Pushan Chakraborty U6FKD

Candidate Number: 1134

“Assess the view that the Third Crusade was a

success"
The success of the Third Crusade is viewed by both contemporary and modern historians as a hotly
debated topic. Success can be assessed by focusing on three aspects of the Third Crusade and the
extent to which they were able to achieve a degree of success either militarily, diplomatically or
territorially throughout this campaign. The conclusion to the Third Crusade was the Treaty of Jaffa in
the summer of 1192 and is described by Asbridge as a result of Saladin and Richard having fought
one another to a ‘standstill’1. This is among historians a pre-eminent factor for debate; the Crusaders
were perceived to be in a dominant position in the Levant, where they possibly could have
manufactured a realistic siege upon Jerusalem, which never materialised. However, multiple
diplomatic factors such as indecision, internal rivalries and a ‘cataclysmic failure in leadership’2 within
the Crusader’s camp resulted in the main objective to retake Jerusalem never even being attempted
and meant that the Third Crusade did not reach its full potential. This failure regarding a lack of
attempt is attributed to historians such as Asbridge & James Reston Jr, coining the Third Crusade as
a missed opportunity and an ultimate failure. James Reston Jr notably describes, “that only the First
Crusade was successful in the sense that it managed to capture Jerusalem”, and, “only three of the
five got close to the object of enterprise, the Holy City”3. Reston Jr’s view definitively disagrees with
the hypothesis that the Third Crusade was a success. However, some Historians view the military
and territorial achievements of the Third Crusade as major successes such as Jonathan Phillips,
who argues that the victories in Acre, Arsuf and Jaffa prolonged the Frankish stay in the Levant.
Phillips provides a valuable counterargument to Reston Jr & Thomas Asbridge's book, also titled The
Crusade. Phillips judges the success of the Third Crusade from a more partial standpoint, where he
acknowledges that the campaign failed in its ‘ultimate aim’ of retaking Jerusalem; however,
geographically, it succeeded in providing the Christians with a ‘firm hold’ of the coastline and ensured
their survival in the Levant for staging future Crusades. Nonetheless, the result of the Third Crusade
can be convincingly believed as a partial success where its military and territorial successes are
limited by the failures in diplomacy.

The Third Crusade, as a military campaign, was viewed as largely successful due to the fact that all
three significant sieges, Acre, Arsuf & Jaffa, were victorious. The military success can be further
heightened by defeating an opponent of seismic stature, Saladin and his united Muslim forces who
had a reputation of invincibility. This interpretation is reflected by Jonathan Phillips’ writing in his
book, The Crusades, “Saladin had swept all before him after Hattin, but the defeats at Acre, Arsuf &
Jaffa cumulatively damaged his reputation and morale in the Muslim Near East”4. Phillips’
interpretation is convincing due to the fact Saladin’s reputation before the Third Crusade was largely

1
Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades, Pg 672, [2010]
2
Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades, Pg 669, [2010]
3
James Reston Jr, Warriors of God: Richard the Lionheart & Saladin in the Third Crusade, Forward,
[2001]
4
Jonathan Phillips, The Crusades, Pg 180 [2014]

1
Pushan Chakraborty U6FKD
Candidate Number: 1134

“Assess the view that the Third Crusade was a

success"
positive with an aura of invincibility due to his military dominance in the Levant pre-the Third
Crusade. Saladin’s invincible reputation as a military leader can be derived from his prominent &
expeditious rise to power - from his appointment of vizir in 1169 to 1186 to be the first ruler since the
Eighth Century to control Damascus, Aleppo and Mosul – thus demonstrating an impenetrable wall
of unified Muslim strength. The height of Saladin’s military genius is illustrated in his commanding
victory at the Battle of Hattin on July 4th 1187 a consequence of his ability to unify the Arab world,
which allowed him to assemble an army of 40,000, the largest he ever commanded on the Golan
Heights, as stated by John France in his book Hattin5. Not only was Saladin impressive militarily - his
territorial conquests, the victory at Hattin, but the subsequent conquest of the coast also culminated
in the capture of Jerusalem. What set him apart was his orthodoxy and use of jihad to unite the
Muslim force, which allowed him to assemble an army of great numbers but also listened to his
command & shrewd military tactics. Beha ad-Din reinforces this, a Kurdish jurist who wrote the
contemporary biography of Saladin, in which he noted that “jihad had taken a mighty hold on
Saladin’s heart and all his being”6, indicating Saladin’s leadership & military prowess deemed him to
be titled a ‘Hero of Islam7’ a point that is further supported by the historian Geoffrey Hindley.
Although Saladin’s widespread legacy in contemporary culture and the writings of Beha ad-Din, his
appointed jurist, were slightly exaggerated due to their closeness & friendship towards Saladin.
Nonetheless, as Beha ad-Din was in a position of trust to Saladin and travelled on campaigns with
him, he would be well suited to make a judgement of his character as he knew him personally.
Furthermore, even William of Tyre, a Frankish Chronicler based in the Levant who was partial to the
Crusading forces, praised Saladin for being, “a man wise in counsel, valiant in war and generous
beyond measure”8. William of Tyre’s view is limited in portraying Saladin as exclusively positive due
to the fact he died in September of 1186, meaning that he did not have a full assessment of Saladin’s
life; this meant he did not survive to view the whole sequence of events in the Third Crusade where
Saladin was defeated on numerous occasions at Acre, Arsuf and Jaffa. Nonetheless, one must
consider that there are very few contemporary accounts of Saladin by those who personally knew
him, therefore assessing his character from a narrow vein of evidence Despite that, this shows that
Saladin was a threat to the Crusaders, who was not only feared but respected by his contemporaries
& opponents alike. Therefore the victories at Acre, Arsuf & Jaffa can be significantly credited with
showing the Crusader’s military prowess & Richard’s immense qualities as a military tactician &
leader. Specifically, it was at Arsuf on the 7th of September in 1191, where Richard the Lionheart

5
France, John. Hattin: Great Battles Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Pg 82 (2015)
6
[Link]
382/[Link]#:~:text=The%20
Jihad%2C%20his%20love%20and,of%20it%20and%20encouraged%20it.
7
Geoffrey Hindley, Saladin: Hero of Islam (1976)
8
[Link]
lips-review-6vchp5sfv

2
Pushan Chakraborty U6FKD
Candidate Number: 1134

“Assess the view that the Third Crusade was a

success"
used his armoured knights to take advantage of Saladin’s mounted archers, in a successful
counterattack which saw the 11,200 Crusader forces decimate the 25,000 Muslim cavalry9. This was
Saladin’s first major setback in battle, in terms of men lost compared to the Crusaders, where
approximately 7,000 Muslim troops were killed as opposed to the measly 700 Crusading soldiers
perishing10. The Battle of Arsuf was where, “Richard and his crusader host won a clear and
unambiguous victory” according to Professor Andrew Latham11, and is notably an utter ‘humiliation’
for Saladin & his forces. Thus September 1191 marked the date when Saladin’s reputation was
tarnished, as reflected by Jonathan Phillips12. Richard’s military superiority is also evident at the
Battle of Arsuf in September 1191, where his organisation on the march from Acre to Jaffa damaged
Muslim morale significantly, and the Battle of Jaffa in August 1192 prevented Saladin from taking
Ascalon. However, there is an element of partiality in terms of the evidence utilised in Phillip’s
writings due to the fact he mainly compiles evidence from a Western perspective. Thus this suggests
Phillips has a more narrow interpretation of the Crusades than if he included a more balanced range
of primary sources from which to draw his conclusions. Nonetheless, coupled with Phillips's
interpretation, Latham reinstates, it can be convincingly assessed that the tarnishing of Saladin’s
reputation of ‘invincibility’ was an unambiguous success in the Third Crusade.

Moreover, the victories in battle throughout the Third Crusade can largely be attributed to the military
astuteness in the leadership of Richard the Lionheart. Richard’s reputation as an outstanding
crusade leader was and remains very high: from his contemporary name ‘The Lionheart’ to his
Victorian depiction on horseback in front of Parliament, shows that his heroics in the Levant have
resulted in him being immortalised as a symbol of strength. However, from an Islamic perspective,
Richard was viewed as a barbaric and ruthless military leader. This can be largely credited to the
Massacre of the Saracens in 1191 after the Siege of Acre, which lasted for almost two years, and
resulted in the execution of 2700 Muslim hostages, according to the Itinerarium Regis Ricardi13,
which is a Latin prose narrative of the Third Crusade written thirty years after the Third Crusade in
1222 by Richard de Templo. When writing about this matter, de Templo justified Richard’s actions by
stating that, “King Richard always hoped to overwhelm the Turks completely, to crush their impudent
arrogance, to confound the Moslem law, and to vindicate Christianity”14. Richard de Templo’s
viewpoint is derived from his time as a former chaplain of the Knights of Templar during the Third
Crusade, where 90 Templars of the 137 knights were massacred at the Battle of Hattin by Saladin’s
orders in 1187. Moreover, including the Christian partiality towards the Crusading forces and Richard

9
Boas, Adrian. "The Crusader World." 2015. Page 78.
10
Boas, Adrian. "The Crusader World." 2015. Page 78.
11
[Link]
12
Jonathan Phillips, The Crusades, Pg 180 [2014]
13
Richard de Templo, Itinerarium Peregrinorum, Pg 231 (1222), published by William Stubbs [1864]
14
Richard de Templo, Itinerarium Peregrinorum, Muslim Hostages Slain at Acre, 1191,
[Link]

3
Pushan Chakraborty U6FKD
Candidate Number: 1134

“Assess the view that the Third Crusade was a

success"
the Lionheart, Richard de Templo portrays the Massacre of the Saracen as entirely positive for the
Crusaders, ‘vindicating’ Richard’s merciless actions due to Saladin previously committing a similar
act in Hattin. Therefore, de Templo formulated a heavily partial opinion which he ‘vindicated’ by his
hatred for Turks. Nonetheless, the Itinerarium Regis Ricardi was written thirty years after the events
might suggest that his primary account of events was less reliable than chroniclers of the Third
Crusade who wrote during the time of the events such as Beha ad-Din. Despite this, de Tempo’s
views imply that the Massacre of the Saracens was a military success for Richard, due to the fact it
‘crushed’ Muslim morale. This view of Muslim demoralisation due to the Massacre is reflected by
Beha ad-Din, who provides a more in-depth and Islamic perspective on these events. Beha Ad-Din
states that there was a breakdown in negotiations due to their distrust between leaders on the
Surrender Terms after the crusader victory at Acre, where Richard’s demands of 100,000 gold pieces
& 1600 Christian captives to be released were not met, in return Saladin would’ve received 2700
Turkish hostages15. Beha ad-Din, an eyewitness, describes the event as a “massacre with sword &
lance in cold blood”16. This highlights that Richard was a military leader who would go to great
lengths to show his Muslim opponents that his Crusading army was their greatest threat; this
indicates that Richard’s barbaric actions were a ploy to worsen Muslim morale to deepen their defeat
at Acre. For example, Beha ad-Din wrote that Muslim soldiers even recognised some of the dead,
and the sight was a ‘great affliction to them’17. Thus, it can be indicated that this act of brutal violence
was indeed a great success for the Crusaders, the Muslim forces were utterly bereaved by the
conclusion of the Siege of Acre in the July of 1191; this meant that Saladin & his men were more
vulnerable in future battles & sieges. Furthermore, Beha ad-Din can be deemed a reliable primary
source of judgement and faithfully substantiate the diminishing morale of the Saracens since he was
a ‘trusted friend’, confident and chronicler to Saladin and he was an eyewitness to many of the
events that took place who wrote contemporarily to write a biography of Saladin’s life. However, one
must still consider that this evidence might be tainted due to his loyalty and devotion to Saladin
which may adapt his opinions slightly based on his own political beliefs. Thus, it can be seen that
Richard’s military decisions and leadership, on this occasion, were performed in a way that only his
Crusaders benefitted from the events occurring in the summer of 1191, where the economic cost of
holding 2700 Turkish prisoners was uplifted from the Crusader’s soldiers while the mental advantage
on the Muslims was opportunistically taken by Richard. This ‘mental advantage’ was certainly
utilised in the Battle of Arsuf in September of 1191 & Jaffa in 1192, where the military victories
demoralised Saladin and his Saracen army, somewhat ruining their reputation as an unbeatable
force. The Saracen’s utter demoralisation & military exhaustion, according to Thomas Asbridge18 was
the primary reason why Saladin called for the Treaty of Jaffa in 1192, which highlighted that Saladin’s

15
Beha ad-Din, in Archer, T.A., The Crusade of Richard I (1889)
16
[Link]
17
Beha ad-Din, in Archer, T.A., The Crusade of Richard I (1889)
18
Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades, Pg 672, [2010]

4
Pushan Chakraborty U6FKD
Candidate Number: 1134

“Assess the view that the Third Crusade was a

success"
Ayyubid Empire was at the point of collapse, due to the military successes of Richard and his
Crusaders. Ultimately, these military successes in Acre, Arsuf & Jaffa are the reason why there is a
debate on the general ‘success’ of the Third Crusade, despite Jerusalem, the primary objective,
never being acquired.

Diplomatic success is judged against the criteria of successful communication, effective teamwork
and achieving a common objective despite the opposition of others. The evaluation of this dictates
and demonstrates that the Third Crusade was far from a Diplomatic success. The Third Crusade
lacked both effective teamwork and successful communication among the three crusading leaders.
The only area which had a degree of diplomatic success was the Treaty of Jaffa in 1192, however,
this achievement should not overshadow the inadequacies in diplomacy portrayed by the Crusading
leaders. Diplomatic failures during the Third Crusade limited their overall success largely due to the
political inadequacies of the three Crusading leaders, most notably Richard I. The majority of the
Third Crusade saw poor diplomatic decisions, mainly due to Richard I's hastiness and his neglect of
diplomacy meant that his strategy became unclear. One historian who reflects on this argument is
Thomas Asbridge, who denounces Richard’s diplomacy as a ‘failure in leadership’ due to the fact he
‘was not considering the crusade’s best interests, but was moved primarily by concerns about his
own reputation’19. Asbridge’s assessment of Richard I can be derived from Richard’s lack of
willingness to materialise an actual siege on Jerusalem due to his desire to return to defend his
Angevine Empire as soon as possible from Phillip Augustus rather than continue pursuing the
original objective, Jerusalem. Therefore, Asbridge holds a convincing interpretation of Richard’s
motivation after the definitive diplomatic failure of Phillip’s departure was hindered due to Augustus’s
threat to Richard’s Angevin Empire. The combative relationship between Phillip II of France and
Richard the Lionheart led to the latter hastily abandoning the campaign in the Levant to secure and
protect his lands at home. Should they of had a better relationship that was mutually committed to
the cause, neither would have left before reclaiming Jerusalem and certainly not for personal gain.
Losing his territories in France would have tarnished Richard’s reputation. Asbridge also furthers this
point when he states how Lionheart was in feared being, ”forever blamed, shamed and less loved”20.
This view is supported by the contemporary chronicler of the Third Crusade and Richard’s ‘ardent
promoter’ Ambroise, who portrayed that in reality the king was ‘paralysed’ by Phillip’s threat to his
land in England and longed for his return. However, Ambroise goes on to write that Richard, “in the
face of mounting public pressure bowed to popular sentiment…this capitulation signalled that
Richard had now lost control of the Third Crusade”, by promising to stay and lay siege to Jerusalem

19
Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades, Pg 671, [2010]
20
Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades, Pg 670, [2010]

5
Pushan Chakraborty U6FKD
Candidate Number: 1134

“Assess the view that the Third Crusade was a

success"
to his crusading army after their rise in morale after Richard had a supposed spiritual epiphany.21
This reinforces the opinion that Richard himself was no longer focused on re-taking Jerusalem as
this was a clear failure in communication, but rather on ending the Third Crusade as quickly as
possible for his own benefit, his diplomatic hastiness led to outcomes not fulfilling their potential.
Ambroise’s comments are especially significant, this is due to the fact that he was a chronicler who
was a pilgrim, travelling as part of the Crusading forces and was dubbed an ‘ardent promoter’ yet he
critiques Richard’s authority to lead the Third Crusade. This suggests he was charged to create
propaganda to promote the Lionheart’s positive image, glorifying him. Therefore, his negative critique
of Richard’s lack of single-mindedness towards achieving the ultimate prize of the Holy Land
suggests that Phillip’s absence was a substantial issue which hindered the outcome of the Third
Crusade which increases the reliability of the primary source. Overall, Richard, the Lionheart failed
to maintain an honest line of communication with his own men and Phillip II and they no longer
shared a common goal. Therefore, it can be convincingly argued that the hastiness and selfishness
in decision-making on Richard I’s behalf was a diplomatic failure which meant that the ultimate
objective of the Third Crusade was never to be attempted.

Another aspect of poor diplomacy during the Third Crusade was the disunity between Crusader
leaders, which did not allow for competent communication and efficient teamwork to take place
during the Third Crusade, which meant that options in strategy were often limited. Jonathan Phillips
echoes this, arguing that Phillip II’s departure greatly ‘reduced Richard’s options in the Levant
considerably’ and ‘plummetted the Crusader army’s morale’22. This view can be considered
extremely convincing due to the fact that Phillip’s departure diplomatically unsettled Lionheart’s
inclination to re-take Jerusalem, which ‘reduced options’ because Richard I was adamant to return
and protect his land from Phillip II and his brother John. Thus this made Richard prone to hasty and
questionable decision-making, such as the Massacre of the Saracens in 1191, where 2700 Turkish
hostages were executed.23 This is supported by the view that Richard is too likely to be ‘hurling
himself into danger & battle imprudently’24, which was a viewpoint allegedly thought by his Muslim
counterpart, Saladin when discussing Richard’s personality with one of his chroniclers Ibn al-Athir.
Ibn al-Athir, also a member of Saladin’s retinue, holds a contemporary interpretation that can be
deemed well-versed in viewing Saladin’s career and what views his leader holds. However, there is
an obvious element of partiality to this primary source, due to his employment by Saladin, which
implies that al-Athir could have intentions of downplaying the threat of Richard the Lionheart and

21
Ambroise, Itinerarium Regis Ricardi, Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades: The War for the Holy Land,
Pg 671, [2010]
22
Jonathan Phillips, The Crusades, 1095-1204 pg 177
23
Richard de Templo, Itinerarium Peregrinorum, Muslim Hostages Slain at Acre, 1191,
[Link]
24
Ibn al-Athir, [Link], 2007: 387

6
Pushan Chakraborty U6FKD
Candidate Number: 1134

“Assess the view that the Third Crusade was a

success"
praising his leader by stating his Frankish counterpart is ‘imprudent’. Overall, this view is too
influenced by their obvious connection to Saladin, therefore this primary source does not have a
complete, well-measured and valid argument. Nonetheless, when incorporated with Phillips’
interpretation, this reinforces that Richard’s hasty, outlandish personality portrays a diplomatic leader
who is not cooperative, resulting in diplomatic tensions which damage the outcome of the Third
Crusade. Asbridge presents an argument which could be a direct response to Richard I’s heavy
desire to leave the Third Crusade to defend his territory, who states that “Richard considered the city
of Jerusalem an unrealistic target”25. Asbridge presents a view which has a degree of scepticism
towards it, this was due to the vulnerable state of the Saracens from their successive major military
defeats and their heavy loss of morale from the Massacre of the Saracens in 1191. Moreover,
Richard even advocated for Jerusalem to be an ‘unrealistic target’26 because he desired to hasten
the process to return to his Angevine Empire. This indicates that Richard did not genuinely believe
Jerusalem was an unrealistic target but he desired his image to not be tainted by cowardice. Despite
Asbridge’s view being questionable, these selfish diplomatic decisions by the Lionheart underline a
major failure in communication, which limits the potential of the Third Crusade. In conclusion, when
combining Phillips’ and Asbridge’s interpretations, Augustus’s departure impacted the Third Crusade
as the ultimate objective was deemed as ‘unrealistic’ by their leader, Richard would have major
repercussions on the Crusader morale showing a general diplomatic failure which is even noticed by
the central opposition, Saladin. Therefore, it can be justified to view Richard the Lionheart’s attitude
towards diplomacy to be inadequate and his unwillingness to effectively communicate with his peer
leaders or use teamwork implies the Third Crusade was a diplomatic failure.

However, during the negotiations for the Peace Treaty of Jaffa in the winter of 1192, an isolated
occurrence of diplomatic competency and shrewdness allowed Richard I to conclude the Third
Crusade on positive terms for the Crusaders. One such opinion, held by James Reston Jr is that
Richard had ‘collapsed from battle fatigue’ due to the ‘stench’ of the battlefield which led to Richard
informing Saladin’s chamberlain Abu Bekr correctly noted that he was ‘anxious above all things to be
able to return to his country’27. Reston Jr provides an unconvincing view when considering Asbridge
and Phillips's interpretations, who both agree that Phillip Augustus’ threat to his territory or the fact
they have ‘exhausted their resources are far more significant reasons for desiring a truce than battle
fatigue, which is challenged & mentioned by Saladin said to his emirs as quoted in Reston Jr’s

25
Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades, Pg 662
26
Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades, Pg 662
27
James Reston Jr, Warriors of God: Richard the Lionheart & Saladin in the Third Crusade,Pg 329,
[2001]

7
Pushan Chakraborty U6FKD
Candidate Number: 1134

“Assess the view that the Third Crusade was a

success"
book28. However, due to the unconvincing nature yet honourable excuse of ‘battle fatigue’, it was the
perfect diplomatic answer to the Turk; also the fact that Richard commenced the peace discussions
between the two camps suggested that he had control of the situation, allowing for more favourable
terms for the Crusaders. Moreover, the timing of Richard’s reasoning was shortly after Saladin’s
unsuccessful three-day assault on Jaffa where they lost seven hundred men as opposed to the mere
two knights who died29, any more losses to Saladin would hurt his reputation beyond repair. For that
reason, it was favourable for Saladin to accept the Peace Treaty terms. Therefore, it can be more
convincing to view Richard’s excuse of battle fatigue as an exaggeration to persuade Saladin to act
in accordance with the idea of a truce. In addition, Richard used his poor health and illness to
emphasise further his desire to end the Third Crusade and to convince Muslims that a truce was an
urgent matter, increasing the severity of the issue and leading Saladin and the emirs to accept his
peace demand promptly. Therefore, it can be implied that Richard’s actions formulated the Peace
Treaty of Jaffa to be more favourable towards the Crusaders.

In assessing how far territorially the Third Crusade could be adjudged as a success, Jonathan
Phillips states, “while it failed to achieve its ultimate aim of retaking Jerusalem, it did succeed in
providing the Christians with a reasonably firm hold of much of the coastline and created a
springboard for future crusades”30. In stating this, Phillips argues that the Third Crusade should be
perceived positively as the Crusading forces made significant territorial inroads in the Levant, which
prolonged Frankish survival in the Middle East post-Third Crusade. This view is convincing because
the Franks retained land in the Levant until 1291 when the territories reclaimed in the Third Crusade
were used as a launchpad to stage two more major Crusades until their demise in 1291. Moreover,
this is a well-assessed view, since Phillips also states the overall failure in ‘retaking Jerusalem’,
which suggests the point is objective as his view also acknowledges the limitations and successes in
terms of territorial achievement. During this crusade, the majority of the coastline of the Levant was
reclaimed; this included the principalities of Tripoli, Acre, Cyprus and a portion of the kingdom of
Jerusalem & a free passage to the Holy City. The Treaty of Jaffa reinforced this in 1192 which stated
that pilgrims had a free passage into the Holy City and that the coastline was to remain in Christian
hands. This interpretation very much supports the idea of the Third Crusade’s outcomes as a
territorial success. Jonathan Phillips’ view of the Third Crusade largely being a territorial success is
reflected in the Itinerarium Regis Ricardi where Richard de Templo describes Richard the Lionheart
conquered Cyprus as a sign of ‘courage’ and an area with an ‘abundance of loot’31. In many ways,
Richard’s conquest of Cyprus can be viewed as unnecessary and insignificant. However, the
28
James Reston Jr, Warriors of God: Richard the Lionheart & Saladin in the Third Crusade, Pg 329,
[2001]
29
[Link]
30
Jonathan Phillips, The Crusades, pg 170 [2014]
31
[Link]

8
Pushan Chakraborty U6FKD
Candidate Number: 1134

“Assess the view that the Third Crusade was a

success"
conquest of Cyprus in May of 1191, on his way to the Levant was a sign of authority, which
highlighted his prowess not only as a military leader but Richard I’s proactivity to expand territorially.
Nonetheless, Richard de Tempo originally finished writing the Itinerarium Regis Ricardi in 1222,
thirty-one years after Richard the Lionheart took Cyprus. Therefore this suggests, that his account of
events has a possibility of inaccuracy. Moreover, de Templo was not an eyewitness to this scene,
further hindering his reliability. Nonetheless, Richard’s conquest of Cyprus was significant, as it was
used as a base for future Crusades due to its relatively close proximity to the Levant yet it was not in
Turkish waters. Moreover, the territorial successes of Richard throughout the Third Crusade were
also supported by Andrew Latham. He asserts that Richard’s ‘initial plan’ after the Siege of Acre was
to ‘march on Egypt’ & disrupt Saladin’s main ‘source of wealth’ & resources, granting the Crusaders
limitless reserves to prolong their hold of the Middle East but also Jerusalem. Latham corroborated
this when he states Crusaders, “enjoy their dominance in the Middle East over Saladin”32. One can
state that territorially, Phillips and Latham are correct as the large amount of land that the Crusaders
acquired, despite not reclaiming Jerusalem had significant strategic and economic benefits because
the Levant’s coast feasibly permitted trade and military reinforcement in numbers which highlights
that the Third Crusade was a territorial success.

However, the argument is hotly contested by Thomas Asbridge, who is strongly influenced that
territorial achievements were significantly less than Latham and Phillips suggest, due to the fact that
their ultimate territorial objectives in Jerusalem’s recapture and the neglect of actually preparing a
strategy to take Egypt were never achieved. Asbridge believes that the lack of Jerusalem’s capture
means that the main objective of the Third Crusade was not materialised, therefore the Third
Crusade is a total failure. Thus in this light, territorially the Third Crusade cannot be perceived as
anything other than inadequate. Asbridge states, “the sultan had survived the crusader’s second
inland advance and remained in possession of Jerusalem … the Lionheart’s abandoned plan to open
a new front in Egypt would threaten the very foundations of the Ayyubid Empire, and likely force
Saladin to agree to a truce on terms of the Lionheart’s choosing”33. Territorially Asbridge is inferring
that the failure to open a new front was a missed opportunity to lay a siege on Egypt and as such the
Crusaders failed to meet their objective. Asbridge makes a convincing argument derived from the
Crusader’s diminishing resources to pose a real threat to take Jerusalem, due to Egypt’s rich
economy. However, as Asbridge states, Richard’s intentions suggest that Jerusalem's acquisition
was never his main objective post his diplomatic failure in allowing for Phillip Augustus’s departure,
instead, it was achieving a favourable truce where the Crusaders can be in a solid position to
dominate the Levant in the future. Thus, conquering Egypt will heavily solve the financial struggles

32
[Link]
33
Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades, Pg 675, [2010]

9
Pushan Chakraborty U6FKD
Candidate Number: 1134

“Assess the view that the Third Crusade was a

success"
and the lack of manpower the Crusaders were facing as it will allow an easy passage to the Middle
East via sea. Therefore it can be seen that Richard’s diplomatic inadequacies and failures restricted
his territorial achievements.

The territorial acquisition of Egypt was a missed opportunity and territorial failure echoed in both
Asbridge and John Gillingham's interpretations due to Egypt’s beneficial tactical position in the
Middle East and its economic prosperity. In his view, Asbridge agrees with John Gillingham, who
believes in the principle that all crusader strategies were based on the belief that ‘the keys to
Jerusalem were found in Cairo’34. This can be verified by the multiple instances where Egypt was
attempted to be captured by the Franks throughout Crusading history. However, Gillingham’s
interpretation is heavily focused on portraying Richard the Lionheart’s perspective during the Third
Crusade; therefore it can be implied that because of this, Gillingham’s interpretation will only favour
Richard I’s strategy of capturing Egypt. Despite this, Richard wrote a letter to the Genoese Council in
the spring of 1192, begging for sufficient funds to stage a proper attempt to capture Egypt. Richard
states, “For the benefit of that land (Jerusalem) if you are agreeable, hasten with all our forces into
Egypt [...] so we beg your sincerity as earnestly as we can out of regard for your sacred duty and
with an eye on your benefit, come with as much equipment as you can without delay to the Christian
army”35. This letter shows that the lack of a proper attempt in capturing Egypt was a major territorial
failure as it would have made it easier to achieve the main objective of the Third Crusade and would
of further prolonged Frankish rule in the Levant. Furthermore, this letter follows Gillingham’s
principle, Richard implies that at the point of writing, Spring of 1192, the Crusaders were heavily
depleted in resources and manpower. Due to the dire situation, the Crusaders are putting
themselves in, this source intends to 'beg' rather than convince, urging the Genoese to send
reinforcements that will be most effective in Egypt. However, Richard’s wording of Jerusalem as ‘that
land’ portrays his reluctance to carry through a realistic siege to Jerusalem. Nonetheless, the
territorial desire to capture Egypt would allow for an easier conquest of the ‘object of enterprise, the
Holy City’36. Therefore it can be convincingly deduced that this was a rare occurrence where the
Third Crusade did not succeed territorially.

The interpretation that the Third Crusade was a success is certainly not the most convincing
argument due to the fact it overlooks the hugely influential diplomatic factors which were ultimately
the most significant causes in limiting the military and territorial successes. This was because the
diplomatic inadequacies of Richard the Lionheart meant that the Crusaders had limited resources, a
lack of manpower. Richard’s diplomatic hastiness and lack of desire to use teamwork were what

34
John Gillingham, Richard the Lionheart, pg 194, [1979]
35
P.W. Edbury, The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade [1998], Source 7d, pg 181, [1192]
36
James Reston Jr, Warriors of God: Richard the Lionheart & Saladin in the Third Crusade, Forward,
[2001]

10
Pushan Chakraborty U6FKD
Candidate Number: 1134

“Assess the view that the Third Crusade was a

success"
ultimately cost the Third Crusade from following through on its objective as Richard’s burning desire
to return to his unprotected Angevine Empire after his poor relationship with Phillip Augustus resulted
in the French king prematurely departing from the Third Crusade with intentions of taking the
Lionheart’s land Nevertheless, Asbridge’s convincing portrayal of the Third Crusade in more of a
negative scope, highlighting the diplomatic ‘paralysis’ Richard showed after Phillip’s departure
negatively changed the course of the Third Crusade from a campaign set out to capture Jerusalem
to then find the most effective and quickest method to a truce37. Nonetheless, the military victories at
Acre, Arsuf and Jaffa and the territorial successes in the conquest of the coast of the Levant certainly
stimulated the debate amongst historians on the success of the Third Crusade. Moreover, the impact
of Richard’s military victories reduced Muslim morale, and tarnished Saladin’s ‘invincible reputation’.
Therefore, Reston Jr and Asbridge’s overall view that the Third Crusade was a clear failure because
Jerusalem was not being captured does not hold weight. On the other hand, Jonathan Phillip’s apt
argument that the success of the Third Crusade was more partial because “it failed to achieve its
ultimate aim of retaking Jerusalem, it did succeed in providing the Christians with a firm hold of much
of the coastline, prolonging their survival in the Levant”38, is far a more balanced argument, and thus
the most convincing to believe.

Bibliography

Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades: The War for the Holy Land [2010]

Jonathan Phillips, The Crusades [2014]

James Reston Jr, Warriors of God: Richard the Lionheart & Saladin in the Third Crusade, [2001]

Geoffrey Hindley, Saladin: Hero of Islam (1976)

John Gillingham, Richard the Lionheart, [1979]

John France, Hattin: Great Battles Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015)

Adrian Boas. "The Crusader World.", [2005]

Richard de Templo, Itinerarium Peregrinorum (1222), published by William Stubbs [1864]

Beha ad-Din, in Archer, T.A., The Crusade of Richard I (1889)

Ibn al-Athir, [Link], 2007

37
Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades, Pg 664, [2010]
38
Jonathan Phillips, The Crusades, pg 170 [2014]

11
Pushan Chakraborty U6FKD
Candidate Number: 1134

“Assess the view that the Third Crusade was a

success"
P.W. Edbury, The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade [1998]

[Link]

Richard de Templo, Itinerarium Peregrinorum, Muslim Hostages Slain at Acre, 1191,

[Link]

[Link]

[Link]

Word count: 5090

12