POLITICAL ANALYSIS

TOPIC: SYSTEMS THEORY AND STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISM

Systems Theory

System theory is an interdisciplinary framework that studies complex interactions within

systems, emphasizing the relationships and dynamics among components. Key concepts include
feedback loops, emergent behavior, and holism. Notable applications range from engineering,
where it informs control systems and circuit design, to social sciences, exploring phenomena like
system justification theory, which examines motives behind maintaining social order despite
inequalities. Influential theorists include Niklas Luhmann, whose work connects system theory
to international law and societal structures.

Systems theory is based on several key assumptions:

1. Holism: The whole system is greater than the sum of its parts, meaning interactions within the
system are crucial for understanding its behavior.

2. Interdependence: Components of a system are interconnected; changes in one part affect

others.

3. Feedback Loops: Systems utilize feedback mechanisms to maintain stability or adapt to

changes, influencing future behavior.

4. Boundaries: Every system has defined boundaries that separate it from its environment,
affecting its interactions.

5. Dynamic Equilibrium: Systems strive for balance but are constantly influenced by external
and internal changes.

Systems theory serves as a robust analytical framework for political analysis by emphasizing the
interconnections and dynamics within political systems. Key aspects include: Holism:
Understanding political phenomena requires analyzing the system as a whole rather than in
isolation. Feedback Loops: Political decisions and outcomes are influenced by previous actions,
creating a cycle of interaction. Emergent Properties: Complex behaviors and patterns arise from
the interactions of simpler components within the political system.

Applications of system theory in Political Analysis:

Policy Development: Systems theory helps assess how policies interact with various societal
elements, predicting potential outcomes. Political Stability: Analyzing feedback mechanisms
aids in understanding factors that contribute to or undermine stability. Conflict Resolution:
Systems theory can identify underlying causes of conflict by examining relationships between
different political entities. By applying systems theory, analysts can gain deeper insights into the
complexities of political behavior and institutional dynamics.

Theory of structural-functionalism

Structural-functionalism is a sociological perspective that views society as a complex system

composed of various parts, each with a specific function that contributes to the stability and
functioning of the whole. Prominent theorists include; Émile Durkheim: Emphasized the
importance of social facts and collective consciousness. Talcott Parsons: Developed the AGIL
framework (Adaptation, Goal attainment, Integration, Latency) to explain societal functions.

Key Concepts include: Social Structure: Refers to the organized patterns of relationships and
institutions in society. Functions: Each part of society (e.g., family, education, religion) serves a
purpose that contributes to social cohesion and stability. Equilibrium: Societies tend to maintain
balance; changes in one part can affect others, necessitating adjustments. Structural-
functionalism has been critiqued for its focus on stability and neglect of social change and
conflict.

Structural-functionalism as analytical framework in Political Science

Structural-functionalism is an analytical framework in political science that examines the

structures of political systems and their functions. It emphasizes how various components of a
political system—such as institutions, norms, and roles—interact to maintain stability and order.

Key components of structural-functionalism in Political analysis include; Structures: Refers to

the established institutions (e.g., legislatures, executives) and their interrelations. Functions:
Focuses on the roles these structures play in society, such as maintaining social order, integrating
diverse groups, and facilitating governance. Adaptation: Highlights how political systems adapt
to changes in society while preserving core functions. This approach helps scholars analyze the
stability and evolution of political systems by understanding how different elements contribute to
the overall functioning of governance.

TOPIC: CLASS, PLURALISM/ INTEREST GROUPS, ELITE AND PLURALISM

APPROACHES

CLASS APPROACH TO POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Class approach is an important tool in Political Science that focuses on the division of society
into classes and how this social stratification determines social conflict and social change. The
class analysis approach is often referred to as Marxism even though the latter encompasses more
than the former because it derives from the writings of Karl Marx and his associate, Friedrich
Engels. It is a critique of the capitalist system where Marx posits a materialist interpretation of
human history. By this, it assumes that the mode of production of goods and services and the
manner of exchange of these goods and services constitute the bases of all social processes and
institutions. Marx insists that it is the economy that serves as the foundation upon which the
superstructure of culture, law, and the government is erected because it is those who own the
means of production that not only determines the economic fortunes of the society but politically
sets its social values. Structurally, according to Marx, every society is divided into classes based
on ownership or non- ownership of the means of production. Those who own property constitute
a class and those who do not constitute another class. He argues that it is the clash between
classes that provides the motive force of history, a class struggle that is, in turn, a reflection of
the contradiction between the forces of production, that is, the instrument of labour and the
people producing the material wealth on the one hand and the relations of production, that is, the
relations among people in the process of production exchange, distribution and consumption of
material wealth on the other hand. Since the social relations develop at a slower pace than the
forces of production they soon constitute a hindrance to the latter, thereby making social
revolution inevitable. From the preceding, Karl Marx has postulated that the relationship
between these two classes is characterised by antagonism because the bourgeoisie exploits and
subjugates the proletariat to maximise profit. He proposed further that people relate to the mode
of production either as owners or non-owners of the means of production. The state, in the
Marxist thesis, is an instrument of domination by the bourgeoisie, “a product and manifestation
of the irreconcilability of class antagonism” (Lenin, 1914). This view is encapsulated in Marx's
oft-quoted saying that “the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the
common affairs of the bourgeoisie” (cf. Avineri, 1970). Far from being a neutral actor in which
some other approaches such as the systems and structural-functionalist approaches promoted, the
state, in class approach is viewed as partisan in favour of the interests of the dominant class.
Ralph Miliband has offered three reasons why the state is an instrument of bourgeois domination
in capitalist society.

First is the similarity in the social background of the bourgeoisie and the state officials located in
government, the civil service bureaucracy, the military, judiciary, etc. Second, is the power of the
bourgeoisie to pressurize for political action through a network of personal contacts and
associations with those in business and industry. Third, is the constraint placed on the state by
the objective power of capital, that is to say, the limits placed on the freedomof state officials by
their need to assist the process of capital accumulation, a need which stems from the
requirements of a strong economy based for political survival (Miliband, 1989). At the core of
class analysis is the concept of dialectical materialismwhich presumes the primacy of economic
determinants of history. Through dialectical materialism, the fundamental Marxist premise that
the history of society is inexorably the “history of class struggle” was developed. According to
this premise, a specific class could rule so long as it best represented the economically
productive forces of society; when it became outmoded it would be destroyed and replaced, and
from this continuing dynamic process, a classless society would eventually emerge. In modern
capitalist society, the bourgeois (capitalist) class had destroyed and replaced the unproductive
feudal nobility and had performed the economically creative task of establishing the new
industrial order. The stage was thus set for the final struggle between the bourgeoisie which had
completed its historic role and the proletariat composed of the industrial workers, or makers of
goods, which had become the true productive class (see Wood, 1981). Marx envisages that as the
contradictions of the capitalist system become more acute, a revolutionary situation will arise
during which the proletariat (the oppressed class) will overthrow the capitalists and the
dictatorship of the proletariat will be established. The proletariat, after becoming the ruling class
would “centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state” and to increase
productive forces at a rapid rate, and a society without division will be established since the
means of production would not be owned by any group. The coercive state, formerly a weapon
of class oppression, would be replaced by a rational structure of economic and social cooperation
and integration. Such bourgeois institutions as the family and religion, which had served to
perpetuate bourgeois dominance, would vanish, and each individual would find true fulfilment.
The final aim of the revolution is to establish communism, a classless society which would have
no need for the state and which would be organised on the principle of, “from each according to
his ability and to each according to his needs” (Carver; 1991).

Contributions of the Class Approach

a. The class approach provides a radically different approach to the understanding of the political
process, especially the role of the state and the crucial role of the ruling class in determining
what the state does and what the state chooses not to do in the value production and allocation
process.

b. Contrary to the systems and structural-functionalist approaches that favour orderly change; the
class approach draws our attention to the possibility of violent revolutionary changes in political
systems.

Criticisms of the Class Approach and its Subsequent Modification

a. The class approach has been criticised for its economic determinism. In other words, the
approach gives a determining significance to economic and property relations that other
institutions –political, legal, cultural, and ideological – are merely a reflection of them and
merely explained by their dependence on prevailing economic relations b. A major criticism of
class analysis is that even in communist states where attempts were made to implement
Marxism, the states did not disappear as Karl Marx foretold, but rather, these communists’
regimes led to the re-erection of huge, monolithic state structures. Also, the demise of the
Communist bloc in Eastern Europe such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc. and Central Asia has
tended to discredit Marx's dire and deterministic economic predictions.

c. A related criticism of the class approach is Karl Marx’s failure to comprehend the fact that the
relationship between the ruling class and the working class is not always antagonistic. Arguing
from this perspective, critics have pointed out that the evolution of varied forms of welfare
capitalism has improved the condition of workers in industrial societies rather than worsen as
Marx projected and that the proletarian revolution did not occur as he anticipated. This point
itself has been acknowledged by some scholars within the class approach such as Miliband who
has argued that the room for autonomous action by the state in capitalist society is not a remote
possibility since the state sometimes carries out reforms favourable to the underclass (Miliband,
1989). Also in the light of the criticism, particularly the failure of the workers' revolution to
occur, Marx’s successors introduced important revisions to his theory. One of them V.I. Lenin
for instance, argues that there has been a new development in capitalism, that is, imperialism
which has resulted in the acquisition of colonies. According to him, imperialism has provided
advanced capitalist countries with ready markets, sources of cheap raw materials and labour, and
havens for investing surplus profits and thereby eased the contradictions of the system. The
conditions of the proletariat have also been improved but only through the exploitation of the
international working class (Lenin, 1914).

Pluralism or Group Approach of Political Analysis

Pluralism in its classical form believes that politics and decision making are located mostly in the
governmental framework, but many nongovernmental groups are using their resources to exert
influence. The central question for classical pluralism is how power is distributed in western
democracies. Groups of individuals try to maximise their interests because lines of conflict are
multiple and shifting. There may be inequalities but they tend to be distributed and evened out.
Any change under this view will be slow and incremental, as groups have different interests and
may act as “veto groups” to destroy legislation that they do not agree with. The existence of
diverse and competing interests represented by groups is the basis for a democratic equilibrium
and is crucial for the realization of goals by individuals. The job of political scientists with this
kind of concern is the analysis of the organization and behaviour of these groups. From the
standpoint of the pluralist approach, a law passed by the legislature, for instance, expresses
mainly the prevailing distribution of influence among competing groups, each of them seeking to
advance its own particular interest. The pluralist approach to politics argues essentially that
power in western industrialised societies is widely distributed among different groups. According
to this approach, no group is without power to influence decision-making and equally no group is
dominant. It is a major premise of pluralism that any group can ensure that its political
preferences and wishes are adopted and reflected in governmental action with sufficient
determination and the deployment of appropriate resources. Thus, pluralism is a theory of
representation in a democracy that gives pride of place to pressure groups and the representation
of specific interests by these groups as a hallmark of liberal democracy. In another sense, the
theory legitimises the role which these groups play in conducting government business by
emphasising the mutuality of obligation which exists between these groups and government.
Pluralists emphasize that power is not a physical entity that individuals either have or do not
have, but flows from a variety of different sources because people are powerful because they
control various resources- resources as assets that can be used to force others to do what one
wants. They argued that politicians become powerful because they command resources that
people want or fear or respect. The list of possibilities is virtually endless: legal authority,
money, prestige, skill, knowledge, charisma, legitimacy, free time, experience, celebrity, and
public support. Pluralists also stress the differences between potential and actual power as it
stands. To them, actual power means the ability to compel someone to do something while
potential power refers to the possibility of turning resources into actual power. To illustrate, Cash
is one of the many resources that are only a stack of bills until it is put to work. Martin Luther
King Jr., for example, was certainly not a rich person, but by using resources such as his forceful
personality, organisational skills, and especially the legitimacy of his cause, he had a greater
impact on American politics than most wealthy people. A particular resource like money cannot
automatically be equated with power because the resource can be used skillfully or clumsily,
fully or partially, or not at all. The pluralist approach to the study of power states that nothing
categorical about power can be assumed in any community. The question then is not who runs a
community, but if any group in fact does. To determine this, pluralists study specific outcomes
by trying to know from their belief that human behaviour is governed in large part by inaction.
To them, actual involvement in an overt activity is a more valid marker of leadership than simply
a reputation; hence, they believe that there is no one particular issue or point in time at which any
group must assert itself to stay true to its own expressed values, but rather that there are a variety
of issues and points at which this is possible. There are also costs involved in taking action at all
—not only losing, but the expenditure of time and effort. While the Marxist may argue that
power distributions have a rather permanent nature, pluralism says that power may in fact be tied
to issues, which vary widely in duration. Also, instead of focusing on actors within a system; the
emphasis is on the leadership roles itself. By studying these, it can be determined to what extent
there is a power structure present in a society. Following the preceding, there are three major
tenets of the pluralist school, namely:

a. Resources and potential power are widely scattered throughout society.

b. At least some resources are available nearly to everyone.

c. At any time the amount of potential power can exceed the amount of actual power.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the pluralists believe that no one is all-powerful in a given
political system because an individual or group that is influential in one realm may be weak in
another. For instance, large military contractors certainly throw their weight around on defense
matters, but they may not have much say on agricultural or health policies. A measure of power,
therefore, is its scope, or the range of areas where it is successfully applied. Pluralists believe
that with few exceptions power holders usually have a relatively limited scope of influence, the
reason why power cannot be taken for granted. As students of political analysis fidelity to reality
through critical observation would enable us to empirically know who truly power-holders are
and who governs. The best way to do this, pluralists believe, is to examine a wide range of
specific decisions, noting who took which side and who ultimately won and lost. c. At any time
the amount of potential power can exceed the amount of actual power. Finally, and perhaps most
important, the pluralists believe that no one is all-powerful in a given political system because an
individual or group that is influential in one realm may be weak in another. For instance, large
military contractors certainly throw their weight around on defense matters, but they may not
have much say on agricultural or health policies. A measure of power, therefore, is its scope, or
the range of areas where it is successfully applied. Pluralists believe that with few exceptions
power holders usually have a relatively limited scope of influence, the reason why power cannot
be taken for granted. As students of political analysis fidelity to reality through critical
observation would enable us to empirically know who truly power-holders are and who governs.
The best way to do this, pluralists believe, is to examine a wide range of specific decisions,
noting who took which side and who ultimately won and lost. Only by keeping score on a variety
of controversies can one begin to know actual power holders. Crucial to the pluralist approach is
the concept of partisan mutual adjustment. According to this concept, the policy takes place in a
crowded arena, and no group or political factions are powerful enough to dominate the others
because policy emerges as a compromise between the various interest groups. This brings along
a specific rationale: each group adjusts its stance to take into consideration the others to promote
stability because even if a group loses out this time, this means it still retains the ability to fight
another day. The major modern proponents of the pluralist approach are Robert Dahl, David
Truman, and Seymour Martin Lipset.

Contribution of the Pluralist Approach

Pluralism maintains that the political system is hierarchically structured, in other words, few are
deciding for many. Despite this fact, pluralism maintains that democracy is possible because the
many can make the few responsive, accountable, and accessible because of the belief that no one
group in society has a monopoly of power; the role of pragmatic coalitions working out
compromises in the making of government policies; crafting out legitimate means of resolving
group conflict without resulting in violence; widespread agreement on a mechanism for making
decisions; eventual losers always willing to comply with the decision of the winners; and
winners permitting losers to criticize and challenge winners’ decision.

Criticism of the Pluralist Approach and Its Modification

While pluralism as an approach gained its most footing during the 1950s and 1960s in America,
some scholars argued that the theory was too simplistic (Connolly, 1969). However, Sambo
(1999: 293) has offered the following criticisms of the pluralist or group approach:

a. The obvious causal explanation of politics and public policy from the perspective of group
struggle alone is an exaggerated claim which overlooks the independent role of individual actors
in the policy process.
b. Is the empirical question whether, indeed, power is as widely distributed in society as group
theory claims and more importantly, whether the voice of the least powerful is ever audible as to
make it significant in the decision making process.

c. That the market place paradigm on which the pluralist approach is anchored raises the
significant question about parity in the process of competition since we are told that the sources
of power available to groups may not be equal. The advantage, which some groups enjoy on
account of superior resource endowment, might be a factor in the dominance of their interests in
public policy. This is more so as they can deploy their advantaged position to secure their
interests through, for example, the manipulation of the rules of competition/game/market.

d. The assumed neutrality of government in the clash of partisan groups in the value allocation
process is questionable if not doubtful. The underlying assumption about government in
pluralism is that government is an impartial mediator of conflict in society and by implication a
preserver of the social order. However, experience all over the world shows that sometimes, the
government is not a neutral actor in policymaking: the government is not necessarily a
disinterested party in the conflict of interests of partisan groups in society. Indeed, the
government sometimes pursues its own preferences which may conflict with the interests of
other groups in the society.

Neo-Pluralism

Faced with the above criticism, attempts have been made to modify pluralism, an attempt that led
to the formulation of neo-pluralism and corporatism. Essentially, although neo-pluralism sees
multiple pressure groups competing over political influence, the political agenda is biased
towards corporate power. Neo-Pluralism no longer sees the state as an umpire mediating and
adjudicating between the demands of different interest groups, but as a relatively autonomous
actor (with different departments) that forges and looks after its own (sectional) interests.
Constitutional rules, which in pluralism are embedded in a supportive political culture, should be
seen in the context of a diverse and not necessarily supportive political culture or a system of
radically uneven economic sources. This diverse culture exists because of an uneven distribution
of socioeconomic power. This reality creates possibilities for some groups - while limiting others
in their political options. In the international realm, the order is distorted by powerful
multinational interests and dominant states, while in classical pluralism emphasis is put on
stability by a framework of pluralist rules and the free market. Corporatism was an attempt to
apply the classical pluralism (which was believed by many to be an American model) to
Westminster-style democracies or the European context. Corporatism is the idea that a few select
interest groups are actually (often formally) involved in the policy formulation process, to the
exclusion of the myriad of other 'interest groups'. For example, trade unions and major sectoral
business associations are often consulted about (if not the drivers of) specific policies. These
policies often concern tripartite relations between workers, employers, and the state, with a
coordinating role for the latter. The state constructs a framework in which it can address the
political and economic issues with these organised and centralized groups. In this view,
parliament and party politics lose influence in the policy forming process. Other groups that
some pluralists believe are more involved and have disproportionate influence in the interest
articulation function are the business interests such as Multinational Corporations (MNCs).
Besides the objections to the classical model of pluralism and the subsequent reformulations
mentioned above, another criticism was that groups need a high level of resources and the
support of patrons to contend for influence and the classical pluralist approach did not factor this
in their account. This observation formed the basis for elite pluralism which is a modified
pluralism account for elements of elite theory

Elite Approach

According to Arslan (1995: 3), the concept of “elite” originally derived from the Latin “eligre”
which means select, shares a common basis with “electa” that means elected or the best.
However, it was not widely used in social and political studies until the late nineteenth century
(Cf. Arslan, 2006). Historical research has already established that the elite is not an immutable
entity, rather its formation is determined by the structural composition of society and especially
by the characteristics of the political and economic systems. Hence, there are different types of
elites to include political elites, business elites, military elites, mass-media elites, trade and
labour unions elites, traditional elites, and academic elites. Theoretically, elites can be defined as
those people who hold institutionalised power, control the social resources (include not only the
wealth, prestige, and status but also the personal resources of charisma, time, motivation, and
energy) and have a serious influence (either actively or potentially) on the decision-making
process where they can impose their own will and perhaps have their way in spite of opposition.
The elite concept acquired world-wide popularity in social science as a result of the writings of
Gaetano Mosca (1939), Wright Mills’ (1956), and especially Vilfredo Pareto (1968) who sought
to construct an alternative vocabulary to the emphasis on Marxian “class” and class conflict.
With these works, the concept of the elite became the new theoretical and methodological
framework for researching the connections between political and economic power in the society.
Since then the concept has achieved a wider acceptance within modern sociology, often being
seen as a useful way of describing certain systems of political power complementary to the use of
the world-class to describe systems of economic power. Elite theory distrusts class analysis and
the idea that class struggle would entail the liberation of the working class, and thereby of
society as a whole. According to Pareto (1968), the most important of these are the struggles
between rising and falling elite groups, which he termed the circulation of the elites. History is
not a history of class struggle as maintained by Marx, but the struggles between elites over social
domination. The classical elite theory developed from a general distrust of democracy (Mosca,
1939; Pareto, 1968), and of the possibility to maintain democratic institutions (Michels, 1959).
Wright Mills (1956) supplemented the classical elite theory by conceiving public and private
elites as convergent into a single ruling group in society. Elite approach also developed as an
alternative paradigm to pluralism by rejecting the pluralist view concerning the distribution of
power in society. In the alternative, Elite theory points to the concentration of political power in
the hands of a minority group which, according to Mosca, “performs all political functions,
monopolies power and enjoys the advantages that power brings” (Mosca; 1939). Further to this,
the Elite approach investigates power and control and aims to analyze elite and non-elite (mass,
public) differentiation. Elite theorists are concerned almost exclusively with inequalities based
on power or lack thereof. This distinguishes elite theory from class theory. Power, in turn, is
based on other resources (such as economic assets and organizational strength) and for its part, it
may give rise to control over other resources as well. But, as Etzioni (1993:19) stressed, elite
theory is concerned primarily with the other resources which are related to it. From the
perspective of elite theory, public policy may be viewed as the values and preferences of the
governing elite. The assumptions of the elite theory are captured by Thomas Dye and Harmon
Zeigle (Cf. Sambo, 1999, p. 294) as follows:

a. Society is divided into the few who have power and the others who do not. Only a small
number of persons allocate values for society; the masses do not decide public policy. The few
who govern are not typical of the masses being governed. Elites are drawn disproportionately
from the upper socioeconomic strata of society.

b. The movement of non-elites to elite positions must be slow and continuous to maintain
stability and avoid revolution. Only non- elites who have accepted the basic elite consensus can
be admitted to governing circles.

c. Elites share a consensus on the basic values of the social system and the preservation of the
system. Public policy does not reflect the demands of the masses but rather the prevailing values
of the elite. Changes in public policy will be incremental rather than revolutionary.

d. Active elites are subject to relatively little direct influence from apathetic masses as the Elite
influences the masses more than the masses influence the elites.

Contributions of the Elite Approach

What is significant about the contribution of the elite approach is that it draws attention to the
fact that it is the elites who make public policies. Consequently, when they do, they tend to
reflect their values and preferences and that it is only a matter of coincidence if the policy
decisions of the elite reflect the interests of the masses, as they sometimes do

Criticisms and Modifications of the Elite Approach

a. The elite approach assumes a conspiratorial character and is to that extent a provocative theory
of public policy and the political process. It is conspiratorial because of the underlying premise
about elite consensus on fundamental norms of the social system which limits the choice of
policy alternatives to only those which fall within the shared consensus. The theory is
provocative because of the characterisation of the masses as passive, apathetic and ill-informed
and the consequential relegation of their role in policymaking (Sambo, 1999). For instance,
Pareto and Mosca (Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1968) drew a sharp distinction between the elites and
the masses and argued that the competence and energy of the elites made it possible for them to
rule the unenterprising masses. Marger (1983) also renders the masses passive in their
relationship with the elites when she stated that the elites “are able to impose on society as a
whole their explanation and justification for the dominant political and economic systems.”
However, these views of the elites and the masses are far from reality. For instance, as Key
reminded us in his book The Responsible Electorate, there is a degree even if relatively low of
the correspondence between the voter’s policy preferences and his reported presidential votes
and concluded that the voter is not so irrational a fellow after all.

b. Also, the classical elite theories have been criticized for their distrust for democracy and their
insistence that (Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1968), and of the possibility to maintain democratic
institutions (Michels, 1959). However, the attractiveness of the elite approach in this version
faded during the second half of the twentieth century as democracy, albeit in its imperfect
versions became the dominant mode of governance in most worlds as recent elite studies,
therefore, interpret elites within the democratic framework. Seen from these studies, elites and
democracy are not incompatible, in fact, elite groups may even be instrumental to the
establishment of democracy as they have done in various years (Burton & Higley, 1987; Bratton
and van de Walle, 1997; Dogan & Higley, 1998).

c. It is now becoming real that the replacement of autocratic forms of government by democracy
requires that various elite group see it in their interest to relinquish immediate power and
elaborate elite compromises. Thus to be preserved in the long run, democracy depends
simultaneously on well- functioning elite network and popular support. As a consequence,
studies of modern elites are simultaneously studies of social and political tensions between
democratic ideals and top-down decision making, between the various sector of the elites as well
as between elites and citizens (Engelstad; 2007). In other words, elites do not disappear in
democracy, but they acquire a new meaning. In more recent elite approach, Lijphart (1969);
Putnam (1976); Higley and Burton (2006) elites are described as institutionally distinct, socially
disparate and politically diverse groups of national leaders where mutual accommodation,
compromises and consensus between these elite groups are seen as preconditions for the
continuance and stability of democracies.

The significance of the elites in a democracy is that their ability to strike stable compromises
depends not only on their internal relationship but also on the relationship between elites and the
population at large. If the elites attempt to preserve or change the model independently of the
opinions of the citizens, it may create mass level reactions which may curtail or abort the actions
of the elites. Relatively open processes of recruitment to the elites may bring the attitudes and
opinions of the elites more in line with those of the population. For instance, post-modern
Liberalism in the 1980s developed a view that a key to the stability, survival and consolidation of
democratic regimes is the establishment of substantial consensus among elites concerning rules
of the democratic political game, the worth of democratic institutions and the consolidation of
democracy. Analytically, consolidated democracies can be thought of as encompassing specific
elite and mass features.

First, all important elite groups and factions share a consensus about rules and codes of political
conduct and the worth of political institutions, and they are unified structurally by extensive
formal and informal networks that enable them to influence decision making and thereby defend
and promote their factional interests peacefully (Higley and Moor; 1981). Second, there is
extensive mass participation in the elections and other institutional processes that constitute
procedural democracy. No segment of the mass population is arbitrarily excluded or prevented
from mobilizing to express discontents and recourse to various corrupt practices that distort mass
participation (Page & Shapiro, 1983). Thus, the concept of consolidated democracies highlights
consensus among elites as the most important condition for the stability of the political system.

CONCLUSION THOUGHTS HIGHLIGHTING THEIR DIFFERENCES AND

SIMILARITIES IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Many political scientists that have used the class analysis approach to see society in terms of
material interests that are often irreconcilable by viewing society in terms of exploitation rather
than accommodation between competing interests as the pluralists approach sees it. Thus, the
state is not pluralistic in the sense of being a neutral arbiter but is a set of institutions existing
independently of social forces and which at different stages in history will be controlled in the
interest of a dominant economic class whether it be landed aristocracy in a feudal economy or
industrial bourgeoisie of early capitalism or global capitalist in the age of economic
globalisation. The pluralist approach plays down the significance of class divisions in society
based on the assumption of the liberal democrats and pluralists that society may be disaggregated
along occupational, gender, ethnic, or religious lines, but not into classes. The elite theory
developed as an alternative paradigm to pluralism by rejecting the pluralist view concerning the
distribution of power in society. In spite of their seeming differences, however, all the
approaches emphasised the struggle over power in society. Both pluralist and elite theories
assign to the government the role of a neutral umpire in the struggle among societal groups to
reflect their interests in public policy while just like class analysis acknowledges the view of the
state as a factor of cohesion where the state is involved in regulating struggles between
antagonistic classes and using both repression and concession.

Topic: Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice approach to politics have become an increasingly important branch of the
discipline. They focus on politics being a response to the problem of collective action, which has
applications both in the study of political institutions and processes and of international relations.
Rational choice approaches start by making certain fundamental assumptions about human
behaviour from which hypotheses or theories are deduced before being tested against facts in the
real world. The assumptions are that human beings are essentially rational, utility maximisers
who follow the path of action most likely to benefit them. This approach has been used in so-
called ‘game theory’ where individual behaviour is applied to particular situations and has
revealed how difficult it can be for rational individuals to reach optimal outcomes because of the
existence of free-riders—actors who calculate that they can reap the benefits of collective action
without paying any of the costs. In Political Science, the best-known application of this approach
can be found in the fields of voting and party competition and in interest group politics. For
rationalist scholars, the central goal is to uncover the laws of political behaviour and action and
still hold the belief that once these laws are discovered, models can be constructed to help us
understand and predict political behaviour. In their deductive model, rational choice scholars
look to the real world to see if their model is right (test the model) rather than look to the real
world and then search for plausible explanations for the phenomenon they observe. Rational
choice institutionalists apply a deductive model of science where general principles and logics
are invoked in terms of games (settlers, prisoner dilemma, tit-for-tat etc.), which may (or may
not) be applied to particular historical events. In this regards, institutions are simply the rules of
the game(s) where efforts are made to understand what the game is and how it is played
(Steinmo; 2001). One of the features noted about institutions - no matter what the analytic
perspective - is that institutions do not change easily as rational choice institutionalists view
institutional equilibrium as the norm. They argue that the normal state of politics is one in which
the rules of the game are stable and actors maximise their utilities (usually self-interest) given
these rules. In effect, as actors learn the rules, their strategies adjust and thus an institutional
equilibrium sets in. Consequent upon the above, although not everyone may be necessarily
happy with the current institutional structure, a significant coalition is - or else it would not, by
definition, be stable, and once stabilised it becomes very difficult to change the rules because no
one can be certain what the outcomes of the new structure would be. This is because institutions
shape strategies as new institutional rules imply new strategies throughout the system. Change
thus implies enormous uncertainty especially as it is very difficult to calculate the effects of rule
changes. In short, the rate of uncertainty implied by a new institutional structure makes actors
unwilling to change the structure (Shepsle, 1986). In other words, people are afraid of changing
the rules because it is difficult to know what will happen after the rules are changed. Following
from the preceding, it is significant for students to know that the major principle of the rational
choice approach in political science is that, collective political behaviour is developed out of the
behaviour of each individual actor where each makes decisions including what determine
individual choices. In all of this, the assumption is that political actors’ choices and interests are
pursued rationally to ensure the greatest benefit with the least of cost. Cesare Beccaria was said
to have originated the theory in Political Science in the 18th century and subsequently reviewed
and developed by Gary Becker, Barry Weingast, among others.

Barry Weingast and Rational Theory

One of the most dominant rational choice institutionalists in recent time is Barry Weingast who
took his time to work on rational choice theory. In his article, “Rational Choice Institutionalism’,
Barry Weingast argues that the rational choice intuitionalism provides an analytical framework
for scholars to explore theoretical puzzles and conduct empirical research on a wide range of
issues in political science. To Weingast, institutions are the ‘humanly created constraints on
actions’- that is, actors interactions based on the “structure of information and beliefs of the
actors, and payoffs to individuals and groups (Weingast, 2002: 661). The rational choice
approach views institutions as formal and informal rules of the game. Formal rules of the game
are official laws and rules, and informal institutions are the norms and conventions accepted by
particular groups (North, 1990). In his study, Weingast presents two levels of analysis
(exogenous and endogenous) of the rational choice institutionalism. The first level of analysis
explores the effects of institutions. It examines the cause and effect mechanism of institutions,
treating institutions as exogenous explanatory variable/variables. He argues that institutions
shape the policy process as well as outcomes in numerous ways. To buttress his argument, he
uses formal and schematic examples like how various powers and institutional forms shape the
legislative and executive balance of power policy and choices. This institutional and
constitutional constraint is largely on the credible commitment of one organ to the other;
however, the absence of such credible commitments can make one organ to be stronger than the
other. The second level of analysis deals with the “endogenou choice of particular institutions”,
that deals with the genesis and endurance of institutions. To shed light on the origins of
institutions, Weingast argued that society or a group cannot do without institutions because
“institutions exist to make cooperation sustainable” (Weingast, 2002: 670) and that in the
absence of institutions, individuals may end up in situations where everyone is worse off. The
main problem with any social exchange is that the parties to the exchange run into the problem
of incentives where some individuals have shortterm temptations not to cooperate. Analyzing the
limitation of the conventional repeated prisoner’s dilemma, Weingast shows the need for
institutions. The standard argument of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma is that although all
players have a short run interest to cheat, they have longrun incentives to cooperate. However,
dependence on repeated prisoner’s dilemma is not wholesomely useful, as it cannot prevent
‘common breakdowns’ such as wars, ethnic conflict, government and private opportunism, and
other systematic failures arising from the attempt by a group to capture gains from cooperation
(Weingast; 2002: 672) But even at that, credible commitments do not emerge simply because
institutions are in place to ensure cooperation rather it is only when institutions become self -
enforcing that they can sustain cooperation. The democratic consolidation and rule of law
example are illustrative. Using a game-theory approach to the problem of political officials’
respect for political and economic rights of citizens, Weingast showed that democratic stability
depends on a self-enforcing equilibrium: which must be in the interest of political officials to
respect democracy’s limits on their behaviour. Political officials will avoid violating the
legitimate boundaries of the state because doing so risks losing power as “citizens hold these
limits in high esteem that they are willing to defend them by withdrawing support from the
sovereign when he tries to violate these limits” (Weingast, 1997, p.251). The sovereign’s self-
interest leads himto respect limits on his behaviour; that is, these limit are self-enforcing.
Arguing further, Weingast noted, “one of the central features of limited government is the rule of
law, a society of universalistic laws, not of discretionary political power because the law and
political limits can be disobeyed or ignored, something beyond laws is necessary to prevent
violations. To survive, the rule of law requires that limits on political officials be self-enforcing;
but, “self-enforcement of limits depends on the complementary combinations of attitudes and
reactions of citizens as well as institutional restrictions” (Ibid, 262). However, Weingast
(1997:246) argues that “self-enforcing limits on the state result when members of a society
resolve their coordination dilemmas about the appropriate limit on the state”. To buttress and
recap the preceding, students are expected to know that the rational choice institutionalism of
Barry Weingast is primarily the analysis of state institutions as explanations to supposed
collective action problems as the characteristic and guarantee of rational choice institutions.
Thus, according to him, “democracies with constitutions that place a constraint on government
valued by citizens are more likely to survive because they are less likely to threaten their
citizens. This implies that citizens do not resort to extra-constitutional means to defend
themselves because constitutional institutions are enough to moderate the stakes of politics by
creating self-enforcing limits on politics.

A Critique of the Rational Approach

There are at least four major criticisms of the rational choice institutionalism (RCI). First, it has
been argued that the approach glosses over the impact of existing ‘state capacities’ and ‘policy
legacies’ on subsequent policy choices (David Collier and Ruth Collier, 1991), that is, the
approach gives little consideration to the way political institutions shape or structure political
process and ultimately political outcomes (cf. Steinmo, Thelen et al. 1992). The second criticism
is that it failed to emphasize the way(s) in which past lines of policy condition and how societal
forces are organized along some lines rather than others, to adopt particular identities, or to
develop interests in policy that are costly to shift (Hall and Taylor, 1996). For instance, in an
analysis of the present development challenges of African States, RCI does downplay the impact
of historical exigencies in shaping the development paths of these states. Yet as we have been
reminded by Ekeh (1980) and Falola (2005), an analysis of the role of the enduring legacies of
colonialism and its epochal consequences is apt if we must properly grasp the present form and
depth of Africa’s development challenges. One fact that students must consider is that history
and culture are largely or completely made unconnected to comprehending political behaviour let
alone development challenges. What this means is that better understanding of present and future
problems including knowing the contradictions, etc. if any, are not encouraged by this approach.
Seen from this perspective, institutions are not the only important variables for understanding
political outcomes. Quite the contrary, institutions are intervening variables (or structuring
variables) through which battles over interest, ideas and power are fought. Institutions are
important both because they are the focal points of much political activity and because they
provide incentives and constraints for political actors that structure activity. In other words,
rather than being neutral boxes in which political fights take place as the rational choice
institutionalists want us to believe, institutions actually structure the political struggle itself.
Institutions can thus also be seen as the points of a critical juncture in a historical path analysis
because political battles are fought inside institutions and over the design of future institutions.
However, it is important to underscore the fact which the rational choice institutionalists failed to
acknowledge, and which is that, institutions- both as structures and as rules, no matter how
perfect they may be, political dynamics usually determine when they function or kept in
abeyance. Thirdly, the rational choice institutionalism can be criticised for given scant attention
to informal rules of the game such as traditions, culture and other informal ways of interaction
which also constraint the behaviour of actors, especially where formal rules of the game are not
credible. By excessively focusing on formal rules, norms and procedures, the rational choice
institutionalism gloss over the fact that institutions also include symbol systems, cognitive
scripts, and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action and that
both the concepts of ‘institutions’ and ‘culture’ are not poles apart but rather intermesh and shade
into each other (Scott, 1995). Further, the rational choice institutionalism discourse of
institutional reform is capable of great mystification and obscurantism. It can conceal the values,
interests and agenda that are being served. Finally, the RCI has been criticised for its over-
reliance on statistical models, its “fixation on quantitative tools” (Gunawardena-Vaughn, 2000,)
and “the mathematisation of political science" (Miller, 2001) and that by doing so, it has made
political science trivial and disconnected from “great political issues” and the “real world” to
researchers’ (see Kremer, 2001; Gunawardena-Vaughn, 2000; Parenti, 2006). In spite of all these
weaknesses, however, the rational choice institutionalism retains essential strength in its account
of strategic behaviour by purposive agents under structural constraints, of the aggregation of
interests, of the distribution and exercise of power, and of the social construction of political
rationality – and its ability to combine and recombine these elements and mobilize them into
theoretically sound causal explanations of a wide range of political phenomena. (Lieberman,
2002, p. 699).

CONCLUSION

The rational choice approach uses deductive models of human interactions based on the
assumption that individuals are self-interested rational actors. From its humble origins, the
rational choice approach has become one of the approaches in the study of politics, most
especially in the USA. Briefly, US is one country that lay so much claim that its institutions are
rational, neutral, strong, and exemplary, yet today in the 21st century America, institutions
because they are controlled by men [politicians] and men have surviving instinct and interest, of
course, they subordinate state institutions to serve personal interest as has been the experience
under Donald Trump Presidency. On the whole, in spite of its success and attractions the
approach has been criticised for glossing over the role of state capacities, history, and culture in
politics and political behaviour; and for its over-reliance on statistical models, and quantification.

Topic: Concepts in Political Analysis; Legitimacy, participation and representation, and

Political Culture

Legitimacy

All regimes, regardless of the type – democratic, monarchic, oligarchic, dictatorship, and
military, etc., all political systems seek legitimacy. Legitimacy is the tacit or explicit support of
the regime by its people, usually an emotional identification with the regime. The regime is
legitimate when people believe that institutional structures of the government are the most
appropriate for society (Kelly, 2008). Beyond Kelly’s acceptability theory, students should note
that legitimacy is also about its legality, fair- mindedness, and problem-solving. It is of course
the combination of these that make up legitimacy. Again, the realisation of political systems
legitimacy could largely be dependent on power and authority. Thus, the need to discuss some
of the key issues related to legitimacy in political systems.

Political Power

Karl Mark conceived power within the context of economic domination by the ruling class
against the working class proletariat. For Max Weber, “power is the possibility of imposing
one’s will upon the behaviour of other persons” (Gerth and Mills; 1946). To him, power involves
domination – a reciprocal relationship between the rulers and the ruled in which the actual
frequency of compliance is only one aspect of the fact that the power of command exists.
Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) define power as a special case of the exercise of influence. It is the
process of affecting the policies of others with the help of (actual or threatened) severe
deprivations for nonconformity with the policies intended. Herbert Simon considers power as an
asymmetrical relation between the behaviour of two persons (Simon, 1965). For Amitai Etzioni,
power is a “capacity to overcome part or all of the resistance to introduce changes in the face of
opposition (and this includes sustaining a course of action or preserving a status quo that would
otherwise be discontinued or altered)” (Etzioni, 1970). For Robert Dahl, power is the product of
human relationships, for instance, where A has power over B to the extent that he (A) can get B
to do something that he would not otherwise do. So, a person may be said to have power to the
extent he influences the behaviour of others in accordance with his intentions (Dahl, 1957;
1991). What Dahl failed to tell us is whether the behaviour consistent with the intention of the
influencer is positive or negative and in whose interest. To Patrick Wilmot (1985:124), “power is
central to politics and defined in terms of the probability of decisions being effective and goals
being achieved”. The major preceding implication of these definitions as the quality of power is
that power is applied in social relation Thus, power is primarily exercised over men and not over
nature or things (Etzioni, 1970). The other quality is that power is the ability to get things done,
to make others do what we want, even if they do not want to do it. Second, in any power
situation, there is always some feedback from the influence to the influencer. This is what Carl
Friedrich has described as “the rule of anticipated reactions” (Friedrich; 1963). This refers to a
situation in which “one actor, B, shapes his/her behaviour to conform to what he believes are the
desires of another actor, A, without having received explicit messages about A's wants or
intentions from A or A's agents” (Friedrich, ibid.). Third, a variety of means can be used to
persuade people to do things, but power always has as its base the ability to reward or punish. A
sanction is a reprisal for disobedience to command with punitive intent. It may be either
deprivation of values already possessed or an obstruction to the attainment of values which
would have been realised were it not for the punitive intervention of the power-holder. A
sanction may be a physical loss- beating, confinement etc. or a nonphysical loss- fining,
confiscation, removal from office, ridicule, etc., (Goldhamer and Shills; 1965). Fourth, power is
also relative. The main problem is not to determine the existence of power but to make
comparisons. To say that the power of A is greater than the power of B, there must be agreement
as to the operational definition of the term power and the operational means that are to be used to
determine the degree of its presence or absence in any situation (Anifowose; 1999). Fifth, the
most powerful people in the community may be those who remain behind the scenes and the
issues which are raised, rather than those who openly participate in settling issues. Sixth, power
is not something that only exists at a national level; so it does exist at the international level with
elements of state power like physical geography, demography, resources, technological prowess,
military, and quality of leadership.

Types of Power

Three major types of power may be distinguished in terms of the type of influence brought to
bear on the subordinated individual. These are force, domination and manipulation. To begin
with, force is the use of raw might by a power-holder to exercises power when he/she influences
behaviour by physical manipulation of the subordinated individual (assault, confinement, etc.).
Domination – is connected and identical with “authoritarian power of command” (Gerth and
Mills, 1946). However, for domination to be present there must be an individual who rules or a
group of rulers; an individual who is ruled or a group that is ruled; the will of the rulers to
influence the conduct of the ruled and an expression of the will (or a Command); evidence of the
influence of the rulers in terms of the objective degree of compliance with the command; direct
or indirect evidence of that influence in terms of the objective acceptance with which the ruled
obey the command (Goldhamer and Shills, 1965). For Manipulation, it is when a power-holder
control or influences the behaviour of others in a manner that is secretive and unfair without
making explicit the behaviour which he/she wants them to perform. Manipulation may be
exercised by utilising symbols of performing acts while propaganda is a major form of
manipulation by symbols (Gerth and Mills, 1946). Attempted domination may meet with
obedience or disobedience- the motivation for obedience and disobedience is instrumental to the
extent that it is based on an anticipation of losses and gains. In effect, if the attempt of a person
to exercise power fails, the power act may be followed by a sanction (Goldhamer and Shills,
[Link]). Power and influence have something in common, and according to Robert Dahl (1957;
1991), influence is “a relation among actors such that the wants, desires, preferences, or
intentions of one or more actors affect the actions, or predisposition to act, of one or more other
actors. There is often little practical difference between power and influence. One person
influences another within a given scope to the extent that the first without resorting to either a
tacit or an overt threat of severe deprivations can cause the second to change his/her course of
action. Hence, power and influence are very difficult to measure because of the presence of
feedback. This suggests that the power of every person is limited in crucial ways, that is, no
human power is absolute, in other words, no one possesses unlimited power -even leaders at the
apex of power, whether in democracy, military, monarchy or otherwise. In sum, power and
influence are alike in that each has both rational and relational attributes. They differ, however,
in that the exercise of power depends upon potential sanctions, while the exercise of influence
does not (Anifowose, 1999).

Authority

Authority is said to be the quality of being able to get people to do things because they think the
individual or group has the right to tell them what to do. In effect, those in authority are followed
because it is believed that they fulfil a need within the community or political system; hence,
should be obeyed. Authority, then, is linked to respect, which creates legitimacy and therefore
leads to power. Legitimate power or influence is generally called authority. It is power clothed
with legitimacy. It is the authentic form of power based on consent, voluntary obedience and
persuasion (Leslie, 1993). Legitimacy is the belief in the rightness of an individual to make
authoritative, binding decisions. It is the belief in the right to give commands and the right to be
obeyed. All governments need authority for people to accept their right to make decisions in the
same way legitimacy is also needed. Mathematically, Power + Legitimacy = Authority.
According to Patrick Wilmot (1985:124), authority is the probability that exercise of power will
accept as right, legitimate, and just. Following from this, there are considerable disadvantages for
a government which depends mainly upon the use of force to maintain control. In the long run,
all people in positions of power need to recognise the use of their positions as legitimate
(rightful) by those over whom they have power. Thus, according to Crick (1978), probably, all
governments require some capacity for or the potentiality of force or violence, but probably no
government can maintain itself through time as distinct from defence and attack at specific
moments, without legitimatizing itself in some way, getting itself loved, respected, even just
accepted as inevitable, otherwise it would need constant recourse to open violence which is
rarely the case.

Max Weber’s Typology of Authority

A German political sociologist, Max Weber, identified three (3) ideal types of authority to
include traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic. These are explained thus: Traditional: The
belief of this type is that legitimacy of authority has always existed; hence, people support the
regime out of habit and custom. Rulers exercising the power of command are masters who enjoy
personal authority by virtue of their inherited status. Their command is legitimate in the sense
that they are in accord with custom or tradition but they possess the prerogative of free personal
decision so that conformity with custom and personal arbitrariness are both characteristics of
such rule. Weber says that this is the type of authority that is typical of simpler, pre-industrial
societies. Legal Rational is the type of authority based on a system of rules applied judicially and
administratively where rulers are superiors, appointed or elected by legally sanctioned
procedures oriented toward the maintenance of the legal order. The governments of many
countries have authority because they were elected by a legal process and because they work
within the law of the land. They are constitutional governments. This type of authority is typical
of modern nations. Charismatic is the support people give a regime because of emotional
identification with the personality of the leader of the regime by virtue of magical power,
revelations, heroism, or other extraordinary gifts or personal attributes such as eloquence. The
persons who obey such a leader are disciples or followers who believe in his/her extraordinary
qualities rather than in stipulated rules or in the dignity of a position sanctioned by tradition.
Charisma is very rare and hence, societies with charismatic leaders often have difficulties
replacing them. Each of Max Weber’s authority type leads to its own peculiar regime legitimacy,
and by implication, the type of regime legitimacy influences political stability. However, let it
said that in reality, there is usually the combination of the three Weber’s authority model in one
political system

Political Culture

Various definitions of political culture have been offered by many scholars and to begin with,
Roy Macridis (1961), political culture is the “commonly shared goals and commonly accepted
rules.’ Dennis Kavanagh defines it as a shorthand expression to denote the set of values within
which the political system operates (Kavanagh, 1993). Lucian Pye describes it as “the sum of the
fundamental values, sentiments and knowledge that give form and substance to the political
process”. Samuel Beer (1958) says it is one of the four variables crucial to the analysis of
political systems. According to him, the components of the culture are values, beliefs and
emotional attitudes about how government ought to be conducted and also about what it should
do. Almond and Powell defined political culture as “the pattern of individual attitudes and
orientations toward politics among the members of a political system,” (Almond and Powell,
1966). The basic distinction developed is that between “secularised” and non-secularized
political cultures. The former is characterised by “pragmatic, empirical orientations,” and a
“movement fromdiffuseness to specificity” of orientations. Individuals who are part of a secular
political culture deal with others in terms of universalistic criteria as against considerations
arising from diffuse societal relationships such as those of tribe caste or family (Almond and
Powell, ibid.) They are aware that institutions have specific functions and orient themselves to
institutions in these terms (Almond and Powell, ibid). Further, secularised, i.e., modern, political
cultures are characterised by bargaining and accommodative patterns of political action which
are relatively open, in that values are subject to change in the basis of new experience. Modern
states in which “rigid” ideological politics continue to play a substantial role are those in which,
for some reason, "the bargaining attitudes associated with full secularization" have failed to
develop (Almond and Powell, ibid, 58-59). For Robert Dahl (1966, cf. Babawale, 1999), he
singled out political culture as a factor explaining different patterns of political opposition in a
political system. The salient elements of the culture for Dahl (cf. Babawale, ibid.) are:
Orientations of problem-solving- are they pragmatic or rationalistic? Orientations to collective
action- are they cooperative or noncooperative? Orientations to the political system- are they
allegiant or alienated? Orientations to other people: are they trustful or mistrustful?

Foundations of Political Culture

According to Johari (2006:224), political culture “is composed of attitudes, beliefs, emotions and
values of the society that relates to the political system and political issues”. According to
Babawale (1999), a political culture, whether diverse or homogenous, is a product of many
factors such as geography, historical development and experiences (coups, civil war,
revolutions), diversity of a nation’s population (ethnicity, language and religion) pattern of
traditional norms and practices as well as varying levels of socioeconomic development and
socialization processes. Sub-cultural variations may hinder the development of national political
culture. In order to overcome the problem arising from this, there is need for cultural
transformation. This involves changes in the values and attitudes of the people and the
emergence of shared orientations. Political culture is not static but will respond to new ideas
generated from within the political system, imported or imposed from outside. Japan provides a
good illustration of a state subject to such internal and external pressures resulting in rapid
changes in the political culture of its people. Among the facilitators of change in the political
culture of a nation are the processes of industrialisation, urbanization, massive investment in
education, the mass media, mass political mobilisation (through political parties and
democratisation processes) as well as the creation of symbolic elements such as national heroes
and political leadership, lingua franca, national flags and national anthems, national public
events and popular national constitutions. All these can foster the spirit of emotional attachment
and loyalty to the nation thereby engendering national pride and unity.

Types of Political Culture: Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba’s Civic Culture

In 1963, the “Civic Culture” project of Almond and Verba was considered groundbreaking for
social sciences as a first attempt to systematically collect and codify variables measuring
citizen’s participation across five different states. Those variables, based on cross-sectional
surveys, measured the qualities used for assessing the degree of political participation of citizens
in the United States, Mexico, Great Britain, Germany and Italy. Through their project, Almond
and Verba wanted to create a theory of civic culture - a political culture explaining the political
involvement of citizens or lack thereof in democratic states. In their work, the authors discussed
the historical origins of the civic culture and the functions of that culture in the process of social
change. They compared and contrasted the patterns of political attitudes in the five countries and
contended that, across states, a democratic system required a political culture encouraging
political participation. The theory employed by Almond and Verba was based on Harold
Lasswell’s personality characteristics of a ‘democrat’ including the following features: “open
ego” (a warm and inclusive attitude toward other human beings; a capacity for sharing values
with others; a multivalued rather than a single-valued orientation; trust and confidence in the
human environment; and relative freedom from anxiety. The authors used a methodology of
experimentation rather than inferring a theory from the institutional systems prevalent in the
discussed states in order to make a valid contribution to the scientific theory of democracy. In
their research, Almond and Verba asked if there is such a thing as a political culture: a pattern of
political attitudes that fosters democratic stability. They concluded that civic culture is a mixed
political culture: individuals are not always perfectly active or passive as Almond and Verba
struggled with the discrepancy between the participants’ actual behaviour, their perceptions and
political obligations. They also questioned the socialization of the citizenry into the civic culture
and asserted that civic culture is not taught in school. Rather, it is transmitted by a complex
process that includes training in many social institutions: family, peers, school, work, and the
political system itself through which socialization occurs through the direct exposure to the civic
culture itself and to the democratic polity. In order to preempt criticism, Almond and Verba
stressed that their research did not carry the explanatory power for creation of the civic culture in
the newly- created nations; this question was beyond the scope of their research. However, they
did not refrain from attempting to speculate on this question based on the cases they studied,
thus, the civic culture emerged in the West as a result of a gradual political development (based
on history and characteristics of the civic culture). Finally, they developed a fusion of new
patterns of attitudes, merged with the old ones and by so doing came up with three types of
citizen’s orientation. These are:

a. Parochial: Political sleepwalker, not involved, no knowledge or interest in the domestic

political system. Here citizens are only remotely aware of the presence of central government
and live their lives near enough regardless of the decisions taken by the state. Distant and
unaware of political phenomena, citizens with a parochial political culture have neither
knowledge nor interest in politics. This type of political culture is in general congruent with a
traditional political structure.

b. Subject: Where citizens are aware of the central government and are heavily subjected to its
decisions with little scope for dissent. The individual is aware of politics, its actors and
institutions. It is affectively oriented towards politics, yet he/she is on the "downward flow" side
of the politics. In general, this type of political culture is congruent with a centralized
authoritarian structure.

c. Participant: Possessing a strong sense of influence, competence and confidence in

understanding the domestic political system. Here citizens can influence the government in
various ways and they are affected by it. The individual is oriented toward the system as a whole,
to both the political and administrative structures and processes (to both the input and output
aspects). The participant political culture is in general congruent with a democratic political
structure. However, Babawale (1999) advised that we should be cautious in taking the above
categorization of political culture as mutually exclusive or existing in isolation. According to
him, no political culture fits perfectly into any of these three types. Rather, each is mixed, made
up of different proportions of parochial, subject and participant attitudes. The relative prevalence
of each type determines the kind of political culture which exists in a nation. Theoretically, in a
developed democratic political-system, dominant values may emphasize participation, the idea
that common people are rational and intelligent enough to participate, that they can trust other
citizens, that interest groups are legitimate .and that governors gain their privilege of governing
and decision making only from the consent of the governed. These kinds of values set limits to
government and spell out relations between the governed and the governors. Also, there may be
fragmentation in the political culture of a nation, that is, political culture may not be the same
throughout the entire population because no nation has a homogeneous political culture. Even
within specific groups within a nation, there are sub-cultures alongside the dominant political
culture because most nations' political cultures are heterogeneous. Where differences between
one group and others are marked, there is said to exist a political subculture, for instance, in
Nigeria, there is no predominant political culture as the various ethnic groups inherently
constitute different political sub-cultural groups. They all exhibit cohesive political cultures of
their own which are very different from each other and which resist amalgamation into a
Nigerian whole (Babawale, 1999).

Participation and Representation

Political Participation

Political participation encompasses the various activities that citizens employ in their efforts to
influence policymaking and the selection of leaders. According to Orum (1978), political
participation refers simply to the “variety of ways in which people try to exercise influence over
the political process.” In a similar vein, McClosky (1968) sees political participation as “those
voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers and directly or
indirectly in the formation of public policy.” Lawson and Wasburn (1969) on the other hand he
describes political participation as “the process by which individuals acting singly or through
group origination, attempt to influence decision-making or alter how it may be exercised in a
particular society. People participate in politics in many ways “ranging from discussing political
issues or events, taking part in a demonstration or riots, voting, writing letters to political parties
and seeking political offices” (Osaghae, 1988). In a federal system such as Nigeria, people have
many opportunities to participate in democracy at national, state, and local levels as some forms
of participation are more common than others just like some citizens participate more than
others. According to Agbaje (1999), in modem society, participation tends to take either of three
basic forms, namely, the form of elections or selections, when people seek to participate in
societal affairs through elected or selected representatives; the form of routine individual or
group involvement in the day to day affairs of the society; and through the shaping of public
opinion on issues, events and – personalities of the day. From the above, it is clear that political
participation is not a preserve of only democratic political systems; in other words, political
participation takes place in all political systems. Political systems, however, differ with regard to
the degree of citizens’ participation, type of participation, and the level of their participation. For
example, in a single-party system where elections are mere formalities, the degree of citizens’
participation in elections cannot be compared to a democracy where competitive party elections
take place periodically. Also, it should be noted that political participation encompasses such
acts as campaign and voting during elections, riots against government policies, writing of
protest letters to one’s representatives, etc. However, because of the emergence of liberal
democracy or representative democracy as the dominant model of democracy and the salience of
election under this system, there is a tendency to associate political participation with elections,
especially participation in campaigns and voting. The literature on political participation is
therefore so overwhelmingly dominated by writings on elections and electoral behaviour that it
will be understandable for political participation to be identified exclusively with the study of
voting. In spite of this shortcoming, however, this dominant bias in the extant literature on
political participation for elections and voting behaviour in some contexts shall underscore our
discussion in this unit. However, wherever necessary, the Nigerian example shall also be
highlighted.

Typologies of Political Participation

Three typologies of political participation to show the levels of participation with the aid of
Lester Milbrath, Karl Deutsch and Robert Dahl based on the critical analysis of Osaghae (1988:
66-68).

Lester Milbraith’s Typology

To Milbraith (1965), political participants can be classified on the basis of their political
activities, namely, spectator activities, transitional activities and gladiatorial activities. The
Spectator participants are the participants who expose themselves to information, initiate and
partake in political discussions, attempt to influence others into voting for a party. In effect, they
take part in the basic political activities required of all full members of the society. But they do
participants. Participants in this category typically have begun to take a keener interest than the
spectators in politics. The activities they engage in include attending a political meeting or rally,
belonging, and making a monetary contribution to a political party or association, and contacting
a public officer or political leader over certain issues. Gladiatorial Participants are the most
active participants who typically have the highest level of political efficacy. Gladiatorial
activities include caucus or strategic meeting, soliciting party funds, seeking political office and
influence, and actually holding public and party office. Gladiatorial participants then are the top
political leaders, and they often constitute a tiny minority (between 5- 100%) of the total adult
population.
Karl Deutsch's Typology

In this typology (Deutsch; 1974), there are two broad categories of political participants, namely,
the politically relevant strata and the elite strata. Each of these categories is further subdivided
into narrower categories of participants based on the position method and the level of
participation. The Politically Relevant Strata comprises of those members of the political system
who count or matter and must be taken into consideration by decision-makers. Students,
teachers, market women, the “common man”, all count because they are those to be affected by
the decisions made. In democratic and nondemocratic political systems alike where voting is a
primary political activity, the politically relevant strata would include all those who are eligible
to vote. In this sense, most adults belong to the politically relevant strata. Within the politically
relevant strata, a further distinction can be made between those who are active (those who
actually participate, by for example voting or demanding or opposing a particular policy) and
non-activists (those who are relevant but fail to actually participate by not voting or discussing
politics). The Elite Strata comprises of those who are not only politically relevant but must
actively participate in the political process, seeking influence and power, and actually occupy the
most important political positions. The elites are ostensibly the most educated and influential
members of society, and they constitute the "attentive public" which moulds public opinion and
provide leadership and direction for society. The elite strata are further subdivided into the
marginal elites, the mid-elite core, the who's who elite, and the top elite, based on the position
method. This method uses the positions or roles of elites to classify them. Members of the lower
middle-class-Clerks, small-scale businessmen and intermediate staffers-belong to the marginal
elite class. Those in the upper-middle class academicians, senior civil servants, and military
officers- belong to the mid-elite group. The who's who elites are the 'notables' captains of
industry, Permanent Secretaries, military Generals, President, Ministers, Ambassadors, and
Chief-Justice - who actually make authoritative decisions. Again, Deutsch's typology, like
Mitbraith’s, does not include those who are not interested at all in politics, though he talks of
non-active members of the politically relevant strata.

Robert Dahl's (Dahl, 1976)Typology

There are four categories in this typology, namely, the Apolitical stratum that is apathetic and
not interested in politics let alone vote. However, they sometimes take part in politics in
unsystematic ways, like violently rioting or participating in a civil war. Political stratum takes
part in basic political activities like voting and discussing party politics. The power seekers are
those who have become so highly involved that they decide to seek power and influence by
running for political office. Lastly, The powerful: these are those that occupy the top political
positions, and control the greatest amount of political resources using their political skills. These
are the President, leaders of political parties, heads of legislative assemblies and “the powers
behind the scene”, who are mostly the wealthiest members of society, the underlying political
forces.