An analysis of port state control inspections

related to the ISPS Code

M. Yilmazel & E. Asyali
Dokuz Eylül University, School of Maritime Business and Management,
Turkey

Abstract
The ISPS Code had come into effect on the 1st of July 2004. The overall
objectives of the Code are to establish an international framework involving co-
operation between contracting governments, government agencies, local
administrations and the shipping industry to detect maritime security threats and
take pro-active measures against potential terrorist attacks against ships and/or
port facilities which are the vital instruments of the international trade.
The Code aims to reduce the vulnerability of port facilities and merchant ships to
terrorist attacks and to increase the secur ity awareness of the industry. The ISPS
Code, is the first ever internationally and widely agreed proactive regulatory
framework to safeguard the maritime industry, seaborne trade, and the world
economy from terrorism. In this study the success level of i mplementation of the
ISPS Code already achieved by the ship managers is analysed through the port
state control databases of the major regional maritime administrations and
MOUs such as the Paris MOU, the Tokyo MOU, the Black Sea MOU and the
United States Coast Guard (USCG). The monthly statistics of ISPS non-
compliant ships have been compiled based on the variables such as the ships’
flag, type, gross tonnage (gt), and the nature of deficiencies between the 1st July
2004, when the ISPS Code came into force, until the end those of months with
available statistics currently released on the websites of the respective MOUs.
Common awareness of errors and lapses, best practices, sharing of information,
and industry-wide co-operation will play a vital role to develop a security culture
in the shipping industry.

Keywords: ISPS Code, port state control, security culture, detention

1 Introduction

Within the maritime community, fraudulent documents and certificates; piracy

and armed robbery against ships; phantom ships; illegal migrants and stowaways
have far long been the security issues, but terrorism has not been seen as a
significant maritime threat until the attacks on the passenger vessels Achille
Lauro in 1985 and City of Poros in 1989 [1, 2, 3]. In 1986, the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) had adopted a Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts that contained some advice on security for cruise ships. The 11th
September 2001 events changed dramatically the perspective, as ships with their
cargo are suddently perceived that they could be used as a weapon and ports
could be either targets or locations of attacks to cause havoc in international
trade and the international economy. As the ships, ports and cargoes are the key
points for security at maritime transportation system, the ship/shore interface
emerged as a main weak point. Thereby, the ISPS Code mainly aimed to focus
on the cooperation and coordination between ports and ships about security
matters.
Briefly, the IMO, through adding the issue of maritime security to its
constitutional mandates, took the necessary initiatives to establish a legal
framework on maritime security resulting in the adoption of a new chapter in
SOLAS on maritime security (Chapter XI-2) and a totally new international
Code on ship and port facility security (ISPS) [4,5]. Both of these documents
entered into force on the 1st of July 2004. Remarkably, for the first time the
remit of the SOLAS Convention was extended to shore facilities when the Solas
Convention Amendments were adopted in December 2002. The ISPS Code not
only applies to ships but also to the ship/port interface areas.
As world trade is highly dependent on maritime transport, effective and
practicable security measures are needed to ensure that the international
transportation system is protected from the acts of terrorism. The global nature
of maritime transport requires that appropriate security regulations and standards
be achieved through international consultation and consensus [1].
Maritime security covers four major inter-related areas. These are the ship; the
crew, the cargo; and the port facilities. As a weak link in one of these areas will
affect the overall transport security, a continuous assessment of risks by all
participants in a “chain of responsibility” approach is a requirement. The
maritime community must develop and maintain her “security culture” similar to
her “safety culture”. Compared to the level of implementation of the ISM Code
and its associated leve l of safety culture which took the maritime industry more
than a decade to achieve, the maritime industry has been constraint by a very
limited transitional period to adapt to the requirements of the ISPS Code and
develop an associated security culture.
Although there were many doubts about the haste in implementation, effects,
practicability and effectiveness of the ISPS Code among the shipping
practitioners, an intensive effort was performed globally to ensure the highest
possible level of compliance by the governments, shipping and port industries.
However, the increased number of crews in order to cope with the new
requirements under the ISPS Code; the potential “wave of lawsuits” over charter
contracts when problems such as off-hire situations arise from the Code;
difficulty in motivating crews about code and of course security-related
surcharges imposed by some port facilities, are some of the drawbacks of this
new era [6].

2 Control mechanism

For an effective and efficient management of security in maritime transportation,

control function plays an important role. Control is the process of monitoring
activities to ensure that they are being accomplished as planned, and correcting
any significant deviations. There are three different approaches to designing
control systems. These are market, bureaucratic and clan control [7]. Maritime
community provides a good example of bureaucratic control which is defined as
an approach that emphasizes organizational authority and relies on
administrative rules, regulations, procedures, policies, standardization of
activities, well-defined job descriptions, and other administrative mechanisms to
ensure that employees exhibit appropriate behaviours and meet performance
standards. Parties in maritime industry are expected to adhere closely to the
international conventions and stay within the guidelines. Establishing a safety
and security culture is a way to apply clan control in which the shared values,
norms, traditions, rituals, beliefs, and other aspects of the organization's culture
regulate employee behaviours.
Port State Control is a widely used control mechanism among the shipping
industry where generally bureaucratic control is applied. Port State Control
(PSC) is a ship inspection process of foreign vessels in national ports to verify
compliance with various major international maritime conventions, The driving
force behind the PSC is to identify and eliminate sub-standard ships jumping flag
state control, promoted and supported as a second line of defence.

3 Control process related to maritime security measures

In order to ensure the effective implementation of the ISPS Code, the control
function plays an important role because; control is not only the process of
monitoring activities to ensure that they are being accomplished as planned, but
also a way to correct any significant deviations.
Ships, the shipping companies, port facilities and contracting governments have
detailed responsibilities under the ISPS Code. One of the main responsibilities of
Contracting Governments among others as per the ISPS Code/A-4.3 is;
exercising control and monitoring compliance measures where contracting
governments may not discharge and delegate their responsibility to a recognized
security organization.
The legal references enabling the port states to exercise control on maritime
security matters is set by the SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code. SOLAS
Reg. I-19 regulates “Control and Compliance Measures” in general. SOLAS
Reg. XI-2/9 regulates the security related control function and the ISPS Code
Part B-4 sets the security related responsibilities of contracting governments in
details, under the title of “control and compliance measures” from paragraph
4.29 to 4.46.
Regulation XI-2/9 of SOLAS describes the control and compliance measures
applicable to ships. It is divided into three distinct sections; control of ships
already in a port, control of ships intending to enter a port of another Contracting
Government, and additional provisions applicable to both situations.
Regulation XI-2/9.1, control of ships in port, implements a system for the control
of ships while in the port of a foreign country where duly authorized officers of
the Contracting Government have the right to go on board the ship to verify that
the “International Ship Security Certificate” or “Interim International Ships
Security Certificate” issued under the provisions of Part A of the ISPS Code are
in proper order. Then, if there are clear grounds to believe that the ship does not
comply, control measures such as additional inspections or detention may be
taken. This reflects the customary control mechanism under the port state control
regime. Regulation XI-2/9.3 describes the safeguards that promote fair and
proportionate implementation of these additional measures (ISPS-B/4.30)
Regulation XI-2/9.2 applies the control measures to ensure compliance to
ships intending to enter a port of another Contracting Government and introduces
an entirely different concept of control within chapter XI-2, applying to security
only. Under this regulation measures may be implemented prior to the ship
entering port -not in port- to better ensure security. If officers have clear grounds
for believing that the ship is in non-compliance with the requirements of
Regulation XI-2 or Part A of the ISPS Code, such officers may take steps in
relation to that ship including denial of entry into port.
Both control mechanisms, in or out of the port, are based on the concept of
clear grounds which means evidence or reliable information that the ship does
not correspond with the requirements of Chapter XI-2 or Part A of this Code,
taking into account the guidance given in Part B of the Code. Examples of
possible clear grounds under regulations XI-2/9.1 and XI-2/9.2 are listed in
ISPS-B/4.33.
In exercising control and compliance measures, as per ISPS-B/4.43, the duly
authorized officers should ensure that any measures or steps imposed are
proportionate. Such measures or steps should be reasonable and of the minimum
severity and duration necessary to rectify or mitigate the non-compliance. No
more favourable treatment principle is applied to the ships flying the flag of a
State, which is not a Contracting Party to the Convention and not a Party to the
1988, SOLAS Protocol, and the ships below the Convention size as well.

4 Methodology

This paper presents the statistical analysis of the security related ship non-
compliance data obtained from the monthly detention statistics released via the
websites of the various MOUs on port state control and the USCG [8,9,10,11].
The above mentioned data of the Black Sea MOU, from the 1st of July 2004 to
the 1st April 2005; Paris MOU, from the 1st of July 2004 to the 1st of June 2005;
Tokyo MOU, from the 1st of July 2004 to the 1st of June 2005, and the USCG,
from the 1st of July 2004 to the 1st May 2005, was duly scanned and processed
into relevant statistical information.
The statistical information achieved for the ISPS non-compliant ships detained
within these regional PSC regimes through the inspections conducted between
the above stated periods were based on the variables such as the ship’s age, flag,
gross tonnage (gt), type, and the nature of the security related deficiencies.

5 Findings

It is seen that the overall number of ships detained within the above -specified
PSC regions within the specified periods is 2511, of which 259 ships (10.3%)
were detained on security grounds. The detention rates (Total Detentions on
Security Grounds over Total Ships Detained) for each individual region are: the
Black Sea MOU 6.6%, the Paris MOU 8.7%, the Tokyo MOU 4.4%, and the USCG
45.7%. The highest detention rate by USCG is highly remarkable among the
others. It is also found that 46% of the detentions were due to only security
grounds (See Table 1)

Table 1: Detention rates on security grounds.

Black Sea Paris Tokyo USCG TOTAL

MOU MOU MOU
(1.7. 04/ (1.7. 04/ (1. 7. 04 / (1.7.04 /
1.4.05) 1.6. 05) 1 .6 .05) 1.5.05)
Total Detentions on 17 84 46 112 259
Security Grounds

A* 13 57 31 19 120
B** 4 27 15 93 139
Total Ships Detained 258 964 1044 245 2511

Detention Rate (%) 6.6 8.7 4.4 45.7 10.3

* A: detentions with only security grounds
**B: detentions with security grounds plus other non-compliances

The overall detention figures on the grounds of security reveals that 4.6% of the
ships detained are under 5 years old, 18.1% are between 5 to 14 years old and
77.3% are 15 years old and over. Therefore, we can undoubtedly confess that
older ships are reflecting non-compliance with the requirements of the ISPS
Code more significantly. This finding is also valid for each individual PSC areas
(See Table 2)
 Table 2: ISPS non-compliant ships classified by ship’s age.
Black Sea Paris Tokyo USCG
TOTAL
MOU MOU MOU
Age
Det. Rate Det. Rate Det. Rate Det. Rate Det. Rate
No (%) No (%) No (%) No (%) No (%)

Under 5 0 0,0 1 1.2 3 6.5 8 7.1 12 4.6

years
5 to 14 years 1 5.9 6 7.1 4 8.7 36 32.1 47 18.1
15 years or 16 94.1 77 91.7 39 84.8 68 60.8 200 77.3
over

It is worth noting that 45% of the ove rall detentions on the security grounds are
attributed to 5 flags only where Panama has the highest score with 52 detentions.
Table 3 lists the five flags with the numbers of detentions, with the exception of
the Russian Federation, all of them Flags of Co nvenience (FOCs).

Table 3: ISPS non-compliant ships classified by ship’s flag (Top 5).

Black Sea
Paris MOU Tokyo MOU USCG TOTAL
MOU
Flag
Det. Rate Det. Rate Det. Rate Det. Rate Det. Rate
No (%) No % No % No % No %

Panama 0 0,0 11 13.1 9 19.6 32 28.6 52 20.1

Russian
3 17.6 13 15.5 11 23.9 3 2.7 30 11.6
Federation
Cambodia 3 17.6 0 0.0 12 26.1 0 0.0 15 5.8

DPR Korea 3 17.6 7 8.3 2 4.3 0 0.0 12 4.6

Georgia 5 29.4 6 7.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 11 4.2

Considering the type of ships, the detention rate on account of ISPS Code non-
compliance is the highest for general cargo ships (45.2 %), followed by bulk
carriers (23.2%), and refrigerated cargo carriers (8.1%) respectively. The figures
are inconsistent in the different MoU PSC areas due to the trade patterns
prevailing through them. Low detention rates of containers ships, tankers and
passenger ships, where the security risks are perceived to be relatively higher, are
worth noting as an optimistic record for the already achieved goals of the Code
for maritime security (See Table 4)
Table 4: ISPS non-compliant ships classified by type of ship.

Black Sea Paris Tokyo

USCG TOTAL
MOU MOU MOU
Ship's Type Det. Rate Det. Rate Det. Rate Det. Rate Det. Rate
No % No % No % No % No %

General Dry
15 88.2 57 67.9 26 56.5 19 17.0 117 45.2
Cargo Ship
Bulk Carrier 0 0.0 2 2.4 5 10.9 53 47.3 60 23.2
Refrigerated
0 0.0 6 7.1 9 19.6 6 5.4 21 8.1
Cargo Carrier
Passenger Ship 1 5.9 1 1.2 0 0.0 9 8.0 11 4.2

Ro-Ro 0 0.0 8 9.5 1 2.2 2 1.8 11 4.2

Oil Tanker 0 0.0 3 3.6 0 0.0 6 5.4 9 3.5

Containership 0 0.0 1 1.2 0 0,0 7 6.2 8 3.1

Chemical
0 0.0 0 0.0 1 2.2 7 6.2 8 3.1
Tanker
Other 1 5.9 6 7.1 4 8.7 3 2.7 14 5.4

By the gross tonnage (gt), the percentage of the detentions of the ISPS non-
compliant ships is the highest for 1001-2500 gt (29 %), followed by 10001-
25000 gt (21%), 2501-5000 gt (17 %). Summing up, this means that the ships up
to 5000 gt makes up 46% of the overall detentions on security grounds. The
inconsistency with the figures could be a reason of the different trade patterns
prevailing in ach individual PSC regions similar with the findings by the ship’s
type. For instance, within the Black Sea MOU region 94.1% of the detentions on
security grounds are the ships between 1001 and 5000 gt, while 75% of the
detentions are the ships bigger than 5000 gt (See Table 5).

Table 5: ISPS non-compliant ships classified by gross tonnage (gt).

Black Sea Paris Tokyo

USCG TOTAL
MOU MOU MOU
Gross Tonnage
(gt) Rate Det. Rate Det. Rate Det. Rate Det. Rate
Det. No
(%) No (%) No (%) No (%) No (%)

500-1000 gt 0 0.0 12 14.3 8 17.4 6 5.4 26 10.0

1001-2500 gt 9 52.9 36 42.9 19 41.3 11 9.8 75 29.0

2501-5000 gt 7 41.2 19 22.6 7 15.2 11 9.8 44 17.0

5001-10000 gt 0 0.0 9 10.7 4 8.7 10 8.9 23 8.8

10001-25000 gt 1 5.9 7 8.3 7 15.2 41 36.6 56 21.6

25001 gt or
0 0.0 1 1.2 1 2.2 33 29.5 35 13.5
more
6 Feedback on the current situation

The early implementation phase had its own difficulties mainly originated from
the lack of understanding the philosophy, rapid transition, resistance to new
codes that seemed not to be related with the work activities, and the lack of
internalisation. Maritime community had experienced a new era and fuelled with
its old and strong cultural heritages achieved a satisfactory level of
implementation of this Code in a relatively short period.
However, all over the world an intensive process was applied to ensure the
highest possible level of compliance by the governments, shipping and port
industries. Main problems faced with the early implementation of the ISPS Code
seems to be related to ISSC, access control procedures, inadequate Master/SSO
familiarity with overall SSP, inadequate crew familiarity with own ISPS roles
and responsibilities, restricted area marking and control, inadequate security
record-keeping, inadequate monitoring of ship's security integrity, ship-port
interface (declaration of security-DOS), SSAS performance characteristics, sub-
standard attitude and awareness, and lack of enough experience of ships’ crew
about the ISPS Code [12]
Feedback by ship management companies, masters and security officers on ISPS
Code-related incidents affecting ships is promoted by MARISEC for the purpose
of identifying and addressing problems. Potential incidents related to port state
actions or requirements in respect of security related matters which impact on the
operations of ships were determined as follows: ISSC acceptance; additional
information demands from port state inspector; port state control attitude;
MARSEC level incompatibility between ship and port facility; degree of liaison
with/co-operation from Port Security; problems over agreement on a Declaration
of Security; excessive information demands before entering port, current and
historical information; problems caused by trading history; access control issues;
restricted areas; monitoring; storing of any delivered spares and provisions; and
cargo operations [13].
According to survey by the European Sea Ports Organisation to assess the status
of implementation of the ISPS Code in the EU, 8 months after 1 July deadline;
the general impression is that the implementation of the ISPS Code has been
smoother than feared. No ship has ever refused to enter an EU port facility due to
its non-compliance, and concluded that some adaptations have been necessary
and difficulties might have been overcome through additional personnel,
equipment and resources [14].
7 Conclusions

As a conclusion of the statistical analysis of the security related ship non-

compliance data obtained from the monthly detention statistics released via the
websites of the various MOUs on port state control and the USCG, it is found
that; the overall detention rate (10.3%) on security grounds is relatively low
which seems as an evidence for the success of the ship managers on reaching the
desired level of compliance with the Code, where remarkable higher detention
rate (45.7%) by the USCG is found to be an exception to this fact. Older ships,
especially 15 years old and over reflects the highest rate of non-compliance
(77.3%) with the requirements of the ISPS Code. It is also seen that four of the
five low-compliant flags are Flags of Convenience (FOCs). According to overall
detentions the rate of ISPS non-compliant ships is the highest for general dry
cargo ships (45.2%), followed by bulk carriers (23.2%). Low detention rate of
container ships, tankers and passenger ships, with perceivable high risks, have
low detention rates. The smaller ships with lower gross tonnages (gt) are having
higher detention rates, whereby ships up to 5000 gt makes up 46% of the overall
detentions on security grounds. According to statistics, the most common areas
of non-compliance are failure of keeping continuous synopsis records (CSR),
and improper ISPS related certificates, i.e. the ISS Certificate and the SSO
Certificate.
Finally, in the light of the above findings, we believe that; in this relatively short
transition period, common awareness of errors and lapses, best practices, sharing
of information, and industry wise close co-operation has played and will be
playing a vital role to develop a security culture in the shipping industry.
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