API 520/521

Relief and Flare Systems Workshop: DAY 3

 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 2

COURSE OUTLINE: DAY 3

• MODULE 4: Relief Rate Quantification & PRD Sizing
• Relief Rate Quantification
• PRD Sizing

• MODULE 5: Overpressure Protection: PRD Selection

• PRD Selection
MODULE 4
Relief Rate Quantification & PRD Sizing
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 4

MODULE 4
Relief Rate Quantification: Fire Contingency
INTRODUCTION Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 5

Lesson Objectives
• After completing this lesson, you will be able to:
• Identify fire contingency relief loads and specific equipment that requires protection in a fire
• Perform an overpressure analysis based on fire contingency
• Determine wetted areas within vessels
• Find the heat of vaporization for single- and multi-component fluids during a fire overpressure relief
scenario
• Calculate the required relief rate of horizontal and vertical wetted vessels and dry vessels for a fire design
contingency
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 6

MODULE 4
Fire Contingency: Equipment To Be Protected From Fire
EQUIPMENT TO BE PROTECTED FROM FIRE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 7

Equipment To Be Protected From Fire

• All vessels subject to overpressure by fire must be protected by pressure
relief valves, unless all the following conditions are satisfied:
• Vessel is 2 ft. in diameter or less and is fabricated only from pipe/piping components
• Primary function of the vessel is to transport fluids (i.e., no processing)
• The inventory of the vessel is less than 1000 gallons of light ends or flammable liquid
• The vessel is not stamped as a coded vessel
EQUIPMENT TO BE PROTECTED FROM FIRE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 8

Equipment To Be Protected From Fire (Continued)

• In the past, protection against overpressure due to fire was not provided for
“dry” vessels (vessels containing no liquid) on the basis that such vessels
would fail due to overheating even if equipped with a pressure relief valve.
More recent interpretations of ASME Code requirements suggest that, at
least in some cases, overpressure protection for external fire must be
provided for dry vessels. This is discussed in more detail later.
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 9

MODULE 4
Fire Contingency: Vessels Containing Liquids
VESSELS CONTAINING LIQUIDS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 10

Vessels Containing Liquids

• Vapor Release Rate:

Q   L  V 
W   
 
 L 


• Where:
• W = Vapor Release Rate, Lb/Hr
• Q = Heat Absorbed, BTU/Hr
• λ = Heat Absorbed per Pound of Liquid Vaporized, BTU/lb
VESSELS CONTAINING LIQUIDS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 11

Vessels Containing Liquids (Continued)

• Heat Absorbed:

Q  21,000FA 0.82 (For Good Drainage)

Q  34,500 FA 0.82 (For Poor Drainage)

• Where:
• Q = Heat Absorbed, BTU/Hr
• F = Environmental Factor, Dimensionless
• A = Vessel Wetted Surface Area, ft2
• Good Drainage – Paved Areas; Typically Process Units
• Poor Drainage – Unpaved Areas; Typically Tank Farms
VESSELS CONTAINING LIQUIDS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 12

Vessels Containing Liquids (Continued)

• For pure component liquids, λ is equal to the latent heat of vaporization of
the liquid since vaporization of a pure component proceeds at constant
temperature

• For multi-component liquids, λ represents the total amount of heat

(sensible and latent) that must be absorbed by the liquid in the vessel to
generate one unit mass of vapor. Some of the heat absorbed goes into
raising the temperature of the residual liquid in the vessel (sensible heat)
while the remainder goes into vaporizing the liquid (latent heat).
VESSELS CONTAINING LIQUIDS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 13

Vessels Containing Liquids (Continued)

• The density correction factor in the calculation of W recognizes that
not all the vapor generated during a fire needs to be relieved. Some
of the vapor generated fills the volume previously occupied by the
vaporizing liquid. This correction factor is close to unity at conditions
far removed from the critical point (ρL – ρV  ρL) but approaches zero
as the critical point is approached. At the critical point, ρL=ρV and the
vapor relief rate due to vaporization becomes zero. The required
relief rate under these conditions is based on the thermal expansion
of the supercritical fluid in the vessel. See Dry Vessels and Vessels
Containing Supercritical Fluids in later sections.
VESSELS CONTAINING LIQUIDS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 14

Vessels Containing Liquids (Continued)

• The value of the environmental factor, F, depends on the type and thickness
of vessel insulation (if any). For an uninsulated vessel, F = 1.0

• The exponent of 0.82 applied to the wetted area is an empirical correction

factor to account for the fact that not all the wetted area is exposed to the
same radiation intensity arising from the fire
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 15

MODULE 4
Fire Contingency: Effect of Insulation on Fire Loads
EFFECT OF INSULATION ON FIRE LOADS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 16

Effect of Insulation on Fire Loads

• Suitable insulation greatly reduces the vapor release rates associated with
external fire. The value of F depends on thermal conductance of insulation.

• Conductance = Thermal Conductivity

Insulation Thickness

• Insulation Conductivity:
o
• Gunite and Concrete: K = 8 Btu-in/Hr Ft2 F
EFFECT OF INSULATION ON FIRE LOADS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 17

Effect of Insulation on Fire Loads (Continued)

• To take credit for insulation in reducing the relief load from vessels
exposed to fire, the insulation system must meet the requirements.
These requirements include:
• Insulation must be able to withstand fire exposure and fire water application
• Insulation must be held in place with corrosion resistant (e.g., galvanized or
stainless steel) banding and jacketing

• Note that insulation used to reduce fire relief loads does not
necessarily qualify as fireproofing.
EFFECT OF INSULATION ON FIRE LOADS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 18

Effect of Insulation on Fire Loads (Continued)

• However, any insulation that qualifies as fireproofing will, by definition,
meet or exceed the requirements for fire relief load reduction

• Insulation of vessels solely for the purpose of reducing fire relief loads (e.g.,
where heat conservation or personnel protection is not required) is seldom
economical and requires a careful assessment of the risks associated with
potential corrosion under the insulation, especially for vessels operating
under 250oF
EFFECT OF INSULATION ON FIRE LOADS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 19

Effect of Insulation on Fire Loads (Continued)

• Typical ‘F’ Factors are shown in the table below. The values were estimated
using the equation on the next slide and an assumed temperature drop
across the insulation of 1600oF (conservative). For other insulating
materials with different thermal conductivities and/or thicknesses, use the
equation on the next slide.

• The Minimum F is 0.075

Material Conductance F
Mineral Wool (1” min.) 1 0.075
Gunite (1.5”) 5.3 0.40
Bare 1
EFFECT OF INSULATION ON FIRE LOADS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 20

Effect of Insulation on Fire Loads (Continued)

• For other types of insulation use the following equation:

k (1660  T )
F 
21,000t
• Where:
• F = Environmental Factor (0.075 minimum)
• k = Thermal Conductivity, BTU-in/hr-ft2oF
• T = Relieving Temperature, oF
• t = Insulation Thickness, Inches

• The thermal conductivity should be calculated at the mean temperature

between T and 1660oF but not less than 1000oF
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 21

MODULE 4
Fire Contingency: Determining Wetted Areas For Fire
DETERMINING WETTED AREAS FOR FIRE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 22

Horizontal Vessels
• Wetted Surface for Horizontal Vessels:
1. Determine the Expanded Liquid Level (XLL) at the onset of relief
2. For a horizontal drum with an XLL that is below the drum centerline, the wetted
area includes all of the vessel surface up to the XLL regardless of the elevation
3. For a horizontal drum with an XLL that is above the drum centerline, the wetted
area includes the vessel surface up to centerline regardless of elevation plus any
additional vessel surface between the centerline and the lesser of XLL or 25 feet
above grade level
DETERMINING WETTED AREAS FOR FIRE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 23

Horizontal Vessels (Continued)

• Grade level usually refers to the ground, but also includes any other
level (such as a large platform) where a pool fire can be sustained

• XLL should be calculated assuming that the liquid inventory in the

vessel at the onset of the fire is at the top of the normal working
level range (HLL) plus volumetric thermal expansion of the liquid
between its initial temperature and its initial boiling point at the
relieving pressure

• The vessel heads should be included in determining the wetted area

DETERMINING WETTED AREAS FOR FIRE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 24

Horizontal Vessels (Continued)

• Above 25 feet, use wetted vessel surface up to XLL or vessel center line,
whichever is less
• At or below 25 feet consider the area wetted inside the vessel up to XLL
CEN T ER LIN E
H LL
CEN T ER LIN E H LL

W ET T ED AR EA
W ET T ED AR EA

25 FEET

WETTED AREA
DETERMINING WETTED AREAS FOR FIRE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 25

Vertical Vessels
• For a vertical drum, consider the vessel surface up to the Expanded Liquid Level
(XLL) within 25 feet of grade including the vessel bottom head if applicable

• If the entire vessel is more than 25 feet above the grade, then consider only the
vessel bottom head if applicable

• Fractionating towers are considered the same as vertical drums, except that the
liquid inventory of the trays or packing is added to the HLL before calculating
the XLL

• In all cases, the Expanded Liquid Level (XLL) should be used in determining the
extent of the wetted surface
DETERMINING WETTED AREAS FOR FIRE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 26

Vertical Vessels (Continued)

• Vessel skirts normally do not require fireproofing of the inside
surface if all of the following conditions are met:
1. The skirt rests on a concrete pedestal constructed as a solid or
continuous base
2. The skirt (or continuous base pedestal) is provided with a single
opening no larger than 20 in. (500 mm) equivalent diameter. Skirt
vents, which are required for internally insulated vessels operating at
fluid temperatures above 500F (260C), are considered as openings.
3. The skirt opening for piping has a 1/2 in. (13 mm) maximum clearance
between the pipe OD and the skirt
DETERMINING WETTED AREAS FOR FIRE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 27

Vertical Vessels (Continued)

• The equivalent dumped level for Fractionating Columns is obtained by
adding the liquid inventory of trays to the top of the normal working level
range (HLL). The expanded liquid level (XLL) is calculated based on thermal
expansion of the dumped liquid inventory from its initial temperature (at
the onset of the fire) to its initial boiling point at the relieving pressure.
DETERMINING WETTED AREAS FOR FIRE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 28

Vertical Vessels (Continued)

• Above 25 feet, consider only the surface of the bottom head
• At or below 25 feet, consider the area wetted inside the vessel

HLL

ADD EQUIVALENT
" DUMPED" LIQUID
T O HLL
HLL
W ET T ED AREA

HLL
HLL
W ET T ED AREA
25 FEET

W ET T ED AREA
WETTED AREA
DETERMINING WETTED AREAS FOR FIRE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 29

Spheres
• For a storage sphere, consider the greater of:
• The total exposed surface of the sphere within 25 feet of grade
• The total exposed surface of the sphere below the horizontal center line

• Storage spheres are always assumed to be 100% full of liquid at the onset of
the fire and the entire surface of the sphere is assumed to be wetted.
However, only the surface calculated above is considered as being exposed
to radiation from the fire.
DETERMINING WETTED AREAS FOR FIRE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 30

Spheres (Continued)
TOTAL EXPOSED TOTAL EXPOSED
SURFACE BELOW
SURFACE WITHIN OR HORIZONTAL
25 FEET OF GRADE CENTERLINE

HLL

CENTERLINE

HLL

WETTED AREA
25 FEET

WETTED AREA

WETTED AREA
(up to arrows)
DETERMINING WETTED AREAS FOR FIRE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 31

Spheres (Continued)
• If the top of the sphere is within 25 feet of grade, the entire surface
of the sphere is normally considered as exposed wetted area
regardless of the location of high-liquid level (HLL). An exception
may be made in the case of spheres in which the location of the HLL
is significantly lower than the top of the sphere.
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 32

MODULE 4
Fire Contingency: Determining Heat for Vaporization
DETERMINING HEAT OF VAPORIZATION Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 33

Single Component Systems

• λ equals the latent heat of vaporization of the fluid at relieving conditions

• λ may be obtained from a flash calculation or from literature sources such

as the Steam Tables (for water)
• Refer to ANSI/API Standard 521 for typical values for hydrocarbon liquids

• The peak relief load will always occur at the start of the fire, when the
wetted surface, A, and consequently, the heat input, Q, are both at a
maximum
• The latent heat, vaporization temperature, and physical properties of the
liquid and vapor phases in equilibrium remain constant as the vaporization
proceeds
DETERMINING HEAT OF VAPORIZATION Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 34

Single Component Systems (Continued)

• If the relieving pressure is equal to or higher than the system’s thermodynamic
critical pressure, vaporization of the liquid will not occur. This situation is
discussed under “Dry Vessels” and “Vessels Containing Supercritical Fluids”.
DETERMINING HEAT OF VAPORIZATION Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 35

Multi-Component Systems
• Vaporization of the liquid in the vessel proceeds as a batch distillation

• The temperature, heat absorbed per unit mass of vapor generated,

required relief rate, and physical properties of the vapor and liquid
change continuously as the vaporization proceeds
DETERMINING HEAT OF VAPORIZATION Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 36

Multi-Component Systems (Continued)

• λ does not equal the difference in the vapor and liquid specific
enthalpies obtained from an equilibrium flash calculation

• Not all the heat absorbed by the system goes into vapor generation.
Some of it is sensible heat that goes into increasing the system
equilibrium temperature as the vaporization proceeds.

• A time dependent analysis is required to calculate the limiting relief

rate and required relief area

• The peak relief load may or may not coincide with the start of the fire
DETERMINING HEAT OF VAPORIZATION Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 37

Multi-Component Systems (Continued)

• A common mistake is to attempt to calculate the value of λ as the difference
between the vapor and liquid specific enthalpies from an equilibrium flash.
In general, this is not valid for multi-component systems. The difference
between vapor and liquid specific enthalpies equals the latent heat of
vaporization only when the equilibrium vapor and liquid compositions are
identical. This is only true for pure component systems and azeotropes
(constant boiling point multi-component systems).
DETERMINING HEAT OF VAPORIZATION Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 38

Multi-Component Systems (Continued)

• Details on how to conduct a time-dependent analysis are beyond the scope
of this Training Package. A suggested procedure is discussed in DP-XV-C,
Appendix 1.

• If the thermodynamic critical temperature of the system is reached before

the liquid in the vessel is totally vaporized, see Section on “Vessels
Containing Supercritical Fluids” for guidance
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 39

MODULE 4
Fire Contingency: Dry Vessels
DRY VESSELS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 40

General Considerations
• For dry vessels, or for vessels that contain supercritical fluids (or fluids that
become supercritical as a result of the fire), overpressure protection by a
pressure relief valve, by itself, is not effective in the prevention of vessel
rupture since, eventually, the exposed vessel will fail due to overheating

• However, a pressure relief valve combined with other protective measures,

such as the application of fire water or the use of fireproofing, can prevent
the vessel pressure from rising indefinitely and provide additional time to
control or extinguish the fire before vessel failure occurs
DRY VESSELS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 41

General Considerations (Continued)

• Consider the use of a rupture disc, fusible plug or similar non-reclosing
device instead of (or in parallel with) a pressure relief valve for overpressure
protection. When such devices relieve, the internal pressure in the exposed
equipment is reduced rapidly.

• A pressure relief valve, on the other hand, merely prevents the pressure
from rising significantly above the MAWP of the equipment, but does not
relieve the internal pressure
DRY VESSELS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 42

General Considerations (Continued)

• The effectiveness of rupture disks or pressure relief valves in this
application, however, depends on whether or not the internal pressure of
the equipment will reach the bursting pressure of the rupture disk or the
set pressure of the pressure relief valve before the vessel wall fails due to
overheating

• From this standpoint, a fusible plug may be a more reliable means of

protecting these vessels against overpressure due to fire
DRY VESSELS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 43

General Considerations (Continued)

• Consider fireproofing the vessel to reduce the rate of metal temperature
rise during a fire exposure. If the vessel is insulated for process reasons,
consider upgrading the insulation system to meet the requirements for
fireproof insulation.

• The advantages of using insulation or fireproofing for this purpose should

be balanced against the potential for corrosion under the insulation (CUI) or
fireproofing (CUF), especially in vessels that normally or frequently operate
below 250oF (121oC). CUI and CUF, if undetected, can lead to catastrophic
failure of a vessel with little or no warning.
DRY VESSELS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 44

General Considerations (Continued)

• Consider providing emergency depressuring facilities to safely and quickly reduce the
vessel pressure and remove the inventory in the event of a fire. Refer to DP-XV-F for
more details.
• Fire water applied uniformly over the entire surface of the vessel at a rate of at least
0.25 gpm/ft2 (10 liters/min-m2) is usually sufficient to keep the metal temperature
from rising above 212oF (100oC)
• Although no credit may be taken for the application of fire water in the design of
pressure relief devices, it is clear that application of fire water is highly desirable to
minimize the risk of vessel failure
• Consideration should be given to providing fire water sprays or fixed fire water
monitors to protect dry vessels against fire exposures
DRY VESSELS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 45

Required Relief Rate

• When local codes require that all vessels (including dry vessels) be
protected against overpressure caused by external fire by a pressure relief
device, or when a pressure relief device is otherwise judged to be of benefit
in protecting a dry vessel against overpressure due to external fire, the
required relief load can be estimated from the equation shown in the next
slide (referenced from API Standard 521)
DRY VESSELS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 46

Required Relief Rate (Continued)

 A' Tw  T1 1.25 
W  0.1406 MP 1  1.1506 
 T 1 
• Where:
• W = Relief Rate, lb/h
• M = Molecular Weight
• P1 = Relieving Pressure, psia
• A’ = Exposed Vessel Surface, ft2
• Tw = Vessel Wall Temperature, R
• T1 = Gas Temperature at Relieving Pressure, R = (P1/Pn) Tn
• Pn = Normal vessel operating pressure, psia
• Tn = Normal vessel operating temperature, R
DRY VESSELS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 47

Required Relief Rate (Continued)

• Tw represents the maximum recommended wall temperature for the
vessel materials. For carbon steel, use 1560oR.

• The exposed surface area, A’, used to calculate heat absorption is

taken to be the total exposed surface within 25 ft (7.5 m) of grade.
“Grade" usually refers to ground level, but any other level at which a
major fire could be sustained, such as a solid platform, should also be
considered. Specific interpretations of A’ to be used for various
vessels are as follows.
DRY VESSELS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 48

Exposed Surface Area

1. Horizontal Drums
• Up to 25 ft (7.5 m) above grade - Use total exposed surface
• Greater than 25 ft (7.5 m) above grade - Use the horizontal projected area of the
vessel

2. Vertical Vessels
• The exposed surface within 25 ft (7.5 m) of grade is used. If the entire vessel is
more than 25 ft (7.5 m) above grade, then only the surface of the bottom head
need be included. For vessels supported on skirts that do not require fireproofing
of their inside surface, the surface of the bottom head need not be included in the
exposed surface area regardless of elevation.
DRY VESSELS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 49

Sizing Pressure Relief Valves

• Once the required relief rate has been calculated, the required relief area is calculated
using the methodology for sizing pressure relief valves in vapor service
DRY VESSELS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 50

Vessels Containing Supercritical Fluids

• The general considerations and sizing methodology are similar to those
discussed under Dry Vessels

• The dry vessel relief rate equation is based on ideal gas behavior and may
not be accurate for fluids that deviate significantly from ideality, such as
supercritical fluids

• For supercritical fluids, or whenever increased accuracy is desired, a time-

dependent analysis to determine the highest isobaric thermal expansion
rate of the fluid at the relieving pressure is required. The relief requirement
is taken as the highest calculated volumetric expansion rate of all time
intervals considered.
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 51

MODULE 4
Fire Contingency: Determining Fire Load Example Calculation
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
DETERMINING FIRE LOAD EXAMPLE CALCULATION 52

Determining Fire Load Example

• Determine the required relieving capacity, relieving molecular weight
and relieving temperature during a fire affecting a Fractionator and
its Overhead Drum, both located within the same Fire Risk Area

• Details for the vessels are provided in a subsequent slides

• The required relief load for each source should be calculated first and
then combined with the individual relief loads from other sources
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
DETERMINING FIRE LOAD EXAMPLE CALCULATION 53

General Assumptions
1. Assume that at relieving conditions the system is far removed from the
critical point such that (L - V) / L  1.0. This assumption is conservative
because this density factor should always be less than 1.

2. Assume that thermal expansion between normal operating temperature

and relieving temperature is negligible for simplicity of this example

3. Both process vessels are located in a paved process area with good
drainage
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
DETERMINING FIRE LOAD EXAMPLE CALCULATION 54

Fractionator Physical Properties

• Tower diameter (below feed inlet) 6’-6”
• Elev. of bottom tangent line (BTL) above grade 15 ft
• HLL above BTL 2.7 ft
• Area of bottom head 45.8 ft2
• Insulation thickness 4 inches
• Total Tray and Down comer Holdup 290 ft3
• Limiting Relief Conditions:
• Heat absorbed per unit mass vaporized: 66 BTU/lb
• Limiting relief temperature: 622oF
• Molecular weight of vapor: 275
• Vapor specific heat: 0.58 Btu/lboF
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
DETERMINING FIRE LOAD EXAMPLE CALCULATION 55

Fractionator Physical Properties (Continued)

• Assume the following:
1. Vessel is supported on legs, not a full circumferential skirt
2. The limiting relief conditions have been obtained based on a time-dependent analysis
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
DETERMINING FIRE LOAD EXAMPLE CALCULATION 56

Overhead Drum Physical Properties

• Drum Diameter (horizontal) 5’-6”
• Length (tangent - tangent) 15 feet
• Elevation of BTL Above Grade 16 feet
• Area of Heads 32.8 ft2 (each)
• HLL Location Above Bottom of Drum 2’-9”
• Insulation None
• Limiting Relief Conditions:
• Heat absorbed per unit mass vaporzied: 113 BTU/lb
• Limiting relief temperature: 227oF
• Molecular weight of vapor: 104
• Vapor specific heat: 0.43 BTU/lboF
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
DETERMINING FIRE LOAD EXAMPLE CALCULATION 57

Overhead Drum Physical Properties (Continued)

• Assume the limiting relief conditions have been obtained based on a
time-dependent analysis

• When finished, check your answers with the results in the next lesson
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 58

MODULE 4
Fire Contingency: FRACTIONATOR RESULTS
FRACTIONATOR RESULTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 59

Fractionator Wetted Area

• HLL 2.70 ft
• Tray and Downcomer Hold-Up 290 ft3

• Tower CSA (6.5)2/4 = 33.18 ft2

• Height of Dumped Liquid 290 ft3/33.18 ft2 = 8.74 ft
• Dumped Liquid Level 2.70 + 8.74 = 11.44 ft
• Tower BTL Elevation 15 ft
• Wetted Height Within 25 feet of grade 25 – 15 = 10 ft
• Wetted Area Within 25 feet of grade:
• Vessel Head: 45.8 ft2
• Vessel Shell: (6.5 ft)(10 ft) = 204.2 ft2
• Total: 45.8 ft2 + 204.2 ft2 = 250.0 ft2
FRACTIONATOR RESULTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 60

Fractionator Wetted Area (Continued)

• To determine the wetted area it is necessary to add the liquid inventory of
the trays and downcomers to the HLL in order to obtain the “dumped”
liquid level

• The “dumped” liquid level is 11.44 feet from the bottom tangent line.
However, only 10 feet are within 25 feet of grade, since the bottom tangent
line is 15 feet above grade. Thus the wetted area is the sum of the area of
the bottom head plus the cylindrical area of the shell up to 10 feet above
the bottom tangent line.
FRACTIONATOR RESULTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 61

Fractionator Wetted Area (Continued)

• Note that the liquid thermal expansion between the normal operating temperature
and the relieving temperature has been neglected, as instructed under “General
Assumptions”
• Thus, the “dumped liquid level” is assumed to be equal to the “high liquid level”
(HLL = 2.70 feet) plus the additional liquid height arising from dumping the liquid
inventory in the trays (8.74 feet). The dumped liquid level is, therefore, 2.70 + 8.74
= 11.44 ft.
• In this case, ignoring the liquid thermal expansion makes no difference in the
results, since the wetted area for use in the radiant heat input calculation is limited
to the exposed surface within 25 feet of grade, and the dumped liquid level is higher
than 25 feet above grade even without considering liquid thermal expansion
FRACTIONATOR RESULTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 62

Fractionator Relief Load

• Radiant Heat Absorption: Q = 34,500(F1)(F2)(Aw)0.82
• F1 = 0.6 (Drainage Factor)
• F2 = 0.075 (Environmental Factor for Insulation)
• Aw = 250 ft2
• Q = (34,500)(0.6)(0.075)(250)0.82 = 143,662 BTU/h

• Relief Rate:

Q   L  V 
W   
   L 

FRACTIONATOR RESULTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 63

Fractionator Relief Load (Continued)

• Assume: (ρL-V) / ρV  1.00
• W = (143,662 BTU/h) / (66 BTU/lb) = 2,177 lb/h
• T = 622F
• MW = 275
• Specific Heat = 0.58 BTU/lb-F
FRACTIONATOR RESULTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 64

Fractionator Relief Load (Continued)

• As stated under “General Assumptions”, the density correction factor is assumed to
be 1.0. This is conservative, since this factor will always be less than 1.0. As the
relieving temperature approaches the critical temperature, this factor decreases
significantly and becomes zero at the critical temperature. Above the critical
temperature (supercritical relief), the “latent” heat of vaporization, λ, becomes zero
(since no change of phase is possible above the critical temperature) and this
equation is no longer applicable. Under these conditions, the required relief rate
would be based on the thermal expansion of the supercritical fluid.
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 65

MODULE 4
Fire Contingency: FRACTIONATOR RESULTS
OVERHEAD DRUM RESULTS
OVERHEAD DRUM RESULTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 66

Overhead Drum Wetted Area

• Drum Diameter: 5.50 feet
• Drum Length: 15 feet
• Drum Elevation: 16 feet
• HLL: 2.75 feet

• The wetted area within 25 feet of grade is half the area of the cylindrical shell
plus half the area of the vessel heads
• Shell area: (5.50 ft)(15 ft)(0.50) = 130 ft2
• Head area: (2)(32.8 ft2)(0.50) = 32.8 ft2
• Total Wetted Area: 130 ft2 + 32.8 ft2 = 162.8 ft2
OVERHEAD DRUM RESULTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 67

Overhead Drum Wetted Area (Continued)

• In this case, all of the drum external surface is within 25 feet of grade, but
only half of it is actually in contact with the liquid since the drum is only
50% full at high liquid level. Thus, for the purpose of calculating the fire
relief load, the wetted area is one half the surface area of the cylindrical
shell plus one half the surface area of both heads.

• Note that thermal expansion between the normal operating temperature

and the relieving temperature has been neglected as instructed under
“General Assumptions”. This was done to simplify the analysis. A rigorous
analysis would require the calculation of an “expanded liquid level” (XLL),
which would exceed the HLL and result in an increased wetted area.
OVERHEAD DRUM RESULTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 68

Overhead Drum Relief Load

• Radiant Heat Absorption: Q = 34,500(F1)(F2)(Aw)0.82
• F1 = 0.6 (Drainage Factor)
• F2 = 1.0 (Environmental Factor for Bare Vessel)
• Aw = 163 ft2
• Q = (34,500)(0.6)(1.00)(163)0.82 = 1,348,851 BTU/h

• Relief Rate:

Q   L  V 
W   
   L 

OVERHEAD DRUM RESULTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 69

Overhead Drum Relief Load (Continued)

• Assume: (ρL-V) / ρV  1.00
• W = (1,348,851 BTU/h) / (113 BTU/lb) = 11,937 lb/h
• T = 227F
• MW = 104
• Specific Heat = 0.43 BTU/lb-F

• The same considerations regarding the use of the density correction factor
discussed under “Fractionators Relief Load” apply to the Overhead Drum Relief
Load
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 70

MODULE 4
Fire Contingency: FRACTIONATOR RESULTS
COMBINED RELIEF RATE
COMBINED RELIEF RATE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 71

Combined Relief Rate and Properties

Mixture Molecular Weight:
Ovhd.
Fractionators Drum Combined
Mass Flow Rate, lb/h 2,177 11,937 14,114
Mol. Weight, lb/lb-mole 275 104 115
Molar Flow Rate, lb-m/h 7.92 114.78 122.70

Mixture Temperature:
Solve For the Temperature Using a Heat Balance
Q = Wdrum Cpdrum (T-227) = Wfrac Cpfrac (622-T)
Q = (11,937 lb / hr) (0.43 Btu / lb°F) (T-227) =
(2177 lb / hr) (0.58 Btu / lb°F) (622-T)
T = 305°F
COMBINED RELIEF RATE Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 72

Combined Relief Rate and Properties (Continued)

• When two or more vessels require simultaneous pressure relief through a
common pressure relief valve due to a fire, the required relief load and
properties for each vessel is calculated separately based on its exposed
wetted area and contents. The results are then combined to obtain the rate
and properties of the relieved fluid to be used in sizing the pressure relief
valve.

• The combined temperature calculation is based on a heat balance. The

heat released by the hotter fluid as it cools from its initial temperature to
the mixture temperature must equal the heat absorbed by the colder fluid
as it is heated up from its initial temperature to the mixture temperature.
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 73

MODULE 4
Fire Contingency: Summary
SUMMARY Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 74

What You Have Learned

• Now that you have completed this lesson, you are able to:
• Identify fire contingency relief loads and specific equipment that requires
protection in a fire
• Perform an overpressure analysis based on fire contingency
• Determine wetted areas within vessels
• Find the heat of vaporization for single- and multi-component fluids during a
fire overpressure relief scenario
• Calculate the required relief rate of horizontal and vertical wetted vessels and
dry vessels for a fire design contingency
INTRODUCTION Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 75

Lesson Objectives
• After completing this lesson, you will understand how to evaluate the
control valve failure contingency as a basis for determining the need for
protection against overpressure
• In particular, you will be able to identify:
• The cases to be considered when assessing the requirement for protection from
overpressure
• The assumptions to be made regarding the flow through control valve bypasses
• The downstream pressure to be considered in determining the flow rate through a
failed control valve
• The effects of the pump curve on the required relief flow rate when the potential
overpressure source is a centrifugal pump
• Additional issues that should be examined when assessing flow through a control
valve that could affect the sizing of relief devices
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 76

MODULE 4
Control Valve Failure Contingency
GENERAL PRINCIPLES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 77

Basics (1/2)
• Control valves are specified to fail open (FO), fail closed (FC) or fail
stationary (FH) upon loss of the actuating medium (usually instrument air)
• Often referred to as the “Fail Safe” position
• The designer is responsible for selecting the failure position based upon which
position is most safe
• Fail Stationary is also commonly referred to as Fail Hold
GENERAL PRINCIPLES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 78

Basics (2/2)
• Control valves that fail stationary will eventually “drift” to the fully open
(FH-O) or fully closed (FH-C) position
• Drift position needs to be specified
• Any individual control valve may go to the fully open or fully closed position
at any time regardless of its specified failure position
• As a result of controller actions, instrument malfunctions or mechanical damage
• Contingency analysis must take this into consideration
GENERAL PRINCIPLES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 79

Control Valve Failures

• Control valve failure contingencies which need to be considered:
• Failure open of a control valve which admits vapor, liquid, or a two-phase stream from
a high-pressure system to a low-pressure system
• Failure open of a letdown valve normally passing liquid, followed by loss of liquid level
and flow of a high-pressure vapor or vapor-liquid mixture
• Failure closed of any valve in an outlet stream from a unit or vessel
• Failure closed of a valve in a stream removing heat from the system
• Failure open of any control valve providing energy (heat) to a system
• The simultaneous movement of two or more independent control valves to
their non-fail-safe position is considered a double contingency
• Double contingencies are not considered likely scenarios and hence are not designed
for
GENERAL PRINCIPLES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 80

Control Valve Failure Position

• When analyzing total or partial instrument air failures that affect more than
one control valve, it is assumed that the affected valves move to their “fail-
safe” position
• In the case of “fail stationary“ control valves, it is assumed that the valve
either remains in its last position or that it “drifts” to its ultimate fail-safe
position, whichever results in the limiting relief load
GENERAL PRINCIPLES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 81

Response of Related Control Valves

• When analyzing control valve failures that affect one or more control valves,
the responses of other control valves not affected by the failure need to be
considered as well:
• Control valves that would normally act to decrease the required relief load are
assumed to stay at their last operating position
• Credit cannot be taken for a control valve responding to reduce contingency load
• Control valves that act to increase the required relief load (e.g., act “unfavorably”) are
assumed to respond to the full extent
• Impact of increased relief load must be included
GENERAL PRINCIPLES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 82

Review Question #1
Click on the correct answer
Which is not a control valve failure contingency that needs to be considered?

X Incorrect!
Fail openFail of open of a control
a control valvevalve
which which lets
lets down high-pressure
down high-pressure vapor vapor to a
low-pressure system. Fail open of a control valve which lets down fluid from high
to a low-pressure
pressure to low is a key system
contingency of concern.
X Incorrect! Fail close of a control valve in a vessel outlet stream. This
Fail closemust
contingency of abecontrol
evaluatedvalve
sincein a vessel
it can outlet stream
lead to overpressure or liquid overfill of the
downstream vessel.
 Correct! Fail close of a control valve adding heat to a system. If the addition of
Fail
energyclose
to the of a control
system valve
is stopped as a adding heat valve
result of control to a failure,
system the system is
generally in a safer state. Fail open of this control valve would be a concern.
X Incorrect!
Fail openFail of open of a letdown
a letdown valvevalve normally
normally passing liquid,
passing liquid,followed
followed by loss
by
of liquid level. Vapor blow-through is a contingency of concern since it will pressure
loss
up theof liquid level
downstream equipment.
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 83

MODULE 4
Control Valve Failure Contingency: Gas Blowby
BLOW-THROUGH CONTINGENCIES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 84

Blow-through Contingencies
• For contingencies involving control valves failing in the full open position that are
equipped with bypasses, the possibility that the bypass valve may be partially or fully
open must be considered in determining the relief requirements

TO ATMOSPHERE OR FLARE

FAILS OPEN TOWER

BYPASS VALVE
BLOW-THROUGH CONTINGENCIES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 85

1. CV Fails Open with Bypass Partly Open (1/2)

• This scenario is evaluated as a design contingency
• Partially-open bypass valve CV assumed to be 50% of the CV of the control
valve in its normally operating position
• Regardless of the actual size of the bypass valve
• Assume the maximum size trim (maximum opening) that fits into the
associated control valve (not necessarily the installed trim) to calculate the
flow rate.
• Do not consider the maximum trim that fits into the associated control valve if
Management of Change (MOC) would preclude unauthorized trim replacement

Note: CV is the valve flow coefficient

BLOW-THROUGH CONTINGENCIES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 86

1. CV Fails Open with Bypass Partly Open (2/2)

• Pressures around control valve station:
• Upstream: assumed to be the maximum normal operating pressure
• Downstream: assumed to be the maximum permissible accumulated pressure for
downstream system (110% of DP for single PRV, 116% for multiple PRV)
• Credit may be taken for fluid being relieved through normal process flow
channels (if the control scheme does not bottle-up the equipment) as well
as through the pressure relief valve
• No credit may be taken for favorable instrument response
• Partial credit may be taken for flow through control valves that do not close
• Assuming that they remain at their last operating position which may correspond to
turndown
• Adverse instrument response must be considered
BLOW-THROUGH CONTINGENCIES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 87

2. CV Fails Open with Bypass Wide Open (1/2)

• This scenario is evaluated as a remote contingency
• Fully-open bypass valve CV is based on the actual size of the bypass valve
• If size and type of bypass valve is unknown (e.g., its C V is unknown), assume its CV is
the same as that of the installed control valve
• Assume the maximum size trim (maximum opening) that fits into the
associated control valve (not necessarily the installed trim) to calculate the
flow rate.
• Do not consider the maximum trim that fits into the associated control valve if
Management of Change (MOC) would preclude unauthorized trim replacement
BLOW-THROUGH CONTINGENCIES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 88

2. CV Fails Open with Bypass Wide Open (2/2)

• Pressures around control valve station:
• Upstream: assumed to be the maximum normal operating pressure
• Downstream: assumed to be Hydrotest Factor (HTF) times the protected equipment Design
Pressure (DP)
• HTF is defined as the multiplier applied to the DP to determine the required proof test pressure
• Credit may be taken for fluid being relieved through normal process channels (if
the control scheme does not bottle-up the equipment) as well as through the
pressure relief valve
• No credit may be taken for favorable instrument response
• Partial credit may be taken for flow through control valves that do not close
assuming that they remain at their last operating position which may
correspond to turndown
• Adverse instrument response must be considered
BLOW-THROUGH CONTINGENCIES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 89

3. CV Fails Open with Bypass Closed (1/2)

• This scenario is evaluated as a design contingency
• This scenario assumes that the downstream system is not yet operational
• Typically, a startup situation
• Relief is through only the pressure relief valve
• The fluid in the equipment is considered to be the startup fluid
• It may be significantly different from the normal fluid in the equipment
BLOW-THROUGH CONTINGENCIES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 90

3. CV Fails Open with Bypass Closed (2/2)

• Assume the maximum size trim (maximum opening) that fits into the
associated control valve (not necessarily the installed trim) to calculate the
flow rate.
• Do not consider the maximum trim that fits into the associated control valve if
Management of Change (MOC) would preclude unauthorized trim replacement
• Pressures around control valve station:
• Upstream: assumed to be the maximum normal operating pressure during startup
• Downstream: assumed to be the maximum permissible accumulated pressure for
downstream system (usually, 110% of design pressure)
BLOW-THROUGH CONTINGENCIES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 91

Additional Considerations
• If flow through the wide open control valve is mixed phase, then this should
be considered when determining the maximum flow through the control
valve
• As a conservative simplification, the flow rate through the partially open
bypass valve may be assumed to be equal to 50% of the flow rate through
the fully open control valve
• Instead of 50% of the flow rate through the control valve in its normal operating
position
• When taking credit for partial relief through normal process channels, any
control valve in the process relief path that does not close in response to
the incident must be assumed to remain in the position corresponding to its
operating capacity at the time of the incident
• Consider both design capacity and nominal turndown operations
BLOW-THROUGH CONTINGENCIES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 92

Vapor Blow-through Into Liquid Filled System (1/2)

• Failure of a control valve in the open position may result in vapor blow-
through into a system that is initially filled with stagnant (non-flowing)
liquid
• Pressure in the downstream piping and equipment may temporarily
approach that of the equipment upstream of the control valve as the liquid
contained in the downstream system is accelerated
BLOW-THROUGH CONTINGENCIES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 93

Vapor Blow-through Into Liquid Filled System (2/2)

• For such systems, the pressure/temperature rating of the piping and the
Design Pressure of the equipment (vessels, exchangers) downstream of the
control valve should be determined as follows:
• Determine the extent of piping and equipment that could be TOTALLY filled with
stagnant (non-flowing) liquid immediately before the control valve fails open
• For any piping that could be TOTALLY filled with stagnant (non-flowing) liquid, specify a
pressure-temperature rating such that the maximum operating pressure of the
equipment upstream of the letdown valve does not exceed the proof test pressure or
the short-term allowable overpressure for the piping, whichever is less
• For any equipment (vessels, exchangers) that could be TOTALLY filled with stagnant
(non-flowing) liquid, specify a Design Pressure such that the maximum operating
pressure of the equipment upstream of the letdown valve does not exceed the proof
test pressure of the equipment
BLOW-THROUGH CONTINGENCIES Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 94

Review Question #2
Click on the correct answer
Which of the following is a remote contingency?

X Incorrect!CCVfails
failswide
wideopen
open with
with bypass
bypasspartly
partlyopen.
openFailure of a
V
control valve with its bypass partially open is a “Design” contingency.

 Correct! CCV fails wide open with bypass fully open. Failure of a control
V fails wide open with bypass fully open
valve with its bypass fully open is a remote contingency.

X Incorrect! CV fails wide open with bypass closed. Failure of a control

valve withCits
V fails
bypasswide open
closed with
is not bypass aclosed
considered conservative-enough
contingency to use as the basis for design.
X Incorrect!C CVfails
failsopen
open. Failure of a control valve without specifying the
V
simultaneous bypass position is not adequate to define the contingency.
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 95

MODULE 4
Control Valve Failure Contingency:
Control Valves in a Pressurization Path
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
CONTROL VALVES IN A PRESSURIZATION PATH 96

Control Valves in a Pressurization Path

• A control valve with a mechanical limit stop to restrict the maximum
opening is not acceptable as a means of limiting the capacity of a
pressurization path
• A control valve in a pressurization path must be designated as safety critical
and equipped with a permanent sign warning against replacement with a
valve having a larger CV unless the maximum flow rate through the fully
open control valve with its bypass valve (if any) also fully open does not
exceed 75% of the rated relief capacity of the pressure relief device
protecting the downstream equipment
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
CONTROL VALVES IN A PRESSURIZATION PATH 97

Review Question #3
Click on the appropriate answer
Which of the following statements about control valves in pressurization paths is
false?

X Incorrect! CVs in pressurization

CVs in pressurization path mustpath be
must be designated
designated as as safety
safety critical.
critical
Control valves in the pressurization path must be designated as safety critical.
X Incorrect! CVs in pressurization
CVs in pressurization path be
path must must be equipped
equipped withwith a sign
a sign warning
warning
against replacement with a valve having a greater CV. The safety critical CV
against
cannot bereplacement
changed out withoutwith evaluating
a valve having
the impacta greater CV C on the relief
of a different V
capacity; hence the sign is required to guard against unsafe changeouts.
X C Vs with a
Incorrect! CVlimit stop
s with to stop
a limit restrict the minimum
to restrict opening
the minimum openingareare
NOTNOT
acceptable
acceptablein in thethe
pressurization
[Link]
A limit stop on the valve stem is not a
sufficient restriction against the valve going wide open.
 Correct!
CVs withCaVslimitwith stop
a limittostop to restrict
restrict the minimum
the minimum opening
opening areacceptable
are acceptable in
the pressurization path. A control valve with a limit stop to restrict the maximum
in the pressurization path
opening is not acceptable as a means of limiting the capacity of a pressurization path.
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 98

MODULE 4
Control Valve Failure Contingency:
Control Valves in a Relief Path
CONTROL VALVES IN A RELIEF PATH Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 99

Control Valves in a Relief Path (1/3)

• Control valves are generally not allowed in a relief path
• Exceptions are as follows:
• Control valve is allowed in a relief path for the low-pressure side of a heat exchanger
subject to tube rupture provided that both the following conditions are satisfied:
• Control valve does not close in response to tube rupture
• Overpressure of the low pressure side does not exceed proof test pressure with the control
valve in its minimum flow (turndown) operating position
• Three-way valve is allowed on a relief path provided that there is an adequate relief
path regardless of valve position and that the pressure drop through the control valve
is accounted for
CONTROL VALVES IN A RELIEF PATH Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 100

Control Valves in a Relief Path (2/3)

• Exceptions: (Continued)
• Two two-way parallel butterfly valves splitting or combining flow are acceptable in a
relief path provided all of the following conditions are met:
• Three-way control valves are NOT available in the size required
• The valve stems in the two-way butterfly valves are mechanically linked such that one valve
opens when the other closes. The mechanical linkage must be durable and sufficiently rugged
to prevent damage in normal use or during maintenance.
• A single actuator manipulates both valves
• The design of the mechanical linkage device and the mounting is carried out by the valve
manufacturer
• The smaller of the butterfly valves must have an adequate relieving area
• All equipment upstream of the two-way butterfly valves satisfy the “Remote Contingency
Rule" if both two-way valves were to close
• A sign is affixed to the valves prohibiting the removal of the linkage
CONTROL VALVES IN A RELIEF PATH Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 101

Control Valves in a Relief Path (3/3)

• In some unique cases where large incentives apply, such as fluid catalytic
cracking unit regenerator flue gas valves, a control valve with a minimum
opening feature may be used, subject to ALL of the following conditions:
• The minimum opening, which may be a hole or cut out in the valve disc or plug, must
be sized to pass the design-relieving rate without over-pressuring any equipment
• Limit stops on valve stem movement are not an acceptable means of ensuring the minimum
opening
• The fact that the minimum opening feature is included for pressure relief, and must
not be changed, should be clearly noted in relevant documentation (specification
sheets, mechanical catalog, flow diagrams, operating manual, etc.) and a warning sign
plate should be welded to the valve body
• The installation should be reviewed by the appropriate safety group, e.g., site Safe
Operations Committee (SOC)
CONTROL VALVES IN A RELIEF PATH Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 102

Review Question #4
Click on the correct answer
Which of the following valve setups is not allowed in a relief path?

X Incorrect! ValveValve
with minimum flow cutout.
with minimum flow Control
cutoutvalves with cutouts are
allowed when specific conditions (e.g., hole is sized to pass design relieving rate)
are met.
X Incorrect! Two way Twoparallel
way parallel
butterflybutterfly valvesbutterfly valves are allowed
valves. Parallel
when specific conditions (e.g., valve stems are mechanically linked and single
actuator manipulates both valves) are met.
X Incorrect! ThreeThree way valves
way valves. 3-way valves are allowed when specific conditions
(e.g., there is an adequate relief path regardless of valve position) are met.

 Correct! Valve with minimum

Valve limit [Link]
with minimum
stop are never allowed in a relief path.
Control
stopvalves with a minimum limit
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 103

MODULE 4
Control Valve Failure Contingency:
Calculations
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
CONTROL VALVE CONTINGENCY CALCULATIONS 104

Basics
• In design calculations the flowrate is known and the selection of control
valve size involves determining the valve flow coefficient, CV
• In blow-through calculations, the CV is known and it is the flow rate that is
calculated (through the valve and any bypass)
• The equations for determining the required CV for a given flow rate or the
flow rate for a given CV are presented in DP-XII-F
• PDR’s Pegasys EMoValve is a useful software tool for performing these calculations
• To use these equations, it is necessary to know the pressures upstream and
downstream of the control valve so that the pressure drop across the
control valve and the resulting flow rate can be calculated
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
CONTROL VALVE CONTINGENCY CALCULATIONS 105

Upstream Pressure
• Upstream pressure is defined as the maximum normal pressure
• i.e., the maximum pressure that can be expected upstream of the control valve within
the range of normal operations
• The maximum normal pressure does not equal the maximum pressure that
could be reached upstream of the control valve as a result of abnormal
conditions
• For example, a pressure relief event upstream of the control valve
• When the source of pressure is a centrifugal pump or compressor, the
maximum upstream pressure depends on the head/capacity curve
• An iterative solution may be required to determine the maximum pressure upstream
of the control valve
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
CONTROL VALVE CONTINGENCY CALCULATIONS 106

Downstream Pressure (1/2)

• Downstream pressure is defined as the pressure that can be expected
downstream of the control valve when the pressure relief device protecting
the downstream system is operating at its maximum allowable
accumulation
• For a design contingency, the maximum allowable accumulated pressure is:
• 110% of the downstream system MAWP (for a single pressure relief device)
• 116% of the downstream system MAWP (for multiple pressure relief devices operating
in parallel)
• For a remote contingency, the maximum allowable accumulated pressure is
the Hydrotest Factor (HTF) times the design pressure of the equipment
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
CONTROL VALVE CONTINGENCY CALCULATIONS 107

Downstream Pressure (2/2)

• If the pressure relief device is not located immediately downstream
of the control valve, the ΔP between the control valve outlet and the
pressure relief device inlet must be considered
• If this ΔP is significant, the set pressure of the pressure relief device
may need to be lowered below the MAWP of the protected
equipment so that the maximum allowable accumulated pressure is
not exceeded immediately downstream of the control valve
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
CONTROL VALVE CONTINGENCY CALCULATIONS 108

Control Valve ΔP
• Generally, the control valve ΔP used to calculate either the required
CV for a given flow rate or the flow rate for a given CV will be the
difference between the upstream and downstream pressures
• For control valves in vapor service, the control valve ΔP to be used in
the sizing/capacity equations cannot exceed the critical ΔP
• Critical ΔP is defined as the pressure drop across the valve which results in
sonic (choked) flow at the control valve orifice
• The same ΔP limitations apply to control valves in flashing liquid service or in
cavitating service
• Refer to DP-XII-F for additional information on control valve ΔP limits for
vapor, flashing liquid or cavitating service
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
CONTROL VALVE CONTINGENCY CALCULATIONS 109

Calculation Methodology with Pump (1/2)

• Calculate “Combined CV”
• Control Valve:
• Design and Remote contingencies: Installed (max) control valve CV
• Bypass:
• Design contingency: 50% of control valve normal CV
• Remote contingency: 100% of actual bypass CV (if known) or 100% of installed control valve CV
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
CONTROL VALVE CONTINGENCY CALCULATIONS 110

Calculation Methodology with Pump (2/2)

• Calculate control valve flowrate during relief
• Assume pump suction is at maximum pressure
• Control valve outlet pressure
• Design contingency: accumulated pressure
• Remote contingency: DP * HTF
• Calculate pump discharge pressure
• Calculate flowrate through control valve using two methods
1. Using Control valve equation and Pin, Pout
2. Using pump head curve and Ps, Pd
• Iterate by changing pump dP until flow calculated by the 2 methods are consistent
• Calculate flow through safety valve during relief

SEE LESSON 3 EXAMPLES!

 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad
CONTROL VALVE CONTINGENCY CALCULATIONS 111

Review Question #5
Click on the correct answer
Which of the following is not required when calculating control valve blowthrough
capacity?

X Incorrect! Valve flowValve

coefficient. In blow-through calculations, the CV is
flow coefficient
known and the flow rate must be calculated (through both the valve and bypass).

 Correct! Flow rate. In blow-through

Flow rate calculations, the CV is known and the flow
rate must be calculated (through both the valve and bypass)

X Incorrect! Upstream Upstream

pressure. The pressure upstream of the control valve is
pressure
required so that the pressure drop across the control valve can be calculated.

X Incorrect! Downstream pressure. The

Downstream pressure downstream of the control
pressure
valve is required so that the pressure drop across the control valve can be
calculated.
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 112

MODULE 4
Control Valve Failure Contingency:
Single Phase Blowby
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGHPrepared by: Ezaideen
– PROBLEM Ahmad
STATEMENT 113

Problem Statement
• A flushing oil supply system operating at two different pressure levels is fed
from a single pump
• See the simplified flow diagram on the next slide
• The low-pressure section of the system is fed from the pump discharge via a
pressure control valve
• Control valve is specified fail open
• Determine the required relief rate for the pressure relief valve protecting
the low-pressure system for the contingency of failure of the pressure
control valve in the full open position
• Be sure to consider both the design contingency and the remote contingency cases
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGHPrepared by: Ezaideen
– PROBLEM Ahmad
STATEMENT 114

Problem Statement (Continued)

FLUSHING OIL
STORAGE DRUM
P = 50 PSIG NORMAL
P = 75 PSIG MAX.

SET @ 230
PR PSIG

LOW PRESSURE
FLUSHING OIL
60 GPM NORMAL
SET @ 100 20 GPM MIN.
PSIG 100 PSIG MIN.
PC

150
300
FO
P-1--

HIGH PRESSURE
FLUSHING OIL
40 GPM NORMAL
10 GPM MIN.
500 PSIG MIN.
FLUSHING OIL PUMP
100 GPM
P = 450 PSI
S.G. = 0.750
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGHPrepared by: Ezaideen
– PROBLEM Ahmad
STATEMENT 115

Problem Statement (Continued)

• Additional Information
• The ΔP vs. capacity curve for the flushing oil pump is shown in the next slide
• The Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) for the low-pressure flushing oil
system is 230 psig
• Frictional pressure drop through piping and static head effects are to be considered
negligible
• Pressure control valve has installed flow coefficient Cv = 5.0
• Bypass valve has installed flow coefficient Cv = 5.0
• Maximum allowable accumulation for PR valve = 10% of MAWP (design contingency
basis)
• Hydrotest pressure for the low-pressure flushing oil system = 345 psig
• E.g., Hydrotest Factor (HTF) = 1.5
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGHPrepared by: Ezaideen
– PROBLEM Ahmad
STATEMENT 116

Problem Statement (Continued)

FLUSHING OIL PUMP CURVE

600

500
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE, PSI

400

300

200

100

0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
CAPACITY, GPM
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGHPrepared by: Ezaideen
– PROBLEM Ahmad
STATEMENT 117

Suggested Calculation Methodology

• Calculate “Combined CV”
• Control Valve:
• Design and Remote contingencies: Installed (max) control valve CV
• Bypass:
• Design contingency: 50% of control valve normal CV
• Remote contingency: 100% of installed control valve CV
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGHPrepared by: Ezaideen
– PROBLEM Ahmad
STATEMENT 118

Suggested Calculation Methodology (Continued)

• Calculate control valve flowrate during relief
• Assume pump suction is at maximum pressure
• Control valve outlet pressure
• Design contingency: accumulated pressure
• Remote contingency: DP * HTF
• Calculate pump discharge pressure
• Calculate flowrate through control valve using two methods
• Using Control valve equation and Pin, Pout
• Using pump head curve and Ps, Pd
• Iterate by changing pump dP until flow calculated by the 2 methods are consistent
• Calculate flow through safety valve during relief
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 119

MODULE 4
Control Valve Failure Contingency:
Single Phase Blowby Calculation
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGHPrepared by: EzaideenSOLUTION
– CALCULATION Ahmad 120

Basis for Calculation of Design Contingency

• Design Contingency => pressure control valve fails in the fully open position with
the bypass valve partially open
• CV of partially open bypass valve taken as 50% of CV of control valve in its normal operating
position
• Pressure upstream of failed control valve:
• Assumed to be the maximum pump discharge pressure within the range of normal
operations (including turndown)
• Pressure downstream of failed control valve:
• Assumed to be the maximum allowable accumulated pressure with the pressure relief valve
blowing
• For this example, 110% of MAWP
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Design Contingency Calculation

1. Calculate CV of control valve under normal operating conditions
Pump Flow Rate = 60 + 40 = 100 GPM
Pump ΔP = 450 psi
Pump Normal Suction Pressure = 50 psig
Pump Normal Discharge Pressure = 50 + 450 = 500 psig
Control valve ΔP = 500 – 100 = 400 psig
Control valve CV (See DP-XII-F, Method 1)

q Gf 60 0.75
CV = = = 2.6
N1 (p1 - p2 ) 1.0 (500 - 100)

2. CV of partially open bypass valve = (0.50)(2.6) = 1.3

3. Combined CV of fully open control valve plus partially open bypass valve
CV COMBINED = 5.0 + 1.3 = 6.3
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Design Contingency Calculation (Continued)

4. Maximum Pump Suction Pressure: P0 = 75 psig
5. Pressure downstream of control valve during relief
P2 = (230)(1.10) = 253 psig
6. Maximum Pump Discharge Pressure
At turndown conditions, flow rate = 10 + 20 = 30 GPM
At 30 GPM, pump differential pressure = 546 psi
Maximum pump discharge pressure: P1 = 75 + 546 = 621 psig
7. Control valve ΔP during relief
ΔPCV = P1 – P2 = 621 – 253 = 368 psi
8. Control valve + bypass flow rate during relief (See DP-XII-F Method 1)

CV (p1 - p2 ) 6.3 (621- 253)

Q CV = = = 140 GPM
N1 Gf 1.0 0.75
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Design Contingency Calculation (Continued)

9. HP Flushing Oil Flow Rate during relief = 10 GPM (corresponding to maximum pump
discharge pressure)
10. Calculated pump flow rate during relief
HP Flushing Oil Flow Rate = 10 GPM
Control Valve + Bypass Flow Rate = 140 GPM
Total = 10 + 140 = 150 GPM
11. At 150 GPM the pump only delivers a ΔP of about 340 psi instead of the 546 psi
calculated on Step 6 (which assumes zero flow through the relief valve). To calculate
the required relief rate, it is necessary to assume a new ΔP across the pump and repeat
steps 6 through 10 until the calculated pump flow rate matches the actual pump flow
rate at the assumed pump ΔP. These iterations are summarized in the next slide.
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Design Contingency Calculation (Continued)

Control Valve
Pump Flow Pump Pump Control Valve plus Bypass HP Flushing Calculated
Rate Suction Discharge Downstream Control Valve Flow Rate Oil Flow Rate Pump Flow
GPM Pump ΔP, psi Pressure psig Pressure psig Pressure psig ΔP psi GPM GPM Rate GPM
0 564 75 639 253 386 143 10 153
10 560 75 635 253 382 142 10 152
20 554 75 629 253 376 141 10 151
30 546 75 621 253 368 140 10 150
40 537 75 612 253 359 138 10 148
50 526 75 601 253 348 136 10 146
60 514 75 589 253 336 133 10 143
70 500 75 575 253 322 131 10 141
80 485 75 560 253 307 127 10 137
90 468 75 543 253 290 124 10 134
100 450 75 525 253 272 120 10 130
110 430 75 505 253 252 116 10 126
120 409 75 484 253 231 111 10 121
130 386 75 461 253 208 105 10 115
140 361 75 436 253 183 99 10 109
150 335 75 410 253 157 91 10 101
160 308 75 383 253 130 83 10 93
170 279 75 354 253 101 73 10 83
180 248 75 323 253 70 61 10 71
190 216 75 291 253 38 45 10 55
200 183 75 258 253 5 16 10 26
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Design Contingency Calculation (Continued)

12. Calculate the required relief rate
Flow rate through control valve and its bypass = 111 GPM
Low-pressure flushing oil minimum demand = 20 GPM
Required relief rate = 111 – 20 = 91 GPM
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGHPrepared by: EzaideenSOLUTION
– CALCULATION Ahmad 126

Basis for Calculation of Remote Contingency

• Remote Contingency => pressure control valve fails in the fully open position
with the bypass valve fully open
• CV of fully open bypass valve and CV of control valve each taken as CV of installed control
valve
• Pressure upstream of failed control valve:
• Assumed to be the maximum pump discharge pressure within the range of normal
operations including turndown
• Pressure downstream of failed control valve:
• Assumed to be the hydrotest pressure of the downstream circuit
• For this example, 150% of MAWP
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Remote Contingency Calculation

1. Combined CV of fully open control valve plus fully open bypass valve
CV COMBINED = 5.0 + 5.0 = 10.0
2. Maximum Pump Suction Pressure: P0 = 75 psig
3. Pressure downstream of control valve during relief
P2 = (1.50)(230) = 345 psig
4. Maximum Pump Discharge Pressure
At turndown conditions, flow rate = 10 + 20 = 30 GPM
At 30 GPM, pump differential pressure = 546 psi
Maximum pump discharge pressure: P1 = 75 + 546 = 621 psig
5. Control valve ΔP during relief
ΔPCV = P1 – P2 = 621 – 345 = 276 psi
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Remote Contingency Calculation (Continued)

6. Control valve + bypass flow rate during relief

CV (p1 - p2 ) 10.0 (621- 345)

Q CV = = = 192 GPM
N1 Gf 1.0 0.75

7. HP Flushing Oil Flow Rate during relief = 10 GPM (corresponding to maximum pump
discharge Calculation pressure)
8. Calculated pump flow rate during relief
HP Flushing Oil Flow Rate = 10 GPM
Control Valve + Bypass Flow Rate = 192 GPM
Total = 10 + 192 = 202 GPM
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Remote Contingency Calculation (Continued)

9. At 202 GPM the pump delivers a ΔP of only about 180 psi instead of the 546 psi
calculated on Step 4 (which assumes zero flow through the relief valve). To calculate
the required relief rate, it is necessary to assume a new ΔP across the pump and repeat
steps 4 through 8 until the calculated pump flow rate matches the actual pump flow
rate at the assumed pump ΔP. These iterations are summarized in the next slide.
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Remote Contingency Calculation (Continued)

Control Valve
Pump Flow Pump Pump Control Valve plus Bypass HP Flushing Calculated
Rate Suction Discharge Downstream Control Valve Flow Rate Oil Flow Rate Pump Flow
GPM Pump ΔP, psi Pressure psig Pressure psig Pressure psig ΔP psi GPM GPM Rate GPM
0 564 75 639 345 294 198 10 208
10 560 75 635 345 290 197 10 207
20 554 75 629 345 284 194 10 204
30 546 75 621 345 276 192 10 202
40 537 75 612 345 267 189 10 199
50 526 75 601 345 256 185 10 195
60 514 75 589 345 244 180 10 190
70 500 75 575 345 230 175 10 185
80 485 75 560 345 215 169 10 179
90 468 75 543 345 198 163 10 173
100 450 75 525 345 180 155 10 165
110 430 75 505 345 160 146 10 156
120 409 75 484 345 139 136 10 146
130 386 75 461 345 116 124 10 134
140 361 75 436 345 91 110 10 120
150 335 75 410 345 65 93 10 103
160 308 75 383 345 38 71 10 81
170 279 75 354 345 9 35 10 45
EXAMPLE #1: SINGLE-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Remote Contingency Calculation (Continued)

10. Calculate the required relief rate
Flow rate through control valve and its bypass = 124 GPM
Low-pressure flushing oil minimum demand = 20 GPM
Required relief rate = 124 – 20 = 104 GPM

Design contingency relief rate: 91 GPM

Remote contingency relief rate: 104 GPM

The remote contingency is the controlling case. The relief valve

should be sized to handle this sizing scenario.
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 132

MODULE 4
Control Valve Failure Contingency:
Two Phase Blowby
 Prepared by:STATEMENT
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – PROBLEM Ezaideen Ahmad 133

Problem Statement
• A low pressure drum receives feed from a high pressure separator
• See flow diagram on next slide
• The low pressure drum is fed via a level control valve
• Control valve is fail closed
• Determine the required relief rate for the pressure relief valve protecting
the low-pressure system for the contingency of failure of the level control
valve in the full open position
• Be sure to consider both the design contingency and the remote contingency cases
 Prepared by:STATEMENT
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – PROBLEM Ezaideen Ahmad 134

Problem Statement (Continued)

Vapor Conditions
Flow = 184,262 lb/hr
Hot Separator Drum MW = 13.28
P(normal) = 770 psig Z = 1.02
PSV set
T(normal) = 550°F Cp/Cv = 1.19
@ 120 psig
Density = 0.934 lb/ft³
Visc = 0.016 cp

LC

Low Press Drum

P(normal) = 105 psig
P(design) = 120 psig

FC

Control Valve
DP = 665 psi
Flow = 2,200 gpm
S.G. = 0.637
 Prepared by:STATEMENT
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – PROBLEM Ezaideen Ahmad 135

Problem Statement (Continued)

• Additional Information
• The Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) for the low pressure drum is 120 psig
• Frictional pressure drop through piping and static head effects are negligible
• Level control valve: Xt = 0.70, Fl = 0.90
• Since the control valve CV is not available, calculate CV for normal operation and select a control
valve size using generic values
• DP-XII-F Method 3 is used because of the flashing liquid service
• Max. allowable accumulation for PR valve (design contingency) = 10% of MAWP
• Hydrotest pressure for the low pressure system = 180 psig (e.g., HTF = 1.5)
• For this example, the assumption is the failure of level control during normal operation resulting
in the mixed feed blowing from the Hot Separator to the low pressure drum.
• DP-XII-F Method 4 is used in this scenario (combination of Methods 1 and 2)
• Vapor could be assumed to blow-through the control valve as feed could be shut-off or the
system is pressured up with nitrogen/hydrogen only
• DP-XII-F Method 2 is used in this vapor-only scenario
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 136

MODULE 4
Control Valve Failure Contingency:
Two Phase Blowby Calculation
 Prepared by: Ezaideen
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION Ahmad
SOLUTION 137

Basis for Calculation of Design Contingency

• Design contingency => level control valve fails in the fully open position with the
bypass valve partially open
• CV of partially open bypass valve taken as 50% of CV of control valve in its normal operating
position
• Pressure upstream of the failed control valve
• Assumed to be the normal operating pressure of the drum
• Pressure downstream of failed control valve:
• Assumed to be the maximum allowable accumulated pressure with the pressure relief valve
blowing
• For this example, 110% of MAWP
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Design Contingency Calculation

1. Since the CV of the control valve is unknown, calculate the CV of the control valve during normal
operation
Method 3 in DP XII-F is used in this calculation
Flow Rate = 2,200 GPM
Absolute Inlet Pressure = 785 psia (Assume static head is negligible for this case)
Absolute Outlet Pressure = 120 psia
Absolute Vapor Pressure at inlet temperature = 785 psia
Critical Pressure of the fluid = 304 psia

pv 785 P1  Pv 785  785

FF  0.96  0.28  0.96  0.28  0.51 if  0.4  0.4(true)
pc 304 Pv 785 then __ Cv  Cv *1.2

q Gf 2200 0.637
CV    99.5
N1 FL ( p1 - FF  pv ) 1.0  0.90 (785  0.51 785)

CV  Cv 1.2  119.4
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Design Contingency Calculation (Continued)

2. CV of partially open bypass valve = (0.50)(119.4) = 59.7

3. Determine the CV of the installed valve

Select a control valve using DP–XIIF Table 5
CV = 150 (6” reduced trim cage valve)

4. Calculate the “Combined CV” of the control valve plus bypass

valve
CV DESIGN = 150 + 59.7 = 209.7
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Design Contingency Calculation (Continued)

4. Pressure downstream of control valve during relief
P2 = (120)(1.10) = 132 psig (Assume static and hydraulic losses are negligible)

5. Control valve ΔP during relief

ΔPCV = P1 – P2 = 770 – 132 = 638 psi

6. Control valve + bypass flow rate during relief

(See DP-XII-F Method 4)
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Design Contingency Calculation (Continued)

Step 6.1 – Compute or estimate the following process parameters
• Separator Inlet Liquid Flow Rate
– Use the normal liquid flow rate to the control valve
– Inlet liquid flow rate = 2,200 gpm
• Separator Inlet Vapor Flow Rate
– Use the normal vapor flow rate from the upstream separator
– Inlet vapor flow rate = 184,262 lb/hr, MW = 13.28
• Control Valve Outlet Conditions
– Combine the streams entering the separator and flash adiabatically at relief
pressure + overpressure
 Outlet Liquid Flow, gpm = 1,508
 Outlet Liquid Density, lb/ft³ = 41.60
 Outlet Vapor Flow Rate, lb/hr = 355,111
 Outlet Vapor MW = 23.58
 Outlet Temperature = 538°F
• Control Valve Inlet and Outlet Pressure
– Inlet pressure is equal to the normal upstream separator pressure = 770 psig
– Outlet pressure = 120 * 1.1 (10% overpressure) = 132 psig
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Design Contingency Calculation (Continued)

Step 6.2 – Calculate the control valve capacity required to handle the full
liquid portion of the outlet flow
• Method 1 – Liquid to Liquid, utilize the following conditions
– q = Outlet Liquid Flow Rate in gpm = 1,508 gpm
– p1 = Inlet pressure = 770 psig
– p2 = Outlet pressure = 132 psig
– Gf = Outlet Specific gravity @ conditions = 0.667

q Gf 1508 0.667
CV    48.8
N1 ( p1 - p 2 ) 1.0 (770  132)
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Design Contingency Calculation (Continued)

Step 6.3 – Calculate the control valve capacity required to handle the
full vapor portion of the outlet flow
• Method 2 – Gas/Vapor to Gas/Vapor, utilize the following conditions
– w = Outlet Vapor Flow Rate = 355,111 lb/hr
– N8 = Constant = 19.3 (English Units) per DP XII-F
– P1 = Absolute Inlet Pressure = 770+14.7 = 784.7
– k = Specific Heat Ratio = 1.12 (From flash calculation)
– MW (in) = 13.28, MW (out) = 23.58
– T1 = Absolute upstream temp = 550+459.67 = 1009.67 °R

1) Calculate X and check the limit of the equation

p1  p2 785  147 k  xt 1.12  0.7
x   0.81 x   0.56 1a) Use x=0.56 (max)
p1 785 1.40 1.4
x 0.56
2) Calculate Y Y  1  1  0.667
2.142  k  xt 2.142 1.12  0.7

3) Calculate M per DP XII-F Winlet ( MWout  MWin ) 184,262(23.58  13.28)

M  MWout   23.58   23.35
WoutletMWout 355,111 23.58
4) Calculate the Cv w T1 355,111 1009.67
CV    308.9
N8 p1Y Mx 19.3  784.7  0.667 23.35  0.56
 Prepared by: Ezaideen
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION Ahmad
SOLUTION 144

Design Contingency Calculation (Continued)

Step 6.4 – Add the results from Steps 6.2 and 6.3 to get a control valve
capacity required to handle the full (combined) separator drum flow
Cv (liquid) = 48.5
Cv(comb)  Cvl  Cvv C48 .8  308.9
v (vapor) = 308.9
357.7

Step 6.5 – Calculate the percentage of the total flow that can actually
pass through the valve and bypass
Cv(design ) 100 209.7 100
% Flow    58.6%
Cv(comb) 357.7

Liquid flow = (0.586) * (1508 gpm) = 884 gpm

Vapor flow = (0.586) * (355,111 lb/hr) = 208,095 lb/hr
 Prepared by: Ezaideen
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION Ahmad
SOLUTION 145

Design Contingency Calculation (Continued)

7. Determine the relief capacity required
• Per DP XV-C, credit can be taken for flow through normally open process channels
that are not likely to become partially or totally blocked as a consequence of the
upset
– The liquid portion of the relief can therefore be assumed to continue flowing from
the bottom of the LP drum
– Credit can be taken for the normal vapor outlet flow from the LP drum
 For the sake of this calculation, we have assumed no credit through the vapor
system
8. Summary of Relief Requirements for Design Contingency
Relief Rate = 208,095 lb/hr
MW = 23.58
Relieving Temperature = 538°F
 Prepared by: Ezaideen
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION Ahmad
SOLUTION 146

Basis for Calculation of Remote Contingency

• Remote contingency => level control valve fails in the fully open position
with the bypass valve fully open
• CV of fully open bypass valve taken as 100% of CV of installed control valve
• Pressure upstream of failed control valve:
• Assumed to be the normal operating pressure of the drum
• Pressure downstream of control valve:
• Assumed to be the hydrotest pressure of the downstream circuit
• For this example, 150% of MAWP
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Remote Contingency Calculation

1. Combined Cv of fully open control valve plus fully open bypass valve
CV COMBINED = 150 + 150 = 300
If it can be shown that the bypass valve would never be opened more than the normal control
valve position, it may be possible to take credit for a bypass valve CV equal to that normal
maximum flow. For this example, assume that is the case.
CV COMBINED = 150 + 119.4 = 269.4

2. Pressure downstream of control valve during relief

P2 = (1.50)(120) = 180 psig

3. Control valve ΔP during relief

ΔPCV = P1 – P2 = 770 – 180 = 590 psi

4. Flow rate through the control valve plus bypass during relief
• Use the same procedure as was followed for the design contingency
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Remote Contingency Calculation (Continued)

Step 4.1 – Compute or estimate the following process parameters
• Separator Inlet Liquid Flow Rate
– Use the normal liquid flow rate to the control valve
– Inlet liquid flow rate = 2,200 gpm
• Separator Inlet Vapor Flow Rate
– Use the normal vapor flow rate from the upstream separator
– Inlet vapor flow rate = 184,262 lb/hr
• Control Valve Outlet Conditions
– Combine the separator inlet streams and adiabatically flash them at 180 psig (remote contingency pressure)
 Outlet Liquid Flow, gpm = 1,630
 Outlet Liquid Density, lb/ft³ = 41.29
 Outlet Vapor Flow Rate, lb/hr = 318,527
 Outlet Vapor MW = 21.42
 Outlet Temperature = 543°F
• Inlet and Outlet Pressure
– Inlet pressure is equal to the normal upstream separator pressure = 770 psig
– Outlet pressure = 120 * 1.5 (hydrotest factor) = 180 psig
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Remote Contingency Calculation (Continued)

Step 4.2 – Calculate the control valve capacity required to handle the
full liquid portion of the outlet flow
• Method 1 – Liquid to Liquid, utilize the following conditions
– q = Outlet Liquid Flow Rate in gpm = 1,630 gpm
– p1 = Inlet pressure = 770 psig
– p2 = Outlet pressure = 180 psig
– Gf = Outlet Specific gravity @ conditions = 0.662

q Gf 1630 0.662
CV    54.6
N1 ( p1 - p 2 ) 1.0 (770  180)
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION SOLUTION

Remote Contingency Calculation (Continued)

Step 4.3 – Calculate the control valve capacity required to handle the full vapor portion of
the outlet flow
• Method 2 – Gas/Vapor to Gas/Vapor, utilize the following conditions
– w = Outlet Vapor Flow Rate = 318,527 lb/hr
– N8 = Constant = 19.3 (English Units) per DP XII-F
– P1 = Absolute Inlet Pressure = 770+14.7 = 784.7
– k = Specific Heat Ratio = 1.13 (From flash calculation)
– MW (in) = 13.28, MW (out) = 21.42
– T1 = Absolute upstream temp = 550+459.67 = 1009.67 °R
1) Calculate X and check the limit of the equation

p1  p2 785  195 k  xt 1.13  0.7

x   0.75 x   0.57
p1 785 1.40 1.4 1a) Use x=0.57 (max)
x 0.57
2) Calculate Y Y  1
2.142  k  xt
 1
2.142 1.13  0.7
 0.664

Winlet ( MWout  MWin ) 184,262(21.42  13.28)

3) Calculate M per DP XII-F M  MWout   21.42   21.20
WoutletMWout 318,527  21.42

w T1 318,527 1009.67
CV    289.5
4) Calculate the CV N8 p1Y Mx 19.3  784.7  0.664 21.20  0.57
 Prepared by: Ezaideen
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION Ahmad
SOLUTION 151

Remote Contingency Calculation (Continued)

Step 4.4 – Add the results from Steps 4.2 and 4.3 to get a control valve capacity required to
handle the full (combined) separator drum flow

CV (liquid) = 54.6
CV (vapor) = 289.5
Cv(comb)  Cvl  Cvv  54.6  289.5  344.1

Step 4.5 – Calculate the percentage of the total flow that can actually pass through the
control valve and bypass

Cv(remote) 100 269.4 100

% Flow    78.3%
Cv(comb) 344.1

Liquid flow = (0.783) * (1630 gpm) = 1276 gpm

Vapor flow = (0.783) * (318,527 lb/hr) = 249,406 lb/hr
 Prepared by: Ezaideen
EXAMPLE #2: TWO-PHASE BLOW-THROUGH – CALCULATION Ahmad
SOLUTION 152

Remote Contingency Calculation (Continued)

5. Determine the relief capacity required
• Credit can be taken for flow through normally open process channels that are not
likely to become partially or totally blocked as a consequence of the upset
– The liquid portion of the relief can therefore be assumed to continue flowing from the
bottom of the LP drum
– Credit can be taken for the normal vapor outlet flow from the LP drum
 For the sake of this calculation, we have assumed no credit through the vapor system
6. Summary of Relief Requirements for Remote Contingency
Relief Rate = 249,406 lb/hr
MW = 21.42
Relieving Temperature = 543°F
• The remote contingency is the controlling case. The relief valve should be sized to handle this
sizing scenario.
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 153

MODULE 4
Control Valve Failure Contingency:
Summary
SUMMARY Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 154

What You Have Learned

Now that you have completed this lesson, you understand how to:
• evaluate control valve failure as a contingency associated with providing protection
against overpressure
And are able to:
• Determine inlet and outlet pressures for control valve flow calculations
• Include the effects of flow through a bypass around a control valve
• Determine the effect of pump curve
• Determine fluid flow through control valves during overpressure contingencies
• evaluate the control valve failure contingency for single-phase and two-phase blow-
through cases
MODULE 5
Overpressure Protection: PRD Selection
INTRODUCTION Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 156

Module Objectives
• After completing this module, you will be able to:
• List the advantages and disadvantages of each type of Pressure Relief Device
(PRD)
• Explain the different types of backpressure and its impact on the operation of
the different types of PRDs
• Explain the reasoning behind the specification of a proposed PRD
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 157

MODULE 5
DEFINITIONS
DEFINITIONS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 158

“Valves”
The terms relief valve, safety valve, safety relief valve and pressure
relief valve are often used interchangeably

• Relief Valve
• An automatic pressure-relieving device actuated by the static pressure upstream of the
valve which opens in proportion to the increase in pressure over the opening pressure
• Used primarily for liquids

• Safety Valve
• An automatic spring-loaded pressure-relieving device actuated by the static pressure
upstream of the valve characterized by a rapid full opening or “pop” action
• Used primarily for gases / vapors
DEFINITIONS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 159

“Valves” (Continued)
• Safety Relief Valve
• A safety valve or a relief valve

• Pressure Relief Valve

• A generic term applying to all the above
DEFINITIONS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 160

Accumulation vs. Overpressure

• Accumulation
• The pressure increase over the Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) of the
vessel during discharge through the PRV, expressed as a percent of that pressure
• Overpressure
• The pressure increase over the set pressure of the relieving device during discharge,
expressed as a percent of set pressure
DEFINITIONS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 161

Accumulation vs. Overpressure (Continued)

• Accumulation and overpressure are the same when the PRV set pressure is
identical to the equipment MAWP. The MAWP is always equal to or greater
than the design pressure, and is calculated using the actual wall thickness of
the vessel exclusive of corrosion allowance and/or thickness required for
loadings other than internal pressure.
• When the MAWP is not known, the design pressure may be used in its
place. When a PRV is set above the equipment MAWP, the accumulation
for the vessel will exceed the overpressure for that valve. Note that
accumulation is always referred to the protected system MAWP whereas
overpressure is always referred to the Pressure Release Device (PRD) set
pressure.
DEFINITIONS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 162

Back Pressures
• Back Pressure
• The pressure on the discharge side of a PRV. Total back pressure is the sum
of superimposed plus built-up back pressure.
• Superimposed Back Pressure
• The pressure at the outlet of the PRV while the valve is in the closed position
• Superimposed back pressure results from other sources of pressure in the
discharge system. It is treated as a static pressure and it may be constant or
variable.
• Superimposed back pressure affects the opening pressure and must be
considered in setting the differential spring pressure for non-balanced valves
DEFINITIONS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 163

Back Pressures (Continued)

• Built-Up Back Pressure
• The increase in pressure at the outlet of a PRD that develops as a result of flow
through the discharge system after the PRV opens
• Built-up back pressure is a dynamic pressure resulting from frictional pressure drop
through the discharge system after the relief valve opens. It includes frictional
pressure drop attributable to other sources that relieve simultaneously.
• Built-up back pressure may affect the selection of the type of valve (balanced or non-
balanced) to be used for a specific application
DEFINITIONS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 164

Hydrotest Factor and Remote Contingency

• Hydrotest Factor (HTF)
• Multiplier applied to MAWP or Design Pressure to define the required hydrotest pressure,
excluding the temperature and corrosion allowance adjustments defined by the applicable
construction code
• Also used to define the maximum permissible pressure when invoking the “Remote
Contingency Rule”
• Usually in the range of 1.25 to 1.50 depending on vessel design code
• PDR standard – 1.5
• May be as low as 1.1 for pneumatically tested vessels

• Remote Contingency Rule

• Equipment is considered to be adequately protected against overpressure from remote
contingencies if during the remote contingency the maximum possible pressure in the
equipment does not exceed HTF times the MAWP or Design Pressure
DEFINITIONS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 165

Blowdown
• Once a PRV opens and the condition that caused it to open is corrected, the inlet
pressure will decay. However, the PRV will not reseat until the inlet pressure drops below
the PRV opening (set) pressure.

• The difference between the set pressure and the reseating pressure is known as
blowdown and is expressed as a percentage of the set pressure

• Blowdown is typically in the range of 4% to 8% of set pressure, but may be as high as 22%
of set pressure for certain valves in liquid or vapor / liquid service or as low as 2% of set
pressure for certain pilot-operated valves

• The blowdown may be adjustable within certain limits by various means depending on
the valve manufacturer
DEFINITIONS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 166

Chattering
The rapidly alternating opening and closing of a PRV. Chattering
may occur in both liquid and vapor service PRVs.

• The main causes of chattering are:

• Oversizing
• Excessive inlet pressure drop
• Excessive built-up back pressure
• Incorrect blow-down ring setting
• Liquid hydraulic surge

• Chattering may result in misalignment and leakage when the valve returns to its normal
closed position. If chattering continues, it may result in mechanical failure of valve
internals or associated pipe fittings. In addition, the vibration may loosen bolts and result
in flange leaks around the PRV.
DEFINITIONS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 167

Capacity
• Design Capacity
• The capacity (flowrate) of the limiting contingency, used to determine the minimum
required area of a PRD

• Rated Capacity
• The capacity a PRD can pass when fully open at accumulated pressure, regardless of
design capacity specification
• The rated capacity of a PRD must equal or exceed its design capacity
• The rated capacity equals the design capacity multiplied by the ratio of installed relief
area to required relief area
DEFINITIONS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 168

Question (1/1)
Click on the correct answer
Superimposed backpressure equals:

X Review section
The frictional on Definitions
pressure for more
drop resulting from information
other sources
that relieve simultaneously
X Review section
The pressure on on
the Definitions for of
discharge side more information
the PRV when it
is open
 Superimposed Back Pressure is the pressure at the outlet of the PRV while the
The pressure
valve is on
in the closed the discharge
position. Superimposed side
backof the PRV
pressure resultswhen
from it
other sources of pressure in the discharge system. It is treated as a static
is closed
pressure and it may be constant or variable.
X Review section
The increase on Definitions
in pressure for more information
on the discharge side of the
PRV resulting from flow through the open PRV
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 169

MODULE 5
ASME SECTION VIII
CODE REQUIREMENTS
ASME SECTION VIII CODE REQUIREMENTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 170

Capacity Certification
• Pressure Relief Valve Capacity Certification (UG-131)
• Capacity certification tests are conducted at an overpressure of 10% of set pressure or
3 psi, whichever is greater
• When a single relief valve is provided for contingencies other than fire, that valve must
be set at a pressure not exceeding the MAWP. If the valve is set at the MAWP, the
maximum overpressure must be 10% of MAWP, which is exactly the same as the
accumulation allowed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code.
ASME SECTION VIII CODE REQUIREMENTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 171

Accumulation
• Maximum Allowable Accumulation (UG-125)
• Single Relief Valve – Contingencies Other Than Fire
• Maximum Allowable Accumulation = 10% or 3 psi, whichever is greater

• Multiple Relief Valves – Contingencies Other Than Fire

• Maximum Allowable Accumulation = 16% or 4 psi, whichever is greater

• Fire
• Maximum Allowable Accumulation = 21%

• Steam Boilers
• Maximum Allowable Accumulation = 6%

• The above apply in the USA and many countries. However, there are some countries where
these will be different. Local regulations need to be consulted.
ASME SECTION VIII CODE REQUIREMENTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 172

Non-Fire Contingencies
• When multiple relief valves are provided for contingencies other than
fire, at least one PRV must be set at a pressure not exceeding the
MAWP but the other(s) may be set as high as 105% of MAWP
• However, a valve set at 105% of MAWP may not achieve its certified (rated)
relieving capacity until its inlet pressure is at least 110% of its set pressure
(10% overpressure)
• Thus, to ensure that such valves achieve their certified relieving capacity, the
Code allows the vessel pressure to increase to 105% x 110% = 116% of
MAWP, resulting in an allowable accumulation of 16%
• Under these conditions, relief valves set at the MAWP will operate at a
capacity in excess of their certified relieving capacity at 10% overpressure
since they will operate at 16% overpressure at relieving conditions
ASME SECTION VIII CODE REQUIREMENTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 173

Non-Fire Contingencies (Continued)

• Note that certain relief valves in liquid service may not achieve full
lift at 10% overpressure. Such valves must have their relief capacity
at full lift derated by an “overpressure correction factor” that
accounts for the difference between the actual overpressure at
relieving conditions and the overpressure required to achieve full lift.
ASME SECTION VIII CODE REQUIREMENTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 174

Fire Contingencies
• When supplemental PRVs are provided for protection against overpressure
due to external fire (or when fire is the only contingency), the Code allows
such valves to be set as high as 110% of MAWP
• A valve set at 110% of MAWP may not achieve its certified (rated) relieving capacity
until its inlet pressure is at least 110% of its set pressure (10% overpressure)
• Thus, to ensure that such PRVs achieve their certified relieving capacity, the Code
allows the vessel pressure to increase to 110% x 110% = 121% of MAWP, resulting in
an allowable accumulation of 21%

• In many cases, the same PRVs provide protection against both fire and non-
fire contingencies
• In such cases, none of the PRVs may be set higher than 105% of MAWP and at least
one must be set at or below MAWP
• However, the permissible accumulation during a fire relief scenario is still 21%
ASME SECTION VIII CODE REQUIREMENTS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 175

Question (1/1)
Click on the correct answer
Maximum allowable accumulation for multiple relief valves during a non-fire
contingency is:

X Review
6% or 3 ASME SectionVIII
psi, whichever for more information
is greater

X Review
10% or 4ASME SectionVIII
psi, whichever for more information
is greater

 Maximum allowable accumulation for multiple relief valves (for

16% or 4 psi, whichever is greater
contingencies other than fire) is 16% or 4 psi, whichever is greater

X Review
21% ASME SectionVIII for more information
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 176

MODULE 5
CONVENTIONAL PRVs
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 177

Opening Controlled by Spring

• The preferred PRD for most applications. A conventional PRV is kept closed by
the force of a spring on the top of a disc.

• When the internal pressure of the protected equipment equals or exceeds the
set pressure of the spring, the valve opens
• For PRVs that discharge non-hazardous fluids (such as steam) directly to the
atmosphere, the spring may be exposed to the atmosphere
• For valves that discharge hazardous fluids or that discharge to closed systems, the
spring is enclosed by a bonnet vented through an internal passage to the valve outlet
• Because of this, any pressure on the valve outlet is added to the spring pressure that tends to
keep the valve closed
• This so-called “back pressure” effect must be considered when determining the
required spring pressure and the valve operational characteristics
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 178

Cross-Sectional View

EXTERNAL
BONNET VENT VENT PLUGGED
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 179

Closed

Spring
Bonnet

Body 2 psi

Blowdown
Ring
(100 psi)
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 180

Open

Spring
Bonnet

Body 2 psi

Blowdown
Ring (100 psi)
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 181

Operational Characteristics
• Significant leakage between the valve seat and disc (“simmer”) typically begins
to occur as operating pressure rises to about 90 to 95% of set pressure
• Simmer is due to the progressively decreasing net closing force acting on the disc (spring
pressure minus internal pressure) as the operating pressure approaches the set pressure
• Depending upon valve maintenance, seating type, and condition, simmer-free operation
may be possible at up to 98% of set pressure

• When set pressure is reached, the disc starts to lift

CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 182

Operational Characteristics (Continued)

• As the vessel pressure continues to rise above the set pressure, the spring is
further compressed until the disc is at full lift
• For vapor service (“pop” action), full lift is achieved at minimal overpressure
• For liquid service (“modulating” action):
• Full lift achieved at 110% overpressure for capacity-certified valves
• Full lift achieved at 125% overpressure for non-capacity certified valves

• When vessel pressure falls below set pressure, the disc tends to close under
the action of the spring
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 183

Operational Characteristics (Continued)

• Full reseating does not occur until the inlet pressure is lower than the
set pressure

• The difference between the set pressure and the full reseating
pressure, expressed as a percent of set pressure, is known as
“blowdown”
• Typically, blowdown is in the range of 4% to 8% of the set pressure
• Certain valves in liquid or vapor / liquid service may have blowdowns as high
as 22% of set pressure
• The blowdown may be adjusted within certain limits by various means
recommended by the valve manufacturer
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 184

Vapor Service
• PRVs for vapor service are designed for “pop” action, moving to the full
open position at only a slight overpressure and remaining fully open as the
inlet pressure builds up to the permissible maximum
• The “pop” action characteristic is achieved by a secondary annular orifice formed
outside the disc-to-nozzle seat. This causes additional disc area to be exposed to the
operating pressure as soon as a slight lift occurs, accelerating the opening movement.
• The kinetic energy of the flowing vapor, by action between the valve disc holder and
the blowdown ring, adds to the opening force and causes the valve to “pop" open

• This kinetic energy also continues to act against the spring force as the fluid
pressure returns to the PRV set point
• This explains why the PRV reseats at a pressure below the set pressure
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 185

Vapor Service (Continued)

• Rated relief capacity is based on maximum allowable accumulation

• As pressure drops below the set pressure, PRV remains fully open until
blowdown pressure is reached
• Usually around 92 - 93% of set pressure
• May be as low as 80% of set pressure

• Flow through the valve is usually sonic and directly proportional to upstream
absolute pressure
• Not affected by back pressure as long as valve is 100% open
• Excessive back pressure may result in partial closing of the valve
• If back pressure exceeds “critical flow” pressure, flow will be subsonic
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 186

Liquid Service
• Liquid relief valves, since 1985, are required by the ASME to have capacity
certification and achieve full lift at no more than 10% overpressure
• Non-certified valves achieve full lift at 25% overpressure

• Rated relief capacity is calculated at maximum allowable accumulation

regardless of opening characteristic

• To avoid potential chattering problems, capacity certified relief valves are

recommended for services in which the relieving fluid is either a non-
flashing liquid or a sub-cooled liquid that flashes downstream of the PRV
nozzle under all contingencies (excluding fire)
• They are also required by the ASME Code for vessels that operate completely filled
with liquid, such as desalters or coalescers
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 187

Liquid Service (Continued)

• These valves are not recommended for services in which some non-fire contingencies
involve the flow of vapor or a vapor / liquid mixture through the PRV nozzle (gas / vapor,
saturated liquid or slightly subcooled liquid at the PRV inlet) due to excessively long
blowdown

• When capacity certified relief valves are used in services where some contingencies
involve the flow of vapor or a vapor / liquid mixture through the PRV nozzle, the reseating
pressure may be as low as 78 – 80% of the set pressure (20 – 22% blowdown)

• The long blowdown may not be acceptable in some installations since it would require
dropping the system pressure significantly below operating pressure to achieve reclosure
of the PRV
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 188

Liquid Service (Continued)

• The long blowdown is usually not a concern when the contingency requiring
the relief of vapor / gas / two phases is fire, but it may be unacceptable for
other contingencies involving vapor or vapor / liquid flow

• Some valve manufacturers offer capacity-certified liquid-trim valves with

reseating pressures in the range of 88 – 93% of set pressure (7 – 12%
blowdown)

• For cases when the blowdown of a capacity-certified valve is not acceptable

in vapor or vapor / liquid service, consideration should be given to the use
of a modulating-action pilot-operated PRV
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 189

Back Pressure Limitations

• Any back pressure on the top of a conventional PRV disc exerts a closing force
and results in reduced valve lift, and hence reduced discharge rate, assuming
that the other variables remain unchanged
• Excessive built-up back pressure acting on the top of the disc may also result in chattering

• For these reasons, conventional PRVs and discharge systems must be designed
such that built-up back pressure (for non-fire contingencies) at the PRV rated
capacity does not exceed the overpressure at relieving conditions
• Usually 10% of set pressure for single valve installations

• Maximum Built-Up Back Pressure (BUBP)

• Maximum BUBP must not exceed overpressure at relieving conditions
• Usually limited to 10% of set pressure
• May be as high as 21% of set pressure for fire contingency
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 190

Superimposed Back Pressure Limitations

• Maximum Constant Superimposed Back Pressure (SIBP)
• Must be less than MAWP of protected equipment
• Usually limited by valve mechanical design
• Must be subtracted from set pressure to obtain differential spring pressure
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 191

Superimposed Back Pressure Limitations (Cont’d)

• Maximum Variable Superimposed Back Pressure
• The effect of back-pressure on non-relieving PRVs tied into a closed system needs to
be evaluated to ensure that the PRV can open when required and the protected
equipment does not exceed its MAWP
• Applies to non-balanced valves that discharge to a shared closed system
• For valves in which differential spring pressure is equal to the set pressure (constant
SIBP ≈ 0)
PSI(MAX) = (0.17)(HTF)(PSET)

• For valves in which differential spring pressure is significantly less than set pressure
(constant SIBP >>0), a detailed system evaluation is required to determine maximum
allowable variable SIBP
• Or the use of a balanced valve (bellows or pilot-operated) should be considered
CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 192

Back Pressure Limitations

• Example
• PRV Set Pressure 200 psig
• HTF 1.5
• Max. Constant SIBP 0 psig
• Overpressure at Relief Conditions 10%
PDIFF SPRING = PSET - SIBP(MAX)
• Differential spring pressure 200 psi
BUBP(MAX) = 10% * PSET

• Maximum BUBP 20 psi

PSI(MAX) = 0.17 * HTF * PSET

• Max. Variable SIBP 51 psig

CONVENTIONAL PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 193

Question (1/1)
Click on the correct answer
Capacity-certified PRVs:
X Review
Achievesection
full lifton
at Conventional PRVs for more information
10% overpressure
X Review
Achievesection
full lifton
at Conventional PRVs for more information
25% accumulation

 Liquid relief valves since 1985 are required by the ASME to have
Achieve full rated relief capacity at lower overpressure
capacity certification and achieve full lift at no more than 10%
than non-certified
overpressure. PRVs
Non-certified valves achieve full lift at 25% overpressure.
X Review sectionby
Are required onASME
Conventional
Code forPRVs for more information
vessels
completely filled with liquid
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 194

MODULE 5
BALANCED BELLOWS PRVs
BALANCED BELLOWS PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 195

Balanced Bellows Valve

• A balanced-bellows valve is similar to a conventional valve, except that:
• An internal bellows is provided to isolate the bonnet cavity from the valve outlet
• The bonnet cavity is vented to the atmosphere

• As a result, superimposed back pressure has minimal effect on the opening

pressure of a balanced bellows valve
• The differential spring pressure is therefore set at the PRV set pressure regardless of
any constant or variable SIBP
BALANCED BELLOWS PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 196

Cross Sectional View

VENT OPEN

BELLOWS
BALANCED BELLOWS PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 197

Forces Acting on PRV Disks

BALANCED BELLOWS PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 198

Operational Characteristics
• Differential spring pressure is the same as nominal set pressure

• Less sensitive to BUBP than conventional valves

• Less prone to chattering as a result of excessive back pressure
• However, relief capacity is affected by total back pressures:
• In excess of 15% of set pressure for valves in liquid service
• In excess of 30% of set pressure for valves in vapor service
BALANCED BELLOWS PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 199

Applications
• Use When:
• Excessive fluctuation in SIBPs
• Large SIBP fluctuations on a conventional PRV may result in either premature or delayed
opening of the valve, potentially resulting in operational upsets or equipment overpressure
• BUBP exceeds limits for conventional valves
• Fouling or corrosive services
• Bellows shields the spring from process fluid
• However – Bellows “folds” could corrode in highly corrosive service or foul in extremely
viscous service, such as asphalt, limiting the lift of the valve
• Valve should be heated and insulated
BALANCED BELLOWS PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 200

Limitations
• The bellows is inherently a point of mechanical weakness which introduces
some degree of additional risk in case the bellows should fail and release
process fluids through the vent

• Avoid Balanced Bellows PRVs when:

• Process temperature exceeds the auto-ignition point or discharge is to a system filled
with hazardous liquid (flammable or toxic)
• Bellows may fail and release hazardous fluids through the bonnet vent
• Backpressure is above the bellows design pressure
• Cold or auto-refrigerating services
• Potential for ice formation around the spring, bellows and other internal components could
interfere with the opening and/or reseating of the valve
• If a balanced bellows valve must be used for such services, a steam-jacketed or equivalent
heat-traced design should be considered
BALANCED BELLOWS PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 201

Back Pressure Limitations

• Balanced bellows PRVs may be used satisfactorily in vapor and liquid service
with a back pressure (SIBP plus BUBP) as high as 50% of set pressure. The
back pressure must be incorporated into the sizing calculation.
• In retrofits it may be acceptable for total back pressure to exceed 50% of set pressure.
In such cases the valve manufacturer should be contacted to establish the reduction in
capacity due to the high back pressure for the particular PRV involved.
• In no case should the total back pressure exceed 75% of set pressure

• In addition to the above back pressure limitations based on valve capacity,

balanced bellows PRVs are also subject to back pressure limitations based
on the mechanical strength of the bellows, bellows bonnet, or the valve
outlet flange rating
BALANCED BELLOWS PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 202

Back Pressure Limitations (Continued)

• Maximum SIBP
• The effect of back-pressure on non-relieving PRVs tied into a closed system needs to be
evaluated
• Same as for conventional PRVs

• For balanced bellows valves that discharge to a shared closed system:

PSI MAX = (0.50)(HTF)(PSET)
BALANCED BELLOWS PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 203

Bonnet Venting
• To achieve the required balancing of the valve disc, the interior of the bellows must be
vented through the bonnet chamber to the atmosphere. A 3/8 to 3/4 inch (10 to 20 mm)
diameter vent hole is provided in the bonnet for this purpose. Any bellows failure or
leakage will permit process fluid from the discharge side of the valve to be released
through the vent to the atmosphere.

• Shipping plugs must be removed from the bonnet vent holes before a new valve is
commissioned

• Bonnet vent should be routed to atmosphere at a safe location

• Alternative is to tie the bonnet vent into a closed, non-varying low-pressure system. This method may be
used in the case of severely toxic fluids.
• Minimum length vent piping should be used. The effects of any back pressure must be thoroughly
examined, since in such a case, SIBP is additive to the spring force and the PRV may not be truly balanced.
BALANCED BELLOWS PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 204

Question (1/1)
Click on the correct answer
In general, when should a Balanced Bellows PRV not be used?

X Review section
Excessive on Balanced
fluctuation Bellows PRVs for more information
in SIBP

X Review section on
BUBP exceeds Balanced
the limit forBellows PRVs for
conventional PRVmore information

X Review
Foulingsection on Balanced
or corrosive Bellows PRVs for more information
services

 • In general,
Cold- a Balanced Bellows
or auto-refrigerating PRV should not be used in Cold or
services
auto-refrigerating services
 Potential for ice formation around the spring, bellows and other internal
components could interfere with the opening and/or reseating of the valve
 If a balanced bellows valve must be used in such service, a steam-
jacketed or equivalent heat-traced design should be considered
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 205

MODULE 5
PILOT OPERATED PRVs
PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 206

Fundamentals
• Assembly consists of a main valve combined with a self-actuated,
auxiliary PRV called a “pilot valve”

• Both Pilot Valve and Main Valve see process pressure

• Process pressure is used to keep the main valve closed

• No spring required
PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 207

Operational Characteristics
• Under normal operating conditions, the vessel pressure acts on the main
valve seat at the bottom of a free-floating differential area piston or flexible
diaphragm and is also applied to the top of the piston (or diaphragm) and
under the pilot valve disc
• Since the top area of the piston (or diaphragm) is larger than the nozzle area at the
lower end of the piston (or diaphragm), there is a net force holding the piston down
on the nozzle
• Under static conditions, this net sealing force increases as the vessel
pressure increases and the pilot valve approaches the set point
• When the set pressure of the pilot valve is reached, it opens and
depressurizes the volume above the piston (or diaphragm) causing the main
valve to open
PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 208

Valve Types
Once pilot valve reaches set pressure and relieves:

• Flowing Type
• Allows continued venting of the process fluid through the pilot valve until the
blowdown pressure is reached and the valve recloses
• Not recommended because they are more prone to plugging

• Non-Flowing Type
• Most common and usually preferred design
• Once the top cavity of the piston (or diaphragm) is depressured, continued
venting of the process fluid is prevented
PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 209

Valve Types (Continued)

Once pilot valve reaches set pressure and relieves:

• “Pop”- action
• The pressure on top of the piston (or diaphragm) is vented fully when the pilot valve
opens causing the main valve to open fully
• Preferred for vapor services to achieve the required relieving rate quickly

• Modulating action
• The pilot valve vents the top of the piston only as much as required to satisfy the relief
demand and the main valve may not reach full lift
• Preferred for liquid services to minimize the potential for chattering
PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 210

Pressure Sensing Point

• Pressure sensing point may be located in the main valve inlet neck or
remote from it
• Sensing point must operate at a pressure greater than 80% of PRV set
pressure; lower pressure may not hold main valve completely closed
• If sensing point operating pressure is less than 80% of PRV set pressure,
vendor needs to be consulted

• Remote sensing point location makes main valve performance less

sensitive to inlet piping pressure drop

• In liquid service, remote sensing may lead to hydraulic surge

PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 211

Pressure Sensing Line

• Sensing lines should be adequately sized to prevent plugging and
should be sloped such that they are self-draining

• Sensing lines may require purging

• All valves in the sensing line must be car-sealed open (CSO) and shall
be of a design that minimizes the risk of accidental closure
• Avoid use of quarter-turn valves unless their handles are removed
PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 212

Advantages of Pilot Operated PRV

• Capable of operation at close to the set point
• Remains closed without simmer until the inlet pressure reaches about 94 – 98% of the set
pressure
• This relative freedom from simmer in the main valve is useful in retrofit situations where a
lower than normal margin between operating and set pressures may be desired

• Once the set pressure is reached, the valve opens fully if a “pop”- action pilot is
used

• The valve remains open as long as the set point is exceeded

• Because the pilot operated valve is slower acting, it may be less prone to
chattering in cyclic service
• A modulating pilot valve may also be considered where chattering is a potential problem
PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 213

Advantages of Pilot Operated PRV (Continued)

• If the pilot valve pressure sensing point is located directly on the vessel
being protected, a pilot-operated valve is less subject to the chattering
which is normally associated with high inlet piping pressure drop
• However, it is still prudent to design inlet piping for a maximum frictional pressure
drop of 3% of set pressure, since some instances have been reported of resonance and
chatter when higher pressure drops have been measured

• Pilot-operated PRVs can be specified for blowdown as low as 2%

• This is an advantage for main gas pipeline and pressure storage applications, where
the narrow range of pressure cycling minimizes product losses resulting from a release
PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 214

Advantages
• PRV is inherently balanced when pilot exhausts to atmosphere
• Opening pressure not affected by SIBP
• High BUBP does not result in chattering
• Vapor relief capacity unaffected by back pressure as long as flow is critical

• May be used as an emergency depressuring device

• By using a hand valve, a control valve or a solenoid valve to exhaust the
piston chamber, the pilot-operated PRV can be made to open and close at
pressures below its set point from any location (local or remote), without
affecting its operation as a PRV
PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 215

Limitations
• Not recommended for dirty or fouling services
• If the pilot valve or pilot connections become fouled, the valve will not open
• Where fouling is a function of entrained solids, this limitation may be countered by the use
of a non-flowing pilot valve and a pilot line filter or a barrier fluid such as glycol
• With a non-flowing pilot valve, there is no flow in the pilot system when the valve opens and;
therefore, solids entrainment is reduced
• Blowback with a suitable fluid can also be used to reduce solids entrainment in the sensing
line

• Maximum inlet temperature limited to 450oF (232oC) by the “O" ring piston
seals
• Newer designs available for a maximum inlet temperature of about 1000F (538C) in a
limited number of valve sizes and for a limited range of set pressures. Check with vendors.
• “O" ring piston seals must also be compatible with the process fluid
PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 216

Limitations (Continued)
• Vapor condensation and liquid accumulation above the piston (or diaphragm) may cause
the valve to malfunction unless special designs are used

• If the back pressure exceeds the process pressure under any circumstance (e.g., during
start-up or shutdown) the main valve will open and material will flow from the discharge
backwards through the valve and into the process vessel
• To prevent this, a backflow preventer should be specified for all pilot operated PRVs that discharge to
closed systems

• In smaller sizes, costlier than spring operated valves

• For start-up a pilot pressurizing fluid may be required to provide pressure on the top side
of the piston
• This is because during initial pressurization the pilot line pressure drop may not allow pressure to
accumulate on the top before the pressure under the piston is present, causing premature opening
PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 217

Back Pressure Limitations

• When balanced (e.g., pilot exhausts to atmosphere), pilot-operated PRVs may
be satisfactorily used in vapor or liquid services up to a total back pressure of
90% of set pressure, provided that the back pressure is incorporated into the
sizing calculation
• At higher back pressures, capacity becomes increasingly sensitive to small changes in back
pressure and is difficult to predict
• Generally desirable to limit total backpressure to 75% of set pressure for new designs

• Maximum Superimposed Back Pressure

• Same as that of balanced-bellows valves
PSI MAX = (0.50)(HTF)(PSET)
PILOT OPERATED PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 218

Question (1/1)
Click on three correct answer
Which three of the following statements are true?

 The remote sensing line should be sloped such

that it is self-draining
 The PRV is inherently balanced when the pilot
exhausts to atmosphere
 A pilot pressurizing fluid may be required to
provide pressure on the top side of the piston to
keep the main valve closed during start-up
X The
The flowing
flowingtype
typePRV
PRVisisrecommended
not recommended
since it is more prone to plugging
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 219

RUPTURE DISKS
RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 220

Rupture Disks
• A Rupture Disk (RD) is a thin diaphragm designed to rupture at a designated
pressure differential
• It is used as a weak point element for the protection of vessels and piping systems against
excessive pressure
• To be “fail-safe,” the RD must not fragment and its design should limit the burst
pressure when damaged or installed upside-down to less than what is allowed
by the “Remote Contingency Rule,” typically “HTF” times the Design Pressure
• Acceptable types
• Pre-scored (cross-score) reverse buckling RD for gas service
• Pre-scored (semi-circular score) reverse buckling RD installed in holder with capture bar for
gas or liquid service
• Pre-scored tension-loaded RD for gas or liquid service
RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 221

Pre-Scored Reverse Buckling

RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 222

Pre-Scored Tension-Loaded
RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 223

Advantages / Disadvantages
• The advantages of RDs over PRVs are:
• No simmering or leaking prior to bursting
• More reliable for responding to explosions
• Less expensive to provide corrosion resistance
• Can be installed to minimize tendency to foul or plug
• Can provide both depressuring and overpressure protection

• The disadvantages of RDs include:

• Non-reclosing devices
• Cannot be tested
• Require periodic replacement
• Greater sensitivity to mechanical and pressure surge damage
• Has a manufacturing range (typical +/- 5%)
RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 224

Applications
• Reduce fugitive emissions from PRVs
• Requires derating of the relief capacity of the PRVs

• Provide better protection against internal explosions or rapid pressure rise

• Reduce PRV corrosion

• Secondary PRD in parallel with a PRV

• In the event of a fire, rapidly depressure dry vessels, vessels in super-critical service or vessels
with higher Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) potential due to layout
congestion
• Minimizes potential for catastrophic failure
RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 225

Sizing
• RDs should be sized to pass the same required relieving rate as a PRV
• Three methods for sizing RDs:
1. Coefficient of Discharge method
2. Resistance Coefficient method
3. Combination Capacity method
RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 226

Sizing (Continued)
1. Coefficient of Discharge (Kd) method
• Uses the manufacturer’s provided Minimum Net Flow Area (MNFA) as the effective
relief area for the RD installation including vessel nozzle, inlet piping, burst RD and
outlet piping
• Relief capacity calculated using restriction orifice equation with a discharge coefficient,
Kd = 0.62
• Applies only when the following conditions are met:
• RD discharges directly to atmosphere
• RD installed within 8 pipe diameters from protected vessel nozzle
• Discharge piping length not greater than 5 pipe diameters
• Nominal diameter of inlet and outlet piping equal to or greater than nominal pipe size of the
RD
RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 227

Sizing (Continued)
2. Resistance Coefficient (Kr) method
• Recommended by ASME Code when other methods do not apply
• RD is treated as a piping component within the entire relief system
• Resistance coefficient, Kr of the RD is determined by the manufacturer during the
certification process
• Calculated relieving capacity of the system is multiplied by a derating factor of 0.9 to
allow for uncertainties inherent in this method
• Two resistance coefficients are typically determined by the manufacturer: Krl for liquid
and Krv for gas / vapor
RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 228

Sizing (Continued)
2. Resistance Coefficient (Kr) method (Continued)
• Resistance coefficient based on the media directly in contact with the RD prior to
bursting should be used
• In liquid service, the pressure drop is larger than predicted by the KrL since the RD is not
likely to open fully
• To account for partial opening in liquid service, the pressure drop exerted by the RD
should be based on either assuming that the RD pressure drop is equivalent to the
pressure drop through a restriction orifice with area equal to one-half the nominal RD
flow area or by multiplying the manufacturer’s KrL recommendation by a factor of 4
RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 229

Sizing (Continued)
3. Combination Capacity method
• Applicable only when the RD is used upstream of a PRV
• PRV is sized using normal sizing procedures
• Capacity of the PRV and RD combination is de-rated by multiplying by the
combination capacity factor, KC
• Published KC values from manufacturers are usually in the range of 0.95 to 0.98
• Published values apply to specific RD / PRV combinations and are registered with the
National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors
• When no published values are available, ASME Code requires using KC = 0.90
RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 230

Installation
• RDs must comply with the installation requirements for PRVs

• The installation must have isolation valves unless the equipment can be placed off-line without
requiring a unit shutdown

• RDs need not comply with the inlet piping pressure drop limitations since these limitations are
required only to prevent chattering of PRVs (chattering cannot occur in a RD)
• However, if significant, the inlet line pressure drop must be taken into account in establishing the
system Design Pressure
• In addition, the discharge piping must limit the accumulated pressure in the system being
protected to 110% of the Design Pressure (or 121% in the case of fire contingency)

• When a RD is installed for a heat exchanger tube failure, install the RD directly on the shell or
channel to minimize the peak transient overpressure before the RD bursts
RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 231

Installation (Continued)
• When a RD is installed upstream or downstream of a PRV, the installation
must provide means for detecting any pressure buildup between the RD
and the PRV

• A RD can also be installed at the outlet of a PRV to reduce fugitive emissions

• When used in this manner, the RD burst pressure must be very low to prevent a large
back-pressure on the PRV discharge prior to the disk bursting
• In addition, the “tell-tale” venting arrangement for leak detection must be routed to a
closed system to minimize fugitive emissions
RUPTURE DISKS Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 232

Question (1/1)
Click on two correct answers
Which two of the following types of RDs are acceptable for use?

 Pre-scored reverse buckling

X Conventional tension-loaded

 Pre-scored tension-loaded
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 233

MODULE 5
RUPTURE / BUCKLING
PIN PRVs
RUPTURE / BUCKLING PIN PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 234

Rupture / Buckling Pin Valve

• Non-reclosing PRD designed to function by the breakage of a load-carrying
section of a pin or by the buckling of an axially-loaded compressive pin that
supports the pressure-containing member (typically a piston)
• Once the pin buckles or breaks, the pressure-containing member (typically a piston)
moves allowing the pressure to be relieved

• Patented ASME-coded device produced by Rupture Pin Technology (RPT)

• Advantages over RDs:

• Not subject to premature failure
• Better accuracy below 40 psig
• Can be easily reset without requiring tools or breaking flanges
RUPTURE / BUCKLING PIN PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 235

Balanced / Unbalanced
• Design can be balanced or unbalanced
• Unbalanced
• Piston is connected to the pin by a shaft having a smaller diameter than the piston
• The opening pressure will be affected by back pressure
• Balanced
• Piston diameter is constant all the way to the pin
• The opening pressure will not be affected by back pressure
RUPTURE / BUCKLING PIN PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 236

Unbalanced Rupture Pin PRD

RUPTURE / BUCKLING PIN PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 237

Balanced Rupture Pin PRD

RUPTURE / BUCKLING PIN PRVs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 238

Sizing
• Sizing is similar to that of a RD
• When installed as a stand-alone PRD and there is essentially no inlet or
outlet piping, it is sized as an orifice with a discharge coefficient of 0.62
• When placed in series with a PRV, the PRV rated capacity should be
multiplied by the published derating factor for the tested Rupture Pin Valve
/ Pressure Relief Valve (RPV / PRV) combination
• If no published derating factor is available, use 0.90
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 239

MODULE 5
OTHER PRDs
OTHER PRDs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 240

Explosion Hatch
• A hinged metal cover fitted over an opening on top of the vessel and sealed
by its own weight
• Typically used to protect a vessel which operates at essentially atmospheric
pressure but may be subjected to an internal explosion (e.g., an asphalt
oxidizer)
• Relief area should be at least 80% the protected vessel cross-sectional area
• For vessels which normally operate at a slight positive pressure, a tight seal
is achieved by the use of hold-down brackets with shear pins, rather than by
increasing the weight of the hatch which would increase inertia and prevent
quick opening
OTHER PRDs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 241

Liquid Seal
• Consists of a simple U-tube containing a suitable liquid (normally water) with
the seal depth and diameter sized to pass the maximum relieving flow at the
required Design Pressure
• Used for relieving overpressure on equipment operating at pressures slightly
above atmospheric
• Example: Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU) Regenerator Overhead upstream of CO boiler
• Key design considerations
• Continuous water makeup and overflow on the seal loop
• Winterizing to prevent freezing of the seal
• Safe disposal of the effluent seal water
• Acceptability of discharging process fluids to atmosphere
• Potential for liquid hydrocarbon discharges
• Flashback protection (snuffing steam)
OTHER PRDs Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 242

Pressure / Vacuum Vent

• Used to provide overpressure and/or vacuum protection for low Design
Pressure vessels / tanks
• May be weight-loaded or spring-loaded
• Operation based on the weight of the pallet or the spring force acting on the
pallet to keep the device closed
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 243

MODULE 5
EXAMPLE PROBLEM
EXAMPLE PROBLEM Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 244

Problem Statement
• A pressure vessel has a MAWP of 100 psig. It is protected against overpressure
(other than due to fire) by two PRVs (A and B) designed to operate in parallel.
The set pressures of the valves are staggered, with the “A” valve being set at
the lower pressure. The HTF for the vessel is 1.3. Answer the following
questions:
1. What is the maximum allowable set pressure for the “A” valve?
2. What is the maximum allowable set pressure for the “B” valve?
3. What is the maximum allowable accumulated pressure?
4. What is the overpressure (as percent of set pressure) for the “A” valve at the maximum
allowable accumulated pressure?
5. What is the overpressure (as percent of set pressure) for the “B” valve at the maximum
allowable accumulated pressure?
6. What is the maximum permissible accumulated pressure for a remote contingency?
EXAMPLE PROBLEM Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 245

Problem Solution
1. 100 psig
• At least one valve must be set at a pressure not exceeding the MAWP
2. 105 psig
• Additional valves may be set at up to 105% of MAWP
3. 116 psig
• Maximum permissible accumulation for non-fire contingencies is 16%
of the MAWP when multiple valves in parallel are provided
EXAMPLE PROBLEM Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 246

Problem Solution (Continued)

4. 16.0 %
5. 10.5%
• Overpressure is the % increase above set pressure during relief
• For the “A” valve: 100(116 – 100) / 100 = 16.0%
• For the “B” valve: 100(116 – 105) / 105 = 10.5%
6. 30%
• For a remote contingency:
• Maximum accumulated pressure = HTF x MAWP = 1.3 x 100 = 130 psig
 Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 247

MODULE 5
SUMMARY
SUMMARY Prepared by: Ezaideen Ahmad 248

What You Have Learned

• Now that you have completed this module, you are able to:
• List the advantages and disadvantages of each type of Pressure Relief Device
(PRD)

• Explain the different types of backpressure and its impact on the operation of
the different types of PRDs

• Explain the reasoning behind the specification of a proposed PRD