Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

Arthur W. Page Society 2011 Case Study Competition

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

Table of Contents
I. Case Study
1. Overview 2. A Brief History of Toyota Motor Co. 2.1 Toyota Motor Company Background 2.2 Continued Success 2.3 Corporate Philosophy 2.4 Corporate Social Responsibility 3. The Issue of Sudden Unintended Acceleration 3.1 A Sticky Situation 3.2 A Trip Down Memory Lane 3.3 Back to the Future 4. Chronology of the Toyota SUA Case: August 2009-August 2010 5. Repercussions 5.1 Media Response 5.2 Consumer Response 5.3 Economic Impact 5.4 Government Criticism and Investigation 6. Internal Discord 6.1 The Toyota Way 6.2 A Crisis Made in Japan 7. Responses of Toyota 7.1 Denial and Deception 7.2 Action Promised but Not Delivered 7.3 A Clearer Picture 7.4 Marketing Actions 8. The Toyota Way Back What the Future Holds 8.1 Weathering the Storm 8.2 Critical Acclaim and Media Coverage 8.3 U.S. Government Developments 9. Toyota s Challenge 3

3 3 4 4 4 4 5 6 9 9 9 10 11 11 12 13 13 14 15 15 15 16 17 28

II. III.

APPENDICES REFERENCES

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

I. CASE STUDY
1. Overview
Newly appointed President and CEO Akio Toyoda, grandson of Toyota Motor Company s founder, would unknowingly soon be faced with the biggest crisis in the company s history a few short months after taking the reins. It started with a single, horrifying car crash in southern California in August 2009.1 And after two separate vehicle recalls attributed to hundreds of consumer claims of Sudden Unintended Acceleration covering 10 million vehicles, the company was forced to announce it was suspending the sale of eight of its best-selling vehicles, a move that would ultimately cost the company and its dealers a minimum of $54 million a day in lost sales revenue at its peak.2 How did a company that became the world's largest automaker on the back of a rock-solid reputation for quality and dependability find itself at the center of the biggest product recalls in company history?3 And what does this mean for Toyota's brand image in the United States, its largest and most profitable market?

2. A Brief History of Toyota Motor Co.

2.1 Toyota Motor Company Background The Toyota Motor Co. Ltd was first established in 1937 as a spin-off from Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, one of the world's leading manufacturers of weaving machinery.4 Toyota Motor Sales Co., Ltd. was later established in 1950, and the first Toyota cars arrived in the United States in 1957 which would lead to the founding of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. on October 31st in the same year. Toyota began manufacturing operations in the U.S. by 1972 and expanded to include vehicle production in 1986.5 Toyota Motors is a publicly traded company on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange under the symbol TM. The company s principal competitors within the industry are Ford Motor Company, General Motors Corporation, and Honda Motor Co., Ltd and as of 2010, Toyota held over 16% of the U.S. market share. 6 With more than 1,500 Toyota, Lexus and Scion dealers in the U.S. alone and a world-wide employment of over 320,000, Toyota sells vehicles in 170 countries and is currently regarded as the world s largest automobile manufacturer by both sales and production.7 2.2 Continued Success Over the past 25 years, Toyota has had a steady increase in both sales and market share within the automotive industry. By the end of the 1980s, Toyota had garnered the reputation of being a powerful and exceptionally well-run car company.8 After a decade of consistent growth, the company stood atop the Japanese automobile industry and ranked number three worldwide.9 By the beginning of the 1990s, Toyota commanded an overwhelming 43% of the Japanese car market, and in the United States it sold more than one million cars and trucks for the first time in its history.10 Toyota also spearheaded the Japanese automobile industry s venture into the luxury car market, leading the way with its Lexus LS400 luxury sedan, which by the mid-1990s was outselling market veterans BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Jaguar.11 In 2000, Toyota introduced its first Hybrid model, the Prius, continuing the company s success into the new millennium. Toyota has gone on to develop multiple hybrid options and extend their availability to seven of their models. Currently, 10% of total sales in the U.S. are hybrids and Toyota has sold nearly 75% of all the hybrids in America so far. Worldwide, Toyota has sold over 2 million hybrid cars.12

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

2.3 Corporate Philosophy Toyota is driven by a corporate purpose that combines harmonious growth and enhancement of profitability, and this purpose is clearly understood and internalized by its senior management and employees.13 At Toyota, employees are continuously trained in the Toyota Production System, or TPS. The main objectives of the TPS are to phase out overburden and inconsistency and to eliminate waste. The most significant effects on process value delivery are achieved by designing a process capable of delivering the required results smoothly by designing out inconsistency.14 Unyielding attention for product quality and cost awareness has become an almost religious way of life for everyone in the organization. TPS enables Toyota to construct automobiles at low cost and develop new products faster than any of their competitors. Not only have Toyota s rivals such as Chrysler, Daimler, Ford, Honda, and General Motors developed TPS-like systems, organizations such as hospitals and postal services also have adopted its underlying rules, tools, and practices to become more efficient.15 2.4 Corporate Social Responsibility While Toyota s reputation has taken a beating in terms of safety, it continues to boast a record of quality corporate citizenship in other areas. In 2009, Ethisphere ranked Toyota as one of the World s Most Ethical Companies based on criteria that included Corporate Citizenship/Responsibility, Legal/Regulatory Reputation and Track Record, and Industry Leadership to name a few.16 Since 1991, Toyota has contributed more than $464 million to philanthropic programs in the U.S. and supports numerous programs focused on environmental, educational and safety issues in an effort to strengthen diverse communities throughout the U.S. 17 In 2008, Toyota launched TogetherGreen, a $20 million, five-year alliance with Audubon, an environmental conservation organization, to fund conservation projects, train environmental leaders, and offer volunteer opportunities to significantly benefit the environment.18 For the past 20 years, the Toyota U.S.A Foundation has funded K-12 educational programs that focus on the areas of math and science. Currently, the company provides $2 million a year in support of various programs and partner with some of America's leading organizations and institutions through grants and scholarships. Toyota also created and driving safety program located in California called Toyota Driving Expectations, a free program for teens and their parents. The goal of Toyota Driving Expectations is to proactively take America's driving youth through a safe driving experience.19

3. The Issue of Sudden Unintended Acceleration

3.1 A Sticky Situation The issue of Sudden Unintended Acceleration (SUA), or sticky accelerators, is no new phenomenon. Beginning in 1986, the issue of SUA was examined in depth by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) due to an "above average" number of incident reports.20 According to a 1989 NHTSA report, SUA was defined as the unintended, unexpected, uncontrolled acceleration of a vehicle from a stationary position, low initial speed or at cruising speed, often accompanied by an apparent loss of braking effectiveness. 21 Despite the research invested in this topic over time, it still remains unclear whether problems are caused by driver error, mechanical or electrical problems with automobiles, or some combination of these factors.22 3.2 A Trip Down Memory Lane Since 2007, issues with brakes, acceleration, floor mats and gas pedals have led to probes by U.S. agencies landing the world s largest carmaker in trouble.23 However, the issue of unintended

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

acceleration is not a problem unique to Toyota. If any company can relate to Toyota's recall woes, it's Audi. During the 1980 s, the German automaker suffered similar allegations of unintended acceleration when supposed faulty gas pedals on its popular Audi 5000 series sedan were linked to six deaths and 700 crashes.24 And although the problem was eventually ruled a case of driver error people were applying the accelerator instead of the brake Audi had to issue a major recall.25 A 1986 60 Minutes investigation aired a short time after the announcement of the recall, showing an Audi 5000 sedan accelerating out of control to an audience of millions.26 The investigation was later debunked when it was discovered that the car had been modified by the television producers, but the damage was done.27 Audi sales dropped 80% over the next five years.28 It wasn't until 2000 that it reached its peak sales mark from 1985.29 In the years following the Audi experience, incidents of unintended acceleration continued to be reported to the NHTSA from all makes of vehicles. The frequency of such incidents was seen by NHTSA as unremarkable, given the millions of cars involved.30 They were viewed through the lens of the 1989 NHTSA study which had concluded that all incidents of unintended acceleration were the result of driver error. Unintended acceleration thus attracted little attention until August 28, 2009, when the U.S. public once again became aware of the phenomenon.31 3.3 Back to the Future On that day, Mark Saylor, an off-duty California Highway Patrol officer, left his Lexus at the Bob Baker Lexus Dealership in El Cajon, California. The dealership loaned him a 2009 Lexus ES350 to use until his car had been serviced. Hours later, he was driving the Lexus along California Highway 125 when it accelerated on its own to 120 miles per hour.32As the car sped down the highway, Saylor s brother in law, Chris Lastrella, called 911. He was heard saying: We re in a Lexus. . . and we re going north on 125 and our accelerator is stuck ... we re in trouble ... there s no brakes ... we re approaching the intersection ... hold on ... hold on and pray ... pray. 33 The Lexus slammed into a Ford Explorer at the intersection of Highway 125 and Mission Gorge Rd., went over a curb and through a fence before it flipped and caught fire, killing Saylor along with his wife Cleofe, 45, and daughter, Mahala, 13, and Chris Lastrella. The incident was widely covered and publicized by media outlets and the recording of the phone call eventually became one of many 911 calls recorded of people whose vehicles were speeding out of control. The combination of the dramatic 911 call, the horrifying accident that ensued and the implausibility of driver error by highway patrol officer created a national buzz34. As a result, twenty-three years after the Audi 60 Minutes episode, an eerily similar program was seen by millions of viewers on an installment of ABC World News. On February 22, 2010, David Gilbert, an automotive technology professor of Southern Illinois University, assisted by ABC correspondent Brian Ross, demonstrated how, under certain conditions, a Toyota vehicle can accelerate rapidly and not record any error on the computer monitoring system of the car.35 This report was aired a few weeks after the announcement of two recalls in response to numerous claims of SUI that accounted for over 8 million vehicles at the time and the night before the beginning of highly anticipated Congressional hearings in which Toyota leadership was called to testify.36 The following day, Professor Gilbert offered a preliminary report of his findings in testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives in these hearings.37 Much like its German predecessor, Toyota eventually found that the ABC report was flawed and had in fact exacerbated the problem. And again, like Audi, the damage had already been done. Whatever the given cause of SUA may be, one lesson from both the Audi and Toyota experiences is that a single highly publicized incident could be devastating to a brand.

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

4. Chronology of the Toyota SUA Case: August 2009-August 2010

August 28, 2009: Off-duty California Highway Patrol officer Mark Saylor was traveling on Highway 125 in Santee, California (northeast of San Diego), with three family members, when the 2009 Lexus ES350 he was driving suddenly accelerated out of control, hits another car, tumbled down an embankment and caught fire. While the car was careening down the highway at speeds estimated to exceed 100 mph, one of the occupants called 911 and reported that the car had "no brakes." All four people were killed in the ensuing crash.38 September 14, 2009: Preliminary reports from Toyota and local authorities indicated that the Lexus, which had been on loan from Bob Baker Lexus of San Diego, where Saylor's personal Lexus vehicle was being serviced, may have had the wrong floor mats installed, interfering with the gas pedal.39 September 29, 2009: Toyota announced it was recalling the floor mats on 4.2 million Toyota and Lexus vehicles. The company advised owners to remove their floor mats and place them in the trunk and directed dealers to use zip ties to secure the floor mats in their vehicles so they could not interfere with the gas pedal.40 October 1, 2009: Toyota reported a September sales decrease of 16.1% from last September on a daily selling rate basis. However, the third quarter showed a 28% increase over the second quarter. Improving economic conditions and the CARS program led to a significant increase for the industry in the third quarter over the first-half year, said Don Esmond, senior vice president of automotive operations for TMS. Moving into the fourth quarter, we expect continued momentum will close the year on a bright note. 41 October 2, 2009: Newly installed Toyota CEO Akio Toyoda publically apologized to the Saylor family members killed in the accident, to every customer affected by the recall and for the recent drop in sales during a briefing at the Japanese Press Club. Toyota , he stated, is grasping for salvation. He went on to state that Toyota was wholly unprepared for the current economic freefall, and that the company is now a single step away from capitulation to irrelevance or death. 42 October 18, 2009: The Los Angeles Times published the first of several stories concerning claims of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. A Toyota spokesperson admitted there is no safety override programmed into its computer to disable the throttle pedal when the brake pedal is pressed, but said Toyota is considering adding one, as well as modifying the pedals themselves to keep them from getting caught on the floor mats. The story also revealed the Lexus' push-button starter must be depressed for at least three seconds to shut down the engine when the vehicle is in drive.43 October 25 , 2009: The results of an investigation by local authorities and the NHTSA revealed a set of rubber floor mats designed for the Lexus RX 400 SUV had been placed over the top of the ES 350's stock carpeted floor mats and that the accelerator pedal had become jammed against them, causing the car to accelerate out of control.44 NHTSA also pointed out the gas pedal on the car was solidly mounted to its stalk, whereas other vehicles use hinged pedals.45 October 30, 2009: Toyota began sending letters to U.S. owners notifying them of an unspecified upcoming recall to fix the unintended acceleration issue. In the letters Toyota said "no defect exists."46

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

November 2, 2009: NHTSA took the highly unusual step of publicly rebuking Toyota, calling a company press release re-iterating the statements made in the October 30th letter to owners "inaccurate" and "misleading," noting that the floor mat recall was an "interim" measure and that it "does not correct the underlying defect."47 November 4, 2009: Toyota issued another press release denying media reports that a problem exists with its drive-by-wire electronic throttle system.48 November 8, 2009: The Los Angeles Times claims reports in an article that Toyota had ignored over 1,200 complaints of unintended acceleration over the past eight years because NHTSA had thrown out those reports that claimed the brakes were not capable of stopping the car under an unintended acceleration scenario. In the story a Toyota spokesman confirms the brakes are not capable of stopping a vehicle accelerating at wide open throttle.49 November 16, 2009: Japanese media reports claimed Toyota had made a deal with NHTSA over a recall. Toyota denied any agreement had been reached, but the company admitted it had already set aside $5.6 billion to deal with the issue.50 November 25, 2009: Toyota dealers were instructed to remove the gas pedal and shorten it so it cannot interfere with the floor mats. As an "extra measure of confidence," the company also directed dealers to update the onboard computers on the Toyota Camry and Avalon, and Lexus ES 350, IS 250 and IS 350 with a new program that overrides the electronic gas pedal when the brake pedal is pressed.51 December 5, 2009: Following an op-ed piece in the Los Angeles Times,52 Toyota wrote a letter to the paper reiterating its stance that the floor mats were the root cause of most unintended acceleration claims that would be published December 9th.53 December 26, 2009: A Toyota Avalon crashed into a lake in Southlake, Texas after accelerating out of control. All four occupants died. Floor mats were ruled out as a cause because they were found in the trunk of the car.54 January 11, 2010: Toyota announced its brake override software fix will be made global by 2011.55 January 21, 2010: Toyota recalled another 2.3 million Toyota-brand vehicles because of a problem with the gas pedal. Toyota said "a rare set of conditions which may cause the accelerator pedal to become harder to depress, slower to return or, in the worst case, stuck in a partially depressed position." The company said the new recall is unrelated to the floor mat recall.56 January 26, 2010: Toyota announced it is immediately halting the sale of all models affected by the January 21 pedal recall, and that it will shut down assembly lines for those models at five North American plants for one week beginning February 1st "to assess and coordinate activities."57 Toyota does not explain why it waited five days to stop sales after announcing the recall.58 January 27, 2010: U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood told Chicago radio station WGN the government asked Toyota to stop selling the recalled vehicles. Toyota confirms LaHood's statement. Other media reports claimed Toyota had quietly informed its dealers and factories the problem was a result of pedals made by the supplier CTS Corporation of Elkhart, Indiana. Lexus and Scion models, it turns out, used pedals made by Japanese supplier Denso, hence their exemption

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

from the recall. The problem was said to occur after 38,000 miles, though the cause was still under investigation.59 The Wall Street Journal estimated that Toyota dealers could lose as much as $1.5 million in profit every week of the sales freeze.60 Toyota shares dropped more than 10% over the day and a half after the freeze was announced and CTS' shares dropped 2.4%. Toyota notified NHTSA late in the day that it would expand its November 25 recall to cover an additional 1.1 million vehicles. The recall now included the Toyota Venza and more model years of the Toyota Highlander, as well as the Pontiac Vibe.61 February 1, 2010: Toyota announced it had developed a plan to fix the accelerator pedals and that parts were being shipped to dealers so they can carry out the repairs.62 February 5, 2010: Toyota President and CEO Akio Toyoda apologized for the car recalls at a news conference at the World Economic Forum and promised to beef up quality control.63 I apologize from the bottom of my heart for all the concern that we have given to so many customers, said Toyoda.64 February 9, 2010: An editorial written by President and CEO Akio Toyoda entitled Toyota s Plan to Repair Public Image was published in the Washington Post.65 Toyota announced it would recall about 437,000 Prius and other hybrid vehicles worldwide to fix brake problems after more than 100 complaints were received from the NHTSA from Prius owners. The announcement raised the number of vehicles recalled by Toyota to more than 8.5 million.66 February 23, 2010: Jim Lentz, the top U.S. executive for Toyota, testified before a House committee on Energy and Commerce stating the company is still investigating whether electronics of the gas pedal system may be at fault.67 February 24, 2010: Toyota President Akio Toyoda apologized during a congressional hearing for the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. He pledged Toyota s full cooperation with U.S. government officials investigating safety problems.68 March 2, 2010: Toyota Motor North America, Inc. announced that former U.S. Secretary of Transportation Rodney E. Slater would lead an independent North American Quality Advisory Panel to advise the company s North American affiliates on quality and safety issues.69 Toyota also announced plans to launch the company s most far-reaching sales program in its history. Starting on March 2nd and lasting through April 5th, 2010, the national marketing program would include financing, leasing and customer loyalty offers.70 April 5, 2010: The U.S. government accused Toyota of hiding dangerous defects and sought a record $16.4 million fine, dwarfing the previous record of $1 million levied against General Motors in 2004 for a unsatisfactory response to a windshield wiper recall.71 April 8, 2010: Toyota announced it will not contest the pending fine presented by the U.S. government and agreed to pay.72 The company also announced it had established a new SMART (Swift Market Analysis Response Team) business process to quickly and aggressively investigate customer reports of unintended acceleration in Toyota, Lexus and Scion vehicles in the United States.73

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

April 20, 2010: The Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, shifting national media and consumer attention away from Toyota.74 May 18, 2010: Toyota paid a $16.4 million fine to settle allegations by U.S. regulators that the company was too slow to recall vehicles with defective gas pedals.75 August 4, 2010: Toyota announced it had returned to a profit of $2.2 billion in the April-to-June quarter because of strong sales in emerging markets and aggressive cost-cutting.76

5. Repercussions
5.1 Media Response When reporting of the August car crash in California showed a potential link with Toyota, the media became heavily involved. Much of the news coverage was critical of Toyota. One study found that 106 of 108 observed media mentions of Toyota during the August 2009-February 2010 period were negative in attitude toward the company.77 A large portion of the coverage concerning the recall was spearheaded by the Los Angeles Times and proposed many questions as to the safety concerns of Toyota. A series of stories were published before the acceleration issues were widely known, and while the company was blaming mechanical problems, starting with defective floor mats, and driver error, the Times reporting raised the possibility that safety issues went deeper than that.78 What began as a simple series of stories quickly became syndicated in many publications nationwide, such as the Wall Street Journal, reaching an unprecedented audience. The Los Angeles Times work was eventually named a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in national reporting, drawing even more attention to Toyota s issues.79 The main underlying issue throughout the media coverage in general was that many believed Toyota was withholding information concerning the accelerator glitches.80 This was accompanied with the belief that Toyota had compromised safety and quality in their engineering in efforts to displace General Motors as the number one car manufacturer in the world.81 Another key talking point for media outlets focused on the lack of a definite cause for the incidents and the consistently changing stance from Toyota in regards to the issue.82 5.2 Consumer Response While Toyota owners remained predominately supportive of their vehicles, they were negatively impacted.83 One major concern arose when buyers purchased models that would soon be recalled and halted for production during the same day.84 Toyota dealers claimed to have no knowledge of the looming recalls, but this did little to diminish the disdain of these purchasers. This resulted in questioning whether they should get their money back after buying a car that was deemed defective by the company itself.85 One of the most harmful examples of consumer backlash was found to be directly related to the amount of media coverage over SUA. As media coverage concerning unintended acceleration increased, so did the amount of complaints from Toyota owners. Specifically in the months of February and March, when the coverage reached its highest point, the number of complaints had tripled from its average amount. At its peak, the number of complaints reached over 1,500 in the month of February.86 5.3 Economic Impact In the wake of the recall announcements, Toyota felt an immediate economic impact. The first of these was the decision on January 26th to temporarily halt production at six assembly plants in North America and suspend sales of eight of its most popular models, including the Camry, the

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best-selling car in the United States.87 Although recalls are somewhat a routine matter for carmakers, taking cars off the market is not. The decision to stop sales and production in America took a substantial toll on Toyota. These eight models accounted for about 60% of sales in 2009 and 60% of the carmaker s U.S. inventory.88 The timing was also a concern because the last week of the month is a peak time for car sales.89 US Toyota dealers were projected to lose as much as $2.47 billion in combined monthly revenue from the halt in sales of both new and used versions of those models with each of the individual dealers in the U.S. potentially losing out on $1.75 million to $2 million a month in revenue.90 The economic news also cast a cloud of uncertainty over the company shareholders and caused the stock price to plummet.91 Toyota's U.S. market share fell by 16% to its lowest level since January 2006, and its monthly sales dropped below 100,000 vehicles for the first time in more than a decade. Fears of an extended sales slump pushed Toyota's shares down 3.7% in a flat market in Tokyo, compounding a slide that had sent the stock down 17% since its recall was announced.92 To compound Toyota s internal financial troubles, this crisis created an opportunity for other carmakers to claim a portion of Toyota s slipping market share. As Toyota sales spun into reverse, Ford and Hyundai Motor Co. emerged as the big winners, each posting 24% sales gains.93 In one telling benchmark, the Ford brand outsold Toyota, Scion and Lexus on a combined basis. GM's volume-leading Chevrolet brand also topped Toyota on its own.94 The tremendous gains of these company s was also attributed to generous rebates specifically to current Toyota owners, such as discounts and no-interest financing.95 The decision to halt production to fix the recalls then led to the suspended production of two plants in Kentucky and Texas on February 16th due to lagging sales following the recall announcements.96 The temporary shutdowns were aimed at adjusting production levels to prevent overstocked lots and massive losses for dealerships.97 5.4 Government Criticism and Investigations The events that took place during the recalls also led to sharp criticism and a number of investigations from U.S. government agencies. U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood announced two major investigations to resolve the issue of sudden acceleration within Toyota and across the entire automotive industry.98 LaHood first called upon The National Assembly of Sciences National Research Council to examine the subjects of unintended acceleration and electronic vehicle controls over the course of 15 months during which it would cover all manufacturers. Secretary LaHood then asked the U.S. Department of Transportation Inspector General to review whether NHTSA's Office of Defect Investigation had the necessary resources and systems to identify and address safety defects as it moves forward. Finally, Secretary LaHood asked the U.S. Department of Transportation Inspector General to assess whether the NHTSA Office of Defect Investigation conducted an adequate review of complaints of alleged unintended acceleration reported to NHTSA from 2002 to the present.99 This was the most comprehensive collective action ever taken toward investigating Sudden Unintended Acceleration. Along with numerous investigations being initiated by the NHTSA for accelerator complaints, the most visible and perhaps harmful criticism of the company occurred with the U.S. Congressional Hearings, in which the leadership in Toyota was called to testify. President and CEO of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Jim Lentz testified before the House Energy committee on February 23rd and Toyota Motor President Akio Toyoda testified before the House Oversight committee on February 24th in an effort to resolve the numerous unresolved unintended acceleration reports and to verify the root of the problem. In the two days of congressional hearings, the company sought to assure that an electronic glitch was not the culprit and that its recent recalls due to gas pedals potentially sticking to floor mats had solved the problem.100

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While Akio Toyoda testified that electronics weren t to blame, Jim Lentz said he wasn t sure the current recalls had entirely solved the problem. This not only discredited any and all statements from both individuals, but also made many stakeholders question the communication within the company. This resulted in a crucial blow to Toyota s recovery efforts, and according to Rep. Bart Gordon of Tennessee, raised more questions than answers. 101 A survey taken after the hearings revealed that 47% of respondents felt worse about Toyota s image after the hearings.102 Shortly after the hearings, stories began surfacing that Toyota was now related to 52 deaths in regards to unintended acceleration.103 The NHTSA also took a rare step in publicly criticizing the company s slow response in addressing and fixing the issue and eventually fined them a record $16.4 million dollars on April 5th, dwarfing the previous record of $1 million levied against General Motors in 2004 for an unsatisfactory response to a windshield wiper recall.104

6. Internal Discord
The discrepancies between Jim Lentz and Akio Toyoda in their Congressional testimonies were just a small example of the major role a lack internal communications played in turning this issue into a full-blown crisis. From the beginning, Toyota was inconsistent in what it was communicating through its response. But in order to best understand the extent in which internal communications suffered, one must look at the foundation of the company s managerial approach as a whole. 6.1 The Toyota Way Toyota s business philosophy and values are summed up in a set of 14 principles dubbed The Toyota Way. This system consists of multiple principles in two key areas, with the first being continuous improvement, and the second being respect for people. Continuous improvement, according to the system, is built upon establishing a long-term vision, working on challenges, seeking continual innovation and going to the source, or issue of the problem. Similarly, respect for people is built on taking responsibility, building mutual trust and maximizing both individual and team performance.105 This approach not only helped Toyota become one of the world s top car manufacturers, but also one of the world s top companies in general. Soon after the recalls, however, the company that appeared to put customers first had its reputation shattered by an e-mail that surfaced on April 8th, 2010.106 6.2 A Crisis Made in Japan Written in mid-January, just days before the company was plunged into its most damaging vehicle recall ever, the e-mail referred directly to company efforts to cover-up mechanical problems with accelerator pedals. Before January, Toyota had only acknowledged publicly that accelerator pedals could become stuck by becoming entangled in loose floor-mats. But the internal e-mails, which were quickly the hands of US investigators along with over 70,000 additional documents, revealed a tussle within Toyota s corporate leadership over whether or not to inform the public over more fundamental flaws in the pedal mechanism problems that had not at the time been fully understood by Toyota s engineers and to which there was no clear fix available.107 Irv Miller, who has since retired but was then Toyota s vice president for public affairs, sent the e-mail in response to comments by his Japanese colleague, Katsuhiko Koganei a senior executive who had been dispatched from Toyota s Japanese headquarters to coordinate with his US colleagues. Mr. Koganei argued in a previous email that the company should not mention about the mechanical failures of the pedal, because the cause of the fault had not yet been identified and that a statement by Toyota would unsettle motorists.108 We are not protecting our customers by keeping this quiet, replied Mr. Miller, who went on to say, WE HAVE a tendency for MECHANICAL failure in accelerator pedals of a certain manufacturer on certain models. 109 In

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response to the surfaced e-mail, Toyota quickly issued the following statement through the virtual newsroom on its website:
While Toyota does not comment on internal company communications and cannot comment on Mr. Miller s email, we have publicly acknowledged on several occasions that the company did a poor job of communicating during the period preceding our recent recalls. We have subsequently taken a number of important steps to improve our communications with regulators and customers on safetyrelated matters to ensure that this does not happen again. These include the appointment of a new Chief Quality Officer for North America and a greater role for the region in making safety-related decisions. As part of our heightened commitment to quality assurance, we are fully committed to being more transparent.110

7. Responses of Toyota
7.1 Denial and Deception Initially after the August 28th, 2009 car crash in San Diego, Toyota s response to potential issues with SUA was limited to a recall of all weather floor mats on September 29th, an entire month after the accident, and public apologies to the Saylor family. However, these apologies came across as matter of fact alongside apologies for sputtering sales with no definitive and collective action taking place.111 The first organized communication to Toyota owners occurred on October 30th, exactly two months after the accident. A letter was sent to owners notifying them of an unspecified upcoming recall to fix the issue, claiming floor mats were the sole source of the problem and that no defect exists .112 In response to the letters, he NHTSA openly criticized the company for giving inaccurate and misleading statements, calling the proposed floor mat recall as an interim solution that didn t solve the underlying problem.113 Despite the NHTSA s claims, Toyota stood by their argument that all SUA cases were caused by floor mats entrapping the accelerator pedal. Throughout the months of October and November, Toyota communicated numerous conflicting messages that undermined their efforts to maintain trust with their stakeholders. Beginning with a Los Angeles Times story on October 18th, a Toyota spokesperson admitted there was no safety override programmed into the vehicles computers to disable the throttle pedal when the brake pedal is pressed.114 Shortly thereafter, a November 8th Los Angeles Times article reported over 1,200 complaints of SUA had been ignored by Toyota over the past eight years. In the same story, a Toyota spokesperson admitted that the current brakes were not capable of stopping a vehicle accelerating at wide open throttle. 115 Toyota continued refuting claims by the Los Angeles Times and other media that a problem existed with their drive-by-wire electronic throttle system. The company took an active role in responding to media claims, which came across in some circles as overly defensive and aggressive, resulting in even more coverage and more attention to the issue. This all culminated with a letter written by Irv Miller to the Los Angeles Times on December 5 that reiterated the stance that floor mats were the root cause of the problem and defended the NHTSA and its methodology in a recent investigation on the matter.116 Miller wrote: The issue of unintended acceleration involving Toyota and Lexus vehicles has been thoroughly and methodically investigated on several occasions over the past few years. These investigations have used a variety of proven and recognized scientific methods. Importantly, none of these studies has ever found that an electronic engine control system malfunction is the cause of unintended acceleration.117 While Toyota s response was delayed, it was sufficient at the time. That was until another event dismantled their floor mat defense and escaladed this situation into a full blown crisis. On

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December 26, a Toyota Avalon crashed after accelerating out of control in Southlake, Texas, killing all four passengers. The floor mats were found in the trunk of the car, as was instructed by Toyota, which ruled them out as a cause of SUA and raised serious issues concerning Toyota s credibility and transparency in communications.118 7.2 Action Promised but Not Delivered After the Texas crash voided all claims that Toyota had fixed the problem of SUA, there was a total void in communication from Toyota. President and CEO Akio Toyoda was nowhere to be found, and there was still no plan of action set out by Toyota to actually solve the problem and ease the worries of Toyota drivers.119 Toyota responded first by announcing that it would make its brake override software fix, which allowed the brakes to override the accelerator pedal when both are applied, global in all vehicles by 2011.120 While this was a promising gesture, it did little to impact the issue at hand. It wasn t until February 1st, 2010, a full five weeks after the Texas crash, that Toyota announced that it had developed a fix for the accelerator pedals that could potentially stick in 2.3 million vehicles.121 The announcement was made by Jim Lentz, a U.S. Toyota executive, and in the process raised even more questions as to why Mr. Toyoda or other Japanese executives were unable to address the crisis.122 By putting Mr. Lentz out front, Toyota was sending a regional sales executive to do a job that needed to be handled by the top management of the entire corporation, said Jeffery A. Sonnenfeld, a Yale University professor and president of the Chief Executive Leadership Institute.123 Mr. Lentz is not a known quantity, and he wasn t able to reassure people that this problem was being addressed, said Arthur C. Liebler, a former Chrysler vice president and top communications adviser to Lee Iacocca.124 Finally, on February 5th, President Toyoda apologized for the car recalls and promised to beef up quality control within the company.125 7.3 A Clearer Picture After the multiple recalls and the announcement of the accelerator pedal fix, Toyota implemented consistent action. A plan was developed to ensure the public that Toyota was committed to safety, and President Toyoda spotlighted the plan intended to rebuild its image and increase transparency in an editorial he wrote for the Washington Post on February 9th, 2010.126 In the letter, Toyoda stated: For much of Toyota's history, we have ensured the quality and reliability of our vehicles by placing a device called an andon cord on every production line -- and empowering any team member to halt production if there's an assembly problem. Only when the problem is resolved does the line begin to move again. Two weeks ago, I pulled the andon cord for our company. I ordered production of eight models in five plants across North America temporarily stopped so that we could focus on fixing our customers' vehicles that might be affected by sticking accelerator pedals. Today, Toyota team members and dealers across North America are working around the clock to repair all recalled vehicles. But to regain the trust of American drivers and their families, more is needed. We are taking responsibility for our mistakes, learning from them and acting immediately to address the concerns of consumers and independent government regulators.127 The letter announced the launching of a top-to-bottom review of global operations to ensure that problems of this magnitude do not happen again. 128 As part the review, he announced the establishment of an Automotive Center of Quality Excellence in the United States, where a team of our top engineers will focus on strengthening our quality management and quality control across North America.129

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The editorial also announced the establishment of what would become the North American Quality Advisory Panel, which would independently review the company s operations and make sure that any deficiencies were eliminated in its processes. The findings of these experts were stated be made available to the public, as will Toyota's responses to these findings, therefore increasing transparency and taking a tremendous step forward for the company in tackling this issue.130 Along with a promise to increase its outreach with government agencies and a pledge to implement steps to do a better job within Toyota in sharing important quality and safety information across global operations, the company made a vital move to bottle up the seemingly never ending escapade. On April 8th, the company announced it had established a new SMART (Swift Market Analysis Response Team) business process to quickly and aggressively investigate customer reports of unintended acceleration in Toyota, Lexus and Scion vehicles in the United States.131 As stated in a Toyota press release: The rapid-response Swift Market Analysis Response Team will attempt to contact customers within 24 hours of receiving a complaint of unintended acceleration to arrange for a comprehensive on-site vehicle analysis There has been a great deal of confusion, speculation and misinformation about unintended acceleration in the past several weeks. We believe judgments should be based on reliable evidence, and our SMART business process is there to help provide information upon which such judgments can be made.132 7.4 Marketing Actions In the U.S., Toyota launched a series of special television ads specifically created for the crisis that acknowledged the automaker had let down customers but emphasized that they were working tirelessly to fix the problem. The company also announced a blueprint for fixes in regards to the problems through newspaper ads, television spots and personalized letters to Toyota owners.133 This blueprint, developed and tested by Toyota engineers, involved reinforcing the pedal assembly in a manner that eliminates the excess friction that has caused the pedals to stick in rare instances.134 This was crucial in that it was the first solution offered by Toyota to combat SUA. Toyota also announced plans to launch the company s most far-reaching sales program in its history in an effort to offset plummeting sales and to retain existing Toyota customers, offering numerous customer loyalty offers to existing Toyota owners.135 In addition, Toyota sought to reconnect with its customers. It began posting updates at [Link] regarding the recall and created a specific page dedicated to safety and recall information.136 Toyota also began heavily leveraging social media outlets such as Twitter and Facebook to connect with the consumers. Toyota s top U.S. executive, Jim Lentz, also took a personal role in the efforts. Along with a personal apology posted to YouTube and the website, he held a live chat at [Link]. In this venue, questions were posted by [Link] users and were voted on, or dugg, to determine which questions would be asked during the 30 minute interview, and in what order.137 Other YouTube videos were posted that spotlighted real workers in the plants and dealerships demonstrating how the recall repairs would take place.138 The company realized that its ability to repair its reputation rested in large part on the level of service it provided. And realizing this on a local level, dealerships also took an active role in the rebound. Along with some dealerships staying open 24 hours to accommodate the demand for recall fixes, one dealership in El Monte, California took advantage of its surroundings and offered coffee, Subway sandwiches and even a shuttle service to a nearby movie theater if repairs were to last longer than three hours.139

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8. The Toyota Way Back What the Future Holds

8.1 Weathering the Storm After the initial impact of the crisis passed, Toyota exhibited signs of economic recovery at a surprising rate. A February 11th report that took place during the recall efforts showed that a oneyear-old Toyota Camry CE dropped $100 in value from Feb. 1st to Feb. 8th and a one-year-old base model Honda Accord coupe in the same book also dropped $100 in value from Feb. 1st to Feb. 8th, and $500 or $100 more than the Camry from the Jan. 11th book. Even with Honda s reputation intact, it lost more value.140 Another identifier that the recall woes were disappearing occurred in the sales reports from March 2010, where Toyota Motor Sales reported a 35.3% increase over the same period from last year despite the multiple plant closings around the country.141 The final and clearest sign that Toyota was on the path to economic recovery was reported in early August, 2010, one year after their troubles began. The company s second-quarter results included a $2.2 billion profit.142 This eased fears in investors and allowed the company to raise predictions for annual vehicle sales to sell 7.38 million, up from an earlier forecast of 7.29 million.143 8.2 Critical Acclaim and Media Coverage Despite the tremendous losses Toyota experienced throughout the SUA debacle, there was some much-needed good news delivered shortly after the peak of the problems. Not only did Toyota customers maintain a positive attitude toward the company throughout the recalls, but the company also continued to receive critical acclaim. Interbrand ranked Toyota 11th on its list of Best Global Brands, placing it as the highest ranked automotive company.144 Consumer Report also ranked Toyota as the Most Highly Perceived Car Brand in the market according to a survey that ranked brands across seven areas.145 J.D. Power and Associates also awarded Toyota with four 1st place awards more than any other brand.146 Another key development in the aftermath of Toyota s recalls would be reports on the validity of the coverage that took place throughout the crisis. According to an article in the August 2010 issue of Forbes magazine: Mounting evidence indicates that those Toyotas truly accelerating suddenly can probably be explained by sliding floor mats (since fixed) and drivers hitting the gas instead of the brake. That is, the media have been chasing a will-o'-the-wisp for the better part of a year, whipping car buyers and Congress into a frenzy.147 The NHTSA "complaint database, available on its website, was discovered to be very poorly monitored and resulted in many of the NHTSA "complaints" turning out to be merely comments. The NHTSA has no "sudden acceleration" category to select when reporting a claim on the database, but instead uses "speed control," meaning that some of the the sudden-acceleration claims were combined with entries regarding vehicle sluggishness and a number of other subjects.148 In most stories referring to the NHTSA complaints, Forbes reported, they all became runaway Toyotas. 149 8.3 U.S. Government Developments After the recalls, information also emerged that the U.S. government might have been withholding information from Toyota in regards to SUA during their investigations. A Wall Street Journal article stated that:

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The U.S. Department of Transportation has analyzed dozens of data recorders from Toyota Motor Corp. vehicles involved in accidents blamed on sudden acceleration and found that the throttles were wide open and the brakes weren't engaged at the time of the crash.150 Simply put, this suggests that some drivers who have claimed their Toyota vehicles suddenly accelerated out of control were mistakenly using the accelerator instead of the brakes. The initial findings of a recent NHTSA study of the data recorders are consistent with a 1989 government-sponsored study that blamed similar driver mistakes for a rash of sudden-acceleration reports involving Audi 5000 sedans.151 The Toyota findings appeared to support Toyota's original position that sudden-acceleration reports involving its vehicles weren't caused by electronic glitches in computer-controlled throttle systems, as many alleged.152

9. Toyota s Challenge
The biggest concern facing Toyota in the wake of their communications crisis is whether they can continue their dominance in the automotive industry on the back of a reputation for quality and dependability when these very qualities have been compromised. This issue played out both externally, through the extensive media coverage, and internally, through the trials and tribulations brought forth through a breakdown in communication within the company. The events that transpired revealed many weaknesses within the automotive giant, but also presented just as many opportunities. Given the culture of Japanese corporations and the great pride they take in efficiency, acknowledging imperfections in their company was a huge step. During his Congressional testimony, Toyota President and CEO Akio Toyoda spoke of the future direction of Toyota: Toyota has, for the past few years, has been expanding its business rapidly. Quite frankly, I fear the pace at which we have grown may have been too quick. I would like to point out here that Toyota's priority has traditionally been the following: First; Safety, Second; Quality, and Third; Volume. These priorities became confused, and we were not able to stop, think, and make improvements as much as we were able to before We pursued growth over the speed at which we were able to develop our people and our organization, and we should sincerely be mindful of that I will do everything in my power to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again.153 Once Toyota s corporate leadership unified internally, the company was able to regain its footing, stand and deliver. Albeit late, their efforts were fixated on the main goal: regaining trust. Toyota is now challenged to realign itself with the foundations that launched them to the level of success from which they ultimately fell. The issue of sudden unintended acceleration will not quickly go away. And while Toyota has made drastic strides in an effort to restore its once infallible reputation for safety and quality, each and every stakeholder and competitor will be watching to see if they will take the opportunity to use these events to their advantage and rediscover the Toyota way.

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II. APPENDICES
Appendix 1 International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers World Ranking of Automotive Manufacturers for the Year 2009 - Top 50 Shown

Source: World Ranking of Manufacturers Year 2009, [Link]. (n.d.). Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]

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Appendix 2 Personal Recall Letter sent from Jim Lentz, President and CEO Toyota Motors U.S.A., Inc. Asked owners to bring in cars if problems were experienced/Announced entire organization was involved in the effort. The body of the letter:
Over the past few days, there has been a lot of speculation about our sticking accelerator pedal recall. Our message to Toyota owners is this if you are not experiencing any issues with your accelerator pedal, we are confident that your vehicle is safe to drive. If your accelerator pedal becomes harder to depress than normal or slower to return, please contact your dealer without delay. At Toyota, we take this issue very seriously, but I want to make sure our customers understand that this situation is rare and generally doesn t occur suddenly. In the instance where it does occur, the vehicle can be controlled with firm and steady application of the brakes. Here s the update on the recall: 1. We re starting to send letter this weekend to owners involved in the recall to schedule an appointment at their dealer. 2. Dealerships have extended their hours some of them working 24/7 to fix your vehicle as quickly as possible. 3. Trained technicians have begun making repairs We ve halted production of these models this week to focus fully on fixing this problem for the vehicles that are on the road. Our entire organization of 172,000 North American employees and dealership personnel has been mobilized. And we re redoubling our quality control efforts across the company. Ensuring your safety is our highest priority. I will continue to update you with accurate and timely information about the status of the recall in the days and weeks ahead. Sincerely, Jim Lentz

Source: [Link]

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Appendix 3 November 25, 2009 press release announcing floor mat recall

Toyota Announces Details of Remedy to Address Potential Accelerator Pedal Entrapment

Torrance, Calif., November 25, 2009 - - Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (TMS) announced today details of the vehicle-based remedy to address the root cause of the potential risk for floor mat entrapment of accelerator pedals in certain Toyota and Lexus models. Toyota issued a consumer safety advisory on September 29 on this issue and has, as an interim measure, commenced the mailing of safety notices to certain Toyota and Lexus owners on October 30. The models involved are: 2007 to 2010 MY (model year) Camry, 2005 to 2010 MY Avalon, 2004 to 2009 MY Prius, 2005 to 2010 MY Tacoma, 2007 to 2010 MY Tundra, 2007 to 2010 MY ES 350, 2006 to 2010 MY IS 250, and 2006 to 2010 MY IS 350. The specific measures of the vehicle-based remedy are as follows: 1. The shape of the accelerator pedal will be reconfigured to address the risk of floor mat entrapment, even when an older-design all-weather floor mat or other inappropriate floor mat is improperly attached, or is placed on top of another floor mat. For the ES350, Camry, and Avalon models involved, the shape of the floor surface underneath will also be reconfigured to increase the space between the accelerator pedal and the floor. 2. Vehicles with any genuine Toyota or Lexus accessory all-weather floor mat will be provided with newly-designed replacement driver- and front passenger-side all-weather floor mats. In addition, as a separate measure independent of the vehicle-based remedy, Toyota will install a brake override system onto the involved Camry, Avalon, and Lexus ES 350, IS 350 and IS 250 models as an extra measure of confidence. This system cuts engine power in case of simultaneous application of both the accelerator and brake pedals. Toyota is in the process of completing development of these actions and for the ES 350, Camry, and Avalon will start notifying owners of the involved vehicles via first-class mail by the end of this year. The remedy process regarding the other five models will occur on a rolling schedule during 2010. Dealers will be trained and equipped to make the necessary modifications to these models starting at the beginning of 2010. Initially, dealers will be instructed on how to reshape the accelerator pedal for the repair. As replacement parts with the same shape as the modified pedal become available, they will be made available to dealers for the repair, beginning around April 2010. Customers who have had the remedy completed will have the opportunity to receive a new pedal if they desire. In the meantime, owners of the involved vehicles are asked to take out any removable drivers floor mat and not replace it with any other floor mat until they are notified of the vehicle-based remedy, as notified in the consumer safety advisory and the interim notice. The brake override system will be made standard equipment throughout the Toyota and Lexus product lines starting with January 2010 production of ES 350 and Camry and is scheduled to be incorporated into new production of most models by the end of 2010. The safety of our owners and the public is our utmost concern and Toyota has and will continue to thoroughly investigate and take appropriate measures to address any defect trends that are identified. Source: Toyota Announces Details of Remedy to Address Potential Accelerator Pedal Entrapment, Toyota Press Room, November 25, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]

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Appendix 4 February 1, 2010 press release announcing comprehensive plan to fix accelerator pedals

Toyota Announces Comprehensive Plan to Fix Accelerator Pedals on Recalled Vehicles and Ensure Customer Safety
TORRANCE, Calif., February 1, 2010 Toyota Motor Sales (TMS) U.S.A., Inc., today announced it will begin fixing accelerator pedals in recalled Toyota Division vehicles this week. Toyotas engineers have developed and rigorously tested a solution that involves reinforcing the pedal assembly in a manner that eliminates the excess friction that has caused the pedals to stick in rare instances. In addition, Toyota has developed an effective solution for vehicles in production. Parts to reinforce the pedals are already being shipped for use by dealers, and dealer training is under way. Many Toyota dealers will work extended hours to complete the recall campaign as quickly and conveniently as possible, some even staying open 24 hours a day. The company has also taken the unprecedented action of stopping production of affected vehicles for the week of February 1. Nothing is more important to us than the safety and reliability of the vehicles our customers drive, said Jim Lentz, president and Chief Operating Officer, TMS. We deeply regret the concern that our recalls have caused for our customers and we are doing everything we can as fast as we can to make things right. Stopping production is never an easy decision, but we are 100% confident it was the right decision. We know whats causing the sticking accelerator pedals, and we know what we have to do to fix it. We also know it is most important to fix this problem in the cars on the road. Lentz added: We are focused on making this recall as simple and trouble-free as possible, and will work day and night with our dealers to fix recalled vehicles quickly. We want to demonstrate that our commitment to safety is as high as ever and that our commitment to our customers is unwavering. On January 21, Toyota announced its intention to recall approximately 2.3 million select Toyota Division vehicles equipped with a specific pedal assembly and suspended sales of the eight models involved in the recall on January 26. Toyota vehicles affected by the recall include: Certain 2009-2010 RAV4 Certain 2009-2010 Corolla 2009-2010 Matrix 2005-2010 Avalon Certain 2007-2010 Camry Certain 2010 Highlander 2007-2010 Tundra 2008-2010 Sequoia No Lexus Division or Scion vehicles are affected by these actions. Also not affected are Toyota Prius, Tacoma, Sienna, Venza, Solara, Yaris, 4Runner, FJ Cruiser, Land Cruiser, Highlander hybrids and certain Camry models, including Camry hybrids, all of which remain for sale. Further, Camry, RAV4, Corolla and Highlander vehicles with Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) that begin with "J" are not affected by the accelerator pedal recall. In the event that a driver experiences an accelerator pedal that sticks in a partial open throttle position or returns slowly to idle position, the vehicle can be controlled with firm and steady application of the brakes. The brakes should not be pumped repeatedly because it could deplete vacuum assist, requiring stronger brake pedal pressure. The vehicle should be driven to the nearest safe location, the engine shut off and a Toyota dealer contacted for assistance.

How Toyota Will Fix Recalled Vehicles

Toyota has pinpointed the issue that could, on rare occasions, cause accelerator pedals in recalled vehicles to stick in a partially open position. The issue involves a friction device in the pedal designed to provide the proper feel by adding resistance and making the pedal steady and stable. The device includes a shoe that rubs against an adjoining surface during normal pedal operation. Due to the materials used, wear and environmental conditions, these surfaces may, over time, begin to stick and release instead of operating smoothly. In some cases, friction could increase to a point that the pedal is slow to return to the idle position or, in rare cases, the pedal sticks, leaving the throttle partially open. Toyotas solution for current owners is both effective and simple. A precision-cut steel reinforcement bar will be installed into the assembly that will reduce the surface tension between the friction shoe and the adjoining surface. With this reinforcement in place, the excess friction that can cause the pedal to stick is eliminated. The company has confirmed the effectiveness of the newly reinforced pedals through rigorous testing on pedal assemblies that had previously shown a tendency to stick. Separately from the recall for sticking accelerator pedals, Toyota is in the process of recalling vehicles to address rare instances in which floor mats have trapped the accelerator pedal in certain Toyota and Lexus models (announced November 25, 2009), and is already notifying customers about how it will fix this issue. In the case of vehicles covered by both recalls, it is Toyotas intention to remedy both at the same time. Source: Toyota Announces Comprehensive Plan to Fix Accelerator Pedals on Recalled Vehicles to Ensure Customer Safety, Toyota Press Room, February 1, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]

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Appendix 5 December 5, 2009 Editorial from the Los Angeles Times proposing that floor mats may not be the only issue to sticking pedals.

Toyota's acceleration issue

Blaming floor mats may not be enough; the automaker needs to look at its vehicles' electronics.
Editorial December 05, 2009

Toyota did the right thing when it recalled more than 4 million cars and trucks in response to mounting reports of unexpected and uncontrolled acceleration. But rather than sticking to its argument that the malfunctions stem from poorly designed pedals that get entangled with floor mats, the automaker should consider what happened to Eric Weiss. Otherwise, it may never get to the root of a problem that has claimed 19 lives in recent years. As The Times' Ken Bensinger and Ralph Vartabedian have reported, Weiss says he had stopped his 2008 Tacoma pickup at an intersection in Long Beach in October when the truck, on its own, suddenly accelerated toward oncoming traffic. He was able to avoid a collision by clamping on the brakes and turning off the engine, but the incident left him reluctant to get behind the Tacoma's wheel again. And Weiss says the mats weren't the problem -- he'd removed them months ago on his dealer's advice. His experience, combined with similar complaints by other Toyota owners and additional pieces of evidence, points to a potential electronic problem, not a mechanical one.
Source: Editorial, Toyota s Acceleration Issue, The Los Angeles Times, December 5, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]

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Appendix 6 February 9, 2010 editorial by Akio Toyoda published in the Washington Post explaining Toyota s plan to repair its public image

Toyota's plan to repair its public image

By Akio Toyoda Tuesday, February 9, 2010

More than 70 years ago, Toyota entered the auto business based on a simple, but powerful, principle: that Toyota would build the highest-quality, safest and most reliable automobiles in the world. The company has always put the needs of our customers first and made the constant improvement of our vehicles a top priority. That is why 80 percent of all Toyotas sold in the United States over the past 20 years are still on the road today. When consumers purchase a Toyota, they are not simply purchasing a car, truck or van. They are placing their trust in our company. The past few weeks, however, have made clear that Toyota has not lived up to the high standards we set for ourselves. More important, we have not lived up to the high standards you have come to expect from us. I am deeply disappointed by that and apologize. As the president of Toyota, I take personal responsibility. That is why I am personally leading the effort to restore trust in our word and in our products. For much of Toyota's history, we have ensured the quality and reliability of our vehicles by placing a device called an andon cord on every production line -- and empowering any team member to halt production if there's an assembly problem. Only when the problem is resolved does the line begin to move again. Two weeks ago, I pulled the andon cord for our company. I ordered production of eight models in five plants across North America temporarily stopped so that we could focus on fixing our customers' vehicles that might be affected by sticking accelerator pedals. Today, Toyota team members and dealers across North America are working around the clock to repair all recalled vehicles. But to regain the trust of American drivers and their families, more is needed. We are taking responsibility for our mistakes, learning from them and acting immediately to address the concerns of consumers and independent government regulators. First, I have launched a top-to-bottom review of our global operations to ensure that problems of this magnitude do not happen again and that we not only meet but exceed the high safety standards that have defined our long history. As part of this, we will establish an Automotive Center of Quality Excellence in the United States, where a team of our top engineers will focus on strengthening our quality management and quality control across North America. Second, to ensure that our quality-control operations are in line with best industry practices, we will ask a blue-ribbon safety advisory group composed of respected outside experts in quality management to independently review our operations and make sure that we have eliminated any

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deficiencies in our processes. The findings of these experts will be made available to the public, as will Toyota's responses to these findings. Third, we fully understand that we need to more aggressively investigate complaints we hear directly from consumers and move more quickly to address any safety issues we identify. That is what we are doing by addressing customer concerns about the Prius and Lexus HS250h anti-lock brake systems. We also are putting in place steps to do a better job within Toyota of sharing important quality and safety information across our global operations. This shortcoming contributed to the current situation. With respect to sticking accelerator pedals, we failed to connect the dots between problems in Europe and problems in the United States because the European situation related primarily to right-hand-drive vehicles. Toyota will increase its outreach to government agencies charged with protecting the safety of motorists and passengers. I have spoken with U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood and given him my personal assurance that lines of communications with safety agencies and regulators will be kept open, that we will communicate more frequently and that we will be more vigilant in responding to those officials on all matters. In recent years, much has been written about what we call "the Toyota Way" -- the values and principles at the heart of our company. Chief among these is our unwavering commitment to continuous improvement: going to the source of a problem and fixing it. While problems with our cars have been rare over the years, the issues that Toyota is addressing today are by far the most serious we have ever faced. But great companies learn from their mistakes, and we know that we have to win back the trust of our customers by adhering to the very values on which that trust was first built. The hundreds of thousands of men and women at Toyota operations worldwide -- including the 172,000 team members and dealers in North America -- are among the best in the auto industry. Whatever problems have occurred within our company, the strength and commitment to fix them resides within our company as well. You have my commitment that Toyota will revitalize the simple but powerful principle that has guided us for 50 years: Toyota will build the highest-quality, safest and most reliable automobiles in the world. The writer is president of Toyota Motor Co.

Source: Akio Toyoda, Toyota s Plan to Repair its Public Image, Washington Post, February 9, 2010. Accessed December 1, 2010 from [Link]

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Appendix 7 March 30, 2010 press release announcing company reforms and the inaugural meeting of the Special Committee for Global Quality

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Source: Toyota Begins Radically Shaping Operations to Meet Customer Expectations, Toyota Motors U.S.A. Inc., Newsroom, March 30, 2010. Accessed December 17, 2010 at <[Link]

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Appendix 8 Important Message - Apology video from jim Lentz posted on Toyota Corporate Website

Toyota Team Members Discuss Toyota s Improvements Video spotlighting plan workers implementing the fixes for recalled vehicles

Source: Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Important Message, <[Link] (February 5, 2010). Accessed November 14, 2010.

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III. REFERENCES
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Abilla, Toyota Motor Corporation: Company History, [Link], January 5 ,2007, Accessed on November 14, 2010 from < [Link] World Ranking of Manufacturers Year 2009, [Link]. (n.d.). Accessef November 14, 2010 from <[Link]
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6 Pete

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22 Ken

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23 A Timeline of Toyota Recall Woes, CNN, February 11, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] 24 Tom

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10 Ibid. 11 Ibid.

Motor North America, Inc. (n.d.) Toyota Corporate web site. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] />
13 Advance!

12 Toyota

Lavell, Audi 1980 s Scare May Mean Lost Generation for Toyota (Update1), Buisnessweek, February 4, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]
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Business Consulting, The Rise of Toyota, (n.d.). Accessed on November 14, 2010 from <[Link] e!/strategic-alignment/strategic-alignment-businesscases/[Link]>

26 Ibid. 27 Stephen Denning, Toyota and the Strange Case of the Runaway Cars: Three Facts & Four Lessons, March 26, 2010. Accessed December 17, 2010 from <[Link]

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28 29

Ibid.

Matthew Phillips, Getting Toyota Back on Track, Newsweek, February 10, 2010. Accessed December 16, 2010 from < [Link] -[Link]> John Pollard and E. Donald Sussman: An Examination of Unintended Acceleration, [Link] <[Link] 989%20NHTSA%20SA%20Study%20Report%20 &%20Appendices%20A-D(1).pdf> (January, 1989). [Original Source: An Examination of Unintended Acceleration (January, 1989)].
30

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40

Toyota Reports September Sales, Toyota Press Room, October 1, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]
41

Channel 10 News, 4 Killed in Fiery Santee Crash Believed Identified, August 31, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] [Link]>
31 32 33 34 35

Brendan Moore, Toyota Offers Very Public Remorse for Financial Results, Autosavant, October 2, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] a-offers-very-public-remorse-for-financialresults/>
42 43 Ralph

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

Vartabedian and Ken Bensinger, Toyota s Runaway-Car Worries May Not Stop at Floor Mats, The Los Angeles Times, October 18, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] ss/fi-toyota-recall18> NHTSA Unwanted and Unintended Acceleration Investigation Summary, Toyota Press Room, October 25, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] /NHTSA_filing_summary.pdf>
44

Brian Ross, ABC News, Expert Recreates Sudden Acceleration in Toyota, < [Link] (February 22, 2010). Accessed November 14, 2010. Jayne O Donnell, Toyota Executive Urged Board to Come Clean , USA Today , February 26, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from < [Link]
36

Ralph Vartabedian and Ken Bensinger, New Details in Crash That Prompted Toyota Recall, The Los Angeles Times, October 25, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] /na-toyota-crash25>
45

Comprehensive Analysis Raises Concerns About Gilbert Congressional Testimony, ABC News Segment, Toyota Press Room, March 8, 2010. Accessed December 1, 2010 from <[Link] -[Link] >
37

Potential Floor Mat Interference with Accelerator Pedal Safety Recall Campaign, Toyota Press Room, October 30, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] /Floor_mat_Owner_Letter_sample.pdf>
46

Channel 10 News, 4 Killed in Fiery Santee Crash Believed Identified, August 31, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] [Link]>
38 39

Lexus ES 350 Accident Investigation, Toyota USA Newsroom, September 14, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] -[Link]>

Nelson Ireson, NHTSA: Toyota Floor Mat Statement Inaccurate and Misleading , [Link], November 5, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] _nhtsa-toyota-floor-mat-statement-inaccurateand-misleading>
47

Irv Miller, Toyota s Statement Regarding NHTSA News Release, Toyota Press Room, November 4, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]
48

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

30

Ralph Vartabedian and Ken Bensinger, Toyota s Runaway Cases Ignored, The Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] ss/fi-toyota-recall18>
49

58 Blake

Ellis and Peter Valdes-Dapena, Toyota s Big Recall Halts Sales, Production of 8 Models, [Link], February 10, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] panies/toyota_recall/[Link] >
59 Micheline

Hugh Lawson, Toyota To Fix Accelerators in Huge US Recall Kyodo, Reuters, November 13, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] 0091114>
50

Maynard and Hiroko Tabuchi, Rapid Growth Has its Perils, Toyota Learns, The New York Times, January 27, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] s/[Link]> Sarah Tibken, Auto Shares with Toyota Exposure Drop, The Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from < <[Link] [Link]>
60 61 Ibid.

Toyota Announces Details of Remedy to Address Potential Accelerator Pedal Entrapment, Toyota Press Room, November 25, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] [Link]>
51

Editorial, Toyota s Acceleration Issue, The Los Angeles Times, December 5, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] n/la-ed-toyota5-2009dec05>
52

Irv Miller, A Healthy Discussion on Safety, Toyota Press Room, December 5, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]
53

Toyota Announces Comprehensive Plan to Fix Accelerator Pedals on Recalled Vehicles to Ensure Customer Safety, Toyota Press Room, February 1, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] [Link]>
62 63 Hiroko

Diaz and Jason Trahan, Four Dead After Car Plunges into Southlake Pond, WFAA News, December 27, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]/news/local/[Link]>
55 Edward Loh,

54 Monica

Tabuchi and Bill Vlasic, Toyota s Top Executive Under Rising Pressure, The New York Times, February 5, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] s/global/[Link]?_r=2l>
64

Ibid.

Toyota to Include Brake Override Function on Global Vehicles by 2011, [Link], January 11, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from < [Link] > Toyota Files Voluntary Safety Recall on Select Toyota Division Vehicles for Sticking Accelerator Pedal, Toyota Press Room, January 21, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] [Link]>
56

Toyoda, Toyota s Plan to Repair its Public Image, Washington Post, February 9, 2010. Accessed December 1, 2010 from <[Link] [Link]> Crawley and Soyoung Kim, Toyota Recalls New Prius in Latest Safety Fix, Reuters , February 9, 2010. Accessed December 2, 2010 from <[Link] 820100209> Prepared Testimony of James Lentz, Toyota Press Room, February 21, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] /Lentz_Testimony_to_House_Committee_on_Energ y_and_Commerce.pdf>
67 68 Prepared Testimony of Akio Toyoda, Toyota Press Room, February 23, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] /A._Toyoda_Testimony_to_House_Committee_on_ Oversight_and_Government_Reform_2-[Link]> 66 John

65 Akio

Toyota Suspends Sales of Selected Vehicles, January 26, 2010, Toyota USA Newsroom, Accessed on November 14, 2010 from <[Link] [Link]>
57

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

31

Former U.S. Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater to Lead Independent North American Quality Advisor Panel for Toyota, Toyota Press Room, March 2, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]
69

78 Dean

Starkman, Toyota No Longer Attacking the L.A. Times, Columbia Journalism Review, February 3, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] attacking_the.php?page=1> Tina Susman, Nonprofit Newsroom wins Pulitzer Prize, The Los Angeles Times, April 13, 2010. Accessed December 2, 2010 from <[Link] /la-na-pulitzer-prizes13-2010apr1 >
79

Toyota Announces March Sales Event, Toyota Press Room, March 2, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]
70

Ken Thomas, US to seek $16 Million over Toyota Recall, [Link], April 5, [Link] November 14, 2010 from <[Link] business-autos/>
71

Hyde, Toyota Safety Recalls were Years in the Making, USA Today, February 1, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from < [Link]
81 Schumpeter,

80 Justin

Associated Press, Toyota Won t Contest $16.4 Million Civil Fine, [Link], April 18, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] business/[Link]>
72

Getting the Cow Out of the Ditch, Economist, February 11, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] Ireson, NHTSA: Toyota Floor Mat Statement Inaccurate and Misleading , [Link], November 5, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] _nhtsa-toyota-floor-mat-statement-inaccurateand-misleading>
83 Autoevolution, 82 Nelson

Toyota Announces SMART Business Process for Quick Evaluation of Unintended Acceleration Reports, Toyota Press Room, April 8, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]
73

Guardian Research, BP Oil Spill Timeline, Guardian [UK], July 22, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] /jun/29/bp-oil-spill-timeline-deepwater-horizon>
74

Customers Stay Loyal to Toyota Survey Shows, March 15, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from < [Link]
84 Laurent

Associated Press, Toyota Pays Record $16.4 million Govt Fine, Boston Herald, May 18, 2010. Accessed December 4, 2010 from <[Link] otive/view/20100518source_toyota_pays_record_ 164m_govt_fine/srvc=home&position=also >
75 76 Hiroko

Belsie, Toyota Recall: Is This Any Way to Treat a Customer?, Christian Science Monitor, January 27, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from < [Link] >
85 Ibid.

Tabuchi, Toyota Recovers from a Slump to Record a $2.2 Billion Profit, The New York Times, August 4, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] s/global/[Link]?_r=1>
77 Vikas

Mittal, Rajan Sambandam, and Utpal M. Dholakia, Does Media Coverage of Toyota Recalls Reflect Reality?, Economist, March 9, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]

Mike Ramsey and Kate Linebaugh, Early Tests Pin Toyota Accidents on Drivers, Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2010. Accessed December 1, 2010 from <[Link] [Link]?mod= WSJ_hpp_LEADNewsCollection>
86 87 Make or Brake, The Economist, January 27, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] 88 Ibid.

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

32

Bailey and Kevin Krolicki, Toyota US Sales Reel from Crisis; GM, Ford Surge, Reuters, February 2, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] W20100203>
90 Husna

89 David

LaBeau, CNBC, Toyota s PR Blitz, <[Link] 28263861&play=1> (February 8, 2010). Accessed November 14, 2010.
103 Alexandra

102 Phil

Haq, Toyota Recall Update: Dealers Face Full Lots, Anxious Customers, Christian Science Monitor, January 29, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] oyota-recall-update-dealers-face-full-lots-anxiouscustomers>
91 Make or Brake, The Economist, January 27, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]

Frean, Death Toll Linked to US Toyota Faults Rises to 52, The Sunday Times, March 2, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] ustry_sectors/engineering/[Link]>
104 Ken

Thomas, US to seek $16 Million over Toyota Recall, [Link], April 5, [Link] November 14, 2010 from <[Link] business-autos/>
105 Jeffery

Bailey and Kevin Krolicki, Toyota US Sales Reel from Crisis; GM, Ford Surge, Reuters, February 2, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] W20100203>
93 Ibid.

92 David

Liker, The Toyota Way. (2004) p.35-41. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]
106

Leo Lewis, Toyota Executive Urged Board to Come Clean , The Sunday Times , April 8, 2010. Accessed December 2, 2010 from <[Link] ustry_sectors/engineering/[Link] >
107 Ibid.

94 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 95 Husna

Haq, Toyota Recall Update: Dealers Face Full Lots, Anxious Customers, Christian Science Monitor, January 29, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] oyota-recall-update-dealers-face-full-lots-anxiouscustomers> Elizabeth Strott, Toyota Takes Sales Crown from GM, [Link], January 21, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] /Dispatch/[Link]>
96 97

109 Ibid.

Toyota Statement on Internal Communications Regarding Our Recent Recalls, Toyota Press Room, April 8, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from [Link]
110

Ibid.

Moore, Toyota Offers Very Public Remorse for Financial Results, Autosavant, October 2, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] a-offers-very-public-remorse-for-financialresults/> Potential Floor Mat Interference with Accelerator Pedal Safety Recall Campaign, Toyota Press Room, October 30, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] /Floor_mat_Owner_Letter_sample.pdf>
112

111 Brendan

98 National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, March 30, 2010. NHTSA web site. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]/news/local/[Link]>
99 Ibid. 100 Jayne

O Donnell, Toyota Executive Urged Board to Come Clean , USA Today , February 26, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from < [Link]
101 Ibid.

Ireson, NHTSA: Toyota Floor Mat Statement Inaccurate and Misleading , [Link], November 5, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] _nhtsa-toyota-floor-mat-statement-inaccurateand-misleading>

113 Nelson

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

33

Vartabedian and Ken Bensinger, Toyota s Runaway-Car Worries May Not Stop at Floor Mats, The Los Angeles Times, October 18, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] ss/fi-toyota-recall18> Ralph Vartabedian and Ken Bensinger, Toyota s Runaway Cases Ignored, The Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] ss/fi-toyota-recall18>
115 116 117

114 Ralph

129 Ibid. 130

Former U.S. Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater to Lead Independent North American Quality Advisor Panel for Toyota, Toyota Press Room, March 2, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]
131

Ibid. Ibid.

Toyota Announces SMART Business Process for Quick Evaluation of Unintended Acceleration Reports, Toyota Press Room, April 8, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]
132 Ibid.

118 Monica

Diaz and Jason Trahan, Four Dead After Car Plunges into Southlake Pond, WFAA News, December 27, 2009. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link]/news/local/[Link]>
119 Hiroko

O Donnell, Toyota Executive Urged Board to Come Clean , USA Today , February 26, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from < [Link] Toyota Announces Comprehensive Plan to Fix Accelerator Pedals on Recalled Vehicles to Ensure Customer Safety, Toyota Press Room, February 1, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] [Link]>
134 135 Toyota Announces March Sales Event, Toyota Press Room, March 2, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] 136 Toyota

133 Jayne

Tabuchi and Bill Vlasic, Toyota s Top Executive Under Rising Pressure, The New York Times, February 5, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] s/global/[Link]?_r=2l>
120 Edward Loh,

Toyota to Include Brake Override Function on Global Vehicles by 2011, [Link], January 11, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from < [Link] >
121 Hiroko

Tabuchi and Bill Vlasic, Toyota s Top Executive Under Rising Pressure, The New York Times, February 5, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] s/global/[Link]?_r=2l>
122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124Ibid. 125 Ibid.

Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Important Message, <[Link] (February 5, 2010). Accessed November 14, 2010.
137 Donna

Talarico, Toyota Recall, Spin & Social Media: A PR Crisis Case Study in the Making, Social Media and PR: Class Blog, February 5, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] 02/05/toyota-recall-spin-social-media-a-pr-crisiscase-study-in-the-making/>
138 Toyota

Toyoda, Toyota s Plan to Repair its Public Image, Washington Post, February 9, 2010. Accessed December 1, 2010 from <[Link] [Link]>
127 Ibid. 128 Ibid.

126 Akio

Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Toyota Team Members Discuss Toyota s Improvements, <[Link] -[Link] > (February 8, 2010). Accessed November 14, 2010.
139 Ed

Wallace, The Real Scandal Behind the Toyota Recall, Buisnessweek, February 11, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] t/feb2010/bw20100211_986136.htm>

Accelerating Into Trouble: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Company and its Recent Recalls

34

140Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid.

Fumento, Why Didn t the Media Do a Better Job on Toyota, Forbes, August 9, 2010. Accessed November 18, 2010 from <[Link] [Link]>
148 Ibid.

147 Michael

144 Interbrand.

(September, 2010). Interbrand web site. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] t-global-brands/best-global-brands-2008/[Link]>
145 Consumer

149 Ibid.

Reports Brand Perception Survey. (January, 2008). Consumer Reports web site. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] w-cars/news/2008/01/brandperceptions/overview/[Link]> Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. Comments on J.D. Power and Associates 2010 Vehicle Dependability Study, Toyota Press Room, March 18, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] /2010_JD_Power_VDS_TMS_Statement.pdf>
146

Mike Ramsey and Kate Linebaugh, Early Tests Pin Toyota Accidents on Drivers, Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2010. Accessed December 1, 2010 from <[Link] [Link]?mod= WSJ_hpp_LEADNewsCollection>
150 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid. 153 Prepared Testimony of Akio Toyoda, Toyota Press Room, February 23, 2010. Accessed November 14, 2010 from <[Link] /A._Toyoda_Testimony_to_House_Committee_on_ Oversight_and_Government_Reform_2-[Link]