TITLE: Terocel Realty v.
Mempin
GR NO. 223335
DATE: March 4, 2020
SUBJECT Prescription of Writ of Execution; Writ of Mandamus
MATTER:
DOCTRINES: 1. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court governs execution of
judgment by motion or by independent action, viz.:
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A
final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations. (6a)
2. On one hand, a final and executory judgment may be executed
by motion within five (5) years from entry of judgment. On the
other, execution by independent action is available in cases
where the five-year period had already expired. The action then
must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations which
under the Civil Code is ten (10) years from finality of judgment.
3. In any event, while in exceptional cases, the Court had allowed
execution by motion even after the lapse of the five-year period,
these cases had one common denominator: the judicial debtor
itself caused or incurred the delay for its personal benefit or
advantage.
4. Under the Rules on Civil Procedure, a writ of mandamus may
issue when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or
the officer to perform an act, and when the party seeking
mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot
be availed of against an official or government agency whose
duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. The writ of
mandamus will not issue either to compel officials to do
something which is not their duty to do or which it is their duty not
to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not
entitled by law.
FACTS: This case involves a petition for review on certiorari filed by Terocel
Reality (now Pechaten Corporation) against Leonardo Mempin. The
case stems from an unlawful detainer case filed by Terocel Realty
against Mempin. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ruled in favor of
Terocel Realty, requiring Mempin to vacate the property. This decision
was affirmed by the RTC. Terocel Realty then sought to execute the
judgment, but faced delays due to an expropriation case filed by the City
of Manila. After the expropriation case was dismissed, Terocel Realty
filed another motion for execution, which was denied by the MeTC for
being filed beyond the five-year prescriptive period. Terocel Realty’s
subsequent petition for mandamus was also denied by the RTC and CA.
ISSUE/S: 1. Did the complaint for expropriation constitute a supervening
event which had the effect of interrupting the five-year period for
execution of judgment by motion in the unlawful detainer case?
2. Does mandamus lie to compel execution of judgment by motion
beyond the five-year period?
RULING: 1. Petitioner’s motion for execution is already barred by
prescription
Here, it is undisputed that although petitioner filed its first motion for
execution in the unlawful detainer case within the prescribed five-year
period, it never pursued the same and was therefore deemed to have
abandoned it. When petitioner, nonetheless, filed its second motion for
execution, twelve (12) years had already elapsed from entry of judgment
(September 20, 2001). Undoubtedly, the second motion was filed seven
(7) years beyond the five-year period. Verily, therefore, MeTC – Branch
28 correctly denied the second motion.
In petitioner's attempt to take out the case from the five-year prescriptive
period, however, it asserts that the filing of the expropriation case was a
supervening event which served to suspend the five-year period.
In any event, while in exceptional cases, the Court had allowed
execution by motion even after the lapse of the five-year period, these
cases had one common denominator: the judicial debtor itself caused or
incurred the delay for its personal benefit or advantage.
This is not the case here. As judicial debtor, respondent did not have
any hand in the filing of the expropriation complaint, the issuance of the
writ of execution, or the supposed pronouncement of the City of Manila
that it did not plan to eject the actual occupants of the affected
properties. In fact, respondent himself was not even a party to the
expropriation case nor a recognized beneficiary thereof by the City of
Manila.
2. Mandamus is not a proper remedy to compel execution of
judgment
Here, petitioner is no longer entitled to execution of judgment either by
motion or independent action since its right to do so is already barred by
prescription. Surely, it is the duty of the courts not to enforce a stale
judgment.
