Champion Briefs

January 2025
Public Forum Brief

Resolved: The African Union should

grant diplomatic recognition to the
Republic of Somaliland as an
independent state.
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The Evidence Standard January 2025

The Evidence Standard

Speech and Debate provides a meaningful and educational experience to all who are involved.

We, as educators in the community, believe that it is our responsibility to provide resources

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the goals and vision of this activity.

These seven statements, while simple, represent the complex notion of what it means to

advance students’ understanding of the world around them, as is the purpose of educators.

Champion Briefs 5
Letter from the Editor January 2025

Letter from the Editor

This debate topic offers an excellent opportunity for students to explore the

complexities of statehood, self-determination, and regional stability in Africa. However, it also

presents unique challenges that debaters must navigate carefully. While the topic is engaging

and relevant, its nuances require significant research and understanding of international law,

African geopolitics, and the historical context of Somaliland.

One key challenge is the need to clarify what “diplomatic recognition” entails and its

implications for Somaliland, the African Union, and other member states. Another

consideration is the tension between the principle of self-determination and the African

Union’s historical commitment to maintaining colonial-era borders. The debate topic implicitly

requires students to address this balance, but understanding why the African Union prioritizes

territorial integrity—especially in a continent with a history of colonial division—requires

significant contextual knowledge. Without this foundation, debaters might struggle to engage

deeply with the AU’s perspective and the broader consequences of recognizing Somaliland.

Additionally, the resolution assumes that granting recognition is solely within the AU’s

authority, but this overlooks other actors in the international system. Recognition is a multi-

faceted process involving not only regional organizations like the AU but also the United

Nations, individual states, and global powers.

Ultimately, this topic challenges students to think critically about sovereignty,

governance, and the role of regional organizations. To succeed, debaters must engage with

both theoretical and practical aspects of recognition, equipping themselves with a deep

understanding of Somaliland’s unique position and the African Union’s broader mission.

Yair Fraifeld
Editor-in-Chief

Champion Briefs 6
Table of Contents January 2025

Table of Contents

The Evidence Standard ........................................................................ 5

Letter from the Editor ......................................................................... 6

Table of Contents ................................................................................ 7

Topic Analyses................................................................................... 10
Topic Analysis By Yair Fraifeld................................................................................................... 11
Topic Analysis By Rachel Mauchline ......................................................................................... 16
Topic Analysis By Thadeus Smith .............................................................................................. 24

General Information.......................................................................... 30

Pro Arguments. ................................................................................. 48

PRO: Somaliland has a more stable government than Somalia. .............................................. 49
PRO: African Union Recognition grants Somaliland international legitimacy .......................... 52
PRO: Recognition of Somaliland strengthens international legitimacy of Taiwan ................... 55
PRO: African Union recognition of Somaliland is a prerequisite to United States recognition 59
PRO: Without recognition, Somaliland’s people lack an international advocate .................... 62
PRO: International recognition reduces Somaliland’s reliance on remittances ....................... 65
PRO: International recognition strengthens the state of Somaliland’s democracy ................. 68
PRO: Recognizing Somaliland could set a new precedent for Africa to deviate away from
violence ..................................................................................................................................... 72
PRO: Recognizing Somaliland encourages Jubaland to advocate for independence ............... 79
PRO: Recognizing Somaliland prevents proxy warfare in the region ....................................... 87
PRO: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access to IMF and World
Bank assistance ......................................................................................................................... 93
PRO: Recognition of statehood would enable the development of strong ties to the U.S...... 99
PRO: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access to international
markets and global trade ........................................................................................................ 105
PRO: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access to military aid ....... 110
PRO: Recognition of statehood enables counterterror support, undermining al-Shabaab ... 113

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Table of Contents January 2025

Pro Responses to Con Arguments .................................................... 116

A/2: Granting independence encourages other secessionist movements in Africa. ............. 117
A/2: Somaliland will be economically taken advantage of by predatory lending. ................. 121
A/2: Recognition causes backlash from the Somali government. .......................................... 125
A/2: Recognition would worsen the Somali Civil War. ........................................................... 129
A/2: Recognition is an extension of Colonialism. ................................................................... 132
A/2: The African Union recognizing Somaliland is purely symbolic and not worth the risk of
enhanced tensions. ................................................................................................................. 135
A/2: Recognizing Somaliland could lead to violence between Egypt and Ethiopia. .............. 143
A/2: There are better alternatives for a peaceful future in Somaliland. ................................ 151
A/2: Recognizing Somaliland could lead to economic disaster in the country. ..................... 158
A/2: Recognizing Somaliland encourages other Somali provinces to split from Somalia. ..... 164
A/2: Recognizing Somaliland would divert the African Union’s resources and attention from
more pressing issues ............................................................................................................... 171
A/2: Recognizing Somaliland will alienate donors and development organizations that favor a
unified Somali state ................................................................................................................ 173
A/2: Recognizing Somaliland prematurely rewards the state without it first making progress
on human rights and governance challenges ......................................................................... 175
A/2: Recognizing Somaliland at this stage undermines the African Union’s status as a neutral
arbiter in conflicts occurring within the continent ................................................................. 177
A/2: Recognizing Somaliland harms the African Union’s relations with Somalia’s allies ....... 179

Con Arguments ............................................................................... 181

CON: Granting independence encourages other secessionist movements in Africa ............. 182
CON: Somaliland will be economically taken advantage of by predatory lending ................ 186
CON: Recognizing Somaliland causes backlash from the Somali government ....................... 190
CON: Recognizing Somaliland would worsen the Somali Civil War........................................ 194
CON: Recognizing Somaliland reinforces colonial boundaries ............................................... 198
CON: The African Union recognizing Somaliland is purely symbolic and not worth the risk of
enhanced tensions .................................................................................................................. 201
CON: Recognizing Somaliland could lead to violence between Egypt and Ethiopia .............. 207
CON: There are better alternatives for a peaceful future in Somaliland ............................... 214
CON: Recognizing Somaliland could lead to economic disaster in the country ..................... 222
CON: Recognizing Somaliland encourages other Somali provinces to split from Somalia .... 228
CON: Recognizing Somaliland would divert the African Union’s resources and attention from
more pressing issues ............................................................................................................... 235
CON: Recognizing Somaliland will alienate donors and development organizations that favor
a unified Somali state.............................................................................................................. 238
CON: Recognizing Somaliland prematurely rewards the state without it first making progress
on human rights and governance challenges ......................................................................... 242

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Table of Contents January 2025

CON: Recognizing Somaliland at this stage undermines the African Union’s status as a neutral
arbiter in conflicts occurring within the continent ................................................................. 245
CON: Recognizing Somaliland harms the African Union’s relations with Somalia’s allies ..... 248

Con Responses to Pro Responses .................................................... 251

A/2: Somaliland has a more stable government than Somalia .............................................. 252
A/2: African Union recognition grants Somaliland international legitimacy .......................... 255
A/2: Recognition of Somaliland strengthens international legitimacy of Taiwan .................. 258
A/2: African Union recognition of Somaliland is a prerequisite to U.S. recognition .............. 262
A/2: Without recognition, Somaliland’s people lack an international advocate ................... 265
A/2: International recognition reduces Somaliland’s reliance on remittances ...................... 268
A/2: International recognition strengthens the state of Somaliland’s democracy ................ 271
A/2: Recognizing Somaliland could set a new precedent for Africa to deviate away from
violence ................................................................................................................................... 274
A/2: Recognizing Somaliland encourages Jubaland to advocate for independence .............. 280
A/2: Recognizing Somaliland prevents proxy warfare in the region ...................................... 287
A/2: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access to IMF and World Bank
assistance ................................................................................................................................ 294
A/2: Recognition of statehood would enable the development of strong ties to the U.S..... 299
A/2: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access to international
markets and global trade ........................................................................................................ 306
A/2: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access to military aid. ....... 310
A/2: Recognition of statehood enables counterterror support, undermining al-Shabaab. ... 313

Champion Briefs 9
Champion Briefs
January 2025
Public Forum Brief

Topic Analyses
Topic Analysis by Yair Fraifeld January 2025

Topic Analysis By Yair Fraifeld

Resolved: The African Union should grant diplomatic recognition to the Republic of

Somaliland as an independent state.

Introduction

The resolution, “Resolved: The African Union should grant diplomatic recognition to the

Republic of Somaliland as an independent state,” dives into the heart of African geopolitics,

identity, and self-determination. Somaliland, located in the Horn of Africa, declared

independence from Somalia in 1991 following the collapse of Somalia’s central government.

Since then, Somaliland has operated with its own government, constitution, and security forces.

However, it remains unrecognized internationally, including by the African Union (AU). This

debate topic challenges students to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of granting Somaliland

official recognition as an independent state, balancing the principles of self-determination with

concerns about regional stability and the precedent it might set for other separatist

movements.

Strategy Considerations

When debating this resolution, it’s important to clarify key terms and focus on the

implications of diplomatic recognition by the African Union.

First, what is Somaliland? Understanding Somaliland’s history and its current status is

critical. Somaliland was a British protectorate before joining Italian Somaliland to form Somalia

in 1960. Its declaration of independence in 1991 was driven by years of conflict and

marginalization under Somalia’s central government. Since then, Somaliland has built a

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Topic Analysis by Yair Fraifeld January 2025

functioning democracy with a stable economy and relative peace compared to the rest of

Somalia. Highlighting these factors can bolster affirmative arguments.

Second, what does diplomatic recognition mean? Diplomatic recognition is more than

symbolic—it grants a state legitimacy on the international stage, allowing it to enter treaties,

join international organizations, and access development funding. Affirmatives should frame

recognition as a necessary step for Somaliland to thrive. Negatives, however, might argue that

recognition is not a panacea and could exacerbate existing tensions.

Third, what are some of the broader implications for the African Union? The AU has

traditionally opposed recognizing secessionist movements to maintain the territorial integrity of

African states. The legacy of colonial borders complicates this further, as recognizing Somaliland

might encourage other separatist movements across the continent, like in Ethiopia’s Tigray or

Nigeria’s Biafra region. Both sides should consider how this decision affects the AU’s principles

and its role in African geopolitics.

And finally, an emphasis on a focus on regional stability. The Horn of Africa is a volatile

region plagued by terrorism, piracy, and economic instability. Affirmatives should argue that

recognizing Somaliland could stabilize the region by encouraging development and

cooperation. Negatives, however, might claim that recognition could destabilize Somalia and

fuel further conflicts.

Affirmative Arguments

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Topic Analysis by Yair Fraifeld January 2025

A common argument is that recognition validates Somaliland’s democratic

achievements. Somaliland has demonstrated its ability to function as a sovereign state with

democratic elections, peaceful transitions of power, and stable governance. Granting

recognition would reward and encourage democratic values in a region where they are often

lacking. Somaliland’s government has proven it can provide services to its citizens and maintain

security, showing it deserves recognition as a legitimate state.

Next, recognition could promote regional stability. Recognition of Somaliland could

stabilize the Horn of Africa by creating a cooperative and peaceful state in a troubled region.

Somaliland has maintained peace within its borders, which could serve as a model for other

regions. Diplomatic recognition would allow Somaliland to join international organizations and

receive development assistance, strengthening its economy and security infrastructure.

It is also important to look at historical and legal justification. Somaliland has a strong

historical case for independence. Before merging with Somalia, it was a separate British

protectorate. Affirmatives can argue that Somaliland’s declaration of independence simply

restores its previous sovereignty. Furthermore, international law recognizes the right of

peoples to self-determination, and Somaliland meets the criteria for statehood under the

Montevideo Convention (permanent population, defined territory, government, and the

capacity to enter relations with other states).

Finally, there may be humanitarian benefits. Recognition would allow Somaliland to

access international aid and loans from institutions like the World Bank or the International

Monetary Fund (IMF). This funding could improve infrastructure, healthcare, and education for

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Topic Analysis by Yair Fraifeld January 2025

its citizens. Without recognition, Somaliland remains ineligible for many of these opportunities,

perpetuating poverty and underdevelopment.

Negative Arguments

A common negative argument is that recognition could set a destabilizing precedent for

Africa. Recognizing Somaliland could set a dangerous precedent for secessionist movements

across Africa. The AU has historically prioritized preserving colonial-era borders to prevent

conflicts. If Somaliland gains recognition, it might embolden other separatist groups, leading to

a wave of fragmentation and instability. This could worsen existing conflicts in regions like

Ethiopia, Cameroon, or Nigeria.

Next, there may be risks to Somalia’s fragile stability. Recognition could destabilize

Somalia, a country already grappling with internal conflict and terrorism. Losing Somaliland

would weaken Somalia’s economy, as Somaliland controls valuable ports and trade routes. It

could also deepen divisions within Somalia, leading to more separatist movements or

resentment from Somali leadership.

There is also questionable viability for Somaliland as a state. While Somaliland has made

progress, it still faces significant challenges, including high unemployment, reliance on

remittances, and limited international trade. Recognition might not address these issues and

could even create new pressures, such as heightened scrutiny or diplomatic conflicts. Negatives

can argue that Somaliland should focus on building its economy and infrastructure before

seeking recognition.

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Topic Analysis by Yair Fraifeld January 2025

Finally, recognition could undermine African unity. The AU was founded on the principle

of promoting unity and cooperation among African states. Recognizing Somaliland might

weaken this unity, as some member states could oppose the decision and withdraw support for

the AU. Negatives might argue that maintaining continental solidarity is more important than

granting recognition to a single entity.

Conclusion

The debate over whether the African Union should grant diplomatic recognition to

Somaliland as an independent state revolves around questions of legitimacy, stability, and

precedent. The affirmative side focuses on Somaliland’s achievements, its historical claim to

independence, and the potential benefits of recognition for both Somaliland and the region.

Meanwhile, the negative side raises concerns about destabilizing Africa, weakening Somalia,

and undermining the AU’s principles of unity and territorial integrity.

For high school debaters, this topic offers a rich field of argumentation, blending history,

international law, and geopolitical strategy. Success in this debate will depend on

understanding the complexities of Somaliland’s situation, framing the broader implications for

Africa, and crafting persuasive narratives that weigh the risks and rewards of diplomatic

recognition.

About Yair Fraifeld

Yair Fraifeld is a former competitor in Public Forum, where he competed at national

tournaments for Trinity Preparatory School in Orlando, FL. Yair was invited to several round

robins and the Tournament of Champions and ranked seventh at the NSDA National

Tournament. Yair holds a Bachelor of Science in Entertainment Management from the

University of Central Florida, and is the Executive Office Assistant at Destination DC,

Washington D.C.’s official convention and visitors bureau.

Champion Briefs 15
Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline January 2025

Topic Analysis By Rachel Mauchline

Resolved: The African Union should grant diplomatic recognition to the Republic of

Somaliland as an independent state.

Introduction

Welcome to the start of 2025! Hopefully, everyone will/did have a relaxing break from

competition and preparation. While this topic analysis will focus on the specific intricacies of

the January PF topic, it is important to consider the adjustment of topic release dates in the

Spring compared to the Fall. As we delve into the structure of PF topics being monthly rather

than bi-monthly, I encourage students to be aware of how their prep structure may change, as

students will be focusing on two topics at the same time. As students begin to prepare for this

topic in the month of January, students will also be aware of the February topic on January 1.

Therefore, it is critical for teams/debaters to create strategies that allow them to develop still

in-depth topic knowledge while not burning out due to time management concerns. Utilizing

briefs and topic analysis, like this one, provides debaters a glance into the key stock arguments

that will be seen on the topic to help shape their preparation work going forward.

The primary question that I ask when examining a topic begins with a simple question:

Why was this topic selected? With the emphasis on the majority of United States-specific topics

over the last few years, this topic is a shift away from that. Honestly, I love this. This topic

provides an opportunity for students to engage in literature that they may not have knowledge

of prior to debating. Thus, again, the importance of learning about the topic is highlighted. But

that doesn't answer the question as to why this topic is being debated. As a classroom

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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline January 2025

educator, I believe it is vitally important that students learn more about the world around them

and learn about topics possibly beyond the scope of what they learn in standard classroom

curriculum. This is a topic that has become more of a conversation in the news. If you go into

Google News and search Somaliland, articles continue to be published recently about their lack

of recognition from the world. Considering that Somaliland has been attempting to be

recognized internationally since the 1991 Somali Civil War, it's important to analyze why this

topic is being debated now. This topic analysis addresses the overarching consideration that

debaters need to keep in mind.

The final component to introducing this topic analysis is that students need to invest

time in developing an understanding of the real-world implications of such a geopolitically

relevant topic. I'd encourage students to spend time understanding how the action of this

resolution impacts the many parties involved. One of the best sources that I found in my

preliminary research was from the Council of Foreign Relations. Beyond this brief, this article

provides a clear overarching topic of knowledge of the history and the role Somaliland has on

the international scope. I'd urge students to use this to help with their understanding of the

topic. Topic knowledge is a vital component to be successful on a topic, especially when judges

will possibly not have the topic knowledge that students will gather. Hopefully, this brief will

assist in preparing for January, with many local and national tournaments on the calendar to

start the year.

Strategy Considerations

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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline January 2025

With any topic, it is vital to examine the possible strategic considerations that will

impact both sides of the topic. As this topic has a vast historical context, it is the most prevalent

strategic consideration that will impact the stance of both teams. It's important that teams

don't focus on giving a history lesson to the judge but instead use historical understanding to

shape a current awareness and argument for the topic. I really don’t want this topic analysis to

become a history lesson either, so I’ve created bullet points that shape the history of the topic –

This is NOT a comprehensive list, but it gives a good starting point for understanding.

- Somaliland was a former British protectorate – Separate from Italian Somaliland.

- Somaliland gained independence on June 26, 1960, and unified with Italian Somaliland

- Unification caused conflict based on the Somali Republic’s constitution from 1961

- Siad Barre served as a Dictator from 1969 to 1991 after a coup that fragmented Somalia

further and led to economic harm and human rights violations.

- Somaliland declared independence in 1991 after the civil war, and Barre being ousted

- Somaliland had a referendum in 2001 that indicated that 97% of the people supported

the call for independence

- Somaliland fails to be recognized on the international level

- Ethiopia–Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) occurred on January 1,

2024, highlighting the potential recognition of Somaliland as an independent state

- Countries such as Somalia and Egypt condemn the Memorandum of Understanding

(MoU)

- Presidential and Parliamentary Election occurred in Somaliland in November 2024 with

the Waddani Party (the opposition for 14 years) defeating the Kulmiye Party.

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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline January 2025

While this is a timeline of history, the most recent updates of the Memorandum of

Understanding and the Presidential Election highlight the timeliness of the topic. First, the

Memorandum of Understanding highlights a signal of change to the region. This MoU has a

quid pro quo arrangement; Somaliland leases some of the Gulf of Aden coastline to Ethiopia,

and in return, Ethiopia recognizes Somaliland as an independent state in the future. This

dynamic of such an arrangement, especially being the first UN member to recognize

Somaliland, did infuriate other actors such as Somalia and Egypt. Somalia’s constitution dictates

Somaliland as a piece of Somalia and, therefore, can't legally recognize the agreement with

Ethiopia. Egypt promptly stood behind Somalia with their statement quickly condemning and

maintaining the stance that Somaliland is part of Somalia. This divide has continued to ripple. In

fact, as I’m working on this topic analysis, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan met with both

leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia separately to discuss trade and also to provide mediation to

both countries. This again highlights how the topic will continue to unfold more based on

updates throughout the month. This action occurred on December 11 – so I’d recommend

debaters have some news alerts set up for over the holiday season. No, that doesn't mean

doing debate work every day, but at least keeping an eye on the news that is occurring

periodically.

The other current update on this situation mentioned above was the Presidential and

Parliamentary Election that occurred in Somaliland in November. This election was actually

pushed back due to timelines and voter registration issues. However, this election highlights the

importance of integrity and engagement. The opposition Waddani Party won with the

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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline January 2025

candidate Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, and Somaliland had the first peaceful transition of

power in history. It is also uniquely interesting to examine this through the lens of the United

States presidential election. There are "several leading US Department of State officials who

worked on Africa policy during Republican leader Donald Trump’s first term have publicly

voiced support for recognizing Somaliland.” (Al Jazeera, November 2024) Therefore, it will be

interesting to see how the topic may even have an updated analysis specifically after the

inauguration on January 20. It would be curious for teams to examine if the United States

recognizes Somaliland and what that means for other UN members. What would the backlash

be from other countries? How would that influence credibility?

As we approach the one-year mark of the MoU, along with the recent outcome of the

presidential election, it is important to understand how those actions will influence the

positioning of Somaliland on a regional and international scale. The Horn of Africa continues to

become an area that is one to watch for analysts and individuals invested in the region. Teams

on both sides should consider the legal, international, political, economic, and regional

implications of affirming or negating the diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Somaliland as

an independent state. There continues to be more literature that is posted that is timely and

takes into account both sides of this controversial issue, and will certainly help shape

arguments for both sides.

Overall, the strategy of this debate on both sides needs to consider the ramifications of the

action. Both sides need to answer the central question: Do the harms or the benefits outweigh

the changes in how Somaliland will be recognized in the year 2024? This leads to the debate

being viewed as a set of scales. It's critical that debaters are aware of how their position is

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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline January 2025

established based on current events. The Economist published an article in November that was

really helpful in understanding the timely nature of this debate. Hopefully, this provides some

guidance in the strategy – without being too history-based.

Affirmative Arguments

With this topic, the affirmative is defending a change in the status quo that has been

how Somaliland has been viewed since 1991. This is a natural uphill battle because individuals

have a natural inclination to fear change. Therefore, the affirmative has a natural burden to

respond to the concerns that individuals, countries, and the global community may have. There

are a couple of different stock arguments that this topic analysis will highlight, but there are

certainly many stances that the pro teams could take to defend the change. The overarching

component of this debate will be focusing on the benefits of self-determination for Somaliland

and the international community at large. Let’s isolate two key arguments that pro teams could

make.

First is the economic benefits that Somaliland could access for international recognition.

Currently, due to the limitations in Somaliland's recognition, they are limited in the economic

markets and institutions that they can engage with. This, in turn, limited the ability Somaliland

had in specific trade, even with its prime geographic position to be a hub for maritime trade.

Allowing Somaliland to be recognized as an independent state would garner economic benefits

not only for Somaliland but also for the surrounding regional economies that could use such a

port for their own increased trade relationships. This stability can also impact the global

economy, which will be a strong impact magnifier for teams.

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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline January 2025

Second is the partnership that can be formed with Somaliland and other regional

countries to tackle security threats and other factors that cause instability. The Horn of Africa is

on the brink of a security risk, with tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia rising due to the

MoU. If the African Union recognized the Republic of Somaliland, what would that mean for

these tensions? There is also the potential that Somaliland could partner with other countries

to tackle security threats such as terrorism in the region. Somaliland doesn't have credibility in

the status quo as they aren't recognized on a diplomatic level to engage. There are many

impacts that teams could read with this argument logic, but it's important to prove specifically

why the recognition is key to security alliance partnerships and the long-term stability of the

Horn of Africa.

Negative Arguments

The negative aspect of this topic has history inherently on its side, as from 1991 to the

present day, there has been a negation stance on Somaliland - not being an internationally

recognized nation. Therefore, there are some compelling arguments for why change should not

occur. Let’s focus on two specific arguments that I could see being common on this topic.

The first of those in the precedent set with such an action. By recognizing Somaliland as

an independent state, it sets a precedent that other countries could follow. In turn, such an

action could uniquely hurt the sovereignty of Somalia while also setting a standard that such a

call for independence could lead to successionist movements. There are already worries from

the African Union directly that "fears the creation of yet another nexus of instability in the Horn

of Africa, or the setting of a precedent for a secessionist movement” (GIS Report, 2024)

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Topic Analysis by Rachel Mauchline January 2025

Therefore, this potential instability could impact beyond the scope of the original intention and

spark other movements that could have unintended negative consequences.

The second con argument to focus on is the meaning of the African Union recognition.

This is more of a defensively based argument, but it is based on the question of what AU

recognition means. Often, the United Nations is the organization that guides others in making

such decisions. The choice of the African Union as the actor in the resolution was interesting.

Con teams could certainly make the defensive argument that even if the AU recognizes, that

doesn't mean that members of the UN will fall in line with that interpretation. There is probably

a compelling argument about the possible fracturing that will magnify a lack of agreement on

this issue. This argument highlights the lack of a clear line on how to determine if Somaliland

meets the criteria for recognition as an independent state. The impacts of this argument

beyond fracturing are also just general rifts between countries – as is already being highlighted

between Ethiopia and Somalia.

I hope this topic analysis is helpful and has provided a brief preview of the

argumentation/considerations to keep in mind in January. Wishing you the best start to 2025 in

debate ☺ Good luck!

Champion Briefs 23
Topic Analysis by Thadeus Smith January 2025

Topic Analysis By Thadeus Smith

Resolved: The African Union should grant diplomatic recognition to the Republic of

Somaliland as an independent state.

Introduction

It's a bit rare for PF topics to have a mandate – Oftentimes, the vote is highly close, with

the difference between the two choices being just a couple of percentage points. Sometimes,

the student vote is decisive, but those voices are overruled by the value of the coach vote. This

topic, however, was selected decisively – 67% of the coach vote and 62% of the student vote.

This does not mean much for what you do in round, but it is something interesting to note

before we dive into the analysis.

This topic is part of the NSDA’s efforts to broaden the scope of Public Forum Debate,

which often has a focus on domestic topics. The topic this month is highly relevant, with the

incoming Trump administration already discussing potential recognition, but teams should be

careful to remember that the topic is not about the United States extending recognition –

Instead, we’re focusing on whether or not the African Union should extend recognition to the

Republic of Somaliland. That distinction is small but crucial because it means most cases will

need to focus on intra-Africa impacts rather than possible benefits to the United States (or at

least will have to do more work to connect topics to the United States.

The nice thing about a topic that is so timely is the wide range of literature available on

the topic. The first thing I recommend teams do is find what I refer to as a "seminal article" – An

article that provides a wide range of background on the topic. There are several options

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Topic Analysis by Thadeus Smith January 2025

available to teams on this front – The Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation,

and the Center for Justice and Accountability all have good overviews. Interestingly, there is a

lot of agreement between think tanks on both sides of the political spectrum. You will be hard-

pressed to find scholars who refuse to see any benefits in granting Somaliland international

recognition. This implies a lack of Negative ground, but as you will see later in this analysis, I do

not think this is the case.

As always, this analysis will begin by focusing on strategic considerations with the topic

before moving on to discuss affirmative and negative arguments. You should use this analysis,

along with the arguments in the brief itself, to guide your case development.

Strategy Considerations

The history of Somaliland has a deeply complicated colonial history that is,

unfortunately for lay rounds, somewhat important for teams to explain for arguments to make

sense. Brittanica has an excellent overview of the history, but the relevant parts for your cases

start in the 19th century. The area that Somaliland occupies was claimed by three different

colonial powers – Italy, Britain, and France. These different zones modified borders over time,

with the Italian and British areas combining in 1960 to become the “Republic of Somali” and the

French area becoming the independent nation of Djibouti in 1977. Throughout the 1980s,

Somalia faced authoritarian rule until the 1991 civil war, which resulted in the area of

Somaliland declaring independence. That independence was widely supported by residents of

Somaliland, which has quickly become a democratic area – Since 2003, the country has held

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Topic Analysis by Thadeus Smith January 2025

elections and had peaceful transitions of power. Despite that, they have never been recognized

internationally.

In the past year, Somaliland has made greater strides towards recognition, signing a

Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia to allow the country to open a port in Somaliland

in exchange for recognition. This was fiercely opposed by Somalia, which still views Somaliland

as part of itself (similarly to how China views Taiwan). In December 2024, Somalia and Ethiopia

came to an agreement to allow the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal to move forward, with Ethiopia’s

recognition of Somaliland becoming official. It is likely that more news breaks over the next

month, so teams should monitor the news here.

Past these historical discussions, teams need to consider ways to incorporate domestic

interests into this debate naturally. I think a very common mistake on this topic will be

inadvertently writing about the benefits of American recognition without clearly linking African

Union recognition to the United States – We’ll discuss this in more detail in the next section.

Affirmative Arguments

I think that the Affirmative in this debate will focus on a few stock arguments: First,

economic considerations; second, institutional democracy benefits; and third, military benefits.

Let’s start with the economic benefits. Right now, Somaliland is ineligible from participating in

what I would describe as the “international system” – This includes trade agreements like the

African Continental Free Trade Area and also includes international lenders like the IMF and the

World Bank. As a result of that lack of access, Somaliland’s economy is highly limited, and the

government is incredibly reliant on remittances to fund basic services when Somaliland gets

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Topic Analysis by Thadeus Smith January 2025

international recognition; however, that changes because they can quickly increase

government funding and will have a greater ability to import goods.

The second stock argument here has to do with the benefits of institutional democracy.

While Somaliland has maintained a functioning democracy for twenty years, that has very much

beaten the odds given their situation, and they've been forced to delay elections in the past –

For example, the 2022 election was postponed until 2024 because the government could not

afford to run it. When countries enter the international system and get access to institutional

lenders, those loans often come with conditions that require democratic reforms. In addition,

being treated as equals in international systems provides an incentive for Somaliland's

government to remain functioning, as once they are recognized, they will not want to lose that

recognition.

The last stock argument I think will come up on the Affirmative has to do with possible

military benefits. Here, I want to shift gears and talk about the United States. The State

Department has said that the United States will not be recognizing Somaliland until after it

receives African Union recognition. This recognition could not come at a better time, however,

because the United States maintains an extremely important drone base in the neighboring

country of Djibouti. Over the last several years, however, Djibouti has grown closer to China,

and there are intelligence concerns that may prompt the United States to seek other

partnerships to combat terrorism in the region. Somaliland could very well fill that gap, with

insiders in the incoming administration stating as much in interviews.

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Topic Analysis by Thadeus Smith January 2025

Negative Arguments

On the negative, I again think there are three main stock arguments. The first has to do

with institutional lending, the second has to do with secession groups, and the last has to do

with colonialism. Let’s start with institutional lending. The main reason Somaliland does not

receive significant IMF or World Bank loans in the status quo is because they do not have

international recognition. When that changes, it’s likely that their government will apply for

significant loans in order to ramp up government services and the economy. IMF loans come

with conditions that tend to require advanced austerity measures – Those measures lead to

extraordinarily negative impacts on regular citizens because they tend to cut human services

and welfare programs, potentially plunging the country even further into poverty.

The second argument has to do with secession groups. A key reason why Somaliland has

not been recognized in the squo is fears that recognizing one secession group in Africa will

embolden other groups who feel they deserve the same treatment. Teams will have a wide

range of impact scenarios to draw from here – There are hundreds of active rebel groups across

Africa that could be emboldened by Somaliland receiving recognition. In the Horn of Africa

alone, those groups have caused incredible amounts of damage and civilian casualties in recent

years.

The last stock argument I see on the negative has to do with colonialism. Somaliland

justifies its bid for recognition by saying that it is returning to colonial-era boundaries. Indeed,

Somaliland’s boundaries are based on an 1887 treaty between Britain and Ethiopia. While this

can be used to justify their bid to connect to prior African Union precedent, teams on

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Topic Analysis by Thadeus Smith January 2025

progressive circuits have the potential to link into colonialism frameworks and have an

interesting philosophical discussion.

As always, I hope this topic analysis is helpful in some way – Make sure you use the

evidence in this brief but don't rely on it. Do your own research, fill in the gaps, and have some

good debates!

About Thadeus Smith

Thadeus is a speech & debate teacher at the American Heritage School in Plantation, FL,

where he has coached state and national champions in multiple events. He holds an MA in

Theory & Practice of Human Rights from the University of Essex, where he competed

internationally in British Parliamentary Debate. He competed in a variety of events for Kingston

High School in Washington and placed tenth in World Schools Debate at NSDA Nationals in

2019.

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Public Forum Brief

General
Information
General Information January 2025

General Information

Resolved: The African Union should grant diplomatic recognition to the Republic of

Somaliland as an independent state.

Foreword: We at Champion Briefs feel that having deep knowledge about a topic is just as
valuable as formulating the right arguments. Having general background knowledge about the
topic area helps debaters form more coherent arguments from their breadth of knowledge. As
such, we have compiled general information on the key concepts and general areas that we feel
will best suit you for in- and out-of-round use. Any strong strategy or argument must be built
from a strong foundation of information; we hope that you will utilize this section to help build
that foundation.

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General Information January 2025

The African Union (AU):

The African Union is a continental organization consisting of 55 member states that promotes

unity, peace, and development in Africa. It was established in 2001, succeeding the

Organization of African Unity (OAU). One of its foundational principles is respect for the borders

inherited from colonial powers to avoid secessionist conflicts. Its involvement in this resolution

would involve granting diplomatic recognition to Somaliland, a move that could have significant

implications for its stance on African unity and territorial integrity.

The African Union’s history and goals according to the African Union

The African Union (AU) is a continental body consisting of the 55 member states that

make up the countries of the African Continent. It was officially launched in 2002 as a successor

to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, 1963-1999).

History:

In May 1963, 32 Heads of independent African States met in Addis Ababa Ethiopia to

sign the Charter creating Africa’s first post-independence continental institution, The

Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was the manifestation of the pan-African vision

for an Africa that was united, free and in control of its own destiny and this was solemnised in

the OAU Charter in which the founding fathers recognised that freedom, equality, justice and

dignity were essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the

African peoples and that there was a need to promote understanding among Africa’s peoples

and foster cooperation among African states in response to the aspirations of Africans for

brother-hood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national Differences. The

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General Information January 2025

guiding philosophy was that of Pan-Africanism which centred on African socialism and

promoted African unity, the communal characteristic and practices of African communities, and

a drive to embrace Africa’s culture and common heritage.

The main objectives of the OAU were to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of

colonisation and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity amongst African States; to

coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of Member States and to promote international cooperation. The OAU

Charter spelled out the purpose of the Organisation namely:

• To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;

• To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the

peoples of Africa;

• To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;

• To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and

• To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United

Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Through the OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, the Continent

worked and spoke as one with undivided determination in forging an international consensus in

support of the liberation struggle and the fight against apartheid. The OAU had provided an

effective forum that enabled all Member States to adopt coordinated positions on matters of

common concern to the continent in international fora and defend the interests of Africa

effectively.

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General Information January 2025

On 9.9.1999, the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

issued the Sirte Declaration calling for the establishment of an African Union, with a view, to

accelerating the process of integration in the continent to enable Africa to play its rightful role

in the global economy while addressing multifaceted social, economic and political problems

compounded as they were by certain negative aspects of globalisation.

The launch of the African Union:

The African Union (AU) was officially launched in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa,

following a decision in September 1999 by its predecessor, the OAU to create a new continental

organisation to build on its work. The decision to re-launch Africa’s pan-African organisation

was the outcome of a consensus by African leaders that in order to realise Africa’s potential,

there was a need to refocus attention from the fight for decolonisation and ridding the

continent of apartheid, which had been the focus of the OAU, towards increased cooperation

and integration of African states to drive Africa’s growth and economic development.

The AU is guided by its vision of “An Integrated, Prosperous and Peaceful Africa, driven by its

own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.”

The Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Protocol on Amendments to the

Constitutive Act of the African Union lay out the aims of the AU which are:

• Achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and their the people

• Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;

• Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;

• Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent

and its peoples;

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General Information January 2025

• Encourage international cooperation

• Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;

• Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good

governance;

• Promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter

on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;

• Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in

the global economy and in international negotiations;

• Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as

the integration of African economies;

• Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of

African peoples;

• Coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future Regional

Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;

• Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in

particular in science and technology

• Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and

the promotion of good health on the continent.

• Ensure the effective participation of women in decision-making, particularly in the

political, economic and socio-cultural areas;

• Develop and promote common policies on trade, defence and foreign relations to

ensure the defence of the Continent and the strengthening of its negotiating positions;

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General Information January 2025

• Invite and encourage the full participation of the African Diaspora as an important part

of our Continent, in the building of the African Union.

The work of the AU is implemented through several principal decision making organs:-

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council, the Permanent

Representatives Committee (PRC), Specialised Technical Committees (STCs), the Peace and

Security Council and The African Union Commission. The AU structure promotes participation of

African citizens and civil society through the Pan-African Parliament and the Economic, Social &

Cultural Council (ECOSOCC).

Organs that handle judicial and legal matters as well as human rights issues include:- African

Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), African Court on Human and Peoples’

Rights(AfCHPR), AU Commission on International Law (AUCIL), AU Advisory Board on

Corruption (AUABC) and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the

Child. The AU is also working towards the establishment of continental financial

institutions (The African Central Bank, The African Investment Bank and the African Monetary

Fund)

The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Peer Review Mechanism are

also key bodies that that constitute the structure of the African Union.

To ensure the realisation of its objectives and the attainment of the Pan African Vision of an

integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, Agenda 2063 was developed as a strategic

framework for Africa’s long term socio-economic and integrative transformation. Agenda

2063 calls for greater collaboration and support for African led initiatives to ensure the

achievement of the aspirations of African people.

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Grant Diplomatic Recognition:

Diplomatic recognition involves acknowledging a political entity as a sovereign state with the

ability to engage in international relations. This includes establishing formal ties, opening

embassies, and recognizing the entity’s government. For Somaliland, this recognition would

mean becoming eligible for international support, joining global organizations, and gaining

legitimacy on the international stage.

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The Republic of Somaliland:

Somaliland is a self-declared republic in the northern part of Somalia. It declared

independence in 1991 after the collapse of Somalia’s central government but remains

unrecognized by any country or international organization, including the AU. Despite its lack of

recognition, Somaliland has operated as a de facto independent state with its own government,

currency, and military. It has also maintained relative peace and stability compared to the rest

of Somalia.

What is its political status?

Somaliland broke ties with Somalia’s government in Mogadishu after declaring

independence in 1991, and has sought international recognition as an independent state since

then. No foreign government recognizes its sovereignty, but many effectively acknowledge the

region as separate from Somalia.

It has held its own democratic elections since 2003, and in 2010 it saw a largely peaceful

transfer of power to the opposition Peace, Unity, and Development Party. The United States,

France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (EU) sent delegations to observe

Somaliland’s 2017 presidential election. Somaliland postponed its 2022 election and extended

President Muse Bihi Abdi’s term by two years, citing financial constraints; its next vote is

currently set for November 13, 2024.

How did it get here?

Somaliland’s history as a distinct region of Somalia dates back to the late nineteenth

century. The territory was a British protectorate until 1960, when it unified with the rest of

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present-day Somalia, which had been under Italian rule. The merger faced challenges early on,

with many in Somaliland rejecting the centralization of power in the country’s south.

A rebel group, the Somali National Movement (SNM), emerged in Somaliland in the 1980s

opposing the military junta of President Siad Barre, which seized power in 1969. In January

1991, SNM and other insurgent groups ousted Barre, whose forces had killed tens of thousands

of Somalilanders and destroyed much of the region’s infrastructure. SNM refused to recognize

an interim government led by another militia group, and in May it declared Somaliland’s

independence, with the city of Hargeisa as its capital.

Delegates took a decade to thrash out a new constitution for Somaliland, which voters

overwhelmingly approved in 2001. The referendum saw a transition from a power-sharing

agreement among leading clans to a multiparty democracy. Although some international

observers applauded the peaceful vote, no government recognized the process.

What is Somaliland’s case for independence?

The Somaliland government asserts that it meets most of the requirements of a

sovereign democratic state: it holds free and fair elections, has its own currency and security

forces, and issues its own passports. It also says that its independence claim is consistent with a

longstanding norm of the African Union and its predecessor that colonial-era borders should be

maintained. Some analysts also note that Somalilanders are predominantly from the Isaaq clan,

and thus ethnically distinctive from other Somalis.

The territory has widely been seen as an “oasis” for stability in a turbulent region. “From

the Somalilanders’ perspective, they have a completely reasonable argument,” Bronwyn

Bruton, democracy and governance expert, said in 2018. “Somaliland is trying to break off from

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General Information January 2025

Somalia, which hasn’t been a functioning country in decades.” Democracy and civil liberties

watchdog Freedom House rates Somaliland’s freedom index at “partly free,” scoring a forty-

four out of one hundred in 2023, while Somalia got only eight in the same year—an

unequivocally “not free” status, and the fourteenth-lowest worldwide However, Somaliland’s

score has declined in recent years following crackdowns on opposition protestors when its

parliament postponed the 2022 presidential election.

What is its financial situation?

A weak economy and limited opportunities for foreign trade and investment have stifled

the government’s capacity to provide services to its approximately four million residents.

Somaliland has a gross domestic product (GDP) of about $2 billion, most of which it receives in

remittances from Somalilanders working abroad. The area’s unemployment remains very high,

particularly for youth, and officials worry about a potential “brain drain” phenomenon, with

educated people migrating in search of opportunities elsewhere. Its main exports are livestock

and animal products, which it ships to neighboring Djibouti and Ethiopia, as well as to Gulf

states, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman. Its GDP per capita, in the hundreds of dollars, is one of

the lowest in the world. If it were to gain independence, Somaliland would become

the eighteenth-poorest country[PDF] today. Somalia, meanwhile, is the world’s fifth-poorest.

Meanwhile, the government is ineligible for loans from the World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund as long as Somaliland is not an internationally recognized state or

reconciled with Somalia. President Muse Bihi Abdi, in an op-ed after his 2017 election victory,

said that Somaliland’s exclusion from international markets “compounds the socioeconomic

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pressures that Somaliland faces,” and analysts say that an anemic economy puts decades of

political progress at risk.

Somaliland has nonetheless negotiated its own foreign investment deals despite

opposition from the federal government in Mogadishu. In 2016, it struck a landmark deal with

DP World of Dubai, part of the UAE, to develop and manage the Port of Berbera, a joint venture

expected to produce millions of dollars of income a year for Somaliland. Landlocked Ethiopia

joined the port development project two years later, aiming to expand its access to the sea.

In January 2024, Somaliland sparked another diplomatic row with Somalia when it

agreed to lease Ethiopia rights to twelve kilometers (twenty miles) of coastline and access to

Berbera for commercial and military purposes for fifty years in exchange for its formal

recognition and part ownership of Ethiopia Airlines, the national carrier.

Where do negotiations between Somalia and Somaliland stand?

Mogadishu continues to reject Somaliland’s call for independence and strongly

condemns its unilateral attempts to negotiate major international agreements. However,

Somaliland remains steadfast in its ambitions. In December 2023, Somalia announced that the

country was ready to reopen talks with Somaliland to resolve their disputes, under mediation

by neighboring Djibouti. The following week, Somaliland struck its provisional deal with Ethiopia

on the port of Berbera. The agreement prompted swift backlash from Somalia, which called it

an illegal act of “aggression” and recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia. In the aftermath of this

dispute, the timeline for resuming Somaliland-Somalia talks remains unclear, but they are likely

to be delayed indefinitely, experts say.

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Is there international support for Somaliland’s independence?

Many countries have encouraged the breakaway state’s elections and economic

development, but none have recognized Somaliland. While some experts see historical and

geopolitical reasons for countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya to take this step, others say the

African Union (AU) would have to be the first to do so. “The United States and the UN and all of

their allies have worked hard to try to build up the AU and position it as a moral authority,” says

Bruton.

The bloc, however, has feared that formal recognition would embolden other

secessionist movements on the continent, such as Nigeria’s Biafra or Morocco’s Western

Sahara, to demand the same. Since the creation of a continental bloc in 1963, there have only

been two widely recognized border changes in Africa: Eritrea’s split from Ethiopia in 1993 and

South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

In the fallout of Somaliland’s January 2024 tentative port deal with Ethiopia, several

countries and blocs such as the United States, Egypt, AU, and EU called for calm in the region

and for Somalia’s sovereignty to be respected.

What is Somaliland’s strategic importance?

Somaliland is positioned along the Gulf of Aden near the entrance to the Bab al-Mandeb

Strait, a major sea-lane through which almost one-third of the world’s shipping passes. Its

coastline has made it and neighboring Eritrea and Djibouti attractive partners for foreign

governments looking for sea access and a maritime presence in the region. Djibouti has become

a hub for foreign military bases; China, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States all have

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facilities in the country. Major foreign powers, including China, Russia, and the UAE, have also

increasingly courted Eritrea.

However, Somaliland will likely continue to struggle to build these types of relationships

without broad international recognition or a compromise with Somalia, as illustrated by its

controversial port investment deals. Diplomacy is also likely to be complicated by Somalia’s

ongoing battle against the al-ShabaabIslamist insurgent group, as well as deteriorating security

and stability in the broader Horn of Africa region. The U.S. special envoy for the Horn of Africa

said that the deal has been weaponized by al-Shabaab to generate new recruits to undermine

regional security.

Countries such as nearby Sudan and Ethiopia are also suffering internal conflicts with

spillover effects, and the region is hammered with climate disasters, including historic

droughts and torrential floods that drive severe hunger. Experts are also concerned that the

pending Berbera port deal will escalate the controversy between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan

over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River. More

recently, amid war between Israel and Palestinian militant group Hamas, Iran-backed rebels in

Yemen have launched strikes on shipping in the Red Sea, adding another layer of volatility to

the region.

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Independent State:

An independent state is one that exercises full sovereignty over its territory and is

recognized as such under international law. Recognition is crucial for a state to join

organizations like the United Nations and access international aid and resources. Somaliland

argues that it fulfills the criteria for statehood under the Montevideo Convention, including

having a defined territory, permanent population, government, and the capacity to enter

relations with other states.

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General Information January 2025

Historical Context

Somaliland’s Colonial History:

Somaliland was a British protectorate from 1884 until 1960, when it gained

independence. However, just days after its independence, it united with the Italian-

administered Trust Territory of Somalia to form the Somali Republic. This union was fraught

with tension, as Somalilanders felt marginalized by the southern-dominated government in

Mogadishu.

The Collapse of Somalia and Somaliland’s Independence Declaration:

In 1991, after years of civil war and the collapse of Somalia’s central government,

Somaliland declared independence. This was a response to decades of political and economic

marginalization and widespread violence under Somali dictator Siad Barre. Since then,

Somaliland has functioned as an independent entity, conducting democratic elections and

maintaining internal stability.

Challenges to Recognition:

Despite Somaliland’s achievements, the African Union and the international community

have not recognized its independence. This is partly due to the AU’s commitment to preserving

colonial borders to avoid setting a precedent for other separatist movements. Many African

countries fear that recognizing Somaliland could encourage other regions, like Ethiopia’s Tigray

or Nigeria’s Biafra, to push for independence, leading to further fragmentation and conflict.

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General Information January 2025

Somalia’s Opposition:

Somalia opposes Somaliland’s independence and views it as part of its sovereign

territory. Recognizing Somaliland could destabilize Somalia further, weakening its economy and

political stability. Somalia has argued that efforts should be focused on reunification and

reconciliation rather than secession.

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Works Cited

“Background on Somaliland.” Center for Justice and Accountability, [Link]

work/somalia/related-resources/background-on-somaliland/.

Laessing, Ulf. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway State.” Council on Foreign Relations,

22 Sept. 2022, [Link]

state.

“Somaliland: Report on the De Facto Independent State.” Folketinget (Danish

Parliament), [Link]

Scharf, Joshua L. “A Shadow on Tomorrow’s Dreams: Somaliland’s Struggle for International

Recognition.” Lewis & Clark Law Review, [Link]

shadow-on-tomorrows-dreams-somalilands-struggle.

Villa, Filippo. “Somaliland: 30 Years of De Facto Statehood and No End in Sight.” ISPI (Italian

Institute for International Political Studies), 6 May

2021, [Link]

statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363.

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Public Forum Brief

Pro Arguments
Pro Arguments January 2025

PRO: Somaliland has a more stable government than Somalia.

Argument: Somaliland has a more stable government than Somalia

Warrant: Somaliland has held elections since 2003

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

It has held its own democratic elections since 2003, and in 2010 it saw a largely
peaceful transfer of power to the opposition Peace, Unity, and Development Party. The
United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (EU) sent
delegations to observe Somaliland’s 2017 presidential election. Somaliland postponed
its 2022 election and extended President Muse Bihi Abdi’s term by two years, citing
financial constraints; its next vote is currently set for November 13, 2024.

Warrant: Somaliland is an oasis of stability in an area rife with conflict

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

The territory has widely been seen as an “oasis” for stability in a turbulent region.
“From the Somalilanders’ perspective, they have a completely reasonable argument,”
Bronwyn Bruton, democracy and governance expert, said in 2018. “Somaliland is trying
to break off from Somalia, which hasn’t been a functioning country in decades.”

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Pro Arguments January 2025

Democracy and civil liberties watchdog Freedom House rates Somaliland’s freedom
index at “partly free,” scoring a forty-four out of one hundred in 2023, while Somalia
got only eight in the same year—an unequivocally “not free” status, and the fourteenth-
lowest worldwide. However, Somaliland’s score has declined in recent years following
crackdowns on opposition protestors when its parliament postponed the 2022
presidential election.

Warrant: Abdullahi’s recent electoral victory and peaceful transition confirm – Somaliland is a
functional democracy

Cannon, Brendon J. “Somaliland’s new government is ready to drive change: these are its
3 big goals.” The Conversation, November 22, 2024,
[Link]
change-these-are-its-3-big-goals-244189. Accessed December 12, 2024.

The election was Somaliland’s fourth successful one-person, one-vote presidential

election. Despite a shaky few years, the poll demonstrates a commitment to democracy,
rule of law and peaceful power transitions. Waddani’s victory signifies a strong public
endorsement for change – 64% of Somalilanders voted for the opposition party. This
ended 14 years of rule under the Kulmiye party.

Impact: Somaliland is fundamentally a more functioning country than Somalia

Adegoke, Yinka. “A Trump White House looks set to recognize the world’s newest
country.” Semafor, December 10, 2024,
[Link]
looks-set-to-recognize-the-region. Accessed December 12, 2024.

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Pro Arguments January 2025

“I support recognizing [Somaliland] because they’ve fundamentally proved they can run
their own country and there’s no plausible scenario where they’d willingly return to
Somalia,” said Joshua Meservey, an analyst at the Hudson Institute think tank. While
Somalia’s leaders would likely be displeased with such a decision, Meservey said they
hadn’t done enough for the US to not prioritize its own interests in the sub-region.

Impact: Somaliland has continued its success despite setbacks -

Gavin, Michelle. “Recognizing Somaliland’s Democratic Success.” Council on Foreign

Relations, June 8, 2021, [Link]
democratic-success. Accessed December 12, 2024.

Somaliland is not perfect; no place on earth is. But in the midst of regional crisis and
global democratic backsliding, Somaliland’s achievements and dogged commitment to its
principles deserve more notice. Somaliland stands as a rebuke to those who claim that
authoritarianism is simply the required price of stability in the region, or that
democratic principles are a fetish of foreigners with no real traction on the ground. Its
successes should also prompt policymakers abroad, currently fixated on the Horn of
Africa’s multiple crises, to rethink what is possible in the region. Somaliland’s example
suggests that the answer may be vastly more ambitious, and far less sensitive to
external influence, than conventional wisdom might suggest.

Explanation: This argument is straightforward, stating that Somaliland is a more stable

government and therefore more deserving of international recognition than Somalia, the state
it broke away from. This argument should be heavy on rhetoric – We’re talking about morals
and “doing the right thing,” which doesn’t always carry a big impact. Because of that, this
argument is best suited for lay debates.

Champion Briefs 51
Pro Arguments January 2025

PRO: African Union Recognition grants Somaliland international

legitimacy

Argument: African Union recognition grants Somaliland international legitimacy

Warrant: Most African countries are waiting for the African Union to take action before making
their own recognitions of Somaliland

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

Many countries have encouraged the breakaway state’s elections and economic
development, but none have recognized Somaliland. While some experts see historical
and geopolitical reasons for countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya to take this step,
others say the African Union (AU) would have to be the first to do so. “The United
States and the UN and all of their allies have worked hard to try to build up the AU and
position it as a moral authority,” says Bruton.

Warrant: Somaliland’s independence claim is consistent with existing African Union precedent

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

The Somaliland government asserts that it meets most of the requirements of a

sovereign democratic state: it holds free and fair elections, has its own currency and

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security forces, and issues its own passports. It also says that its independence claim is
consistent with a longstanding norm of the African Union and its predecessor that
colonial-era borders should be maintained. Some analysts also note that Somalilanders
are predominantly from the Isaaq clan, and thus ethnically distinctive from other
Somalis.

Warrant: Ethiopia has already offered all-but-formal recognition to Somaliland

Adegoke, Yinka. “A Trump White House looks set to recognize the world’s newest
country.” Semafor, December 10, 2024,
[Link]
looks-set-to-recognize-the-region. Accessed December 12, 2024.

Ethiopia has already made a big bet on Somaliland by signing a controversial maritime
agreement with the territory. Africa’s second most populous country is landlocked and
very keen to have access to Somaliland’s Berbera port for trade and much more. Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed’s stance with Hargeisa has sparked diplomatic tensions with
Somalia’s leaders in Mogadishu and even some mutterings of potential conflict. But if
Trump was to recognize Somaliland, Abiy’s gamble could pay off.

Impact: African Union recognition would directly trigger United States recognition

Rubin, Michael. “On Somaliland, the African Union and UN Betrays Their Own
Precedents.” American Enterprise Institute, April 3, 2023, [Link]
eds/on-somaliland-the-african-union-and-un-betrays-their-own-precedents/.
Accessed December 12, 2024.

The State Department remains disinterested if not dismissive, despite Congressional

calls to augment ties to Somaliland. U.S. diplomats resist relations and explain that they

Champion Briefs 53
Pro Arguments January 2025

will not formally re-recognize Somaliland until the African Union does so. The African
Union, meanwhile, cites a reluctance to change borders and questions the legality of
Somaliland’s decision to dissolve its federation with Somalia. On both counts, the African
Union betrays its own precedents.

Impact: African Union and United Nations decisions are closely linked

“As Destabilizing Conflicts Escalate across Africa, United Nations-African Union

Partnership Has Never Been More Critical, Top Officials Tell Security Council.”
United Nations, October 2, 2024, [Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

The partnership between the United Nations and African Union has never been more
critical, several senior officials told the Security Council today, as they laid out the
myriad challenges facing the continent from the world’s largest forced displacement
crisis and numerous instances of political instability to territorial disputes and climate-
change-driven insecurity. “As the Council is aware, several African countries and sub-
regions continue to face significant challenges to achieving lasting peace, security and
sustainable development,” Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the
Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the
African Union, told the 15-member body.

Explanation: This argument builds upon others that discuss Somaliland’s stability and adds a
clear impact, stating that international legitimacy is important. From here, teams can link into a
variety of impacts and should consider what aspects of the international system might benefit
Somaliland the most.

Champion Briefs 54
Pro Arguments January 2025

PRO: Recognition of Somaliland strengthens international legitimacy

of Taiwan

Argument: Recognition of Somaliland strengthens international legitimacy of Taiwan

Warrant: Somaliland is a staunch defender of Taiwan and has consistently strengthened ties
between the two nations

“Somaliland deepens ties with Taiwan..” AfricaNews, August 13, 2024,

[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

Somaliland opened a representative office in Taiwan on Wednesday, returning the

favour from Taiwan's office in Somaliland which opened last month. Both are
unrecognised, but de facto sovereign territories, and have found common ground in
their isolated international status. "Taiwan and Somaliland shared the commitment to
safeguarding the values of freedom, democracy, justice and the rule of law", said Joseph
Wu, Taiwan's foreign minister. "We both face external pressures, but both proud of our
sovereignty and ready to defend it."

Warrant: The Somaliland-Taiwan relationship has received tacit support from the United States

Hagi, Mohamed. “A Future Outlook: Prospects for Somaliland-Taiwan Relations.” Global

Taiwan Institute, May 1, 2024, [Link]
prospects-for-somaliland-taiwan-relations/. Accesed December 12, 2024.

The relationship between Taiwan and Somaliland has become an issue, causing
contrasting reactions from the United States and China. While Washington cautiously

Champion Briefs 55
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acknowledged Taiwan’s establishment of ties with Somaliland, China responded

aggressively by trying to undermine the newfound partnership. Initially, the response
from the US administration toward the Taiwan-Somaliland connection seemed lukewarm.
Although the White House National Security Council (NSC) tacitly approved the new
relations between Taiwan and Somaliland, the State Department continued to follow
its “One-Somalia Policy,” refraining from acknowledging Somaliland while exclusively
recognizing the Somalian government in Mogadishu. However, within US circles—in
Congress and the Pentagon, for instance—there was recognition of Somaliland’s
strategic significance and democratic values.

Warrant: Taiwan and Somaliland are increasing cooperation and are steadfast supporters of
each other’s independence

Kao, Anthony. “Shared status fuels closer Taiwan and Somaliland partnership.” Al Jazeera,
July 6, 2023, [Link]
closer-taiwan-and-somaliland-partnership. Accessed December 12, 2024.

“Compared to other countries with diplomatic offices in Somaliland – like the [United
Kingdom], Denmark or [United Arab Emirates] – Taiwan has far more specific and
politically important bilateral relations, premised on a shared status as de facto states,”
Jethro Norman, a researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies focused on
conflict and humanitarianism in East Africa, told Al Jazeera. “Relations between the two
are both an act of solidarity and a way to enact sovereignty in the absence of
international recognition.”

Impact: African Union and United Nations decisions are closely linked

“As Destabilizing Conflicts Escalate across Africa, United Nations-African Union

Partnership Has Never Been More Critical, Top Officials Tell Security Council.”

Champion Briefs 56
Pro Arguments January 2025

United Nations, October 2, 2024, [Link]

Accessed December 12, 2024.

The partnership between the United Nations and African Union has never been more
critical, several senior officials told the Security Council today, as they laid out the
myriad challenges facing the continent from the world’s largest forced displacement
crisis and numerous instances of political instability to territorial disputes and climate-
change-driven insecurity. “As the Council is aware, several African countries and sub-
regions continue to face significant challenges to achieving lasting peace, security and
sustainable development,” Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the
Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the
African Union, told the 15-member body.

Impact: It’s past time for United Nations recognition of Taiwan

Parello-Plesner, Jonas. “Time for the UN to recognize Taiwan’s voice.” Politico, September
28, 2023, [Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

Ignoring Taiwan’s existence is leading to increasingly farcical consequences. Taiwanese

journalists are regularly denied access to U.N. bodies; a group of Taiwanese students
were barred from learning about the human rights commission in Geneva because their
passports weren’t deemed valid documents by U.N. officials; and the exclusion even
extended to an American high school that wrote “Taiwan” rather than “Taiwan,
Province of China” on its website. These examples may seem ridiculous, but they are the
result of a purposeful, long-term strategy to erode support for Taiwan’s very right to
exist. China has used its standing to push its officials to the top of international bodies
and coerce countries into limiting contact with Taiwan. This lobbying has led to the willful

Champion Briefs 57
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misreading of Resolution 2758 in a way that is entirely contrary to the U.N.’s founding
charter.

Explanation: This argument provides a unique impact to international recognition, stating that
because Somaliland and Taiwan have strong ties, recognition for Somaliland would carry a
positive benefit for Taiwan as well. This can be built upon by referencing prep from the Taiwan
topic a few months ago.

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Pro Arguments January 2025

PRO: African Union recognition of Somaliland is a prerequisite to

United States recognition

Argument: African Union recognition of Somaliland is a prerequisite to United States

recognition

Warrant: Most countries are waiting for the African Union to take action before making their
own recognitions of Somaliland

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

Many countries have encouraged the breakaway state’s elections and economic
development, but none have recognized Somaliland. While some experts see historical
and geopolitical reasons for countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya to take this step,
others say the African Union (AU) would have to be the first to do so. “The United
States and the UN and all of their allies have worked hard to try to build up the AU and
position it as a moral authority,” says Bruton.

Warrant: The United States has rejected Somaliland’s agreements with individual countries

Cannon, Brendan J. “Somaliland’s new government is ready to drive change: these are its
3 big goals.” The Conversation, November 22, 2024,
[Link]
change-these-are-its-3-big-gaoals-244189. Accessed December 12, 2024.

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The pace of recognition from the US and UK has been slow. And the west condemned
Somaliland’s deal with Ethiopia. This deal gives Ethiopia access to a strip of Somaliland’s
coastline in return for acknowledgement of Somaliland’s independence. But Waddani
must carefully navigate that deal, signed by the previous administration. The leaders I
spoke to said: We don’t know the details of the MOU (memorandum of understanding).
How can we implement it before we evaluate it in light of the interests of our country
and its people? Washington’s rejection of the agreement surprised Bihi and his
administration.

Warrant: Somaliland cannot sidestep African Union recognition – It’s a prerequisite in the eyes
of the United States

Gramer, Robbie. “Somaliland Courts U.S. for Independence Recognition.” Foreign Policy,
March 21, 2022, [Link]
independence-recognition/. Accessed December 12, 2024.

They also argue that a U.S. recognition of Somaliland would severely damage
Washington’s relations with other partners on the continent and the African Union,
which does not recognize Somaliland. “They’re doing an end run around the African
Union and around their own home region trying to get Washington to give them what
they can’t get locally,” said Cameron Hudson, a former U.S. diplomat and now expert
on East Africa at the Atlantic Council. “That would be sort of like the African Union
recognizing Puerto Rico as the 51st U.S. state before the U.S. does.”

Impact: African Union recognition would directly trigger United States recognition

Rubin, Michael. “On Somaliland, the African Union and UN Betrays Their Own
Precedents.” American Enterprise Institute, April 3, 2023, [Link]

Champion Briefs 60
Pro Arguments January 2025

eds/on-somaliland-the-african-union-and-un-betrays-their-own-precedents/.
Accessed December 12, 2024.

The State Department remains disinterested if not dismissive, despite Congressional

calls to augment ties to Somaliland. U.S. diplomats resist relations and explain that they
will not formally re-recognize Somaliland until the African Union does so. The African
Union, meanwhile, cites a reluctance to change borders and questions the legality of
Somaliland’s decision to dissolve its federation with Somalia. On both counts, the African
Union betrays its own precedents.

Impact: United States recognition of Somaliland is a good opportunity to hedge against China

Meservey, Joshua. “The U.S. Should Recognize Somaliland.” The Heritage Foundation,
October 19, 2021, [Link]
10/[Link]. Accessed December 12, 2024.

The U.S. must compete in Djibouti, but a strong American presence in an independent
Somaliland would be a hedge against the U.S. position continuing to deteriorate in
Djibouti. Somaliland has more than 500 miles of coast on the Gulf of Aden that abuts
the Indian Ocean and is directly across the water from conflict-torn Yemen, where
Iranian-backed militias and an al-Qaeda affiliate operate. Its nearest point is about 70
miles from the heart of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—through which around 9 percent of
the world’s maritime-borne petroleum and much of Europe–Asia sea trade transits.

Explanation: Like other arguments, this says that recognition brings a unique external benefit –
In this case, it opens the door to Somaliland being recognized by the United States. For impacts,
teams should look into the conflict between the US and China.

Champion Briefs 61
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PRO: Without recognition, Somaliland’s people lack an international

advocate

Argument: Without recognition, Somaliland’s people lack an international advocate

Warrant: Somaliland has historically been ignored by the United Nations

Hoehne, Markus. “Somaliland: 30 Years of De Factor Statehood, and No End In Sight.”

ISPI, May 7, 2021, [Link]
de-facto-statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363. Accessed December 12, 2024.

At the same time, reconstruction work began, especially in Hargeysa and Bur'o.
Diaspora Somalis invested in shops, hotels, and schools, while some international aid
organizations reluctantly started their first small programs in the country. The
international community, on the other hand, was focused entirely on the civil war in
southern Somalia. Somaliland was ignored by the United Nations. In retrospect, this
proved to be a blessing in disguise. It allowed the local actors to experiment with peace
and state building and to develop a formula that worked – undisturbed by external
interferences.

Warrant: Somaliland is ineligible from receiving most international funding, including World
Bank and IMF funding

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

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Pro Arguments January 2025

Meanwhile, the government is ineligible for loans from the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund as long as Somaliland is not an internationally recognized
state or reconciled with Somalia. President Muse Bihi Abdi, in an op-ed after his 2017
election victory, said that Somaliland’s exclusion from international markets “compounds
the socioeconomic pressures that Somaliland faces,” and analysts say that an anemic
economy puts decades of political progress at risk.

Warrant: Somaliland is historically disconnected from the mainstream international aid

architecture

Peake, Gordon. “Doing better without aid: the case of Somaliland.” DevPolicyBlog, March
17, 2021, [Link]
20210317/. Accessed December 12, 2024.

The focus of Phillips’ stimulating book is Somaliland, the northern segment of Somalia.
The region is, to all intents and purposes, self-governing and independent, but no
member states of the United Nations recognise it as sovereign. It’s unlikely to join the
club of nations anytime soon. International attention on Somaliland was particularly
slight in the 1990s, during which time the region started to break away. In that decade,
the United Nations and United States spent US $4 billion on fruitless military
operations and lavish peace conferences on Somalia while the equivalent of 0.0025% of
that sum was spent on similar (and more fruitful) peacebuilding efforts in Somaliland.

Impact: Access to international lending is key to democratic growth

Nelson, Stephen and Geoffery Wallace. “Are IMF lending programs good or bad for
demmocracy?” The Review of International Organizations, April 25, 2016,
[Link]
[Link]. Accessed December 12, 2024.

Champion Briefs 63
Pro Arguments January 2025

Building on the extensive literature on conditional lending, we outline several pathways

through which IMF program participation might affect the levels of democracy in
borrowing countries - including a new variant that suggests the possibility of a positive
association between lending program participation and democracy scores. In order to
test the argument we assemble annual data from 120 low- and middle-income countries
observed (at maximum) in each year between 1971 and 2007. We use three strategies -
genetic matching, instrumental variables, and difference-in-differences estimation - to
better estimate the direction and size of the statistical association between
participation in IMF lending programs and the level of democracy. We find evidence for
modest but definitively positive conditional differences in the democracy scores of
participating and non-participating countries.

Impact: World Bank funding helps countries streamline aid deliverance

Thomas, Vinod, Cheryl Gray, and Mark Sundberg. “Poverty Reduction Support Credits: An
Evaluation of World Bank Support.” World Bank, 2010,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

In terms of process, PRSCs worked well, serving in many respects as a prototype for
Development Policy Loans (stronger country ownership, eased conditionality, more
predictable resource flows, and greater emphasis on public sector management and pro-
poor service delivery). PRSCs balanced tensions between predictability of financing and
program credibility. They reflected commitment to aid harmonization and, in some
countries, served as a donor focal point.

Explanation: This argument is rooted in the idea of the “international system” and says that
until Somaliland is more broadly recognized, it cannot benefit from those institutions. While
international funding is the obvious reference point here, teams should examine other
international institutions like the ICC or ICJ for possible impacts.

Champion Briefs 64
Pro Arguments January 2025

PRO: International recognition reduces Somaliland’s reliance on

remittances

Argument: International recognition reduces Somaliland’s reliance on remittances

Warrant: Somaliland is ineligible from receiving most international funding, including World
Bank and IMF funding

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

Meanwhile, the government is ineligible for loans from the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund as long as Somaliland is not an internationally recognized
state or reconciled with Somalia. President Muse Bihi Abdi, in an op-ed after his 2017
election victory, said that Somaliland’s exclusion from international markets “compounds
the socioeconomic pressures that Somaliland faces,” and analysts say that an anemic
economy puts decades of political progress at risk.

Warrant: Somaliland is extremely reliant on remittances in the status quo

“Somali diaspora’s remittances cast a lifeline.” United Nations, n.d.,

[Link]
remittances-cast-lifeline. Accessed December 12, 2024.

During two decades of conflict, famines and floods, Somali expatriates’ transmission of
money back home — known as “remittances” — has been instrumental in keeping

Champion Briefs 65
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Somalia afloat. The UN Development Programme estimates that $1.6 billion in

remittances are sent back annually by Somali emigrants living in North America and
Europe. Abdirashid Duale, a Somali who is chief executive of Dahabshiil, one of the
largest money-transfer businesses in Africa, says that such transfers have been a lifeline.

Warrant: This reliance is unsustainable because it’s heavily dependent on global market
recommendations

Bradbury, Mark, Mohamed Hassan, Ahmed Musa, and Nauja Kleist. “COVID-19 has
transformed Somaliland’s remittance lifeline.” Open Democracy, April 19, 2021,
[Link]
transformed-somalilands-remittance-lifeline/. Accessed December 12, 2024.

Analysts understandably drew a lot of attention to this projected decline, but in the
intervening months they’ve missed the ways in which the industry has adapted to the
new circumstances. Drawing on interviews with some of the Somaliland’s leading
financial institutions, we argue that two key changes have taken place. On the one hand,
the pandemic has interrupted the operation of the more established remittance
organisations. But on the other, it has provided business opportunities to relatively
new market entrants, such as cashless digital remittance providers and the two banks
in Somaliland that use the SWIFT transfer system. We also show that though
remittances dropped almost 7% in 2020 when compared to 2018, remittances picked up
again during the year. This suggests that although the remittance lifeline is affected, it is
still intact.

Impact: Remittances lower labor force participation in dependent nations

Champion Briefs 66
Pro Arguments January 2025

Amuedo-Dorantes, Cataline and Susan Pozo. “The widespread impacts of remittance

flows.” IZA, n.d., [Link]
flows/long. Accessed December 12, 2024.

One of the most widely cited concerns about remittances in studies at the micro level
pertains to the potential for these money flows to breed dependency on the receiving
side. Remittances may ease budget constraints, raise reservation wages, and through an
income effect, reduce the employment likelihood and hours worked by individuals
receiving remittances. However, remittances also lower the opportunity cost of leisure
of those receiving transfers from abroad and, in turn, may reduce recipients’ labor
supply. It is this potential distortion of household labor supply that preoccupies some
researchers and policymakers.

Impact: Somaliland’s youth unemployment rate is 70%

“Somaliland Vice President regrets 70% of Somaliland youth to be unemployed.”

Somaliland, November 26, 2022,
[Link]
70-of-somaliland-youth-to-be-unemployed/. Accessed December 12, 2024.

The Vice President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Abdillahi Ismail (Saylici) expressed

dissatisfaction that 70% of Somaliland youth are currently unemployed. He believes the
increased rate of unemployment is due to mistakes coming from within the
community. The Vice President called upon the public to unite and initiate new strategies
to decrease the growing rate of unemployment in Somaliland. He said it’s the right time
for Somaliland to produce skilled youth in the various competences.

Explanation: This has the same basic link chain as the argument about IMF funding but has a
more unique impact scenario. Instead of focusing solely on funding, however, the impact here
focuses on the possible harms from remittances. Somaliland already has a major
unemployment problem – Does relying on external funding make that worse?

Champion Briefs 67
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PRO: International recognition strengthens the state of Somaliland’s

democracy

Argument: International recognition strengthens the state of Somaliland’s democracy

Warrant: International recognition is key to supporting democracy

Newman, Edward and Gezim Visoka. “The Geopolitics of State Recognition in a

Transitional International Order.” Geopolitics, April 28, 2021,
[Link] Accessed December 12, 2024.

Simultaneously, some of the diplomatic discourse related to international recognition

reflects the normative contestation that can be associated with the transitional
international order. Liberal justifications for recognition – with reference to human
rights and democracy – are in tension with other principles which emphasise territorial
integrity, respect for the sovereignty of existing states, and a strict interpretation of
international law. Thus, to some extent, the discourse of international recognition
debates does reflect normative contestation; the US and the EU member states are more
likely to at least make reference to liberal values in justifying recognition decisions, and
key ‘rising’ powers such as China, India and Brazil provide a strict reading of international
law around territorial integrity, with far less reference to ‘domestic’ issues.

Warrant: Somaliland is ineligible from receiving most international funding, including World
Bank and IMF funding

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,

Champion Briefs 68
Pro Arguments January 2025

[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

Meanwhile, the government is ineligible for loans from the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund as long as Somaliland is not an internationally recognized
state or reconciled with Somalia. President Muse Bihi Abdi, in an op-ed after his 2017
election victory, said that Somaliland’s exclusion from international markets “compounds
the socioeconomic pressures that Somaliland faces,” and analysts say that an anemic
economy puts decades of political progress at risk.

Warrant: Somaliland’ precarious status has left in a state of perpetual property

Brown, Ryan. “How a DIY nation has made it this far.” The Christian Science Monitor, May
26, 2020, [Link]
nation-has-made-it-this-far. Accessed December 12, 2024.

But the value would also be deeply practical. Because Somaliland doesn’t technically
exist, it can’t get loans for big development projects from financial institutions like the
International Monetary Fund. It can’t sign bilateral aid agreements – the kinds that
exist between two countries – because it isn’t, according to most of the world, a
country at all. That leaves Somaliland deeply impoverished. Its government estimates
that in 2017, gross domestic product was about $675 per person, which would make it
among the 15 poorest countries in the world. Its economy relies heavily on the black-
headed sheep roaming its streets and scrubby countryside. (Picture a typical sheep
whose head has been dipped in a pot of ink.) Those are exported by the millions to Saudi
Arabia during the annual Hajj pilgrimage.

Impact: Access to international lending is key to democratic growth

Champion Briefs 69
Pro Arguments January 2025

Nelson, Stephen and Geoffery Wallace. “Are IMF lending programs good or bad for
demmocracy?” The Review of International Organizations, April 25, 2016,
[Link]
[Link]. Accessed December 12, 2024.

Building on the extensive literature on conditional lending, we outline several pathways

through which IMF program participation might affect the levels of democracy in
borrowing countries - including a new variant that suggests the possibility of a positive
association between lending program participation and democracy scores. In order to
test the argument we assemble annual data from 120 low- and middle-income countries
observed (at maximum) in each year between 1971 and 2007. We use three strategies -
genetic matching, instrumental variables, and difference-in-differences estimation - to
better estimate the direction and size of the statistical association between
participation in IMF lending programs and the level of democracy. We find evidence for
modest but definitively positive conditional differences in the democracy scores of
participating and non-participating countries.

Impact: World Bank funding helps countries streamline aid deliverance

Thomas, Vinod, Cheryl Gray, and Mark Sundberg. “Poverty Reduction Support Credits: An
Evaluation of World Bank Support.” World Bank, 2010,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

In terms of process, PRSCs worked well, serving in many respects as a prototype for
Development Policy Loans (stronger country ownership, eased conditionality, more
predictable resource flows, and greater emphasis on public sector management and pro-
poor service delivery). PRSCs balanced tensions between predictability of financing and

Champion Briefs 70
Pro Arguments January 2025

program credibility. They reflected commitment to aid harmonization and, in some

countries, served as a donor focal point.

Explanation: This argument says that international recognition will boost Somaliland’s
democracy. There are two paths here – teams can focus on democratic institutions at the
international level or discuss the benefits of aid and how IMF conditionality might lead to more
democratic nations.

Champion Briefs 71
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PRO: Recognizing Somaliland could set a new precedent for Africa to

deviate away from violence

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland could set a new precedent for Africa to deviate away from
violence caused by colonial borders.

Warrant: The African Union wants to keep colonial borders intact.

Gebereamlak, Hagos. “Ethiopia’s Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for

African Borders.” The Reporter, October 2, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 11, 2024.

After gaining independence, African states largely adopted a policy of respecting the
borders drawn during colonial times. This principle, known as ‘Uti Possidetis’, is
enshrined in Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act, which calls for the
preservation of borders as they existed at the time of independence. The goal of this
policy has been to prevent disorder, chaos, and conflict across the continent. African
countries have generally followed this principle, fearing that the recognition of
secessionist movements could set dangerous precedents.

Warrant: Colonial borders were drawn without regard for the inhabitants.

Hyde, Tim. “Are colonial-era borders drawn by Europeans holding Africa back?”
American Economic Association, July 13, 2016,
[Link]
Accessed December 11, 2024.

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Observers have blamed trends like a rising tide of jihadism and incursions by Islamic
State militants, but African scholars have long maintained that the national borders in
Africa, most of which date back to the period in the late 1800s when European powers
divided up most of the continent in a flurry of diplomatic agreements and colonial
wars now known as the “Scramble for Africa,” are actually one of the biggest sources
of its present-day strife and violence. These borders were not drawn with much
attention or sympathy to the people already living on the continent -- most of the
European diplomats negotiating new territorial borders had little or no knowledge of
the terrain or populations they were apportioning. In 1890, the British Prime Minister
noted that “we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other,
only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the
mountains and rivers and lakes were.” By the time World War I began, the continent
was crisscrossed with novel political borders that had little significance to the people on
the ground. Most African colonies gained independence as new nations during the
1950s and 1960s, and in many cases inherited the borders that had been haphazardly
drawn decades before. That left many ethnic groups divided across borders, sparking
strife and civil wars, and leaving the continent with dozens of separatist movements
even today.

Warrant: Colonial borders have been used to structurally disenfranchise groups.

Gashaw, Tasew Tafese. “Colonial Borders in Africa: Improper Design and its Impact on
African Borderland Communities.” Wilson Center, November 17, 2017,
[Link]
design-and-its-impact-on-african-borderland-communities. Accessed December
11, 2024.

Some political elites in Africa affiliate more along ethnic lines, and play crucial roles in
fueling tensions and escalating political disenfranchisement. For instance, the Lou-

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Nuer of South Sudan and the Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia are the same ethnic group, and live
along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border, yet they are considered as two distinct ethnic
groups with different nationalities and have developed hostility through resource
competition. Despite the effects of colonization and artificial borders on borderland
communities, African political leaders have not alleviated these problems but rather
used them as political instruments. Improper border design and the partitioning of
ethnic groups have contributed to underdevelopment and instability in African states.
In addition, the disconnect between center-periphery relations demonstrated by the
exclusion of borderland communities in economic development exacerbates the
challenges. The lack of economic, social, and political development and limited upward
mobility expose borderland communities to a number of problems, including
widespread poverty, lack of infrastructure, limited education, and cross-border conflicts.
The improper design of African borders and use of these designs as political instruments
have increased instability and underdevelopment for borderland communities across
the continent.

Warrant: These colonial borders cause violence.

Papaioannou, Elias & Michalopoulos, Stelios. “The long-run effects of the ‘Scramble for
Africa’.” Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 24, 2015,
[Link] Accessed
December 11, 2024.

Our work shows that, by splitting ethnicities across countries, the colonial border
design has spurred political violence. Ethnic partitioning is systematically linked to civil
conflict, discrimination by the national government, and instability. More research is
needed to examine the precise mechanisms at play and elucidate other aspects of state
artificiality, related to country size, isolation, and fractionalisation. And since border
artificiality and ethnic partitioning are not phenomena exclusive to Africa, subsequent

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works perhaps in the Middle East could shed light on how the colonial borders in this
part of the world may have a contributed to violence and civil strife.

Warrant: Violence that is caused by the division of an ethnic group is especially harmful.

Papaioannou, Elias & Michalopoulos, Stelios. “The long-run effects of the ‘Scramble for
Africa’.” Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 24, 2015,
[Link] Accessed
December 11, 2024.

Our econometric analysis shows that civil conflict is significantly higher in the homelands
of partitioned, as compared to non-split, ethnicities. The strong link between ethnic
partitioning and conflict is also present, when we restrict the estimation to ethnic
homelands close to the national borders, so as to account for any border effects (which
nonetheless could be driven by partitioning). Our estimates suggest that conflict
intensity is approximately 40% higher and conflict lasts on average 55% longer in the
homelands of partitioned ethnicities. And the likelihood of conflict is approximately
8% higher in the homelands of split ethnicities. We also document spillovers to areas
adjacent to split ethnicities. Conflict intensity is approximately 30% higher and the
likelihood of conflict increases by 7% in the homelands of groups that are surrounded
by 50% of split groups (as compared to groups whose neighbours are not partitioned).

Warrant: Recognizing Somaliland would be moving away from those colonial borders.

Gebereamlak, Hagos. “Ethiopia’s Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for

African Borders.” The Reporter, October 2, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 11, 2024.

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Although Somaliland was a separate British colony before merging with Somalia, the
application of this principle may be complicated by the fact that it voluntarily joined
Somalia shortly after gaining independence in 1960. Therefore, recognizing
Somaliland’s independence today might be seen as a challenge to the established
principle of respecting colonial boundaries. If Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing
Somaliland, it could compromise the long-standing principle of preserving colonial
borders. This move might encourage other secessionist movements across Africa and
lead to broader geopolitical instability. The recognition of Somaliland could serve as a
precedent, prompting other groups to push for independence and potentially leading
to a reshaping of the African political landscape. Recognizing Somaliland could
encourage secessionist movements and irredentist claims across the Horn of Africa,
fueling instability in the region. There are already existing aspirations for independence
in several parts of the Horn, and Somaliland’s recognition could embolden these
movements.

Warrant: Giving ethnicities their own state would be helpful because of how much violence has
been caused.

Papaioannou, Elias & Michalopoulos, Stelios. “The long-run effects of the ‘Scramble for
Africa’.” Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 24, 2015,
[Link] Accessed
December 11, 2024.

In an attempt to dig deeper on the partitioning-repression-civil war nexus we use the

Ethnic Power Relation dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009), which offers an assessment of
formal and informal degrees of political power in national politics since independence.
The analysis reveals three key findings: First, partitioned ethnicities are significantly
more likely (11%-14% higher likelihood) to engage in civil wars that have an explicit
ethnic dimension. Seventy-two out of the 234 split groups in our sample (31%) have

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participated in an ethnic-based civil war, while 69 out of the 359 non-split groups (19%)
have participated in a war with a specific ethnic dimension (Figure 3). Second, the
likelihood that split ethnicities are subject to discrimination from the national
government is approximately 7 percentage points higher compared to non-split
groups. Fifty-eight of the 234 split groups have suffered from discrimination (25%),
while the corresponding likelihood for non-split groups is 15% (Figure 3). Third, we
examine the impact of partitioning jointly on one-sided violence (repression) and two-
sided violence (civil war). We find that in the weakly institutionalised African countries,
ethnic partitioning leads much more often to major two-sided conflict, rather than on
political discrimination; thanks to support from nearby countries and the low
opportunity cost of war, repression often escalates into full-fledged conflict.

Impact: Reducing possible conflict in Africa is important because it is the most conflict prone
area.

Herre, Bastian. “Millions have died in conflicts since the Cold War; most of them in
Africa and intrastate conflicts.” Our World in Data, July 15, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 11,
2024.

The chart shows the total number of conflict deaths for each region and conflict type.

More than half of conflict deaths since 1989 have occurred in Africa The first bar shows
that globally, an estimated 3.8 million people — combatants and civilians — died due to
fighting in armed conflicts between 1989 (the first year for which data is available) and
2023. This number comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which uses
news reports, other contemporary sources, and academic research to count the deaths
in armed conflicts worldwide. The data does not include deaths due to disease and
starvation resulting from conflicts, which can make the death toll much larger. The

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chart’s second bar shows that more than half of these deaths occurred in Africa,
where 2 million people were killed. The Middle East and Asia were the next most
affected regions, with approximately 680,000 and 580,000 deaths. Europe and the
Americas saw the fewest deaths, with around 290,000 and 220,000 deaths, respectively.
You can explore the data by year in this chart. When we consider that some regions
have larger populations than others, we see that Africa and the Middle East have had
the highest death rates: theirs are ten times higher than rates in other world regions.
A closer look at the countries with the highest number of deaths shows that 800,000 of
the deaths occurred in Rwanda alone, followed by more than 400,000 in Syria and more
than 380,000 in Ethiopia.

Impact: It is specifically one sided ethnic conflict that is so high in Africa.

Herre, Bastian. “Millions have died in conflicts since the Cold War; most of them in
Africa and intrastate conflicts.” Our World in Data, July 15, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 11,
2024.

The chart shows, by region, the share of deaths each conflict type is responsible for.

Africa One-sided violence was the deadliest form of conflict in Africa, accounting for
over half of its deaths between 1989 and 2023. A significant portion of these deaths
resulted from a single act of violence: the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Intrastate
conflicts caused about a third of all deaths, particularly in Ethiopia and present-day
Eritrea. Non-state and interstate conflicts were less deadly, each contributing fewer
than 10% of deaths.

Analysis: This argument is really good because it ties into the topic while also demonstrating a
wider problem that is much bigger in scope than the topic, which is violence caused by
improperly drawn colonial borders. This allows debaters to really be able to weigh very well on
scope and magnitude.

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PRO: Recognizing Somaliland encourages Jubaland to advocate for

independence

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland encourages Jubaland to advocate for independence.

Warrant: Jubaland is a region in Somalia that has been making moves towards independence.

Staff Reporter. “Jubaland conflict: What we know so far.” Garowe Online, November 26,
2024, [Link]
we-know-so-far. Accessed December 11, 2024.

KISMAYO, Somalia - Strong disagreements have emerged between authorities in

Mogadishu and Kismayo after Ahmed Islam Mohamed Madobe defied orders to hold
direct elections, effectively winning his third term as regional leader, leading to the
current standoff. In his address, Madobe maintained that the federal government 'has
no role in determining our internal affairs' while insisting that 'any attempts to
destabilize the region shall be resisted'. However, he said that his government would
be eager to dialogue. But for Mogadishu, the elections were 'unconstitutional and
illegal', calling for actions from the Attorney General who should prefer charges against
Madobe - initiate a process that guarantees his removal from office for failing to
embrace changes. The Jubaland leader said the universal suffrage model of elections
would trigger unconstitutional term extensions for state and national leaders, a claim
disputed by the federal government of Somalia under Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Warrant: Violence is already occurring in Jubaland.

Hassan, Abdiqani & Sheikh, Abdi. “Fighting breaks out between Somalia's Jubbaland
region and federal government.” Reuters, December 11, 2024,
[Link]

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somalias-jubbaland-region-and-federal-government/ar-
AA1vGtmq?ocid=BingNewsVerp. Accessed December 11, 2024.

MOGADISHU/GAROWE, Somalia (Reuters) -Clashes erupted on Wednesday between

forces from Somalia's federal government and the semi-autonomous Jubbaland
region, raising concerns that internal rivalries are diverting attention from the fight
against the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab group. The violence in the strategically
important region, which follows an election held there despite being opposed by
authorities in Mogadishu, is taking place just weeks before the mandate of an African
Union peacekeeping force expires. "This morning, federal forces from Mogadishu in
Ras Kamboni, using drones, attacked Jubbaland forces," Adan Ahmed Haji, assistant
security minister of Jubbaland, told a press conference in the regional capital Kismayu.
Later in the day he said hundreds of federal forces had surrendered and fled to the
Kenyan border, while Jubbaland fighters had captured Ras Kamboni. Reuters could not
immediately verify his claims. Somali Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur said
the Jubbaland forces initiated the clashes. "Early this morning Jubbaland forces
attacked the Somali federal military troops that were deployed in Lower Jubba to take
bases withdrawn from by ATMIS," he said in a statement, referring to the African
Union Transition Mission in Somalia.

Warrant: Giving independence to Somaliland promotes Jubaland’s independence.

Gebereamlak, Hagos. “Ethiopia’s Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for

African Borders.” The Reporter, October 2, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 11, 2024.

After gaining independence, African states largely adopted a policy of respecting the
borders drawn during colonial times. This principle, known as ‘Uti Possidetis’, is
enshrined in Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act, which calls for the

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preservation of borders as they existed at the time of independence. The goal of this
policy has been to prevent disorder, chaos, and conflict across the continent. African
countries have generally followed this principle, fearing that the recognition of
secessionist movements could set dangerous precedents. Although Somaliland was a
separate British colony before merging with Somalia, the application of this principle
may be complicated by the fact that it voluntarily joined Somalia shortly after gaining
independence in 1960. Therefore, recognizing Somaliland’s independence today might
be seen as a challenge to the established principle of respecting colonial boundaries. If
Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could compromise the long-standing
principle of preserving colonial borders. This move might encourage other secessionist
movements across Africa and lead to broader geopolitical instability. The recognition
of Somaliland could serve as a precedent, prompting other groups to push for
independence and potentially leading to a reshaping of the African political landscape.
Recognizing Somaliland could encourage secessionist movements and irredentist claims
across the Horn of Africa, fueling instability in the region. There are already existing
aspirations for independence in several parts of the Horn, and Somaliland’s recognition
could embolden these movements.

Warrant: Jubaland would see great economic benefit from independence.

Salad, Mohamed. “Fragmented federalism: Puntland and Jubaland’s quest for autonomy
and its impact on Somali sovereignty.” Caasimada Online, November 6, 2024,
[Link]
quest-for-autonomy-and-its-impact-on-somali-sovereignty/. Accessed December
11, 2024.

These areas see themselves as separate entities inside Somalia, frequently demanding
their autonomy at the expense of national unity. This autonomy hinders the federal
government’s efforts to build a cohesive and autonomous Somali state capable of

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addressing security and governance concerns. Puntland and Jubaland want

independence for political and economic reasons. Politically, these regions have
strong clan ties and local power structures that oppose federal intervention.
Economically, Puntland and Jubaland want to control local resources, including trade
income and possible oil deposits, which has significant consequences for national
revenue-sharing policies. This quest for economic self-sufficiency frequently clashes
with Mogadishu over resource management, causing economic friction and further
separating these areas from the central authority. These contradictions become even
more pronounced in the realms of security and counterterrorism. Groups like Al-
Shabaab, which take advantage of Somalia’s fragmented federal government, continue
to pose a threat to the country. Puntland and Jubaland have established their own
security forces, frequently outside the federal military, creating operational problems
that impede collaborative counterterrorism activities.

Warrant: Much of this wealth is untapped because of violence.

Barnes, Cedric, Ken Menkhaus, Degan Ali, Nikolai Hutchinson & Matt Bryden. “Somalia’s
Jubbaland: Past, present and potential futures.” Rift Valley Institute, 2018,
[Link]
potential-futures/. Accessed December 11, 2024.

Due to its natural resources and location, Jubbaland has the potential to be one of
Somalia’s richest regions, but conflict has kept it chronically unstable for over two
decades. The regions of Jubbaland are not linked by road and have no history of shared
administration. As an administrative unit, Jubbaland is not likely to be functional. The
Somali constitution provides no clear guidance on how newly declared federal states are
to be created, or what their relations with the central government should be.

Warrant: Leaving Somalia’s federalist system would help stop violence in Jubaland.

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Barnes, Cedric, Ken Menkhaus, Degan Ali, Nikolai Hutchinson & Matt Bryden. “Somalia’s
Jubbaland: Past, present and potential futures.” Rift Valley Institute, 2018,
[Link]
potential-futures/. Accessed December 11, 2024.

The Somali constitution provides no clear guidance on how newly declared federal
states are to be created, or what their relations with the central government should
be. The environmental consequences of the charcoal trade are having a negative impact
on livelihoods and food security. Evidence from neighbouring countries is that
federalism and devolution, if not handled carefully, can exacerbate communal and
political tensions over resources. There is concern among Somalis that their neighbours
are not intervening in good faith.

Warrant: This would allow them to capitalize on their oil wealth, and they have a lot.

“Somalia aims to produce first oil in its history by end of year.” AzerNews, February 17,
2024, [Link] Accessed December 11,
2024.

"Somalia will start producing oil on its territory for the first time in history later this
year," said Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirizak Omar
Mohamed, Azernews reports, citing TACC. The first oil is expected to be extracted from
fields in Galmudug, Southwest and Jubaland states. In October 2022, Somalia signed an
agreement to develop oil reserves with US-based Coastline Exploration. The agreement,
based on a production sharing principle, grants Coastline Exploration the right to
explore for oil in seven blocks. Geoseismic studies have shown that Somalia has
potential oil and natural gas reserves equivalent to 30 billion barrels.

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Impact: Oil exports end up increasing GDP.

Salem, Leila Ben, Ridha Nouira, Sami Saafi & Christophe Rault. “How do oil prices affect
the GDP and its components? New evidence from a time-varying threshold
model.” ScienceDirect, May 8, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 11, 2024.

Overall, our empirical study showed strong evidence for the existence of potential
nonlinearity and time-varying threshold effects in the impact of oil price on the GDP of
both oil-importing and oil-exporting countries, but the patterns are likely to be
contingent upon the net position of the country in the oil market. For most of the oil-
exporting countries examined, our findings indicate that lower oil prices have a
detrimental effect on economic growth, whereas higher oil prices exhibit a positive
influence. The reverse outcome holds for most oil-importing countries. In addition, the
presence of the oil price threshold effect persists across all individual GDP components.
Notably, our research unveils a substantial heterogeneity in the oil price thresholds
across the investigated countries, challenging the notion of a universal threshold
applicable to all. These findings suggest that a sustained rise in oil prices fosters the
economic growth of oil-exporting countries and offers them an opportunity to
enhance investments and increase their public expenditures. For oil-importing
countries, lower oil prices should alleviate the cost of production, thereby promoting
exports and boosting economic growth, while a sustained decline in oil prices represents
a great opportunity to stimulate investments and public expenditures. Given the
nonconstant nature of the threshold, this empirical study presents compelling evidence
of distinct periods marked by political and economic tensions that have influenced the
oil–GDP relationship. Such periods include the Global Financial Crisis (2008), the oil price
plunge of 2014–2016, the Russian–Ukrainian war (2014 and 2022) and the recent
COVID-19 pandemic.

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Impact: Increasing GDP decreases poverty.

Balasubramanian, Pooja, Francesco Burchi, & Daniele Malerba. “Does economic growth
reduce multidimensional poverty? Evidence from low- and middle-income
countries” ScienceDirect, October 15, 2022,
[Link]
Accessed December 11, 2024.

The long-standing tradition of empirical studies investigating the nexus between

economic growth and poverty concentrates mainly on monetary poverty. In contrast,
little is known about the relationship between economic growth and
multidimensional poverty. Consequently, this study seeks to assess the elasticity of
multidimensional poverty to growth, especially in low- and middle-income countries.
The study employs two novel, individual-based multidimensional poverty indices: the G-
CSPI and the G-M0. It relies on an unbalanced panel dataset of 91 low- and middle-
income countries observed between 1990 and 2018: this is thus far the largest sample
and the longest time span used in the literature to address this research question.
Within a regression framework, we estimate the growth elasticity of multidimensional
poverty using the first difference estimator. Our study finds that the growth elasticity
of multidimensional poverty is −0.46 while using the G-CSPI and −0.35 while using the
G-M0: this means that a 10% increase in GDP decreases the multidimensional poverty
by approximately 4–5%. There is, however, heterogeneity in the results; in particular,
the elasticity is higher in the second sub-period (2001–2018) and for countries with
lower initial levels of poverty. Furthermore, a comparative analysis reveals that the
elasticity of income-poverty to growth is five to eight times higher than that of
multidimensional poverty. In conclusion, our results indicate that economic growth is
an important instrument to alleviate multidimensional poverty, but its effect is
substantially lower than that on monetary poverty. Therefore, future research should

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identify other factors and policies, such as social policies, to substantially reduce
multidimensional poverty.

Analysis: This argument is good because of the strength of the link chain. It’s clear that if one
region secedes, it opens up a path for another one to do the same. The harder part of the
argument comes with proving that oil extracting will actually end up happening. If you can
prove this will happen, then you are on a clear path to victory.

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PRO: Recognizing Somaliland prevents proxy warfare in the region

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland prevents proxy warfare in the region.

Warrant: Somaliland will continue to pursue independence no matter what.

Cannon, Brendon. “Somaliland’s new government is ready to drive change: these are its
3 big goals.” The Conversation, November 22, 2024,
[Link]
change-these-are-its-3-big-goals-244189. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Waddani will remain committed – like the majority of Somalilanders – to gaining

international recognition as an independent state. Somaliland joined the Somali
Republic in 1960 but departed in 1991. In doing this, Waddani will build on the Kulmiye
party’s achievements. These include diplomatic representation in some western
countries. In 2022, Bihi made an unofficial visit to Washington, DC, and a UK
parliamentary delegation visited Hargeisa. Waddani party leaders, however, intend to
shift away from Kulmiye’s complete reliance on the west. They hope to get
independence recognition faster from African and global south states. The pace of
recognition from the US and UK has been slow. And the west condemned Somaliland’s
deal with Ethiopia. This deal gives Ethiopia access to a strip of Somaliland’s coastline in
return for acknowledgement of Somaliland’s independence.

Warrant: The African Union’s failure to recognize will lead to violence.

Daud, Abdullahi. “How Ignoring Somaliland's Status Affects The Looming Proxy War
Between Ethiopia And Egypt.” Saxafi Media, October 10, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 9, 2024.

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The path forward requires the international community, particularly the African
Union, to address Somaliland’s status urgently. Delaying this issue further risks
destabilizing not just Somaliland and Somalia but the entire Horn of Africa. As
Professor Ali Mazrui (2006) has noted, the troubled union between Somaliland and
Somalia is akin to a disastrous marriage, much like the union between East and West
Pakistan. This comparison illustrates the deep divisions that have characterized the
Somaliland-Somalia relationship. Somaliland’s quest for recognition is emblematic of the
broader struggles for self-determination and autonomy that have shaped post-colonial
African history. The African Union must draw lessons from the experiences of Eritrea
and South Sudan, both of which successfully navigated the challenges of independence.
Somaliland, like these other nations, has a legitimate claim to recognition. The time for
inaction has long passed. The international community must engage meaningfully
with Somaliland to ensure lasting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. In
conclusion, the issue of Somaliland’s recognition presents a critical challenge that, if
left unresolved, could have significant implications not only for Somalia but also for
the wider Horn of Africa region. Somaliland’s progress in terms of peace, stability, and
governance, juxtaposed with the chronic instability in Somalia, makes the question of its
recognition urgent. The African Union and the broader international community must
reassess their approach and take decisive action to recognize the unique history and
circumstances of Somaliland.

Warrant: Intervention is key for stability in the region.

Palma, José Carlos. “Assessing the Military Situation in the Horn of Africa: A Complex
Geopolitical Landscape.” International Studies of Strategic and Geopolitics,
January 19, 2024, [Link]
military-situation-in-the-horn-of-africa-a-complex-geopolitical-landscape/.
Accessed December 9, 2024.

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Somaliland, a self-declared republic in northwestern Somalia, has been in a state of de

facto independence since 1991. The region has made significant progress in establishing
its government and institutions, but it remains unrecognized by the international
community. Somaliland’s quest for recognition is complicated by the ongoing conflict
in Somalia and the reluctance of neighboring countries to upset the delicate balance
of power in the Horn of Africa. Conclusion: A Region in Turmoil The Horn of Africa is a
region in turmoil, facing a multitude of challenges, including civil wars, insurgencies,
territorial disputes, and political instability. The future of the region is uncertain, and
there is a risk that the current instability could escalate into a wider conflict. The
international community has a responsibility to address the root causes of conflict in
the Horn of Africa and support efforts to promote peace and stability. Investing in
development, strengthening governance, and promoting regional cooperation are
essential steps towards a more peaceful and prosperous Horn of Africa.

Warrant: Leaving the country in limbo increases the likelihood of proxy wars.

Daud, Abdullahi. “How Ignoring Somaliland's Status Affects The Looming Proxy War
Between Ethiopia And Egypt.” Saxafi Media, October 10, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 9, 2024.

The ongoing proxy war tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia in Somalia underscore
the importance of addressing Somaliland’s status to prevent further destabilization in
the region. Somaliland’s quest for international recognition is not just a local or
regional issue but one that, if ignored, could trigger wider geopolitical conflicts, as
seen in recent developments. The international community must not remain passive
but instead engage in proactive diplomacy to ensure that peace and stability are
maintained across the Horn of Africa.

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Impact: Proxy wars are uniquely harmful.

Benowitz, Brittany & Ceccanese, Alicia. “Why No One Ever Really Wins a Proxy War.”
Just Security, May 11, 2020, [Link]
ever-really-wins-a-proxy-war/. Accessed December 9, 2020.

One study found that, while security assistance to foreign security forces may help
democratic regimes become more professional, it might actually contribute to abuses
by authoritarian regimes. Even if security assistance does not directly contribute to
human rights violations in oppressive regimes, there are grounds for concern that such
assistance may help such regimes stay in power, thereby prolonging their repressive
tactics. The U.S. also supports non-state armed groups. A key study found that foreign
support of these groups increased the risk of atrocities, as armed groups with foreign
backing are less likely to be dependent on the local population for support. As a result,
proxy forces are more likely to prey on the population for resources or to use violence
to intimidate civilians. Such acts are often unlawful and may in turn increase the risk
of liability of the sponsor for providing assistance to groups engaged in illegal activity.
In addition to being more likely to commit atrocities, proxy forces also are prone to
engage in criminal conduct. Non-state armed groups that receive foreign support often
devolve into criminal enterprises to maintain diverse funding sources, and thus
independence from the sponsor’s demands. Such criminal conduct can include the sale
of weapons provided by sponsors on the black market. For example, weapons provided
by the United States to militias in Syria quickly ended up in the hands of the Islamic
State.

Impact: The impact of violence in the region will be felt far and wide.

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Gavin, Michelle. “Tensions Rising in the Horn of Africa.” Council on Foreign Relations,
October 18, 2024, [Link]
Accessed December 9, 2024.

Non-African powers with strong interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are not sitting
on the sidelines. Turkey has renewed its close relationship with Somalia, while the
United Arab Emirates remains close to Abiy. The complexity of the region and the web
of influences that crisscross historically contested terrain makes the risk of
miscalculation tipping into conflict particularly high. If that happens, the price will be
paid first in African lives. It will then affect the global economy as commercially critical
shipping lanes become less secure. Refugee flows will tax recipient countries. What
happens in the Horn will reverberate globally.

Impact: Last time there was violence in the region, millions died.

“Somali Civil War.” The Organization for World Peace, n.d.,

[Link] Accessed December 9, 2024

The fall of Said Barre’s regime and the Somali Civil War created a power vacuum in
which nationalist and Islamic groups, warlords, clan and sub-clan militias and other
actors aimed to carve out swathes of territory for their own governance.
Subsequently, regional and international institutions initiated various peace and
reconciliation processes in an attempt to create a stable and robust federal government,
with various degrees of success. The inter clan rivalries have fuelled the tension
between the Federal government and the regional states, making the consensus and
state-building, as well as peacebuilding, process strenuous. The chaos resulted in the
declaration of independence by Somaliland in 1991, though still not recognised by any
nation in the world, and Somalia maintains its authority over the northern territory. In
1998, the Puntland region in Northern Somalia declared partial autonomy, meaning that

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they reserve the right to operate independently but still can be part of the Federal
Government of Somalia. Conflict as a result of both internal and external factors has
resulted in more than a million deaths, with many more fleeing to neighbouring
countries.

Analysis: This is a really good argument because it shows that failure to act could lead to far
reverberating impacts that stretch way outside of Somaliland. Teams can probably add some
more cards to this argument if they want to show how this possible proxy war could have global
economic impacts in addition to the terrible impacts of war in general.

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PRO: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access

to IMF and World Bank assistance

Argument: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access to IMF and World
Bank assistance, alleviating poverty.

Warrant: Because Somaliland isn’t independent, it can’t join the International Monetary Fund.

Primorac, Marina. “How Does a Country Join the IMF?” IMF Library, January 1, 1991,
[Link]
Accessed December 11, 2024.

Who can apply for membership in the IMF? The prospective member must be a
country in control of its own foreign affairs, and it must be willing and able to meet
the obligations of membership contained in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement—its
charter. Under those obligations, a member must conduct its exchange rate policy and
related economic and financial policies in accordance with the Articles, and provide
requested economic and financial information. Consistent with its purposes, the IMF
helps a member in finding a solution to the country’s balance of payments problems. A
member must also pay a subscription—financial reserves that can be made available for
use by the IMF’s members.

Warrant: Because Somaliland is not eligible for the IMF, it is also not eligible for the World
Bank.

“The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)” World Bank Group,
n.d., [Link]
the-imf. Accessed December 11, 2024.

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Founded at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the two institutions have
complementary missions. The World Bank Group works with developing countries to
reduce poverty and increase shared prosperity, while the International Monetary
Fund serves to stabilize the international monetary system and acts as a monitor of
the world’s currencies. The World Bank Group provides financing, policy advice, and
technical assistance to governments, and also focuses on strengthening the private
sector in developing countries. The IMF keeps track of the economy globally and in
member countries, lends to countries with balance of payments difficulties, and gives
practical help to members. Countries must first join the IMF to be eligible to join the
World Bank Group; today, each institution has 189 member countries.

Warrant: The World Bank and IMF helps drive nations out of poverty.

“The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)” World Bank Group,
n.d., [Link]
the-imf. Accessed December 11, 2024.

The World Bank Group is one of the world’s largest sources of funding and knowledge
for developing countries. Its five institutions share a commitment to reducing poverty,
increasing shared prosperity, and promoting sustainable development. Together, IBRD
and IDA form the World Bank, which provides financing, policy advice, and technical
assistance to governments of developing countries. IDA focuses on the world’s poorest
countries, while IBRD assists middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries. IFC,
MIGA, and ICSID focus on strengthening the private sector in developing countries.
Through these institutions, the World Bank Group provides financing, technical
assistance, political risk insurance, and settlement of disputes to private enterprises,
including financial institutions. The International Monetary Fund

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The IMF works to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability,
facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic
growth, and reduce poverty around the world. The IMF's primary purpose is to ensure
the stability of the international monetary system—the system of exchange rates and
international payments that enables countries and their citizens to transact with each
other. It does so by keeping track of the global economy and the economies of member
countries, lending to countries with balance of payments difficulties, and giving practical
help to members.

Warrant: The World Bank would be committed to ending poverty in the country.

“Who We Are” World Bank Group, n.d., [Link]

are. Accessed December 11, 2024.

Our mission is to end extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity on a livable
planet. This is threatened by multiple, intertwined crises. Time is of the essence. We are
writing a new playbook to drive impactful development that is: Inclusive of everyone,
including women and young people. Resilient to shocks, including against climate and
biodiversity crises, pandemics and fragility. Sustainable, through growth and job
creation, human development, fiscal and debt management, food security and access to
clean air, water, and affordable energy. To achieve this, we will work with all clients as
one World Bank Group, in close partnership with other multilateral institutions, the
private sector, and civil society.

Warrant: The world bank is investing billions towards this goal.

“World Bank announces record $100bn support for world’s poorest countries.” Al
Jazeera, December 6, 2024, [Link]
us/money/companies/world-bank-announces-record-100bn-support-for-world-

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s-poorest-countries/ar-AA1vmYWB?ocid=BingNewsSerp. Accessed December 15,

2024.

The World Bank has announced that it has raised close to $24bn to provide loans and
grants for some of the world’s poorest nations, which it can leverage to generate a
record $100bn in total spending power. Donor countries committed $23.7bn to
replenish the bank’s concessional lending arm, known as the International
Development Association (IDA), a World Bank spokesperson told the AFP news
agency, marking a slight increase from the roughly $23.5bn pledged during the last
fundraising round three years ago. The bank can use this money to borrow on financial
markets, allowing it to leverage the amount raised by around four times, unlocking
about $100bn in new loans and grants, up from $93bn in 2021. “We believe the historic
success of this IDA21 replenishment is a vote of confidence and support from donors
and clients,” a World Bank statement read, referring to the current IDA funding round.
“This funding will be deployed to support the 78 countries that need it most,” World
Bank President Ajay Banga said in a separate statement, referring to the developing
countries that are eligible for IDA support.

Warrant: The World Bank has turned the tide in many countries worldwide.

Masters, Jonathan, Noah Berman & Andrew Chatzky. “The World Bank Group’s Role in
Global Development.” Council on Foreign Relations, October 12, 2023,
[Link]
development#chapter-title-0-2. Accessed December 15, 2024.

The World Bank has been revered by many as the preeminent brain trust in
development economics. “You could certainly find brilliant development economists
outside the bank,” writes CFR’s Sebastian Mallaby in his book The World’s Banker, but
“nobody could match the Bank’s concentration of talent.” As a result, he says, the

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bank’s annual World Development Report often establishes the accepted wisdom on
any given development topic. The World Bank has had several successful interventions,
in the estimation of many observers. With bank support, Bosnia went from being a
war-torn, low-income economy in 1995 to becoming an upper-middle-income
economy today. The World Bank also provided almost half of the public funding of
South Korea in the high-growth years of the 1970s and 1980s, paving the way for the
country to become the eleventh-largest economy by gross domestic product (GDP)
today (up from the thirtieth-largest in 1975). Most recently, the World Bank introduced
several initiatives to keep low-income economies from collapsing during the pandemic,
including measures to increase lending and defer payments on existing external debt.
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the bank formed a fund to finance the
country’s recovery, though experts note that an end to the war could still be years away.

Impact: Economic development is important because poverty shortens life expectancy.

Staff Writer. “‘Poverty-free life expectancy’ metric proposed.” Harvard T.H. Chan School
of Public Health, December 2, 2024, [Link]
in-the-news/poverty-free-life-expectancy-metric-proposed/. Accessed December
9, 2024.

Reducing poverty can play a key role in improving the health of people around the
world. But few measurement tools have been available that enable global health
experts to assess the combined effects of poverty and health on people’s lives. Now,
researchers from Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health have developed a new
metric—“poverty-free life expectancy,” or PFLE—that could help more accurately
measure health and economic wellbeing around the world. In an August 2018 Lancet
Global Health study, the authors wrote that while most monitoring and benchmarking
efforts are focused on a single dimension, such as healthy life expectancy or poverty
prevalence, “PFLE brings focus to health and wellbeing of populations in a way that

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encourages policy makers to consider the broad benefits of decisions, policies, and
reforms.” The researchers developed a population-level measure of PFLE based on data
from 90 countries. For each of the countries, they produced a PFLE estimate—the
average number of poverty-free years a person could expect to live if exposed to
current mortality rates and poverty prevalence in that country. The average PFLE in
the 90 countries in the study was 66 years for women and 61.6 years for men. But
PFLE varied widely between countries—for example, the average in Malawi was only
9.9 years, while in Iceland it was 83.2 years. In 67 out of 90 countries, the difference
between life expectancy and PFLE was greater for women than men, suggesting that
women generally live more years of life in poverty than men. Differences in PFLE
between countries are substantially greater than differences in life expectancy, the
authors wrote. They urged the use of the PFLE metric to “help establish accountability
for policies that aim to end poverty and promote wellbeing at all ages.”

Analysis: This argument is good because it highlights a benefit that is specifically unique to
recognition. Debaters can use this argument in order to show that even though Somaliland may
be poor right now, its best option is to split from Somalia to grow. Debaters just need to be able
to prove the link that recognition by the African Union leads to a path to become a member of
the World Bank.

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PRO: Recognition of statehood would enable the development of

strong ties to the U.S.

Argument: Recognition of statehood would enable the development of strong ties to the U.S.,
combatting China’s influence in the Horn of Africa through the BRI.

Warrant: China’s Belt Road Initiative is taking over Africa by storm.

Soy, Anne. “China's Belt and Road Initiative: Kenya and a railway to nowhere.” BBC,
October 13, 2023, [Link] Accessed
December 15, 2024.

He says the government would be exploring options for funding the construction of the
remaining portion of the railway during the upcoming Belt and Road Summit in China.

Launched in 2013, China's massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has stretched across
the globe and noticeably changed the landscape of infrastructure across Africa. But its
future is a matter of debate now as China continues to scale down funding and African
countries face the reality of growing debt that in some cases threatens to destabilise
their economies. American think tank the Council on Foreign Relations argues that
some BRI investments have involved opaque bidding processes and required use of
Chinese firms leading to inflated costs which have in some cases resulted in the
cancelation of projects and a political backlash.

Warrant: Countries often find themselves trapped in the debt from the BRI.

Chellaney, Brahma. “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy by Brahma Chellaney.” Project

Syndicate, January 23, 2017, [Link]

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[Link]/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-
chellaney-2017-01. Accessed December 15, 2024.

If there is one thing at which China’s leaders truly excel, it is the use of economic tools
to advance their country’s geostrategic interests. Through its $1 trillion “one belt, one
road” initiative, China is supporting infrastructure projects in strategically located
developing countries, often by extending huge loans to their governments. As a result,
countries are becoming ensnared in a debt trap that leaves them vulnerable to China’s
influence. Of course, extending loans for infrastructure projects is not inherently bad.
But the projects that China is supporting are often intended not to support the local
economy, but to facilitate Chinese access to natural resources, or to open the market
for its low-cost and shoddy export goods. In many cases, China even sends its own
construction workers, minimizing the number of local jobs that are created. Several of
the projects that have been completed are now bleeding money.

Warrant: Lack of US support could lead to Somaliland leaning to China.

Meservey, Joshua. “The U.S. Should Recognize Somaliland.” The Heritage Foundation,
October 19, 2021, [Link]
should-recognize-somaliland. Accessed December 15, 2024.

Even if Beijing took this tack, however, it should not change the U.S.’s calculation. A
pressure campaign by the Chinese government would only drive Somaliland closer to
Washington. The U.S. should also have a plan for economic and diplomatic exchange
with Hargeisa before formal recognition, thereby helping the new country weather
possible pressure. The greater danger is that the Chinese government would try to
degrade Somaliland’s relationship with Taiwan and the U.S. by wooing its leadership
with lavish aid packages or personal inducements, as it has done with many other
African governments. Somaliland resisted such blandishments previously because

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Hargeisa likely calculated that spurning Beijing would win American favor. This
problem complicates all of the U.S.’s relationships with African countries, and
Washington would have to meet it the same way it must meet it elsewhere: by making
the benefits of a strong partnership compelling enough that Hargeisa would wish to
maintain it no matter what Beijing does. Being the first to recognize Somaliland would
also give the U.S. a head start on building enduring ties that would withstand a
Chinese challenge. It could be difficult for Hargeisa to demur if Beijing offered to not
use its veto at the U.N. Security Council to block U.N. recognition of Somaliland
independence in exchange for Somaliland spurning Taiwan. Ultimately, it would be up to
Taipei to make the case to Hargeisa for why its diplomatic opening should continue,
while the U.S.’s priority is its own interests in Somaliland.

Warrant: Recognition of Somaliland by the African Union would make other countries like the
US feel more comfortable recognizing Somaliland.

Idaan, Gulaid Yusuf. “A Legal and Diplomatic Analysis of Somaliland’s Quest for
International Recognition.” Modern Diplomacy, July 4, 2024,
[Link]
somalilands-quest-for-international-recognition/.. Accessed December 7, 2024.

Somaliland has, therefore, been at pains to insist that its case was the restoration of
historical independence and not an issue of secession. Highlighting the unique colonial
experience and a union that was voluntarily entered into with Somalia, Hargeisa argues
that its fight for a claim to sovereignty is not similar to the other secessionist territories
or cases. More particularly, however, the non-interference in the states’ territorial
boundaries had pressed a great challenge to the cause for the international recognition
of Somaliland. It has participated in development activities at the UN and lobbied for
assistance with its recognition quest. But without AU support, the path to the UN for
Somaliland is a hard one. The regional consensual voice on UN policy is loud, and

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without AU support has given a quick path to international recognition through the
UN, to Somaliland. The multilateral engagement Kosovo had undertaken until then was
a process in which Kosovo sought recognition from influential international bodies as
early as possible in the independence process.

Warrant: Partnership with the US has advantages for the US.

Meservey, Joshua. “The U.S. Should Recognize Somaliland.” The Heritage Foundation,
October 19, 2021, [Link]
should-recognize-somaliland. Accessed December 15, 2024.

Djibouti and Mombasa in Kenya are the only two large, modern ports serving the region,
which gives Somaliland’s Berbera port an opportunity to emerge as an economic hub.

Beyond shoring up its position that Beijing is undercutting in an important region,

recognizing Somaliland would help the U.S. in other ways as well. Hargeisa and Taipei
established close informal relations in 2020, and subsequently exchanged
representatives. An independent Somaliland would give Taiwan another country
willing to have such ties with it, thereby boosting a territory that the U.S. also
supports. By serving as a maritime gateway for East Africa not under Chinese
influence, Somaliland could also complicate the continuity of the Belt and Road
infrastructure that Beijing is building in the region. At a time when illiberal governance
is advancing in parts of Africa, American recognition of Somaliland would be a way to
help a prominent experiment in democracy address its shortcomings, something
Washington cannot currently do fully because of constraints imposed by Mogadishu.
Problems with Somaliland’s democracy have included deadly—though limited—post-
election clashes and elite power struggles that have twice necessitated years-long
extensions of the president’s term.

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Impact: The US can better monitor the Bab-el Mandeb Strait.

Adegoke, Yinka. “Somaliland: Trump’s White House looks set to recognize the region.”
Semafor, December 10, 2024.
ttps://[Link]/article/12/10/2024/somaliland-trump-white-house-
looks-set-to-recognize-the-region. Accessed December 15, 2024.

The support for recognizing Somaliland from Africa watchers on the US right is
ostensibly about long-term relations with people in the territory. But it’s also about
strategic military and shipping interests in the region, as well as countering China. In
particular, the Bab-el Mandeb strait in the Gulf of Aden between Somaliland’s Berbera
port, Djibouti and Yemen is a “critical shipping choke point” for moving goods and
military wares in the sub-region. Based on conversations I’ve had with likely advisors to
Trump, Hargeisa shouldn’t expect an easy ride with the Trump White House. As we’ve
noted previously, this is going to be a very transactional administration which will want
to be sure they’re getting something in exchange for official support.

Impact: Somaliland avoids the horrors of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Chellaney, Brahma. “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy by Brahma Chellaney.” Project

Syndicate, January 23, 2017, [Link]
[Link]/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-
chellaney-2017-01. Accessed December 15, 2024.

For example, Sri Lanka’s Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which opened in 2013
near Hambantota, has been dubbed the world’s emptiest. Likewise, Hambantota’s
Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port remains largely idle, as does the multibillion-dollar
Gwadar port in Pakistan. For China, however, these projects are operating exactly as
needed: Chinese attack submarines have twice docked at Sri Lankan ports, and two

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Chinese warships were recently pressed into service for Gwadar port security. In a
sense, it is even better for China that the projects don’t do well. After all, the heavier
the debt burden on smaller countries, the greater China’s own leverage becomes.
Already, China has used its clout to push Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand to
block a united ASEAN stand against China’s aggressive pursuit of its territorial claims
in the South China Sea. Moreover, some countries, overwhelmed by their debts to
China, are being forced to sell to it stakes in Chinese-financed projects or hand over
their management to Chinese state-owned firms. In financially risky countries, China
now demands majority ownership up front. For example, China clinched a deal with
Nepal this month to build another largely Chinese-owned dam there, with its state-run
China Three Gorges Corporation taking a 75% stake.

Analysis: This argument is good because it puts this situation into a realistic lens of what’s
actually occurring in international relations right now. Great Power Competition is dictating
what the world is looking like right now, and by showing how this fits into the puzzle, you show
your judge a convincing argument. Debaters can use this argument also as an extended
argument about US hegemony being good or leave it as it is.

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PRO: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access

to international markets and global trade

Argument: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access to international

markets and global trade.

Warrant: Recognition for secessionist entities allows them to reap the benefits of international
organizations

Zackin, Emily. "The Role of International Recognition in State Sovereignty." University of

Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 34, no. 4, 2013, pp. 849-879,
[Link]
.

“In a somewhat circular fashion, recognition also changes the legal framework of the
interactions between the parent state, the secessionist entity, and other states. It enables the
secessionist entity to seek the benefits of the international system, including military and
economic aid. Recognition allows the new state to seek admission into the United Nations16
and to secure aid from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.17 Support from
these institutions, achieved only after recognition, undoubtedly aids the continued existence
and security of the new state, and secures its removal from the control of the parent state.
Finally, recognition as a new state frees other states in the international community to send
military assistance to secure the newfound territorial integrity of the recognized state. Even if
military assistance is not actually sent, recognition makes it easier for the international
community to threaten such action, making it more likely that the parent state will not resist
the newly recognized state’s independence. Given the potential negative consequences of
recognition for the parent state, it can serve effectively as a sanction for the parent state’s bad
behavior.”

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Warrant: It is also true of military aid that recognition is a prerequisite

Zackin, Emily. "The Role of International Recognition in State Sovereignty." University of

Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 34, no. 4, 2013, pp. 849-879,
[Link]
.

“In a somewhat circular fashion, recognition also changes the legal framework of the
interactions between the parent state, the secessionist entity, and other states. It enables the
secessionist entity to seek the benefits of the international system, including military and
economic aid. Recognition allows the new state to seek admission into the United Nations16
and to secure aid from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.17 Support from
these institutions, achieved only after recognition, undoubtedly aids the continued existence
and security of the new state, and secures its removal from the control of the parent state.
Finally, recognition as a new state frees other states in the international community to send
military assistance to secure the newfound territorial integrity of the recognized state. Even if
military assistance is not actually sent, recognition makes it easier for the international
community to threaten such action, making it more likely that the parent state will not resist
the newly recognized state’s independence. Given the potential negative consequences of
recognition for the parent state, it can serve effectively as a sanction for the parent state’s bad
behavior.”

Warrant: Many states’ recognition is a prerequisite because it meets the preconditions of

statehood

Zackin, Emily. "The Role of International Recognition in State Sovereignty." University of

Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 34, no. 4, 2013, pp. 849-879,

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[Link]
.

“Much of that complicated determination, declaring either the secessionist entity or its parent
state the winner or the loser, falls to other states in the international community. For
secessionist entities to become full-fledged states with all the accordant benefits, they must
be recognized as states for one of two reasons: either because recognition is an essential
precondition for statehood or, more practically, because it is only with recognition that new
states actually realize the benefits of statehood. Under international law, other states decide
whether or not to recognize secessionist entities as new states. The question, then, is: how
should states decide whether or not to recognize a secessionist entity as a new state?”

Impact: Statehood eases restrictions for international trade, which helps to reduce poverty

"Trade Has Been a Powerful Driver of Economic Development and Poverty Reduction."
World Bank, [Link]
a-powerful-driver-of-economic-development-and-poverty-
reduction#:~:text=Trade%20Has%20Been%20a%20Powerful%20Driver%20of%2
0Economic%20Development%20and%20Poverty%20Reduction,-
Share%20more&text=From%201990%20to%202017%2C%20developing,36%20p
ercent%20to%209%20percent.

“From 1990 to 2017, developing countries increased their share of global exports from 16
percent to 30 percent; in the same period, the global poverty rate fell from 36 percent to 9
percent. Not all countries have benefited equally, but overall, trade has generated
unprecedented prosperity, helping to lift some 1 billion people out of poverty in recent
decades. Trade has multiple benefits. Trade leads to faster productivity growth, especially for
sectors and countries engaged in global value chains (GVCs). These links allow developing
countries to specialize in making a single component, like a keyboard, rather than a finished

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product, like a personal computer. GVCs give them access to foreign technology, know-how,
and investment. Trade eases the diffusion of technologies that reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and support adaptation – such as solar panels and wind turbines or drought-resistant
seeds. Consumers enjoy a greater variety of goods and services at lower cost, though some
firms and workers in individual sectors may see their livelihoods at risk through increased
competitive pressures.”

Impact: Recognition and subsequent international trade and development reduces the risk of
conflict

Collier, Paul. "Development and Conflict." United Nations,

[Link]

Surprisingly, the most important risk factors were three economic characteristics: the level of
per capita income, its rate of growth, and its structure. Doubling the level of income halves
the risk of conflict. A percentage point on the growth rate reduces the risk by around a
percentage point. Reducing dependence upon natural resource exports powerfully reduces the
risk of conflict.3 Other characteristics, such as ethnic and religious fractionalization, political
rights, and colonial history, do not show up as being important. Indeed, if anything, societies
composed of many different ethnic groups are safer than homogenous societies. Evidently,
where conflicts occur in ethnically differentiated societies they are likely to be organized along
ethnic lines, and the rhetoric deployed may well be that of ethnic grievance. However, we
should be careful not to conclude from this that ethnic differences are the cause of civil war.
The same differences, the same grievances, and the same personalities, can generally be
harmlessly contained in the context of a middle-income country with a growing and diversified
economy, yet may be explosive in the context of poverty, stagnation, and valuable natural
resources.

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Analysis: This argument is persuasive because debaters can argue that recognition has a direct
link to the likelihood that statehood becomes a reality. Statehood comes with several benefits,
one of which is that there is an increased likelihood that a state becomes engaged in trade with
other countries. Trade itself comes with a plethora of benefits.

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PRO: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access

to military aid

Argument: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access to military aid.

Warrant: Recognition for secessionist entities allows them to reap the benefits of international
organizations

Zackin, Emily. "The Role of International Recognition in State Sovereignty." University of

Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 34, no. 4, 2013, pp. 849-879,
[Link]
.

“In a somewhat circular fashion, recognition also changes the legal framework of the
interactions between the parent state, the secessionist entity, and other states. It enables the
secessionist entity to seek the benefits of the international system, including military and
economic aid. Recognition allows the new state to seek admission into the United Nations16
and to secure aid from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.17 Support from
these institutions, achieved only after recognition, undoubtedly aids the continued existence
and security of the new state, and secures its removal from the control of the parent state.
Finally, recognition as a new state frees other states in the international community to send
military assistance to secure the newfound territorial integrity of the recognized state. Even if
military assistance is not actually sent, recognition makes it easier for the international
community to threaten such action, making it more likely that the parent state will not resist
the newly recognized state’s independence. Given the potential negative consequences of
recognition for the parent state, it can serve effectively as a sanction for the parent state’s bad
behavior.”

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Warrant: Recognition is a prerequisite for military aid

Zackin, Emily. "The Role of International Recognition in State Sovereignty." University of

Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 34, no. 4, 2013, pp. 849-879,
[Link]
.

“In a somewhat circular fashion, recognition also changes the legal framework of the
interactions between the parent state, the secessionist entity, and other states. It enables the
secessionist entity to seek the benefits of the international system, including military and
economic aid. Recognition allows the new state to seek admission into the United Nations16
and to secure aid from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.17 Support from
these institutions, achieved only after recognition, undoubtedly aids the continued existence
and security of the new state, and secures its removal from the control of the parent state.
Finally, recognition as a new state frees other states in the international community to send
military assistance to secure the newfound territorial integrity of the recognized state. Even if
military assistance is not actually sent, recognition makes it easier for the international
community to threaten such action, making it more likely that the parent state will not resist
the newly recognized state’s independence. Given the potential negative consequences of
recognition for the parent state, it can serve effectively as a sanction for the parent state’s bad
behavior.”

Impact: Military aid reduces the longevity of conflict

Bapat, Navin A. "Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups." Journal of

Conflict Resolution, vol. 52, no. 6, 2008, pp. 871–888,
[Link]

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“The main empirical finding is as follows: foreign aid is directly affecting the probability of civil
conflict continuation (i.e., the probability of having conflict at t, conditional on having conflict
at t − 1), negatively and significantly. Aid flows therefore reduce the duration of civil conflicts
in sub-Saharan Africa. A 10% increase in foreign aid is estimated to decrease the probability
of continuation by about 8% points (the unconditional probability of conflict continuation is
about 90%). We do not find a significant effect of aid flows on the onset probability (i.e., the
probability of having conflict at t, conditional on having peace at t − 1).”

Impact: Reducing the likelihood of conflict also lifts people out of multi-generational poverty

"Fragility and Conflict: On the Front Lines of the Fight Against Poverty." World Bank, 18
Feb. 2020, [Link]
conflict-on-the-front-lines-fight-against-poverty.

“While the immediate effects of conflict are stark, there are long-term ramifications that can
impact generations of people. Exposure to conflict in childhood leads to poorer
lifetime health, and the negative health effects go beyond the current generation as children of
the original victims of conflict also have worse outcomes. Human capital losses due to conflict
lower people’s lifetime productivity and earnings and reduce socioeconomic mobility.”

Analysis: This argument stresses the need for recognition for additional military assistance. The
argument is that military assistance is necessary for reducing the length of conflicts, and that
conflicts are bad in the short-term of course as they cause loss of life, but also in the long-term
for the larger population as well as conflicts creates multi-generational, negative effects on
everyone around conflicts.

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PRO: Recognition of statehood enables counterterror support,

undermining al-Shabaab

Argument: Recognition of statehood enables counterterror support, undermining al-Shabaab.

Warrant: Recognition for secessionist entities allows them to reap the benefits of international
organizations

Zackin, Emily. "The Role of International Recognition in State Sovereignty." University of

Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 34, no. 4, 2013, pp. 849-879,
[Link]
.

“In a somewhat circular fashion, recognition also changes the legal framework of the
interactions between the parent state, the secessionist entity, and other states. It enables the
secessionist entity to seek the benefits of the international system, including military and
economic aid. Recognition allows the new state to seek admission into the United Nations16
and to secure aid from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.17 Support from
these institutions, achieved only after recognition, undoubtedly aids the continued existence
and security of the new state, and secures its removal from the control of the parent state.
Finally, recognition as a new state frees other states in the international community to send
military assistance to secure the newfound territorial integrity of the recognized state. Even if
military assistance is not actually sent, recognition makes it easier for the international
community to threaten such action, making it more likely that the parent state will not resist
the newly recognized state’s independence. Given the potential negative consequences of
recognition for the parent state, it can serve effectively as a sanction for the parent state’s bad
behavior.”

Warrant: Recognition is a prerequisite for military aid

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Zackin, Emily. "The Role of International Recognition in State Sovereignty." University of

Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 34, no. 4, 2013, pp. 849-879,
[Link]
.

“In a somewhat circular fashion, recognition also changes the legal framework of the
interactions between the parent state, the secessionist entity, and other states. It enables the
secessionist entity to seek the benefits of the international system, including military and
economic aid. Recognition allows the new state to seek admission into the United Nations16
and to secure aid from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.17 Support from
these institutions, achieved only after recognition, undoubtedly aids the continued existence
and security of the new state, and secures its removal from the control of the parent state.
Finally, recognition as a new state frees other states in the international community to send
military assistance to secure the newfound territorial integrity of the recognized state. Even if
military assistance is not actually sent, recognition makes it easier for the international
community to threaten such action, making it more likely that the parent state will not resist
the newly recognized state’s independence. Given the potential negative consequences of
recognition for the parent state, it can serve effectively as a sanction for the parent state’s bad
behavior.”

Warrant: Military aid is important for counterterror efforts against al-Shabaab

"PRISM Volume 9, Issue 1." National Defense University Press,

[Link]
[Link].

“The effectiveness of AFRICOM’s counterterrorism operations is mixed. U.S. operations have

targeted the global elements of Salafi-jihadi groups to diminish the transnational threat.

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None of the current counterterrorism efforts is on course to defeat the local groups,
however. The United States has supported partners in the fight against al-Shabaab in Somalia
for over a decade. Al-Shabaab no longer controls the majority of the country or the major
populated areas, but its external attack capability remains worrisome. The security forces of
America’s partners—Kenyan, Ugandan, Burundian, and Somali troops among others—are more
capable and conduct successful ground campaigns against al-Shabaab. However, insufficient
ground forces preclude further progress.”

Impact: Reducing the likelihood of conflict also lifts people out of multi-generational poverty

"Fragility and Conflict: On the Front Lines of the Fight Against Poverty." World Bank, 18
Feb. 2020, [Link]
conflict-on-the-front-lines-fight-against-poverty.

“While the immediate effects of conflict are stark, there are long-term ramifications that can
impact generations of people. Exposure to conflict in childhood leads to poorer
lifetime health, and the negative health effects go beyond the current generation as children of
the original victims of conflict also have worse outcomes. Human capital losses due to conflict
lower people’s lifetime productivity and earnings and reduce socioeconomic mobility.”

Analysis: This argument, in sum, is that military assistance reduces the risk of terrorism.
However, while military assistance has helped, it would be far more effective with additional
assistance. And that assistance would only be allowed after recognition. Recognition promotes
legitimacy, and subsequent aid.

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Champion Briefs
January 2025
Public Forum Brief

Pro Responses to
Con Arguments
Pro Responses to Con Arguments January 2025

A/2: Granting independence encourages other secessionist

movements in Africa.

Delink: Granting independence does not embolden other secessionist groups

Warrant: Other independence claims prove secessionist groups aren’t emboldened.

Maservey, Joshua. “Missing Opportunities in Somaliland.” Heritage Foundation,

November 29, 2021, [Link]
opportunities-somaliland. Accessed December 13, 2024.

A frequent concern expressed by those opposed to Somaliland’s independence is that

it would encourage other secessionist movements on the continent. That hypothesis
has already been tested. Eritrea gained independence in 1991, as did South Sudan in
2011. There was no subsequent explosion of independence claims in either case. In
fact, establishing a standard for independence based on the Somaliland model would
raise the bar for achieving recognition, since there is no other African secessionist
movement with nearly the same autonomy and success that Somaliland has. Its
borders are also today the same as they were upon independence in 1960, aligning
them with the African Union member states’ pledge that countries should abide within
the boundaries “existing on their achievement of national independence.”

Warrant: International recognition does not boost other secessionist groups because they do
not make legal arguments.

Schwartz, Stephen. “The African Union Should Resolve Somaliland’s Status.” Foreign
Policy Research Institute, November 9, 2021,

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[Link]
somalilands-status/. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Meservey also identifies numerous potential downsides to U.S. recognition. He lists

Chinese hostility towards Somaliland over the latter’s relationship with Taiwan and likely
refusal to seat it in the United Nations; Somalia’s ire at the U.S. having formally broken
up the country; consternation from other African states that the move would spur more
secessionist movements; and the possibility that Somaliland might fail as has South
Sudan (and arguably Eritrea). Both he and I see this latter outcome as unlikely. Nor do
we believe Somaliland’s unique situation would boost the argument of any other African
secessionist movement. There is a course that would, if successful, achieve for the
United States all the benefits of recognizing Somaliland without any of these
downsides: The United States should work with African and non-African states to
persuade the African Union to lead the process to resolve Somaliland’s status. The
African Union has the mandate and legitimacy to address the issue and to act
authoritatively in the eyes of Africans and the international community.

Warrant: Somaliland has stuck to traditional boundaries and is not trying to create “a new
state”.

T.G., “Why Somaliland is not a recognised state.” The Economist, November 1, 2015,
[Link]
somaliland-is-not-a-recognised-state. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Throughout the post-independence era, geopolitics in Africa has tended to respect

"colonial borders", ie the borders laid down by European colonial powers in the 19th
century. Across the continent, there have been only two significant alterations to the
colonial map since the 1960s: the division of Eritrea from Ethiopia, in 1993; and South
Sudan from Sudan, in 2011. On the question of Somaliland, the African Union (AU), to

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whom the international community tends to defer on boundary issues, has stuck to its
traditional line: to recognise Somiliand would be to open a Pandora’s box of separatist
claims in the region. Only with the consent of greater Somalia should Somaliland be
granted independence, so the argument goes. But this, Somilalanders point out, is
inconsistent: Somaliland, unlike Somalia, sticks to old colonial borders. It even has
previous experience of statehood (prior to independence, the territory was
administered as a separate British colony, and briefly enjoyed a five-day spell as a
sovereign state). Formerly British Somaliland’s union with Italian Somaliland to its
south, which brought about modern Somalia in 1960, was voluntary, they argue. Its
independence should require merely divorce, not reinvention.

Warrant: The success of secessionist groups is determined by a variety of conditions.

Bereketeab, Redie. “Self-determination and Secessionism in Somaliland and South

Sudan.” Nordiska, 2012, [Link]
[Link]. Accessed December 13, 2024.

The factors underlying demands for secession may vary considerably. Ethnic or cultural
distinctions maybe invoked to drive the group’s demands for self determination. Past
historical glories may be invoked. Further reference may also be made to subjugation.
These drivers can be potent if the group occupies a distinct territory (Trzcinski
2004:208). Invariably, conditions that determine the outcome of secessionist
movements in Africa include: Interests of powerful states, Attitude of the central
government towards the secessionist movement, Military balance between the
secessionist movement and central government, Strategic importance of the seceding
region, External support to the secessionist movement or central government,
Recognition of the secession by the international community, particularly the UN,
Economic significance of the seceding region for the parent state (Trzcinski 2004).

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Analysis: Teams can make the counterargument that Somaliland’s independence is not actually
likely to cascade into the momentum of other secessionist movements, especially when its
claim is grounded in long-standing principles of adhering to colonial borders, and when it is
recognized by such a thoughtful, slow moving, respected, and legitimate organization as the
African Union. Meservey and Schwartz can be useful cards that help provide historical backing
to this argument for teams.

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A/2: Somaliland will be economically taken advantage of by predatory

development lending.

Turn: International lending is good

Warrant: Somaliland is set back by its lack of international lending.

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 13, 2024.

Meanwhile, the government is ineligible for loans from the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund as long as Somaliland is not an internationally
recognized state or reconciled with Somalia. President Muse Bihi Abdi, in an op-ed
after his 2017 election victory, said that Somaliland’s exclusion from international
markets “compounds the socioeconomic pressures that Somaliland faces,” and
analysts say that an anemic economy puts decades of political progress at risk.
Somaliland has nonetheless negotiated its own foreign investment deals despite
opposition from the federal government in Mogadishu. In 2016, it struck a landmark
deal with DP World of Dubai, part of the UAE, to develop and manage the Port of
Berbera, a joint venture expected to produce millions of dollars of income a year for
Somaliland. Landlocked Ethiopia joined the port development project two years later,
aiming to expand its access to the sea.

Warrant: Somaliland is lagging behind most other countries.

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“Implementation Completion and Results Report on the Grant in the Amount of US

$10M to the Government of Somaliland.” World Bank Public Report, September
27, 2023,
[Link]
[Link]. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Key elements of Somaliland’s social, political, and economic context include conflict and
fragility. Somaliland’s quest for state recognition shaped its political and economic
landscape, forging a separate, more self-reliant identity through locally driven
reconciliation and state-building. The political settlement in Somaliland was founded
on a deep-rooted commitment to maintain peace, sometimes at the expense of other
priorities. Somaliland dramatically lagged other low-income economies with regard to
social and development achievements, as evidenced by poor health and education
indicators. Somaliland’s revenue base was very low by international standards but
showed marked improvement in the run-up to the launch of the CSSP. While overall
civil service employment and wage bill expenditures are extremely low in Somaliland
by international standards (employment stood at well under 2 percent in 2018,
relative to a Lower Income Countries average of 5.5 percent), the wage bill as a share
of total government expenditures stood at 52 percent as of 2019, well above
international norms, thus crowding out needed expenditures on other inputs and
investments. The bulk of Somaliland’s economic activity remained concentrated in a
small number of sectors, including livestock production, khat trade, import and export
businesses, telecommunications and remittances, many of which have been dominated
by a few large entrepreneurs, thus limiting economic growth and exacerbating
vulnerability of its economy to downturns in one or more of those limited number of
sectors.

Impact: World Bank lending is associated with long-run economic growth.

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Butkiewicz, James and Halit Yanikkaya, “The Effects of IMF and World Bank Lending on
Long-Run Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis.” World Development, March
2005, [Link]
Accessed December 13, 2024.

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, frequently, and often
repeatedly, extend loans to developing nations. These loans have been blamed for
generating adverse economic outcomes. The growth impact of Fund and Bank loan
programs is assessed using an empirical growth model that controls for other
determinants of growth. A unique feature of this study is the use of the value of loans
rather than the number of programs. The estimates indicate that Bank lending
stimulates growth in some cases, primarily by increasing public investment. Fund
lending is either neutral or detrimental to growth. The channel for this effect is a
negative impact of Fund lending on public as well as private investment.

Impact: Programs have a positive impact on growth for several years after being adopted

Bird, Graham and Dane Rowlands. “The Effect of IMF Programmes on Economic Growth
in Low Income Countries: An Empirical Analysis.” The Journal of Development
Studies, September 5, 2016,
[Link]
Accessed December 13, 2024.

Using an LIC-specific participation model, we adopt a propensity score matching (PSM)

methodology to compare economic growth performance in countries with and without
IMF programmes over the period 1989–2008. Concessional programmes are found to
have had a generally positive effect on economic growth for up to two years after
agreements were signed. The effects are contingent on other factors including overall
initial economic conditions, recent prior growth performance, aid dependency, debt,

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IMF resources, recent history of IMF engagement and time period. We examine the
implications of the results as the IMF considers how best to support the Sustainable
Development Goals.

Analysis: Teams can make the counterargument that Somaliland is economically strapped and
needs to be able to access outside investment (from the World Bank and IMF, for example) for
it to continue developing and to raise people out of poverty. It can only do this if its sovereignty
is internationally recognized. There is literature on both sides of the debate on this kind of
development loan, for teams to read and choose from.

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A/2: Recognition causes backlash from the Somali government.

Turn: Backlash doesn’t trigger backlash because Somalia relationships are normalizing now

Warrant: Relations are normalizing now – Turkey is mediating talks.

Fraser, Suzan. “Ethiopia and Somalia agree to hold ‘technical talks’ over breakaway
Somaliland region.” Washington Post, December 11, 2024,
[Link]
joint-declaration/3a2759fa-b80f-11ef-8afa-452ab71fe261_story.html. Accessed
December 13, 2024.

Turkey has been mediating between the two east African countries as tensions
between them have simmered since Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding
with Somaliland in January to lease land along its coastline to establish a marine force
base. In return, Ethiopia would recognize Somaliland’s independence, which Somalia
says infringes on its sovereignty and territory. A joint declaration was reached after
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met separately with Somali President Hassan
Sheik Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on Wednesday. It says the
sides agreed the talks, which would begin by February 2025 and conclude within four
months, would respect Somalia’s territorial integrity while recognizing “potential
benefits” of Ethiopia’s access to the sea. The declaration also says the sides would
work to “finalize mutually advantageous commercial arrangements” to allow Ethiopia
“to enjoy reliable, secure and sustainable access to and from the sea,” under Somalia
sovereignity.

Warrant: Somaliland independence would not cause force to be used.

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Sultan, Ibrahim. “Revisiting Somaliland’s Case for Independence.” International Policy

Digest, January 11, 2024, [Link]
somaliland-s-case-for-independence/. Accessed December 13, 2024.

In the context of Somaliland, the armed resistance to reclaim sovereignty may be

viewed as a reaction to the severe human rights violations and institutional injustices it
endured under the Somali regime. Nevertheless, it is critical to acknowledge that force
should be contemplated only as a final option, and all peaceful alternatives must be
thoroughly pursued before resorting to armed conflict. The philosophical robustness
of Somaliland’s bid for secession is a mosaic of historical grievances, human rights
infringements, and the democratic will expressed through popular vote. While
Somaliland’s arguments find resonance with certain secessionist theories, like those
advocating for remedial rights and plebiscitary support, there are also
counterarguments that challenge the impact of secession on regional stability and the
potential for further fragmentation. The philosophical merit of Somaliland’s secessionist
claims is a subjective matter, largely dependent on which theories and principles are
deemed paramount.

Warrant: African Union recognition, specifically, prevents the outbreak of war.

Schwartz, Stephen. “The African Union Should Resolve Somaliland’s Status.” Foreign
Policy Research Institute, November 9, 2021,
[Link]
somalilands-status/. Accessed December 13, 2024.

There is a course that would, if successful, achieve for the United States all the benefits
of recognizing Somaliland without any of these downsides: The United States should
work with African and non-African states to persuade the African Union to lead the

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process to resolve Somaliland’s status. The African Union has the mandate and
legitimacy to address the issue and to act authoritatively in the eyes of Africans and
the international community. The African Union took up the issue in 2005 by sending a
fact-finding mission to Somaliland. The official summary of its findings is very
favorable towards Somaliland’s claims, asserting, “Somaliland’s search for recognition
[is] historically unique and self-justified in African political history,” and it urges the
AU to take up the issue with the governments in Mogadishu and Hargeisa without
delay. The African Union did not act on that report and has played little role since then.
Now, 16 years later, it is the time for the African Union to act.

Warrant: Somaliland’s independence is aligned with historical and international norms

Carroll, Anthony and B. Rajagopal. “The Case for Independent Statehood of Somaliland.”
American University International Law Review, 1993,
[Link]
ntext=auilr. Accessed December 13, 2024.

This Comment explores the legal validity of Northern Somaliland's assertion of

independence and argues for the recognition of Somaliland as an independent state.
Section I discusses the validity of such independence in a historical perspective,
dealing with the nature of sovereign rights over Somaliland. Section II posits arguments
under international law for the exercise of such a right by the people of Somaliland.
Section III analyzes the concept of recognition and its conformity with existing
international law. This Comment concludes that Somaliland should be recognized as an
independent nation.

Analysis: Teams can make the counterargument that Mogadishu may be unhappy with
Somaliland’s independence, but the benefits of an independent country outweigh the chance
of backlash, especially if the African Union (which all African countries agree has power to make

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this decision) is the one to acknowledge Somaliland. Even if they are unhappy, they are unlikely
to take concrete new actions, considering Somalia has already been at civil war for more than
two decades.

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A/2: Recognition would worsen the Somali Civil War.

Turn: Backlash doesn’t trigger backlash because Somalia relationships are normalizing now

Warrant: Relations are normalizing now – Turkey is mediating talks.

Fraser, Suzan. “Ethiopia and Somalia agree to hold ‘technical talks’ over breakaway
Somaliland region.” Washington Post, December 11, 2024,
[Link]
joint-declaration/3a2759fa-b80f-11ef-8afa-452ab71fe261_story.html. Accessed
December 13, 2024.

Turkey has been mediating between the two east African countries as tensions
between them have simmered since Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding
with Somaliland in January to lease land along its coastline to establish a marine force
base. In return, Ethiopia would recognize Somaliland’s independence, which Somalia
says infringes on its sovereignty and territory. A joint declaration was reached after
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met separately with Somali President Hassan
Sheik Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on Wednesday. It says the
sides agreed the talks, which would begin by February 2025 and conclude within four
months, would respect Somalia’s territorial integrity while recognizing “potential
benefits” of Ethiopia’s access to the sea. The declaration also says the sides would
work to “finalize mutually advantageous commercial arrangements” to allow Ethiopia
“to enjoy reliable, secure and sustainable access to and from the sea,” under Somalia
sovereignity.

Warrant: Somaliland independence would not cause force to be used.

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Sultan, Ibrahim. “Revisiting Somaliland’s Case for Independence.” International Policy

Digest, January 11, 2024, [Link]
somaliland-s-case-for-independence/. Accessed December 13, 2024.

In the context of Somaliland, the armed resistance to reclaim sovereignty may be

viewed as a reaction to the severe human rights violations and institutional injustices it
endured under the Somali regime. Nevertheless, it is critical to acknowledge that force
should be contemplated only as a final option, and all peaceful alternatives must be
thoroughly pursued before resorting to armed conflict. The philosophical robustness
of Somaliland’s bid for secession is a mosaic of historical grievances, human rights
infringements, and the democratic will expressed through popular vote. While
Somaliland’s arguments find resonance with certain secessionist theories, like those
advocating for remedial rights and plebiscitary support, there are also
counterarguments that challenge the impact of secession on regional stability and the
potential for further fragmentation. The philosophical merit of Somaliland’s secessionist
claims is a subjective matter, largely dependent on which theories and principles are
deemed paramount.

Warrant: African Union recognition, specifically, prevents the outbreak of war.

Schwartz, Stephen. “The African Union Should Resolve Somaliland’s Status.” Foreign
Policy Research Institute, November 9, 2021,
[Link]
somalilands-status/. Accessed December 13, 2024.

There is a course that would, if successful, achieve for the United States all the benefits
of recognizing Somaliland without any of these downsides: The United States should
work with African and non-African states to persuade the African Union to lead the
process to resolve Somaliland’s status. The African Union has the mandate and

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legitimacy to address the issue and to act authoritatively in the eyes of Africans and
the international community. The African Union took up the issue in 2005 by sending a
fact-finding mission to Somaliland. The official summary of its findings is very
favorable towards Somaliland’s claims, asserting, “Somaliland’s search for recognition
[is] historically unique and self-justified in African political history,” and it urges the
AU to take up the issue with the governments in Mogadishu and Hargeisa without
delay. The African Union did not act on that report and has played little role since then.
Now, 16 years later, it is the time for the African Union to act.

Warrant: Somaliland’s independence is aligned with historical and international norms

Carroll, Anthony and B. Rajagopal. “The Case for Independent Statehood of Somaliland.”
American University International Law Review, 1993,
[Link]
ntext=auilr. Accessed December 13, 2024.

This Comment explores the legal validity of Northern Somaliland's assertion of

independence and argues for the recognition of Somaliland as an independent state.
Section I discusses the validity of such independence in a historical perspective,
dealing with the nature of sovereign rights over Somaliland. Section II posits arguments
under international law for the exercise of such a right by the people of Somaliland.
Section III analyzes the concept of recognition and its conformity with existing
international law. This Comment concludes that Somaliland should be recognized as an
independent nation.

Analysis: Teams can make the counterargument that Mogadishu may be unhappy with
Somaliland’s independence, but the benefits of an independent country outweigh the chance
of backlash, especially if the African Union (which all African countries agree has power to make
this decision) is the one to acknowledge Somaliland. Even if they are unhappy, they are unlikely
to take concrete new actions, considering Somalia has already been at civil war for more than
two decades.

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A/2: Recognition is an extension of Colonialism.

Delink: Recognition is in line with existing norms

Warrant: Somaliland’s history is more complicated than a single colonial power

Miller, Phil. “Another colonial border is causing conflict in Africa.” Declassified UK,
March 8, 2023, [Link]
causing-conflict-in-africa/. Accessed December 13, 2024.

The clashes come despite the inhabitants of this area having a shared language and faith
– factors that once looked like Somalis could be a post-colonial success story. The
Scramble for Africa in the 1880s had divided Somalis between British, French, Italian and
Ethiopian empires. In 1960, after just five days of independence, British Somaliland
rushed to unite with the former Italian-held territory, forming the Somali Republic.
Other Somali regions were supposed to join soon, but a movement in parts of Kenya
was ignored by the British and Emperor Haile Selassie was unwilling to split up
Ethiopia. French Somaliland went its own way and became Djibouti. An attempt in the
late 1970s by Somali dictator Sayid Barre to capture the Ogaden – Ethiopia’s Somali-
majority region — ended in a disastrous defeat.

Warrant: Somaliland’s claim is in line with exiting international norms.

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 13, 2024.

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The Somaliland government asserts that it meets most of the requirements of a

sovereign democratic state: it holds free and fair elections, has its own currency and
security forces, and issues its own passports. It also says that its independence claim is
consistent with a longstanding norm of the African Union and its predecessor that
colonial-era borders should be maintained. Some analysts also note that
Somalilanders are predominantly from the Isaaq clan, and thus ethnically distinctive
from other Somalis.

Warrant: Somaliland’s border is based on ethnic lines and the state has been independent
before.

“Somaliland International Boundaries.” Somaliland Law, 2007,

[Link] Accessed
December 13, 2024.

The other boundaries of the united country in Somaliland (i.e with the then French
Somaliland and with Ethiopia) were already the international boundaries of the
independent State of Somaliland. Arguments advanced by some “union for ever
Somalis” to the effect that the Cairo Declaration of 1964 related to the boundaries of
the then Somali Republic overlook the fact that a) the Declaration itself refers to borders
on independence, which as far as the Somali Republic was concerned was not just 1 July
1960, but also 26 June 1960 when Somaliland became independent and b) in any case,
the Declaration was simply reflecting the doctrine of uti possidetis, with, as mentioned
above, the “photograph is taken” at independence and not at 1964 when the OAU
formally endorsed the concept. Somaliland is of course addressing peacefully the issues
relating to neighbouring clan based Puntland region of Somalia and its claim on swathes
of Somaliland territory on the basis of clan kinship with Some of the Somaliland
communities in the eastern regions of Sool and Sanag. The salient point though is that
all the other Somaliland clans also live in areas that straddle the boundaries that

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Somaliland has with either Ethiopia or with Djibouti, and similarly member of the
same sub clan Puntland bases its claim on also live in the far south of Somalia, as well
as across the boundary in Northern Kenya.

Analysis: A key counter-argument here can be made simply by adopting evidence used in the
Negative argument, that outlines colonial borders and their shifting history. The African Union
itself is the organization that has decided the best way to decide modern borders is just to stick
with what was decided when European colonial powers carved up the continent in the 1800s. If
the AU itself has decided this, teams can argue that the best possible thing is for the AU to
maintain a consistent policy and apply it everywhere. Since an independent Somaliland lines up
better with old colonial borders, that’s more consistent with the AU policy and a way for teams
to turn this argument.

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A/2: The African Union recognizing Somaliland is purely symbolic and

not worth the risk of enhanced tensions.

Delink: Admittance to the AU typically coincides with admittance to the UN.

Warrant: Eritrea was a breakaway province from Ethiopia.

Markakis, John and Last, Geoffrey Charles. “History of Eritrea.” Encyclopedia Britannica,
April 11, 2024, [Link] Accessed
December 7, 2024.

history of Eritrea, survey of the notable events and people in the history of Eritrea from
prehistory to the present. Located on the Red Sea in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea has long
been an important centre of trade, with many bustling ports along its coast. Eritrea
gained its independence from neighbouring Ethiopia in 1993, after a decades-long
war. Eritrea’s capital, Asmara, is at the northern tip of the Ethiopian Plateau and is
connected by road and rail to the country’s Red Sea port, Massawa, 40 miles (65 km) to
the northeast.

Warrant: Eritrea was admitted to the AU on 24 May 1993.

“Member States.” African Union, n.d.,

[Link] Accessed December 7, 2024.

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Date of Joining the OAU or

Member State Abbreviation AU
Union of the Comoros Comoros 18-Jul-75
Republic of Djibouti Djibouti 27-Jun-77
State of Eritrea Eritrea 24-May-93
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ethiopia 25-May-63
Republic of Kenya Kenya 25-May-63
Republic of Madagascar Madagascar 25-May-63
Republic of Mauritius Mauritius Aug-68
Republic of Rwanda Rwanda 25-May-63
Republic of Seychelles Seychelles 29-Jun-76
Federal Republic of Somalia Somalia 25-May-63
Republic of South Sudan South Sudan 27-Jul-11
Republic of the Sudan Sudan 25-May-63
United Republic of Tanzania Tanzania 25-May-63
Republic of Uganda Uganda 25-May-63

Warrant: Eritrea was admitted to the UN on 28 May 1993.

“A Look Back on Eritrea’s Historic 1993 Referendum.” Raimoq Media, April 26, 2018,
[Link] Accessed
December 7, 2024.

On April 27, 1993, several days after the votes had been cast and tallied, and as the
provisional results were being shared, Isaias Afwerki, then the Secretary-General of the
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Provisional Government of Eritrea
(PGE), announced, “Eritrea is a sovereign country as of today.” Weeks later,
independence would be formally declared on May 24, 1993, two years to the day after
the EPLF had entered and took control of Asmara, the Eritrean capital, which had been
abandoned by retreating Ethiopian troops. Subsequently, four days after formally
announcing independence, Eritrea was admitted to the United Nations (UN) as its
182nd member by General Assembly Resolution 47/230 of May 28, 1993. As well, the

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country established permanent representation at the Organization of African Unity

(OAU, now the African Union), joined the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and
Development (IGADD, renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
[IGAD] in 1996), and assumed observer status at the Arab League. Notably, upon gaining
independence, Eritrea not only became the first state in Africa to achieve independence
from an African state, it also had won the longest armed conflict in Africa’s history.

Warrant: South Sudan was a breakaway province from Sudan.

Collins, Robert O. , Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, Jay L. Spaulding and Sabr, Mohy el Din.
“South Sudan.” Encyclopedia Britannica, December 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 7, 2024.

South Sudan, country located in northeastern Africa. Its rich biodiversity includes lush
savannas, swamplands, and rainforests that are home to many species of wildlife. Prior
to 2011, South Sudan was part of Sudan, its neighbour to the north. South Sudan’s
population, predominantly African cultures who tend to adhere to Christian or animist
beliefs, was long at odds with Sudan’s largely Muslim and Arab northern government.
South Sudan’s capital is Juba.

Warrant: South Sudan was admitted to the AU on July 27, 2011.

“Member States.” African Union, n.d.,

[Link] Accessed December 7, 2024.

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Date of Joining the OAU or

Member State Abbreviation AU
Union of the Comoros Comoros 18-Jul-75
Republic of Djibouti Djibouti 27-Jun-77
State of Eritrea Eritrea 24-May-93
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ethiopia 25-May-63
Republic of Kenya Kenya 25-May-63
Republic of Madagascar Madagascar 25-May-63
Republic of Mauritius Mauritius Aug-68
Republic of Rwanda Rwanda 25-May-63
Republic of Seychelles Seychelles 29-Jun-76
Federal Republic of Somalia Somalia 25-May-63
Republic of South Sudan South Sudan 27-Jul-11
Republic of the Sudan Sudan 25-May-63
United Republic of Tanzania Tanzania 25-May-63
Republic of Uganda Uganda 25-May-63

Warrant: South Sudan was admitted to the UN on 14 July 2011.

“About the UN in South Sudan.” United Nations in South Sudan, n.d.,

[Link] Accessed December 11,
2024.

South Sudan was admitted as a member of the United Nations on 14 July 2011, the
same year the country attained its independence. In South Sudan, the UN Country
Team contributes towards national development priorities and the agenda 2030 for
Sustainable Development through the United Nations Sustainable Development
Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), a joint cooperation agreement between the UN and
Government of South Sudan.

Turn: The African Union opening diplomatic ties is the first step towards future recognition for
Somaliland.

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Warrant: Other countries will be less wary

Idaan, Gulaid Yusuf. “A Legal and Diplomatic Analysis of Somaliland’s Quest for
International Recognition.” Modern Diplomacy, July 4, 2024,
[Link]
somalilands-quest-for-international-recognition/.. Accessed December 7, 2024.

Somaliland has, therefore, been at pains to insist that its case was the restoration of
historical independence and not an issue of secession. Highlighting the unique colonial
experience and a union that was voluntarily entered into with Somalia, Hargeisa argues
that its fight for a claim to sovereignty is not similar to the other secessionist territories
or cases. More particularly, however, the non-interference in the states’ territorial
boundaries had pressed a great challenge to the cause for the international recognition
of Somaliland. It has participated in development activities at the UN and lobbied for
assistance with its recognition quest. But without AU support, the path to the UN for
Somaliland is a hard one. The regional consensual voice on UN policy is loud, and
without AU support has given a quick path to international recognition through the
UN, to Somaliland. The multilateral engagement Kosovo had undertaken until then was
a process in which Kosovo sought recognition from influential international bodies as
early as possible in the independence process. The most important step in that regard
was the advisory opinion of the ICJ, which in 2010 established Kosovo’s declaration of
independence was not in violation of any international law. Kosovo has in this regard
become a member of international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank,
and its position on the international stage is almost equal to other recognized states and
countries.

Delink: The United Nations already has shown interest in Somaliland.

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Warrant: UN officials are happy to have a relationship with the country.

“Long-running and wide-ranging support to Somaliland highlighted in UN family visit to

Hargeisa.” UNSOM, February 3, 2021, [Link]
running-and-wide-ranging-support-somaliland-highlighted-un-family-visit-
hargeisa. Accessed December 7, 2024.

The long-running and wide-ranging relationship between the United Nations and
Somaliland came to the fore during a recent visit of senior officials from the world
body to its capital, Hargeisa. “We arrived yesterday and had the opportunity to meet
with senior government officials and members of civil society, and the National Electoral
Committee, before meeting with President [Muse] Bihi [Abdi] and members of his
cabinet this morning,” the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia,
James Swan, said in a media statement today. “We are very pleased to be able to
discuss the work of the United Nations in Somaliland in helping to address practical
issues affecting the people of Somaliland,” he added. “Our partnership dates back to
1991, and we have remained committed since then through the most difficult times
and the better times.” The UN envoy was in Hargeisa with officials from other parts of
the UN family with operations in Somaliland – the Country Director of the UN World
Food Programme (WFP), Cesar Arroyo; the Representative of the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Johann Siffointe; and the Country Programme
Manager for UN Women, Sadiq Syed.

Warrant: Many UN entities already operate in the country.

“Long-running and wide-ranging support to Somaliland highlighted in UN family visit to

Hargeisa.” UNSOM, February 3, 2021, [Link]
running-and-wide-ranging-support-somaliland-highlighted-un-family-visit-
hargeisa. Accessed December 7, 2024.

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Currently, more than 20 UN agencies, funds and programmes operate throughout

Somaliland. “UN support is wide-ranging. It includes humanitarian and development
help, and my colleagues and I were able to see some of that support first-hand with a
visit to a World Food Programme-operated nutrition and medical centre,” Mr. Swan
said. “At that centre,” he continued, “we observed other UN agencies that are
providing integrated food, nutrition and health support to babies, young children and
their mothers.” The UN envoy was referring to a visit on Tuesday to the Mohamed
Moge nutrition centre in Hargeisa, one of 47 fixed centres in Somaliland where WFP –
together with cooperating partner Health Poverty Action and the Somaliland Ministry of
Health Development – has a targeted supplementary feeding programme as well as
mother and child health and nutrition programme. In addition, the UN Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) provides support to severely malnourished children under the age of five in
an outpatient therapeutic programme. A total of 1,354 beneficiaries are currently
supported at the Mohamed Moge location.

Delink: China will come around.

Warrant: China is willing to court favor with those in Somaliland. It’s Somaliland that’s pushing
China away.

O’Brian, Robert. “China’s Worldwide Expansion Plan Stops in Somaliland.” The National
Interest, August 13, 2021,
[Link]
plan-stops-somaliland-191653. Accessed December 7, 2024.

Almost unnoticed during the pandemic, Somaliland is resisting China’s rapid

expansion in Africa through the Belt-and-Road initiative. After months of Chinese
pressure, the Somaliland government cut out Beijing and invited Taiwan to open an

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embassy in the capital, Hargeisa. Taiwan now has a scholarship program for Somaliland
students to study in Taipei and Taiwanese aid is flowing into the country to assist with
energy, agriculture, and human-capital projects. It is often difficult for developing
nations, including those in Africa, to resist the economic allure of Chinese loans and
investment. China’s government is pouring money into Africa in a bid to secure energy
and raw materials long into the future. Governments often set aside concerns over
China’s predatory lending, corruption, human-rights abuses and its high-handed “wolf
warrior diplomacy” to provide for their desperate populations. When a developing
nation stands up to China and rejects its tainted aid, the United States should make
every effort to help it succeed, particularly in strategically vital geography.

Analysis: Each response really addresses a separate part of the argument; however, as a
blanket rejection of the argument, the first response is really good. Empirics are your best
friend, and there are literally two empirical examples to prove the con wrong with this
argument. If you can show this to your judge, you’re sure to be able to show that admittance to
the AU is truly good for Somaliland.

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A/2: Recognizing Somaliland could lead to violence between Egypt

and Ethiopia.

Delink: Egypt and Ethiopia are fighting mostly about the Nile, not Somaliland.

Warrant: Tensions over the Nile have been simmering for years, long before the Somaliland
dispute.

Al-Anani, Khali. “Water Conflict Between Egypt and Ethiopia: A Defining Moment for
Both Countries.” Arab Center Washington DC, June 16, 2020,
[Link]
a-defining-moment-for-both-countries/. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Tensions and disputes over the Nile River’s water have been ongoing for decades. The
relationships among the Nile Basin’s ten countries are governed by a set of treaties
and agreements signed during the 20th century (in 1902, 1929, and 1959) and are
commonly known as the Nile River Agreements. They stipulate that the upstream
riparian states (mainly Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia) have to respect the rights
of the downstream countries (mainly Egypt and Sudan) regarding the Nile’s water. In
addition, they are prohibited from building dams or launching construction projects on
the river without the approval of the downstream countries, particularly Egypt. Not only
have these treaties guaranteed Egypt’s share of the Nile water over the past century
and enabled it to achieve its developmental and agricultural plans –– particularly after
building the Aswan High Dam in the early 1960s––but they also gave Cairo and
Khartoum veto power over any construction plans or projects that might affect their
share of the water. These agreements were always contested and challenged by the
upstream riparian states. While Egypt and Sudan insist that their share of water should
be respected and honored, the upstream riparian states believe that these

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agreements are unfair and impede their agriculture and development plans. They
reason that they are not bound by these agreements as they were signed by colonial
powers and their governments were not part of such accords. As the populations of
the Nile River Basin countries have been growing rapidly during the past decades, their
developmental needs have increased, adding tensions and disagreements among them.

Warrant: Egypt is very concerned about its water security.

Al-Anani, Khali. “Water Conflict Between Egypt and Ethiopia: A Defining Moment for
Both Countries.” Arab Center Washington DC, June 16, 2020,
[Link]
a-defining-moment-for-both-countries/. Accessed December 9, 2024.

According to the 1959 agreement over the Nile River water, Egypt’s share is 55.5
billion cubic meters (bcm). Around 85 percent of the water that flows into the Nile
River comes from the Ethiopian highlands through the Blue Nile. Approximately 90
percent of Egypt’s fresh water comes from the Nile River, with about 57 percent of
that water from the Blue Nile, on which Ethiopia is building its dam. Therefore, Egypt
views the GERD as an existential threat. The reservoir behind the GERD, once filled, will
hold about 74 bcm of water, almost equivalent to the entire annual volume of the Nile
that flows into Egypt’s Aswan High Dam. Currently, water insecurity is perhaps the most
serious threat to Egypt. It is noteworthy that Egypt suffers from a shortage of water
even without taking the GERD into account: its water resources are around 60 bcm
and its consumption is 80 bcm. Egypt imports about half its food products and recycles
about 25 bcm of water annually. Should the GERD be filled without an agreement, Egypt
would face a risk of drought conditions and of losing more than one million jobs and
about $1.8 billion in economic production each year. Filling the GERD would thus
significantly affect Egypt’s share of water—it would decrease it by about 10 to 15
billion cubic meters.

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Warrant: Ethiopia built a dam that threatens this water security.

“Why is Egypt worried about Ethiopia's dam on the Nile?” BBC, September 13, 2023,
[Link] Accessed December 9,
2024.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Gerd) is on the Blue Nile tributary in the
northern Ethiopia highlands, from where 85% of the Nile's waters flow. Gerd is 19
miles (30km) south of the border with Sudan and is Africa's biggest hydroelectric dam
project. It is more than a mile long and 145m high. It is not quite complete yet, but has
already involved 12 years of construction. The reservoir behind the $4.2bn (£3.8bn)
dam has a surface area the size of Greater London. How will the dam help Ethiopia?
Ethiopia wants the dam to produce electricity for the 60% of its population who
currently have no supply. It is hoped this will eventually double Ethiopia's electricity
output, provide businesses with constant electricity supplies and boost development. It
could also provide electricity for neighbouring countries including Sudan, South Sudan,
Kenya, Djibouti and Eritrea. Why are Egypt and Sudan upset about the dam? Egypt, with
a population of about 107 million people, relies on the River Nile for nearly all of its
fresh water. It needs it for households and agriculture - especially for growing cotton,
which requires a lot of water. Nile water is also used to fill Lake Nasser, the reservoir
for Egypt's own hydro-electric power plant, the Aswan High Dam. Sudan, with a
population of 48 million people, is also heavily reliant on water from the Nile.
"Ethiopia's unilateral measures are considered a disregard for the interests and rights
of the downstream countries and their water security," Egypt's foreign ministry said. It
has argued that a 2% reduction in water from the Nile could result in the loss of
200,000 acres of irrigated land. Egypt is also concerned that in times of drought,
Ethiopia might fill the reservoir behind its dam with water, to increase its generating
capacity, instead of letting it flow downstream. "There is no agreement on how Gerd

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should be managed during and following periods of drought," says Mohammed

Basheer of the University of Toronto. "Without an agreement, Ethiopia might adopt
an approach that maximizes electricity generation following droughts, by first
recovering storage, which would be unfavourable for Egypt." Ethiopia filled the dam
over the course of three years, dismissing Egypt's argument that it should take 12 to 21
years as unacceptable. Although Sudan is as affected by water levels on the Nile as
Egypt is, its response to the dam has been restricted by conflict in the country.

Warrant: This dam is the biggest cause of recent tensions.

Muller, Mike. “Egypt’s fears about Ethiopia’s mega-dam haven’t come to pass: moving
on from historical concerns would benefit the whole region..” The Conversation,
September 24, 2024, [Link]
mega-dam-havent-come-to-pass-moving-on-from-historical-concerns-would-
benefit-the-whole-region-239418. Accessed December 9, 2024.

A new round of angry exchanges has broken out between Egypt and Ethiopia over the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). On September 1, Cairo wrote to the UN
security council to protest against Ethiopia’s continued filling of Africa’s second largest
reservoir and bringing two more power generating turbines into operation. Egypt sees
any new infrastructure development on the Nile as a potential threat, since the river is
the source of over 98% of the country’s water. Egypt calls this a violation of
international law and Ethiopia’s obligations to “prevent significant harm”. Ethiopia’s
policies, it says, could result in an existential threat to Egypt … and would consequently
jeopardise regional and international peace and security. Ethiopia has told Egypt to
“abandon its aggressive approach” towards the dam. Ethiopia says that it must allow the
Blue Nile’s water to flow through the dam’s turbines and on to Egypt to generate the
hydropower for which it has been built, thus guaranteeing the overall flow to Egypt.

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Turn: It is precisely the failure to recognize Somaliland that will lead to violence.

Warrant: Somaliland will continue to pursue independence no matter what.

Cannon, Brendon. “Somaliland’s new government is ready to drive change: these are its
3 big goals.” The Conversation, November 22, 2024,
[Link]
change-these-are-its-3-big-goals-244189. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Waddani will remain committed – like the majority of Somalilanders – to gaining

international recognition as an independent state. Somaliland joined the Somali
Republic in 1960 but departed in 1991. In doing this, Waddani will build on the Kulmiye
party’s achievements. These include diplomatic representation in some western
countries. In 2022, Bihi made an unofficial visit to Washington, DC, and a UK
parliamentary delegation visited Hargeisa. Waddani party leaders, however, intend to
shift away from Kulmiye’s complete reliance on the west. They hope to get
independence recognition faster from African and global south states. The pace of
recognition from the US and UK has been slow. And the west condemned Somaliland’s
deal with Ethiopia. This deal gives Ethiopia access to a strip of Somaliland’s coastline in
return for acknowledgement of Somaliland’s independence.

Warrant: The African Union’s failure to recognize will lead to violence.

Daud, Abdullahi. “How Ignoring Somaliland's Status Affects The Looming Proxy War
Between Ethiopia And Egypt.” Saxafi Media, October 10, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 9, 2024.

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The path forward requires the international community, particularly the African
Union, to address Somaliland’s status urgently. Delaying this issue further risks
destabilizing not just Somaliland and Somalia but the entire Horn of Africa. As
Professor Ali Mazrui (2006) has noted, the troubled union between Somaliland and
Somalia is akin to a disastrous marriage, much like the union between East and West
Pakistan. This comparison illustrates the deep divisions that have characterized the
Somaliland-Somalia relationship. Somaliland’s quest for recognition is emblematic of the
broader struggles for self-determination and autonomy that have shaped post-colonial
African history. The African Union must draw lessons from the experiences of Eritrea
and South Sudan, both of which successfully navigated the challenges of independence.
Somaliland, like these other nations, has a legitimate claim to recognition. The time for
inaction has long passed. The international community must engage meaningfully
with Somaliland to ensure lasting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. In
conclusion, the issue of Somaliland’s recognition presents a critical challenge that, if
left unresolved, could have significant implications not only for Somalia but also for
the wider Horn of Africa region. Somaliland’s progress in terms of peace, stability, and
governance, juxtaposed with the chronic instability in Somalia, makes the question of its
recognition urgent. The African Union and the broader international community must
reassess their approach and take decisive action to recognize the unique history and
circumstances of Somaliland.

Warrant: Leaving the country in limbo increases the likelihood of proxy wars.

Daud, Abdullahi. “How Ignoring Somaliland's Status Affects The Looming Proxy War
Between Ethiopia And Egypt.” Saxafi Media, October 10, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 9, 2024.

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The ongoing proxy war tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia in Somalia underscore
the importance of addressing Somaliland’s status to prevent further destabilization in
the region. Somaliland’s quest for international recognition is not just a local or
regional issue but one that, if ignored, could trigger wider geopolitical conflicts, as
seen in recent developments. The international community must not remain passive
but instead engage in proactive diplomacy to ensure that peace and stability are
maintained across the Horn of Africa.

Impact: Proxy wars are uniquely harmful.

Benowitz, Brittany & Ceccanese, Alicia. “Why No One Ever Really Wins a Proxy War.”
Just Security, May 11, 2020, [Link]
ever-really-wins-a-proxy-war/. Accessed December 9, 2020.

One study found that, while security assistance to foreign security forces may help
democratic regimes become more professional, it might actually contribute to abuses
by authoritarian regimes. Even if security assistance does not directly contribute to
human rights violations in oppressive regimes, there are grounds for concern that such
assistance may help such regimes stay in power, thereby prolonging their repressive
tactics. The U.S. also supports non-state armed groups. A key study found that foreign
support of these groups increased the risk of atrocities, as armed groups with foreign
backing are less likely to be dependent on the local population for support. As a result,
proxy forces are more likely to prey on the population for resources or to use violence
to intimidate civilians. Such acts are often unlawful and may in turn increase the risk
of liability of the sponsor for providing assistance to groups engaged in illegal activity.
In addition to being more likely to commit atrocities, proxy forces also are prone to
engage in criminal conduct. Non-state armed groups that receive foreign support often
devolve into criminal enterprises to maintain diverse funding sources, and thus
independence from the sponsor’s demands. Such criminal conduct can include the sale

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of weapons provided by sponsors on the black market. For example, weapons provided
by the United States to militias in Syria quickly ended up in the hands of the Islamic
State.

Analysis: These two arguments are very good responses, but they kind of have to be used
independently of each other. Teams must pick one narrative and stick with it so that they avoid
a situation where they are defending mutually exclusive arguments. Use the second response if
you want more offense. Use the first response if you just want to get rid of that argument
entirely and just move on.

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A/2: There are better alternatives for a peaceful future in Somaliland.

Delink: The government of Somalia is too weak to support Somaliland.

Warrant: Somalia’s national government is facing problems.

“What Type Of Government Does Somalia Have?” WorldAtlas, n.d.,

[Link]
[Link]. Accessed December 11, 2024.

Challenges Facing The Government Of Somalia Somali has an internationally recognized

Federal government in the country’s capital Mogadishu. After years of civil war and
unrest, the government has ineffectively performed critical state functions like
maintenance of internal order, tax collection, and economic redistribution. The primary
challenges facing the government of Somali are misappropriated sovereignty,
corruption, and incessant political infighting, lack of widespread support, and a
shoestring government budget.

Warrant: The power of the federal government doesn’t extend much outside the capital.

“Somalia: Moving the Federalism Agenda Forward.” The World Bank, n.d.,
[Link]
[Link]. Accessed December 9, 2024.

At present, the former Somalia functions, in most respects, as seven separate political
jurisdictions: the ‘federal government’ whose authority is largely confined to
Mogadishu, the five member states, and Somaliland. Despite 20 years of effort, the
various regional interests have not managed to reach definitive agreements regarding

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the division of expenditure responsibilities between the federal and FMS governments,
the assignment of revenues between them, and/or the design (if any) of a fiscal transfer
system. Indeed, goods imported from one FMS are taxed in another FMS as part of
revenue generating activities.

Warrant: Somalia’s corruption places too much value on the capital Mogadishu.

“Somalia: Moving the Federalism Agenda Forward.” The World Bank, n.d.,
[Link]
[Link]. Accessed December 9, 2024.

It is difficult to disentangle the federal revenues that finance federal services to

Somalia as a whole from those that benefit only the residents of Mogadishu. Thus, the
figures do not show an amount for the federal government. The potential impact of the
two options for the federal government can nevertheless be illustrated using somewhat
arbitrary assumptions. Figure 8b illustrates the fiscal implication of the two options. It
is based on the assumption that 75 percent of federal expenditures are devoted to
services that benefit Somalia as a whole and the remaining 25 percent on services that
benefit residents of Mogadishu. (The per capita figure for the federal government is
based on Somalia’s total population, whereas the figure for Mogadishu is based only on
the population of the city).

Turn: Somalia’s federalist system encourages independence.

Warrant: Other parts of Somalia are also breaking away under the federalist system.

Salad, Mohamed. “Fragmented federalism: Puntland and Jubaland’s quest for autonomy
and its impact on Somali sovereignty.” Caasimada Online, November 6, 2024,
[Link]

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quest-for-autonomy-and-its-impact-on-somali-sovereignty/. Accessed December

11, 2024.

Somalia’s federal system was designed to promote unity while preserving the
sovereignty of its many regions. However, the experiences of Puntland and Jubaland
demonstrate how federalism has occasionally exacerbated rather than healed divides
within Somalia. In the northeast, Puntland and Jubaland in the south have both
sought extensive autonomy from Mogadishu, focussing on local government and
resource management. While these quests for independence have contributed to
regional peace and self-government, they also offer substantial difficulties to Somalia’s
national sovereignty, notably regarding security and counterterrorism coordination. The
campaigns for autonomy in Puntland and Jubaland have political and historical
foundations. Puntland became an autonomous province in 1998, partially due to the
turmoil in Mogadishu and a desire to rule autonomously. With its closeness to Kenya’s
border and significant links to cross-border commerce, Jubaland has preserved its
independence, emphasising the necessity for locally directed security and
administration. These areas see themselves as separate entities inside Somalia,
frequently demanding their autonomy at the expense of national unity. This
autonomy hinders the federal government’s efforts to build a cohesive and
autonomous Somali state capable of addressing security and governance concerns.

Delink: Somaliland would never accept this proposition.

Warrant: Somaliland will continue to pursue independence no matter what.

Cannon, Brendon. “Somaliland’s new government is ready to drive change: these are its
3 big goals.” The Conversation, November 22, 2024,
[Link]
change-these-are-its-3-big-goals-244189. Accessed December 9, 2024.

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Waddani will remain committed – like the majority of Somalilanders – to gaining

international recognition as an independent state. Somaliland joined the Somali
Republic in 1960 but departed in 1991. In doing this, Waddani will build on the Kulmiye
party’s achievements. These include diplomatic representation in some western
countries. In 2022, Bihi made an unofficial visit to Washington, DC, and a UK
parliamentary delegation visited Hargeisa. Waddani party leaders, however, intend to
shift away from Kulmiye’s complete reliance on the west. They hope to get
independence recognition faster from African and global south states. The pace of
recognition from the US and UK has been slow. And the west condemned Somaliland’s
deal with Ethiopia. This deal gives Ethiopia access to a strip of Somaliland’s coastline in
return for acknowledgement of Somaliland’s independence.

Warrant: Somaliland feels so attached to this independence because they literally fought a war
for it.

Guudle, Mohamed. “Somaliland-Somalia Talks 2012-2023: An Analysis of Progress,

Impasse, and Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence” Horn Diplomat, December 31,
2023, [Link]
2012-2023-an-analysis-of-progress-impasse-and-prospects-for-peaceful-
coexistence/. Accessed December 11, 2024.

The past decade has witnessed a complex dance of dialogue and divergence between
Somaliland and Somalia. From initial cautious engagement in 2012 to recent high-level
meetings facilitated by Djibouti, the talks have grappled with the enduring question of
Somaliland’s future relationship with Somalia. For academics, these interactions offer a
rich tapestry of political dynamics, inter-clan rivalries, and the interplay of domestic
aspirations with international ambitions. Policymakers, meanwhile, navigate a sensitive
landscape where regional stability hinges on understanding the nuanced positions of

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both sides. At the heart of the negotiation lies a fundamental divergence. Having
restored its independence in 1991 after a brutal civil war and the loss of hundreds of
thousands, Somaliland views itself as a de facto sovereign state. Its narrative
emphasizes a distinct colonial history, a functioning democracy, and hard-won peace
and stability. Conversely, Somalia clings to its internationally recognized borders and
views Somaliland’s aspirations as detrimental to national unity. Any solution, therefore,
must consider not only the complex historical baggage but also the unwavering
commitment of Somalilanders to their self-determination. While compromise in areas
like resource-sharing and international recognition may be possible, Somaliland’s
sovereignty and the will of its people, as expressed through multiple referendums,
remain non-negotiable cornerstones of its position. As the talks evolve, understanding
these core beliefs is crucial for academics and policymakers seeking to navigate a
sustainable and peaceful resolution.

Delink: Tanzania is an outlier, not the rule for nation unification in Africa.

Warrant: Mali was a federal republic that failed.

Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Mali Federation". Encyclopedia Britannica,

July 20, 1998, [Link] Accessed
December 11, 2024.

Mali Federation, short-lived union between the autonomous territories of the

Sudanese Republic and Senegal in West Africa. The federation took effect on April 4,
1959, achieved complete independence on June 20, 1960 (remaining within the French
Community), and was dissolved by Senegal’s secession on Aug. 20, 1960. Thereafter
both countries became independent republics, Senegal continuing within the French
Community and the Sudanese Republic becoming the Republic of Mali.

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Warrant: The combination of Ethiopia and Eritrea eventually split.

Markakis, John & Last, Geoffrey Charles. "Eritrea". Encyclopedia Britannica, December 1,
2024, [Link] Accessed December 11, 2024.

In 1950 the United Nations (UN), under the prompting of the United States, resolved
to join Eritrea to Ethiopia within two years. The proposed federation would provide
Eritrea with autonomy under its own constitution and elected government. Elections
to a new Eritrean Assembly in 1952 gave the Unionist Party the largest number of seats
but not a majority; the party thus formed a government in coalition with a Muslim
faction. The Eritrean constitution, prepared by the UN in consultation with Emperor
Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, was adopted by the Eritrean Assembly on July 10, 1952, and
ratified by Haile Selassie on August 11. The act of federation was ratified by the emperor
on September 11, and British authorities officially relinquished control on September
15. Failure of the federal scheme The federal scheme was short-lived, mainly because
the imperial government in Addis Ababa was unwilling to abide by its provisions. First,
the Eritrean constitution sought to establish an equilibrium between ethnic and
religious groups. It made Tigrinya and Arabic the official languages of Eritrea, and it
allowed local communities to choose the language of education for their children. In the
spirit of the constitution, it became a practice to ensure parity between Christians and
Muslims in appointment to state office. This delicate balance was destroyed by
Ethiopian interference, and Muslims were the initial losers, as Arabic was eliminated
from state education and Muslims were squeezed out of public employment.

Analysis: These four responses are really great to show how Somalia might not be able to
provide what Somaliland needs. The first response is good because it shows that the
government of Somalia couldn’t provide anything to Somaliland even if Somaliland was open to
the idea of cooperation. The second response is good because it shows that a federal system is
inadequate. The third response is good because it shows that Somaliland would never back

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down from the desire for independence. The fourth response is good because it shows
empirical evidence of federalism not working in Africa.

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A/2: Recognizing Somaliland could lead to economic disaster in the

country.

Delink: Somalia doesn’t have a tax system that distributes money well.

Warrant: Somalia has a very inefficient tax collection system.

“Somalia: Moving the Federalism Agenda Forward.” The World Bank, n.d.,
[Link]
[Link]. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Each member state collects and retains its own taxes, along with various fees. The
federal government also collects taxes and fees, but only within the Benaadir Regional
Administration (BRA). By 16 Information on revenues collected by Somaliland is
included in the module on Domestic Resource Mobilization 0% 50% 100% Other
revenue Domestic grants Foreign grants Other tax Tax on international trade
Goods/services tax Income tax 50 100 150 200 250 300 Taxes Foreign grants Domestic
grants Other revenues 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 2016 2017 2018 Federal donor
revenue State donor revenue 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 2016 2017 2018 Fed transfer to
Mogadishu Fed transfer to states and large, both federal and FMS taxes fall on the same
bases. International trade taxes account for the vast majority of own-sources revenues
at the federal level, as well as in Puntland and Jubaland (Figure 4). For the remaining
states which do not generate taxes from customs-related activities, own-source
revenues are almost nonexistent (Figure 5). Indeed, tax revenues in Galmudug,
Hirshabelle and Southwest are all less than US$ 0.05 per capita.

Warrant: Somalia’s system of taxation doesn’t actually distribute taxes in a fair way.

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“Somalia: Moving the Federalism Agenda Forward.” The World Bank, n.d.,
[Link]
[Link]. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Apart from taxes, the federal government derives a substantial proportion of its
revenues from foreign grants. These grants include funding from the European
Development Fund, focused on state building, food security and education, as well as
the World Bank Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing project. In 2018, the federal
government derived about one-third of its revenue from such sources. Starting in 2018,
direct donor assistance to individual states also reached a significant level (Figure 6).
Although donor funding has increased rapidly over the past three years, future levels
are unpredictable. In addition, other non-tax revenues are important sources of
revenues, such as port fees, tuna licensing fees and potentially revenues from the oil
sector, in the form of royalty and profit oil. 23. The federal government, for its part,
makes transfers to the Mogadishu local government and the member states.17
Approximately half of such transfers went to Mogadishu in 2017 and 2018. With few
exceptions (Figure 7)18, the available evidence suggests that there is no rule or
formula that determines the amount allocated to each jurisdiction. Instead, the
amount is determined through negotiations on a case-by-case basis.

Turn: Recognizing Somaliland allows for economic growth by joining international institutions.

Warrant: Because Somaliland isn’t independent, it can’t join the International Monetary Fund.

Primorac, Marina. “How Does a Country Join the IMF?” IMF Library, January 1, 1991,
[Link]
Accessed December 11, 2024.

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Who can apply for membership in the IMF? The prospective member must be a
country in control of its own foreign affairs, and it must be willing and able to meet
the obligations of membership contained in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement—its
charter. Under those obligations, a member must conduct its exchange rate policy and
related economic and financial policies in accordance with the Articles, and provide
requested economic and financial information. Consistent with its purposes, the IMF
helps a member in finding a solution to the country’s balance of payments problems. A
member must also pay a subscription—financial reserves that can be made available for
use by the IMF’s members.

Warrant: Because Somaliland is not eligible for the IMF, it is also not eligible for the World
Bank.

“The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)” World Bank Group,
n.d., [Link]
the-imf. Accessed December 11, 2024.

Founded at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the two institutions have
complementary missions. The World Bank Group works with developing countries to
reduce poverty and increase shared prosperity, while the International Monetary
Fund serves to stabilize the international monetary system and acts as a monitor of
the world’s currencies. The World Bank Group provides financing, policy advice, and
technical assistance to governments, and also focuses on strengthening the private
sector in developing countries. The IMF keeps track of the economy globally and in
member countries, lends to countries with balance of payments difficulties, and gives
practical help to members. Countries must first join the IMF to be eligible to join the
World Bank Group; today, each institution has 189 member countries.

Warrant: The World Bank and IMF helps drive nations out of poverty.

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“The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)” World Bank Group,
n.d., [Link]
the-imf. Accessed December 11, 2024.

The World Bank Group is one of the world’s largest sources of funding and knowledge
for developing countries. Its five institutions share a commitment to reducing poverty,
increasing shared prosperity, and promoting sustainable development. Together, IBRD
and IDA form the World Bank, which provides financing, policy advice, and technical
assistance to governments of developing countries. IDA focuses on the world’s poorest
countries, while IBRD assists middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries. IFC,
MIGA, and ICSID focus on strengthening the private sector in developing countries.
Through these institutions, the World Bank Group provides financing, technical
assistance, political risk insurance, and settlement of disputes to private enterprises,
including financial institutions. The International Monetary Fund

The IMF works to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability,
facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic
growth, and reduce poverty around the world. The IMF's primary purpose is to ensure
the stability of the international monetary system—the system of exchange rates and
international payments that enables countries and their citizens to transact with each
other. It does so by keeping track of the global economy and the economies of member
countries, lending to countries with balance of payments difficulties, and giving practical
help to members.

Warrant: The World Bank would be committed to ending poverty in the country.

“Who We Are” World Bank Group, n.d., [Link]

are. Accessed December 11, 2024.

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Our mission is to end extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity on a livable
planet. This is threatened by multiple, intertwined crises. Time is of the essence. We are
writing a new playbook to drive impactful development that is: Inclusive of everyone,
including women and young people. Resilient to shocks, including against climate and
biodiversity crises, pandemics and fragility. Sustainable, through growth and job
creation, human development, fiscal and debt management, food security and access to
clean air, water, and affordable energy. To achieve this, we will work with all clients as
one World Bank Group, in close partnership with other multilateral institutions, the
private sector, and civil society.

Turn: Embezzlement makes Somalia’s system bad.

Warrant: Embezzlement is rampant in Somalia.

“Somalia’s audit unearths irregularities, embezzlement of funds.” Nation, July 2, 2024

[Link]
embezzlement-of-funds--4678222. Accessed December 11, 2024.

Somalia's Office of the Auditor General has released results of forensic audits which
highlight significant financial irregularities and embezzlement with several key

government agencies. In a move that provides a critical step towards greater financial
transparency and accountability, the audits were launched following a similar
compliance exercise in 2020 for the fiscal year 2019, which identified suspicious
activities across multiple government sectors. The investigation spanned three years
and rigorously examined the financial activities of various departments. The report
leaves 22 offices on the spotlight, including 15 from the Immigration and Nationality
Directorate, 3 from the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank, and 4 officers from the

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Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Eleven of these officers have since been convicted
of criminal activities, receiving prison sentences ranging from 1 to 9 years. Additionally,
several individuals have been barred from government employment for five years.

Impact: Foreign actors like the EU have stopped sending aid because of corruption.

Baczynska, Gabriela, Michelle Nichols, Aaron Ross & Emma Farge. “Exclusive: EU
temporarily holds back food aid in Somalia after UN finds widespread theft.”
Reuters, September 19, 2023. [Link]
holds-back-food-aid-somalia-after-un-records-widespread-theft-2023-09-18/.
Accessed December 11, 2024.

UNITED NATIONS/NAIROBI/GENEVA, Sept 18 (Reuters) - The European Union executive

has temporarily suspended funding for the World Food Programme (WFP) in Somalia,
two senior EU officials told Reuters on Monday, after a U.N. investigation found
widespread theft and misuse of aid meant to avert famine. The European Commission
gave more than $7 million in aid to the WFP's operations in Somalia last year, a fraction
of the donations of more than $1 billion it received, U.N. data shows. EU member states
gave much more money on a bilateral basis. It was not immediately clear whether any
would also suspend aid. Balazs Ujvari, a spokesman for the European Commission,
neither confirmed nor denied specifically a temporary suspension but said: "So far, the
EU has not been informed by its U.N. partners of a financial impact on EU-funded
projects. "Nevertheless, we will continue to monitor the situation and abide by our
zero-tolerance approach to fraud, corruption or misconduct."

Analysis: These responses will definitely be sufficient to combat the argument. Responses one
and three basically prove that it doesn't matter if Somalia is technically better off because
Somaliland will see none of the benefits of a better Somalia. The second argument allows
debaters to gain offense on the argument. They can show that an independent Somaliland
would be able to grow because it has access to more resources.

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A/2: Recognizing Somaliland encourages other Somali provinces to

split from Somalia.

Delink: These provinces are already shifting towards independence; they don’t need
encouragement.

Warrant: Puntland already declared de facto independence this past summer.

“Somalia: Puntland refuses to recognise federal government after disputed

constitutional changes.” Africanews, August 13, 2024,
[Link]
recognise-federal-government-after-disputed-constitutional-cha/. Accessed
December 11, 2024.

The semi-autonomous state of Puntland says it has withdrawn from the country's
federal system and will govern itself independently until constitutional amendments
passed by the central government in Somalia are approved in a nationwide
referendum. On Saturday, the federal parliament in Mogadishu approved several
constitutional changes that the government said are necessary to establish a stable
political system. But Puntland has rejected the latest constitutional reforms approved by
the Somali Parliament. "Puntland will act independently until there is a federal
government with a constitution that is agreed upon by a referendum in which
Puntland takes part," said the state's council of ministers in a statement. But some
critics have said the changes, which include introducing direct presidential elections and
allowing the president to appoint a prime minister without parliamentary approval,
concentrate power in the hands of the executive.

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Warrant: Jubaland’s leader said that the federal government should play no role in internal
matters.

Staff Reporter. “Jubaland conflict: What we know so far.” Garowe Online, November 26,
2024, [Link]
we-know-so-far. Accessed December 11, 2024.

KISMAYO, Somalia - Strong disagreements have emerged between authorities in

Mogadishu and Kismayo after Ahmed Islam Mohamed Madobe defied orders to hold
direct elections, effectively winning his third term as regional leader, leading to the
current standoff. In his address, Madobe maintained that the federal government 'has
no role in determining our internal affairs' while insisting that 'any attempts to
destabilize the region shall be resisted'. However, he said that his government would
be eager to dialogue. But for Mogadishu, the elections were 'unconstitutional and
illegal', calling for actions from the Attorney General who should prefer charges against
Madobe - initiate a process that guarantees his removal from office for failing to
embrace changes. The Jubaland leader said the universal suffrage model of elections
would trigger unconstitutional term extensions for state and national leaders, a claim
disputed by the federal government of Somalia under Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Warrant: Jubaland is literally fighting its independence right now.

Hassan, Abdiqani & Sheikh, Abdi. “Fighting breaks out between Somalia's Jubbaland
region and federal government.” Reuters, December 11, 2024,
[Link]
somalias-jubbaland-region-and-federal-government/ar-
AA1vGtmq?ocid=BingNewsVerp. Accessed December 11, 2024.

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MOGADISHU/GAROWE, Somalia (Reuters) -Clashes erupted on Wednesday between

forces from Somalia's federal government and the semi-autonomous Jubbaland
region, raising concerns that internal rivalries are diverting attention from the fight
against the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab group. The violence in the strategically
important region, which follows an election held there despite being opposed by
authorities in Mogadishu, is taking place just weeks before the mandate of an African
Union peacekeeping force expires. "This morning, federal forces from Mogadishu in
Ras Kamboni, using drones, attacked Jubbaland forces," Adan Ahmed Haji, assistant
security minister of Jubbaland, told a press conference in the regional capital Kismayu.
Later in the day he said hundreds of federal forces had surrendered and fled to the
Kenyan border, while Jubbaland fighters had captured Ras Kamboni. Reuters could not
immediately verify his claims. Somali Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur said
the Jubbaland forces initiated the clashes. "Early this morning Jubbaland forces
attacked the Somali federal military troops that were deployed in Lower Jubba to take
bases withdrawn from by ATMIS," he said in a statement, referring to the African
Union Transition Mission in Somalia.

Delink: Somalia is an untenable state, and the country dissolving is good.

Warrant: Somalia is too divided to survive anyways.

Samatar, Abdi Ismail. “Somalia’s toxic political and security order: the death knell of
democracy.” The Conversatiion, April 23, 2021,
[Link]
death-knell-of-democracy-159549. Accessed December 11, 2024.

Foreign actors, including the African Union, back a political scheme that segregates
Somalis into exclusive genealogical units in all spheres of political and public life. The
country is divided into tribal regions. Parliamentary representation, ministerial

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appointments and employment in civil and security services (as well as the judiciary) are
all based on tribal identity. Each region is the preserve of a particular genealogical
group. And each government department is the fiefdom of a certain tribe. The
fundamental political effect of these divisions has been that Somalis cohabit the same
national territory, but share little common civic agenda that can guide rebuilding their
country. Such reinvention of colonial and apartheid-like political order has created
superficial and short term stability in pockets of the country. But this has been at the
cost of country-wide insecurity, and economic and social progress. This tribal-based
political scheme is accepted under the false notion that it reflects Somali tradition. But
it only fits the designs of a sectarian faction of the Somali political elite, and their
erstwhile ally in Ethiopia, the late prime minister Meles Zenawi. The current order is
an amalgam of two totally contradictory systems. A public sector that is supposed to be
inclusive and democratic, and an exclusive tribal-based politics. This mixture has
produced a dysfunctional order inept in all of its operations except in looting public
resources and alienating Somalis from each other.

Warrant: Somalia will be pushed towards a seven state division.

“Who We Are” World Bank Group, n.d., [Link]

are. Accessed December 11, 2024.

Looking ahead, different governance options can be envisioned. Theoretically, the

former Somalia could be permanently divided into seven independent countries,
linked to each other only through a customs union along the lines of the European
Economic Community from 1957 to 2009. Or it could become a defensive pact along
the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both types of options are
inconsistent with Somalia’s efforts to reconstitute the nation-state. At the opposite
extreme, Somalia could be reconstituted as a unitary state. This option is inconsistent
with demands for some degree of regional autonomy. This chapter therefore rejects

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both extremes and instead focuses on intermediate, federal solutions that combine
varying degrees of federal and state power.

Turn: Splitting from Somalia would achieve positive political and economic outcomes for
Puntland and Jubaland.

Warrant: Jubaland and Puntland have economic incentive to separate from Somalia.

Salad, Mohamed. “Fragmented federalism: Puntland and Jubaland’s quest for autonomy
and its impact on Somali sovereignty.” Caasimada Online, November 6, 2024,
[Link]
quest-for-autonomy-and-its-impact-on-somali-sovereignty/. Accessed December
11, 2024.

These areas see themselves as separate entities inside Somalia, frequently demanding
their autonomy at the expense of national unity. This autonomy hinders the federal
government’s efforts to build a cohesive and autonomous Somali state capable of
addressing security and governance concerns. Puntland and Jubaland want
independence for political and economic reasons. Politically, these regions have
strong clan ties and local power structures that oppose federal intervention.
Economically, Puntland and Jubaland want to control local resources, including trade
income and possible oil deposits, which has significant consequences for national
revenue-sharing policies. This quest for economic self-sufficiency frequently clashes
with Mogadishu over resource management, causing economic friction and further
separating these areas from the central authority. These contradictions become even
more pronounced in the realms of security and counterterrorism. Groups like Al-
Shabaab, which take advantage of Somalia’s fragmented federal government, continue
to pose a threat to the country. Puntland and Jubaland have established their own

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security forces, frequently outside the federal military, creating operational problems
that impede collaborative counterterrorism activities.

Delink: The Somali system encourages independence.

Warrant: Somalia is a failed state with a system that encourages breaking away, Jubaland and
Puntland empirically prove this.

Salad, Mohamed. “Fragmented federalism: Puntland and Jubaland’s quest for autonomy
and its impact on Somali sovereignty.” Caasimada Online, November 6, 2024,
[Link]
quest-for-autonomy-and-its-impact-on-somali-sovereignty/. Accessed December
11, 2024.

Somalia’s federal system was designed to promote unity while preserving the
sovereignty of its many regions. However, the experiences of Puntland and Jubaland
demonstrate how federalism has occasionally exacerbated rather than healed divides
within Somalia. In the northeast, Puntland and Jubaland in the south have both
sought extensive autonomy from Mogadishu, focussing on local government and
resource management. While these quests for independence have contributed to
regional peace and self-government, they also offer substantial difficulties to Somalia’s
national sovereignty, notably regarding security and counterterrorism coordination. The
campaigns for autonomy in Puntland and Jubaland have political and historical
foundations. Puntland became an autonomous province in 1998, partially due to the
turmoil in Mogadishu and a desire to rule autonomously. With its closeness to Kenya’s
border and significant links to cross-border commerce, Jubaland has preserved its
independence, emphasising the necessity for locally directed security and
administration. These areas see themselves as separate entities inside Somalia,
frequently demanding their autonomy at the expense of national unity. This

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autonomy hinders the federal government’s efforts to build a cohesive and

autonomous Somali state capable of addressing security and governance concerns.

Analysis: The first response is good because it basically takes the warranting for the original
argument and flips it on its head. You’re saying that the argument is pointless because they
would be declaring independence anyway. Although, this argument does run the risk of being
mutually exclusive of the other three. The second and third argument basically argue the
positive impacts of Puntland and Jubaland leaving. The fourth argument says Somalia is prime
for this to happen.

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A/2: Recognizing Somaliland would divert the African Union’s

resources and attention from more pressing issues

Response: Recognizing Somaliland would create opportunities for stability in the Horn of Africa

Turn: Recognizing Somaliland could strengthen its governance and stability, reducing AU
peacekeeping needs in the region

“A Legal and Diplomatic Analysis of Somaliland’s Quest for International Recognition.”

July 4, 2024, [Link]
analysis-of-somalilands-quest-for-international-recognition/. Accessed December
13, 2024.

Somaliland’s experience, since its declaration of independence in 1991, is the story of

its strength and commitment to realizing its sovereignty and ensuring stability in the
region. The lack of international recognition is a big lacuna, yet in itself means there
must be a requirement for some nuance in the interplay between the legal standard
and the political realities within the international system. While Somaliland continues to
seek recognition, the case also remains relevant for gauging the potentials and
constraints of the ventures of state-building in the background of the complex dynamics
of geopolitics.

Turn: The AU needs to focus its resources on other regional challenges

“Eight Priorities for the African Union in 2024.” International Crisis Group, February 14,
2024, [Link]
eight-priorities-african-union-2024. Accessed December 13, 2024.

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Many of the institutional difficulties facing the AU are common to other multilateral
organisations at a time of increasing international friction. Member states are looking
inward, closely protecting their sovereign prerogatives rather than investing in
collective security and struggling with geopolitical tensions that undermine cooperative
efforts. For the AU, money is a major constraint as well. The organisation relies heavily
on international funding, much of which comes from the European Union – exposing it
to African criticism for its perceived lack of independence. Yet for all its challenges, the
AU occupies a unique niche when it comes to African diplomacy and peacemaking. The
G20 forum of the world’s largest economies recognised its important role in September
2023, when it made the AU a permanent member. The AU thereby got a seat at the table
for discussions of issues of great consequence to African states, such as reform of
international financial institutions. Three months later, the UN Security Council handed
the organisation another major win when it cleared the way for the use of assessed
contributions to help pay for AU-led peace operations.

Analysis: This counterargument highlights how recognition could decrease the AU’s long-term
resource burdens by fostering regional stability. It challenges the contention that recognition
would divert attention, instead presenting it as a pragmatic solution.

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A/2: Recognizing Somaliland will alienate donors and development

organizations that favor a unified Somali state

Response: The lack of donor attention to Somaliland has actually helped the region

Mitigate: Less aid has improved democratic outcomes in Somaliland

Eubank, Nick. “In Somaliland, less money has brought more democracy.” The Guardian,
August 26, 2011, [Link]
matters/2011/aug/26/somaliland-less-money-more-democracy. Accessed
December 13, 2024.

As the humanitarian crisis in southern Somalia threatens millions of lives, Somalia's

little-known northern neighbour, Somaliland, is doing so well that its government
recently offered to send aid across the border. That a small and relatively poor country
that is also suffering from the ongoing drought would be in a position to help Somalia is
itself remarkable; that Somaliland achieved this position without being officially
recognised by the international community as a sovereign nation – and thus without
being eligible for international assistance – is truly impressive. But have Somaliland's
accomplishments come in spite of its ineligibility for foreign assistance, or because of it?
Somaliland's success – providing peace, stability and democracy in a region where all are
scarce – is in large part due to the fact that the government has never received foreign
aid. Because Somaliland's government cannot access funding from the World Bank,
IMF, or other major donors, officials were forced to negotiate with citizens and
business leaders for financial support. This negotiation created the responsive political
institutions that, in turn, have allowed the nation to fare relatively well in recent years
and in the current crisis.

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Warrant: An abundance of aid has hamstrung Somalia, hindering its progress toward adequate
governance

Brown, Ryan. “How a DIY nation has made it this far.” The Christian Science Monitor, May
26, 2020, [Link]
nation-has-made-it-this-far. Accessed December 13, 2024.

While Somaliland goes it alone, neighboring Somalia offers a stark illustration of a

world where foreign assistance falls short, often seeming driven as much by donors’
interests as locals’ needs. Although pumped full of foreign aid, foreign expertise, and
foreign guns, Somalia’s government can barely control its capital city. Powerful militias
govern much of its territory, and the country is near the bottom of global rankings for
almost every measure of the quality of life. While most experts find that aid does boost
growth, it also creates powerful entanglements and obligations from which poorer
countries struggle to free themselves. “There’s no free lunch in this world,” says Sa’ad
Mohamed Abdi Gedo, director of the Diaspora Department at Somaliland’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. “Everyone has an interest behind the money they give.”

Analysis: This counter challenges the assumption that more aid is better, and provides a
compelling case for state-building through less aid and more public trust and institution-
building.

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A/2: Recognizing Somaliland prematurely rewards the state without it

first making progress on human rights and governance challenges

Response: Somaliland’s human rights and governance record surpasses that of many
recognized states

Warrant: Somaliland’s democratic processes have fared relatively well compared to its
neighbors

Eubank, Nick. “In Somaliland, less money has brought more democracy.” The Guardian,
August 26, 2011, [Link]
matters/2011/aug/26/somaliland-less-money-more-democracy. Accessed
December 13, 2024.

But have Somaliland's accomplishments come in spite of its ineligibility for foreign
assistance, or because of it? Somaliland's success – providing peace, stability and
democracy in a region where all are scarce – is in large part due to the fact that the
government has never received foreign aid. Because Somaliland's government cannot
access funding from the World Bank, IMF, or other major donors, officials were forced
to negotiate with citizens and business leaders for financial support. This negotiation
created the responsive political institutions that, in turn, have allowed the nation to
fare relatively well in recent years and in the current crisis.

Warrant: Recognition would empower civil society and governance reforms

“Strategy for International Democratization Support to Somaliland.” International

Republican Institute, 2014, [Link]

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content/uploads/2022/01/Strategy-for-International-Democratization-Support-to-
[Link]. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Elections have played an important role in the stabilization of Somaliland, and

Somaliland takes great pride in having completed a succession of them successfully
(using this success as one of the arguments for international recognition of an
independent Somaliland). While support for civil society’s role in future elections
remains important, some donors now validly suggest that the time has come to move
past this narrow focus to concentrate on issues of actual governance, including
accountability.

Analysis: By emphasizing Somaliland’s relative progress in governance and human rights, this
counter reframes recognition as a reward for success rather than premature acknowledgment.

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A/2: Recognizing Somaliland at this stage undermines the African

Union’s status as a neutral arbiter in conflicts occurring within the
continent

Response: Recognizing Somaliland would enhance the African Union’s credibility by

demonstrating a principled commitment to self-determination and stability

Turn: The AU’s failure to recognize Somaliland weakens its credibility in promoting justice

Schwartz, Stephen. “The African Union Should Resolve Somaliland’s Status.” Foreign
Policy Research Institute, November 8, 2021,
[Link]
somalilands-status/. Accessed December 13, 2024.

One could argue that with the civil war in Ethiopia putting that country at risk of
dissolution, this is not the time for the African Union to entertain Somaliland’s secession.
However, the opposite is true. Growing instability in Ethiopia calls for greater stability in
the region, which clarity in the Somalia-Somaliland relationship would achieve.
Whether the outcome be independence, association, or a hybrid, Somaliland and
Somalia would emerge stronger. For example, if the parties agreed to an association,
Mogadishu would attain some degree of actual authority over Somaliland that it currently
lacks. Alternatively, if Somaliland achieved independence, it would then be able to assist
Somalia with its security challenges in a way that it cannot or will not at present. Talks
would assist with two other regional issues, one actual and one potential. Negotiations to
resolve Somaliland’s status and relationship to Somalia would need to address the
festering jurisdictional and security issues in Somaliland’s eastern region and its unsettled
relationship with Puntland. Finally, should Ethiopia dissolve into its component parts, the

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talks would provide a forum for Ethiopia’s ethnic Somali Ogaden region to negotiate its
own association with Somalia, Somaliland, or both. The African Union has the mandate
to mediate peace and make determinations on sovereignty. It can compel Somalia to
negotiate or decide itself whether to accept Somaliland’s demand for its sovereignty to
be restored. Persuading African governments and the AU to take on this responsibility
should be a focus of U.S. diplomacy.

Analysis: This counter demonstrates how recognition aligns with AU principles, presenting it as
a strengthening move rather than a compromise of neutrality.

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A/2: Recognizing Somaliland harms the African Union’s relations with

Somalia’s allies

Response: Recognition of Somaliland could open new opportunities for collaboration with
other international actors, reducing dependency on Somalia’s allies

Delink: Recognition would attract investment from countries prioritizing stability, such as the
UAE and Ethiopia

“The Stakes in the Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal.” International Crisis Group, March 6, 2024,
[Link]
ethiopia-somaliland-deal. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Farther afield, Egypt has perhaps been most active in capitalising on the dispute,
doubtless due to Cairo’s longstanding rivalry with Addis Ababa. On 20 January, Egyptian
President Abdelfattah al-Sisi invited President Mohamud to Cairo, pledging to defend
Somalia if asked. Traditional partners like the European Union and the U.S. have
expressed strong support for Somalia. Other powers closer to the Horn of Africa,
including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the UAE, have publicly backed Mogadishu
but likely seek to balance their relations in the region. The UAE appears to be in a
particularly awkward position, given its majority stake in Berbera port, its strong security
partnership with Mogadishu and its warm relations with Addis Ababa. Somali officials
complain quietly that they see the Emirates playing a role in the deal, given Emirati
leaders’ proximity to Abiy, although foreign diplomats are less certain.

Warrant: Recognition could balance regional power dynamics in the Horn of Africa

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“Horn of Africa’s New Security Landscape: Geopolitical Consequences of the Conflict-

Cooperation Dynamics.” Somaliland Chronicle, April 8, 2024,
[Link]
landscape-geopolitical-consequences-of-the-conflict-cooperation-dynamics/.
Accessed December 13, 2024.

Gulf states and international partners, particularly Western nations, are keenly interested
in restoring the Horn of Africa’s stability. This includes increasing investment in collective
action mechanisms and platforms to contain crises and reduce hotspots of tension in the
region. These efforts also aim to reformulate relations and interactions between local
actors, governments, and states while mitigating the risks of proxy conflicts and
internationalizing issues in the Horn of Africa. These initiatives enhance regional peace
and security and foster win-win partnerships by fostering climates that rationalize
competition and cooperation. Considering the entrenched positions, current tensions,
and mistrust among local and regional actors, it is crucial to discuss guarantees,
incentives, and joint pressures necessary to steer them toward peaceful resolutions of
existing crises.

Analysis: This counter shifts the narrative from risk to opportunity, arguing that recognition
could diversify partnerships and strengthen the AU’s position globally.

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January 2025
Public Forum Brief

Con Arguments
Con Arguments January 2025

CON: Granting independence encourages other secessionist

movements in Africa

Argument: Granting independence encourages other secessionist movements in Africa.

Warrant: Somaliland is not recognized in the status quo because of the possible ripple effect.

T.G., “Why Somaliland is not a recognised state.” The Economist, November 1, 2015,
[Link]
somaliland-is-not-a-recognised-state. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Although the AU itself admitted as much in 2005, Somaliland’s claim remains in limbo.
The reason for this lies in and around Mogadishu. Somalia’s civil war has raged for two
and a half decades, and despite the introduction of a new constitution in 2012, the
SFG’s claim to territorial authority is precarious. Many fear that the apparent creation
of a new state in the region, whose presence would almost certainly embolden
Somalia’s other secessionist provinces (Puntland, Jubbaland and Hiranland), would
lead to the balkanisation of Somalia along clan lines, while simultaneously reigniting
old regional tensions (between Somalis and Ethiopians, for example). Moreover, by
crimping the power of the federal government in Mogadishu, which is loth to accept
anything less than a united Somali state, it could trigger a resumption of hostilities
between north and south, rendering peace negotiations, which have been going on for
years, nearly impossible. This, for Somalia’s neighbours as well as the international
community, is the doomsday scenario. Many argue something similar can be seen
playing out in South Sudan today.

Warrant: Formal recognition of Somaliland would embolden other secession movements in

Africa.

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Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Lobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 13, 2024.

Many countries have encouraged the breakaway state’s elections and economic
development, but none have recognized Somaliland. While some experts see historical
and geopolitical reasons for countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya to take this step,
others say the African Union (AU) would have to be the first to do so. “The United
States and the UN and all of their allies have worked hard to try to build up the AU
and position it as a moral authority,” says Bruton. The bloc, however, has feared that
formal recognition would embolden other secessionist movements on the continent,
such as Nigeria’s Biafra or Morocco’s Western Sahara, to demand the same. Since the
creation of a continental bloc in 1963, there have only been two widely recognized
border changes in Africa: Eritrea’s split from Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan’s
independence in 2011. In the fallout of Somaliland’s January 2024 tentative port deal
with Ethiopia, several countries and blocs such as the United States, Egypt, AU, and EU
called for calm in the region and for Somalia’s sovereignty to be respected.

Warrant: Secessionists only want independence and are inspired by other secessionists –
Fighting is inevitable post-recognition.

Coggins, Bridget. “Friends in High Places: International Politics and the Emergency of
States from Secessionism.” July 28, 2011, International Organization,
[Link] Accessed December 13, 2024.

Acknowledging external politics’ influence over the outcomes of these ostensibly

internal conflicts promises better models of secession and civil war. In secessionist

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conflicts, actors are responding to incentives not currently specified in domestic-level

models. Sensing the potential for political recognition, for example, may encourage
secessionist movements to continue fighting rather than accept seemingly generous
settlements from their home states. Perhaps this is why Kosovo Albanians rejected
Serbia’s offers of “everything but independence” and would accept “nothing but …
independence.”106 They were confident that the United States and Europe would
eventually support their statehood and therefore refused to compromise. Equally,
home states assured that the international community will not recognize their
challengers—as was perhaps the case for Russia after the 1996 ceasefire with
Chechnya—may feel emboldened to crack down on the secessionists and those
presumed to be supporters. These findings have clear implications for my models and
present important new considerations for diplomacy, peacekeeping, and conflict
resolution.

Impact: Rebel groups in Ethiopia are waiting to take action post recognition.

Gebereamlak, Hagos. “Ethiopia’s Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for

African Borders.” The Reporter, October 2, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 13, 2024.

Recognizing Somaliland could encourage secessionist movements and irredentist

claims across the Horn of Africa, fueling instability in the region. There are already
existing aspirations for independence in several parts of the Horn, and Somaliland’s
recognition could embolden these movements. In Ethiopia, for example, various
regions, including Tigray, Oromia, and the Somali region, have elements advocating
for greater autonomy or outright secession. Similar tendencies exist in Sudan,
Somalia, and Somaliland itself. The complex ethnic landscape in the Horn of Africa
further complicates these dynamics. For instance, Somalis live across Kenya, Ethiopia,
Djibouti, Somalia, and Somaliland, while Afars inhabit Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

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Similarly, Tigrayans and Oromos span multiple countries, creating fertile ground for
secessionist and irredentist movements.

Impact: History proves that secessionist movements in Africa are common and dangerous

Steinwher, Uta. “Separatism in Africa: A colonial legacy.” DW News, December 3, 2020,

[Link]
55805551. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Diverse secessionist movements are back in the spotlight in Africa. The Tigray Region
in Ethiopia is only one example. The roots often go back to the colonial era, and some
of these conflicts still smolder today. Toyin Falola believes colonialism is at the root of
all separatist movements in Africa, dating back to when European colonial powers
divided the continent between them at the Berlin Congo Conference in 1894-95 and at
the end of World War I. "They cobbled together hundreds of peoples and nations that
had existed before into about 50 countries," the history professor at the University of
Texas told DW. Existing structures or religious and ethnic affiliations were not taken
into account by the European powers.

Analysis: The Coggins card is a strong piece of evidence from the literature. The link about
outside actors and perception is a stronger link to emboldenment than constructing a link
about the disruption of colonial-era border policies (which recognizing Somaliland doesn’t do).
Gebereamlak helps build up the mechanism by which the Ethiopian-Somali relationship
specifically could lead to this cascade of secessionism. There is a strong implication from his
claims into a larger impact on US-China dynamic/power vacuum for rising Middle Eastern
countries. Steinwehr is a starting point for impacts (teams should argue that there are a lot of
issues with borders and hotbeds for secessionism in Africa, so there’s a potentially very wide-
ranging impact on this argument)..

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CON: Somaliland will be economically taken advantage of by

predatory development lending

Argument: Somaliland will be economically taken advantage of by predatory development

lending.

Warrant: Despite being cut off from the international system, Somaliland has successfully
navigated international funding.

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 13, 2024.

Meanwhile, the government is ineligible for loans from the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund as long as Somaliland is not an internationally
recognized state or reconciled with Somalia. President Muse Bihi Abdi, in an op-ed
after his 2017 election victory, said that Somaliland’s exclusion from international
markets “compounds the socioeconomic pressures that Somaliland faces,” and analysts
say that an anemic economy puts decades of political progress at risk. Somaliland has
nonetheless negotiated its own foreign investment deals despite opposition from the
federal government in Mogadishu. In 2016, it struck a landmark deal with DP World of
Dubai, part of the UAE, to develop and manage the Port of Berbera, a joint venture
expected to produce millions of dollars of income a year for Somaliland. Landlocked
Ethiopia joined the port development project two years later, aiming to expand its
access to the sea.

Warrant: World Bank and IMF funding is associated with significant issues in target countries.

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“What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and IMF?” Bretton Woods Project, June
4, 2019, [Link]
criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/. Accessed December 13, 2024.

An extensive academic literature, with which the Bank and Fund rarely engage,
challenges the robustness of the theoretical and evidence bases for Bank and Fund’s
principles and policies. Volumes of documents testify to the experiences of millions of
people negatively impacted by Bank and Fund policies and programmes. Together
they suggest that Bank and Fund’s policies have failed to achieve their stated
objectives and instead support an economic order that benefits elites and private
sector interests at the expense of poor and marginalised communities.

Warrant: IMF and World Bank loans have been associated with these impacts for decades.

Cavanagh, John and Jerry Mander. “World Bank, IMF turned poor Third World nations
into loan addicts.” July 2003, The CCPA Monitor,
[Link] Accessed December 13,
2024.

Beginning with Mexico in 1982, the World Bank and the IMF swung into action with
structural adjustment as their primary response. Together they reoriented national
economies to focus on debt repayment and to further open their resources, labour, and
markets to foreign corporations. “Adjusted” countries came under great pressure to
increase the export of their natural resources and the products of their labour, become
more import-dependent, and increase the foreign ownership of their economies. Once
the countries accepted these conditions, the IMF and the World Bank rewarded them
with still more loans, thus deepening their indebtedness—rather like a fireman
pouring gasoline on a burning house to stop the blaze. The results have been
disastrous, not only in human and environmental terms, but also in economic terms.

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In 1980, the total external debt of all developing countries was $609 billion; in 2001,
after 20 years of structural adjustment, it totalled $2.4 trillion. In 2001, sub-Saharan
Africa paid $3.6 billion more in debt service than it received in new long-term loans and
credits. Africa spends about four times more on debt-service payments than it does on
health care.

Impact: IMF lending causes higher rates of poverty.

Biglaiser, Glen and Ronald McGauvren. “The effects of IMF loan conditions in poverty in
the developing world.” Journal of International Relations and Development, June
7, 2022, [Link]
Accessed December 13, 2024.

Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) claims that poverty reduction is one
of its objectives, some studies show that IMF borrower countries experience higher
rates of poverty. This paper investigates the effects of IMF loan conditions on poverty.
Using a sample of 81 developing countries from 1986 to 2016, we find that IMF loan
arrangements containing structural reforms contribute to more people getting
trapped in the poverty cycle, as the reforms involve deep and comprehensive changes
that tend to raise unemployment, lower government revenue, increase costs of basic
services, and restructure tax collection, pensions, and social security programmes.
Conversely, we observe that loan arrangements promoting stabilisation reforms have
less impact on the poor because borrower states hold more discretion over their
macroeconomic targets. Further, we disaggregate structural reforms to identify the
particular policies that increase poverty. Our findings are robust to different
specifications and indicate how IMF loan arrangements affect poverty in the developing
world.

Impact: IMF lending prevents climate change recovery efforts.

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Perry, Keston. “The IMF and the World Bank must be abolished to save the planet.” Al
Jazeera, November 24, 2024,
[Link]
must-be-abolished-to-save-the-planet. Accessed December 13, 2024.

It has been now almost five months since the hurricane swept through the Caribbean
and these communities are still struggling to recover. This is because these island
nations have been taken hostage by disastrous deals with the IMF and the World
Bank. Instead of helping a region that is at the epicentre of climate disasters, these
two institutions force its nations into borrowing arrangements that prioritise austerity
and objectives of global capital, rather than immediate and longer-term relief and
recovery. As a result, communities suffer under increased public debt and reduced
investment in supporting the social infrastructure necessary to respond to climate
disasters and mitigate the effects of climate change. In addition, instead of offering
unconditional relief and recovery funding on terms required to truly meet the needs
of people, these entities have explicitly supported debt-related financial tools like
catastrophe insurance or bonds, debt swaps, and now “disaster clauses” integrated
into debt contracts. A disaster or hurricane clause adds to the contractual terms of a
debt instrument the ability of a borrower to defer payments of interest and principal in
the event of a qualifying natural disaster.

Analysis: The narrative teams should paint is that Somaliland has been able to take reasonably
good steps toward development and economic growth while acting as an autonomous region
rather than a sovereign country. What we don’t want is a newly independent Somaliland, that’s
now eligible for WB and IMF loans, which it would take in a misguided attempt at rapid
development. It would be preferable to continue the status quo where they slowly branch out
without making big changes that rock the boat (Mogadishu/the rest of the southern continent).
Then teams can implicate this to say WB and IMF loans are predatory, bad, etc (the full Bretton
Woods Project card holds lots of detail here).

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CON: Recognizing Somaliland causes backlash from the Somali

government

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland causes backlash from the Somali government.

Warrant: Recognizing Somaliland would anger Mogadishu.

Mahmood, Omar. “Somaliland’s Peaceful Handover Withstands Neighbourhood

Strains.” International Crisis Group, December 11, 2024,
[Link]
peaceful-handover-withstands-neighbourhood-strains. Accessed December 13,
2024.

Another potential flashpoint surfaced in the aftermath of the U.S. election. Although not
an official publication of incoming U.S. President Donald Trump’s campaign, the Project
2025 conservative manifesto issued by some of his allies makes the case for official
recognition of Somaliland. It argues that such a step would reward the entity for its
relative stability, while also countering what the document’s authors describe as
neighbouring Djibouti’s pro-Beijing orientation. (Djibouti hosts a major Chinese naval
base located a stone’s throw away from a large U.S. base; its decision to grant China
basing rights in 2016 irritated Washington.) On paper, Somaliland would welcome
official recognition by a great power. But if this is done unilaterally and with no major
diplomatic spadework in advance, it would also supercharge tensions between
Somaliland and Somalia, particularly along the contested boundary with Puntland. It
would likewise prompt furious objections from Mogadishu’s allies in the region, such
as Djibouti and Eritrea, as well as their friends farther afield, including Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Qatar and Egypt – further dividing the wider region.

Warrant: Integration of Somaliland into broader economic structures has angered Somalia.

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“Ethiopia-Somali Dispute: What Is at Stake for MENTA?” Middle East Council on Global
Affairs, September 30, 2024, [Link]
somalia-dispute-what-is-at-stake-for-mena-council-views/. Accessed December
13, 2024.

On January 1, the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland and landlocked Ethiopia signed

a controversial memorandum of understanding (MoU) granting the latter port access to
the Red Sea. In exchange for a 50-year lease of coastline near the strategic port of
Berbera for commercial and naval uses, Addis Ababa agreed to consider recognizing
Somaliland as a state—it would become the first country to do so. The MoU has
sparked backlash from neighboring states—particularly Somalia, Eritrea and Egypt—as
Mogadishu considers Somaliland part of its sovereign territory. Last week, Egypt
delivered another major shipment of weapons to Somalia, prompting fears in Ethiopia
that the arms “would further exacerbate the fragile security [of the region].” With ten
full-blown conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia since the latter’s independence in
1960, the latest uptick in tensions now threatens the entire Horn of Africa’s stability, as
well as substantial economic interests in the region from Middle Eastern countries
ranging from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to Türkiye and Iran.

Warrant: Somaliland needs to directly negotiate with Mogadishu for any hope at reconciliation.

Badar, Abdi. “Somaliland: Waking Up To The Hard Reality.” Kormeeraha Magazine,

August 17, 2022, [Link]
waking-up-to-the-hard-reality/. Accessed December 13, 2024.

There’s no wonder some “Somalilanders”, as separatists call the population from that
region, are in admiration of the current Farmajo government’s discipline and view a
possible reunification as a better alternative to the squandering of public funds by their

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administration. Others even see the current military achievements as reminiscent of the
time Somalia was at its height of its glory. With this in the background, it was expected
the Somaliland administration has no other choice but to accept a direct negotiation
with Mogadishu and, in spite of the SNM old guard rhetoric’s, a public consultation
would be unavoidable to mitigate a severe backlash from a public indoctrinated for so
long in the simple and distressing concept that the “North” is a victim and the “South”
is a murderous mess.

Impact: A new state causes secessionist groups to become emboldened.

T.G., “Why Somaliland is not a recognised state.” The Economist, November 1, 2015,
[Link]
somaliland-is-not-a-recognised-state. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Although the AU itself admitted as much in 2005, Somaliland’s claim remains in limbo.
The reason for this lies in and around Mogadishu. Somalia’s civil war has raged for two
and a half decades, and despite the introduction of a new constitution in 2012, the
SFG’s claim to territorial authority is precarious. Many fear that the apparent creation
of a new state in the region, whose presence would almost certainly embolden
Somalia’s other secessionist provinces (Puntland, Jubbaland and Hiranland), would
lead to the balkanisation of Somalia along clan lines, while simultaneously reigniting
old regional tensions (between Somalis and Ethiopians, for example). Moreover, by
crimping the power of the federal government in Mogadishu, which is loth to accept
anything less than a united Somali state, it could trigger a resumption of hostilities
between north and south, rendering peace negotiations, which have been going on for
years, nearly impossible. This, for Somalia’s neighbours as well as the international
community, is the doomsday scenario. Many argue something similar can be seen
playing out in South Sudan today.

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Analysis: There is credible evidence that there would be lots of blowback from the central
government of Somalia in Mogadishu if there was international recognition of Somaliland’s
independence. This probably fragments the African Union (of which Somalia is part) but also
angers Somalia’s allies (Eritrea, Egypt, and any Middle Eastern states that want to get involved).
Teams could implicate this as a variety of economic impacts or possibly raise the threat of
violent conflict.

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CON: Recognizing Somaliland would worsen the Somali Civil War

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland would worsen the Somali Civil War.

Warrant: The recognition of Somaliland would embolden secessionist groups.

T.G., “Why Somaliland is not a recognised state.” The Economist, November 1, 2015,
[Link]
somaliland-is-not-a-recognised-state. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Although the AU itself admitted as much in 2005, Somaliland’s claim remains in limbo.
The reason for this lies in and around Mogadishu. Somalia’s civil war has raged for two
and a half decades, and despite the introduction of a new constitution in 2012, the
SFG’s claim to territorial authority is precarious. Many fear that the apparent creation
of a new state in the region, whose presence would almost certainly embolden
Somalia’s other secessionist provinces (Puntland, Jubbaland and Hiranland), would
lead to the balkanisation of Somalia along clan lines, while simultaneously reigniting
old regional tensions (between Somalis and Ethiopians, for example). Moreover, by
crimping the power of the federal government in Mogadishu, which is loth to accept
anything less than a united Somali state, it could trigger a resumption of hostilities
between north and south, rendering peace negotiations, which have been going on for
years, nearly impossible. This, for Somalia’s neighbours as well as the international
community, is the doomsday scenario. Many argue something similar can be seen
playing out in South Sudan today.

Warrant: There are fears in the United States that Somalia would react negatively to
international recognition for Somaliland.

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Mahmood, Omar. “Somaliland’s Peaceful Handover Withstands Neighbourhood

Strains.” International Crisis Group, December 11, 2024,
[Link]
peaceful-handover-withstands-neighbourhood-strains. Accessed December 13,
2024.

Another potential flashpoint surfaced in the aftermath of the U.S. election. Although not
an official publication of incoming U.S. President Donald Trump’s campaign, the Project
2025 conservative manifesto issued by some of his allies makes the case for official
recognition of Somaliland. It argues that such a step would reward the entity for its
relative stability, while also countering what the document’s authors describe as
neighbouring Djibouti’s pro-Beijing orientation. (Djibouti hosts a major Chinese naval
base located a stone’s throw away from a large U.S. base; its decision to grant China
basing rights in 2016 irritated Washington.) On paper, Somaliland would welcome
official recognition by a great power. But if this is done unilaterally and with no major
diplomatic spadework in advance, it would also supercharge tensions between
Somaliland and Somalia, particularly along the contested boundary with Puntland. It
would likewise prompt furious objections from Mogadishu’s allies in the region, such
as Djibouti and Eritrea, as well as their friends farther afield, including Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Qatar and Egypt – further dividing the wider region.

Warrant: Somaliland lacks the ability to guard its borders, so war would be easy

“African Game Changer? The Consequences of Somaliland’s International (Non)

Recognition.” Brenthurst Foundation, May 2011,
[Link]
[Link]. Accessed December 13, 2024.

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There are four main reasons put forward why it may be better not to recognise
Somaliland’s claims on statehood: • The security concerns: In terms of the impact on
Al-Shabaab (which is committed to Somali unity, and, indeed, to a greater Somalia
incorporating the Ogaden and the north-western area of Kenya); the impact for
Ethiopia on the Somali population in the Ogaden; and that this would worsen the
border security problems between Puntland and Somaliland over the Sool, Sanaag and
Ceyn regions.9 Essentially some parts of these regions within Somaliland are under
the sway of Puntland’s clans. • That the state lacks the capacity to guard its borders
and, as highlighted in the point (1) above, these borders are to some extent contested.
• That this undermines the TFG’s and AU’s efforts to install government and order in
Somalia per se. • That regional hegemon Ethiopia is hesitant diplomatically on the idea,
a position which is criticised in Hargeisa. ‘Ethiopia benefits more than any African state
from Somaliland’s stability and democracy,’ says Dr Omar. ‘We were expecting them to
take a much more positive step towards recognition … and democracy.’

Impact: Ethiopia and Somalia’s talks are going well now – We shouldn’t endanger them

Fraser, Suzan. “Ethiopia and Somalia agree to hold ‘technical talks’ over breakaway
Somaliland region.” Washington Post, December 11, 2024,
[Link]
joint-declaration/3a2759fa-b80f-11ef-8afa-452ab71fe261_story.html. Accessed
December 13, 2024.

Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on Wednesday to hold “technical talks” to resolve a

dispute sparked by Ethiopia’s deal with Somalia's breakaway region of Somaliland,
according to a statement following talks in Turkey. Turkey has been mediating between
the two east African countries as tensions between them have simmered since
Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland in January to lease
land along its coastline to establish a marine force base. In return, Ethiopia would

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recognize Somaliland’s independence, which Somalia says infringes on its sovereignty

and territory. A joint declaration was reached after Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan met separately with Somali President Hassan Sheik Mohamud and Ethiopian
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on Wednesday. It says the sides agreed the talks, which
would begin by February 2025 and conclude within four months, would respect
Somalia’s territorial integrity while recognizing “potential benefits” of Ethiopia’s access
to the sea. The declaration also says the sides would work to “finalize mutually
advantageous commercial arrangements” to allow Ethiopia “to enjoy reliable, secure
and sustainable access to and from the sea,” under Somalia sovereignity.

Analysis: It really seems to be most palatable to both Somalia and Ethiopia (the two powers in
the region) to have Somalia retain sovereignty over Somaliland but for Somaliland to be able to
make economic arrangements with other countries as an autonomous region. This seems like a
strong reason to prefer the status quo. The Economist card is important here. Somalia’s civil
war has been going on for far too long and killed far too many people. Teams can use this very
recent evidence to make the case that Somaliland’s independence not only emboldens other
secessionist parts of Somalia like Puntland, but is also diplomatically unpalatable to the
Somalian and Ethiopian central governments. It is preferable for the civil war not to be
deadlocked and to have the best chance at peace negotiations possible, when taking a view
that prioritizes security/peace/saving lives on the African continent. Teams can weigh from
here.

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CON: Recognizing Somaliland reinforces colonial boundaries

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland reinforces colonial boundaries.

Warrant: Somaliland claims that it is follow old British colonial borders.

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 13, 2024.

The Somaliland government asserts that it meets most of the requirements of a

sovereign democratic state: it holds free and fair elections, has its own currency and
security forces, and issues its own passports. It also says that its independence claim is
consistent with a longstanding norm of the African Union and its predecessor that
colonial-era borders should be maintained. Some analysts also note that Somalilanders
are predominantly from the Isaaq clan, and thus ethnically distinctive from other
Somalis.

Warrant: Somaliland’s borders are the same as British Somaliland.

Miller, Phil. “Another colonial border is causing conflict in Africa.” Declassified UK,
March 8, 2023, [Link]
causing-conflict-in-africa/. Accessed December 13, 2024.

It’s a familiar story. Lines on the map drawn by European colonisers carved up
communities across Asia and Africa, putting minorities at the mercy of larger ethnic or
religious groups. From India to Iraq, Sudan to Cameroon, millions have died in conflicts
caused by arbitrary borders imposed on countries by imperial powers. The latest

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example can be found in Somaliland, a former British colony that unilaterally declared
independence from neighbouring Somalia over thirty years ago. Praised by aid
agencies for its relative stability but still internationally unrecognised, the country’s
promising image is now threatened by an uprising in its eastern city of Las Anod.

Warrant: Somaliland’s borders are based on an 1887 colonial-era treaty.

“Somaliland International Boundaries.” Somaliland Law, 2007,

[Link] Accessed
December 13, 2024.

Briefly, the international boundary between Somaliland and Ethiopia was based on
the 1887 agreement between Britain & reached Ethiopia. The Treaty consisted of a
formal convention of six Articles and annexures containing, among other things, an
exchange of notes, which, according to Article 2 of the Treaty shall determine the
frontiers of the “British Protectorate on the Somali Coast”. The exchange of notes took
place during the same year and the final letters were annexed to the treaty by 8
December 1887. A boundary demarcation commission met in January 1932, and started
the work on the ground setting up boundary lines, roads and bollards. We shall be
looking at separately the controversial aspects of the 1887 Treaty, as well as the 1954
Agreement which re-affirmed the 1887 Treaty in respect of the “Haud and Reserved
areas” grazing rights, but on its independence on 26 June 1960, the new Constitution of
the independent STATE OF SOMALILAND defined the territory of Somaliland as “all that
territory which, on the commencement of the Constitution, is comprised in Her
Britannic Majesty’s Protectorate of Somaliland” (s. 2(1)). The Somaliland - Ethiopia
boundary, runs for 463 miles from at the 8 N. 48 E. (the tripoint of Somaliland-
Eithopia-Somalia) to Madaha Jalelo at the tripoint of Somaliland-Eithopia-Djibouti
boundaries. The demarcation of the boundray and its marking with bollards was
undertaken in the early 1930s.

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Impact: These colonial borders are historically problematic.

T.G., “Why Somaliland is not a recognised state.” The Economist, November 1, 2015,
[Link]
somaliland-is-not-a-recognised-state. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Throughout the post-independence era, geopolitics in Africa has tended to respect

"colonial borders", ie the borders laid down by European colonial powers in the 19th
century. Across the continent, there have been only two significant alterations to the
colonial map since the 1960s: the division of Eritrea from Ethiopia, in 1993; and South
Sudan from Sudan, in 2011. On the question of Somaliland, the African Union (AU), to
whom the international community tends to defer on boundary issues, has stuck to its
traditional line: to recognise Somiliand would be to open a Pandora’s box of separatist
claims in the region. Only with the consent of greater Somalia should Somaliland be
granted independence, so the argument goes. But this, Somilalanders point out, is
inconsistent: Somaliland, unlike Somalia, sticks to old colonial borders. It even has
previous experience of statehood (prior to independence, the territory was
administered as a separate British colony, and briefly enjoyed a five-day spell as a
sovereign state). Formerly British Somaliland’s union with Italian Somaliland to its
south, which brought about modern Somalia in 1960, was voluntary, they argue. Its
independence should require merely divorce, not reinvention.

Analysis: The colonial borders that were drawn for eastern Africa are very complicated and
were changed at various times throughout the 1800s and 1900s. An independent Somaliland is
technically compliant with previous colonial-era borders, but there is an argument to be made
for moving away from these colonial systems of state demarcation. There are overlapping
ethnic groups (clans) living in all parts of Somalia and Somaliland as well as Djibouti, Ethiopia,
and northern Kenya. To run this argument, teams should become familiar with the main eras of
borders as well as the reasons for and against the continued African Union policy of sticking to
those colonial era borders in the modern day.

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CON: The African Union recognizing Somaliland is purely symbolic and

not worth the risk of enhanced tensions

Argument: The African Union recognizing Somaliland is purely symbolic and not worth the risk
of enhanced tensions.

Warrant: The African Union doesn’t really do much.

Staeger, Ueli & Fagbayibo, Babatunde. “The African Union is weak because its members
want it that way – experts call for action on its powers.” The Conversation.
March 5, 2024. [Link]
its-members-want-it-that-way-experts-call-for-action-on-its-powers-224191.
Accessed December 5, 2024.

Structural weaknesses. Member states have little trust in the AU. Since its creation in
2002, there has been more talk about what is needed to make it effective than
actually fixing its many problems. The AU Constitutive Act allows the assembly to
transfer some of its functions to organs such as Pan-African Parliament and AU
Commission. Very little has been done about this, though. Rather than granting the
parliament the ability to make binding laws, the amended PAP Protocol only gave it the
powers to make “model laws”. These are no more than recommendations. The same
applies to the AU Commission. It can’t compel member states to comply with its
decisions. So the AU has no way to exercise supranational powers (binding over its
member states). The AU is only as strong as member states allow it to be. African
leaders have a worrying track record of putting narrow domestic gains ahead of
transferring higher powers to the AU. This is unfortunate because African regional
integration does not, as is often assumed, come at the cost of national sovereignty.

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Warrant: China does not want to recognize Somaliland.

Agence France-Presse. “China supports Somalia's 'integrity' after Ethiopia-Somaliland

accord.” The Citizen, January 12, 2024,
[Link]
integrity-after-ethiopia-somaliland-accord-4489556. Accessed December 5,
2024.

"Somaliland is part of Somalia," said a posting on X by the Chinese embassy in

Somalia, citing Mao Ning, a spokeswoman for the Chinese foreign ministry. "China
supports the federal government of Somalia in safeguarding national unity,
sovereignty and territorial integrity," it said, adding that "we hope that regional
countries will handle regional affairs well through diplomatic dialogue." The East
African trade bloc Igad said Thursday it will meet January 18 in Uganda to discuss the
tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as the situation in Sudan, which has
been torn apart since April by fighting between rival generals. The United States, the
European Union, the African Union, the Arab League, Egypt and Turkey have already all
called for respecting Somalia's sovereignty. Ethiopia, the second most populous country
in Africa, has been searching for an outlet to the sea ever since the Read Sea coastal
region of Eritrea declared independence in 1993.

Warrant: This UN would likely never recognize Somaliland.

Meservey, Joshua. “The U.S. Should Recognize Somaliland.” The Heritage Foundation,
October 19, 2021, [Link]
should-recognize-somaliland. Accessed December 5, 2024.

Lesser But Real Risks. There is also the slight danger of reputational harm to the U.S. if
no other country follows its lead in recognizing Somaliland’s independence. It is true

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that it will be difficult for Somaliland to gain a U.N. seat, as that would require a
positive recommendation from the Security Council on which China permanently sits,
and then approval by the General Assembly. Yet Washington leading the way would
probably give the diplomatic cover some states require before proceeding with
unilateral recognition. Even if no other country recognized Somaliland, it would not
lessen the advantages the U.S. would receive. It could even make Somaliland hew more
closely to Washington as its staunchest international partner.

Warrant: UN recognition allows for benefits from the international community.

Ball, Duncan. “6 Reasons Why Countries Join The United Nations.” Humanitarian
Careers, n.d., [Link]
nations/. Accessed December 5, 2024.

The United Nations runs specialized agencies that aim to promote global peace and
security and address development and humanitarian challenges. Being a UN member
state allows countries to participate in programmes ran by UN agencies and also
means they can feed into how and where these agencies do their work. UN agencies
cover a huge range of areas focusing on different global issues. These include agencies
such as UNHCR, World Food Programme and UNICEF that focus on humanitarian and
development work as well as agencies such the International Maritime Organization
and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) that focus on coordinating global
travel and communication. UN agencies such as WHO and UNESCO help governments
in poorer countries run effective services for their populations. Specialist agencies are
an important part of what the UN does. A big reason countries join the United Nations is
so they can benefit from the projects these agencies run. This is especially true of
poorer countries and nations that often face humanitarian crises.

Warrant: Any steps towards recognition of Somaliland is likely to incite violence.

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Yibeltal, Kalkidan & Zane Damian. “Ethiopia-Somaliland deal: Can the Horn of Africa rift
be healed?” BBC, July 3, 2024, [Link]
67911057. Accessed December 5, 2024.

For Somalia, Somaliland is an integral part of its territory. Any suggestion that it could
make a deal with another country or that bits of it could be leased without the
approval of Mogadishu is highly problematic. The day after the MoU was signed,
Somalia described the deal as an act of "aggression" that was an "impediment to…
peace and stability". It also recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa. Ethiopia's
ambassador to Somalia subsequently left Mogadishu. In the immediate aftermath of
the deal, Somalia's president also stepped up the rhetoric saying: "We will defend our
country, we will defend it by all means necessary and seek the support of any ally
willing to help us." He also called on youths "to prepare for the defence of our country"
and described Ethiopia as his country's "enemy". Ethiopia and Somalia have a long
history of rivalry. In 1977 and 1978, Ethiopia and Somalia fought a devastating war for
control of what is now called the Somali region of Ethiopia. There have also been
protests in Mogadishu against the deal, with tens of thousands turning up to express
their opposition.

Impact: Last time there was a war between the groups, millions died.

“Somali Civil War.” The Organization for World Peace, n.d.,

[Link] Accessed December 9, 2024

The fall of Said Barre’s regime and the Somali Civil War created a power vacuum in
which nationalist and Islamic groups, warlords, clan and sub-clan militias and other
actors aimed to carve out swathes of territory for their own governance.
Subsequently, regional and international institutions initiated various peace and

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reconciliation processes in an attempt to create a stable and robust federal government,

with various degrees of success. The inter clan rivalries have fuelled the tension
between the Federal government and the regional states, making the consensus and
state-building, as well as peacebuilding, process strenuous. The chaos resulted in the
declaration of independence by Somaliland in 1991, though still not recognised by any
nation in the world, and Somalia maintains its authority over the northern territory. In
1998, the Puntland region in Northern Somalia declared partial autonomy, meaning that
they reserve the right to operate independently but still can be part of the Federal
Government of Somalia. Conflict as a result of both internal and external factors has
resulted in more than a million deaths, with many more fleeing to neighbouring
countries.

Impact: Even smaller and more recent violence has had large impacts.

Staff Writer. “210 Civilians Killed in 24 Days of Somaliland Clashes.” The Defense Post,
March 3, 2023, [Link]
somaliland-clashes/. Accessed December 5, 2024.

A total of 210 people lost their lives over 24 days of clashes between security forces and
clan members in a town in Somalia’s breakaway region of Somaliland, a government
official said Thursday. “210 civilians were killed and 680 others were wounded in the
fighting which broke out between Somaliland forces and the local community in Las
Anod,” the mayor of the contested town, Abdirahim Ali Ismail, told a press
conference. “The fighting started on the 6th of February 2023 and continued for 24
days,” he said, adding that 200,000 families had fled from their homes following the
clashes. Somaliland, which has claimed independence from Somalia since 1991, but has
never been recognized internationally, is often seen as a beacon of stability in a chaotic
region.

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Impact: Last time there was violence between the groups, wildlife was severely hurt.

Omaar, Rageh. “The fight to protect Somaliland’s wildlife.” Horn Diplomat, December 3,
2018, [Link]
somalilands-wildlife/. Accessed December 5, 2024.

As a child I remember visiting the lush savannah bush outside the capital, Hargeisa,
and the regions to the east that are still home to one of the last natural wild forests of
trees producing frankincense and myrrh. These same areas saw a considerable
abundance of wildlife, in particular cheetahs that were common, from the very south of
Somalia near its border with Kenya, to the very north, in areas near the Red Sea. But
hardly any of those creatures remain today. The civil war between Somalia and
Somaliland in the Eighties saw the near-annihilation of wildlife. The few that survived
soon saw their habitats destroyed as the shrub, trees and much of the savannah bush
that they relied on was burned for charcoal — which almost every household uses to
cook their food. Some of these creatures, however, do remain clinging to life in an ever-
decreasing habitat where a perfect storm of degradation of soil and plants,
deforestation, climate change and the effects of civil war have ravaged both rural
communities and wildlife.

Analysis: While the African Union recognizing Somaliland seems like a big step towards further
recognition, it actually doesn’t really mean much. Teams can therefore use this argument as a
turn to many arguments about how Somaliland's recognition will lead to further recognition. It
also functions perfectly well on its own even if another team is not arguing about further
recognition.

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CON: Recognizing Somaliland could lead to violence between Egypt

and Ethiopia

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland could lead to violence between Egypt and Ethiopia.

Warrant: Ethiopia wants access to the sea.

Matshanda, Namhla. “Landlocked Ethiopia wants better sea access: a port deal with
neighbours could benefit the region.” The Conversation, August 29, 2023.
[Link]
port-deal-with-neighbours-could-benefit-the-region-211759. Accessed
December 9, 2024.

Ethiopia is one of the fastest growing economies on the continent. It also has a large
population, estimated at around 126 million and projected to grow at about 2.7% a
year. This indicates a big market and many needs to be met. Economic development
became central to fiscal and economic planning and projections in the period between
2000 and 2012. But lack of direct coastal access became a notable obstacle to
Ethiopia’s efforts to achieve middle-income status via export-oriented
industrialisation. At one time Eritrea’s Assab port handled 70% of Ethiopia’s trade. At
present Ethiopia’s imports and exports mainly pass via the port of Djibouti. Reliance on
Djibouti has proved costly and unsustainable, however, leading Addis to search for
alternatives.

Warrant: They’ve been floating with the idea of recognizing Somaliland in exchange for this
access.

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Yibeltal, Kalkidan. “Ethiopia signs agreement with Somaliland paving way to sea access.”
BBC, January 2, 2024, [Link]
Accessed December 9, 2024.

An MoU is not legally binding, though it is seen as a statement of intent and can lead
to a treaty imposing obligations on those parties who have signed. Nevertheless, the
development is being portrayed by Addis Ababa as a major diplomatic victory. The
prime minister, who signed the MoU with Somaliland's President Muse Bihi Abdi in the
Ethiopian capital, wrote on X that "all that can be said is thank God". Speaking at the
signing ceremony, Mr Abdi said the agreement included a section stating that Ethiopia
would recognise Somaliland as an independent country at some point in the future.
Somaliland's foreign ministry said in a statement later that the "historic agreement
ensures Ethiopia's access to the sea for their naval forces, reciprocated by formal
recognition of the Republic of Somaliland, marking this as a significant diplomatic
milestone for our country". It quoted Mr Abdi as saying that recognition came in
"exchange for 20km (12 miles) sea access for the Ethiopian naval forces, leased for a
period of 50 years".

Warrant: Egypt is doing everything it can to stop recognition.

Idaan, Gulaid Yusuf. “Egypt’s Blockade Threat and Hostility Toward Somaliland: Strategic
Implications and Regional Consequences.” Modern Diplomacy, October 24, 2024,
[Link]
toward-somaliland-strategic-implications-and-regional-consequences/. Accessed
December 9, 2024.

In addition to threatening economic sanctions, Egypt is employing its diplomatic

influence to further isolate Somaliland on the international stage. By leveraging its
longstanding ties with both the Arab League and the African Union—two

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organizations that place a strong emphasis on the principle of territorial integrity—

Egypt aims to prevent Somaliland from gaining any form of international recognition.
The Arab League, with its commitment to the preservation of post-colonial borders in
the Arab world, and the African Union, which upholds similar principles across the
African continent, are key players in Egypt’s diplomatic strategy. Egypt’s goal is to
maintain the global consensus that Somaliland remains an integral part of Somalia,
thereby blocking any potential steps toward Somaliland’s de facto independence.
Through this strategy, Egypt seeks to diplomatically undermine the growing alliances
between Somaliland and Ethiopia, particularly their Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), which threatens to reshape regional dynamics in a way that disadvantages
Cairo’s influence.

Warrant: Egypt has threatened violence at the mere idea of recognition.

“Egypt’s el-Sisi says Cairo will not allow any threat to Somalia.” Al Jazeera, January 21,
2024, [Link]
not-allow-any-threat-to-somalia. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has said Cairo stands shoulder to shoulder with
Somalia and has slammed Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland to obtain access to the
sea and establish a marine force base. “Egypt will not allow anyone to threaten
Somalia or affect its security,” el-Sisi said, speaking at a news conference with visiting
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. “Do not try Egypt, or try to threaten its
brothers especially if they ask it to intervene,” he said. Somaliland, a region
strategically located by the Gulf of Aden, broke away from Somalia in 1991 as the
country collapsed into a civil conflict. The region has maintained its own government
despite a lack of international recognition.

Warrant: Egypt is sending arms to Somalia.

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Sheikh, Abdi & Paravicini, Giulia. “Egypt sends arms to Somalia following security deal,
sources say.” Reuters, August 28, 2028.
[Link]
security-pact-sources-say-2024-08-28/. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Egypt delivered its first military aid to Somalia in more than four decades on Tuesday,
three diplomatic and Somali government sources said, a move likely to deepen strains
between the two countries and Ethiopia. Egypt and Somalia have drawn closer
together this year after Ethiopia signed a preliminary deal with the breakaway region of
Somaliland to lease coastal land in exchange for possible recognition of its
independence from Somalia. The Mogadishu government has called the deal an assault
on its sovereignty and said it will block it by all means necessary. Egypt, at odds with
Ethiopia for years over Addis Ababa's construction of a vast hydro dam on the
headwaters of the Nile River, has condemned the Somaliland deal. It signed a security
pact with Mogadishu earlier this month and has offered to send troops to a new
peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Warrant: The risk of proxy conflict is growing higher.

Bayeh, Endalcachew. “Egypt-Ethiopia hostilities are playing out in the Horn – the risk of
new proxy wars is high.” The Conversation, October 17, 2024,
[Link]
horn-the-risk-of-new-proxy-wars-is-high-241402. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland and Egypt’s presence in Somalia come at a time of

multiple regional crises. These include the strained Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, the
Ethiopia-Sudan dispute over Al-Fashaga border region, and instability in Ethiopia. This
volatile environment increases the likelihood of proxy wars.

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Impact: Proxy wars are uniquely harmful.

Benowitz, Brittany & Ceccanese, Alicia. “Why No One Ever Really Wins a Proxy War.”
Just Security, May 11, 2020, [Link]
ever-really-wins-a-proxy-war/. Accessed December 9, 2020.

One study found that, while security assistance to foreign security forces may help
democratic regimes become more professional, it might actually contribute to abuses
by authoritarian regimes. Even if security assistance does not directly contribute to
human rights violations in oppressive regimes, there are grounds for concern that such
assistance may help such regimes stay in power, thereby prolonging their repressive
tactics. The U.S. also supports non-state armed groups. A key study found that foreign
support of these groups increased the risk of atrocities, as armed groups with foreign
backing are less likely to be dependent on the local population for support. As a result,
proxy forces are more likely to prey on the population for resources or to use violence
to intimidate civilians. Such acts are often unlawful and may in turn increase the risk
of liability of the sponsor for providing assistance to groups engaged in illegal activity.
In addition to being more likely to commit atrocities, proxy forces also are prone to
engage in criminal conduct. Non-state armed groups that receive foreign support often
devolve into criminal enterprises to maintain diverse funding sources, and thus
independence from the sponsor’s demands. Such criminal conduct can include the sale
of weapons provided by sponsors on the black market. For example, weapons provided
by the United States to militias in Syria quickly ended up in the hands of the Islamic
State.

Impact: Last time there was violence in the region, millions died.

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“Somali Civil War.” The Organization for World Peace, n.d.,

[Link] Accessed December 9, 2024

The fall of Said Barre’s regime and the Somali Civil War created a power vacuum in
which nationalist and Islamic groups, warlords, clan and sub-clan militias and other
actors aimed to carve out swathes of territory for their own governance.
Subsequently, regional and international institutions initiated various peace and
reconciliation processes in an attempt to create a stable and robust federal government,
with various degrees of success. The inter clan rivalries have fuelled the tension
between the Federal government and the regional states, making the consensus and
state-building, as well as peacebuilding, process strenuous. The chaos resulted in the
declaration of independence by Somaliland in 1991, though still not recognised by any
nation in the world, and Somalia maintains its authority over the northern territory. In
1998, the Puntland region in Northern Somalia declared partial autonomy, meaning that
they reserve the right to operate independently but still can be part of the Federal
Government of Somalia. Conflict as a result of both internal and external factors has
resulted in more than a million deaths, with many more fleeing to neighbouring
countries.

Impact: Last time there was violence between in the region, wildlife was severely hurt.

Omaar, Rageh. “The fight to protect Somaliland’s wildlife.” Horn Diplomat, December 3,
2018, [Link]
somalilands-wildlife/. Accessed December 5, 2024.

As a child I remember visiting the lush savannah bush outside the capital, Hargeisa,
and the regions to the east that are still home to one of the last natural wild forests of
trees producing frankincense and myrrh. These same areas saw a considerable
abundance of wildlife, in particular cheetahs that were common, from the very south of

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Somalia near its border with Kenya, to the very north, in areas near the Red Sea. But
hardly any of those creatures remain today. The civil war between Somalia and
Somaliland in the Eighties saw the near-annihilation of wildlife. The few that survived
soon saw their habitats destroyed as the shrub, trees and much of the savannah bush
that they relied on was burned for charcoal — which almost every household uses to
cook their food. Some of these creatures, however, do remain clinging to life in an ever-
decreasing habitat where a perfect storm of degradation of soil and plants,
deforestation, climate change and the effects of civil war have ravaged both rural
communities and wildlife.

Analysis: This argument is good because it shows how the potential conflict over Somaliland
could escalate into something bigger. This will allow teams to be able to go for a bigger scope
when arguing. Teams could also probably go into looking at how Great Powers would react to
this situation in order to truly expand the scope of their argument.

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CON: There are better alternatives for a peaceful future in Somaliland

Argument: There are better alternatives for a peaceful future in Somaliland.

Warrant: The current way the government is set up promotes autonomy.

“Somalia: Moving the Federalism Agenda Forward.” The World Bank, n.d.,
[Link]
[Link]. Accessed December 9, 2024.

It was not until August 2012 that a new Constitution was provisionally adopted by a
National Constituent Assembly (NCA) comprising 825 members representing various
parts of Somali society. The Constitution has several key provisions. First, it declares that
the territory of the federal republic corresponds to the boundaries of the former
republic as defined in the 1960 Constitution (thus including Somaliland). Second, it
defines the political structure of the federal government. It consists of a federal
Parliament consisting of an upper house of no more than 54 members, with an equal
number of representatives for each region (based on the 18 regions that existed in
Somalia before 1991) and a lower house consisting of 275 members ‘representing all
communities of the federal republic in a balanced manner.’ Together the two houses
are to elect a president, who among other duties, serves as commander in chief of the
armed forces, approves legislation drafted by the federal parliament, and appoints a
prime minister. The prime minister, in turn, serves as the head of the federal
government, and appoints and dismisses members of the Council of Ministers. 14. The
Provisional Constitution defines the structure of the state but leaves the division of
responsibilities for several major functions undefined. The state is to consist of two
levels: the federal government and the federal member state (FMS) levels.9 The
Provisional Constitution goes part way toward assigning functions to each of the two
levels. It identifies four functions that are exclusive to the federal government: foreign

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affairs, national defense, citizenship and immigration and monetary policy. It also
states explicitly that the ‘Federal Government shall guarantee the peace and … national
security of the Republic through its security services, including the armed forces and the
police force.’ At the same time, it acknowledges that the FMSs may have their own
police forces, stating that the ‘police forces established by the FMS have the mandate to
protect lives and property and preserve peace and security locally, alone or in
cooperation with the federal police force.’10 However, the Provisional Constitution
does not define the functional responsibilities for a wide range of other functions such
as education, health, and transport, stating that ‘power (shall be) given to the level of
government where it is likely to be most effectively exercised.’11

Warrant: With a little bit of improvement, the federal system of Somalia could satisfy both
parties.

Salad, Mohamed. “Fragmented federalism: Puntland and Jubaland’s quest for autonomy
and its impact on Somali sovereignty.” Caasimada Online, November 6, 2024,
[Link]
quest-for-autonomy-and-its-impact-on-somali-sovereignty/. Accessed December
11, 2024.

Somalia must balance regional autonomy (such as Puntland and Jubaland) and
national unity to solve these difficulties. Collaborative security frameworks might
provide a more integrated approach to counterterrorism by allowing regional forces to
work with federal soldiers as part of a nationally coordinated effort. Joint security
structures, backed by regional and federal governments, might build confidence and
facilitate effective intelligence sharing, eliminating weaknesses that extremist
organisations could exploit. International mediation might also help define the
functions of regional and federal administrations in Somalia. A mediated approach
might provide a neutral platform for Mogadishu and regional leaders to make accords

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that respect regional autonomy while strengthening Somalia’s sovereignty. These

agreements might resolve economic issues, clarify resource management, and provide
the groundwork for a more integrated federal government that fosters security and
governance in all areas. Finally, Puntland and Jubaland’s push for autonomy
underscores Somalia’s federalism issues. Without a determined effort to bridge these
gaps, Somalia risks becoming fragmented and subject to internal and external forces.
The route forward is to build a federal system that respects regional identities while
assuring a cohesive approach to government and security. This results in a resilient
Somalia capable of defending its sovereignty in a complex regional terrain.

Warrant: Federalist systems have worked for Tanzania.

“Tanzania and Zanzibar.” Media Law Handbook for Southern Africa, n.d.,
[Link]
+14+Tanzania+and+[Link]/80fde508-91e9-90a6-e90a-
d5e60a042830?t=1612258531358. Accessed December 9, 2024.

The United Republic of Tanzania was created from the union of two former colonial
territories, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, in 1964. It consists of mainland Tanzania, which
is predominantly Christian, and the island of Zanzibar, which is predominantly Muslim.
The country has had multi-party elections since 1992 and has been governed by the
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party since 1977. Tanzania has a federal system of
government, and Zanzibar is given a great deal of autonomy to determine its laws and
legal institutions, including its constitution. Consequently, the media in Tanzania is
governed by different laws, depending on whether it operates in mainland Tanzania or
on the island of Zanzibar. This extends to constitutional provisions, and so this chapter
is effectively two chapters in one, with corresponding provisions for mainland Tanzania
and the island of Zanzibar.

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Warrant: Somalia being united allows for a wide array of diplomatic growth.

Seifu, Batseba. “Somalia and Somaliland: A Complex Relationship in the Horn of Africa .”
Modern Diplomacy, June 27, 2024,
[Link]
relationship-in-the-horn-of-africa/. Accessed December 9, 2024.

International Relations: The broader geopolitical landscape also influences economic

relations between Somalia and Somaliland. Regional and international actors with
vested interests in the Horn of Africa can either support or obstruct efforts towards
economic collaboration. Diplomatic efforts to garner support from influential countries
and organizations are crucial for overcoming these challenges. The economic
relationship between Somalia and Somaliland is characterized by both competition and
potential collaboration. While the development of ports and strategic locations presents
competitive challenges, there are substantial opportunities for mutual economic
benefits through trade, infrastructure development, and shared resources. Addressing
political, security, and regulatory obstacles, alongside fostering a cooperative
economic framework, can pave the way for a more integrated and prosperous future
for both regions. Regional and International Influences The regional dynamics in the
Horn of Africa further complicate the Somalia-Somaliland relationship. Djibouti’s
interests, Ethiopia’s strategic maneuvers, and the influence of Gulf countries all play a
role in shaping the interactions between Somalia and Somaliland. Internationally,
major powers like the United States and China have interests in the region, often
influencing diplomatic and economic strategies.

Warrant: Somalia being united allows for a wide array of economic growth.

Seifu, Batseba. “Somalia and Somaliland: A Complex Relationship in the Horn of Africa .”
Modern Diplomacy, June 27, 2024,

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[Link]
relationship-in-the-horn-of-africa/. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Economic Collaboration Opportunities Trade Synergies: Despite the competitive aspects,

there are numerous opportunities for economic collaboration between Somalia and
Somaliland. Both regions can benefit from increased trade links, leveraging their
respective strengths to create a more integrated and efficient regional economy.
Infrastructure Development: Joint infrastructure projects could further enhance
economic ties and mutual benefits. Developing road networks, rail connections, and
shared logistics facilities could streamline trade routes and reduce transportation
costs. For example, improving the road link between Berbera and Hargeisa, and
extending it to connect with major Somali cities, would facilitate smoother and faster
movement of goods. Investment and Employment: Collaborative economic initiatives
can attract foreign investment and create jobs, benefiting both populations. By
presenting a united front in attracting investors, Somalia and Somaliland could offer
more comprehensive and appealing opportunities for international businesses looking
to invest in the Horn of Africa. Shared Resources and Expertise: Pooling resources and
expertise in sectors such as fisheries, agriculture, and livestock can enhance
productivity and economic resilience. Both regions have rich marine resources that, if
managed cooperatively, could lead to sustainable and profitable fishing industries.
Similarly, collaboration in agricultural practices and livestock management can improve
food security and export potential.

Impact: Economic growth allows for reduction of poverty.

Balasubramanian, Pooja, Francesco Burchi, & Daniele Malerba. “Does economic growth
reduce multidimensional poverty? Evidence from low- and middle-income
countries” ScienceDirect, October 15, 2022,

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[Link]
Accessed December 11, 2024.

The long-standing tradition of empirical studies investigating the nexus between

economic growth and poverty concentrates mainly on monetary poverty. In contrast,
little is known about the relationship between economic growth and
multidimensional poverty. Consequently, this study seeks to assess the elasticity of
multidimensional poverty to growth, especially in low- and middle-income countries.
The study employs two novel, individual-based multidimensional poverty indices: the G-
CSPI and the G-M0. It relies on an unbalanced panel dataset of 91 low- and middle-
income countries observed between 1990 and 2018: this is thus far the largest sample
and the longest time span used in the literature to address this research question.
Within a regression framework, we estimate the growth elasticity of multidimensional
poverty using the first difference estimator. Our study finds that the growth elasticity
of multidimensional poverty is −0.46 while using the G-CSPI and −0.35 while using the
G-M0: this means that a 10% increase in GDP decreases the multidimensional poverty
by approximately 4–5%. There is, however, heterogeneity in the results; in particular,
the elasticity is higher in the second sub-period (2001–2018) and for countries with
lower initial levels of poverty. Furthermore, a comparative analysis reveals that the
elasticity of income-poverty to growth is five to eight times higher than that of
multidimensional poverty. In conclusion, our results indicate that economic growth is
an important instrument to alleviate multidimensional poverty, but its effect is
substantially lower than that on monetary poverty. Therefore, future research should
identify other factors and policies, such as social policies, to substantially reduce
multidimensional poverty.

Impact: Pulling people out of poverty saves lives.

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Staff Writer. “‘Poverty-free life expectancy’ metric proposed.” Harvard T.H. Chan School
of Public Health, December 2, 2024, [Link]
in-the-news/poverty-free-life-expectancy-metric-proposed/. Accessed December
9, 2024.

Reducing poverty can play a key role in improving the health of people around the
world. But few measurement tools have been available that enable global health
experts to assess the combined effects of poverty and health on people’s lives. Now,
researchers from Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health have developed a new
metric—“poverty-free life expectancy,” or PFLE—that could help more accurately
measure health and economic wellbeing around the world. In an August 2018 Lancet
Global Health study, the authors wrote that while most monitoring and benchmarking
efforts are focused on a single dimension, such as healthy life expectancy or poverty
prevalence, “PFLE brings focus to health and wellbeing of populations in a way that
encourages policy makers to consider the broad benefits of decisions, policies, and
reforms.” The researchers developed a population-level measure of PFLE based on data
from 90 countries. For each of the countries, they produced a PFLE estimate—the
average number of poverty-free years a person could expect to live if exposed to
current mortality rates and poverty prevalence in that country. The average PFLE in
the 90 countries in the study was 66 years for women and 61.6 years for men. But
PFLE varied widely between countries—for example, the average in Malawi was only
9.9 years, while in Iceland it was 83.2 years. In 67 out of 90 countries, the difference
between life expectancy and PFLE was greater for women than men, suggesting that
women generally live more years of life in poverty than men. Differences in PFLE
between countries are substantially greater than differences in life expectancy, the
authors wrote. They urged the use of the PFLE metric to “help establish accountability
for policies that aim to end poverty and promote wellbeing at all ages.”

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Analysis: The argument is good because it makes the situation more positive. A lot of the
negation side are just talking about bad things that would happen if Somaliland were to be
independent. This argument shows a potential positive of Somaliland staying with Somalia
which will be hard for the affirmation team to disprove. If teams can effectively pair this
argument with an argument saying why independence would be bad, they would have a strong
case to go into round with.

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CON: Recognizing Somaliland could lead to economic disaster in the

country

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland could lead to economic disaster in the country.

Warrant: Somaliland is mostly made of farmers.

“Somaliland Statehood, Recognition and the Ongoing Dialogue with Somalia.” Social
Research and Development Institute, 2013,
[Link]
he_ongoing_dialogue_with_somalia.pdf. Accessed December 10, 2024.

Somaliland has an opportunity to avoid the pitfalls of most African countries that relied
on the windfall earnings from resources, especially hydrocarbons. It is now in the entry
stage of oil exploration, which affords it time to prepare its governance systems and its
communities for the challenges of being an oil producing country. It should start to
undertake a contextual analysis of Somaliland’s socio-economic and political situation
and then base its strategies for development on the outcomes off this analysis.
Somaliland’s economy is mainly reliant on the livestock sector, which provides direct
or indirect employment to no less than 70-80% of the population. It sustains over 60%
of the population with pastoralist and agro-pastoralists occupations. It also sustains
another 20% through the export of livestock on the hoof, the local slaughter business,
and the sales of its 92 other products such as local milk consumption and exports of
hides and skins. A junk of the remaining population works in retail Khat business and
other miscellaneous occupations such as commerce, public and modern private sector
employment, and on remittances. Somaliland needs to have a strategy and planning
system for how the advent of the hydrocarbon age in Somaliland will affect these
employment sectors. It is also important to analyse how the fragile governance

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institutions will behave in a situation of slush funds and windfall oil revenues, without
robust regulatory and public governance mechanisms, and how to counter its corruptive
effects. A further caveat will be the fact that Somaliland lacks international recognition
and how that will affect its capacity to manage its wealth.

Warrant: Somaliland has one of the lowest GDPs per capita in the world.

Klomegah, Kester Kenne. “The World Shames Ethiopia Over Recognizing Somaliland –
Analysis.” Eurasia Review, January 6, 2024,
[Link]
recognizing-somaliland-analysis/. Accessed December 9, 2024.

In 1991 Somaliland, now with approximately 5.7 million, broke away from Somalia.
Since 1991, the territory has been governed by democratically elected governments that
seek international recognition as the government of the Republic of Somaliland.
Somaliland’s Economy Somaliland has the fourth lowest GDP per capita in the world,
and there are huge socio-economic challenges for Somaliland, with an unemployment
rate between 60 and 70% among youth, if not higher. According to International
Labour Organization (ILO), illiteracy exists up to 70% in several areas of Somaliland,
especially among females and the elder population. Agriculture is the backbone of
Somaliland’s economy, and the largely untapped maritime resources. Since Somaliland
is unrecognized, international donors have found it difficult to provide all kinds of aid
including finances.

Warrant: Somalia has a marginally higher GDP per capita.

“Somalia GDP Per Capita Ppp.” Trading Economics, n.d.,

[Link] Accessed December
9, 2024.

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The Gross Domestic Product per capita in Somalia was last recorded at 1452.36 US
dollars in 2023, when adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP). The GDP per Capita,
in Somalia, when adjusted by Purchasing Power Parity is equivalent to 8 percent of the
world's average.

Warrant: Somaliland’s taxation system is broken and can’t fix the GDP difference on its own.

Tellander, Ebba & Mohamed Aden Hassan. “Accountability in the Taxation System in
Somaliland” Rako Research And Communication Center, March 26, 2024,
[Link]
somaliland/. Accessed December 9, 2024.

There are several serious challenges to accountability within the taxation system in
Somaliland. These include lack of a public dialogue, transparency, and proper
feedback and enforcement mechanisms. The low accountability reinforces the low
trust between the government and its citizens. This is particularly so in certain regions,
such as Sool, where the government presence is weak and disputed. At the same time,
the fact that many taxpayers are willing to pay tax even when they are not forced to
suggests that there are small signs of trust. This indicates that there is both potential
and great room for improvement, which can be developed through civic education,
greater access to accountability measures for ordinary citizens, and continued
investment in the tax reforms that are in progress.

Warrant: Staying part of Somalia is the best way to stay economically stable because
governments invest in poorer regions.

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“Why is GDP per capita important?” Bright Hope, n.d.,

[Link] Accessed
December 9, 2024.

Resource allocation refers to the distribution of resources, including capital, labor, and
natural resources, among different sectors of the economy. GDP per capita is a useful
indicator of resource allocation because it reflects the level of economic activity and
the availability of resources within a country. GDP per capita can also help
governments and businesses make decisions about where to allocate resources based
on the size and growth potential of different markets. For example, a country with a
high GDP per capita may be an attractive market for businesses looking to expand their
operations. Similarly, a government may prioritize investments in sectors that are
expected to drive economic growth and increase GDP per capita. It can also identify
regions within a country that may require additional resources and support. For
example, if certain regions have a lower GDP per capita than the national average, it
may indicate that those regions require additional investment in infrastructure,
education, and other sectors to help boost economic activity and raise living
standards.

Warrant: Being within Somalia gives Somaliland access to many economic opportunities.

Seifu, Batseba. “Somalia and Somaliland: A Complex Relationship in the Horn of Africa .”
Modern Diplomacy, June 27, 2024,
[Link]
relationship-in-the-horn-of-africa/. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Economic Collaboration Opportunities Trade Synergies: Despite the competitive aspects,

there are numerous opportunities for economic collaboration between Somalia and
Somaliland. Both regions can benefit from increased trade links, leveraging their

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respective strengths to create a more integrated and efficient regional economy.

Infrastructure Development: Joint infrastructure projects could further enhance
economic ties and mutual benefits. Developing road networks, rail connections, and
shared logistics facilities could streamline trade routes and reduce transportation
costs. For example, improving the road link between Berbera and Hargeisa, and
extending it to connect with major Somali cities, would facilitate smoother and faster
movement of goods. Investment and Employment: Collaborative economic initiatives
can attract foreign investment and create jobs, benefiting both populations. By
presenting a united front in attracting investors, Somalia and Somaliland could offer
more comprehensive and appealing opportunities for international businesses looking
to invest in the Horn of Africa. Shared Resources and Expertise: Pooling resources and
expertise in sectors such as fisheries, agriculture, and livestock can enhance
productivity and economic resilience. Both regions have rich marine resources that, if
managed cooperatively, could lead to sustainable and profitable fishing industries.
Similarly, collaboration in agricultural practices and livestock management can improve
food security and export potential.

Impact: Poverty has a strong correlation with low life expectancy.

Staff Writer. “‘Poverty-free life expectancy’ metric proposed.” Harvard T.H. Chan School
of Public Health, December 2, 2024, [Link]
in-the-news/poverty-free-life-expectancy-metric-proposed/. Accessed December
9, 2024.

Reducing poverty can play a key role in improving the health of people around the
world. But few measurement tools have been available that enable global health
experts to assess the combined effects of poverty and health on people’s lives. Now,
researchers from Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health have developed a new
metric—“poverty-free life expectancy,” or PFLE—that could help more accurately

Champion Briefs 226

Con Arguments January 2025

measure health and economic wellbeing around the world. In an August 2018 Lancet
Global Health study, the authors wrote that while most monitoring and benchmarking
efforts are focused on a single dimension, such as healthy life expectancy or poverty
prevalence, “PFLE brings focus to health and wellbeing of populations in a way that
encourages policy makers to consider the broad benefits of decisions, policies, and
reforms.” The researchers developed a population-level measure of PFLE based on data
from 90 countries. For each of the countries, they produced a PFLE estimate—the
average number of poverty-free years a person could expect to live if exposed to
current mortality rates and poverty prevalence in that country. The average PFLE in
the 90 countries in the study was 66 years for women and 61.6 years for men. But
PFLE varied widely between countries—for example, the average in Malawi was only
9.9 years, while in Iceland it was 83.2 years. In 67 out of 90 countries, the difference
between life expectancy and PFLE was greater for women than men, suggesting that
women generally live more years of life in poverty than men. Differences in PFLE
between countries are substantially greater than differences in life expectancy, the
authors wrote. They urged the use of the PFLE metric to “help establish accountability
for policies that aim to end poverty and promote wellbeing at all ages.”

Analysis: This argument is good because it shows a concern for the actual people living in
Somaliland. Leaving Somaliland may not be the best choice for the people in Somaliland. Now,
there is some conflicting data on which has a higher GDP per capita because Somaliland is not
officially recognized; however, it does seem that Somalia is slightly better off meaning that it
would most likely be a problem if Somaliland split from it. Thus, this argument basically comes
down to you as the debater being able to prove this fact to your judge.

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CON: Recognizing Somaliland encourages other Somali provinces to

split from Somalia

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland encourages other Somali provinces to split from Somalia.

Warrant: Puntland is a region in Somalia that is playing with the idea of independence.

“Puntland profile.” BBC News, April 3, 2024, [Link]

14114727. Accessed December 11, 2024.

Puntland, an arid region of north-east Somalia, declared itself an autonomous state in

August 1998, in part to avoid the clan warfare engulfing southern Somalia. Despite its
relative stability, the region has endured armed conflict, and grabbed the world
headlines with an upsurge in pirate attacks on international shipping in the Indian
Ocean. Puntland is a destination for many Somalis displaced by violence in the south.
Unlike its neighbour, breakaway Somaliland, Puntland has said it does not seek
recognition as an independent entity, wishing instead to be part of a federal Somalia.
However, in 2024, Puntland announced it would operate as a functionally
independent state amid a dispute over Somali constitutional changes. The territory
takes its name from the Land of Punt, a centre of trade for the ancient Egyptians and a
place shrouded in legend.

Warrant: Puntland has declared itself functionally autonomous.

“Somalia: Puntland refuses to recognise federal government after disputed

constitutional changes.” Africanews, August 13, 2024,
[Link]

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Con Arguments January 2025

recognise-federal-government-after-disputed-constitutional-cha/. Accessed
December 11, 2024.

The semi-autonomous state of Puntland says it has withdrawn from the country's
federal system and will govern itself independently until constitutional amendments
passed by the central government in Somalia are approved in a nationwide
referendum. On Saturday, the federal parliament in Mogadishu approved several
constitutional changes that the government said are necessary to establish a stable
political system. But Puntland has rejected the latest constitutional reforms approved by
the Somali Parliament. "Puntland will act independently until there is a federal
government with a constitution that is agreed upon by a referendum in which
Puntland takes part," said the state's council of ministers in a statement. But some
critics have said the changes, which include introducing direct presidential elections and
allowing the president to appoint a prime minister without parliamentary approval,
concentrate power in the hands of the executive.

Warrant: Jubaland is another region in Somalia that has been making moves towards
independence.

Staff Reporter. “Jubaland conflict: What we know so far.” Garowe Online, November 26,
2024, [Link]
we-know-so-far. Accessed December 11, 2024.

KISMAYO, Somalia - Strong disagreements have emerged between authorities in

Mogadishu and Kismayo after Ahmed Islam Mohamed Madobe defied orders to hold
direct elections, effectively winning his third term as regional leader, leading to the
current standoff. In his address, Madobe maintained that the federal government 'has
no role in determining our internal affairs' while insisting that 'any attempts to
destabilize the region shall be resisted'. However, he said that his government would

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be eager to dialogue. But for Mogadishu, the elections were 'unconstitutional and
illegal', calling for actions from the Attorney General who should prefer charges against
Madobe - initiate a process that guarantees his removal from office for failing to
embrace changes. The Jubaland leader said the universal suffrage model of elections
would trigger unconstitutional term extensions for state and national leaders, a claim
disputed by the federal government of Somalia under Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Warrant: Violence is already occurring in Jubaland

Hassan, Abdiqani & Sheikh, Abdi. “Fighting breaks out between Somalia's Jubbaland
region and federal government.” Reuters, December 11, 2024,
[Link]
somalias-jubbaland-region-and-federal-government/ar-
AA1vGtmq?ocid=BingNewsVerp. Accessed December 11, 2024.

MOGADISHU/GAROWE, Somalia (Reuters) -Clashes erupted on Wednesday between

forces from Somalia's federal government and the semi-autonomous Jubbaland
region, raising concerns that internal rivalries are diverting attention from the fight
against the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab group. The violence in the strategically
important region, which follows an election held there despite being opposed by
authorities in Mogadishu, is taking place just weeks before the mandate of an African
Union peacekeeping force expires. "This morning, federal forces from Mogadishu in
Ras Kamboni, using drones, attacked Jubbaland forces," Adan Ahmed Haji, assistant
security minister of Jubbaland, told a press conference in the regional capital Kismayu.
Later in the day he said hundreds of federal forces had surrendered and fled to the
Kenyan border, while Jubbaland fighters had captured Ras Kamboni. Reuters could not
immediately verify his claims. Somali Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur said
the Jubbaland forces initiated the clashes. "Early this morning Jubbaland forces
attacked the Somali federal military troops that were deployed in Lower Jubba to take

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bases withdrawn from by ATMIS," he said in a statement, referring to the African

Union Transition Mission in Somalia.

Warrant: Giving independence to Somaliland promotes their independence.

Gebereamlak, Hagos. “Ethiopia’s Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for

African Borders.” The Reporter, October 2, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 11, 2024.

After gaining independence, African states largely adopted a policy of respecting the
borders drawn during colonial times. This principle, known as ‘Uti Possidetis’, is
enshrined in Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act, which calls for the
preservation of borders as they existed at the time of independence. The goal of this
policy has been to prevent disorder, chaos, and conflict across the continent. African
countries have generally followed this principle, fearing that the recognition of
secessionist movements could set dangerous precedents. Although Somaliland was a
separate British colony before merging with Somalia, the application of this principle
may be complicated by the fact that it voluntarily joined Somalia shortly after gaining
independence in 1960. Therefore, recognizing Somaliland’s independence today might
be seen as a challenge to the established principle of respecting colonial boundaries. If
Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could compromise the long-standing
principle of preserving colonial borders. This move might encourage other secessionist
movements across Africa and lead to broader geopolitical instability. The recognition
of Somaliland could serve as a precedent, prompting other groups to push for
independence and potentially leading to a reshaping of the African political landscape.
Recognizing Somaliland could encourage secessionist movements and irredentist
claims across the Horn of Africa, fueling instability in the region. There are already
existing aspirations for independence in several parts of the Horn, and Somaliland’s
recognition could embolden these movements.

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Impact: This fracturing puts an end to any of Somalia’s goals.

Salad, Mohamed. “Fragmented federalism: Puntland and Jubaland’s quest for autonomy
and its impact on Somali sovereignty.” Caasimada Online, November 6, 2024,
[Link]
quest-for-autonomy-and-its-impact-on-somali-sovereignty/. Accessed December
11, 2024.

The campaigns for autonomy in Puntland and Jubaland have political and historical
foundations. Puntland became an autonomous province in 1998, partially due to the
turmoil in Mogadishu and a desire to rule autonomously. With its closeness to Kenya’s
border and significant links to cross-border commerce, Jubaland has preserved its
independence, emphasising the necessity for locally directed security and
administration. These areas see themselves as separate entities inside Somalia,
frequently demanding their autonomy at the expense of national unity. This autonomy
hinders the federal government’s efforts to build a cohesive and autonomous Somali
state capable of addressing security and governance concerns. Puntland and Jubaland
want independence for political and economic reasons. Politically, these regions have
strong clan ties and local power structures that oppose federal intervention.
Economically, Puntland and Jubaland want to control local resources, including trade
income and possible oil deposits, which has significant consequences for national
revenue-sharing policies. This quest for economic self-sufficiency frequently clashes
with Mogadishu over resource management, causing economic friction and further
separating these areas from the central authority. These contradictions become even
more pronounced in the realms of security and counterterrorism. Groups like Al-
Shabaab, which take advantage of Somalia’s fragmented federal government,
continue to pose a threat to the country. Puntland and Jubaland have established
their own security forces, frequently outside the federal military, creating operational

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problems that impede collaborative counterterrorism activities. In Puntland, security

forces periodically conflict with federal soldiers, but regional forces prioritise border
security concerns over national objectives in Jubaland. This dispersion of security
organisations exposes loopholes that extremist groups might exploit, threatening the
federal government’s capacity to coordinate a national response to terrorism.

Impact: These movements could lead to the end of Somalia.

Salad, Mohamed. “Fragmented federalism: Puntland and Jubaland’s quest for autonomy
and its impact on Somali sovereignty.” Caasimada Online, November 6, 2024,
[Link]
quest-for-autonomy-and-its-impact-on-somali-sovereignty/. Accessed December
11, 2024.

The implications of Puntland and Jubaland’s autonomy go beyond security, affecting

the federal system’s capacity to unite the country. As these areas establish
independence, they risk setting a precedent that may inspire other states to follow
suit, undermining Somalia’s unity. The idea of a divided Somalia erodes popular faith
in the federal system, fuelling a cycle of regionalism that hinders efforts to establish a
united Somali identity. Citizens who see the inequalities between autonomous regions
and federal territories may feel estranged from the national government, resulting in a
weak state subject to internal conflict and external interference

Impact: Violence could spillover and lead to horrible consequences.

Gavin, Michelle. “Tensions Rising in the Horn of Africa.” Council on Foreign Relations,
October 18, 2024, [Link]
Accessed December 9, 2024.

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Non-African powers with strong interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are not sitting
on the sidelines. Turkey has renewed its close relationship with Somalia, while the
United Arab Emirates remains close to Abiy. The complexity of the region and the web
of influences that crisscross historically contested terrain makes the risk of
miscalculation tipping into conflict particularly high. If that happens, the price will be
paid first in African lives. It will then affect the global economy as commercially critical
shipping lanes become less secure. Refugee flows will tax recipient countries. What
happens in the Horn will reverberate globally.

Analysis: This argument is really good because of its proximity to Somaliland and its real time
consequences. Jubaland is literally in an independence conflict right now, and recognizing
Somaliland could add more fuel to the independence fire. Teams just need to convince their
judge of this fact as well as demonstrating that this independence is bad in order to win this
argument.

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CON: Recognizing Somaliland would divert the African Union’s

resources and attention from more pressing issues

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland would divert the African Union’s resources and attention
from more pressing issues

Warrant: The AU is already financially strained by ongoing peacekeeping operations

"Inconsistencies Are Costing the AU Mission in Somalia." ISS News, April 2023002C
[Link]
somalia. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Inadequate finance, exacerbated by the second extension request, prompted the AU to

allocate US$2 million from its Peace Fund to ATMIS. These challenges and a failure to
commit authoritatively to decisions may have led to the sidelining of the PSC by Somali
authorities, revealing inconsistencies in PSC interventions and ongoing fragmentations
among its members.

Warrant: AU involvement in Somaliland would escalate tensions with Somalia, requiring

additional diplomatic efforts

Hassan, Mohamed. "Somalia Insists Ethiopia Not Be Part of New AU Mission." Voice of
America, November 10, 2024, [Link]
ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/[Link]. Accessed December 13,
2024.

In August, Somalia Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre said Ethiopian forces would only
join AUSSOM once Addis Ababa withdraws from the MoU with Somaliland. Mogadishu,

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which sees Somaliland as a part of Somalia, has described the agreement as an assault
on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Analysts say Somalia’s repeated demands
that Ethiopia withdraw from the MoU have fallen on deaf ears, which further alienates
Somalia. Professor Sonkor Geyre, a former director of the defense ministry, said Somalia
has a right to choose the countries it wants and rejects others. “Somalia has national
sovereign rights to exclude Ethiopia from the upcoming AU mission because it sees
Ethiopia’s actions, including its MoU with Somaliland, as a national threat,” Geyre told
VOA Somali.

Warrant: Key crises, such as the Sahel insurgencies and Sudan's conflict, already stretch the
AU’s capabilities

“Sudan: One year since conflict began, response from international community remains
woefully inadequate.” Amnesty International, April 12, 2024,
[Link]
began-response-from-international-community-remains-woefully-inadequate/.
Accessed December 13, 2024.

“For one year, the people of Sudan have been neglected and ignored as they bore the
brunt of violent clashes between the SAF and the RSF. Diplomatic efforts have so far
failed to end violations, protect civilians, provide sufficient humanitarian aid, or hold
the perpetrators of war crimes to account,” said Tigere Chagutah, Amnesty
International’s Regional Director for East and Southern Africa. “The international
community has not exerted sufficient pressure on the warring parties to stop violating
the human rights of people caught up in this war. The African Union, in particular, has
not displayed the required level of leadership nor taken concrete actions that match
the scale and gravity of the conflict.” “During its annual summit in February, the first
since the outbreak of the conflict, the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and
Government failed to include the situation in Sudan as a stand-alone agenda item.”

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Impact: The AU risks weakening its effectiveness in resolving existing crises in conjunction with
the United Nations, leading to greater instability in critical regions

“As Destabilizing Conflicts Escalate across Africa, United Nations-African Union

Partnership Has Never Been More Critical, Top Officials Tell Security Council.”
United Nations, October 2, 2024, [Link]
Accessed December 13, 2024.

“Given the evolving security landscape in Africa, and instances where United Nations
peacekeeping missions may not be suitable, it is critical to recognize how African
Union-led peace support operations, including enforcement actions, contribute to both
regional and global peace and security efforts,” [Fatima Kyari Mohammed, Permanent
Observer of the African Union to the United Nations] added. The Security Council and
the Peacebuilding Commission should identify countries where Council resolution 2719
(2023) — on financing African Union-led peace support operations — can serve as the
financing framework for peace-building efforts, thereby enhancing national capacity to
consolidate the achievements of such operations. She pointed out how the African
Union-United Nations Joint Framework on Human Rights explicitly highlights the need to
promote women's full and equal participation in political, economic and social life, and
recognizes the critical role of young people in promoting peace, development and human
rights.

Analysis: This argument highlights the AU's existing limitations and the risks of resource
misallocation. It effectively opposes the resolution by showing how Somaliland's recognition
could exacerbate instability across the continent.

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CON: Recognizing Somaliland will alienate donors and development

organizations that favor a unified Somali state

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland will alienate donors and development organizations that
favor a unified Somali state

Warrant: Donor nations prioritize Somalia’s territorial integrity

“Somalia and the Gulf Crisis.” International Crisis Group, June 5, 2018,
[Link]
crisis. Accessed December 13, 2024.

The Farmajo government objects that federal states’ stance on the Gulf spat undercuts
Somali foreign policy, which is Mogadishu’s prerogative. It also views growing commercial
and military assistance funneled directly to the regions as a threat, likely to diminish its
already shaky influence in the regions and embolden an assertive periphery. Other
foreign powers have their own ties to federal states, but the Somali government argues
that they usually coordinate with Mogadishu or at least keep it informed. Qatari
officials, for example, argue explicitly that, unlike the UAE, they channel aid only
through the federal government “to protect Somalia’s territorial integrity” and accuse
Abu Dhabi of seeking to regionally divide Somalia. The Somali government echoes that
charge. The friction may have hurt counter-insurgency efforts. The security pact unveiled
at the London conference, shortly after Farmajo’s inauguration and before the June 2017
Gulf crisis, envisaged federal states’ forces becoming part of the Somali army and the
establishment of federal and regional state police departments. All federal states and
donors signed up to the pact, which set a six-month deadline for the reforms. That
deadline has since been missed, partly due to political infighting in the capital but also
to Mogadishu-federal state tensions.

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Warrant: International development organizations may withdraw funding from contested

regions

“The Human Costs of Development Funding Cuts in the Central Sahel: Why Donors Must
Stay Engaged.” Norwegian Refugee Council, May 2024,
[Link]
[Link]. Accessed December 13, 2024.

With global humanitarian needs skyrocketing and the humanitarian funding gap
increasing year after year as more crises become protracted, and in some cases
multifaceted, donors have made clear policy commitments, under the OECD DAC
recommendation on the Nexus, to increasingly invest in development and prevention in
fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The aim is to reduce humanitarian needs by
addressing the root causes creating vulnerabilities. However, such fragile and conflict-
affected contexts are often politically unstable and can at times experience
unconstitutional changes in government (UCG). While most donors continue to fund
humanitarian action in contexts affected by a UCG, development donors and
international financial institutions (IFIs) often suspend, freeze or withdraw
development funding in these situations.

Warrant: Ethiopia has already offered all-but-formal recognition to Somaliland

Klomegah, Kester. “The World Shames Ethiopia Over Recognizing Somaliland – Analysis.”
Eurasia Review, January 6, 2024, [Link]
world-shames-ethiopia-over-recognizing-somaliland-analysis/. Accessed December
13, 2024.

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With military action unfeasible, Somalia will likely use formal diplomatic channels at the
AU or United Nations to prevent any implementation of the agreement. Thus far, the
European Union and the United States have issued statements expressing support for
Somalia’s position. The European Union also issued an official statement asking for the
highest respect for Somalia sovereignty after Ethiopia deal with Somaliland. The EU said
in a statement that it “would like to remind the importance of respecting the unity, the
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia pursuant of its
constitution, the Charters of the African Union and the United Nations.” “This is key for
the peace and stability of the entire Horn of Africa region,” the statement from an EU
spokesperson said.

Impact: Losing donor support would reduce financial resources for broader AU peacekeeping
and development initiatives

“Funding for African Union Somalia mission critical to security: UN political chief.” United
Nations, March 22, 2023, [Link]
Accessed December 13, 2024.

Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo was speaking on Wednesday at a meeting at

UN Headquarters to draw attention to the widening financing gap at the year-old
operation. “Despite initial generous donor support, contributions have significantly
declined, leaving the mission in a dire financial situation,” she said. ATMIS builds on the
work of a previous African Union (AU) mission, AMISOM, and has contributed to progress
made in Somalia on the political, security and development fronts, amid ongoing threats
from Al-Shabaab insurgents. Ms. DiCarlo highlighted some of the mission’s work so far,
which has included liberating population centres and providing an environment
conducive for political processes to take place. The mission has also made quantifiable
progress in implementing the Somali Transition Plan, which calls for the handover of
security to the Government. At the same time, the Somali authorities have also logged

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recent advances in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Security forces have carried out
successful operations in two states, Galmudug and Hirshabelle, recovering territory from
the group. Ms. DiCarlo warned that the lack of funding poses a significant risk to the
security transition and could threaten hard-won gains. “Our proposition is
straightforward: It is urgent to ensure predictable, sustainable and multi-year funding
for ATMIS and adequate resourcing for the Somali security transition,” she said. “Our
common objective - the full handover of security responsibilities to Somali security forces
and institutions by the end of 2024 – depends on it.”

Analysis: This argument is persuasive because it underscores the financial risks associated with
alienating donors, a tangible concern for the AU.

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CON: Recognizing Somaliland prematurely rewards the state without

it first making progress on human rights and governance challenges

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland prematurely rewards the state without it first making
progress on human rights and governance challenges

Warrant: Somaliland has faced criticism for suppressing press freedoms and dissent

“Joint Letter from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to the President of
Somalia.” Human Rights Watch, October 5, 2020,
[Link]
recommendations-somalias-new-media-law. Accessed December 13, 2024.

On behalf of Amnesty International, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and Human

Rights Watch, we write to you to share concerns regarding the amendment to the media
law which you signed into law in August 2020. Our organizations have documented
severe restrictions on the media and the right to freedom of expression in Somalia for
many years, and we have repeatedly called on the Somalia government to create a
conducive legal environment for journalists and media organizations to operate. In the
run-up to the national elections expected to take place in late 2020 or early 2021, the
government’s commitment to free and independent reporting is especially important.
Creating a conducive legal and security environment for the media requires important
measures by your office and government, Excellency.

Warrant: Somaliland's political system lacks inclusivity for minority clans and opposition voices

“Overcoming Somaliland’s Worsening Political Crisis.” International Crisis Group,

November 10, 2022, [Link]

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africa/somalia/overcoming-somalilands-worsening-political-crisis. Accessed
December 13, 2024.

Secondly, sub-clan rivalries are on the rise. Each political party corresponds to an Isaaq
sub-clan or collection of sub-clans. The Garhajis, whose two main branches form the
base of opposition parties Waddani and UCID, respectively, argue that it is their turn to
govern because the previous four Somaliland presidents have hailed from either the
Isaaq sub-clans Haber Awal and Haber Jeclo (whose jeegan, or “rainbow”, alliance
secured the presidency in 2010 and 2017) or the Dir sub-clan Samaroon. The Garhajis
appear to see Bihi’s determination to forge ahead with the political parties vote as part
of a ploy by other Isaaq sub-clans to prevent the Garhajis from obtaining the
presidency. As a manifestation of their discontent, Garhajis elders have vowed to
obstruct elections in their areas unless the three political parties find consensus regarding
the electoral schedule.

Warrant: Premature recognition could embolden other separatist movements across Africa to
seek statehood without addressing fundamental governance and human rights challenges,
destabilizing the continent

Jacques, Demi et. al. “A Shadow on Tomorrow’s Dreams: Somaliland’s Struggle for
Statehood.” Lewis & Clark Law School, 2016,
[Link]
somalilands-struggle. Accessed December 13, 2024.

The African Union does not recognize any post-independence, self-determination claim
that impacts the territorial integrity of a member State. The A.U. does not recognize
secession primarily because secession does not promote African unity and it fears that
any recognition of secession may spark a domino effect of further secession attempts.
Though States that have unilaterally seceded can freely operate without A.U. assistance,

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the importance of A.U. recognition cannot be underestimated. Lack of A.U. recognition

results in less aid and support from the region generally. Further, A.U. recognition is a
growing requirement for being recognized globally. For example, the United States,
Europe, and Canada have exhibited hesitance towards recognizing self-determined States
that the A.U. does not itself recognize.

Analysis: This argument underscores the importance of governance benchmarks in state

recognition. By highlighting Somaliland’s governance shortcomings, it establishes a clear case
for why premature recognition could harm the AU’s credibility and set a harmful precedent.

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CON: Recognizing Somaliland at this stage undermines the African

Union’s status as a neutral arbiter in conflicts occurring within the
continent

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland at this stage undermines the African Union’s status as a
neutral arbiter in conflicts occurring within the continent

Warrant: Recognizing Somaliland would set a precedent that politicizes the African Union’s role
in mediating conflicts

Palmo, Kyle. “Will Somaliland Gain Recognition?” Berkeley Political Review, May 4, 2024,
[Link]
recognition/. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Despite its de-facto independence which has existed since 1991, Somaliland is still
internationally recognized as part of Somalia, who recently signed a law stating that the
MoU between Somalia and Ethiopia is illegal. Somalia’s claim is bolstered by the
Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU), which Ethiopia and Somalia are both members
of, as it states that the body is founded on respect for the territorial integrity of states
and principles of non-interference. An Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland without
approval from Somalia would violate this principle. Furthermore, the League of Arab
States has called the move “void, unacceptable, and a violation of international law.”
At the same time, actors such as the African Union, Arab League, United Nations, U.S.,
and U.K. have all signaled support for Somalia, calling on nations to respect the
authority of Somalia while still pressing for further negotiations.

Warrant: The African Union has a history of prioritizing territorial integrity to avoid setting
divisive precedents

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Jacques, Demi et. al. “A Shadow on Tomorrow’s Dreams: Somaliland’s Struggle for
Statehood.” Lewis & Clark Law School, 2016,
[Link]
somalilands-struggle. Accessed December 13, 2024.

The African Union does not recognize any post-independence, self-determination claim
that impacts the territorial integrity of a member State. The A.U. does not recognize
secession primarily because secession does not promote African unity and it fears that
any recognition of secession may spark a domino effect of further secession attempts.
Though States that have unilaterally seceded can freely operate without A.U. assistance,
the importance of A.U. recognition cannot be underestimated. Lack of A.U. recognition
results in less aid and support from the region generally. Further, A.U. recognition is a
growing requirement for being recognized globally. For example, the United States,
Europe, and Canada have exhibited hesitance towards recognizing self-determined States
that the A.U. does not itself recognize.

Impact: Undermining the African Union’s neutrality risks reducing its credibility and
effectiveness in resolving ongoing and future conflicts

“Eight Priorities for the African Union in 2024.” International Crisis Group, February 14,
2024, [Link]
eight-priorities-african-union-2024. Accessed December 13, 2024.

Finally, the Commission and the PSC should also keep a close eye on growing frictions
between Ethiopia and Somalia, linked to the former’s ambitions to have better access to
the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden. In January, Ethiopia angered Somalia by announcing it had
struck an initial deal with Somaliland for a naval base on its territory. Somaliland, which
declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but remains unrecognised, says it may get

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formal recognition from Ethiopia in return. The dispute is heightening tensions in an

already volatile region. The AU is well placed to marshal others to take preventive
action. It has already dispatched former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, its
high-level envoy to the Horn of Africa who led the Pretoria negotiations, to mediate.
Member states should encourage direct talks between Abiy and Somali President Hassan
Sheikh Mohamud, possibly refereed by Obasanjo.

Analysis: This argument is particularly effective because it ties Somaliland’s recognition to the
broader credibility of the African Union, an institution central to peace and security in Africa. By
focusing on the AU’s foundational principles and its track record, the argument highlights the
far-reaching consequences of a single recognition decision.

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CON: Recognizing Somaliland harms the African Union’s relations with

Somalia’s allies

Argument: Recognizing Somaliland harms the African Union’s relations with Somalia’s allies

Warrant: Turkey has a vested interest in Somalia’s unity and has taken action to oppose
recognition of Somaliland

Baez, Kiran. “Turkey signed two major deals with Somalia. Will it be able to implement
them?” Atlantic Council, June 18, 2024,
[Link]
deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them/. Accessed December 13,
2024.

Though Somali and Turkish officials maintain that the recent agreements are unrelated
to the major deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, the timing is difficult to ignore. The
Somali cabinet labeled the Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU as a “blatant assault” on its
sovereignty and said it was an example of Ethiopian “interference against the
sovereignty of [Somalia].” Unsurprisingly, Somalilanders reacted similarly to the
Turkey-Somalia agreements that followed. Though the regional backlash to the MOU
may in part steer Ethiopia and Somalia to dissolve it, this is far from certain. It remains
unknown if Turkey’s enforcement of Somali maritime security will extend to Somaliland
waters, which Ankara recognizes as part of Somalia. In May, Somaliland’s foreign
minister explicitly stated that Turkish naval vessels would not be welcome in its territorial
waters. This issue will be particularly important if Ethiopia proceeds with its plans to build
a naval facility in Somaliland. Despite a strong Turkish-Ethiopian relationship, the Turkish
Navy supported joint Somalia-Egypt naval exercises days after the January 1 agreement
was signed. It is also unclear how the Turkish Navy will interact with the Puntland

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Maritime Police Force, which has received funding support from the UAE. Though the
semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland does not claim total independence, it pulled
recognition of the Somali federal government in March.

Warrant: Qatar, another ally of Somalia, opposes secessionist movements in the region

“Reshaping the African Union Mission in Somalia: From AMISOM to ATMIS.” Horn of
Africa Bulletin, May-June 2022, [Link]
content/uploads/2022/06/[Link].
Accessed December 13, 2024.

Despite Qatar’s relatively small size and population with a foreign policy impetus and
objectives characterised as something of a black box and its long history in Somalia, the
Gulf nation has played a powerful role in the country’s politics since 2006 which was
prompted by the rise of the ICU, their short-lived rule, and the subsequent atomisation
of Islamist movements in the country. Doha used personal and religious networks to
seriously engage with Islamist factions and former ICU members to influence politics in
Somalia. Crucially, after Ethiopia invaded Somalia and ended the ICU’s rule in 2006, Qatar
hosted some of the ICU leadership members which included Sheikh Sharif Ahmed whose
subsequent election as President in 2009 was possibly funded by Qatar despite later
falling out with Doha when it insisted on expanding the government to include violent
Islamists such as Hassan Dahir Aweys and his Hisbul Islam.

Impact: Recognizing Somaliland could undermine broader Gulf-African partnerships,

particularly in infrastructure and trade

Kinkoh, Hubert. “Conflict Resolution Efforts by GCC States in Africa.” Gulf Research
Center, October 18, 2024, [Link] Accessed
December 13, 2024.

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The Gulf states’ involvement in Africa’s peace and security landscape is driven by several
key factors. Both regions face shared security concerns, including enduring conflicts such
as the civil wars in Yemen and Sudan, the situation in Libya, and ongoing tensions in
Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Terrorism and violent extremism are mutual threats, with
both regions combating transnational terrorist networks like Al-Shabaab in Somalia and
Al-Qaida affiliates in the Sahel. Humanitarian crises resulting from these conflict
situations contribute to the increasing number of forced migrants heading to Gulf states.
Additionally, the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, crucial maritime routes for global trade, are
vital to the economic and geostrategic interests of the various African and Gulf states,
yet remain threatened by piracy, smuggling, and other geopolitical competition and
maritime threats. The geographical proximity, particularly of Saudi Arabia, to the Horn
of Africa underscores the strategic importance of Gulf states’ engagement–through the
Red Sea Cooperation Council, military and naval cooperation, and investments in port
infrastructure in the Red Sea region.

Analysis: This argument effectively highlights the geopolitical and economic implications of
recognizing Somaliland. The African Union relies on cooperative relationships with Somalia’s
allies for broader regional development and stability. Any move perceived as undermining
these partnerships could create long-term diplomatic and financial challenges, limiting the AU’s
effectiveness in addressing conflicts and promoting growth.

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January 2025
Public Forum Brief

Con Responses to
Pro Arguments
Con Responses to Pro Arguments January 2025

A/2: Somaliland has a more stable government than Somalia

Response: Somaliland’s government is not as stable as it appears

Turn: Recognizing Somaliland could have a destabilizing effect in the region

Adegoke, Yinka. “A Trump White House looks set to recognize the world’s newest
country.” Semafor, December 10, 2024,
[Link]
looks-set-to-recognize-the-region. Accessed December 12, 2024.

While Somalia’s leaders would likely be displeased with such a decision, Meservey said
they hadn’t done enough for the US to not prioritize its own interests in the sub-region.
“Recognizing Somaliland would undoubtedly rattle the rump state of Somalia, further
destabilize the Horn, and elicit a sharp rebuke from the African Union,” argues Ken
Opalo, a political science professor at Georgetown University.

Turn: The situation in Somaliland is less stable than their elections would have you believe

Patel, Vedant. “Instability and Democratic Backsliding in Somaliland.” U.S. Department of

State, March 30, 2023, [Link]
backsliding-in-somaliland/. Accessed December 12, 2024.

The United States is increasingly concerned by the continuing violence in Lascanood

and joins other international partners and neighbors in calling for de-escalation,
adherence to the agreed ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access, and resumption of
constructive dialogue towards peaceful resolution. Continued violence will increase the

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potential for extremist groups to sow broader instability and further exacerbate the
ongoing humanitarian crisis.

Turn: Somaliland has experience democratic backsliding, delaying elections in 2022 by two
years

“Overcoming Somaliland’s Worsening Political Crisis.” International Crisis Group,

November 10, 2022, [Link]
africa/somalia/overcoming-somalilands-worsening-political-crisis. Accessed
December 12, 2024.

First, the current crop of politicians shows little enthusiasm for the consensus-based
problem solving that has helped Somaliland navigate prior crises. Leaders on both sides
have a winner-take-all mentality. The presidency appears less inclined to seek
consensus, instead arguing that its positions are formally and legally correct, and that
others should fall in line. Among the opposition, many feel that they have benefited
too little from backing down previously, as they did after initially disputing the 2017
presidential election result. In parallel, Somaliland’s state institutions, like the Guurti,
appear weaker and more deferential to the government than in the past, partly due to
the individuals heading them and government efforts to bring them in line. They seem
unwilling to put forth compromise solutions lest they antagonise the president and his
circle. Clan elders, influential businesspeople, religious leaders and civil society
representatives have attempted to bridge the gap, with little success.

Mitigate: Somaliland is not free from corruption and instability

“Major Corruption Allegations Rock Somaliland Finance Ministry’s Recruitment for World
Bank’s Public Resource Management Project.” Somaliland Chronicle, August 3,
2024, [Link]

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rock-somaliland-finance-ministrys-recruitment-for-world-banks-public-resource-
management-project/. Accessed December 12, 2024.

According to documents examined by Somaliland Chronicle, serious allegations of

misconduct have emerged in the selection process for a World Bank-funded Project
Coordinator position in Somaliland. The ongoing investigation has raised significant
concerns about transparency and fairness in the recruitment procedure, potentially
fitting into a broader pattern of corruption in internationally funded projects. Multiple
professionals have filed formal complaints with the World Bank regarding the selection
committee’s processes and potential conflicts of interest. These individuals, whose
identities remain confidential, have highlighted irregularities and possible biases in the
recruitment process.

Turn: Somaliland’s attempts at recognition have angered other countries

Pinto, Teresa. “Ethiopia-Somaliland deal risks regional tensions.” GIS, February 21, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 12,
2024.

The deal was met with enthusiasm in Somaliland, but also triggered protests. The
defense minister resigned, declaring that allowing Ethiopian troops into Somaliland
posed a vital threat to national security. Somalia declared the deal null and void and
called it a direct attack on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The agreement openly
defies the “One-Somalia” policy and weakens Mogadishu’s stabilization efforts.

Explanation: This response says that Somaliland is not as stable as it appears. Teams will
benefit from being as up-to-date as possible and should research the current situation between
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland to understand the root of violence and instability.

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A/2: African Union recognition grants Somaliland international

legitimacy

Response: Increased recognition for Somaliland will backfire

Turn: Recognition of Somaliland might embolden other secession movements on the continent

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

The bloc, however, has feared that formal recognition would embolden other
secessionist movements on the continent, such as Nigeria’s Biafra or Morocco’s
Western Sahara, to demand the same. Since the creation of a continental bloc in 1963,
there have only been two widely recognized border changes in Africa: Eritrea’s split from
Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

Turn: Ethiopia’s recognition has caused enhanced tension in the region

Adegoke, Yinka. “A Trump White House looks set to recognize the world’s newest
country.” Semafor, December 10, 2024,
[Link]
looks-set-to-recognize-the-region. Accessed December 12, 2024.

Ethiopia has already made a big bet on Somaliland by signing a controversial maritime
agreement with the territory. Africa’s second most populous country is landlocked and
very keen to have access to Somaliland’s Berbera port for trade and much more. Prime

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Minister Abiy Ahmed’s stance with Hargeisa has sparked diplomatic tensions with
Somalia’s leaders in Mogadishu and even some mutterings of potential conflict. But if
Trump was to recognize Somaliland, Abiy’s gamble could pay off.

Turn: Somaliland’s attempts at recognition have angered other countries

Pinto, Teresa. “Ethiopia-Somaliland deal risks regional tensions.” GIS, February 21, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 12,
2024.

The deal was met with enthusiasm in Somaliland, but also triggered protests. The
defense minister resigned, declaring that allowing Ethiopian troops into Somaliland
posed a vital threat to national security. Somalia declared the deal null and void and
called it a direct attack on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The agreement openly
defies the “One-Somalia” policy and weakens Mogadishu’s stabilization efforts.

Turn: The Ethiopia-Somaliland deal has irreparably harmed the Horn of Africa’s unity

Yibeltal, Kalkidan and Damian Zane. “Ethiopia-Somaliland deal: Can the Horn of Africa rift
be healed?” BBC, July 3, 2024, [Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

The AU commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat was one of the first to call for
calm and mutual respect "to de-escalate the simmering tension". His sentiment was
shared by the US government, the Arab League and the European Union. In late June
during a UN security council meeting, senior US diplomat Robert A Wood said his
country remained "concerned about tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, and the
negative impact it is having on shared security interest". Egypt, which is at loggerheads
with Ethiopia over a giant dam that has been built on the River Nile in the northern

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Ethiopian highlands, has also pledged support for Somalia. Earlier this year, President
Abdul Fattah al-Sisi reassured his Somali counterpart that Egypt stood by Somalia and
supported "its security and stability".

Turn: Africa has only seen border changes twice since the 1960s

Woodward, Peter. “Somaliland wants to secede – here’s why caution is necessary.” The
Conversation, September 8, 2016, [Link]
to-secede-heres-why-caution-is-necessary-63919. Accessed December 12, 2024.

The issue of secession first arose in the 1960s with the wave of decolonisation and
questions over the viability of the newly independent states across the continent. Two
cases stood out: the Congo, where Katanga’s self-proclaimed breakaway was defeated by
United Nations forces; and Nigeria, where the Biafran secession was ended by the
Nigerian federal forces. The issue has come up again in recent times. In northeast Africa
two states have experienced separation. In 1993 Eritrea was recognised as a separate
state from Ethiopia, and the world’s newest state, South Sudan, was recognised in
2011. The circumstances in each of these cases was different. But the purpose here is
not to revisit how and why these took place, but to consider what happened next.

Explanation: This response says that any increased recognition for Somaliland could backfire
and that it could lead to decreased stability. Again, teams should focus on the most up-to-date
information possible and make reference to the current situation in Ethiopia.

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A/2: Recognition of Somaliland strengthens international legitimacy

of Taiwan

Response: International legitimacy for Taiwan risks Chinese escalation

Turn: China wants to capture Taiwan in the squo

“What’s behind China-Taiwan tensions?” BBC, May 23, 2024,

[Link] Accessed October 10, 2024.

China has launched major military drills around Taiwan, simulating a full-scale attack on
the island - just days after the new president William Lai was sworn in. The exercises
reinforce what is at the heart of the issue: China's claim over self-governed Taiwan.
Beijing sees the island as a breakaway province that will, eventually, be part of the
country, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve this. But many Taiwanese
consider themselves to be part of a separate nation - although most are in favour of
maintaining the status quo where Taiwan neither declares independence from China nor
unites with it.

Turn: China is prepping to invade Taiwan by 2027

Tiron, Roxana. “China on Track to Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027, US Says.”

Bloomberg, March 20, 2024, [Link]
20/china-on-track-to-be-ready-for-taiwan-invasion-by-2027-us-says. Accessed
October 10, 2024.

China is building its military and nuclear arsenal on a scale not seen since World War II
and all signs suggest it’s sticking to ambitions to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, a

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top US admiral testified. Despite Beijing’s economic challenges, its official defense budget
has increased by 16% over recent years to more than $223 billion, Admiral John Aquilino,
the leader of the Indo-Pacific Command, told the US House Armed Services Committee in
prepared testimony on Wednesday. In the three years since he took command, he said
the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, has added more than 400 fighter aircraft, along
with more than 20 major warships. It’s also doubled its inventory of ballistic and cruise
missiles since 2020, he said.

Turn: Absent international legitimacy, Taiwan becomes more self-sufficient than the squo

Kuo, Raymond. “The Counter-Intuitive Sensibility of Taiwan’s New Defense Strategy.”

War on the Rocks. December 6, 2021, [Link]
counter-intuitive-sensibility-of-taiwans-new-defense-strategy/. Accessed October
10, 2024.

These voices all miss the root of the problem: the lack of U.S. political commitment to
Taiwan’s security and survival. Until that issue is resolved, Taipei will always concentrate
on the question of whether the United States will show up to a fight, rather than how
they can best fight together. Taiwan faces a difficult operational and political tradeoff
in adopting asymmetric defense. Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka convincingly argue
that Taipei should adopt an elastic denial-in-defense strategy, investing in popular
resistance to Chinese invasion. In doing so, however, Taiwan deliberately reduces its
ability to confront Chinese gray zone strategies and operations, as well as to defeat
China’s air force and navy. Instead, it would acquire numerous small and cheap
capabilities to deny territory, attrit Chinese forces, and prolong the conflict.

Impact: Preventing a Chinese invasion is crucial because it could spillover into other Southeast
Asian countries

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Bing, Ngeow Chow. “How Southeast Asia Might React in a Potential Military Conflict Over
Taiwan.” Carnegie Endowment, June 17, 2024,
[Link]
react-in-a-potential-military-conflict-over-taiwan?lang=en&center=china. Accessed
October 10, 2024.

These Southeast Asian claimant states may also fear that if they do not join the fight
against China, and China later prevails over the United States and Taiwan, they would
be the next victims of Chinese hegemony. As Asian security expert Drew Thompson
argues, “it would be disingenuous and delusional for those states to ignore the
precedent set by a cross-Strait conflict initiated by Beijing since they would eventually
also be subject to Chinese military coercion over their own disputes.” Based on this
logic, it could be better for claimant states to seize the opportunity afforded by a
Taiwan conflict to push back against China in the South China Sea once and for all, and
seek to ensure that the U.S.-led coalition prevailed over China. This argument might be
met with a warm reception in the Philippines, but would be considered a risky strategy in
the rest of Southeast Asia.

Impact: Regional war could trigger a nuclear arms race

Nan, Hao. “US-China tensions risk igniting nuclear arms race in East Asia.” South China
Morning Post, September 19, 2024, [Link]
opinion/article/3278834/us-china-tensions-risk-igniting-nuclear-arms-race-east-
asia. Accessed October 10, 2024.

Amid a deterioration in US-China relations, the risks of a nuclear arms race in East Asia
are growing alarmingly. The recent US-China diplomatic battles over nuclear arms
control are a continuation of earlier unsuccessful attempts at dialogue. Both countries
have attempted to resume the long-stalled nuclear arms control talks. On November 6,

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the first official nuclear arms control dialogue since 2018 was convened in the lead-up to
Biden’s talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping on November 15, 2023, on the sidelines of
the Apec summit. However, these talks produced no concrete results, and no specific
date for follow-up discussions was announced. Semi-official channels were also explored,
such as a track two nuclear arms dialogue in March – the first since 2019. The trajectory
of nuclear developments in East Asia, driven by US-China rivalry, threatens to
destabilise the region and spark a chain reaction of nuclear deterrence efforts. It is
imperative for global security that the US and China resume meaningful arms control
dialogue to prevent a cascading series of escalatory measures that could have
catastrophic consequences.

Explanation: This response is straight from the Taiwan topic – If increased recognition for
Taiwan backfires, it could easily spiral into a much more dangerous impact.

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A/2: African Union recognition of Somaliland is a prerequisite to

United States recognition

Response: Increased recognition of Somaliland backfires

Turn: Recognition of Somaliland might embolden other secession movements on the continent

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

The bloc, however, has feared that formal recognition would embolden other
secessionist movements on the continent, such as Nigeria’s Biafra or Morocco’s
Western Sahara, to demand the same. Since the creation of a continental bloc in 1963,
there have only been two widely recognized border changes in Africa: Eritrea’s split from
Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

Turn: Ethiopia’s recognition has caused enhanced tension in the region

Adegoke, Yinka. “A Trump White House looks set to recognize the world’s newest
country.” Semafor, December 10, 2024,
[Link]
looks-set-to-recognize-the-region. Accessed December 12, 2024.

Ethiopia has already made a big bet on Somaliland by signing a controversial maritime
agreement with the territory. Africa’s second most populous country is landlocked and
very keen to have access to Somaliland’s Berbera port for trade and much more. Prime

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Minister Abiy Ahmed’s stance with Hargeisa has sparked diplomatic tensions with
Somalia’s leaders in Mogadishu and even some mutterings of potential conflict. But if
Trump was to recognize Somaliland, Abiy’s gamble could pay off.

Turn: Somaliland’s attempts at recognition have angered other countries

Pinto, Teresa. “Ethiopia-Somaliland deal risks regional tensions.” GIS, February 21, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 12,
2024.

The deal was met with enthusiasm in Somaliland, but also triggered protests. The
defense minister resigned, declaring that allowing Ethiopian troops into Somaliland
posed a vital threat to national security. Somalia declared the deal null and void and
called it a direct attack on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The agreement openly
defies the “One-Somalia” policy and weakens Mogadishu’s stabilization efforts.

Turn: The Ethiopia-Somaliland deal has irreparably harmed the Horn of Africa’s unity

Yibeltal, Kalkidan and Damian Zane. “Ethiopia-Somaliland deal: Can the Horn of Africa rift
be healed?” BBC, July 3, 2024, [Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

The AU commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat was one of the first to call for
calm and mutual respect "to de-escalate the simmering tension". His sentiment was
shared by the US government, the Arab League and the European Union. In late June
during a UN security council meeting, senior US diplomat Robert A Wood said his
country remained "concerned about tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, and the
negative impact it is having on shared security interest". Egypt, which is at loggerheads
with Ethiopia over a giant dam that has been built on the River Nile in the northern

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Ethiopian highlands, has also pledged support for Somalia. Earlier this year, President
Abdul Fattah al-Sisi reassured his Somali counterpart that Egypt stood by Somalia and
supported "its security and stability".

Turn: Africa has only seen border changes twice since the 1960s

Woodward, Peter. “Somaliland wants to secede – here’s why caution is necessary.” The
Conversation, September 8, 2016, [Link]
to-secede-heres-why-caution-is-necessary-63919. Accessed December 12, 2024.

The issue of secession first arose in the 1960s with the wave of decolonisation and
questions over the viability of the newly independent states across the continent. Two
cases stood out: the Congo, where Katanga’s self-proclaimed breakaway was defeated by
United Nations forces; and Nigeria, where the Biafran secession was ended by the
Nigerian federal forces. The issue has come up again in recent times. In northeast Africa
two states have experienced separation. In 1993 Eritrea was recognised as a separate
state from Ethiopia, and the world’s newest state, South Sudan, was recognised in
2011. The circumstances in each of these cases was different. But the purpose here is
not to revisit how and why these took place, but to consider what happened next.

Explanation: This response says that any increased recognition for Somaliland could backfire
and that it could lead to decreased stability. Again, teams should focus on the most up-to-date
information possible and make reference to the current situation in Ethiopia.

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A/2: Without recognition, Somaliland’s people lack an international

advocate

Response: Enhanced international involvement can backfire, as in the case of the IMF

Turn: IMF conditionality means that countries that receive IMF loans face significant conditions
to receive aid

“Conditionality.” IMF Monitor, n.d., [Link] Accessed

December 12, 2024.

Conditionality has been linked to several detrimental economic, social, and political
outcomes. On the economic side, IMF conditionality has been linked to reductions in
economic growth and increases in inequality. On the social side, studies have found
detrimental impacts to health systems in Africa and Europe, and identified adverse
effects on population health. On the political side, research has linked conditionality to
decreases in unionization and greater incidence of civil war.

Turn: IMF conditionality traps countries in a poverty cycle

Biglaiser, Glen and Ronald McGauvran. “The effects of IMF loan conditions on poverty in
the developing world.” Journal of International Development, June 7, 2022,
[Link] Accessed December 12,
2024.

We include arrangements that have both structural and stabilisation conditions in Model
4, and find that poverty is only related to the number of structural conditions. The results
from agreements including both structural and stabilisation conditions (about 56% of

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the sample) indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the number of structural
conditions would lead to an expected increase in poverty of about 1.5% 2 years after
implementation.

Turn: IMF loans go to repeat borrowers – That shows that these loans trap people in a cycle

Ravenscroft, Julia. “IMF loan conditions make situation worse for crisis-hit countries,
shows new study.” European Network on Debt and Development, November 29,
2018, [Link] Accessed December
12, 2024.

Our research shows that most of these countries are repeat borrowers from the IMF,
which suggests that programmes are often ineffective, or even counter-productive,
when it comes to resolving debt crises. Instead of promoting fair and sustainable
solutions, the IMF is ramping up its conditions and intruding into policy areas that are
normally the domain of democratic decision-making for the good of a population. By
doing so, the IMF protects and bails out creditors, and puts the burden of adjustments on
vulnerable people.

Turn: IMF conditions create austerity spikes and cause cuts to public health

Ravenscroft, Julia. “IMF loan conditions make situation worse for crisis-hit countries,
shows new study.” European Network on Debt and Development, November 29,
2018, [Link] Accessed December
12, 2024.

Gino Brunswijck said: "In many countries, such as Chad and Gabon, austerity measures
imposed by IMF loans have sparked cuts to the health sector, which has had a grave
impact on health service delivery and personnel. Furthermore, the social spending

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floors that are part of IMF programmes, and that are supposed to shield vulnerable
groups, are at levels below what is needed to guarantee basic healthcare. This makes it
difficult for countries to reach the Sustainable Development Goals in relation to health."

Turn: IMF lending increases inequality

Lang, Valentin. “The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on
inequality.” The Review of International Organizations, December 2, 2020,
[Link] Accessed
December 12, 2024.

Does the International Monetary Fund (IMF) increase inequality? To answer this
question, this article introduces a new empirical strategy for determining the effects of
IMF programs that exploits the heterogeneous effect of IMF liquidity on loan allocation
based on a difference-in-differences logic. The results show that IMF programs increase
income inequality. An analysis of decile-specific income data shows that this effect is
driven by absolute income losses for the poor and not by income gains for the rich. The
effect persists for up to 5 years, and is stronger for IMF programs in democracies, and
when policy conditions, particularly those that demand social-spending cuts and labor-
market reforms, are more extensive. These results suggest that IMF programs can
constrain government responsiveness to domestic distributional preferences.

Explanation: This argument focuses on just a single negative impact from greater integration in
the world system – IMF conditionality. If Somaliland is able to access IMF loans, it may see the
same negative economic impacts that other countries have. For greater reach, teams may
consider looking into other harms from international institutions or utilizing a settler-colonial
framework in their cases.

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A/2: International recognition reduces Somaliland’s reliance on

remittances

Response: A shift towards international lending would be damaging to Somaliland’s economy

Turn: IMF conditionality means that countries that receive IMF loans face significant conditions
to receive aid

“Conditionality.” IMF Monitor, n.d., [Link] Accessed

December 12, 2024.

Conditionality has been linked to several detrimental economic, social, and political
outcomes. On the economic side, IMF conditionality has been linked to reductions in
economic growth and increases in inequality. On the social side, studies have found
detrimental impacts to health systems in Africa and Europe, and identified adverse
effects on population health. On the political side, research has linked conditionality to
decreases in unionization and greater incidence of civil war.

Turn: IMF conditionality traps countries in a poverty cycle

Biglaiser, Glen and Ronald McGauvran. “The effects of IMF loan conditions on poverty in
the developing world.” Journal of International Development, June 7, 2022,
[Link] Accessed December 12,
2024.

We include arrangements that have both structural and stabilisation conditions in Model
4, and find that poverty is only related to the number of structural conditions. The results
from agreements including both structural and stabilisation conditions (about 56% of

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the sample) indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the number of structural
conditions would lead to an expected increase in poverty of about 1.5% 2 years after
implementation.

Turn: IMF loans go to repeat borrowers – That shows that these loans trap people in a cycle

Ravenscroft, Julia. “IMF loan conditions make situation worse for crisis-hit countries,
shows new study.” European Network on Debt and Development, November 29,
2018, [Link] Accessed December
12, 2024.

Our research shows that most of these countries are repeat borrowers from the IMF,
which suggests that programmes are often ineffective, or even counter-productive,
when it comes to resolving debt crises. Instead of promoting fair and sustainable
solutions, the IMF is ramping up its conditions and intruding into policy areas that are
normally the domain of democratic decision-making for the good of a population. By
doing so, the IMF protects and bails out creditors, and puts the burden of adjustments on
vulnerable people.

Turn: IMF conditions create austerity spikes and cause cuts to public health

Ravenscroft, Julia. “IMF loan conditions make situation worse for crisis-hit countries,
shows new study.” European Network on Debt and Development, November 29,
2018, [Link] Accessed December
12, 2024.

Gino Brunswijck said: "In many countries, such as Chad and Gabon, austerity measures
imposed by IMF loans have sparked cuts to the health sector, which has had a grave
impact on health service delivery and personnel. Furthermore, the social spending

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floors that are part of IMF programmes, and that are supposed to shield vulnerable
groups, are at levels below what is needed to guarantee basic healthcare. This makes it
difficult for countries to reach the Sustainable Development Goals in relation to health."

Turn: IMF lending increases inequality

Lang, Valentin. “The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on
inequality.” The Review of International Organizations, December 2, 2020,
[Link] Accessed
December 12, 2024.

Does the International Monetary Fund (IMF) increase inequality? To answer this
question, this article introduces a new empirical strategy for determining the effects of
IMF programs that exploits the heterogeneous effect of IMF liquidity on loan allocation
based on a difference-in-differences logic. The results show that IMF programs increase
income inequality. An analysis of decile-specific income data shows that this effect is
driven by absolute income losses for the poor and not by income gains for the rich. The
effect persists for up to 5 years, and is stronger for IMF programs in democracies, and
when policy conditions, particularly those that demand social-spending cuts and labor-
market reforms, are more extensive. These results suggest that IMF programs can
constrain government responsiveness to domestic distributional preferences.

Explanation: This argument focuses on just a single negative impact from greater integration in
the world system – IMF conditionality. If Somaliland is able to access IMF loans, it may see the
same negative economic impacts that other countries have. For greater reach, teams may
consider looking into other harms from international institutions or utilizing a settler-colonial
framework in their cases.

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A/2: International recognition strengthens the state of Somaliland’s

democracy

Response: International recognition harms democracy outside of Somaliland

Turn: Recognition of Somaliland might embolden other secession movements on the continent

Ferragamo, Mariel and Claire Klobucista. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway
State.” Council on Foreign Relations, January 25, 2024,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

The bloc, however, has feared that formal recognition would embolden other
secessionist movements on the continent, such as Nigeria’s Biafra or Morocco’s
Western Sahara, to demand the same. Since the creation of a continental bloc in 1963,
there have only been two widely recognized border changes in Africa: Eritrea’s split from
Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

Warrant: Africa has only seen border changes twice since the 1960s

Woodward, Peter. “Somaliland wants to secede – here’s why caution is necessary.” The
Conversation, September 8, 2016, [Link]
to-secede-heres-why-caution-is-necessary-63919. Accessed December 12, 2024.

The issue of secession first arose in the 1960s with the wave of decolonisation and
questions over the viability of the newly independent states across the continent. Two
cases stood out: the Congo, where Katanga’s self-proclaimed breakaway was defeated by
United Nations forces; and Nigeria, where the Biafran secession was ended by the

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Nigerian federal forces. The issue has come up again in recent times. In northeast Africa
two states have experienced separation. In 1993 Eritrea was recognised as a separate
state from Ethiopia, and the world’s newest state, South Sudan, was recognised in
2011. The circumstances in each of these cases was different. But the purpose here is
not to revisit how and why these took place, but to consider what happened next.

Turn: Separation is not straightforward and tends to deepen divisions

Woodward, Peter. “Somaliland wants to secede – here’s why caution is necessary.” The
Conversation, September 8, 2016, [Link]
to-secede-heres-why-caution-is-necessary-63919. Accessed December 12, 2024.

Both the Ethiopian and Sudanese examples suggest that separation isn’t always the
straightforward option. The division has led to violent border disputes, economic
complications, and poor relations with the wider international community. There is also
a case to be made that granting secession has merely served to fuel the claims of other
separatist movements. Somaliland’s calls to be recognised as independent, rather than
being included in the efforts to rebuild Somalia, is an example. When South Sudan
became independent in 2011 a Somaliland delegation arrived in Juba, the capital,
wearing t-shirts saying “Somaliland Next”.

Turn: Politics in Somaliland is highly convoluted and rooted in the idea of “clans”

“1.2. The role of clans in Somalia.” European Union Agency for Asylum, June 2022,
[Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

Dominant clans have so far maintained an ‘artificial’ balance in terms of political power
in the Federal State of Somalia, with the presidency and premiership alternating

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between the Hawiye and the Darood, the speakership of the parliament assigned to the
Rahanweyn and the supreme court to the Dir. The FMS’ administrations function, in
general, with clearer clan affiliation, with all main power functions gathered in the hands
of the locally dominant clans.

Turn: This clan-based model has slowed progress towards human rights and equality

Elder, Claire. “Somaliland Between Clans and November Elections.” New Internationalist,
October 1, 2017, [Link]
Accessed December 12, 2024.

Thus, despite its ‘exceptional’ peace and stability, the reality is that Somaliland remains
fragile. It too was formed through its own civil wars (from 1991-93), and while clan-
based resolution of conflict brought a firm popular commitment to stability, it also
slowed progress towards human and civil rights – restricting space for open dialogue
and criticism of the staunchly nationalist government.

Explanation: This response says that any increased recognition for Somaliland could backfire
and that it could lead to decreased stability. Again, teams should focus on the most up-to-date
information possible and make reference to the current situation in Ethiopia.

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A/2: Recognizing Somaliland could set a new precedent for Africa to

deviate away from violence

Turn: Doing away with this principle causes violence.

Warrant: The reason that the African Union has its principle of “togetherness” in the first place
is to prevent conflict.

Gebereamlak, Hagos. “Ethiopia’s Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for

African Borders.” The Report, October 2, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 11, 2024.

After gaining independence, African states largely adopted a policy of respecting the
borders drawn during colonial times. This principle, known as ‘Uti Possidetis’, is
enshrined in Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act, which calls for the
preservation of borders as they existed at the time of independence. The goal of this
policy has been to prevent disorder, chaos, and conflict across the continent. African
countries have generally followed this principle, fearing that the recognition of
secessionist movements could set dangerous precedents. Although Somaliland was a
separate British colony before merging with Somalia, the application of this principle
may be complicated by the fact that it voluntarily joined Somalia shortly after gaining
independence in 1960. Therefore, recognizing Somaliland’s independence today might
be seen as a challenge to the established principle of respecting colonial boundaries. If
Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could compromise the long-standing
principle of preserving colonial borders. This move might encourage other secessionist
movements across Africa and lead to broader geopolitical instability. The recognition
of Somaliland could serve as a precedent, prompting other groups to push for
independence and potentially leading to a reshaping of the African political landscape.

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Recognizing Somaliland could encourage secessionist movements and irredentist

claims across the Horn of Africa, fueling instability in the region. There are already
existing aspirations for independence in several parts of the Horn, and Somaliland’s
recognition could embolden these movements.

Warrant: Jubaland’s struggle to separate from Somalia is using violence.

Hassan, Abdiqani & Sheikh, Abdi. “Fighting breaks out between Somalia's Jubbaland
region and federal government.” Reuters, December 11, 2024,
[Link]
somalias-jubbaland-region-and-federal-government/ar-
AA1vGtmq?ocid=BingNewsVerp. Accessed December 11, 2024.

MOGADISHU/GAROWE, Somalia (Reuters) -Clashes erupted on Wednesday between

forces from Somalia's federal government and the semi-autonomous Jubbaland
region, raising concerns that internal rivalries are diverting attention from the fight
against the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab group. The violence in the strategically
important region, which follows an election held there despite being opposed by
authorities in Mogadishu, is taking place just weeks before the mandate of an African
Union peacekeeping force expires. "This morning, federal forces from Mogadishu in
Ras Kamboni, using drones, attacked Jubbaland forces," Adan Ahmed Haji, assistant
security minister of Jubbaland, told a press conference in the regional capital Kismayu.
Later in the day he said hundreds of federal forces had surrendered and fled to the
Kenyan border, while Jubbaland fighters had captured Ras Kamboni. Reuters could not
immediately verify his claims. Somali Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur said
the Jubbaland forces initiated the clashes. "Early this morning Jubbaland forces
attacked the Somali federal military troops that were deployed in Lower Jubba to take
bases withdrawn from by ATMIS," he said in a statement, referring to the African
Union Transition Mission in Somalia.

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Warrant: Even Somaliland’s separation from Somalia came out of a violent war.

Guudle, Mohamed. “Somaliland-Somalia Talks 2012-2023: An Analysis of Progress,

Impasse, and Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence” Horn Diplomat, December 31,
2023, [Link]
2012-2023-an-analysis-of-progress-impasse-and-prospects-for-peaceful-
coexistence/. Accessed December 11, 2024.

The past decade has witnessed a complex dance of dialogue and divergence between
Somaliland and Somalia. From initial cautious engagement in 2012 to recent high-level
meetings facilitated by Djibouti, the talks have grappled with the enduring question of
Somaliland’s future relationship with Somalia. For academics, these interactions offer a
rich tapestry of political dynamics, inter-clan rivalries, and the interplay of domestic
aspirations with international ambitions. Policymakers, meanwhile, navigate a sensitive
landscape where regional stability hinges on understanding the nuanced positions of
both sides. At the heart of the negotiation lies a fundamental divergence. Having
restored its independence in 1991 after a brutal civil war and the loss of hundreds of
thousands, Somaliland views itself as a de facto sovereign state. Its narrative
emphasizes a distinct colonial history, a functioning democracy, and hard-won peace
and stability. Conversely, Somalia clings to its internationally recognized borders and
views Somaliland’s aspirations as detrimental to national unity. Any solution, therefore,
must consider not only the complex historical baggage but also the unwavering
commitment of Somalilanders to their self-determination. While compromise in areas
like resource-sharing and international recognition may be possible, Somaliland’s
sovereignty and the will of its people, as expressed through multiple referendums,
remain non-negotiable cornerstones of its position. As the talks evolve, understanding
these core beliefs is crucial for academics and policymakers seeking to navigate a
sustainable and peaceful resolution.

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De-link: The Africa Union has already moved away from this principle. It lets countries split off if
they make a good enough case.

Warrant: Eritrea was a break away state from Ethiopia.

Markakis, John and Last, Geoffrey Charles. “History of Eritrea.” Encyclopedia Britannica,
April 11, 2024, [Link] Accessed
December 7, 2024.

history of Eritrea, survey of the notable events and people in the history of Eritrea from
prehistory to the present. Located on the Red Sea in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea has long
been an important centre of trade, with many bustling ports along its coast. Eritrea
gained its independence from neighbouring Ethiopia in 1993, after a decades-long
war. Eritrea’s capital, Asmara, is at the northern tip of the Ethiopian Plateau and is
connected by road and rail to the country’s Red Sea port, Massawa, 40 miles (65 km) to
the northeast.

Warrant: Eritrea was admitted into the AU shortly after declaring independence.

“Member States.” African Union, n.d.,

[Link] Accessed December 7, 2024.

Date of Joining the OAU or

Member State Abbreviation AU
Union of the Comoros Comoros 18-Jul-75

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Republic of Djibouti Djibouti 27-Jun-77

State of Eritrea Eritrea 24-May-93
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ethiopia 25-May-63
Republic of Kenya Kenya 25-May-63
Republic of Madagascar Madagascar 25-May-63
Republic of Mauritius Mauritius Aug-68
Republic of Rwanda Rwanda 25-May-63
Republic of Seychelles Seychelles 29-Jun-76
Federal Republic of Somalia Somalia 25-May-63
Republic of South Sudan South Sudan 27-Jul-11
Republic of the Sudan Sudan 25-May-63
United Republic of Tanzania Tanzania 25-May-63
Republic of Uganda Uganda 25-May-63

Warrant: South Sudan was a break away state from Sudan.

Collins, Robert O. , Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, Jay L. Spaulding and Sabr, Mohy el Din.
“South Sudan.” Encyclopedia Britannica, December 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 7, 2024.

South Sudan, country located in northeastern Africa. Its rich biodiversity includes lush
savannas, swamplands, and rainforests that are home to many species of wildlife. Prior
to 2011, South Sudan was part of Sudan, its neighbour to the north. South Sudan’s
population, predominantly African cultures who tend to adhere to Christian or animist
beliefs, was long at odds with Sudan’s largely Muslim and Arab northern government.
South Sudan’s capital is Juba.

Warrant: South Sudan was admitted into the AU shortly after declaring independence.

“Member States.” African Union, n.d.,

[Link] Accessed December 7, 2024.

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Date of Joining the OAU or

Member State Abbreviation AU
Union of the Comoros Comoros 18-Jul-75
Republic of Djibouti Djibouti 27-Jun-77
State of Eritrea Eritrea 24-May-93
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ethiopia 25-May-63
Republic of Kenya Kenya 25-May-63
Republic of Madagascar Madagascar 25-May-63
Republic of Mauritius Mauritius Aug-68
Republic of Rwanda Rwanda 25-May-63
Republic of Seychelles Seychelles 29-Jun-76
Federal Republic of Somalia Somalia 25-May-63
Republic of South Sudan South Sudan 27-Jul-11
Republic of the Sudan Sudan 25-May-63
United Republic of Tanzania Tanzania 25-May-63
Republic of Uganda Uganda 25-May-63

Analysis: Empirics are your best friend when responding to this argument, and that’s why both
responses are basically just straight empirics. These responses are on the border of mutually
exclusive so be careful when using them both in the same round. Show your judge the real
world reason why these arguments exist. This will be your key to winning this argument, and
debaters will even be able to garner offense off it.

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A/2: Recognizing Somaliland encourages Jubaland to advocate for

independence

Non-unique: Jubaland is already seceding without Somaliland being recognized. It doesn’t

matter what happens to Somaliland.

Warrant: Jubaland’s leader said that the federal government should play no role in internal
matters.

Staff Reporter. “Jubaland conflict: What we know so far.” Garowe Online, November 26,
2024, [Link]
we-know-so-far. Accessed December 11, 2024.

KISMAYO, Somalia - Strong disagreements have emerged between authorities in

Mogadishu and Kismayo after Ahmed Islam Mohamed Madobe defied orders to hold
direct elections, effectively winning his third term as regional leader, leading to the
current standoff. In his address, Madobe maintained that the federal government 'has
no role in determining our internal affairs' while insisting that 'any attempts to
destabilize the region shall be resisted'. However, he said that his government would
be eager to dialogue. But for Mogadishu, the elections were 'unconstitutional and
illegal', calling for actions from the Attorney General who should prefer charges against
Madobe - initiate a process that guarantees his removal from office for failing to
embrace changes. The Jubaland leader said the universal suffrage model of elections
would trigger unconstitutional term extensions for state and national leaders, a claim
disputed by the federal government of Somalia under Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Warrant: Jubaland is literally fighting its independence right now.

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Hassan, Abdiqani & Sheikh, Abdi. “Fighting breaks out between Somalia's Jubbaland
region and federal government.” Reuters, December 11, 2024,
[Link]
somalias-jubbaland-region-and-federal-government/ar-
AA1vGtmq?ocid=BingNewsVerp. Accessed December 11, 2024.

MOGADISHU/GAROWE, Somalia (Reuters) -Clashes erupted on Wednesday between

forces from Somalia's federal government and the semi-autonomous Jubbaland
region, raising concerns that internal rivalries are diverting attention from the fight
against the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab group. The violence in the strategically
important region, which follows an election held there despite being opposed by
authorities in Mogadishu, is taking place just weeks before the mandate of an African
Union peacekeeping force expires. "This morning, federal forces from Mogadishu in
Ras Kamboni, using drones, attacked Jubbaland forces," Adan Ahmed Haji, assistant
security minister of Jubbaland, told a press conference in the regional capital Kismayu.
Later in the day he said hundreds of federal forces had surrendered and fled to the
Kenyan border, while Jubbaland fighters had captured Ras Kamboni. Reuters could not
immediately verify his claims. Somali Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur said
the Jubbaland forces initiated the clashes. "Early this morning Jubbaland forces
attacked the Somali federal military troops that were deployed in Lower Jubba to take
bases withdrawn from by ATMIS," he said in a statement, referring to the African
Union Transition Mission in Somalia.

Turn: Secession by Jubaland leads to regional instability.

Warrant: Somalia has the potential to fall apart.

Salad, Mohamed. “Fragmented federalism: Puntland and Jubaland’s quest for autonomy
and its impact on Somali sovereignty.” Caasimada Online, November 6, 2024,

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[Link]
quest-for-autonomy-and-its-impact-on-somali-sovereignty/. Accessed December
11, 2024.

The implications of Puntland and Jubaland’s autonomy go beyond security, affecting

the federal system’s capacity to unite the country. As these areas establish
independence, they risk setting a precedent that may inspire other states to follow
suit, undermining Somalia’s unity. The idea of a divided Somalia erodes popular faith
in the federal system, fuelling a cycle of regionalism that hinders efforts to establish a
united Somali identity. Citizens who see the inequalities between autonomous regions
and federal territories may feel estranged from the national government, resulting in a
weak state subject to internal conflict and external interference

Warrant: More secessionist movements could pop up leading to instability.

Gebereamlak, Hagos. “Ethiopia’s Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for

African Borders.” The Reporter, October 2, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 11, 2024.

After gaining independence, African states largely adopted a policy of respecting the
borders drawn during colonial times. This principle, known as ‘Uti Possidetis’, is
enshrined in Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act, which calls for the
preservation of borders as they existed at the time of independence. The goal of this
policy has been to prevent disorder, chaos, and conflict across the continent. African
countries have generally followed this principle, fearing that the recognition of
secessionist movements could set dangerous precedents. Although Somaliland was a
separate British colony before merging with Somalia, the application of this principle
may be complicated by the fact that it voluntarily joined Somalia shortly after gaining
independence in 1960. Therefore, recognizing Somaliland’s independence today might

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be seen as a challenge to the established principle of respecting colonial boundaries. If

Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could compromise the long-standing
principle of preserving colonial borders. This move might encourage other secessionist
movements across Africa and lead to broader geopolitical instability. The recognition
of Somaliland could serve as a precedent, prompting other groups to push for
independence and potentially leading to a reshaping of the African political landscape.
Recognizing Somaliland could encourage secessionist movements and irredentist
claims across the Horn of Africa, fueling instability in the region. There are already
existing aspirations for independence in several parts of the Horn, and Somaliland’s
recognition could embolden these movements.

Turn: The oil industry is bad for countries and the planet.

Warrant: Increase in oil GDP is associated with a decline in democracy.

Aslaksen, Silje. “Oil and democracy: More than a cross-country correlation?” JSTOR, July
2010, [Link] Accessed December 11,
2024.

Column 1 has the most parsimonious specifications, including only lagged democracy,
the oil variable and time effects. Lagged democracy is highly significant, and shows a
considerable degree of persistence in democracy. More precise, the estimate of about
0.8 in Column 1 implies that a 10% higher score of democracy five years ago is typically
associated with an 8% higher score of democracy today. The oil variable is also
significant and illustrates the well-documented negative relationship between oil and
democracy. Though statistically significant, the short-term effect of oil is quantitatively
small. A coefficient of 0.002 (as in Column 1) implies that an increase in the oil value in
GDP of 10% is associated with a 2% lower score of democracy. The long-term effect is
considerably higher. A point estimate of 0.002 implies that an increase in the oil value

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in GDP of 10% is associated with a reduction of the steady-state value of democracy

by 11.24%.8 This suggest that, for example, a 15% increase in the oil variable would shift
long-run democracy from the level of USA to the level of Romania, or from the level of
Pakistan.

Warrant: Oil can drive even greater income inequality.

Kim, Dong-Hyeon, Ting-Cih Chen, & Shu-Chin Lin. “Does oil drive income inequality?
New panel evidence.” ScienceDirect, September 5, 2020,
[Link]
3. Accessed December 11, 2024.

The paper finds that in the long run oil abundance stimulates human capital investment
and improves institutional quality, thus alleviating income inequality. However, oil
volatility reduces human capital investment and worsens institutional quality, thereby
reinforcing income inequality. The effects are particularly pronounced for non-OPEC,
non-OECD countries, or countries with more ethnic fractionalization, lower quality of
political institutions and less developed financial systems. For countries with opposite
attributes, both the level and volatility of oil wealth lessen income inequality. These
findings line up with the view that it is the inability of institutionally weak societies to
deal with economic shocks that is of first-order importance (van der Ploeg and
Poelhekke, 2009). If a country can effectively manage its revenues from oil windfalls and
insulate against external shocks by conducting structural reforms, both financial and
political, apart from stabilization policies, it can greatly benefit from its oil abundance in
terms of income inequality in the long run.

Warrant: Oil extraction produces harmful greenhouse gases.

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Cabrera, Grace “What Is the Carbon Footprint of Oil Energy? A Life-Cycle Assessment.”
Impactful Ninja, n.d., [Link]
energy/. Accessed December 11, 2024.

Basically, it is the amount of carbon emitted by an activity or an organization. This

includes GHG emissions from fuel that we burn directly (e.g., heating a home, driving a
car) and GHG emissions from manufacturing the products that we use (e.g., power
plants, factories, and landfills). What Is the Overall Carbon Footprint of Oil Energy Oil is
considered dirty energy because of its carbon footprint. On a life-cycle basis, oil emits
970 grams of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent per kWh of electricity produced. Which
is the highest carbon footprint of all energy types – and higher than all the other ones
on the illustration below. The world collectively emitted 12.36 billion tons (bt) of CO2
from oil in 2019.

Warrant: CO2 emissions are causing global warming.

Hersher, Rebeccas. “Carbon dioxide hits record level in atmosphere, causing climate
change.” NPR, June 7, 2024, [Link]
4992290/carbon-dioxide-record-high-atmosphere. Accessed December 11, 2024.

The amount of planet-warming carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere has hit a new
record, as humanity struggles to rein in emissions of greenhouse gasses from burning
fossil fuels. The new record comes as tens of millions of people are grappling with
extreme weather in the United States. Much of the western U.S. is experiencing the first
major heat wave of the year, which is driving temperatures 20 to 30 degrees Fahrenheit
hotter than what is normal for June. In the Southwest, temperatures are lingering well
above 100 degrees. Such extreme, prolonged heat is directly related to human-caused
climate change, scientists say. All the extra carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere
traps heat, and leads to more intense, frequent and persistent heat waves, and other

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extreme weather such as powerful hurricanes and heavy rain storms. “Over the past
year, we’ve experienced the hottest year on record, the hottest ocean temperatures on
record, and a seemingly endless string of heat waves, droughts, floods, wildfires and
storms,” said Rick Spinrad, administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), in a statement. “We must recognize that these are clear signals
of the damage carbon dioxide pollution is doing to the climate system, and take rapid
action to reduce fossil fuel use as quickly as we can.”

Analysis: These three responses will allow you to effectively respond to the argument. The third
argument is probably your best response because it allows you to gain offense in three
separate ways on the argument. However, if the argument you face isn’t specific to oil, the first
two responses about uniqueness and further violence should be able to shut down your
opponent’s arguments.

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A/2: Recognizing Somaliland prevents proxy warfare in the region

Delink: Egypt and Ethiopia are fighting mostly about the Nile, not Somaliland.

Warrant: Tensions over the Nile have been simmering for years, long before the Somaliland
dispute.

Al-Anani, Khali. “Water Conflict Between Egypt and Ethiopia: A Defining Moment for
Both Countries.” Arab Center Washington DC, June 16, 2020,
[Link]
a-defining-moment-for-both-countries/. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Tensions and disputes over the Nile River’s water have been ongoing for decades. The
relationships among the Nile Basin’s ten countries are governed by a set of treaties
and agreements signed during the 20th century (in 1902, 1929, and 1959) and are
commonly known as the Nile River Agreements. They stipulate that the upstream
riparian states (mainly Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia) have to respect the rights
of the downstream countries (mainly Egypt and Sudan) regarding the Nile’s water. In
addition, they are prohibited from building dams or launching construction projects on
the river without the approval of the downstream countries, particularly Egypt. Not only
have these treaties guaranteed Egypt’s share of the Nile water over the past century
and enabled it to achieve its developmental and agricultural plans –– particularly after
building the Aswan High Dam in the early 1960s––but they also gave Cairo and
Khartoum veto power over any construction plans or projects that might affect their
share of the water. These agreements were always contested and challenged by the
upstream riparian states. While Egypt and Sudan insist that their share of water should
be respected and honored, the upstream riparian states believe that these
agreements are unfair and impede their agriculture and development plans. They

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reason that they are not bound by these agreements as they were signed by colonial
powers and their governments were not part of such accords. As the populations of
the Nile River Basin countries have been growing rapidly during the past decades, their
developmental needs have increased, adding tensions and disagreements among them.

Warrant: Egypt is very concerned about its water security.

Al-Anani, Khali. “Water Conflict Between Egypt and Ethiopia: A Defining Moment for
Both Countries.” Arab Center Washington DC, June 16, 2020,
[Link]
a-defining-moment-for-both-countries/. Accessed December 9, 2024.

According to the 1959 agreement over the Nile River water, Egypt’s share is 55.5
billion cubic meters (bcm). Around 85 percent of the water that flows into the Nile
River comes from the Ethiopian highlands through the Blue Nile. Approximately 90
percent of Egypt’s fresh water comes from the Nile River, with about 57 percent of
that water from the Blue Nile, on which Ethiopia is building its dam. Therefore, Egypt
views the GERD as an existential threat. The reservoir behind the GERD, once filled, will
hold about 74 bcm of water, almost equivalent to the entire annual volume of the Nile
that flows into Egypt’s Aswan High Dam. Currently, water insecurity is perhaps the most
serious threat to Egypt. It is noteworthy that Egypt suffers from a shortage of water
even without taking the GERD into account: its water resources are around 60 bcm
and its consumption is 80 bcm. Egypt imports about half its food products and recycles
about 25 bcm of water annually. Should the GERD be filled without an agreement, Egypt
would face a risk of drought conditions and of losing more than one million jobs and
about $1.8 billion in economic production each year. Filling the GERD would thus
significantly affect Egypt’s share of water—it would decrease it by about 10 to 15
billion cubic meters.

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Warrant: Ethiopia built a dam that threatens this water security.

“Why is Egypt worried about Ethiopia's dam on the Nile?” BBC, September 13, 2023,
[Link] Accessed December 9,
2024.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Gerd) is on the Blue Nile tributary in the
northern Ethiopia highlands, from where 85% of the Nile's waters flow. Gerd is 19
miles (30km) south of the border with Sudan and is Africa's biggest hydroelectric dam
project. It is more than a mile long and 145m high. It is not quite complete yet, but has
already involved 12 years of construction. The reservoir behind the $4.2bn (£3.8bn)
dam has a surface area the size of Greater London. How will the dam help Ethiopia?
Ethiopia wants the dam to produce electricity for the 60% of its population who
currently have no supply. It is hoped this will eventually double Ethiopia's electricity
output, provide businesses with constant electricity supplies and boost development. It
could also provide electricity for neighbouring countries including Sudan, South Sudan,
Kenya, Djibouti and Eritrea. Why are Egypt and Sudan upset about the dam? Egypt, with
a population of about 107 million people, relies on the River Nile for nearly all of its
fresh water. It needs it for households and agriculture - especially for growing cotton,
which requires a lot of water. Nile water is also used to fill Lake Nasser, the reservoir
for Egypt's own hydro-electric power plant, the Aswan High Dam. Sudan, with a
population of 48 million people, is also heavily reliant on water from the Nile.
"Ethiopia's unilateral measures are considered a disregard for the interests and rights
of the downstream countries and their water security," Egypt's foreign ministry said. It
has argued that a 2% reduction in water from the Nile could result in the loss of
200,000 acres of irrigated land. Egypt is also concerned that in times of drought,
Ethiopia might fill the reservoir behind its dam with water, to increase its generating
capacity, instead of letting it flow downstream. "There is no agreement on how Gerd
should be managed during and following periods of drought," says Mohammed

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Basheer of the University of Toronto. "Without an agreement, Ethiopia might adopt

an approach that maximizes electricity generation following droughts, by first
recovering storage, which would be unfavourable for Egypt." Ethiopia filled the dam
over the course of three years, dismissing Egypt's argument that it should take 12 to 21
years as unacceptable. Although Sudan is as affected by water levels on the Nile as
Egypt is, its response to the dam has been restricted by conflict in the country.

Warrant: This dam is the biggest cause of recent tensions.

Muller, Mike. “Egypt’s fears about Ethiopia’s mega-dam haven’t come to pass: moving
on from historical concerns would benefit the whole region..” The Conversation,
September 24, 2024, [Link]
mega-dam-havent-come-to-pass-moving-on-from-historical-concerns-would-
benefit-the-whole-region-239418. Accessed December 9, 2024.

A new round of angry exchanges has broken out between Egypt and Ethiopia over the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). On September 1, Cairo wrote to the UN
security council to protest against Ethiopia’s continued filling of Africa’s second largest
reservoir and bringing two more power generating turbines into operation. Egypt sees
any new infrastructure development on the Nile as a potential threat, since the river is
the source of over 98% of the country’s water. Egypt calls this a violation of
international law and Ethiopia’s obligations to “prevent significant harm”. Ethiopia’s
policies, it says, could result in an existential threat to Egypt … and would consequently
jeopardise regional and international peace and security. Ethiopia has told Egypt to
“abandon its aggressive approach” towards the dam. Ethiopia says that it must allow the
Blue Nile’s water to flow through the dam’s turbines and on to Egypt to generate the
hydropower for which it has been built, thus guaranteeing the overall flow to Egypt.

Turn: Recognizing Somaliland spurs Egypt to violence.

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Warrant: Egypt is doing everything it can to stop recognition.

Idaan, Gulaid Yusuf. “Egypt’s Blockade Threat and Hostility Toward Somaliland: Strategic
Implications and Regional Consequences.” Modern Diplomacy, October 24, 2024,
[Link]
toward-somaliland-strategic-implications-and-regional-consequences/. Accessed
December 9, 2024.

In addition to threatening economic sanctions, Egypt is employing its diplomatic

influence to further isolate Somaliland on the international stage. By leveraging its
longstanding ties with both the Arab League and the African Union—two
organizations that place a strong emphasis on the principle of territorial integrity—
Egypt aims to prevent Somaliland from gaining any form of international recognition.
The Arab League, with its commitment to the preservation of post-colonial borders in
the Arab world, and the African Union, which upholds similar principles across the
African continent, are key players in Egypt’s diplomatic strategy. Egypt’s goal is to
maintain the global consensus that Somaliland remains an integral part of Somalia,
thereby blocking any potential steps toward Somaliland’s de facto independence.
Through this strategy, Egypt seeks to diplomatically undermine the growing alliances
between Somaliland and Ethiopia, particularly their Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), which threatens to reshape regional dynamics in a way that disadvantages
Cairo’s influence.

Warrant: Egypt has threatened violence at the mere idea of recognition.

“Egypt’s el-Sisi says Cairo will not allow any threat to Somalia.” Al Jazeera, January 21,
2024, [Link]
not-allow-any-threat-to-somalia. Accessed December 9, 2024.

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Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has said Cairo stands shoulder to shoulder with
Somalia and has slammed Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland to obtain access to the
sea and establish a marine force base. “Egypt will not allow anyone to threaten
Somalia or affect its security,” el-Sisi said, speaking at a news conference with visiting
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. “Do not try Egypt, or try to threaten its
brothers especially if they ask it to intervene,” he said. Somaliland, a region
strategically located by the Gulf of Aden, broke away from Somalia in 1991 as the
country collapsed into a civil conflict. The region has maintained its own government
despite a lack of international recognition.

Warrant: Egypt is sending arms to Somalia.

Sheikh, Abdi & Paravicini, Giulia. “Egypt sends arms to Somalia following security deal,
sources say.” Reuters, August 28, 2028.
[Link]
security-pact-sources-say-2024-08-28/. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Egypt delivered its first military aid to Somalia in more than four decades on Tuesday,
three diplomatic and Somali government sources said, a move likely to deepen strains
between the two countries and Ethiopia. Egypt and Somalia have drawn closer
together this year after Ethiopia signed a preliminary deal with the breakaway region of
Somaliland to lease coastal land in exchange for possible recognition of its
independence from Somalia. The Mogadishu government has called the deal an assault
on its sovereignty and said it will block it by all means necessary. Egypt, at odds with
Ethiopia for years over Addis Ababa's construction of a vast hydro dam on the
headwaters of the Nile River, has condemned the Somaliland deal. It signed a security
pact with Mogadishu earlier this month and has offered to send troops to a new
peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

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Warrant: The risk of proxy conflict is growing higher.

Bayeh, Endalcachew. “Egypt-Ethiopia hostilities are playing out in the Horn – the risk of
new proxy wars is high.” The Conversation, October 17, 2024,
[Link]
horn-the-risk-of-new-proxy-wars-is-high-241402. Accessed December 9, 2024.

Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland and Egypt’s presence in Somalia come at a time of

multiple regional crises. These include the strained Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, the
Ethiopia-Sudan dispute over Al-Fashaga border region, and instability in Ethiopia. This
volatile environment increases the likelihood of proxy wars.

Analysis: These two responses are very good; however, they are mutually exclusive. The first
argument is good if you just want to get rid of this point entirely and move on. The second
argument is good if you want to use the opponent’s case to build offense. Either way, these
responses should allow debaters to effectively respond to their opponents argument and get
them on track to winning the round.

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A/2: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access

to IMF and World Bank assistance

Turn: The World Bank and IMF exacerbate poverty.

Warrant: The IMF hurts economic growth.

Biglaiser, Glen & McGauvran, Ronald. “The effects of IMF loan conditions on poverty in
the developing world.” National Library of Medicine, June 7, 2022,
[Link] Accessed December 15,
2024.

Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) claims that poverty reduction is one of
its objectives, some studies show that IMF borrower countries experience higher rates
of poverty. This paper investigates the effects of IMF loan conditions on poverty. Using a
sample of 81 developing countries from 1986 to 2016, we find that IMF loan
arrangements containing structural reforms contribute to more people getting trapped
in the poverty cycle, as the reforms involve deep and comprehensive changes that tend
to raise unemployment, lower government revenue, increase costs of basic services,
and restructure tax collection, pensions, and social security programmes. Conversely,
we observe that loan arrangements promoting stabilisation reforms have less impact on
the poor because borrower states hold more discretion over their macroeconomic
targets. Further, we disaggregate structural reforms to identify the particular policies
that increase poverty. Our findings are robust to different specifications and indicate
how IMF loan arrangements affect poverty in the developing world.

Warrant: The conditions that the World Bank imposed on countries is often counterproductive.

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Masters, Jonathan, Noah Berman & Andrew Chatzky. “The World Bank Group’s Role in
Global Development.” Council on Foreign Relations, October 12, 2023,
[Link]
development#chapter-title-0-2. Accessed December 15, 2024.

The bank’s perceived shortcomings have come under scrutiny for decades, including
from former bank officials. “The plan to end world poverty shows all the pretensions
of utopian social engineering,” former World Bank economist William Easterly wrote in
2006. And since resigning from the World Bank in 1999, former Chief Economist Joseph
Stiglitz has argued that the economic reforms the IMF and World Bank frequently
require as conditions for their lending have often been counterproductive for recipient
economies and devastating for those countries’ populations. The economic
consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have battered many
developing economies, reinvigorating criticism of the bank and other Western lenders.
Some experts say the global nature of these crises has laid bare the bank’s limitations
and its “obsolete” rules. While rich countries issued stimulus packages to fight
deteriorating economic conditions during the pandemic, low-income countries had to
borrow vast sums of money to stay afloat. Yet even with historic levels of lending from
the World Bank, low-income countries could afford to mobilize just a small fraction of
their economies toward pandemic response, compared to over a quarter of GDP in the
United States. And after the war in Ukraine sparked skyrocketing inflation, poverty and
hunger increased around the world. Global education and health outcomes also
suffered. In 2023, the World Bank warned of a “lost decade,” projecting average global
economic output through 2030 would fall to a thirty-year low.

De-link: Recognition by the African Union doesn’t guarantee UN recognition.

Warrant: The African Union doesn’t really do much.

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Staeger, Ueli & Fagbayibo, Babatunde. “The African Union is weak because its members
want it that way – experts call for action on its powers.” The Conversation.
March 5, 2024. [Link]
its-members-want-it-that-way-experts-call-for-action-on-its-powers-224191.
Accessed December 5, 2024.

Structural weaknesses. Member states have little trust in the AU. Since its creation in
2002, there has been more talk about what is needed to make it effective than
actually fixing its many problems. The AU Constitutive Act allows the assembly to
transfer some of its functions to organs such as Pan-African Parliament and AU
Commission. Very little has been done about this, though. Rather than granting the
parliament the ability to make binding laws, the amended PAP Protocol only gave it the
powers to make “model laws”. These are no more than recommendations. The same
applies to the AU Commission. It can’t compel member states to comply with its
decisions. So the AU has no way to exercise supranational powers (binding over its
member states). The AU is only as strong as member states allow it to be. African
leaders have a worrying track record of putting narrow domestic gains ahead of
transferring higher powers to the AU. This is unfortunate because African regional
integration does not, as is often assumed, come at the cost of national sovereignty.

Warrant: China does not want to recognize Somaliland.

Agence France-Presse. “China supports Somalia's 'integrity' after Ethiopia-Somaliland

accord.” The Citizen, January 12, 2024,
[Link]
integrity-after-ethiopia-somaliland-accord-4489556. Accessed December 5,
2024.

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"Somaliland is part of Somalia," said a posting on X by the Chinese embassy in

Somalia, citing Mao Ning, a spokeswoman for the Chinese foreign ministry. "China
supports the federal government of Somalia in safeguarding national unity,
sovereignty and territorial integrity," it said, adding that "we hope that regional
countries will handle regional affairs well through diplomatic dialogue." The East
African trade bloc Igad said Thursday it will meet January 18 in Uganda to discuss the
tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as the situation in Sudan, which has
been torn apart since April by fighting between rival generals. The United States, the
European Union, the African Union, the Arab League, Egypt and Turkey have already all
called for respecting Somalia's sovereignty. Ethiopia, the second most populous country
in Africa, has been searching for an outlet to the sea ever since the Read Sea coastal
region of Eritrea declared independence in 1993.

Warrant: This UN would likely never recognize Somaliland.

Meservey, Joshua. “The U.S. Should Recognize Somaliland.” The Heritage Foundation,
October 19, 2021, [Link]
should-recognize-somaliland. Accessed December 5, 2024.

Lesser But Real Risks. There is also the slight danger of reputational harm to the U.S. if
no other country follows its lead in recognizing Somaliland’s independence. It is true
that it will be difficult for Somaliland to gain a U.N. seat, as that would require a
positive recommendation from the Security Council on which China permanently sits,
and then approval by the General Assembly. Yet Washington leading the way would
probably give the diplomatic cover some states require before proceeding with
unilateral recognition. Even if no other country recognized Somaliland, it would not
lessen the advantages the U.S. would receive. It could even make Somaliland hew more
closely to Washington as its staunchest international partner.

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Warrant: It is only UN recognition that guarantees World Bank and IMF admission.

Ball, Duncan. “6 Reasons Why Countries Join The United Nations.” Humanitarian
Careers, n.d., [Link]
nations/. Accessed December 5, 2024.

The United Nations runs specialized agencies that aim to promote global peace and
security and address development and humanitarian challenges. Being a UN member
state allows countries to participate in programmes ran by UN agencies and also
means they can feed into how and where these agencies do their work. UN agencies
cover a huge range of areas focusing on different global issues. These include agencies
such as UNHCR, World Food Programme and UNICEF that focus on humanitarian and
development work as well as agencies such the International Maritime Organization
and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) that focus on coordinating global
travel and communication. UN agencies such as WHO and UNESCO help governments
in poorer countries run effective services for their populations. Specialist agencies are
an important part of what the UN does. A big reason countries join the United Nations is
so they can benefit from the projects these agencies run. This is especially true of
poorer countries and nations that often face humanitarian crises.

Analysis: Both of these responses highlight a different path to the ballot for teams. They are
mutually exclusive, so debaters have to pick one response and stick with it. The first argument
basically accepts the aff’s argument about lack of access to these international organizations as
a true statement and says that that is good. The second argument says that it doesn’t matter
what the African Union does because Somaliland won’t get widespread recognition even if the
African Union recognizes Somaliland. Basically, take the first option to be offensive and the
second option to be defensive.

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A/2: Recognition of statehood would enable the development of

strong ties to the U.S.

De-link: Somaliland is already staunchly anti-China.

Warrant: Somaliland rejected China’s BRI offer.

O’Brian, Robert. “China’s Worldwide Expansion Plan Stops in Somaliland.” The National
Interest, August 13, 2021,
[Link]
plan-stops-somaliland-191653. Accessed December 7, 2024.

Almost unnoticed during the pandemic, Somaliland is resisting China’s rapid

expansion in Africa through the Belt-and-Road initiative. After months of Chinese
pressure, the Somaliland government cut out Beijing and invited Taiwan to open an
embassy in the capital, Hargeisa. Taiwan now has a scholarship program for Somaliland
students to study in Taipei and Taiwanese aid is flowing into the country to assist with
energy, agriculture, and human-capital projects. It is often difficult for developing
nations, including those in Africa, to resist the economic allure of Chinese loans and
investment. China’s government is pouring money into Africa in a bid to secure energy
and raw materials long into the future. Governments often set aside concerns over
China’s predatory lending, corruption, human-rights abuses and its high-handed “wolf
warrior diplomacy” to provide for their desperate populations. When a developing
nation stands up to China and rejects its tainted aid, the United States should make
every effort to help it succeed, particularly in strategically vital geography.

Warrant: Somaliland is close with Taiwan.

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Grammar, Robert & Yang, Mary. “Somaliland Makes Bid for Independence in
Washington. U.S. Says No.” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2022,
[Link]
recognition/. Accessed December 15, 2024.

The lobbying efforts by Somaliland’s top officials offer a small window into how foreign
dignitaries are working to advance their interests in Washington amid the growing
great-power rivalry between the United States and China. Somaliland officials, as well
as U.S. lawmakers, played up the growing ties between Somaliland and Taiwan during
their visit to Washington—a trend that has angered both Somalia and China. While the
United States doesn’t have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, as part of the long-
standing “One China” policy that only recognizes Beijing’s government, the Biden
administration and U.S. lawmakers are working to strengthen Washington’s informal
ties with Taiwan and increase support for the dwindling handful of countries around the
world that have spurned pressure from Beijing to maintain formal diplomatic relations
with the island. “There are similarities in terms of values and democracy and elections
and human rights between Somaliland and Taiwan,” said Kayd, when asked about the
matter. “On the other hand, Somaliland is ready to engage with everyone—as long as
our sovereignty is respected and as long as there [are] no strings attached to our
political views.”

De-link: The new Trump administration is likely to recognize Somaliland no matter what the
African Union does.

Warrant: Trump is already preparing to recognize Somaliland.

Adegoke, Yinka. “Somaliland: Trump’s White House looks set to recognize the region.”
Semafor, December 10, 2024.

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ttps://[Link]/article/12/10/2024/somaliland-trump-white-house-
looks-set-to-recognize-the-region. Accessed December 15, 2024.

Somaliland, a self-governing region within Somalia, will be much closer to being

recognized by the United States as the world’s newest country when Donald Trump
returns to the White House in January. Support for the region has grown strong
among Republican US-Africa policy leaders on Capitol Hill, right-leaning Washington
DC think tanks, and likely Africa advisors of Trump’s incoming White House. Many of
these people told Semafor Africa they would encourage Trump to recognize Somaliland
“even if it wasn’t on Day One.” Recognizing Somaliland could enable US intelligence to
set up long term operations to monitor the movement of weapons in a volatile region as
well as keep an eye on Chinese activity. China already has a permanent military base in
neighboring Djibouti. It should allow the US to better monitor Houthi activity in Yemen.

Turn: The US recognizing Somaliland is basically the US giving the green light for violent
revolution.

Warrant: The US acknowledging Somaliland will create more instability.

FP Staff. “Breakaway Somaliland may get Trump push for recognition as world’s newest
nation: Report.” Firstpost, December 11, 2024,
[Link]
[Link]. Accessed
December 15, 2024.

In the Trump administration that’s set to be brutally transactional, the support for
Somaliland’s recognition stems from its strategic military and shipping interests in the
region as well as countering China in the region, according to Somaliland’s Yinka
Adegoke. There are also fears that any recognition of Somaliland, that too by the

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United States, could trigger other secessionist movement in Africa and destabilise the
continent further. Earlier this year, Somaliland pulled off a diplomatic coup when it
reached a deal with Ethiopia to lease 12 kilometers of coastline and access to Berbera
for commercial and military purposes for 50 years in exchange for its formal recognition
and part ownership of Ethiopia Airlines, according to Council of Foreign Relations (CFR).

Warrant: Somaliland separated from Somalia through violence.

Guudle, Mohamed. “Somaliland-Somalia Talks 2012-2023: An Analysis of Progress,

Impasse, and Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence” Horn Diplomat, December 31,
2023, [Link]
2012-2023-an-analysis-of-progress-impasse-and-prospects-for-peaceful-
coexistence/. Accessed December 11, 2024.

The past decade has witnessed a complex dance of dialogue and divergence between
Somaliland and Somalia. From initial cautious engagement in 2012 to recent high-level
meetings facilitated by Djibouti, the talks have grappled with the enduring question of
Somaliland’s future relationship with Somalia. For academics, these interactions offer a
rich tapestry of political dynamics, inter-clan rivalries, and the interplay of domestic
aspirations with international ambitions. Policymakers, meanwhile, navigate a sensitive
landscape where regional stability hinges on understanding the nuanced positions of
both sides. At the heart of the negotiation lies a fundamental divergence. Having
restored its independence in 1991 after a brutal civil war and the loss of hundreds of
thousands, Somaliland views itself as a de facto sovereign state. Its narrative
emphasizes a distinct colonial history, a functioning democracy, and hard-won peace
and stability. Conversely, Somalia clings to its internationally recognized borders and
views Somaliland’s aspirations as detrimental to national unity. Any solution, therefore,
must consider not only the complex historical baggage but also the unwavering
commitment of Somalilanders to their self-determination.

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Warrant: Rewarding this promotes more violence and instability on the continent.

Gebereamlak, Hagos. “Ethiopia’s Recognition of Somaliland and the Repercussions for

African Borders.” The Report, October 2, 2024,
[Link] Accessed December 11, 2024.

After gaining independence, African states largely adopted a policy of respecting the
borders drawn during colonial times. This principle, known as ‘Uti Possidetis’, is
enshrined in Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act, which calls for the
preservation of borders as they existed at the time of independence. The goal of this
policy has been to prevent disorder, chaos, and conflict across the continent. African
countries have generally followed this principle, fearing that the recognition of
secessionist movements could set dangerous precedents. Although Somaliland was a
separate British colony before merging with Somalia, the application of this principle
may be complicated by the fact that it voluntarily joined Somalia shortly after gaining
independence in 1960. Therefore, recognizing Somaliland’s independence today might
be seen as a challenge to the established principle of respecting colonial boundaries. If
Ethiopia proceeds with recognizing Somaliland, it could compromise the long-standing
principle of preserving colonial borders. This move might encourage other secessionist
movements across Africa and lead to broader geopolitical instability. The recognition
of Somaliland could serve as a precedent, prompting other groups to push for
independence and potentially leading to a reshaping of the African political landscape.
Recognizing Somaliland could encourage secessionist movements and irredentist
claims across the Horn of Africa, fueling instability in the region. There are already
existing aspirations for independence in several parts of the Horn, and Somaliland’s
recognition could embolden these movements.

Turn: Recognizing Somaliland could push Somalia towards China.

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Warrant: Somalia would seek out China after being abandoned by the US.

Meservey, Joshua. “The U.S. Should Recognize Somaliland.” The Heritage Foundation,
October 19, 2021, [Link]
should-recognize-somaliland. Accessed December 15, 2024.

One virtually certain consequence of Washington recognizing Somaliland is that it

would damage relations with southern Somalia that would view it as dismembering
the country. Yet Somaliland, in practice, is already separate from the rest of Somalia
and has, for 30 years, repudiated Mogadishu’s sovereignty claims. Somaliland has
taken the decision to carve itself off from the rest of the country, and American
recognition of its independence would simply be acknowledging that reality. While a
break with Mogadishu would be unfortunate, it would not badly harm U.S. strategic
interests because Washington derives little benefit from its current relationship with the
federal government. Its political elites’ power struggles obstruct the battle against al-
Shabaab, and the rampant corruption siphons off American aid money and fuels further
violent conflict. Despite massive military, diplomatic, and financial support, Mogadishu
has made scant progress rectifying the many thorny issues facing the country. As
mentioned earlier, American recognition of Somaliland may bring a unity and
seriousness of purpose to the federal government facing the prospect of other
attempted defections by its federal member states. Somalia’s anger over American
recognition could give China an advantage in the strategically situated country.
However, Somalia badly needs American security assistance and humanitarian aid,
which would dampen an overreaction from Mogadishu and likely facilitate an
eventual rapprochement. And while Beijing could replace any American aid
Mogadishu rejects, it could not and would not provide the kinetic counterterrorism
support that the U.S. does, and which is important to keeping al-Shabaab at bay.
Beijing has made some recent investments in Somalia and publicly proclaims its interest

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in strong diplomatic relations, but Somalia for the foreseeable future is unlikely to
achieve enough stability to be the type of partner with which Beijing can build strong
ties.

Analysis: These four responses are all good ways to combat the argument about the Belt and
Road Initiative. The first response says that Somaliland is too distant from China to ever join it.
The second response says that the United States’ decision to recognize Somaliland will be
independent of the African Union because of Trump. The third response says that this
recognition will encourage more violence. The fourth response says that Somalia could go
deeper into the BRI. Debaters should mix and match these arguments and use the ones that
best fit their case.

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A/2: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access

to international markets and global trade

Response: Global markets and trade will prove detrimental to Somaliland’s prosperity.

Turn: Greater foreign investment only harms the domestic sectors of developing countries like
Somaliland, decreasing economic growth and exacerbating poverty.

The impact of foreign direct investment on economic growth: case of post communism
transition economies”

Melnyk, Leonid. “The impact of foreign direct investment on economic growth: case of post
communism transition economies” Problems and Perspectives in Management. 2014.
Accessed 14 December, 2024.
[Link]
s/article/assets/5575/PPM_2014_1_Melnyk.pdf.

However, some other studies (e.g. Schoors et al., 2002) suggest that FDI can have
negative impact on domestic economies. Repatriation of profit and “market stealing
effect” are good examples discussed in this study. Mahutga et that foreign investment
also has a robust positive effect on income inequality; effect was observable over the
short term, no matter how FDI was measured. FDI are different in its structure and as
Eller et al. (2006) suggest the level and quality of foreign investment influences the
financial sectors’ contribution to growth in emerging markets. 2. Negative consequences
for the domestic country from FDI In some cases investments aimed at other countries
might be harmful for [the] domestic economy––decreasing rates of economic growth.
The FDI recipient country may fear foreign ownership of domestic firms. According to
Schoors et al. (2002) at early stages of the development and/or transition to the market

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economies, FDI may have a negative impact. Additional inflows of FDI in firms may push
out of the market other firms without FDI. This fact is referred to as a “market
stealing” effect, when domestic firms are not so productive compared to the foreign
ones. Thus, when business with less than average market productivity leave the market,
then the industry benefits due to increases in productivity. However, when the most
productive firms leave the market, in such cases FDI inflows are harmful for the
recipient country. This is because the FDI negative influence weakens the competitive
position of local producers and results in structural unemployment. An important issue
of FDI is where research and development is held.

Turn: Global investment in developing economies has a significant negative impact on total
factor productivity, which measures aggregate economic activity—prefer this empirical study.

Herzer, Dierk. “The long-run effect of foreign direct investment on total factor productivity
in developing countries: a panel cointegration analysis.” Empirical Economics, 2018.
Accessed 14 December, 2024.
[Link]

Conclusion In this paper, we used panel cointegration techniques to explore a

relationship that has received surprisingly little attention in the FDI literature—the long-
run relationship between the level of FDI and the level of TFP in developing countries.
The panel cointegration approach was chosen not only to obtain non-spurious results,
but also to account for omitted variables and the possible endogeneity of FDI.
Employing data for 49 developing countries for the period 1981–2011, we found that
an increase in the stock of FDI (per capita) has, on average, a robust negative long-run
effect on TFP [Total Factor Productivity] in developing countries. While the finding of a
negative productivity effect of FDI is consistent with many firm-level studies, it
contradicts previous macro-level studies that suggest that FDI has (on average) a
positive or insignificant effect on TFP growth in developing countries. Another finding of

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this study is that there is long-run causality from FDI to TFP, but no short-run causality
from FDI to TFP.

Turn: Somalia demonstrates that greater investment destroys domestic sectors––that’s exactly
why they are doing poorly while Somaliland thrives.

Phillips, Sarah. “When There Was No Aid: War and Peace in Somaliland.” eBook Academic
Collection (EBSCOhost). 2020. Accessed 14 December, 2024.
[Link]
aid/.

Somaliland’s independence discourse hinges on the fact that its sovereignty is

unrecognized even though it has achieved a level of civil order that far exceeds the rest
of Somalia. The discourse emphasizes that Somaliland’s lack of recognition has
contributed to an unusually low (though now rising) level of direct external involvement
in Somaliland’s financial and political affairs. The resulting isolation is framed as an
injustice even though it is sometimes simultaneously referred to as a blessing in
disguise, having afforded Somalilanders a level of self-determination in their
peacebuilding process that was closed to other Somalis. This chapter explores how the
independence discourse assigns meaning to Somaliland’s relative isolation within the
international system. To that end, some background is necessary about the kinds of
intervention that Somalia has experienced. Intervention in Somalia The common
contention that Somalia’s biggest governance problems are exclusively internal (Mills,
Pham, Kilcullen 2013, 306–27) sits uncomfortably with the historical record. The
extraordinary level of intervention in Somalia’s politics makes it extremely difficult—in
fact meaningless—to delineate between domestic or external drivers because Somalia’s
politics are produced by their intersection. In a globalized world the same could, of
course, be said for any state, but it is worth discussing the degree of their entanglement
in Somalia. When the government collapsed in 1991, Somalia was the largest per capita

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recipient of aid in Africa (excluding tiny states like the Gambia and Djibouti). It had held
this position since Siyad Barre swapped from the Soviet to the US side of the Cold War in
1978 (de Waal 1997, 162). As foreign money poured in, the country began to lose its
food self-sufficiency, ultimately to the point of famine. This was due to a combination
of externally mandated austerity programs, a drought, and the “unintended impact of
large-scale annual and often poorly timed delivery of food aid, which depress[ed]
prices and [drove] farmers out of agriculture” (UNEP 2005, 30; see also Farzin 1991,
273; Nestle and Dalton 1994, 19).

Explanation: investment itself is not something to be desired, but something destabilizing to

the domestic industries within Somaliland.

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A/2: Subsequent recognitions of statehood provide Somaliland access

to military aid.

Response: The U.S. and other countries will not recognize Somaliland, even if the African Union
does, so it will not provide access to Western markets.

De-Link: The U.S. and others have said they will not recognize Somaliland, no matter what, due
to important counterterror agreements with Somalia

Gramer, Robbie. “Somaliland Courts U.S. for Independence Recognition.” Foreign Policy.
2022. Accessed 14 December, 2024.
[Link]
recognition/

Top leaders from Somaliland, a semi-autonomous region in Somalia, visited Washington

last week to lobby the United States to recognize the territory’s independence, touting
Somaliland’s stable governance and geostrategic location that they argued could be an
asset for U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa. The Biden administration made clear it had
no plans to recognize Somaliland’s independence from Somalia during the visit by
Somaliland’s president, Muse Bihi Abdi, and foreign minister, Essa Kayd Mohamoud. But
in meetings on Capitol Hill, top U.S. lawmakers signaled that they wanted the United
States to deepen ties with Somaliland, viewing the territory as a bastion of stability in an
otherwise unstable region and potential bulwark against growing Chinese influence in
East Africa. “Even if it takes 100 years for recognition, we will still stand for our identity,
we’ll still engage with everybody, and we’ll still dream of a day where Somaliland is
recognized as its own country,” Kayd told Foreign Policy in an interview. Bihi and Kayd
met with senior officials in the Biden administration, as well as Republicans and
Democrats in Congress, who stopped short of calling for Somaliland’s independence but

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who pushed for closer U.S.-Somaliland ties. U.S. officials fear that recognizing
Somaliland would upend U.S. relations with the federal government in Somalia, which
cooperates with the United States on counterterrorism despite having only fragile
control over some parts of the country, and would open the floodgates for other semi-
autonomous regions in Africa to double down on drives for independence.

Turn: International engagement with Somaliland is fundamentally destabilizing, increasing the

stakes of governmental control, fracturing political factions, and ultimately exacerbating the
civil war.

Zahran, Motaz. “Stability in the Horn of Africa Is Vital to Global Trade and Security |
Opinion.” Newsweek. 12/10/2024. Accessed 14 December, 2024.
[Link]
1998578.

Emboldened by promises of peace and stability, international partners including the US,
the United Kingdom, the EU, the UAE and Taiwan have all announced various
infrastructure, trade and military cooperation initiatives and increased their diplomatic
presence in the capital, Hargeisa. The multi-million-dollar investment by UAE’s DP World
is transforming Berbera port into a 1 million container trade hub that is anticipated to
reshape the regional economy. There has also been deepening security ties. The United
Kingdom has funded and trained a controversial elite police unit, whilst Washington has
been interested in establishing a new military base in Berbera. This dizzying gush of
international engagement intended to stabilise Somaliland has however had
destabilising consequences for the whole region. Firstly, it has renewed hopes of
Somaliland becoming internationally recognised as an independent state, dramatically
raising the stakes, and intensifying competition amongst political elites over control.
The political crisis that emerged in summer of 2022 over delayed elections highlighted
this increasingly fractious internal competition. In anti-government demonstrations in

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Hargeisa in August 2022, five civilians were killed in clashes with security forces, a grim
harbinger of what was to come in Las Anod. If the increased stakes of statehood have
resulted in competition in the centre of the region, then it has done the opposite in the
peripheries: uniting peripheral communities against Somaliland.

Explanation: this response works well with the broader narrative that Somaliland has
succeeded due to its independence from external (i.e., Western) influence. International
engagement increases the incentives for conflict, only destabilizing the region and undermining
progress towards democracy.

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A/2: Recognition of statehood enables counterterror support,

undermining al-Shabaab.

Response: Recognition of statehood would actually increase terror-levels.

Turn: International Recognition would enable Al-Shabab to expand and mackenzie under the
guise of “preventing Somalia’s disintegration.”

Zahran, Motaz. “Stability in the Horn of Africa Is Vital to Global Trade and Security |
Opinion.” Newsweek. 12/14/2024. Accessed 14 December, 2024.
[Link]
1998578.

The eyes of the world are fixed on the rising tensions in the Middle East as Israel's war
continues in Gaza and Syria falls back into chaos, dominating global news coverage. Yet
the world cannot afford to overlook the rising tensions in the Horn of Africa posing a
serious threat to both regional and international peace and security. For the past year,
the Houthis have disrupted global commerce in one of the world's most crucial
waterways, the Red Sea leading to the Suez Canal, but this is only the tip of the iceberg.
Instability in the Horn of Africa was exacerbated following Ethiopia's decision to
undermine the internationally recognized sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Somalia by signing an agreement with the region of Somaliland. This enables the
terrorist group Al-Shabab to recruit militants, spread their destructive ideology, and
expand operations beyond Somalia's borders under the guise of preventing Somalia's
disintegration. Coordination between Al-Shabab and the Houthis will only add fuel to
fire to engulf the Bab Al Mandeb Strait. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea is of critical
importance to global economic security due to the integrated nature of global supply
chains. 12 percent of world trade flows through the Red Sea, and disruptions to this flow

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affect the global economy. The recent elections in Somaliland are an important
development, as they create an opportunity, if seized correctly, to considerably reduce
tensions in the region. Ethiopia should revoke its agreement with Somaliland, and the
U.S. should put in use its political clout to mediate between Mogadishu and Hargeisa
to settle, once and for all, the nature of their relationship within a unified Somalia.
Under this arrangement, it would still be possible for all international and regional
stakeholders to enhance ties with Somaliland while preserving the region's stability and
combatting terrorism. The present agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland directly
defies the realization of these goals.

Turn: Recognizing Somaliland would undermine cooperation with Somalia on counterterror.

The Ethiopia recognition empirically demonstrates this.

Kaar, Liam. “Salafi-Jihadi Movement Update Special Edition: Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Deal
Alters Horn of Africa Counterterrorism and Red Sea Geopolitics.” Institute for the
Study of War. January 2024. Accessed 14 December, 2024.
[Link]
edition-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-alters-horn.

Key Takeaway: Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the de facto

independent Somaliland Republic, a breakaway region of Somalia, to lease a naval port
that will give it Red Sea access in exchange for formally recognizing Somaliland. The
port deal has severely strained Somali-Ethiopian relations and increased anti-Ethiopian
sentiment in southern Somalia, which will likely weaken regional counterterrorism
cooperation and energize al Shabaab. Ethiopia’s African Red Sea neighbors in Djibouti,
Egypt, and Eritrea will likely view an Ethiopian base as a threat, while the United Arab
Emirates’ (UAE) strong ties with the Ethiopian government will strengthen the Emiratis’
position in its regional rivalry with other Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

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Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the de facto independent

Somaliland Republic, a breakaway region of Somalia, on January 1, which will give
Ethiopia access to the Red Sea in exchange for recognizing Somaliland independence.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described Red Sea access in July and October
2023 as an existential issue and “natural right” that Ethiopia would fight for if it could
not secure it through peaceful means.[1] The memorandum of understanding grants
Ethiopia access to a leased military base near the port city of Berbera along Somaliland’s
coast on the Gulf of Aden.[2]

Explanation: Somalia is the key actor on counterterror due to its proximity to Al-Shabab; we
cannot risk alienating Somalia by recognizing Somaliland.

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