Article-1
An Indian Member of Parliament (MP) is said to represent 2.5 million citizens, on average. In
comparison, a U.S. House of Representatives member typically represents approximately
7,00,000 citizens. Similarly, in Pakistan, a member of the National Assembly is a representative
of approximately 6,00,000 citizens, while the ratio in Bangladesh is closer to approximately
5,00,000 citizens. In this year so far, India had around 4,126 Members of the Legislative
Assembly, 543 Lok Sabha MPs and 245 Rajya Sabha MPs. There are far too few
parliamentarians/Assembly members responsible for citizen welfare in India. Limited
representation, in a democratic setup, seems to be our default preference.
While India does have innumerable grassroots politicians, 1,000-plus municipal
councils/corporations with between 50 to 100 wards and approximately 2,38,000 panchayats
(according to Press Information Bureau data) with between five to 30 members on average at
the national/State level, there is a clear deficit in terms of their adequate representation in order
to raise critical issues and enable law-making.
Meanwhile, our political system is riven with malapportionment, with legislative weight being
skewed towards the citizens of select States. Unlike India, the United States has a political
system that seeks to engender malapportionment, with each State given two senators in the U.S.
Senate, enabling a block on legislation. Disproportionate allocation of power is encouraged.
This is easier in a homogeneous country with a bi-party political system, where the same parties
compete across all States. In India, with its heterogeneous political system across States,
malapportionment can mean empowering select political outfits over others. With a sense of a
different political culture in south and north-east India growing, one must tread carefully.
On delimitation
Delimitation could be a potential solution to restore proportionality — it has been utilised in the
past. The Commission was set up four times in the past as an independent body, to enable
redistricting. In 1976, during the Emergency, the number of Lok Sabha seats was frozen, with
delimitation pushed out to 2001, citing ongoing family planning policies, with a push to avoid
punishing select States with effective population control measures in place.
Delimitation may have resumed when States had reduced their fertility rates, enabling parity. In
February 2002, the 84th Amendment Act of the Constitution was introduced, which froze the
number of Lok Sabha seats until the first Census after 2026 (i.e., 2031). With the 2021 Census
delayed (now likely to be conducted in 2024, with results potentially published by 2026), there
is a window to conduct delimitation earlier. However, unleashing delimitation will have its
consequences. Between 1971 and 2011, Rajasthan and Kerala, at 25 million and 21 million in
population in 1971, respectively, have seen a widening to 68 million and 33 million,
respectively. Similarly, in the 2019 elections, each MP from Uttar Pradesh represented
approximately three million voters, while an MP from Lakshadweep represented about 55,000
voters. Assuming the number of parliamentary seats goes up to say 753 seats, States such as
Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Kerala might see an increase in seats of about 6%,
with Karnataka potentially seeing an 11% rise. Meanwhile, northern States such as Uttar
Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan would see their seats rise by 63%. Delimitation,
in its historical form, would engender a bias towards a Hindi-speaking northern population
while enabling select national parties to rise to power. States which have performed well in
reducing their population growth, such as Tamil Nadu and Kerala, may be punished.
Delimitation is inevitable, but its deleterious consequences can be minimised. First, the number
of seats in Parliament needs to increase significantly (at least around 848 seats to avoid any
State losing seats), helping to enhance democratic representation ratios. Delimitation should not
be driven only by factors based on population. Geographical determinism, economic
productivity, linguistic history, and a sense of fairness should also play a part. In simpler terms,
Sikkim’s voice must also be heard in Parliament even if Bihar has a greater population. The
fiscal impact of delimitation on future transfers to States will also need to be rethought.
Promoting federalism
Beyond this, our electoral system must be reformed. Federalism needs to be promoted (past
decades of centralisation that have impacted Centre-State relations), and we need to give States
a better voice and a platform to represent their interests.
The Rajya Sabha can play this role; however, it is currently elected by State legislatures, giving
disproportionately more representation to larger/more populous States. Constitutional reform
can be pursued to give each state the same number of Rajya Sabha MPs. At the same time,
direct elections for Rajya Sabha MPs should be promoted while ensuring that a domicile
requirement is added and stringently adhered to.
Proportional representation can also be considered, especially for the Lok Sabha and State
Assembly elections. In Australia, lower-house elections have voters rank candidates on an
alternative preference ballot — if a candidate does not win a majority of votes in the first round,
the weakest candidate is eliminated, with their votes redistributed to the next preferred
candidate. This goes on until there is a clear majority behind a candidate. In France, a double
ballot system is conducted for National Assembly elections; if no candidate wins in the first
round, the second round sees only candidates with over 1/8th of total votes in the prior round
competing. India’s first-past-the-post system may ensure quicker election results. But still, it
does ensure that a legislator often represents a constituency without a majority of votes.
Having more States
We need more States as well. The largest State (highest resident population) in the United
States, California, has a population of just 39 million, with the average State having a
population of about five to six million. Around 22 Indian States/Union Territories have a
population higher than that. The States Reorganisation Commission was set up in 1953, creating
nearly 14 linguistic States and six Union Territories. There is potential for India to have more
States (moving up from 29 to say 50 or even 75 States); for example, a State such as Uttar
Pradesh, is simply too big to be governed well as a single unit. A concern about North Indian or
large States dominating the polity would be alleviated if we had more and smaller-sized States.
A New State Reorganisation Commission may be set up after the next election to evaluate the
socio-economic and administrative viability of select to-be States (for example, Bundelkhand,
Gorkhaland, Jammu, Karu Nadu, Kongu Nadu, Mithila, Saurashtra, Tulu Nadu and Vidarbha).
We have enough linguistic States — States must be split up/redesigned to enhance
administrative efficiency and democratic accountability.
India has 8,000-plus urban settlements, but the number of mayors remains in the low hundreds.
Every Census town may have a fixed-tenure mayor elected in direct elections. Direct elections
could enhance democratic representation while improving efficiency in urban governance. Such
mayors must also be empowered, with decision-making ability over 18 critical functions — for
example, urban planning, water supply, fire, land use regulations and slum improvement), as
outlined by the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act. Select States such as Bihar and Rajasthan)
must be pushed to loosen their grip on city-level authorities/functions.
Enhancing local democratic representation will help strengthen India’s democracy. Such
measures might help alleviate the concerns of citizens in varied parts of India and to enhance its
democracy. Any child from the northeast or south of India could aspire to become a Prime
Minister. One hopes our policymakers have the wisdom to ensure a just electoral system.
Article-2
The story so far: The delimitation of constituencies for the Lok Sabha and State Legislative
Assemblies is to be carried out on the basis of the first Census after 2026. The 2021 Census was
originally postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequently due to delays on the part
of the Central government.
What is delimitation?
Delimitation means the process of fixing the number of seats and boundaries of territorial
constituencies in each State for the Lok Sabha and Legislative assemblies. It also includes
determining the seats to be reserved for Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) in
these houses. Article 82 and 170 of the Constitution provide that the number of seats in the Lok
Sabha and State Legislative assemblies as well as its division into territorial constituencies shall
be readjusted after each Census. This ‘delimitation process’ is performed by the ‘Delimitation
Commission’ that is set up under an act of Parliament. Such an exercise was carried out after the
1951, 1961 and 1971 Census.
What is the constitutional requirement?
‘Democracy’ means ‘rule or government by the people’. It follows that the government is
elected by a majority with the broad principle of ‘one citizen-one vote-one value’. The number
of seats in the Lok Sabha based on the 1951, 1961 and 1971 Census was fixed at 494, 522 and
543, when the population was 36.1, 43.9 and 54.8 crore respectively. This broadly translated to
an average population of 7.3, 8.4 and 10.1 lakh per seat respectively.
However, it has been frozen as per the 1971 Census in order to encourage population control
measures so that States with higher population growth do not end up having higher number of
seats. This was done through the 42nd Amendment Act till the year 2000 and was extended by
the 84th Amendment Act till 2026. Hence, the population based on which the number of seats is
allocated refers to the population as per the 1971 Census. This number will be re-adjusted based
on the first Census after 2026. The boundaries of territorial constituencies were readjusted
(without changing the number of seats) and seats for SC and ST were determined as per the
2001 Census and will again be carried out after 2026.
In a normal course of events, the delimitation process for the number of seats, boundaries of
territorial constituencies and determining the reserved seats for SC and ST would have
happened based on the Census of 2031 as it would have been the first Census after 2026.
However, with the 2021 Census now being postponed and the year 2026 nearing, there have
been talks about the impending delimitation exercise.
What are the issues?
The number of seats were frozen based on the 1971 Census in order to encourage population
control measures. The population explosion that happened in our country during the last five
decades has been uneven with some States like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and
Rajasthan having a greater increase than States like Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra
Pradesh. There are two options that are being discussed in the public domain with respect to the
revised delimitation exercise based on the projected population of various States as of 2026.
The first is to continue with the existing 543 seats and their redistribution amongst various
States (Table 1) and the second is to increase the number of seats to 848 with proportionate
increase among various States (Table 2).
It can be noticed in both these scenarios that the southern States, the smaller states in the north
like Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, as well as the northeastern States are bound to
be at a disadvantage when compared to the northern States of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya
Pradesh and Rajasthan. This may go against the federal principles of our country and may lead
to a feeling of disenchantment in the population of the States that stand to lose in their
representation. It also goes against the philosophy of freezing seats as per the 1971 Census with
the States that have been better at controlling the population losing out on their political
significance.
What are international practices?
In a federation like the U.S., the number of seats in the House of Representatives (the equivalent
of our Lok Sabha) has been capped at 435 since 1913. The population of the country has
increased almost four times from 9.4 crore in 1911 to an estimated 33.4 crore in 2023. The seats
among the States are redistributed after every Census through the ‘method of equal proportion’.
This does not result in any significant gain or loss for any of the States. For example, based on
the Census of 2020, the reapportionment has resulted in no change in the number of seats for 37
States. Texas gained two seats, five other States gained one seat each and seven States lost one
seat each.
In the European Union (EU) Parliament which consists of 720 members, the number of seats is
divided between 27 member countries based on the principle of ‘degressive proportionality’.
Under this principle, the ratio of population to the number of seats shall increase as the
population increases. For example, Denmark with a population of around 60 lakh has 15 seats
(average population of 4 lakh per member) as against Germany with a population of 8.3 crore
having 96 seats (average population of 8.6 lakh per member).
What can be an ideal solution?
The issue arises because democratic and federal principles seem to be at loggerheads in the
delimitation exercise as envisaged. However, they can be harmoniously reconciled by giving
equal importance to both. The main work of a Member of Parliament is to legislate on ‘Union
List’ matters like Defence, External Affairs, Railways, Telecommunication, Taxation etc. and
hold the Central government accountable. Majority of the schemes of the Central government
are implemented only by the State governments. Hence, the number of MPs in Lok Sabha may
be capped at the present number of 543 which would ensure no disruption in the present
representation from various States. This will maintain and uphold the federal principle. The
number of MLAs in each State may be increased in line with current population (without
changing the number of Rajya Sabha seats) to address the democratic representational
requirement. However, the most important reform for strengthening democracy is to empower
the local bodies of panchayats and municipalities who engage with the citizens on a day-to-day
basis. The devolution of powers and finances to these bodies must be significantly increased to
strengthen democracy at grass root levels.
Article-3
Delimitation, the biggest elephant in the room called the Indian Union, is about to take centre
stage. Statesmen such as Indira Gandhi and Atal Bihari Vajpayee appreciated the explosive
potential of delimitation and kicked the can down the road, as it were, to be handled by a future
generation. Here we are as that future generation. Do we kick the can further down the road? Do
we detonate it? Or do we defuse it? We, the people of India, are at a historical crossroad. Will
India remain a federal union? Or will it become an ethno-linguistic majoritarian mega state with
minority ethno-linguistic mutinies?
Federalism is part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution of India. The Indian
Union is a federal union. States are the federating units. Most States find their basis in language
and many States of the Indian Union are continuations of ethno-linguistic homelands that have
existed for centuries or even millennia. This is precisely why the Supreme Court of India has
termed States as political units and not arbitrary administrative units.
Indian unity was forged in the anti-imperialist struggle against British imperialism and that
unity continues in independent India through a delicate balance of power distribution between
federating units and ongoing dialogue between diverse peoples of the Indian subcontinent.
What is delimitation? Article 82 of the Indian Constitution requires that the number of Lok
Sabha seats per State is recalibrated after each Census by the Delimitation Commission, in
accordance with the population. Delimitation last happened based on the 1971 census, when in
1976, the Indira Gandhi government suspended the delimitation process for 25 years, until
2001. It was further suspended for another 25 years by the A.B. Vajpayee government, and
would lapse by 2026, unless another amendment is introduced. The freezing of delimitation was
done in order not to disincentive States that were effective in population control. However, the
Narendra Modi government has given hints about undertaking fresh delimitation before the
elections in 2029.
Delimitation as a threat
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is a demographic indicator that estimates the average number of
children a woman gives birth to during her reproductive years. Even today, TFR of non-Hindi
States such as Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal is in the 1.6-1.8 range, below the
replacement level of 2.1. The TFR of Hindi heartland States such as Bihar, Chhattisgarh,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, at about 3.5, is well above the replacement level.
This has been true for many decades and thus by now, a recalibration via delimitation will mean
a radical decrease in the proportion of non-Hindi State seats in the Lok Sabha. For example, if
delimitation takes place, the proportion of seats in Parliament for the southern States would be
reduced from 25% to 17% and the number of seats from Hindi heartland States where the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has electoral dominance would increase from 40% to 60%.
States such as Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu already receive only about 30% of the
total funds that contribute as direct taxes, while Bihar and Uttar Pradesh receive between 250%
and 350% of their overall contribution. The decision of 16th Finance Commission to include the
2011 Census instead of the 1971 Census to devolve funds to States will be even more
discriminatory to developed States. It is cause for worry that continuation of the same pattern
would profoundly exacerbate the already existing bias against the non-Hindi States.
Fostering discrimination
India was conceived as a permanent, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual federal union, and not as a
mono ethno-linguistic majoritarianism territory. The difference with states such as China and
Russia is that they are only federal in name, the population being made of a ethno-linguistic
group with a majority of upwards of 80% and several other small minority nationalities. In
India’s case, however, there never was a majority ethno-linguistic group. India is a federation of
various ethno-linguistic stakeholders, none of whom is a majority in India. But the major ones
among them form the basis of various linguistic States, where they are super majority. But with
long-term differences of TFR among States, and thereby, ethno-linguistic groups, this long-
settled pattern faces the threat of being unsettled. Since 1947, the population proportion of
Bengali, Kannada, Malayalam, Marathi, Odia, Punjabi, Tamil and Telugu have all decreased
while the population proportion of one language, Hindi, has massively increased, from 36% to
nearly 43%; 43% is not too far away from the majority.
The ratio of Lok Sabha seats allocated to a State to the total number of Lok Sabha seats
represents the Stakeholdership Index of a State in matters of the Union. Delimitation will
reward the non-performers of population control policies that will effectively dominate and
determine the policy of the Union. The performers will have a declining say and will be reduced
to being mere revenue contributors The proportion of GDP and revenue from non-Hindi States
is much greater than their population percentage while the proportion of GDP and revenue from
Hindi States is lesser than their population percentage.
Post delimitation, States such as Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, where the BJP is dominant, will
have their Stake holdership Index nearly double, whereas States such as Kerala and Tamil Nadu
where the BJP has one to zero seats will see it being reduced by 30%-40%. Such a situation
would skew Indian democracy in favour of the Hindi States, with other regions risking a loss of
electoral dominance. Without electoral dominance and representation in the Union, this would
further alienate the non-Hindi states.
Thus, the implementation of delimitation will create the perfect cocktail of layered
discrimination. Non-Hindi States that have implemented population control measures
successfully will lose a say in Union affairs. Non-Hindi States that contribute a majority of
GDP, resources, revenue and taxes will lose say in how their monies are used. The
‘unsuccessful’ will create policies for the ‘successful’ with money from the ‘successful’. No
taxation without representation was the cry in the Boston Tea Party. In a similar vein,
delimitation will further shrink the representation of States that produce taxes. This is a very
risky and dangerous path to pursue. There is no place for any system in India where some States
increasingly look like owners of an imperial centre while others mimic colonies. Therefore, it is
necessary to balance two competing constitutional values: formal equality in voting and
federalism.
Possible solutions
There can be many solutions. First, just follow what Mrs Gandhi and A.B. Vajpayee did and
extend the freeze by another 25 years and defer to a future generation.
Second, permanently freeze delimitation as far as the India-wide redistribution of seats across
States is concerned.
Third, go through with delimitation as envisaged. But supplement it with a long-due new grand
federal compact such that the Concurrent List is abolished in favour of an expanded State list,
all residual powers vested to the States and large-scale transfer of subjects are made from the
Union list to the State list, keeping external defence, external affairs and currency in Delhi’s
hands. This would balance delimitation with decentralisation, softening the majoritarian blow
inherent in delimitation.
Fourth, preserve the present seat proportion between States in the Lok Sabha but increase the
number of seats in each State to partially offset the representational deficit of population
explosion States.
India is a unique experiment. It is not an ethnic-linguistic majoritarian empire like Russia or
China. It is not a mono-linguistic nation state such as Bangladesh and Thailand. India is like
Africa or Europe, a tapestry of languages, ethnicities, cultures, civilisations and faiths, but with
a crucial difference. It is bound in an inseparable political Union born in the crucible of anti-
imperialist struggle with one, unified voice when speaking to others. India is the grandest
experiment of plurality in modern human history. Majoritarianism and partisanship cannot be
allowed to undo it and threaten its unity. History will not forgive us.
Article-4
Political equality in liberal democracies is not only about equality of opportunity to participate
in the political decision-making process, but also about carrying a vote value that is equal to that
of other members of the community. According to the legal scholar Pamela S. Karlan, the right
to vote can be diluted quantitatively and qualitatively by redrawing the boundaries of the
constituency in an electoral system. Quantitative dilution happens when votes receive unequal
weight due to huge deviations in the population among the constituencies. Qualitative dilution
happens when a voter’s chance of electing a representative of their choice is reduced due to
gerrymandering (redrawing of boundaries to favour a candidate/party). Thus, delimitation of
constituencies plays a major role in strengthening or weakening democracy.
Safeguards
To avoid these dilutions, our Constitution framers envisaged appropriate safeguards to ensure
equal political rights for all citizens. Articles 81 and 170 of Constitution state that the ratio of
the population for the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assembly constituencies shall be the
same as far as practicable. Article 327 empowers Parliament to make laws related to the
delimitation of constituencies, which cannot be questioned in a court of law. Based on this, the
government forms an independent delimitation commission headed by a retired Supreme Court
judge to avoid qualitative dilution. Articles 330 and 332 guarantee reservation of seats for
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in Parliament and State Legislative
Assemblies, which need to be kept in mind during delimitation. Delimitation of constituencies
needs to be carried out regularly based on the decennial Census to maintain equality of the vote
value as far as practicable.
The government has constituted four delimitation commissions so far: in 1952, 1962, 1972 and
2002. The first delimitation order in 1956 identified 86 constituencies as two-member
constituencies, which was abolished by the Two Member Constituencies (Abolition) Act, 1961.
The second delimitation order in 1967 increased the number of Lok Sabha seats from 494 to
522 and State Assembly seats from 3,102 to 3,563. The third delimitation order of 1976
increased the number of Lok Sabha and State Assembly constituencies to 543 and 3,997,
respectively. Due to the fear of more imbalance of representation, the 42nd Amendment Act in
1976 froze the population figure of the 1971 Census for delimitation until after the 2001
Census. The Delimitation Act of 2002 did not give power to the Delimitation Commission to
increase the number of seats, but said that the boundaries within the existing constituencies
should be readjusted. The Commission allowed up to 10% variation in the parity principle; yet
around 17 parliamentary constituencies and many more Assembly constituencies violated this
so that each representative could represent more people. But the fourth Delimitation
Commission was able to reassign reserved constituencies, which increased the number of seats
for SCs from 79 to 84 and STs from 41 to 47 based on the increase in population. The
moratorium was extended until the first Census after 2026 for any further increase in the
number of seats.
Dilution of vote value
The population of Rajasthan, Haryana, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, and
Gujarat has increased by more than 125% between 1971 and 2011, whereas the population of
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Goa, and Odisha has increased by less than 100% due to stricter population
control measures. This also reveals a huge variation in the value of vote for a people between
States. For example, in U.P., an MP on average represents around 2.53 million people, whereas
in Tamil Nadu, an MP represents on average around 1.84 million people, a quantitative dilution.
The qualitative dilution of vote value parity can be used as a tool to sideline or make
insignificant the votes of minorities. This can happen in three ways. The first is cracking, where
areas dominated by minorities are divided into different constituencies. The second is stacking,
where the minority population is submerged within constituencies where others are the
majority. And the third is packing, where minorities are packed within a few constituencies;
their strength is weakened everywhere else.
The qualitative dilution of vote value was highlighted in the National Commission to Review
the Working of the Constitution and the Sachar Committee Report: in a majority of the seats
reserved for SCs by the Delimitation Commission (1972-76), the population of Muslims was
more than 50% and also higher than the SC population. And constituencies which had a large
SC population and a lower Muslim population were declared unreserved. This has a major
impact on the number of Muslim representatives in Parliament. At present, the share of Muslims
MPs in Parliament is only around 4.42%, whereas the Muslim population is 14.2%.
Delimitation cannot be postponed further as it will lead to more deviation in the population-
representation ratio. At the same time, the interests of the southern States have to be protected
as their representation in Parliament might weaken due to more seats being assigned to States
with a higher population growth. Along with addressing quantitative dilution of vote value, the
next Delimitation Commission needs to address qualitative dilution so that minorities are
represented more adequately.
Article-5
Recently, the Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, N. Chandrababu Naidu and
M.K. Stalin, respectively, were quite peeved about the question of the proposed delimitation
exercise and the possibility, subsequently, of the loss of parliamentary seats. This is very likely
as the two States, along with the other southern States, are ahead of the rest of India in terms of
fertility transition — implying a reduced share of the population when compared with the
northern region. What is galling to people in general, and not necessarily just the politicians in
south India, is that success in “family planning” will surely reduce the number of seats of the
less populated States in Parliament.
“The state government [Andhra Pradesh] is thinking of enacting a law that would make only
those with more than two children eligible to contest local body elections,” Mr. Naidu had said.
Earlier, Andhra Pradesh had passed a piece of legislation barring people with more than two
children from contesting local polls. Mr. Naidu said, “We have repealed that law, and we are
now considering reversing it.... Government may provide more benefits to families with more
children.”
Mr. Stalin’s response was, “Today, as there is a scenario of decreasing Lok Sabha
constituencies, it raises the question why should we restrict ourselves to having fewer children?
Mr. Stalin added in jest, “Why not aim for 16 children?”
The example of China
The question that arises in the light of the reactions and the responses of the Chief Ministers is:
would it be possible to arrest fertility decline and, moreover, reverse it by attempting to increase
it? It is evident that the attainment of low fertility in the course of fertility transition is hardly
reversible by intervention, but in the natural course of events, there might be a minor reversal as
suggested by experience worldwide. Despite this understanding, there are attempts being made
in some countries to reverse the fertility trend through incentivisation, but to no effect. China’s
one-child policy was one of the desperate measures to realise population control. The
consequences confronting the Chinese state on varied fronts include problems in the marriage
market, a dependency burden and, above all, extreme low fertility beyond the scope for reversal.
Quick and forced regulatory measures to restrict reproduction have never paid dividends beyond
restricting population counts. In fact, an emphasis on limiting population counts without caring
for its composition that sustains the population may well be considered unplanned. China’s case
is an example wherein the state is facing numerous crises at this point over the familial
transitions underway and the consequential burden of social security provisioning on the state.
An imbalanced population composition reached by intruding into the natural course of transition
will pose problems that would only be remedied through promoting migration. Efforts at
incentivising reproduction and adoption of a pro-natal population policy may not be an
alternative as seen in countries such as Japan and South Korea. Hence, the response of the
southern States to the emerging threat may well be considered premature and ineffective in the
long run.
Varied population counts
The course of fertility decline in India’s States does show signs of a convergence across space
and characteristics but a population momentum keeps the demographic divide wider between
regions. Given this circumstance, population counts between provinces may not be the
appropriate criterion to have political representation that will defy the federal structure of our
nation. ‘One person one vote’ may well be ideal but the difference in numbers of political
representation in one region will be skewed beyond proportions. Unless these counts are
weighed with some characteristics in terms of appropriating political representation, it will be
unfair, for example, to a region that ushered in development with population control. This
brings in a recognition of demographic divide apparent with education, coupled with the
number of children being the criteria for shaping political outcomes.
Impact on women
Encouraging women to have more children may be easier said than done. In the current
circumstances, a woman’s personal loss in engaging in reproduction is much greater than
imagined given the state’s approach in facilitating the same. When the state celebrates the
fertility decline and its dividend has benefited the larger cause, its implication in a woman’s life
has been less than expected. Therefore, thinking about fertility reversal needs to be preceded by
measures of guaranteeing the state’s social support for the additional children on the one hand
and compensation for women’s engagement in reproduction on the other.
Reversing fertility could well be ideal in terms of maintaining a sustainable population but the
regional population imbalance can perhaps be addressed through migration in immediate terms.
What needs to be answered is the ensuing disadvantage of a lower population count and
political representation that can only be resolved provided the count gets an equivalence in
valuation in terms of capability characteristics. Therefore, the ultimate solution lies not in
reversing fertility but in revising count-based political representation in the delimitation
exercise.
