Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 2015

Vol. 35, No. 1, 123–140, [Link]

Emergence of Muslim Middle Class in Post-

Independence India and its Political Orientations

ANWAR ALAM

Abstract
This paper attempts to understand the process of formation of middle class in the
Muslim community of India since independence and its emerging political orien-
tations. It questions the popular, rhetorical but hegemonic discourses that tend to
portray the “perpetual underdevelopment and dalitinization of the Muslim commu-
nity” and argues that section of the Muslim community, despite obstacles and chal-
lenges, like any other community, has been beneficiary of India’s economic growth
over the years. While reflecting on the process of formation of Muslim middle class
in post-colonial period in India, the paper takes a differentiated view of community,
identifies the social and regional variations of formation of Muslim middle class and
highlights its main aspirations and orientation and its relationship with the domi-
nant (Hindu) middle class and the Indian state.

Introduction
The Justice Rajender Sachar Commission Report on Social, Economic and Educational
Status of the Muslim Community of India issued in 20061 provides a reasonable basis for
an informed discussion on the nature and growth of Muslim middle class in contempor-
ary India. The document, while highlighting interstate and inter-region variation in the
socio-education and economic status and condition of the Muslim community, has con-
firmed the widely held public perception about the overall marginalized status of the
Muslim community in comparison to other socio-religious communities (SRCs) of
India. Given this background, how appropriate would it be to speak of “Muslim
middle class” at a juncture when socioeconomic and educational conditions of the com-
munity are increasingly being compared with that of Dalits or what is rhetorically referred
as “dalitalization of the Muslim community”?2 The popular, dominant discourse of mar-
ginalization, exclusion, discrimination and alienation about the Muslim community
though makes the task of identifying the contour, size and orientation of Muslim
middle class in post-independence India difficult, and there is no denying that a visible
Muslim middle class, though relatively smaller in size, has surfaced on the national
scene against all odds and hindrances. This paper is a small attempt toward ascertaining
this direction.

Contesting the Conventional Meaning of the Middle Class

Before analyzing the size, nature and orientation of emerging Muslim middle class in
post-independence India, a prior discussion around the meaning and definition of
middle class is required in order to understand in what way the formation of Muslim

© 2015 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs

124 Anwar Alam

middle class in India and its orientation and behavior varies from the general formation of
middle class, particularly Hindu middle class in India.
The term “middle class” has a long history and has had several, sometimes contradic-
tory, meanings. It was once defined as an “intermediate social class” between the nobility
and the peasantry of Europe. While the nobility owned the land, and the peasantry
worked therein, a new bourgeoisie (literally “town-dwellers”) arose around mercantile
functions in the city. In France, the middle classes helped drive the French Revolution.
Within capitalism, middle class initially referred to the bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie.
However, with the proletarianization of much of the petit bourgeois world, and the
growth of finance capitalism, middle class came to refer to the combination of labor, aris-
tocracy, professionals and white-collar workers.
The size of the middle class depends on how it is defined, whether by education,
wealth, consumption pattern, occupation, environment of upbringing, social network,
manners or values, etc. These are all related, though far from deterministically depen-
dent. However, the cultural, political and economic context of formation of middle
class in post-colonial societies including India is vastly different from that of European
societies. Unlike Europe, the state has been the most dominant agency for the growth
of middle class in post-colonial societies. Hence, any attempt to transport the “imagin-
ation” of middle class as crystallized through European history (from where the basic
meaning of middle class is derived) to the post-colonial societies will be of little help in
understanding the size and contours of development of middle class in India. In this
regard, Prof. Bateille has rightly remarked that “any reasonable conception of the
middle class must accommodate more than one kind of market situation, work situation
and status situation”.3

Middle Class in India

Size of the Middle Class
The figures for the middle class in India vary from a low of 62 million to as high as 400
million. The Arjun Sengupta Committee Report (2007) has estimated the size of middle
class as 23% or 253 million.4 National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER)
defines middle class as
the households earning between Rs 2.5 and 12.5 lakh (US$6000 to US$30,000,
2004–05 prices) annually … . Between 1995–96 and 2001–02, total middle
class homes grew twice in size from 4.5 million households to 10.7 million in
2007–08, and by 2009–10, they are expected to rise to 28.4 million households
with a total of 153 million people. About two-third of the Indian middle class is
to be found in urban India and there is not much change in this trend.5

Locating the Muslim Middle Class

The rate of formation of middle class in the Muslim community is very low in comparison
to other socio-religious group in Indian society. Thus in 2004–2005, 11.2% of Scheduled
Caste/Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) and 13.3% of Muslims were in the middle-income
group though the shares in 1993–1994 were 8.1% for SC/ST and 11.1% for Muslims.
In 1999–2000, 14.1% of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) were in the middle-
income category and that increased to 17.8% by 2004–2005 and in contrast, in the
 Emergence of Muslim Middle Class in Post-Independence India 125

group of “Others”, the share increased from 29.4% to 32.2%. As far as the high-income
group is concerned, it is very thin layer among the SC/STs and Muslims increasing from
0.9% to 1% for the former and from 1.5% to 2.2% for the latter. In the case of OBCs, it
was 1.4% in 1999–2000 and 2.4% in 2004–2005 while for “Others” it increased from
6.4% to 11% during this period.6
In the case of Muslims, the decline in the percentage of illiterates between 1999–2000
and 2004–2005 was about 4.8 percentage points, and the decrease in the poor and vul-
nerable group among them was 4.5 percentage points. The overall increase in the percen-
tage of graduates and above among Muslims was 0.3 percentage points, while the
increase in the poor and vulnerable of the group was marginal at 0.04 percentage
points.7 According to another report,
between 2004–05 and 2009–10 the rate of poverty decline more than doubled,
from 2.1 percent in the 1993–94 to 2004–05 period to 4.3 per cent in the 2004–
05 to 2009–10 period—in this period, poverty levels for Hindus fell 3.9 per cent
per annum versus 5.8 percent for Muslims.8
Despite the formidable constraints, education seems to provide the best hope for over-
coming poverty and vulnerability. The speed of change has been faster wherever the edu-
cational attainments are higher. In this context, it needs to be pointed out that since mid-
1990s education as a critical factor for the upward mobility has caught attention of all
SRCs including the Muslim community. According to a survey conducted by Abu
Dhabi Gallup Centre during 2010–2011, Muslim’s enrollment at the elementary level
of education was higher (88%) than Hindus (84%) and all other Indians (72%).9

The Problematic of Identifying the Muslim Middle Class

The above-mentioned data have been derived on the basis of criterion of education,
income, consumption and occupation. These four indicators remained the basis for
measuring the size of middle class within any community. However, they are not very
helpful in measuring the size of middle class in the Muslim community in post-indepen-
dence India. Being a minority and steeped into the “Islamic imagination of good life”, the
community has different way of looking toward the criterion of education, consumption,
income and occupation and that not necessarily corresponds to the values underlying
these four factors. For instance, the measurement of middle class in any community is
based on the understanding of the percentage of access of community to the “secular
modern education”. In fact, the notion of middle class is derived from the secular under-
standing of human history and development. In this imagination of history since religion
is relegated to private sphere, hence access to any kind of religious education is con-
sidered irrelevant for the purpose of calculating the size of middle class. As a result,
the formation and size of the middle class in the Muslim community appears to be
very slow due to the lack of access/opportunities to modern education.
However, deriving conclusion about the size of Muslim middle class in post-indepen-
dence India on the basis of criterion of access to secular modern education could be mis-
leading as Muslim imagination of “good life” in this country as well as in other parts of the
Muslim world is dominantly colored through their religious understanding of history and
human development in which “ilim” (knowledge) based on Islamic education system
carries more values than other knowledge system. Being minority the community is
more susceptible to the issue of preservation of identity and culture. This partly explains
the reasons why the community in India has been reluctant to send their children to the
126 Anwar Alam

government school and also did not actively pursue the agenda of establishing the modern
educational institution along the line of Christian community.

Madrassas as an Indicator of Muslim Middle Class

However, the community did not lag behind in establishing the chain of madrassas in
post-independence India. It is estimated that compared to pre-independence period
the number of madrassas has quadrupled in post-independence India in order to preserve
the “Muslim/Islamic identity”, to provide the basic education to the poor segment of the
Muslim population and also serve as a self-employment program for the graduate of
nationally established madrassas such as Darul Uloom, Deoband. There is no official stat-
istic with regard to existing numbers of madarasas. Yogi Sikand provides the following
figures in relation to madrassa in India,
according to the Centre for the Promotion of Science at Aligarh Muslim Uni-
versity, in 1985 there were 2890 madrassas in the country. A decade later, the
Union Minister for Human Resources Development put the figure at 12,000.
In 2002 the Union Minister for Home claimed that the number stood at 31,
875. In 2003, a leading Muslim paper claimed that there were some 125,000
madrassas in India, catering to around 3,000,000 students and with a combined
annual budget of approximately Rs 14 billion.10
Though it is not clear how much resource mobilization for sustaining these institutions is
generated from within the nation and how much come from outside, it is estimated that
the bulk of financial support are generated from within the community. The expansion of
these institutions is also indicative of formation of religious middle class within the com-
munity.

Nature of Muslim Participation in Indian Public Employment

The growth of middle class in the post-colonial societies including India is linked with the
expansion of public employment. In other words, the “salaried state classes” predomi-
nantly constitute middle class in post-colonial societies. The majoritarian Hindu commu-
nity is the dominant beneficiary of state’s welfare and development policies on account of
their access to modern education and cultural capital. They constitute the bulk of “salar-
ied middle class” in India. Unlike the majoritarian Hindu community, the participation
of the Muslim community in governmental public services has been very low due to
various reasons including the lack of adequate secular and modern education. Thus,
according to the Sachar Commission Report (2006),
in no state does the representation of Muslims in state sector match their popu-
lation share. Instead, they are falling far behind their population shares. Andhra
Pradesh is the only state where the representation of Muslims is fairly close to,
but still less than their population share. Three other states which show Muslim
representation in government jobs as more than 50% of their population shares
are Karnataka (70%), Gujarat (59%) and Tamil Nadu (57%). All other states
show the representation of Muslims as less than half of their population
share. Further, one notices that in most States, Muslims are employed more
as Group-B officers than as Group-A officers. Only West Bengal, Delhi,
Kerala, Bihar and Jharkhand have reported Group-A Muslim officers to be
 Emergence of Muslim Middle Class in Post-Independence India 127

proportionately more than Group-B officers. In the case of lower positions,

about 5.9% workers in Group-C are Muslim compared to 5.1% in Group-D
positions.11
The lack of adequate representation of Muslims in the public service does not mean
that Indian state system deliberately pursued the agenda of excluding the community
from governmental opportunity structure. Neither does it indicate the lack of access
to modern education system among the community due to their poor economic
resources. A part of the reason for this deficit lies in the low level of Muslim partici-
pation in the government competitive examination. The Sachar Commission itself
has noted:
As data on religious identities is not normally maintained, the UPSC undertook
special tabulations from its records relating to the share of Muslims who
appeared in the written examination, those selected for oral interviews and
those selected for appointments. Overall, Muslims constituted only 4.9% of candi-
dates who appeared in the written examination of Civil Services in the years 2003 and
2004; this is far below the 13.4% share of Muslims in the population. However, the
success rate of Muslims is about the same as other candidates [emphasis added by
author]. While the small number of Muslim candidates appearing in the
written examination of the Civil Services is a cause for concern, similar
success rates are re-assuring. There is a need to improve Muslim participation
in the UPSC competitive selection process.12
Nasim Zaidi also found lower participation of Muslim students in Union Public Service
Commission as the reason for low level of Muslim representation [which is staggering at
3.5%] in the all India service conducted by UPSC.13
In fact, there is no co-relation between the economy/income status and the level of edu-
cational attainment in the Muslim community. Imtiaz Ahmed while reflecting on the
issue of educational backwardness remarked,
Muslims are not necessarily running away from higher education for lack of
means. A primary factor in their educational backwardness is lack of motivation
and initiative arising out of fear of frustration in the employment market, and
the irrelevance of education for their occupational roles.14
Similarly, a survey conducted by Brij Raj Chauhan in 1992 in both urban and rural
regions of Meerut found that “educational level of the members (Muslim community)
is not commensurate with their economic attainments and greater attention to the
need for education has to be given for these groups”.15
The issue of Muslims lagging behind other communities in getting access to opportu-
nity structure created by welfare and development-oriented state in post-independence
is far more complex than the dominant public perception among the Muslim commu-
nity and section of non-Muslim secular intelligentsia that holds the government
responsible for the economic and educational backwardness of the community. In
fact, the lack of access to modern education system, negative perception about the
state and government and lack of confidence and motivation to pursue higher and
quality education despite having means to pursue the same within the Muslim commu-
nity coupled with the communal mindset of a section of state establishment and
other localized factors are responsible for the poor representation of Muslims in state
services.
128 Anwar Alam

The Nature and Character of Muslim Middle Class

Thus, unlike the formation of Hindu middle class which is predominantly linked with
“state-salaried class”, the growth of middle class in the Muslim community is rooted
in its informal bazzari character. Muslims are predominantly an urban community and
a majority of them are self-employed. According to the Sachar Commission Report,
the self-employed comprised own account worker/employer/unpaid family worker,
regular salaried/wage employee in public sector/private sector and casual wage labor in
public works/other types of work. Taken together, the three self-employed categories con-
stituted about 61% of the total Muslim workforce as compared to about 55% of the
Hindu workers. In urban areas this share is 57% for Muslims and 43% for Hindus.16
Within the Muslim community, the reliance on self-employment is higher for OBCs
(64%) than for general Muslims (59%).17 A more detailed analysis of the occupational
profiles of different SRCs shows higher than average participation of Muslim workers
in the following nonagricultural occupations:
. Merchants and shopkeepers (especially for males and in urban areas);
. Sales persons and shop assistants (especially for males and in urban areas);
. Tailors, dress makers and the like (especially for women and in urban areas);
. Transport equipment operators (especially for males and in urban areas);
. Tobacco preparers and tobacco product makers (especially women);
. Spinners, weaver, knitters and dyers (especially for males in urban areas) and
. Machinery fitters, assemblers and precision instrument makers (especially for
males and in urban areas).18

The underlying factors that have contributed to the growth of the middle class among
Muslims in post-independence India are many and complex. First, the benefit that has
occurred through the general process of development of India has also accrued to the seg-
ments of Muslim population. It is hard to see the communal basis of public policies that
has been enunciated by various state and central governments from time to time. The
reasons for non-accruing of benefits that follow from public policies/schemes to the
wider segment of the Muslim community are varied and beyond the scope of this
paper to reflect upon. Second, sections of the Muslim community have been beneficiary
of affirmative policies of central and various state governments.19 Third, the oil boom of
1970s in the Gulf tremendously helped in increasing the opportunity resources among
Muslims in India. Fourth, the liberalization and globalization of Indian economy has
both positively and negatively impacted on the Muslim communities who are predomi-
nantly urban, artisan and petty traders. Within this general framework, the trajectory of
formation of middle class in the Muslim community in north and south of India has
been qualitatively different.

Formation of Muslim Middle Class in North India

Particularly in north India the Muslim middle class suffered serious jolt in the wake of
Partition of the British India in 1947 and the creation of India and Pakistan. The bulk
of the upper caste/class Muslims kept migrating to Pakistan till 1965 and left behind
the predominantly poor, lower caste/class Muslim population to face the hostile Hindu
majoritarianism and in an indifferent state for a fairly long period. As a result, the com-
munity grew in the midst of insecurity, fear and lack of confidence to interact with
the outside world. The political economy of the Muslim community and its cultural
 Emergence of Muslim Middle Class in Post-Independence India 129

preference in north India did not allow them even to secure an access to modern edu-
cation and forget about their participation in higher education that became the most
important basis for graduating to “middle class” for many other communities. Despite
these structural limitations, a weak and feeble Muslim middle class did emerge gradually
in north India in course of time owing to the combination of factors and process. Some of
these discernible factors are as follows:
. First, though land reform adversely affected the Muslim landed aristocracy, par-
ticularly in Utter Pradesh (UP), some of them managed to circumvent the
impact of land reform. Zarina Bhatty provides an example of the strategy
employed toward this end by the Kidwai clan of Oudh.20 In addition to agricul-
tural diversifications, members of this group secured their position through econ-
omic diversifications as well.
. Second, in some ways akin to the landed gentry, is the large number of the reli-
gious aristocracy represented by the descendant of the mystical saints—the pirs,
sajjadannashins, murshids and shayikh—who presided over a number of large and
small darghas or shrines dotting the entire region. Many of these shrines own sub-
stantial lands, commercial real estate, besides donations offered in cash and kind
on special occasions. They were entirely unaffected by the political changes of the
last 50 years.21
. Third, the Green Revolution of 1970s in India heralded a radical change in agri-
cultural productivity and transformed a section of peasants into capitalist farmers.
This also has had positive impact on the Muslim peasantry of Western Utter
Pradesh.22 Some Muslim orchard owners, for instance, the mango-growers of
Malihabad, near Lucknow, are quite successful in growing and marketing
India’s signature fruits of many varieties.23
Fourth, however it is in the field of handicrafts that Muslims in north India have done
well. According to Omar Khalidi, “a 1991 survey gives the following figures for
Muslim employment in various handicrafts: art metal ware (76%), embroidery
(87.5%), cotton rugs (67%), zari gold thread/brocade and zari goods (89%), cotton
rugs (67%), wood wares (72%)”.24 Muslims are to be found in large numbers both as
workers and small-scale owners in various trades in many districts of state of UP and
Bihar. For instance, silk sari, silk embroidery and zari gold embroidery in Varanasi;
carpets, rugs and durries in Bhadohi and Mirzapur; bed sheets and handloom cloths in
Mau; silk sari in Bhagalpur; chikan-embroidered clothes in Lucknow; brassware in
Moradabad; woodwork in Saharanpur; pottery in Khurja; padlocks in Aligarh and
glass in Firozabad; leather and tanneries in Kanpur and so on. In this regard, Khalidi
has noted the increase in the Muslim ownership of lock industry from 4% in 1965–
1976 to 8% in 1980–1985 and 10% in tannery industry from zero in 1950s.25 A few
Muslims have even graduated into national-level companies as exemplified by the case
of Mirza Tanneries—the largest exporter of leather footwear.
Fifth, over the years there developed a miniscule group of entrepreneurs in the Muslim
community, such as the Shervanis of Allahabad who established Great Eastern Electro-
plates Limited, subsequently named ZEEP, Himalaya Drugs in pharmaceuticals indus-
try, Hamdard Unani herbal medical products and its famous Rouh Afza brand, the
beauty parlor franchise of Shahnaz Hussain, the retail chain of Sabka Bazzar and the
Harvest Gold Bread of Taab Siddiqi.26 Further, the growth in non-vegetarian due
to economic liberalization has also resulted in a good number of Muslim-owned meat
130 Anwar Alam

enterprises and exporters as exemplified by the case of Al-Khabeer of Bhiwandi, Medak

of Andhra Pradesh, Hind Agro Industries of Delhi and Al-Saqib of Meerut. However, a
majority of Muslim businessmen in north India are actually retailers, not big businessmen
or industrialists.27 Since the 1970s, a few Muslim entrepreneurs have started to make
inroads into traditionally Hindu-dominated business. However, the business Muslim
entrepreneurs are disproportionately high in those industries in which Muslims already
constitute a large share of the workforce, such as textiles, handicrafts, transport, auto
and appliance mechanics. With access to credit and marketing guidance, they are
expected to succeed more than they do now. In this context, it is to be noted it is the
urban space with significant economic visibility of Muslim communities that has been
a site of communal riots in the “modern” India.28
Sixth, another feature of Muslim middle class in north India is its lower castes roots. As
majority of upper and middle class belong to upper caste migrated to Pakistan, those who
were left in India mostly belong to poor, lower class and lower caste segments of Muslim
population. It is from these lower caste Muslims such as Ansaris (weavers), Qureshis (also
called qassab, i.e. those who deal in animals or slaughter animals), Silawats (masons) of
Rajasthan, many of whom became builders and others that middle class began to
emerge. The reservation of lower caste Muslims in the state educational institutions
and employment opportunity in some of north Indian states as well as in the central gov-
ernment educational institutions and employment structure also facilitated the process of
formation of middle class among Muslims in north India. Thus, Mohammad Sajjad has
noted the role of Muslim politics of making Urdu as a second official language29 of Bihar
and its connectivity with public opportunity structure as well as of Bihar government’s
policy of bringing more and more lower caste Muslim groups within the ambit of govern-
ment’s reservation policies in facilitating the formation of a middle class within the
Muslim community.30 The oil boom of 1970s in the Gulf tremendously helped in
expanding the export market of these lower caste Muslim entrepreneurs. Gradually
along with children of Ashraf (upper caste Muslims), they began to participate in the
domain of higher education that resulted in producing doctors, engineers and other pro-
fessionals. In this context, one has to highlight the role of educational institutions such as
Aligarh Muslim University (Aligarh), Jamia Millia Islamia (New Delhi), Jamia Hamdard
deemed University (New Delhi) and few others that over the years have successfully pro-
duced Muslim professionals that were/are being absorbed within and outside Indian
market, particularly in the Gulf and in turn contributed the formation of middle class
in the Muslim community. This process has continued. The 1990s also was the develop-
ment of the Milli Gazatte, an English-medium newspaper that became the carrier of
Muslim middle class orientation. The economic churning within a section of the
Muslim community and recognition of critical role of modern education in the social
and economic upliftment of individual/community led many members of emerging
Muslim middle class to establish chains of school and colleges with a focus on imparting
professional and technical education to the member of the community, though providing
a quality education in a Muslim-managed education institution remains a challenge.

Formation of Muslim Middle Class in Southern and Western India

Unlike the north India where the bulk of Muslim middle class came from landed gentry
and artisan community in pre-partition days, the Muslim middle class in southern India
was historically formed on the basis of trade, business and entrepreneurship. The
powerful anti-upper caste social and educational movements in south including
 Emergence of Muslim Middle Class in Post-Independence India 131

Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu also made positive
impact on the Muslim communities, helped in expanding their educational and social
opportunities. Unlike in north India where the issue of extension of affirmative policies,
particularly reservation, in public opportunity structure, to the Muslim community has
recently surfaced, the substantial section of Muslims in the south has been, historically
speaking, beneficiary of the affirmative policies of the various successive governments.31
Mattison Mines while writing in the early 1970s provides vivid testimony of the commer-
cial success of the Muslims merchant in Tamil Nadu.32 Achyut Yagnik and Suchitra
Sheth provide how Muslim communities in Gujarat have historically been a part of “mer-
cantile ethos” and have flourished economically.33 According to Omar Khalidi,
as of 2007, there was hardly a town in Gujarat without Chelia restaurants.
Gradually Muslim middle class began to expand from its erstwhile entrepre-
neurial communities such as Bohras, Khojas, Labbes, Memons in Gujarat
and developed an all India profile.34
Moreover, the Partition did not much affect the Muslims in the South. Compared to
north, the flight of Muslim middle class from the south to Pakistan has been much
less. Neither the Muslims faced the kind of hostility of Hindu majoritarian community
and indifferent state that existed and continue to exist in various forms in the north
vis-a-vis Muslim community. As a result, the middle class among the Muslims in
Kerala and other southern states steadily grew in the post-Partition period. For instance,
compared to Hindu Gujaraties, Marwaris and Punjabis who own most medium and
major industries in Hyderabad, with only one in Muslim ownership during 1950–
1980, Muslims now represent 11.97% and 15.48% of the small firms in 1983 and
1994, respectively.35 Gradually Muslims in the south have also set up literally thousands
of institutions that cater to the community—not just madrasas and mosques, but also
schools, colleges, hospitals, orphanages, industrial centers, technical educational insti-
tutions, banks, newspapers and so on. The Sachar Commission Report has noted that lit-
eracy rate among Muslims are higher than the state average in the southern and western
states of Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and on par with other socio-
religious group in Kerala.36
In this context, it may be noted the Muslim access to Gulf market since the 1970s—the
decade of oil boom—was a crucial component in the development of Muslim middle
class in southern India, particularly in Kerala. The Arabic language ability of Kerala
Muslims, thanks to the Kerala government’s patronization of Arabic college, tremen-
dously helped the Kerala Muslims in getting easy access to Gulf market. Though the
Indian government does not provide community-wise classification of Indian diaspora,
Muslims constitute the majority of Indian migrants working in the Gulf. The south
Asian Migration Study (2004), conducted by Centre for Development studies, Thiruva-
nanthapuram, estimated that the annual remittances to Kerala during 2004 was Rs.
18,465 crores, (approximately US$4.6 million) which were 1.74 times the revenue
receipts of the state, 1.8 times of the annual expenditure of the Kerala government and
7 times of what the state received from the central government. The remittances were suf-
ficient to wipe out 60% of the state’s debt in 2003. The remittances in 2003 were 15 times
the export earnings from cashew and 18 times that from marine products. The effect of
remittances on Kerala’s per capita annual income in 2003 was an increase of Rs. 5678.
The Kerala’s per capita income reached 49% above the national average in 1999–
2000. The contribution of remittances to Kerala economy is more significant compared
to its contribution to the overall Indian economy. Compared to Indian economy whose
132 Anwar Alam

share in remittances from all countries is about 3% of the Gross Domestic Product, the
share of Kerala is 22% of Net State Domestic Product.37 Today any casual observer will
identify the district of Mallapuram—the predominantly Muslim dominated area—as
middle class habitation.

The Modi Government (2014–) and Its Implications for the Growth of Middle
Class among Muslims in India
There is considerable fear among the segments of secular intelligentsia and the Muslim
community that the Modi government, given the anti-Muslim mooring of Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), its role in the communal riots and the context of 2002
Gujarat riots, would discriminate and exclude the Muslim community from the informal
and formal opportunity structure of the Indian society. What is the prospect of develop-
ment of the Muslim community in India under the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
government? Would India likely to witness more Gujarat-kind pogrom against Muslims
under the Modi government? Would the Muslim community be further ghettoized,
excluded and marginalized under the Modi government? Would the process of formation
of middle class among the Muslim community be slowed down or rapidly declined under
the present political dispensation?
These questions, though always present, have acquired more propensity chiefly due to
Gujarat riots in 2002 that took place under the chief minister of Mr Modi, who is cur-
rently the Prime Minister of India. Therefore, a brief re-visit to the highly contested,
what is called “Gujarat Model of Development” under the Chief Ministerial tenure of
Mr Modi and its implications for the development of the Muslim community in
Gujarat are required in order to reflect upon the future implication of the Modi govern-
ment for the development of the Muslim community at all India level. The proponents of
this model have mostly relied upon the data of Sachar Commission Report (2006) and
the latest National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) Survey (2012) to demonstrate
how conditions of Muslims under the Modi government have improved far better on
all indicators of Human Development Index (HID) such as education, health, public
employment, health, reduction in poverty in comparison to other states and the national
average.38 Critics, however, point out the relative decline in the prosperity of the Muslim
community during the reign of Modi government on HID using more or less same
sources.39
However, what can be fairly argued is that as generally happened in any neo-liberal
economy the people with some capital (economic, social, political or bureaucratic) are
beneficiary of such economic model, while large magnitude of poor are left behind.
This also happened with neo-liberal economy-based “Gujarat model of development”
under the leadership of Modi. Thus, while a small section of Muslims with economic
and social capital (education, family, social origin and economic capacity) did achieve
economic development despite being ruined in 2002 riots, the vast majority of
Muslims being poor and uneducated or without any quality education remained left
behind. Moreover as Bandukwala has argued that the historical connectivity with
trade, commerce and mercantile ethos helped the Muslim community to regain econ-
omic and educational success despite being ruined in Gujarat pogrom of 2002.40 My
own several visits to Ahmedabad, Bharuch and Kutch, where substantial Muslim popu-
lation lives, conform to the perception of the economic recovery of the Muslim commu-
nity, notwithstanding the very poor representation of Muslims in the power structure of
Gujarat.
 Emergence of Muslim Middle Class in Post-Independence India 133

Second, though attempts have been made to draw a parallel between European fascism
and political Hindutva,41 the possibility of happening of such things in near future is
highly unlikely on multiple grounds. (A) The very diverse structure of Hinduism itself
militates against the one hegemonic and homogenizing national version of Hinduism.
In other words, a talibanization of political Hinduism is not possible. (B) The consti-
tutional fabric of India from above and social diversities of Indian society from below
along with robust system of Indian judiciary and media effectively limit the role of Hin-
dutva in the governance of the country. The fact that the Supreme Court has declared the
parliamentary system of governance, federalism, judicial review, secularism and funda-
mental rights as “basic structure of the constitution”42 and hence beyond the power of
Parliament to amend the constitutional provisions related to them has effectively
limited the legislative power of the government to tinker with the structure of governance
of the country.
Third, the anti-Muslim plank of BJP is to a large extent a political compulsion or an
instrument to consolidate their Hindu vote, not a necessary goal to liquidate or legally
discriminate Muslim. Once in power the BJP has not displayed its keenness to implement
anti-Muslim agenda or rhetoric such as repeal of Article 370, Uniform Civil Code, con-
struction of Ram Mandir, abolition of National Minority Commission, Ministry of
Minority Affairs, National Minority Developmental Financial Corporation (NMDFC),
National Waqf Board, Maulana Azad Education Foundation and various centrally admi-
nistered minority programs such as the modernization of madrassas, Maulana Azad scho-
larship for research (MPhil and Ph.D.), financial assistance for construction of hostel for
minority students, financial assistance for vocational education, free coaching to train
minority students to compete in the public employment opportunities, etc. that often
characterize their politics in public domain. Not only the Modi government has retained
government-related minority institutions and programs, but has also increased the bud-
getary outlay for Ministry of Minority Affairs, NMDFC and Maulana Azad Education
Foundation. In fact, both the government and BJP would like to retain these programs
in order to increase their social base among the Muslims. There is a growing perception
that a section of the Muslim community has voted for the Modi government.
Fourth, India has federal administrative structure and subject matter of governance
and law order rests with state government. It would be indeed difficult on the part of
any central government including the present Modi government to impose specific
anti-minority measures/agenda on the states, even if they desire so. The most recent indi-
cation of this fact is that while RSS and BJP has systematically demanded the abolition of
Article 370 from the Constitution over the last 60 years, the BJP and Prime Minister
Modi during their election campaign in the recently held state assembly election of
Jammu and Kashmir in November 2014 have repeatedly denied such intention of the
BJP and the central government and even promised the maintenance of Article 370
along with development of the state.
In view of the above-mentioned points, it is difficult to visualize that the Modi govern-
ment would constitute the program with a view to exclude the Muslim community from
developmental process of the nation. Neither the Modi government would prefer a large-
scale, if not localized small-scale, communal riots as that would not only vitiate the
national-political environment to attract foreign investment, a key element of Modi’s
vision of economic development of India—the very promise upon which he came to
power at the central level—but would also brought him under greater international scru-
tiny of human and minority rights—something that he would like to avoid.
134 Anwar Alam

What is most likely to happen is that in conjunction with the ideology of Hindu nation-
alism of ruling party, the national security discourse is likely to be dominated by the anti-
Pakistan, anti-Islamic overtone, which in part also serves the function of consolidating the
Hindu constituency. This will likely to increase the “securitisation and policing” of
Muslims in the name of fighting terrorism. The government might initiate tougher
anti-terror law or even revived the much abused Prevention of Terrorist Activities,
which was scrapped by the predecessor Congress Party in view of large-scale protest of
the Muslim community against the misuse of this law against them. This might result
in the illegal confinement of large number of Muslims and misuse of anti-terrorism
law to target the selective individual Muslim businessman by the rival Hindu business-
man, which in turn would adversely affect the confidence of the Muslim community to
participate in the national opportunity structure.

Relationship of Muslim Middle Class with Majoritarian Community and the

Indian State
Muslims in India including its growing segment of middle class relate to the Indian state
through the notion of secularism as articulated and practiced by Nehruvian Congress.
They see their collective wellbeing as linked with this doctrine of secularism. In terms
of this doctrine, they expect from the Indian state not only to provide physical protection
and security but also recognize and affirm their religious and cultural identity in public
arena. The Islamic doctrine of darul aman and darul ahad was invoked to justify and
rationalize the predicaments of Muslim minority in post-colonial India under non-
Muslim political dispensation. According to these Islamic doctrines, Muslims and
non-Muslims have entered upon a mutual contract in India since independence to estab-
lish a secular state under which Muslims would be free to exercise their religious obli-
gations, at least in personal sphere. Thus Muslims see the growing communalization of
Indian state and society as violation of secularism and threat to its identity and culture.

Dominant Political Trends and Orientations

A glance over the statements of various Muslim newspapers, political leaders and social
and religious activists to the series of communal riots including the Gujarat carnage
(2002) reveals a generalized monolithic response: a sense of dejection, alienation,
apathy, inferiority complex, resignation, withdrawal, fear-psychosis, insecurity, existen-
tial dilemma and total loss of faith in state machinery and secularism. This feeling is
widely prevalent cutting across caste, class and regional variations among Muslim com-
munities. Within this generalized Muslims response to Indian state, one discerns the fol-
lowing political trends and orientations operating within the Muslim middle class that
structured its relationship with majoritarian Hindu community and Indian state that
will be examined below.

The Revivalist Trend

First, there is a greater assertion of traditional religious identity among Muslims cutting
across its class, caste and regional variations. Yesterday Muslims with secular outlook are
now increasingly found exhibiting their religious identity whether in terms of attending
mosque, observing Ramadan fast or any other rituals. This trend is very visible at least
among lower and middle-class Muslims. The context of globalization and liberalization,
 Emergence of Muslim Middle Class in Post-Independence India 135

rise of Hindutva and decline of political secularism have strengthened the “process of
Islamization” within the Muslim community, particularly among its lower and middle
segment. For instance Urdu, an erstwhile language of Indian middle and literary class,
is gradually being transformed into all India marker of Muslim/Islamic identity. In
fact, the rate and pace of Islamization among middle-class Muslims in southern and
Western India is far greater than in north, as exhibited in strong identification with
“Urdu” as a language of Muslims, the growing phenomenon of the veil, the increasing
observance of rituals and the proliferation of publications on Islamic literature, the
phenomenon of Islamic bankings and host of other Islamic educational and charitable
organizations.

The Withdrawal Symptom

Second, there is a growing emphasis that Muslims should consciously withdraw them-
selves from the political process and pay attention to economic and educational develop-
ment of the community. This view is more prevalent among the upper middle-class
Muslims. Their argument is that Muslim intervention in state politics has historically
proved counterproductive as it has given the rise of militant Hindutva, hence they
should pay more attention to economics, that is, building community schools, colleges,
hospitals, professional institutions and other resources. In other words, Muslim should
become like Jews. The import of this sentence is that once the community will build the
strong education and economic assets, they would be able to influence the decision-
making process of the state. This viewpoint among a well to-do Muslim section is not
out of the present national context. It has emerged out of the thinking that given the
resource crunch of the state and its gradual withdrawal from social sector under “globa-
lization project” along with the communalization of state sector, Muslims hardly hope to
get anything from shrinking state resources. Since the cost of intervention in political
process is very high without any significant gains, it is better to be indifferent to large pol-
itical discourse and pay attention to the economy and education so as to improve its bar-
gaining capacity in market economy. This has been reflected at least in their low turnout
in times of voting. This section of the Muslim population is getting mentally prepared to
live with the reality of Hindu state provided it gives them security and stable condition to
pursue their economic activities.

Shift in Muslim Politics: From Identity to Development

Third, since mid-1990s “Muslim politics” is increasingly being characterized by an
increasing tendency on the part of dominant section of the Muslim middle class to
form independent Muslim political formations as well as to move from “exclusive
politics of identity” to the “politics of identity and development”. Three factors
underlie this shift. First, as politics of Mandal (caste) and Kamandal (religious)
exhausted its potential by late 1990s, the developmental politics came to acquire
the centre stage in the Indian political process. This process also galvanized a
section of the Muslim community for empowerment. Second, the demolition of
Babri Masjid totally discredited the ashraf-based political and religious leadership in
the community, particularly in north India. As a result, they also focussed on devel-
opmental discourse, particularly demanding 10% reservation for OBC Muslims in
all categories of central public services,43 partly to maintain their hold of leadership
and partly to meet the expectation of restless segment of upper caste Muslims.
136 Anwar Alam

Third, the fragmentation of social and political constituencies during 1980s and 1990s
made the electoral democracy more competitive, thereby increasing the political
weight of the Muslim community for every political party and made a section of
Muslims realized that “Muslim interest” can be better served by through Muslim pol-
itical formation in the era of coalition politics. The combined result of this is that
today the community has become far more politically assertive than was the case in
previous four decades. As a result, various local and regional Muslim political for-
mations such as All India Muslim Front, Peace Party and Ulema Council (Uttar
Pradesh), INSAF Party (UP and Bihar), All India United Assam Democratic Front
(Assam), All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (Hyderabad) and reorganized
Indian Union of Muslim League (Kerala) surfaced on political level with the plank
of identity and developmental discourse. The Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH) has formally
launched “the Welfare Party of India” in April 2011 on all India level. This political
assertion is partly derived from Muslim’s perception of the failure of secular political
parties to address their grievances and partly is also indicative of the formation of size-
able Muslim middle class over the last 50 years in different parts of India. For a long
such political formulation has not been given an institutional shape at all India level
probably for the want of fear that such an initiative might be counterproductive and
will further strengthen and consolidate the communal majoritarian forces. Today
such perception among Muslims is rapidly declining and aspires to play active political
role in the national affairs.

Political Assertion of Subaltern Muslim Class

Fourth, there is a significant development of political assertion of subaltern Muslim
class, principally among the Dalits and OBC Muslims that has risen during the last
two decades.44 This trend also reflects the formation of a sizable section of middle
class within these social groups of the Muslim community and its emerging political
aspiration to have access to political power that is historically concentrated in the
hands of ashraf section of the Muslim community. The movement gained momentum
in the context of “mandalization” of political processes and loss of legitimacy of upper
class/caste religio-political leadership in the wake of demolition of Babri Masjid. The
organized political expression of this movement has been found in the formation of
Pasmanda Muslim Mahaj led by Ali Anwar, All India Backward Muslim Morcha
led by Ajaz Ali and All India Muslim OBCs organization led by Shabir Ahmad
Ansari. While sharing the perspective of social and educational reform within the com-
munities, the basic orientation of these organizations is essentially Mandalite. They
seek to undermine the social and political hegemony of upper class/caste Muslim lea-
dership by dislodging them from their access to state power. Their primary concerns
and demands are to include all backward caste communities among Muslims in the
OBC and SC lists at the state and the central levels. They are staunchly opposed to
any move to extend the benefit of government’s affirmative policies to all Muslims
as they fear that better educated upper caste Muslim middle class will monopolize
the benefits of affirmative policies at their cost. They also seek to pressurize the main-
stream political parties to give more representation to their caste/class in their organ-
izational structure and in ticket distribution at all levels of elections: municipal,
assembly and parliament, in the council of minister and other state aided minorities’
bodies.
 Emergence of Muslim Middle Class in Post-Independence India 137

Development of Islamic Militancy

Last but not the least is growing Islamic radicalization of section of lower, middle and
higher middle-class Muslims in India. This process has resulted in the formation of
Islamic militant groups in India, though their numbers are very few. Some of these mili-
tant groups in India that are alleged to have indulged in the terrorist activities are Student
Islamic Movement of India, al-Umma in Assam, Islamik Sevak Sangh (now operating as
Peoples Democratic Party) and National Democratic Front (NDF) in Kerala and al-
Umma in Tamil Nadu and Indian Mujaheedin (IM). The origin and discourses of
these radical middle-class Islamic outfits are linked to rise of Hindutva and its attack
on life, property and symbols of the Muslim community, increasing loss of faith in the
state machinery, politics of cross-border terrorism and the rise of global Islamic move-
ments with anti-western tone.

Emerging Trends
By way of rounding out the argument, I would like to make a few observations in light of
analysis of this paper. First, the conventional conceptualization of middle class is not ade-
quate enough to measure the size and gauge the orientation of middle class in the min-
ority community, particularly the Muslim minority community in India. Second,
contrary to popular, dominant perspective that highlights the underdevelopment and dali-
tization of Muslim community in post-independence India, this paper demonstrates that in
spite of surmountable obstacles (communal riots, indifferent attitude of state agencies,
construction of majoritarian nationalism, etc.) the process and nature of formation of
middle class in the Muslim community is very much underway in post-independence
India though it varies from region to region. In this regard, the fear and apprehensions
that the Modi government might hamper the growth of Muslim middle class is largely
misplaced, if not completely irrelevant, on account of several structural constraints as
outlined in the text.
In a recent work, Lauren Gayer and Christopher Jafferlot have underlined that in sum
Muslims constitute the “largest poor” in urban cities but found the trajectories of margin-
alization among Muslims in Indian cities as uneven and non-linear and concluded that:
… the most significant development, in this respect, concerns the growth of
Muslim middle class feeding on strategies of extraversion [including the Gulf
connection], the general growth of the Indian economy and a new emphasis
on education, even in ghettos like Juhapura where the gatherings together of
poor and rich Muslim benefits the former.45
Gayer and Jafferlot also noted the caste/class location of emerging Muslim middle class in
India as follows:
More importantly, a new Muslim middle class is emerging here and there,
around economic niches long occupied by Muslims [meat export, leather
goods, Unani medicine] but also beyond the traditional Muslim economy [agri-
business, IT, Pharmaceuticals, real estate]. Moreover this burgeoning middle
class is no longer composed exclusively of traditional mercantile communities
but, increasingly, including successful entrepreneurs hailing from the lowest
section of the Muslim community, such as the Ansaris [a lower caste tradition-
ally associated with weaving] and Quershis [an ‘impure’ caste traditionally
138 Anwar Alam

involved in butchering] as well as Silawarts [mason] and Malis [fruit and veg-
etable sellers].46

Conclusion
It is clear that both endogenous and exogenous factors have contributed to the formation
of middle class in the Muslim community in post-independence India. Internally the
expansion of trade and commerce has led to an increase in the demand for their services
and the income they can command. Traders such as those who practiced as butchers,
tailors, dairymen, greengrocers and others have prospered as a result of the growing pur-
chasing power in the cities. The growing demand for goods and services handled by them
along with increase in the prices of commodities and services has substantially improved
the economic condition of all menial labor groups including those in the Muslim commu-
nities in the urban areas without exception.
It is to be noted here that Muslims constitute a predominantly urban community and
hence have been, directly or indirectly, the beneficiary of developmental works of modern
the state which are mostly urban-centered. The expansion of the economy in post-inde-
pendence India that was given boost during the current phase of liberalization has
increased the volume of trade and commerce within and outside India and added to
the prosperity of the Muslim trading and commercial groups. The factor of oil boom
in the 1970s in the Persian Gulf critically helped in expanding the size of Muslim
middle class by providing employment opportunities to a large number of Muslims, gen-
erating huge remittances and strengthening Muslim entrepreneurs, traders and merchant
class in India and abroad. In addition to this, the government policy of affirmative action
at the central as well as at the state level has also benefited the Muslim community the
degree of which varies from region to region and state to state.
Finally, the paper demonstrates that Muslim middle class is not a homogeneous entity
and as such does not structure its relationship in a homogenized manner visa-vis the
majority community and the state except in a situation of communal threat. Rather, there
are various factions within the Muslim middle class that articulates its own political position
viz a viz the state and the majority community depending upon the specific context.

NOTES
1. Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Com-
munity of India: A Report, Cabinet Secretariat Government of India, New Delhi, November, 2006.
2. The term dalit refers to outcaste social group—the most socially, economically and politically discri-
minated and excluded social group in Indian society that belongs to no caste. Constitutionally, this
social class is referred to as Scheduled Caste. To uplift this community, the central government has
made an affirmative provision of 15.5% reservation in all categories of centrally funded employment
and educational opportunities.
3. Andre Beteille, The Description and Analysis of Classes in Marxism and Class Analysis, Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2007, p. 296.
4. Report on the ‘Conditions of Work and Promotion of Livelihood in the Unorganized Sector’, www.
[Link], retrieved on 12 December 2009.
5. See Rajesh Shukla, ‘Changing Income Demographics and Its Implications for Marketers’, p. 56, http://
[Link]/downloads/MediaClips/Press/RajeshShukla-Articles-India%20Retail%[Link]
(retrieved 30 June 2014).
6. The data in this paragraph have been taken from Arjun Sengupta, K.P. Kannan, G. Raveendran,
“India’s Common People: Who Are They, How Many Are They and How Do They Live?”, Economic
and Politically Weekly, March 15, 2008, pp. 52–53.
 Emergence of Muslim Middle Class in Post-Independence India 139

7. Ibid, p. 54.
8. Sunil Jain, “Castes of Mind: Every Social and Religious Community Is Doing Better in a Growing
Economy”, Indian Express, December 12, 2011.
9. “Muslims in India: Confident in Democracy Despite Economic and Educational Challenges”, http://
[Link]/se/ms/154229/Muslims-India-Confident-Democracy-Despite-Economic-Educational-
[Link] (retrieved 9 August 2012).
10. Yoginder Sikand, Bastions of the Believers: Madrasas and Islamic Education in India, Delhi: Penguin
Books, 2005, p. 95.
11. Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Com-
munity, op. cit. p. 171.
12. Ibid., pp. 166–167. It must be emphasized here that contrary to dominant Muslim public perception, a
low level of Muslim representation in government jobs partly results from low level of Muslim partici-
pation, and not necessarily a result of state discrimination.
13. See Naseem A. Zaidi, “Muslim in the Civil Service”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIX, No. 3,
January 18, 2014, pp. 23–25.
14. Imtiaz Ahmed, “Economic and Social Change”, in Muslims in India, ed. Zafar Imam, New Delhi:
Orient Longman, 1975, p. 251.
15. Brij Raj Chauhan, “Rural–Urban Interactions of Muslim in Meerut Region”, ICSSR Newsletter, April–
June, 1992, p. 54.
16. Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Com-
munity, op. cit. p. 91.
17. Ibid., p. 92.
18. Ibid., p. 103.
19. Muslim groups now receive the benefit of reservation in the states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka,
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal. In Kerala, 12% of jobs are currently reserved for Muslims.
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh brought in 4% and 5% reservation for Muslims in 1994 and 2005,
respectively. In Tamil Nadu and Bihar, Muslims are entitled to reservation under the 30% and
17% category earmarked for OBC. In 2010, the government of West Bengal has also made the pro-
vision of 10% reservation for Muslims in state educational institutions and public services. In addition
to this, some 80 lower caste Muslim groups enjoy the benefit of 27% reservation in the central govern-
ment services and educational institutions as per the Mandal Commission Recommendation.
20. Zarina Bhatty, “Status and Power in a Muslim Dominated Village of Utter Pradesh”, in Caste and
Social Stratification among the Muslims in India, ed. Imtiaz Ahmed, New Delhi: Manohar, 1973, p. 58.
21. Elizabeth A. Mann, “Religion Money and Status: Competition for Resources at the Shrine of Shah
Jamal, Aligarh”, in Muslim Shrines in India, ed. Christian W. Troll, New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1989, pp. 145–171.
22. Majid Husain, “Diffusion of New Agricultural Technology and Its Impact on the Economy and
Society of Muslim Cultivators: A Case Study”, in Muslims in India since Independence: A Regional Per-
spective, ed. M.H. Qureshi, New Delhi: Institute of Objective Studies, 1998, pp. 127–138.
23. Preeti Verma Lal, “Mango Mania”, India Currents, August 2005, pp. 12–18.
24. Omar Khalidi, Muslims in Indian Economy, New Delhi: Three Essays Collective, 2006, p. 87, quoting
S. Vijayagoplan, Economic Status of Handicraft Artisans, New Delhi: National Council for Applied
Economic Research, 1993, p. 9.
25. Omar Khalidi, “Entrepreneurs From Outside the Traditional Mercantile Communities: Muslims in
India’s Private Sector”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, Winter
2008, p. 30.
26. Khalidi, Muslims in Indian Economy, op. cit., p. 65.
27. On Muslim Entrepreneurship, see M. Akbar, Entrepreneurship and Indian Muslims, New Delhi:
Manak, 1990.
28. See Asghar Ali Engineer, Communalism and Communal Violence in India: An Analytical Approach to
Hindu-Muslim Conflict, New Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1989; Communal Riots in Post-independence
India, New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 1991; The Gujarat Carnage, Orient Longman, 2003;
M. J. Akbar, Riot after Riot: Reports on Cast and Communal Violence in India, Penguin Books, 1988.
29. The importance of second official language status lies in the fact that all government notifications and
orders will also be made available in this language as well as the official language. This creates employ-
ment opportunities in terms of appointment of translators in all the departments of the government, as
well as the appointment of teachers in the public schools. Currently, Urdu enjoys the status of second
official language in the states of Bihar and Delhi, in 13 districts in the state of Andhra Pradesh and also
140 Anwar Alam

in certain pockets of Karnataka. In the state of UP, Urdu was declared as a second language in the
western parts of the state in the early 1980s through an ordinance that subsequently lapsed.
30. Mohammad Sajjad, “Language as the Tool of Minority Politics: Urdu, in Bihar, India, 1951–1989”,
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, May 2014, p. 13.
31. See Tanweer Fazal, “Between Identity and Equity : An Agenda for Affirmative Action for Muslims”,
in Religion, Community and Development: Changing Contours of Politics and Policy in India, eds. Gurpreet
Mahajhan and Surinder S. Jodhka, New Delhi: Routledge, 2010, pp. 237–242.
32. Mattison Mines, Muslims Merchants: The Economic Behaviour of an Indian Muslim Community, New
Delhi: Sri Ram Centre, 1972, p. 111.
33. Achyut Yagnik and Suchitra Sheth, The Shaping of Modern Gujarat: Plurality, Hindutva and Beyond,
New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005, Chapter 2, “Mercantile Ethos”, pp. 19–38.
34. See Omar Khalidi, “Entrepreneurs from Outside the Traditional Mercantile Communities: Muslims
in India’s Private Sector”, op. cit.
35. Ibid., n. 27, p. 163.
36. Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Com-
munity, op. cit., p. 53.
37. For these data, see “Abdul Azeez and Mustiary Begum, Gulf Migration, Remittances and Economic
Impact”, Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2009, pp. 55–60. [Link]
Journals/JSS/JSS-20-0-000-09-Web/JSS-20-1-000-09-Abst-PDF/JSS-20-01-055-09-650-Azeez-A/
[Link] (retrieved 8 August 2012).
38. See Surjit S. Bhalla, “Lessons to Be Learnt from Narendra Modi’s Gujarat”, The Financial Express,
October 26, 2013, [Link]
1187235; Madhu Purnima Kishwar, “Narendra Modi Through the Eyes of Gujarati Muslims, Chris-
tians and … ”, Manushi, [Link]
(retrieved 8 June 2012); Asifa Khan and Zafar Sareshwala, “Debunking the ‘facts’ on Narendra
Modi and Muslims”, [Link]
muslims-1218661html (retrieved 8 June 2012); Kanchan Srivastava, “Muslims Prosper in Gujarat
and Kerela, UP, Bihar the Worst”, [Link]
gujarat-and-kerala-up-bihar-the-worst-1971244; Arun Rajnath, “Modi Emerging as Popular Leader
of Muslims in Gujarat”, [Link]
popular-leader-of-Muslims-in-Gujarat (retrieved 8 June 2012).
39. Muslims in Gujarat: A Reality Check, [Link]
gujarat-reality-check(retrieved 10 June 2014), Abusaleh Shariff, “Gujarat Shining! Relative Develop-
ment of Gujarat and Socio-Religious Differentials”, USIP Occasional Paper No 2, April 2012, US
India Policy Institute, pp. 1–19, [Link]
[Link] (retrieved 10 June 2012); Sanjeev Kumar, “Development of Gujarat
Muslims”, The Kashmir Walla: A Magazine of Art, Politics and Society, [Link]
com/2014/04/development-gujarat-muslims/ (retrieved 10 June 2012).
40. J.S. Bandukwala, “The State of Muslims in Gujarat Today”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.
XLVII, No. 33, August 18, 2012.
41. See Achin Vanaik, “Situating the Threat of Hindu Nationalism: Problems with Fascist Paradigm”,
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXIX, No. 28, July 9, 1994, pp. 729–748.
42. For details see “The Basic Structure of Indian Constitution, Compiled by Venkatesh Nayak”, http://
[Link]/publications/const/the_basic_structure_of_the_indian_constitution.
pdf (retrieved 25 June 2012).
43. In fact, recently the central government conceded 4.5% reservation for Muslims within the 27% reser-
vation for OBC community but Indian Court struck down the same, calling religion-based reservation
as unconstitutional.
44. See a series of articles on this dimension in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 46,
November 15, 2003.
45. See Lauren Gayer and Christopher Jafferlot , “Conclusion: In their Place? The Trajectories of Margin-
alisations of India’s Urban Muslims”, in Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalisation, eds.
Lauren Gayer and Christopher Jafferlot, New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2012, p. 320.
46. Ibid., p. 312.
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