from the others and too hospitable.
Different approaches are put there in spite of radical differences.
According to Oruka, there is no radical difference between European and African philosophy –
philosophy remains, irrespective of where it is being practiced. This is off course not an
acceptable view. Oruka distinguishes between philosophy and what he sees as quasi-philosophy.
They think that ethno philosophers can present to the discourse of African philosophy both
interesting and useful material on which to draw for analysis of the traditional and cultural
manifestation of African existence. They indirectly suggest that the ethno philosophy category
should have had the more positive label of cultural philosophy.
Furthermore at the time that this article was written originally, sage philosophy was not much of
a trend.
They are as follows, The Intra-personal pole. This relates as to whom or what is a human person.
In philosophical anthropology, a human person is conceived as a composite substance, made up
of body and soul. In western philosophical anthrolopologies, this view raised many philosophical
problems as philosophers attempted to understand the very nature of these two entities and how
the two co-exist. In African philosophy, the problem of the nature of both substance and their co-
existence does not arise. What arises is the concern on how to maintain a healthy balance
between one’s body (material) and spiritual needs. The concern stems from the belief that
persons who are overly concerned about their bodily well-being at the expense of the spiritual
dimension of their being are not in touch with their real selves, and are likely to care less about
other person. Gbdadegesin corroborates this view as follows; the idea is that a selfish person is
concerned with the well-being of his or her own body as opposed to the spirit. This suggests that
if human beings were to be concerned with their spirits, they would not be selfish. That a human
person is body-soul implies that they are more than just a body or material entity. A human
person is enlivened by a principle that has its origin from a being beyond this world.
The second one is known as the Inter-personal pole…according to this view, a person is not only
related to himself, and a person is not an isolated, individuated being. A human being is an
ontological relationship with other human beings and also with the rest of hierarchy of beings
and as such is only real in relationship with others. According to Shutte who draws from
Tempels and Mbiti, a human only exists by being shared. Without others or the community, the
individual’s existence is almost incomplete. The human person is therefore never an independent
and isolated being. He or she is always ‘a being with others’ . He is also a social being in relation
to others.
English in 1959. Early philosophers of this trend were critical of the ethnocentrism and Euro
centrism of many western philosophers which was expressed in what became known
derogatively as ‘the primitive mentality’ of Africans. It also came about as a result of reaction
against colonialism. The following philosophers and politicians were responsible for it, Kwame
Nkrumah (Ghana), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Kenneth Kaunda 9Zambia), Leopold Sengor
(Senegal).
Francophone African philosophy has two perspectives that dominate philosophical thought and
discourse in contemporary French-speaking Africa, the question of identity and the idea of
modernity. On the question of identity, Africans have struggled to understand themselves and
their place in the world. Colonialism was seen as a violent confrontation between Europe and
Africa which led to an emotional response concretised in Negritude . In the post-colonial era, the
policy of assimilation, together with characterization of Africa and Africans in European
literature e.g. novels of Loti etc. this philosophy was an attempt to postulate a black racial
identity founded upon an original African essence.
SECTION B
ACCORDING TO JOHN AYETUNDE BAWAJI, ETHICS IN AFRICA MAY BE
DESCRIBED AS HUMANISTIC i.e. HAVING A HUMAN WELFARE AS ITS GOAL.
CRITICALLY DISCUSS BEWAJI’S IDEAS ON AFRICAN MORALITY AS
CONTAINED IN HIS ESSAY, ‘ETHICS AND MORALITY’ IN THE YORUBA
CULTURE. (50)
African morality is based on norms and codes on how one ought to behave in given
circumstances, this is an important component of human existence. In any society, certain deeds
or actions and forms of behavior are acceptable and thus commended while others are
unacceptable. Even though different societies have different norms and practices, the idea of
good and bad behavior is universally acceptable. In this regard, the relationship between morality
on one hand and religion, human nature, rationality and culture and individual make up on the
other hand is important. In the African context, an attempt is made to offer basic framework of
morality and moral discourse in Africa.
In Africa, there is a particular approach to morality, an approach in which the community
Such and the individual’s embeddednes in the community are crucially important. Attempts to
describe and account for moral thinking in Africa show that these issues are general in nature.
Moral thinking would thus raise questions like these;
Exactly what is involved when a moral judgment is made?
How should we view moral education and punishment
What is the role of religion, culture , traditions and history in morality and moral
discourse?
How do we differentiate between moral utterances on the one hand and descriptions, facts
and scientific theories on the other.
In short, African moral thinking is to a large extent an introduction to moral thinking in general.
A closer analysis of the two words, ethics and morality show that they are closely related in
terms of their original meaning, basically these two words mean way of life. A moral choice is a
decision for the better alternative while an immoral choice is a decision for the inferior
alternative. The choice between equally valuable possibilities is morally neutral. Thus instead of
pointing to the autonomous individual, morality in African thought tends to focus on the
communal nature of human society . An act is viewed as good provided it enhances both the
good of the society and the individual. Principles such as personhood, ubuntu and humanizing of
economic action reflect this approach. Human solidarity and harmony in social relationships are
some of the important elements of morality that are promoted in African thought. Morality in
African thought is organic in nature, in the sense that it grows within the community and
permeates every sphere of community life and activities in which members of the community
carry out their different roles. What is good or evil is articulated by the community within the
parameters of its own experience. Among the Yoruba culture there are many moral concepts and
the following are discussed eg, infractions against the Supreme Being, deities, ancestors as well
as other people.. This implies that all the afore-mentioned have a very crucial role to play in the
embodiment of the African morality and ethical discourses as it were.
Eewe ..Things that are prohibited by the Supreme Being , which could lead to sanctions..These
sanctions could be either the revoking of favors, protection and well-being that was supposedly
offered by these deities per se.
Abuku…this is the blemish which is acquired when one acts against moral expectations, people
who thus behave like this are thus likely to be punished severely by the ancestors , things like
homosexuality and other sexual vices are considered a taboo in the Yoruba culture and should be
punished accordingly.
1. In his discussion of the Africanity of African Philosophy, Osuagua identifies four factors that can be used to
characterise someone as African, Discuss briefly those factors.
Jun 217
16 Marks
Answer below
African Philosophy can be formally defined as a critical thinking by Africans on their experiences of reality. African
philosophy is "that which concerns itself with the way in which African people of the past and present make sense of
their destiny and of the world in which they live." African philosophy is the work of philosophers of African descent
and others whose work deals with the subject matter of the African diaspora.
African philosophy has a lot much to do with communal issues as opposed to individualisation of the ideas. African is
largely known as unwritten philosophy but the philosophy that lives in the commonly accepted practices.
An example of African philosophy can be the Ubuntu philosophy. Research on Ubuntu presents an alternative
collective discourse on African philosophy ("collective" in the sense that it does not focus on any individual in
particular) that takes differences, historical developments, and social contexts seriously.
Exam Pack Answer
a) Cultural interaction- the interaction between and among the Romans and the Greeks and the people of what was
later called North Africa.
b) Climate conditions of the continent.
c) The historical experiences of the West Europeans.
Exam Pack Answer
4. Having studies African Philosophy, how can you define or describe it?
June 2017
50 Marks
African Philosophy can be formally defined as a critical thinking by Africans on their experiences of reality. African
philosophy is "that which concerns itself with the way in which African people of the past and present make sense of
their destiny and of the world in which they live." In this regard, African philosophy is a critical reflection on African
leaderships in the administration of their duties towards their citizens, the morally blameworthiness or
praiseworthiness of it. It will also provide possible solutions to the problems experienced in African governance.
Much of the modern African philosophy has been concerned with defining the ethnophilosophical parameters of
African philosophy and identifying what differentiates it from other philosophical traditions. One of the implicit
assumptions of ethnophilosophy is that a specific culture can have a philosophy that is not applicable and accessible
to all peoples and cultures in the world, however this concept is disputed by traditional philosophers. Furthermore,
ethnophilosophical approach to African philosophy is a static group property which is highly problematic. Research
on Ubuntu presents an alternative collective discourse on African philosophy ("collective" in the sense that it does
not focus on any individual in particular) that takes differences, historical developments, and social contexts
seriously.
One of the most basic disagreements concerns what exactly the term 'African' qualifies: the content of the
philosophy and the distinctive methods employed, or the identities of the philosophers. On the former view,
philosophy counts as African if it involves African themes such as perceptions of time, personhood, space and other
subjects, or uses methods that are defined as distinctively African. In the latter view, African philosophy is any
philosophy produced by Africans or by people of African descent, and others engaged in critiques or analysis of their
works.
An African philosopher is one who attempts to understand the African's phenomena, the purpose of human
existence, the nature of the continent, and the place of human beings in that world. This form of natural philosophy
is identifiable in Africa even before individual African philosophers can be distinguished in the sources.
In Southern Africa and Southeast Africa the development of a distinctive Bantu philosophy addressing the nature of
existence, the cosmos and humankind's relation to the world following the Bantu migration has had the most
significant impact on the philosophical developments of the said regions, with the development of the philosophy of
Ubuntu as one notable example emerging from this worldview. African philosophy is the work of philosophers of
African descent and others whose work deals with the subject matter of the African diaspora.
a) The Ethno-African: identifies an African author or authors by origin or nature, by birth, ancestry, tribe,
physiology, colour, and culture.
b) The Geo-Temporal African: qualifies the African space and time within which African philosophy is typically
occurring. The African geo-temporality is by immediate physical placement within the African continent or by
remote spatial presence anywhere else where the African finds himself or itself.
c) The Lego-African: qualifies and expatriate author or issue which becomes African by virtue of a civil, an
ecclesiastical or academic law which empowers or mandates him or it.
d) The Techno-African: identifies an expatriate African who becomes an African philosopher by interest or
preoccupation, enterprise, research, literature, doctrine undertaken or produced. It clearly identifies any work
produced as African philosophy.
The first way of classifying philosophies in Africa, of which you have to take note, is one based on language.
Languages will always be a challenge in Africa. One of the legacies of colonialism is the place of the colonial
languages as a means of inter-group communication in the former colonies.
Philosophers from the French-speaking countries will link with the French culture and philosophy and likewise in the
case of African philosophers from English-speaking colonies.
The most general classification of African philosophy is Anglophone African philosophy and Francophone African
philosophy.
The first movement is a reaction against colonialism. As a result African philosophical discourses in this movement
were dominated by ideological and political postures which were intended to lead to the decolonisation of Africa.
The second movement is the struggle for the professionalization of African philosophy. Through this movement
departments and conferences of African philosophy were opened.
There are two perspectives that dominate philosophical thought and discourse in contemporary French-speaking
Africa: The question of identity and the dilemma of modernity.
On the question of identity: Since the era of colonialism Africans have struggled to understand themselves and their
place in the world. Colonialism was seen as a violent confrontation between Europe and Africa which led to an
emotional response concretised in negritude. In the post-colonial era the policy of adjustment, together with the
characterisation of Africa and Africans in European literature led to distancing – which became the dominant theme
in Francophone African literature and which culminated in the problem of identity as a central philosophical theme.
Negritude developed as an answer to this identity crisis. It is an attempt to postulate a black racial identity founded
upon an original African essence. It played an important polemical role. Negritude is, however, not the only
philosophical perspective of importance in French-speaking Africa. This is clear from the criticism against negritude.
The framework is challenged – is negritude a valid concept? Is this an acceptable rendition of the African’s world-
view? Is it still relevant? The foundation on which it is built is challenged.
The Dilemma of Modernism: Colonialism caused a crisis for Africans but the end of this system did not end the crisis.
Philosophers could not ignore the crisis, which meant an extension of the terms of the debate so as to include the
African’s experience of modernity. This brought reflection in Francophone Africa closer to philosophical activity in
Europe. On the one hand, in the direction of critical involvement, African philosophers critically evaluate the
Western tradition of philosophy and its historical consequences as well as its transformation potential in the African
context. On the other, European philosophers also reflect on modernism, on the fundamental human issues raised
by the impact of modern technological civilisation, which means that there is common ground between the two
traditions which is exploited.
1. Briefly discuss the different between Anglophone and Francophone African Philosophy.
Nov 2016 and Jun 2016
10 Marks
Answer from the Exam pack
Language is an important component in the study of philosophy. It is language that characterises the philosophy of
many countries in the world today.
Anglophone African philosophy is the philosophy of the previously English colonial countries in the African continent
whereas is the philosophy of the previously French colonial countries in the African continent. Anglophone African
philosophy came to existence the day Africa was colonised by the English speaking tribe and francophone African
philosophy is influenced by the colonisation of Africa by France.
The language is though the defining factor of both the trends but the other one is characterised by English language
whereas the other one is influenced by the French language.
Anglophone emerged partly in reaction to Placide Tempels, after which it was translated into English in 1959 since
francophone is based on the critical questioning of characterising factors which are the identity and the dilemma of
modernism.
1. Compare and contrast any two Orukas four trends in African Philosophy.
Nov 2017
10 Marks
Professional philosophy is the view that philosophy is a particular way of thinking, reflecting and reasoning that such
a way is still unquestionably new to Africa, and that African philosophy must grow in terms of the philosophical work
carried out by Africans and applied to African problems. This sort of view would be the spontaneous answer of most
Western philosophers to the question 'is there African philosophy?'
This trend has a claim that for a philosophy to be authentic and real, it must be put in writing. It then suggests that
ethnophilosophy and sage philosophy are not part of the philosophy because what they represent is not in text.
Nationalist-ideological philosophy might be seen as a special trend of philosophic sagacity, in which not sages but
ideologues are the subjects. We might see it as professional political philosophy because it has a lot of political
techniques in it. I refer to it as a tank of ideology and not philosophy; we have to retain a distinction between
ideology and philosophy between sets of ideas and a special way of reasoning.
Ethnophilosophers attempt to show that African philosophy is distinctive by treading heavily on the 'African' and
almost losing the 'philosophy'. Their main rivals, the professional philosophers, adopt the view that philosophy is a
particular way of thinking, reflecting, reasoning, that such a way is relatively new to (most of) Africa, and that African
philosophy must grow in terms of the philosophical work carried out by Africans and applied to (perhaps not
exclusively) African concerns.
2. One great shortcoming of ethno philosophy is that it is derived not from the critical but the uncritical part of
African Philosophy. Relating to the above quote, critically discuss Orukas first trend, Ento philosophy which he
examines in his article.
Nov 2016
12 Marks
Ethnophilosophy involves the recording of the beliefs found in African cultures. Such a trend treats African
philosophy as a set of shared beliefs, a shared world-view, and item of communal property rather than an activity for
the individual. He classifies it as a trend which came from ethnic philosophy, myths, religions, legends customs and
superstitions. Such an approach treats African philosophy as a set of similar beliefs which are not based on human
reason or scientific knowledge. This trend involves the lived ritual practices of ethnic Africans, because it pronounces
that Africa has only one ethnic group with the same philosophic practice. Eg, Ubuntu philosophy.
3. Briefly discuss the four trends in current African Philosophy that H Odera Ourka identified.
Jun 2016
8 Marks
Ethnophilosophy deals much with the beliefs found in African cultures. These beliefs include the activities of the
kind. Such an approach treats African philosophy as a set of similar beliefs which are not based on human reason or
scientific knowledge. Ethnophilosophy is a communal thing and not an individualised belief. He classifies it as trend
which came from ethnic philosophy.
Philosophic sagacity is an individualist version of ethnophilosophy, this trend characterises the beliefs of individuals
as opposed to those of a community. The premise here is that, the sage goes beyond mere knowledge and
understanding to reflection and questioning the truth against all odds. Sage philosophy is still known as the widely
unwritten aspect of African philosophy. It lives in the minds of individuals and not in text.
Professional philosophy this trend has a claim that for a philosophy to be authentic and real, it must be put in
writing. It then suggests that ethnophilosophy and sage philosophy are not part of the philosophy because what they
represent is not in text.
Nationalist-ideological philosophy might be seen as a special trend of philosophic sagacity, in which not sages but
ideologues are the subjects. We might see it as ‘professional political’ philosophy because it has a lot of political
techniques in it. I refer to it as a tank of ideology and not philosophy.
Assignment 3 answer:
Introduction
Henry Odera Oruka was a Kenyan philosopher best known for his work on African philosophy. African philosophy at
the time was seen more as unEuropean, different to European and Western philosophies. European philosophy is
known to be a critical and rigorous analysis with logical explanation, whereas African philosophy is considered to be
innocent of such characteristics. It is considered to be basically intuitive, mystical and counter rationalistic. In some
views, philosophy is seen as “philosophy”, a universal discipline. Philosophy is believed to be independent of racial or
regional boundaries and specialities. Philosophy is a discipline that employs critical, reflective and logical inquires,
with African philosophy fulfilling the meaning above. To expand of African philosophy, Oruka is his study wrote
about four trends of African philosophy to better understand the components of African philosophy. They are
namely; Ethno-philosophy, Philosophy sagacity, Nationalist-ideological and Professional philosophy. In my report I
am going to discuss Orikas four trends of African philosophy and discuss which trend closely relates to African
philosophy.
Ethno-philosophy
To understand Ethno- philosophy, let’s first discuss the foundation of European philosophy. European philosophy as
discussed above is known to be critical and severe analysis with logical details, which are produced by individual
thinkers. Ethno-philosophy on the other hand swaps logic and individuality with emotion and community. In this way
the community as a whole is responsible for the philosophy and it is accepted by everyone as truth. The philosophies
are based on dance, African customs, poems, taboos, religion, etcetera, and so African philosophy is identified with
folk philosophy. The whole community as a group can philosophise. One of the greatest inadequacies of ethno-
philosophy is that it is derived from the uncritical aspects of African philosophy. Where the critical parts are works of
individual man, and women, philosophers, poets, etcetera, and the uncritical parts constitutes of beliefs and
activities found in religion, legend, folk tales, customs, superstition etcetera.
Philosophy sagacity
African philosophy does not begin and end with folk and community based philosophy as described in ethno-
philosophy. Within the African continent there are many men and women, who have had the benefit of modern
education but none the less, fall in the category of critical independent thinkers. These men and women are called
Sages. They guide their thoughts and judgements by the power of reason and inborn insights. They are capable of
taking a problem or concept, breaking it down and making a clear judgement where they accept or reject the
established judgement on the matter. These Sages face many short comings as defined in the European way of
analysing philosophy and some even say that these Sages are a fall back on ethno-philosophy. However we cannot
discount all sages based on this theory. Many combine the quality of wisdom with the dialectical and critical
attributes of free thinking philosophy.
Nationalist-ideological philosophy
This trend is developed from a communist foundation. Where statesmen and politicians acted on behalf of the state
to ensure all parties develop together, none at the expense of the other. Hence, most of the contributions to this
trend have so far been politicians and statesmen. Although some of the work in this trend is not regarded as really
philosophy, Nationalist-ideological philosophy views no difference between African philosophy and European
philosophy. These philosophies are generally claimed to be part of the whole community but are actually the
philosophy of the statesmen, politician or author. The Nationalist-ideological philosophy defer from ethno-
philosophy in that it is of national and individual based whereas the latter is apolitical and free for all.
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Professional philosophy
This trend consists of thoughts, thinkers who are trained students or teachers of philosophy in Africa. They believe
that philosophy is philosophy no matter what part of the world you are from. They don’t believe that philosophy is
motivated of region or race. Philosophy is taken in the strict sense which involves critical, reflective and logical
inquiry. They, however, do believe in slight differences between African and European philosophy based on cultural
dissimilarities.
Conclusion
The African philosophies discussed above showed Oruka’s four trends. It caused debate when he first presented his
paper but these trends are generally accepted now after changes over the years. The question is, which trend
characterises African philosophy and why? In my view it will have to be Ethno-philosophy and Philosophy sagacity. I
think analysing the key components of these two trends epitomises the nature of people in Africa. The community
and emotional foundation of ethno-philosophy shows how African philosophy values the input of its people. The
community acts as one. At the same time one can say that the philosophies are developed for the people by the
people, to guide the people. Philosophy sagacity also closely relates to true African philosophy, in that many African
tribes are guided by traditional leaders who are independent thinkers. Most of these leaders, however, don’t have
traditional philosophy training or education but they do make up for it in their individuality and their knowledge of
the land and its people.
2. African Anthropology revolves around two poles. Discuss these two poles.
Jun 2017
8 Marks
The intra-personal pole: what is the human person? A human person is made up of body and soul. In Western
philosophical, this view raised many philosophical problems as philosophers attempted to understand the very
nature of these two entities and how the two co-exist. In African philosophy, the problem of the nature of both
substances and their coexistence does not arise. What arises is the concern on how to maintain a healthy balance
between one’s bodily (material) and spiritual needs. The concern stems from the belief that persons who are overly
concerned about their bodily well-being at the expense of the spiritual dimension of their being, are in fact not in
touch with their real selves, and are likely to care less about other persons.
NOTE: This pole of anthropology dictates that a human being is soul and body and not his/her surroundings.
The inter-personal pole: According to the African view of a person, a person is not only related to himself. A person
is not an isolated, individuated being. A human being is in an ontological relationship with other human beings and
also with the rest of the hierarchy of beings and as such is only “real” in relationship with others.
A human only exists by being shared. Without others or the community, the individual’s existence is almost
incomplete. The human person is therefore never an independent and an isolated being. He or she is always “a
being-with-others,” or “a person-in relation-to-others”. He or she is essentially social – a being-in-community.
According to Gbadegesin:
Persons are therefore not construed as atomic individuals. A person whose existence and personality are dependent
on the community is expected in turn to contribute to the continued existence of the community … the crown of
personal life is to be useful to one’s community. The meaning of one’s life is therefore measured by one’s
commitment to social ideals and communal existence”.
That a person is a being-in-community is not collectivist thinking. For a human being the community is a pre-
condition for his or her full self-realisation.
Essay questions
1. Kwame Gyekye is regarded as a moderate communication. What is the main argument in Gyekye’s
communication?
50 Marks
Nov 2017
2. In his essay, Person and community, Kwame Gyekye investigates the role that the individual plays in a moral
community. Discuss critically Gyekye’s essay in the regard?
50 Marks
June 2017
3. In a paragraph, briefly define and discuss moderate communication as discussed by Kwame Gykye as discussed
in his article “Person and Community in African thought”
12 Marks
Nov 2016
4. Kwame Gyekye investigates the crucial issue of the individual within African though. In light of his essay “Person
and Community in African Thought”, critically discuss the following question. What is the role of the individual
with the context of African Philosophy?
50 Marks
June 2016
50 Marks
Gyekye has identified the characterisation of the function of the community in determining personhood as radical
communitarianism. He argues that this position is erroneous as it confuses the cultural structure and the person who
is supposed to function within that structure. Hence he proposes his own version of moderate communitarianism.
He argues that while it is true that an individual is a social being, she is other things as well. The community may
nurture the individual but she possesses mental attributes at birth which are not handed to her by the community.
These mental features are responsible for the individuality of the person and the exercise of certain capacities such
as rationality and free will. He argues that his own version of moderate communitarianism retains the attraction that
it takes the rights of the individual seriously.
Although, by his own admission, a communitarian society will not be overly obsessed with rights; his version will
recognise the individuality of every person. He goes on to argue that within the traditional Akan society there exists
a number of proverbs that show recognition of individuality of the person that is not wholly subsumed by the
community.
He says it is some isolated static quality of rationality, will or memory that defines a person as a person. Personhood
is a thing to be acquired through birth. It is not the community that makes an individual, but the individuality of a
person that makes a community. The way persons sees the community is the right way that defines a person in the
African context according to Gyekye.
Gyekye bitterly criticises Menkiti’s argument that personhood is determined by one’s moral achievement and that
one becomes more of a person as she gets along in society.
Firstly Gyekye argues that it is not entirely clear how rituals are supposed to add any moral worth to a person.
Secondly, he notes that Menkiti’s assertion that one becomes more of a person or a fuller person as she gets along in
society is beset with incoherencies and confusions as it fails to articulate what those excellences could possibly be.
Further, Gyekye argues that Menkiti’s position runs into difficulty because it necessarily conceives of old people as
having the disposition or ability to practice moral virtues. Gyekye notes that there are a lot of elderly people who are
known to be immoral yet we would not rush to identify them as non-persons.
Gyekye conception of persons is communitarian but only the moderate kind, according to him.
12 Marks
The goal of moderate communitarianism is the reconciliation of rights and social responsibilities, that is, the
balancing of social forces and individual autonomy. Moderate communitarianism aims to ascribe to both the
community and an individual an equal moral standing. Moderate communitarianism is optimistic that social
responsibilities and individual rights are reconcilable. This trend is motivated by the need to prevent the over-
celebration of the community. Gyekye holds a view that rights are so important that at both theoretical and practical
level, communitarianism cannot set its face against individual rights. This trend states that an individual is both social
(communitarian) and autonomous (not self-completeness state but the having of a rational will of one’s own that
determines one’s destiny.
C. Kwame Gyekye
The question asks whether Kwame Gyekye succeeds in his communitarianism theory to strike a balance between the
rights of the individual and those of the community. The answer of course is not a simple “yes” or “no.” You have to
argue your answer.
4. Final decision of whether Gyekye succeeded in bridging the tension between individual rights and duties to the
community or others.
Gyekye argues that a human person in African cultures is a communitarian being. He or she is born into a community
and is shaped and influenced by it. But what is communitarianism? According to Gyekye, communitarianism can
generally be described as an “ethical and political theory, which considers the community as a fundamental human
good [and] advocates a life lived in harmony and cooperation with others, a life of mutual consideration and aid and
of interdependence, a life in which one shares in the fate of the other…” But since any community comprises of
individuals who may differ in their outlook and the actual living out of their lives, tensions are bound to arise in
communities. How one resolves these tensions can lead one to be labelled a radical or moderate communitarian.
It seems that there are many shades of communitarianism. However, Gyekye distinguishes between two, namely,
radical and moderate communitarianism.
Radical communitarianism, which is also known as unrestricted or extreme communitarianism, overemphasizes the
importance of community life at the expense of individual rights, argues Gyekye. He cites Menkiti as one of the
proponents of this communitarianism.
For Menkiti:
• It is the community that defines the person as person. This is because the community has priority over the
individual person.
• Personhood is something that must be acquired in community. In other words you become a person if you fulfil
all the norms and values laid down by the community.
• This implies that personhood is achieved and not given simply because one is born of a man and a woman. Thus,
one can fail in his or her attempt to become a person.
Menkiti, observes Gyekye, reasoned his idea of an acquisition of personhood from the usage of the pronoun “it” in
many languages, including English. He asserts that children and new-borns in many human communities are referred
to by the pronoun “it” (2002: 23). This implies that new-borns and children are not yet human persons. As they grow
they are evolving towards personhood. Gyekye is critical of Menkiti’s idea in this regard. He disagrees that the many
languages that Menkiti refers to, do not include African languages. He argues that Menkiti commits a category
mistake because he applies an idea taken from a European language to African languages (2002: 27).
• Human beings are naturally oriented toward other persons and because of that they must have relationships
with them.
• As a result community life is a necessary part of being human. This means that human beings cannot and should
not live in isolation from other humans.
However, having said the above, Gyekye (2002: 25) is also quick to point out that “the person is constituted, but only
partly by social relationships in which he/she necessarily finds him/herself.” This implies that you are a person
before you enter a community even though you may not be self-sufficient (2002: 25). Therefore, a person is
constituted partly by social relationships in a community.
However, having said the above, Gyekye (2002: 25) is also quick to point out that “the person is constituted, but only
partly by social relationships in which he/she necessarily finds him/herself.” This implies that you are a person
before you enter a community even though you may not be self-sufficient (2002: 25). Therefore, a person is
constituted partly by social relationships in a community.
A person is by nature a social (communal) being, yes; but he/she is by nature other things as well (i.e. a person
possesses other essential attributes) (Gyekye 2002: 26).
For Gyekye, the community and the individual exist for each other. He further believes that the community shapes
and forms the individual thus making the individual to thrive. But at the same time the community is constituted by
individuals. This suggests that the individual is prior to the community. The individual is therefore both a communal
and an autonomous being capable of self-determination.
According to Gyekye rights and duties are not polar concepts in themselves. This means that individuals can exercise
their rights while at the same time fulfilling their obligations or duties to the community. Further, rights are not
absolute. There are situations that may necessitate the overriding of rights in order to safeguard the well-being of
the community. For instance, in times of war soldiers may sacrifice their right to life in order to protect the
community. Equally important is the realization that “allowing free reign for the exercise of individual rights … will
enhance the cultural development and success of the community”. For Gyekye the two aspects go hand-in-hand. The
community needs the individual and the individual the community. Even after arguing for a balance between the
individual and community rights, Gyekye emphasizes the significance of the idea of the common good, which
according to him everyone should strive for. It therefore appears as if for Gyekye, the common good is the goal of
the community.
4. Did Gyekye succeed in bridging the tension between individual and community rights / duties?
Every student must decide for himself or herself whether Gyekye has successfully managed to strike a healthy
balance between individual rights and duties to the community.
In my conversation with Dr Koenane, who is my colleague in the department, he remarks as follows, in so far as this
issue is concerned:
“Although Gyekye advocated for a balance between individual rights and the community it becomes clear on close
evaluation that his argument seriously focuses on the theory of the common good for which he believes must be
what everyone is striving for and all sacrifices must be made in order to promote the common good. In this way, he
makes it clear that the community is more important than the individual – thus failing to maintain the balance he so
much wanted to establish. Gyekye criticized radical communitarianism for placing more emphasis on the importance
of the community over that of the individual while he does the same. Therefore, Gyekye fails to show how the
individual can prosper outside the community and still ties the individual to the community in the same way radical
communitarianism has done.”
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Do you agree with Dr Koenane or not? However, some students may argue that Gyekye succeeded in his defence of
his thesis of moderate communitarianism especially when taking into account Menkiti’s radical communitarianism
which gives the community absolute dominance over the individual. As long as students take a position, which they
support with sound arguments, they will be rewarded points for this.
Conclusion
Summarize your discussion here. Inform the reader what you have done in this essay.
Morality and ethics in Western and non-Western societies have similar importance in that human social and
interpersonal behaviour is under the necessity of the adjustment of interests among individuals for attaining the
general well-being of the community. In all societies the concepts of right and wrong are determined by perceptions
of what constitutes the good life for individuals, on the one hand, and the general good of society, on the other.
Divergences of moral norms as between Western and non-Western societies are largely due to variations in cultural
traditions and to ecological, sociological, and other existential differences.
In this regard, one can boldly affirm that the wellspring of morality and ethics in African societies is the pursuit of a
balance of individual, with communal, wellbeing. It is not unusual to get the impression that African cultures extol
the virtues of community, that moral obligations are primarily social rather than individual, and that communal
factors often take precedence over individual rights or interests.
Consider the idea that each person is a representative of himself or herself as well as of his or her family. This has
the implication that an individual has to consider not only how a course of action contemplated by him will affect
him personally, but also how it will affect his family, either directly or in terms of the way in which they will be
perceived in the society. For example, one is expected, even as one pursues one’s own goals, to be careful not to
tarnish any tradition of excellence in conduct established by one’s lineage. But this does not diminish the
responsibility that society has to the individual.
It may seem that morality is a personal thing, first and foremost. This is only partially true, from the African
perspective. The artificial separation of individual moral responsibility from that of society is the result of superficial
thinking. It is obvious that the context in which moral obligations arise is an interactive one. It is the social milieu in
which competition for the scarce resources of the environment takes place.
But it is not only the resources of the environment that are scarce. The human resources of love, patronage,
recognition, compassion, companionship, etc. are also scarce, and require deliberate efforts in both their generation
and equitable distribution. Here lies the crux of the moral responsibility of society to its members and to itself. And
this fact is represented in numerous ideas in African moral thought.
If we shift gears a bit, we will immediately understand the full meaning of the above reflections. The suggestion that
Africans are ‘‘in all things religious’’ and that religion is the basis of their morality misses the relationship between
religion and morality. All the foregoing is contrary to the notion that the basis of African morality is to be found in
religion. Still, there is some relationship between religion and conduct in African society, and we need to be clear
about it. Briefly, in African society religion is both an instrument of cohesion and a factor of order, bringing to the
fore the creative genius of members of society. In essence, it is being suggested here that religion developed out of
human necessity and served the human need for knowledge and security
To gain a more concrete idea of the substance of an African morality, let us consider a number of related concepts
used in the assessment of behaviour in Yoruba ethical reasoning. In Yoruba philosophical discourse, ethics relates to
the norms that govern human behaviour, on the one hand, and the behaviour of the supernatural beings in their
relationship with humans, on the other.
A morally upright person, a person who exhibits such virtues as honesty, respect for himself, the elders, and for
others. Such persons are highly valued and respected in Yoruba society, and are rewarded by society in various ways
for their goodness
The first concept that I want to examine here is Sin. This concept has gained much currency in religious discourse
because of the influence of Christian ethics in many African societies. This is not to suggest that it was absent
originally from the lexicon of Yoruba people. But it is important to note a fundamental distinction between sin and
the Christian concept of sin. In the Yoruba language sin refers not only to religious infractions against the Supreme
Being, the deities, and the ancestors, but also to infractions against fellow human beings. Indeed, the religious cases
are sin only because the infractions are ultimately against fellow human beings. Thus, while a person may have done
wrong, it does not necessarily follow that the person has sinned, if sin is understood in the purely Christocentric
sense.
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Another concept is Taboo. This concept has two aspects. It is often translated as taboo by theological writers on
African religions in their attempt to understand Yoruba beliefs. Taboo in this sense relates to things prohibited by
the Supreme Being, the divinities, and the ancestors. However, there is the more secular meaning of taboo which
relates to morality simpliciter. Taboo, conceived in this sense, means things that are wrong to do and for which
sanctions will be incurred. When one says ‘‘sanctions,’’ this is not to be construed as meaning punishment formally
enforced, as in legal punishment. It may be in the form of simply losing stature, status, or face in the community,
whereas in the religious sense, some atonement or sacrifice has to be made to assuage the unseen forces that may
have been offended.
Another important concept in Yoruba moral discourse is Blemish. In the Yoruba understanding of morality, to act
against moral expectations is to exhibit a moral blemish on one’s character. Human beings with moral blemishes are
deformed by the blemish, and will, for instance, be shy, as a consequence, to raise their voice in public to participate
in the discussion of community affairs. In fact, to have such a blemish is to be unworthy of communion with one’s
peers or of holding a responsible office in the community.
Another important concept is Epistemic (relating to knowledge or to the degree of its validation), or Moral. In the
epistemic sense it means ‘‘lack of knowledge’’ or ‘‘absence of knowledge’’. This sense could lead to infractions in the
ethical sense, for ignorance can be a liability in many ways. But our main concern is with the moral sense of the
term. In this sense is very close to the blemish discussed above. The difference is that epistemic or moral is a more
episodic failure and is easier to expiate and be rid of. There are many things that may create this concept for a
person, some of them small, others big. The significance of these acts of vice can be cumulative, and their
destructive effect on one’s image, as well even as on one’s own self-conception, can be very real.
An equally interesting, though somewhat more striking, concept is that of superlative beauty in a person or thing is
characterized by comparing the person or thing to a beautiful animal. Children are brought up with a clear sense of
the differentiation of all these degrees of defect of behaviour or character, and they mature with the consciousness
of the need to internalize the virtues of good behaviour that are highlighted by the delineated polarities.
Morality in most civilized societies does not start and end with mere notions of right and wrong, dissociated from
the emotions and feelings of members of society. What makes moral dictates so powerful is not the mere rationality
of the grounds for their determination. What gives moral notions the imperativeness of their purport is the fact that
persons and communities feel that infractions of the demands of morality constitute serious challenges to the
survival of human life and culture.
Moral education consists in both prescriptions and proscriptions. The concepts discussed above form the basis of
various proscriptions. Together they give a vivid, though incomplete, portrayal of Yoruba morality. In a more
extended discussion one would not only cover more concepts for proscriptions but also treat of those concepts that
motivate the prescriptions that help to define the Yoruba ethic. In some cases, however, as in the present one, the
negative can be quite effective in highlighting the positive.
It has been suggested above that ethics in Africa may be described as humanistic. If care is not taken to clarify what
is intended by this, it may be asked: ‘‘If so, why do we see so much human disaster in Africa?’’ The interlocutor may
want to know why there is so much leadership disorientation and violent conflicts with their attendant
socioeconomic catastrophes. The proper understanding of the fundamental factors that have led to this situation is
deeper than what a cursory glance can unravel. Suffice it to say that many of the leadership crises experienced today
are consequences of a breakdown in the indigenous ethic. This has been the result of the adoption, in a largely
adverse historical process, of various alien cultural elements. Thus, for example, the ethos of politics, law, and
business operative in contemporary Africa is in many ways alien to her indigenous cultures. When this is taken
account of, it becomes clear that the human disasters current on the continent are predictable and unavoidable.
Finally, the interplay of specific rules of behaviour with general ideas about morality in this discussion is typical of
traditional African life and thought. It signalizes the integration of the concerns of the moral life with those of the
philosophical understanding of the same.
PLS1502
Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Table of Contents
Part 1: Defining scope and trends in African philosophy ..................................................... 2
SU 1: Defining African philosophy .............................................................................................. 2
Defining the term 'Bantu'________________________________________________________________ 4
Africanity of Afican philosophy ................................................................................................................. 7
SU 2: Discourses on Africa ........................................................................................................ 11
How to examine essays ........................................................................................................................... 13
Biakolo: essay analysis ............................................................................................................................. 14
Ramose: essay analysis ............................................................................................................................ 19
SU 3: Trends in African philosophy ........................................................................................... 21
Notes on Odera Oruka’s “Four trends in current African philosophy” .................................................... 26
1
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PLS1502
Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
What is Af phil?
“Af phil is, at the same time, basically philosophical and typically African” (Osuabwu,
vol 4:28).
Alternative names
Azania (for SA) Alkebulan (for Africa)
• Indigenous name • Means “mother of
applied to SA by black mankind” or “Garden
nationalists + of Eden”.
liberationists. • Alkebulan is oldest +
• In Hebrew Azania only word of
means ‘God listens’. inidenouse origin. Is
Azania can also be of used by Moors,
Arabic origin. Nebious Numidians,
Khart-Haddans
(Carthegenious) +
Ethiopians.
1
Dispora: dispersion / spread of any people from their homeland.
2
Maghreb: NW Af (predominantly Muslim) – Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia = all members of Arab Maghreb
Union.
3
Sub-Saharan Af: all countries S of Saharah (46 out of Af’s 54).
2
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PLS1502
Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Contention 1:
• Raised from natural history perspective.
• At one time all continents joined – geographic divs didn’t exist. The undivided whole
(supercontinent) was called Pangea4. Divided over millennia, naturally formed = Af,
Asia, Euro, Americas + islands.
Contention 2:
• Humans named diff continents.
• Understanding reasonableness of naming “Af”.
o 5forms bridge between understanding term “Af” from geographic perspective +
“Af” from historic perspective.
Kingdom of
Tanganyika - Basutoland -
Tanzania
Lesotho
Thus,
geographic
S Rhodesia - meaning of "Af"
Zimbabwe must be
From social,history complemented
+ political by hist.meaning
perspectives, human
named parts of Af (+
changed the names) ==
study of nat.science - why Name of Africa arose at a
N Rhodesia - + when changes particular time, under
Zambia specific hist.
circumstances
In antiquity, the Greeks are said to have called the continent Libya and the Romans Africa,
perhaps from the Latin aprica (sunny), or the Greeks aphrike (without cold). The name Africa,
however, was chiefly applied to the northern coast of the continent, which was in effect regarded
as a southern extension of Europe. The Romans, who for a time ruled the North African coast,
are also said to have called the area south of their settlements, Afriga, or the Land of the Afrigs –
the name of a Berber community south of Carthage. Another explanation occassionally offered is
that the name applied to a productive region of what is now Tunisia meant Ears of Corn. The
Ifriqiyah is apparently the Arabic trasliteration of Africa (“Encylopaedia Britannica) 1974:117).
4
or Pangaea: supercontinent – when all continents were one B4 breaking up + theories on tectonics.
5
Azania: indigenous name applied to SA by black nationalists & liberationists. In Hebrew Azania means ‘God listens’. Azania
can also be of Arabic origin.
3
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PLS1502
Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
6
“Carthage has been destroyed” – Roman Gen.Scipio Africanus. Africanus = his nickname: his tactical reforms gave Rome
dominant position in N.Africa, Spain and Greece. Carthage, N tip of Tunisia, near Siciliy (across Mediterranean),
approx.450km.
7
Semitic: denotes family of langs.incl. Hebrew, Arabic, Phoenician, Arkadian.
4
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PLS1502
Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Problem 1: author contradicts “Greek opinion” on facts not revealed, exept to say
“Egyptian writings”.
Problem 2: Not only “Greek travellers” visited + sojourned8 in Egypt, but from
other parts of world.
Not only “priestly guides” imparted “knownledge + wisdom”, but these
also received priestly training from Egyptians = had to stay longer than
just a visit.
Aristotle (Metaphysicas 1.1981b:14-24), acknowledged Egyptian
origin of sciences, mathematics, astronomy. – testimony such as this
that above author misses/ignores/denies. Even Copleston showed
similar disregard + denial of 1st-hand testimony of ancient Greeks.
Osuagwu (1997:87, 94), states:
Copleston totally rejcts a histo.+sci Af phil of ancient Black E + its
subsequent influ.on + relation to early Greek phil … Copleston (1907-1985),
and Amer.Catholic clergyman, … typical view which denies + severs all
hist.phil links of ancient E with Greece + Rome … Copleston would not
st
accpet even the personally + 1 hand literary testimoiens of ancient Greek
nd
phils, he would certainly be less ready to accept the 2 ary reports of later
past authors like Herodotus …
Ramose
8
Sojourned: stayed, stopped; brief visit.
9
Arrogate: assum; lay claim to; appropriate.
5
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PLS1502
Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Bondy: wrote essay on Latin Am + asked these questions. Indicates that Af, Amerindian +
Australasian also “rational animal” (Bondy 1986:240-243).
Where is the cause, the deremining complex of this condition of Hipanic American as an entity + also of
11
each of its constituent nations? If we are aware that this condition is not perculiar to Hispanic Am
countries, but is largely similar to that of other communities + regional groups of nations, belonging to
rd
what today is called the 3 World, then it is clear that, to explain it, we must utulize the concept of
underdevelopment, with the correlative concept of domination … Philosophy in Hispanic American has a
possiblity of being authentic in the midst of the unauthenticity that surrounds and consumes it, and to
convert itself into the lucid awareness of this condition and into the thought capable of unleashing the
process to overcome it. It must be a mediation about our anthropological status and from our own
negative status, with a view to is cancellation. Consequently, Hispanic American phil has before it – as
a probability of its own recuperation – a destructive task that, in the long run, will be destructive to its
current form. It must be an awareness that cancels prejudice, myths, idols; an awareness that will
awaken us to our subjection as peoples and our depression as men. In consequence, it must be an
awareness that liberates us from the obstacles that impede our anthropological expansion, which is also
the anthropological expansion of the world. It must be, in addition, a critical and analytical awareness of
the potentialities and demans of our affirmation as humanity.
10
Ontology: branch of metaphysics dealing with nature of being.
11
Hispanic: relating to Spanish / Spanish-speaking countries.
12
Science: intellectual + practical activity encompassing systematic study of structure of behaviour of physical + natural world
thru obs + experiment.
13
Exigency: urgent need / demand.
14
Putative: generally considered / reputed to be.
6
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PLS1502
Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
15
Foci: plural of focus.
16
Ethnic: fact / state of belonging to social group that has common national / cultural tradition.
17
Temporal: relates to time.
18
Legonisim: ancient wisdom.
19
Techno: from Greek (used in combinations), meaning art / skill.
20
Enterprise: company, business, organization or other purposeful endeavor.
7
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PLS1502
Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
According to Osuagwu, any phil / phil’er influenced by one or more factors above, qualifies
to be regarded as African philosopher.
Prof. Ali Mazrui in Daily Monitor (Dec.12, 2009) distinguishes 4 types of Afs:
We must distinguish between [1] Africans of the blood and [2] Africans of the soil. Africans of the
blood are defined in racial and genealogical terms; they are identified with the black race. Africans of
the soil, on the other hand, are defined in geographical terms; they are identified with the African’s
continent in nationality and ancenstral locations.
However, most Ghanaians, Nigerians and Ugandans are [3] both Africans of the blood,
genealogically belonging to the Af race, and Africans of the soil, geographically located in or
belonging to, the Af continent … F W de Klerk and other white South Africans are [4] Africans of the
soil by adoption. This also applies to East Africans of Indian or Pakistani ancestry. They are indeed
Africans of the soil by adoption.
Osuagwu Mazrui
ethno-African Africans of the blood
spacial-temporal (or geo-temporal) African Africans of the soil
lego- African Africans of both blood + soil
techno- African Africans of soil by adoption
Philo = love
Philosophicality of Af phil
-sophos = wisdom
Philosophers want to understand how and why people do certain
Greek philosophia means things and how to live a good life – want to know meaning of life
love of wisdom
Not mean phil originated in Greece: Chinese + ancient Eqyptian phil older.
• = phil specifically associated with Greece;
o Greek has become known as Western philosphy.
• hence, term phil has particular historical tradition.
21
Argue: give reasons / cite evidence in support of an idea, action, or theory, with the aim of persuading others to share view.
8
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PLS1502
Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
NB Quest to attain reliable knowledge + act out such knowledge in relevant situations of
practical life, NB import in phil.
So, wisdom of phil = knowledge based on argumentation pertaining to experience’s:
o what?
o why?
o how?
BUT problem arises when phil assumes restricted meaning of scientific / prof discipline.
This is problem = contenscious among phils of esp. Af + W phils
Activity
st
Do I agree that phil must be 1 + foremost undertaken by individuals / groups for community agenda?
Maybe this is where the problem lies. Every human being on earth can be philosophical, to a degree,
depending on their ability to reason. Of course, exposure to life “out there” – an education is very important
here, because it opens the mind to new and different possiblities, it enables one to grow oneself and
understand the world better - will enable one to have a better level of reasoning. If philosopy was only left to
the philosophers, the real philosophy of the people would not be heard, because a philosopher will be too
detached from the reality of the man-in-the-street. However, the everyday person can reason through things
that apply to his/her own life and then apply these. Its because “the” philosophers have made it know that
the average person is not educated and thus cannot possibly have a reasoning, philosophical brain cell in
their heads, that this “task” has been left to the “professionals”. The philosophers think they are so clever –
it’s just like the clergy – especially in the dark ages – where the masses were kept illiterate and thus in the
dark, being told and convinced that only the clergy knew what was best and could make decisions for them.
Once the ordinary person started to become literate and thus find out the true state of affairs, the hypocracy
and lies of the clergy became apparent. Is this what the philosophers are trying to do? To make people that
they can’t think for themselves?
Normal people are philosophical allthe time – they love wisdom. Why can’t they observe, comment and
discover? They are not intellectually inferior.
The cummulative knowledge of the common people, when taken into accout, could amount to a lot of
combined information that could be useful for the “philosophers” to use towards the community purpose.
22
Contemporary: living/occurring at same time; person/thing existing at same time as another.
9
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PLS1502
Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Paulin Hountondji’s:
• Prominent Francophone Af phil.
• Prolific writer on Af phil.
• One of earliest + severset critics of ethno-phil.
• He describes Af phil as “sets of texts, specifically the sets of texts
written by Afs + described as phil by the authors” (in Alienated
literature).
23
Verity: true principle of belief, esp one of fundamental importance.
10
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PLS1502
Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
SU 2: Discourses on Africa
From Dimpho: In order to understand this unit, you will need to have read the two prescribed readings.
1. An essay by Emvwo Biakolo, “Categories of cross-cultural cognition and the African condition” (2002).
2. Mogobe Ramose, “The struggle for reason in Africa” (2002).
A philosophical understanding of the 'Discourse' as a concept is understood from the position of Michel Foucault.
It goes beyond what is said about a certain topic and is often related to the notion of power.
Discourse is not simply what is said about a certain topic, or the ideas that people have about a particular subject.
Discourse carries power – those who control the discourse, control what
people believe about those subjects.
The purpose of this unit is to provide a defense of the existence and the reasonableness of African
philosophical thinking. Biakolo and Ramose are critical of Eurocentrism in the evaluation of African thinking.
The focus of this unit is on post-colonial African philosophy. However, the ideas that are being reviewed and
criticized are ideas that constructed and influenced colonialism. Non-African colonizers often constructed distorted
and unreal images of Africans that contained false, one-dimensional ideologies. Problematically, some of these
ideas are still pervasive after the end of colonialism.
Biakolo:
Argues that Western cross-cultural paradigms provide no key to understanding and knowing the African past and
present. Instead, they have served the colonization of Africa well and continue to ensure the exploitation of Africa.
He shows that it is a misjudegment (particularly by Levy-Bruhl) that Africans can be characterized as pre-logical,
perceptual or religious in their being.
Identifies five categories of cognition from specific texts that he attributes with particular thinkers
1. savage vs civilized
2. Pre-logical vs logical
3. Perceptual vs conceptual
4. Oral vs written
5. religious vs scientific.
He concludes that the “cross-cultural paradigms” are actually obscure efforts to come to grips with the African
condition. They provide no access to understanding either the past or the present of Africa. They have served great
uses in the colonization and exploitation of Africa, as Mudimbe suggests. But they provide no key to the knowledge
of Africa. On the contrary, their perpetuation merely serves to repeat the outdated myth of Africa as the “white
man’s burden”.
Ramose
Ramose addresses the issue of reason in Africa. The conception of this article is founded on Aristotle's definition
of man as a rational animal.
He argues that Aristotle’s restrictive definition of the human being as a rational animal may not be justified on
ontological, ethical, political and juridical grounds.
This definition is restrictive in the sense that that reason was the exclusive quality and preserve of the Western
“man”. Other “man”-like (human-like) animals deserved to be colonized because, though they looked human, they
were not human beings proper – by virtue of the fact that they did not have the quality of reason. Consequently,
Africans were colonized on the basis that they lacked the ability to reason.
NB! - Make use of the self-assessment questions to evaluate your understanding of the content.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Unit:
• Defends: Emevwo A Mogobe B
o existence + Biakolo Ramose
o reasonableness
of African philosphical thinking.
• Rebutts: Critical of
Eurocentrism in
o myths + evaluation of
o ideological justification African thinking
of inhumanity of Africans
• We discuss:
o formal
o orderly
o extended
debates occurring around Africa = try understand power-relations
“Discourse”
Understanding a concept involves min.2 Discourse carries power:
those who control the
elements: discourse, control what
1. meaning as content people believe on those
subjects
2. meaning as context
Defining Discourse
Understanding any concept involves at minimum 2 elements:
Meaning as content: Meaning as context:
Merriam-Webster Dictionary: Which def.best defs ‘discourse’ in philosophical context?
1. capacity of orderly
thought or procedure; Dictionary of critical theory:
2. rationality: verbal Discourse: “[a] specific form of language use shaped & determined by
interchange of ideas; situational rules & context … [of] Michel Foucault … done most to devel.this
3. conversation: formal + concept … discourse is expanded to include the operation of power: Foucault
orderly + usually asks (1) who has the right to use a particular discourse, (2) what benefits
extended expression of accrue to them for using it, (3) how is its usage policed, & (4) where
thought on a subject
does it derive its authority from?” (Bunchanan 2010) (these last 2 are most
appropriate for philosphical context)
Discourses on Africa
During colonisation:
– non-African colonisers sometimes knowledge
of +
constructed distorted + unreal images Post-colonial
African
of Africans. philosophy: built
on premise that
– unreal images contained false, one-
dimen.ideologies of Africans experienced
by Africans,
truth about
– = problem: some ideas still pervasive. Africa
must be
understood
Essays of Biakolo & Ramose: by Africans
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Dialogue:
• not just betweem Africans & Westerners
• not just Af’s historical experience since Pre-colonial
period
colonisation understood
• extends to pre-cololonial in 2 ways: 1. Serves as
background against
Discourses unfold on pre-+post-colonial hist.experiences of Af. which statements of
Philosophy NB: participation in knowledge + truth debate is Africa were made
distinctly philosophical
2. it is also the
resource we may use
Think philosophically because: for verification /
falsification of claims
1. it is important to review ideas to knowledge & truth
by non-Africans
2. we must critique views
• Show approach & method used to answer statement of question + defend thesis / theses
Step 3
24
Anthropology: science of h.beings; study of humans+ansectors thru time+space in relation to physical characters,
environ.+social relationships&culture.
25
Reason: reational, logical, intelligence.
26
Eurocentrism: idea that W/Euro understandings & interprets of world are most NB/dominant; “yardsticks” against which all
others are measured = experiences of non-W auto discounted, overlooked, ignored.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Prescribed reading:
- “Categories of cross-cultural cognition & the Af condition” (Emvwo Biakolo,
Nigerian 2002)
- “The struggle for reason in Africa” (Mogobe Ramose, SA 2002)
27
Paradigm: a world view underlying theories + methodology of specific scientific subject.
28
Wrote: Les fonctions mentals dans les societies inferiures, 1910 (How natives think).
29
Wrote: Systems of consan-guinity and affinity of the human family, 1870.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
30 31
• Debate between mongenists + polygenists .
o Debate basis: Bible+creation story.
32
§ Monogenists : “God” created only 1 race =
that race is only truly human.
33
§ Polygenists : if “God” created many races,
all other races not given same soul.
• implication: other races inferiour to
Western
• implication: because inferiority
based on their sub-humanity =
justified trate those races as sub-
human, by eg. colonising +
enslaving them.
Ø L-B made paradigm shift by introducing categories “pre-logical” + “logical”. (Biakolo 2002:39)
30
Monogenism: all humans from single, created pair = common ancestrale type.
31
Polygenism: existing human races evolved from 2/more distinct ancestral types.
32
Monogenism: all humans from single created pair, common anestral type.
33
Polygenism: existing human races evolved from 2 or more distinct ancestral types.
34
Not have logical character.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
35
Wrote: The savage mind, 1966.
36
Bricolage: something constructed or created from a diverse range of things.
37
Binary: relating to, using / composed of 2 things.
38
Dichotomy: represented as being opposed or entirely different.
39
Ideology: systems of ideas / ideals (ideal: satisfying one’s concept of what is perfect / suitable).
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Biakolo’s questions:
1. Writing of history takes in2 acc.a number of factors in reconstruct.of past. Yet argument in this case is
40
only on 1 item – writing (as cause of W civil.) Is this claim not rather odd from a historiographical point
of view?
41
2. Common assumption we owe alphabet to Greeks. Studies by I.J. Gelb = assumption invalid
(Phoenicians, but Greeks created system of consistently indication vowels).
Argues that if writing is basis of civilization, then those who belong to the mind-set of the written civilisation
are precluded from having access to oral consciousness. Do they not remain trapped in the culture of writing
without the possiblity of stepping out of it?
Biakolo’s observations:
(2002:44-45): notes the disctinct.between orality & literacy (written word) has been elaborated on in such a
manner that only literacy elevated to status if “science”&civil. Says, no scientific basis for claim that writing is
the essence of culture. Thus distinct.between written&spoken word should not be exaggerated.
(e) religious v scientific
Biakolo (2002:45) question:
Could we say “primitive thought” is rational at all?
40
Histography: the study of the writing of history.
41
Origin of alphabet by Semitic peoples living near Egypt about 2000 BCE; hieroglyphs.
42
Analogous: comparable in certain respects, in way that makes clearer the nature of the things compared.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Conclusion
Biakolo considers arguments for + against 5 categories. (shifts from category to
paradigm. Not synonomous, he seems to know).
V.Y. Mudimbe “The invention of Africa (1998) & “The idea of Africa” (1994).
He presents W's arguments with regard to their understanding of the cognitive potential of the
"Other" (in this case, Afs)
From an Afs point of view, he shows the strengths + weaknesses of the W's arguements - so,
voice of Af articulated by him only (notwithstanding mention of Mudimbe)
Ref's "Af condition", but not explain/describe. Maybe "condition" not sustainable
Biakolo’s aim: to identify Western ways of knowing + interpreting the “Other” (ie Africans).
“What can we make of the cross-cultural paradigms in view of the African condition? It seems to
me that they serve merely to obscure effrots to cme to grips with the African concdition. They
provide no access to understanding either the past or the present of Africa. They have served
great uses in the colonization and exploitation of Africa … But they are no key to the knowledge of
Africa. On the contrary, their perpetuation merely serves to repeat the outdated myth of Africa as
the ‘whiteman’s burden’”.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Aristotle: defines “man as a rational animal”: compared to plants, which are purely functional for either eating
or providing shelter or oxygen, and animals, that operate purely on instinct. Rational impies reason
and logical. Just because he describes man as rational, does not mean that they all behave that way, it just means
that humans, as a whole, have the capacity for it.
Reason is the ability to apply knowledge, analyse information, make comparisons and use logical thought processes to
arrive at conclusions that are “reasonable”. W philosophers state that Afs cannot reason. They cannot come to different
conclusions because of “bricolage” – they, collectively, use the same conserved knowledge, and just juggle it around and
reformat it but don’t come up with anything new and innovative.
Statement of question
Why and how was the concept of reason used to justify colonisation and to pursue its aims to:
43
1. conquer and proselytise the conquered?
44 45
2. conquer and wrongfully dispossess the conquered of their freehold interest in their territory (disseise ),
and assume sovereignty over them?
3. impose unilaterally, and on behalf of the conquered, the meaning of experience, knowledge and truth (in
46
short “kill knowledge – commit “epistemicide ”)?
Thesis to be defended
Ø The restrictive interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of the human being as a rational animal may not be
47 48
justified on ontological , ethical, political and juridical grounds.
Approach & method
a) Arisitole defined “man” – “rational animal”. Colonisation used term narrowly = ie reason
exclusive quality + preserve of W “man”.
b) Other “man”-like animals deserved 2B colonised because not have reason – looked
human but not.
49
c) This onological defect imposed on coloniser implied the putative ethical duty to:
conquer, proselytise, disseise + commit “epistemicide” of colonised.
d) This imagined duty was put into practise.
e) Bartolomeo Las Casas questioned wisdom + justice of colonisation === was not
proselytisation only supposed to be for human beings?
a. since not “human beings”, unwise + unjust to colonise them + purusue aims of
colonisation.
f) Debate between Las Casas +
Sepulveda.
a. result: papacy departing
specifically from the papal bulls
of Romanus Pontifex, Dum
Diversas and Inter Caetera
Divinae, by issuing papal bull of
Sublimis Deus.
b. This papal bull expressly declared “all men are rational
animals”. “… it is clear that there is indeed only one race,
the human race”.
c. = removed contradiction between colonisation + proselytisation.
d. But, it justified colonisation + reaffirmed its original aims.
g) Wide interpretation of Aristole’s “man is a rational being” did not eradicate conviction that African,
Amerindian + Australasian are not rational animals.
a. = theory + practice of racism continued to get philosphical backing, such as by philosophers La
Peyerè, Kant, Locke, Hume + Hegel.
b. in our time, “Bell Curve Wars” of USA + post-April 1994 SA.
43
Proselytise: convert to another religion / opinion / belief.
44
Dispossess: deprive someone of their land / property / other possessions.
45
Disseise: dispossess someone from land / property.
46
Epistemicide: decolonization of knowledge; war on knowledge; destruction of existing knowledge.
47
Ontology: the philosophical study of being; it studies concepts that directly relate to being, in particular becoming, existence,
reality, as well as the basic categories of being and their relations.
48
Juridical: relating to judicial proceedings; administration of the law.
49
Putative: generally reputed to be.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Conclusion
• “Western philosphy … systematically and persistently ignored and excluded the experience of being-an-
African in Africa.”
50
• “The injustice is apparent in the recognition that there is neither a moral basis nor pedagogical
justification for the Western epistemological paradigm to retain primacy and dominance in decolonized
Africa.”
st
• Despite apparent gains in, eg. international politics thru appointment of Kofi Annana as 1 Sub-Saharan
Sec. Gen of UN, struggle for reason is far from over.
• Offspring of colonisers still view “man is a rational being” as not being from Af, Amerindian, Australasian.
• Ramose does not try to persuade offspring of coloniser to recognise + understand folly of their conviction,
but urges formerly colonised to construct knowledge + define truth on basis of their experience as human
beings, second to none in their humanity.
50
Pedagogy: method and practice of teaching, esp.academic subject or theoretical concept.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
3b. They differ on: nature and status of suggested solutions to problems +
authorities to be followed in doing philosophy.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Philosophies / philosophers:
• can have similaries + overlaps
o despite individual differences
• classify acc to own interests
o use diff criteria for classiphications
§ = classifications grouped in different ways, eg:
• is geographical philosphy relevant?
• can we talk of German/French/American philosophy?
NB: some classifications more widely accepted by philosophical fraternity = take note of these.
various time
periods on how + in a particular + similar trends
Classification depends on diff period, diff in dff parts of
of philosophies regions people view
approaches world
selves + world
NB: classification
(labels) when teaching /
learning philosophy
References to trends are
easier for outsider to
understand.
a way for
humans to get
grip on reality
a way of
coping with a
labels help to variety of diff
give insights Classification ways to give
meaning to
live + world
a label can
help us
understand
that we are
dealing with a
kind of
approach
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
51
Bantoue: one who speaks a Bantu language.
52
Further reading: Barry hallen’s “Contemporary Anglophone African philosophy: a survey” (2004:99-148) in Blackwell’s
companion to African philosophy.
53
Nagritude: Quality / fact of being of black origin; value of black / Af culture.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
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54
Polemical: of / involving strongly critical / disputatious writing or speech.
55
Esoteric: intended for / likely 2b understood by a small number of people with specialized knowledge / interest.
56
Hermeneutical: re interpretation, esp Bible / literary texts.
24
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
African philosophy
Nationalist-ideological philosophy Professional philosophy
ideas of politicians on the social, cultural + economic ideas of professionally trained students + teachers of
reconstruc of Af countries, post-colonial philosophy in Africa
Text analysis
Significant
• 1978 – revised a few times.
• He 1st read it at a conference + published.
o = widely discussed / critisized.
• Significant influence on development of Af phil.
o provided framework for study + discussion of Af.phil.
o categories still used today.
o === students of Af phil should expose selves to this historic+influenctional
piece.
Shortcomings
• Diff apporaches are dealt with in abstract way.
o Oruka does not give egs.
o Oruka does not give classify specific philos.
§ who belongs where?
§ eg negritude seems to belong to etho-phil, but could be prof-philo.
o Cat.of prof-philo could be questioned because it’s too diff.from other … too
hospitable.
§ diff approaches are inserted even tho radical differences.
Nature of philosophy
• Oruka has specific view of Af.phil. (which is actually position of prof-philo):
o says no radical diff between Euro+Af philos.
§ phil remains phil irrespective of where practiced (not gen accepted view).
o at time of paper, sage-phil was not much of trend; O’s work thereon came later.
Some phils object to Oruka calling ethno-phil,
Philosophy quasi. They think
Oruka’s - this label should have had more positive
distinction is label of cultural phil.
between & his view of Quasi- - that ethno-phils “can present to the
phil / non-phil discourse of Af.phil both interesting &
cultural manifestations of Af existence”.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Philosphy:
a discipline that, in strictest sense, employs method of
Ø critical,
Ø reflective +
Ø logical enquiry
African philosophy
Nationalist-ideological
philosophy Professional philosophy
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Oruka
Ethno-philosophy
Nature of this A-political; free-for-all metaphysics; communal / group thought; communality;
philosophical trend idiosyncracies of traditional Af customs; folk phil.
Mission • For this phil 2B Af. (+ unique) must show it differs from Eurp or Greek
thought (+ thus be rejected): logic + individuality.
• Léopold Senghor: argued logic is Greek as emotion is Af.
• Euro.phil is taken for granted to be individualistic i.e. body of thoughts
produced or forumlated by vrious individual thinkers.
• Communality as opposed to individuality is indicated as essential attribute
of Af.phil.
o Fr.P.Tempels writes in his mythological Bantu philosphy, the
“wisdom of the Bantu based on the phil of vital force is accepted
by everyone, it is not subjected to critisism”, because it is taken by
everyone as “imperishable truth” (sic.) (1945:75).
• Replacing logic + individuality with emotion + communality leaves
challenge to find exact egs of Af.phil., or areas in Af culture where it can
be found.
o Need: idiosyncrasies of tradional / communal Af:
§ customs
§ poems
§ taboos
§ religions
§ songs
§ dances, etc.
o = radical antithesis of rational elements …
§ reflective == critical == dialectical phil
§ = communal / “folk phil” – impression whole community can
philosphize (opposed to Plato: open denial: the multitude
cannot be philosphic).
Philosophers? • Most works / books (these are of anthropologists / theologians) “which
purport to describe a world outlook or thought system of a paricular
African community or the whole of Africa”.
• O says that where they claim to 2B explicitly philosophical, ‘as being
philosophy only in the unique + ‘debased’ sense of the term’
(Okura 1972 and 1975).
Short comings • Derived not from critical but from uncritcal part of Af traditions.
o (traditional culutre often consists of critical + uncritical aspects.)
• Critical aspects of traditon / culture:
o thoughts / works of individual men / women of intellect (sages,
phis, poets, prophets, scientists, etc.)
o philosophy proper is critical.
• Uncritical parts:
o beliefs + activities of types found in religions, legends, folk tals,
myths, customs, superstitions, etc.
o emotive / mythical / unlogical = not phil proper.
o (we never look for uncritical phil in Euro culture.)
Critisims • from rigorous phil circles + caused debates on question of “Af.phil”
Resulting notes Regardles of critisims + debates – they are instrumental in inspiring + shaping
devl.of phil thought in Af.
Ethno-phil useful role in Af.phil history.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Oruka
Philosophic Sagacity
Nature of this • Individuals / sages = use reasoning + insights (but might be illiterate – but
philosophical these philosophers will support these sage=for them literacy is not NB.
trend • It is explicitly expressed in enthymematic57 form.
o But an enthyme is a short-cut logical / philos argument in the exact
sense of philosophy.
§ = its full logical range can be easily uncoiled.
Mission • Among various Af peoples likely to find rigorous indigenous thinkers.
• These sages – not benefited of modern education.
• NB: they are cricial, independent thinkers, who guide their thoughts +
judgements by power of reason and inborn insight rather than by the
authority of communal consensus.
• Can take problem / concept & offer rigorous philiosophical analysis, make
clear rationally where they accept / reject the established / communal
judgement on the matter.
Assumptions One may maintain:
• Af phil does not being + end with folk thought + consensus;
• Afs even without outside influence are not innocent of logical + dialectical58
critical enquiry;
• that literacy is not a necessary condition for phil reflection + exposition
=== not fall into pitfall of ethno-phil
Philosophers? • Various in Kenya – must be many all over Af.
• Their thoughts = ideas, if properly exposed + written down would form
interesting aspect of current Af.phil thought + literature.
Objections
1. sagacity, even if it involves
insight + reasoning of 2. a recourse to sagacity is a
Phil.type, is not in itself a phil fall back on ethno-phil.
in proper sense of the word.
Responses to • Not all sages are free thinkers, but some combine conventional quality of
objections wisdom with dialectical + critical attribute of free philos thinking.
• “Phil-saga” is only the critical & reflective thought of such sages.
Differ from • Fundamental diff from ethno-phil as it is both individualistic + dialectical.
other trends • It is a thought or reflection of various known / named individual thinkers, not
a folk phil + is rigorous + philo in strictest sense.
Resulting Modern students + teachers, doing research into sagious thought, will find it
notes rewarding to find out the aspects of it that are true in the phil. proper sense.
57
Enthymeme: argumentative statement which writer / speaker omits one of major / minor premises; does not clearly pronounce
it, or keeps it implied (rhetoric).
58
Dialectic: art of discussing / investigating truth of opinions; Dialectical: relating to logical discussion of ideas / opnions.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
In traditional
Af, Julius
In Nyerere
communalis argues, the
m the society individual
no individual would not
individual + would was rich or
ignore the
society are prosper at poor only to
stagnation of
said to have expense of the extent
any of its
agalitarian society that the
members. society was
mutual
obligations. rich or poor,
+ vice versa
(1968:9).
59 st
Metaphysics: abstract concepts after physics; branch of phil that deals with 1 principles of things, including abstract concepts
such as: knowing, identity, time, space.
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60
Appropriate: make ones own.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Metaphysical problem === problem of ‘self’ – but seen from Af phil perspective (according to Af culture).
This unit deals with what it means to be human in the African culture.
Af cosmos is
divided into two According to The Akan scheme Plaside
inter-penetrating + Okolo (slightly (sharing similarities Francis
inspeparable, yet resembling model to the Igbo + Bantu Tempels
distinguishable of Tempels), in schemes) 1906 – 1977
parts, namely: his thesis of Belgian
63
the the forces, beings of includes charms + Fransciscan
64
world world the hierarchy, in amulets missionary.
of of descending in spiritual realm Wrote Bantu
sprits matter order: whose purpose it is philosophy
• God to help humans
whose beings are ward off misfortune
arranged in a • Ancestors
hierarchical order, • Spirits that may come in
in which invisible + • humans their way.
visible realms can • animals
be discerned. • plants
• inanimate
things.
61
Multiplicity: large number or variety; quantity or state of being multiple.
62
Pluriformity: diversity; variety of forms.
63
Charm: some item worn about the person to ward off evil; charm can also be chanting / reciting a magic spell (incantation).
64
Amulet: eg a charm (ornament) often inscribed with a magic incantation / symbol to aid / protect wearer against evil (such as
disease / witchcraft).
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
• In African cosmology, beings on hierarchy not just “substances” – standing on own (as in
Aristotelian metaphysics – theory of beings_.
• In Af cosmology the beings of the hierarchy are dynamic +
hence forever in motion.
• Beings are interconnected = interact with all.
• So, Af universe is like spider web with a network of relations –
each part being affected by and affecting each other.
• Af ontology is thus unitary ontology in that it promotes a holistic
view of reality whereby material + non-material phenomena are
viewed as ontological equalis, constantly interacting with one
another.
• A person is understood to be inseparably embedded in anetwork of relations:
st
o 1 with other human beings
nd
o 2 with other things in hierarchy.
• The idea of unitary ontology makes it impossible for Afs to compartmentalise reality.
o Reality is one & hence viewed in a holistic manner.
o The logic of “part” & “whole” is at work in this ontology.
o No “part” may be understood in isolation from the “whole” & vise versa.
65
Intra: prefix meaning inside / within.
66
Inter: meaning “between”, “among”, in the midst of”, “mutually”, “reciprocally”, “together” etc.
67
Ethics: moral principles that guide one’s behaviour.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Gyekye closely analyses the work of Menkiti and comes to some conclusions about the thoughts and
observations of Menkiti. Menkiti forwards the view that “it is the community which defines the person as a
person…” (Menkiti 1984:172), but Gyekye goes to great lengths to disprove this idea by analysing various
aspects. Menkiti deduces that personhood is aquired through the community. His use of the neuter pronoun
“it” with reference to children and newly born is exposed by Gyekye when Gyekye, in an in-depth discussion,
shows that Menkiti “errs”. Gyekye shows, by an analysis of the Akan cultures, that Menkiti has gotten it all
wrong. When looking at the fact that the Akan cultures do not go to great lengths to mourn the death of child
or new born, Menkiti thinks that “personhood is something which has to be achieved … (Menkiti 1984:172).
Gyekye exposes the depth of Menkiti’s mis-impression, as an over-much show of grief, according to the
superstitions of the Akan cultures, have severe fertility implications for the mother and the dead child would
have a reduced likelihood of reincarnation and rebirth. Additionally, Menkiti notes that the personhood is
“processual” (Menkiti 1984:172), but Gyekye shows that a person, born immediately into a community
structure, also immediately has personhood, not through some sort of process is this acquired. He says that
Menkiti is “misguided”.
The types of wording and sentence structure used by Gyekye when he quotes or refers to the writings of
Menkiti are rather derogatory, i.e. “ … overstated and not entirely correct, and require some amendments or
refinements. I will … justify my critisims of his views”; “One might thus easily succum to the temptation of
exaggerating the normative status … Menkiti succumbed to this temptation”; “The inference Menkiti draws
would probably be incorrect …”; “ … it would follow, on Menkit’s showing, that not even the adult or oldest
person can strictly be referred to as a person!”; “… Menkiti errs”; “ … the contrast Menkiti wants to establish …
is … misguided”; and what can only result in the embarrassment of Menkiti, Gyekye states “This passage
surely commits Menkiti to saying that a person is defined in terms of ‘isolated static quality’ – the quality of
moral sense or capacity in the African case – which he thought was the characteristic of Western concpetions
of personhood!” (the exclamation point drives the embarrassment home.)
It is clear from the entire passage where Gyekye discusses aspects of Menkiti’s work, that he is not only under
the impression that Menkiti has come to incorrect conclusions on many aspects of personhood, but that
Gyekye, in his exposé feels that Menkiti has not taken sufficient care to be thorough and accurate and to delve
to find out the correct and real truths, such as seen in the details mentioned of the Akan cultures.
My community
Think about your relationship with your community. How big is the influence of you on your community, and of your community on
you? Now, think of the children in your community. Does your community view them as full persons? If so, why? If not, what is
the difference? By what principles does your community judge the moral status of children?
I live more like a Western person (as compared to an African, with the understanding and feeling of
community), with the same aloofness, enveloped in a cocoon of my rights and the rights of the individual “my
rights’. This is because we believe we have a right to privacy and, in my family, we in effect, close ourselves
off from others as much and for as long as we possibly can. In our culture, but also perhaps because of safety
reasons and the view that we are exposed and, in a manner of speaking, under attack (certainly, this is how
the white man in South Africa feels all the time, because we are made to feel guilty and shamed and not
belonging), we cordon ourselves off. But, having said that, I am probably more exposed to the community,
than say, for instance, my husband. Because we have school-going children, I do interact with that side of the
community more. But, truthfully, if I disappeared today, noone in this community would feel it, noone would
even notice or be affected, that is how little I bring to this community. The community’s affect on me is quite
frustrating. Do I think the community helps and supports me? No. Do I think the community is benefitted by
me? No. Do I think I feel a collective good from the community, so that I feel at peace and am content? No.
The political tension in this country does not make for true contentment. Quite frankly, that is probably why I
do not wish to involve myself in the community; the community wants to drown us out, not support us. So yes,
there are different types of communities, but the biggest community of the entire city around me, is not there
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for me. More and more one sees beggars on the street. Unsurprisingly, for me at least, these are white
persons. The extreme tilt of the political view – hence adopted by the community – is that the whites have had
the unfair advantage for too long and hence racisim is very much alive, resulting in unfair (my opnion)
discrimination against the white person, margainalising them to prevent them from having any sort of income
(because employment is prioritised for the blacks – regardless of whether they can actually do the job), and in
the same vein, the government has a mandate (not just from a moral standpoint, or from the standpoint of ‘of
course the government should do this and that’) to care for all the peoples of this country, but my view is that
the the individuals of the government first look out for themselves. This is seen on daily reports of corruption
and extortion, resulting in a severe draw down of funds where funds are needed, thus the community on the
whole is excessively damaged.
There are stark contrasts between the children of the community. Clearly, there are more privileged children
that come from more well-off homes (irrespective of whether from black or white origin), and then, of course,
there are the poorer, less privileged. These are mostly black people with black children. The divide is clear.
The children should be protected by their own community, but I think that the communities of those of black
people are scattered. The levels of crime are on the increase and the vulnerable of our society are easy
targets. A large proportion of these vulnerable ones include children. They are abused and exploited, not
cared for and nurtured as they should be.
Yes, the children are viewed as full persons. But, in my view, the general view of life – any human person’s life
– is cheap. The government, by means of the laws it passes, fosters a complete disrespect for human life.
So, if they do not care for adults, they cannot care for children.
Since the Constitution many people have become more in-tune with their rights. In fact, some are quite
surprised by the rights that they suddenly have acquired. Laws have changed to be aligned to these const.Rs.
So, it is said, justice is served. Justice, of course, is subjective. A problem which the courts have is which
rights to take note of when making judgments. If each party to litigation has a right, which one’s is more
important; who has the stronger right? We know that the mandate that the courts have is to take history into
account, to take historic discrimination and inequalities into account before making a judgment. So, the
question begs asking, of what use is a right if it is ignored or even squashed down, in order to elevate
another’s right, that, in the bigger scheme of things, is unjust?
But there is a bigger problem. The Constitution is based on rights, which are, in effect, universal human rights,
but many are adopted from the Western view of law. Africans, in reality, do not subscribe to the Western view
of law, i.e. law of property is actually very foreign and completely not the communitarian way. It is not the
African way. The fact that the Const. decrees that courts must take A.I. law into account, must put quite a
strain on the courts, since the Roman basis of SA law is almost the complete antithesis of A.I. law. How to
marry the two? Can it be done? It is exactly because of the view which is held by Afs of property such as
land, that plans are afoot to change Section 25 of the Const.to include expropiration of land without
compensation. This will suit the communitarian way of Af life admirably, and it falls directly into the camps of
collectivism and thus communism. But it goes against the Western (Roman) basis of views of property. I
firmly believe that once that section has been changed, the laws which are not aligned to the re-newed Const.
will topple and quickly be replaced by laws that align to the Const. My opinion is that South Africa is on the
verge of a radical change to law as we know it. The consequential effect is going to be disbelief, anger,
heartbreak, threats of violence, violence, picketing, departure from this country of more and more of the
collective intelligence that this country needs so much, but that is pushes down to the subsurvient position of
comminiatrianism.
In Gyekye’s words, he deduces that Kant recognises “rational freedom”, that “human
dignity or intrinsic worth [is based] on the capacity of the person for moral authonomy”.
The superlative origin of morality “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity …
never simply as a means but at the same time as an end” (Kant 1965:95). To Kant,
“innate rights” are natural rights, which are human rights, and not necessarily from a belief that it is a bestowal
from a higher being. Kant is of the view that the fulfilment of the duty(ies) which we have supersedes whatever
other moral obligation we feel we have when having to decide on the morally correct course of action, because
the resultant effect of action is not as important as the duty shown to the community.
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Kant applies the rules, as he sees them of morality, in the strictest and narrowest of sense. Disconsertingly, it
is highly unlikely that anyone can actually measure up to his standards; but at least we know that if he expects
these standards from us, he must be willing and certainly able to fulfil those standards himself.
He calls this “supreme principle of morality” The Categorical Imperative. The word “imperative” has a sense of
urgency, a sence of dictated obligaiton, while “categorical” impies uncompromising explicitness. The title
indicates no room for manouverablity; you have not choice in the matter – it must be done, and be done in
equal measure: what is fair for you must thus also be fair for me. I cannot expect you to be unwaveringly
punctual if I am tardy. Kant does not allow for double-standards: what I expect from you must be that I expect
the exact same from me. If this were the case, it would become a “universal law”, stringenlty and without
expection nor negotiation appliable to every human being. He indicates that never ever is it acceptable to
forfeit one’s own moral virtue in exchange for one or other object or pursuit. He highly prizes the fact that a
good person, having the fortitude of a strong “will” will always enlist it in the decision-making process and in the
general course of one’s day and life, and in so-doing manifest one’s moral fibre strength.
For Kant, the actions which one performs are either catogorised wrong or categorised right, but the evaluation
of the person is either “morally worthy” or not. So, the conclusion of being a good person or a bad person is
derived from the reason behind the person’s actions and has nothing to do with the consequential
“goodness” which flow as a product thereof. Purety of motivation is what makes a person good. “Moral
worth” only comes when you do something because you know it is your duty and would do it regardless of
whether you liked it.
Duty, to Kant, is of paramount importance. It is the fulfilment of one’s duty, of doing what is expected of
the individual, that results in a “good person”. Whether enjoyment is derived from the fulfilling of the duty is
beside the point; the duty must be done, no questions asked. Thus, the main thrust of Kant’s philosophy that a
person must be good because goodness is good and doing what you are supposed to do, i.e. recognise that
you have duties towards others and yourself, and then do these, that makes you a good person.
[be good for goodness sake – no ifs no buts]
Analysis of Gyekye’s text
: the relationship between self and the other; between the individual and the community +
duties of care of others and community over individual’s rights.
Introduces • Gyekye clarifies some commonalities & differences as found in the understanding of
Menkiti’s ideas on communatriansm.
rights + duties
• Refs Menkiti.
• Considers “radical communitarians” such as Nkrumah, Senghor + Nyerere.
Menkiti wrote: [Africa has socio-ethical philosophy = communatarian]
‘Person and • G opposes the idea that the community is the epitome (embodiment) of what should
community in determine personhood.
traditional African • G’s main focus is the freedom which the human peson is given in
thought’ (1984)
Mentiki is unrestricted order to give effect to own rights, but within the protective
/ radical / excessive
communitarianism
environment of communitarianism.
• Rights v duties are analysed and questioned.
Menkiti’s ideas; • Relationship between community + individual: = G critisises.
refuted by G •
68
M asserts ontological primacy, G calls it “ontological independence of the community”.
G takes exception to 1 and M’s views:
3 because they don’t
necessarily follow from the 1. “it is the community that defines the person as person not rationality / will / memory”
notion of the priority of the
community – M’s view of
2. “personhood is acquired”
status of the community is 3. “personhood is something which has to be achieved, and is not given simply because
“overstated and not entirely
correct” = grounded in one is born of human seed”
“African sosialism,” 4. “personhood is something at which individuals could fail”
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Ontology: study of being; reality in general.
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• Hence, anyone daring to operate outside of the community runs the risk of failing to attain
personhood.
G says:
A person is by nature a social (communal) being, yes; but he/she is by naure other things as well (i.e. a
person possess other essential atributes). Failre to recognise this may result in pushing the
significance and implications of a person’s communal nature beyond their limits, an act that would in
turn result in investing the community with an all-engulfing moral authority to determine all things about
the life of the individual person. One might thus eaisly succumb to the temptation of exggerating the
normative status and power of the culutral community in relaiton to those of the person, and thus
obfuscating our understanding the real natue of the person.
“it” and mourning • Menkiti tries to justify his views of the acquisition of personhood (which he thinks he
defines from Af thought), in-so-doing uses neutral pronoun “it” for children/newborns but
Menkiti’s use of neuter
‘it’ means that the not for adults.
children or newborns • G heavily critisises M for this: M clearly has not investigated other Af languages +
are not yet persons –
the community has not cultures to make sure he is correct in his interpretation. G indicates that M is over-hasty
conferred personhood to say that personhood has not yet been conferred on children, but then resorts to a
on them yet – it is in
process of becoming a
definitely non-African lang (Eng) to formulate the foundation for his argument. Clearly, if
person. M had taken the time to investigate other Af langs he would not and could not have
arrived at this deduction.
In Akan language ‘it’ is
used for inanimate • Then, as though trying to bolster his argument regarding “it”, almost in saying “well,
objects, not animate. besides all that …” he tries to use the logic that children in the Akan cultures are not
“thus Menkiti errs”. given the execssive mourning rituals as are given adults, because, he claims, the
community does not view the children as having personhood. G dispells those ideas, by
painting the true (albeit superstitous) picture:
o over-much demonstration of grief will make the mother infertile, by hastening the
onset of menopause.
o exessive grief will disoriente the dead child or drive the dead child away, not
enabling it to find its way to be reincarnated and rebirth.
Age does not • M indicates, in his interpretation, that the reason deceased adults are worthy of huge
determine events of ritualised grieving, is because personhood has been bestowed on the person.
personhood o But G counters that, showing that such showy grieving is not the norm;
(ritualistic burials
empoverished people must also be buried, but this occurs with much less
of older persons
and not displays of ritualistic grieving. The type of burial and the nature and extent of grief expressed over death of older
person is not because of his personhood but depends on the community’s assessment of his achievements in life, his/her contribution
youngsters) to the welfare of the community + respect commanded in the community.
… no distinctions as to personhood can be made on the basis of the nature and extent of ritualized grief over the
death of a child or older person. A human person is a person whatever his/her age or social status.
Personhood may reach its full realization in community, it is not acquired or yet to be achieved as one goes along in
society. What a person acquires are status, habits, and personality or character traints: he/hse, qua person,
becomes the subject of the acquisition, and being thus prior to the acquisition process, he/she cannot be defined
by what he/she acquires. One is person becomes of what one is, not because of what one has acquired.
Menkiti: • G disagrees.
personhood can • G: it is not personhood that fails, it is social status at which individuals fail.
fail
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• One of the main goals of G’s writing: dispell myth that in an Af setting, human
persons have no lives of their own.
o “besides being commmunitarian, a person, is by nature, other things as well”.
Akan community’s
‘useless person’ • While striving to attain some social status (striving for social status not personhood) by”
1. Being responsibe + sensitive to needs/demands of the group
2. having personal achievements: physical, intellecutal, moral
3. fulfilling social norms, e.g. marital life, rear children
individual might fail. In Akan will be called a ‘useless person’ – but this does not diminish
his/her personhood. So a person can fail at social status, not personhood.
Rationality = • G: human person has rationality which gives him/her opportunity to make moral
human person can judgements = human person is capable of choice. (community discovers+nurures these attributes)
choose=autonomy (Greek: • Capacity to assert selves = can question some practices that they disagree with, even in
autos=self + nomos=rule
=self-governing, self-directing
community setting.
thus can set personal goals • Set own goals means person can define + determine own identity.
Autonomous • Human person = autonomous – individual goal choices + life plans, exercised within
communitarianist setting.
M: not proponent • M: he gives the community “an all-engulfing moral authority that determines all things
of moderate view about the life of the individual person”.
G: restricted / • Restricted / moderate communitarianism is G’s approach.
moderate • Gives comprehensive account of the self as a communal being + as autonomous being.
communitarianism
• G sees himself as moderate communitarian thinker, because for him personhood is not
entirely “defined by membership of the community:.
• Restricted communitariansim recognises self as a being that is:
o autonomous
+ o self-determining
o self-assertive
o with capacity for evaluation + choice.
• G: there is a place for rights in moderate communitarianism.
rights • G: “rights belong primarily and irreducibly to individuals; a right is a right of of some
individual”.
[communatarianism is • G: “the respect for human dignity, a natural or fundamental attribute of the perons which
either radical +
understricted
cannot, as such, be sat nought by the communal structure, generates regard for personal
or rights”.
moderate + restricted o radical communitarianism does not allow for rights because it gives priority to the
– either has socio- community – over the individual.
political consequences o but, in moderate communitarianism, recognition of self as “an autonomous, self-
for the individual]
determining entity capable of evaluation and choice and as a communal being”
indicates that it would be immoral not to allow rights.
• G: for community’s cultural develp + success = NB to allow for exercise of rights.
st
Community 1 ; • Despite recognition of of individual rights, the communitarian structure also focuses on
rights not absolute other communal values for the good of the society as a whole.
Akan maxim: one tree
• G: communitarianism will not separate “rights form the common values of the community
does not consitute a … conferring on them a pre-eminent status”. Hence, G argues “ in the communitarian
forest. = 1 individual political morality, priority will not be given to rights if doing so will stand in the way of
does not constitute a
community. attaining a more high ranked value or a more preferable goal of the community”.
• So, rights will always have a place in the communiatrian theory, although they will not be
But the community
st held as absolute.
always comes 1 .
The fundamentally relational character of the person and the interdependece of human individuals arising out of their natural sociality
are thus clear” … Akan maxim: “a person is not a palm tree that he should be self-complete or self-sufficient” … “in terms of
functioning or flourishing in a human community, the individual person is not self-sufficient; his/her capacities, talents, and
dispositions are not adequate for the realization of his/her potential and basic needs.
Duties priority • G: “duties that individual members have or ought othave toward others will be given
priority”.
Supreme principle
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of morality • Communitarianism: the common good or communal welfare, of each member of the
community, duty will be considered the moral tone, as supreme principle of morality.
• “duty”:
o task
o service
o conduction
o function
that person feels morally obliged to perform iro another person(s).
• However, some feel that they owe others by reason of common humanity and should:
o fulfil duty to help others in distress
o fulfil duty to not harm others, etc.
Westerners • G: Success of communitarianism in advancing duties of caring for others, will
obesessed with entail not being obesessive about individual rights.
rights
• G: W’s individualistic system does practice duties, but with less success = because
obsessed with individual rights.
• G: the reason duties are given priority over rights is required by “the demands of the
relational character of the person in the wake of his natural society”.
• G: explains:
The sociality of the person immediately makes him/her naturally oriented to other person with
whom he/she must live in relation. Living in relation with others directly invovles a person in social
and moral roles, duties, obligations, and commitments which the individual person must fulfil. The
natural relationality of the person thus immediately plunges him/her into a moral universe, making
morality an essentially social and trans-individual phenomenon focused on the well-being of
others. Our natural sociality then prescribes or mandates a morality that, clearly, should be
weighted on duty, i.e. on that which ones has to do for others. One of the priorities of the
communitarian structure is to promote communal liviing.
Realisation: moral • G maintains: the success of communal living depends on the realisation of each
responsibility to community member that he or she has the moral responsibility to actively care for
care the needs of others.
o shown when members pursue their duties.
• G: “ the social and ethical values of social well-being, solidarity, interdependence,
cooperation, compassion, and reciprocity … primarily impose on the individual a duty to
the community and its members”.
• G adopts Kant’s view / ethical approach: carry out duty for duty’s sake.
o G: you must carry out your duty, not because someon has a right against you,
but because you consider the person worthy of moral consideration.
Communitarianism • Just because communitarianism prioritises duties over rights, it does not imply that rights
recognises rights are not important.
• G:
… in the light of the overwhelming emphasis on duties within the communitarian moral framework,
rights would not be given priority over the values of duty and so would not be considered inviolable
or indefeasibly: it might on this showing, be approriate occasionally to override some individual
rights for the sake of protecting the good of the community itself.
Balance your • The emphasis on duty does not imply that one shold focus on caring for the needs of
needs + those of others without considering one’s own needs.
others. • Communitarianism encourages striking a balance between your needs and the
needs of others.
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In every society:
Certain deeds, actions + forms of behavour = accepted + commended.
Others = unacceptable = warned + punished.
But universally there is idea of good / bad behaviour, even though the actual behaviours
might be different,
In every culture / society, the question is asked: Why / why not this / that?
Relationship
between:
… very important
morality & - religion Accounts of this
- human nature relationship
- rationality between morality +
religion differ.
- culture
- individual make-up
2 key issues on
basic framework of
In Af there +
is individual's morality & moral
particular in which embedded = Af moral discourse in Af
community is crucial thinking
approach ness in the
to morality community
idea of
Af humanism communitarian
ethics
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Moral
thinking
Activity
H
How should we diffe ow do w
renti
view m oral m o ra ate b e
l utte etwe
education & en
one rances o
punishment? desc
r
hand n
+
etc. scien iptions, f
t if ic t acts
h &
the o eories o
ther? n
Concern for others should be inbred. Actually, it is. However, in our modern world, and
South Africa in particular, we are surrounded by severely high crime rates. Because of
difficult financial issues, people who one normally would not expect to become in criminal
behaviour are doing so. The result is that one feels one cannot trust almost anyone
anymore. This drastically affects concern for others, because none of us wants to be
exploited; taken-for-a-ride, so we become more and more suspicious and less and less
inclined to shown concern for others. We don’t want to be manipulated, exploited, used
and hurt.
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Respect starts with self-respect. An honour and love for oneself that is respectful in how one views oneself. This
spills over into how we view and thereafter treat someone else. Respect is an interesting ethical principle.
Sometimes we don’t realise that we are or are not displaying it. Frustrations, fears, uncertainty and anger can
make us say things in a way that is disrepsctufl, even heartless. For instance, do I just bardge into a room and
start talking over whomeer else is in the room, engaging in conversation? Or do I enter the room, take
congnisance of what is happening and respectfully wait before opening my mouth to say what I came to say? Do I
show respect in what I say to others (the words that I used) and how I say what I say (the tone that I use)? This is
something that I personally have to give constant attention to. Frustrations and uncertainty makes all of us tense,
but what I feel these emotions I need to take a deep breath and THINK. THINK before I speak; consider how, what
and even whether I say something. Respect for others, for nature, etc. starts in our heads – what we think about
others. If we conjure up disrespectful thoughts, its going to be very difficult to speak and act respectfully. I find that
it is for me an on-going battle to keep my thoughts and
perceptions under control; to reign them in so that I can remain
calm and respectful. Quoting Aesop, we have tried to teach
our children that if they can’t say something nice (about
someone), don’t say anything at all.
Which brings me to gossip. This, for me, is a huge NO-NO. In my opnion gossip is the best way show disrespect.
I don’t like it. I don’t listen to it. I don’t do it. And I have come to know that if someone tries to gossip to me, there
is a 100% guarantee, that person will – and probably is - gossiping about me. I steer clear of such people.
Many ethical principles are universal. In almost any setting the application of trustworthiness, integrity, loyalty,
respect and so forth, are highly prized. The display of these ethics affords the other person(s) the dignity and
respect they deserve. But it also helps you to retain your own dignity – hence avoiding embarrasment and having
to grovel and say you are sorry. Hence, I would say, ethics enables one to recognise and respect another’s moral
principles, whatever the situation, even if you don’t agree with the other persons morals. Thus acting on “gut-feel”
is very dangerous: you could end up doing the wrong thing because you are basing it on your ‘gut’ – your own
sense of right and wrong. But this is likely to be different from the other person’s view of right and wrong. One way
to know if you are doing / saying the right thing, is to first research; find out who this person is, what this person’s
background is. Offending someone is very easy – but the application of universal ethical principles will be what
save’s one.
Ethics should be what you yourself are in your head, in every fibre of your being: the repuation that you have for
being, behaving and reacting in various situations.
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Ethics Morals
What are they? The rules of conduct recognized in Principles or habits with respect to right or
respect to a particular class of human wrong conduct. While morals also prescribe
actions or a particular group or culture. dos and don'ts, morality is ultimately a
personal compass of right and wrong.
Why we do it? Because society says it is the right thing Because we believe in something being
to do. right or wrong.
Flexibility Ethics are dependent on others for Usually consistent, although can change if
definition. They tend to be consistent an individual’s beliefs change.
within a certain context, but can vary
between contexts.
The "Gray" A person strictly following Ethical A Moral Person although perhaps bound by
Principles may not have any Morals at a higher covenant, may choose to follow a
all. Likewise, one could violate Ethical code of ethics as it would apply to a system.
Principles within a given system of rules "Make it fit"
in order to maintain Moral integrity.
Origin Greek word "ethos" meaning"character" Latin word "mos" meaning "custom"
Acceptability Ethics are governed by professional and Morality transcends cultural norms
legal guidelines within a particular time
and place
- One professional example of ethics conflicting with morals is the work of a defense attorney. A lawyer’s morals
may tell her that murder is reprehensible and that murderers should be punished, but her ethics as a
professional lawyer, require her to defend her client to the best of her abilities, even if she knows that the client
is guilty.
- Another example can be found in the medical field. In most parts of the world, a doctor may not euthanize a
patient, even at the patient's request, as per ethical standards for health professionals. However, the same
doctor may personally believe in a patient's right to die, as per the doctor's own morality.
- If one has different basic principles that didn't recognize an item as "property", a similar action might not be
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unethical. (Helping a slave escape would be ethical if one believes people should not be owned as property.)
In original meaning, the two words meant custom or way of life (Moral philosophy in
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https://www.diffen.com/difference/Ethics_vs_Morals
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https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Meta:Historical/Ethics_vs._Morals
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PLS1502
Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Ilori:
• Today, there is a tendency
o to use “morals” and “morality” to refer to conduct itself, and
o to use “ethics” and “ethical” to refer to the study of moral conduct or the system or
code that is followed.
• In philosophic tradition, Ilori finds morality more comprehensive.
o “While the everyday idea of the moral is based on conformity to a specified and
limited code of conduct, the comprehensive definition extends the concept to
include every area of the human experience”. (not just conduct, mine)
• As moral judgements apply to every area of human experience =
human life is moral life (Ilori 1994:5).
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Sobriety: soberness; being serious
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Some important elements
Important observations and notes of morality promoted in Af
thought:
1.
• Af does not promote autonomous individual. • human solidarity
• Morality in Af thought = focuses on communal nature of (agreement/unity of
human society. feeling/thought; esp
o Act is viewed as good provided it enhances both among people with
the good of society + individual, i.e. principles of: common interest)
§ personhood
§ Ubuntu • harmony in social
§ humanising economic action relationships
2.
• Morality in Af though is organic in nature: it grows within the community + permeates every
sphere of communal life.
• Morality manifests self in daily communal life + activities = community members carry out
different daily life roles.
• What is good / evil is articulated within parameters of its own experience:
o Af proverbs (articulate + preserve experiences).
o Akan (African) saying onipa na ohia (it is a human being who has value) hinges on
Akan experience.
o In traditional Af morality does not have an abstract source, but grows from within,
because communities themselves are makers of morality.
3.
• Some concepts presented + argued have universal significance, despite being originally
Af.
o e.g. if the concept of Ubunt is applied worldwide, it acquires a universal dimension.
§ but being universally applicable does not necessarily nullify72 Ubuntu’s
particular dimension.
• hence, Ubunt as a concept displays both particulare + universal
features.
Text analysis:
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Nullify: invalidate.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Concepts of right and wrong constitutes what is determined for individuals on one hand and
general good of society on the other.
Ethics relates to
norms that govern Behaviour of supernatural
behaviour (on one beings in their relationship
hand), & with humans (on the
other). - Gods must be
ethical too.
honesty
decency
benevolence
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
Gbadegesin:
From this it follows that there need not be any tension between individuality and community
since it is possible for an individual to freely give up his/her own perceived interest for the
survival of the community. But in giving up one’s interests thus, one is also sure that the
community will not disown one and that one’s well-being will be its concern … The idea of
individual rights, based on a concepton of individuals as atoms, is therefore foreign to this
system. For community is founded on notions of an intrinsic and enduring relationship among
its members (1991:66-7).
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Divergence is
due to
PLS1502
variations in Introduction to African Philosophy
cultural
traditions, + Summary
ecological, African ethics Western ethics
socialogical + How does what I do affect myself + my family in eyes of
other existential community
differences.
Basis of morality in Af in human welfare. Aim: Basis of morality is universal, but what is
the balance of individual with communal well-being. moral in concrete situations may not
Community precedence over individual rights and universally same in all societies.
interests.
Inseperable integration between ethics + all aspects dislocation between intellectual + artistic
Similarities of life; efforts in American thought. For Soyinka
Relationship between beauty + good character = there is very little separation, if any,
inseparable integration between ethics + all between the ends of art + the ends of
aspects of life. ethics.
Wiredu: Aesthetic analogies are taken much more Aesthetic analogies inmoral language of
seriously + have more extensive moral relevance. other cultures.
Being morally upright promotes human welfare. Being morally upright is a matter of
pleasing a Higher Being.
Devotion to deities is in the interest of the people; Devotion to a deity is in the interests of the
when a deity fails to bring benefits to society, deities.
people freely sever the relationship.
What is morally good is what befits a human being: Immoral conduct is hateful to God,
it is what is decent for a man, what brings dignity Supreme Being + even lesser gods.
- respect
- contentment
- prosperity Wiredu: the circles of Thought is:
obligations, rights +
- joy priveleges which radiated Not that something is good because
to man + his community from the center of household God approves of it, but rather that God
relations of kinship to the
larger circumferences of approves of it because it is good in the
What is morally bad is lineage + clan affinities first place.
provided a natural school for
what brings: training tin the practice of
- misery sympathetic impartiality
- misfortune which, in its most generalized
form, is the root of all moral
Differences - disgrace virtue.
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Introduction to African Philosophy
Summary
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Simpliciter: simply; unconditionally.
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Epistemic: relating to knowledge or the degree of its validation.
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Expiate: make amends / reparation for (guilt of wrongdoing).
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Decadence: excessive indulgence in pleasure / luxury.
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Odious: extremely unpleasant; repulsive.
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Prescription: establishment of claim founded on basis of uninterrupted long period/custom
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Proscription: action of forbidding something; banning; condemnation; denunciation.
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