FACULTY OF LAW

DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL STUDIES

COURSE CODE : BLS001
COURSE NAME : COMMERCIAL LAW
LECTURER : MR MAKUYA & MS
GROUP :1
ASSIGNMENT QUESTION
“In several jurisdictions it is often common for dominant firms to abuse their
dominance because of their market power irrespective of the clear legislative
framework that condemns the Abuse of dominance”. Against this background write a
lucid essay in which you define the concept of a dominant firm and indicate the ways in
which dominance can be abused. Furthermore, make a comparative analysis of the
regulation of dominant firms in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Reference must be made
to relevant and applicable legal authorities in the course of your discussion.

GROUP 1 : LIST OF NAMES

SURNAME NAME REG NUMBER PROGRAMME

[Link] LINDA R235585Z BLS

[Link] OZIAS T R235588T BLS
[Link] BRIAN R235589G BLS
[Link] ANTONY R211501T BLS
[Link] GEILOD R235558S BLS
[Link] TINOTENDA R109429J BLS
[Link] BEVERLY R235548L BLS
[Link] RUVARASHE M R236287E BLS
[Link] TAFARA W R236931W BLS
10. CHIDZIVA PAIDAMOYO RM R235592V BLS
[Link] BLESSING R235577A BLS
[Link] FORTUNE R235550Y BLS
[Link] C. MUTSAWASHE R235572Q BLS
[Link] VIMBAINASHE R235569J BLS
[Link] BERVERLY R235811V BLS
Introduction

Market dominance refers to a firm’s ability to wield significant control over a particular
market, influencing prices, output, and competitive conditions. Dominant firms often possess
considerable market power, which, if abused, can distort competition and harm both
competitors and consumers. Addressing the abuse of dominance is a cornerstone of
competition law, designed to safeguard market integrity and ensure fair and equitable
competition. However, despite the existence of legal frameworks like the Competition Act in
Zimbabwe and South Africa, dominant firms frequently engage in practices such as predatory
pricing, exclusive dealing, and foreclosure of rivals—practices that undermine the principles
of free competition. This essay delves into the concept of market dominance, exploring how
firms abuse this power to the detriment of competition. It further provides a comparative
analysis of how such abuses are regulated in Zimbabwe and South Africa, revealing the
challenges in enforcement and the persistent need for reforms in competition policy. By
unpacking these dynamics, the discussion underscores the critical role of effective regulation
in balancing market power and fostering economic equity.

The Principle of Dominant Firm

Dominance in a market refers to the ability of a firm or group of firms to exert significant
control over prices, supply, or other market conditions without substantial counter pressure
from competitors or consumers.1 Under section 2(2) of Zimbabwe’s Competition Act
[Chapter 14:28], a firm has substantial market control if it can profitably maintain prices
above competitive levels (as a producer or distributor) or below competitive levels (as a
purchaser or user) for a considerable time within Zimbabwe or a significant part of it. 2 This
control may also arise through collaboration with economically connected entities. 3 Anderson
et al. (1999) explain that market power enables firms to profitably maintain prices above
competitive levels for a sustained period. This "profitably" qualifier underscores the ability to
raise prices without losing customers to the extent that the increase becomes unprofitable.
Market power may also manifest through reduced quality or a lack of innovation. Dominance
is closely linked to market power, which is assessed using factors like market share, demand
elasticity, barriers to entry, and buyer power. Abuse of dominance, such as excessive pricing
or exclusionary practices, undermines competition, consumer welfare, and innovation,
necessitating regulatory scrutiny to preserve fair competition.4

1
W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon and Joseph E Harrington Jr., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 2 nd Ed.,
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998.
2
W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon and Joseph E Harrington Jr., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 2nd Ed.,
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998.
3
Section 2(2) of Zimbabwe’s Competition Act [Chapter 14:28],
4
Robert Anderson, Timothy Daniel and Alberto Heimler, “Abuse of Dominance”, in A Framework for the Design
and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy, The World Bank, Washington D.C., and Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris, 1999.
Ways in Which Dominance Can Be Abused

In its 2000 monograph on Investment and Competition, CUTS International observed that
firms with a dominant market position often gain advantages akin to monopolists, such as
setting prices and output levels.5 While dominance can enable operational efficiencies and
economies of scale, it can also lead to anti-competitive practices that marginalize
competitors, harm consumers, and undermine free market principles. Zimbabwe provides
pertinent examples of such abuses across various sectors. Predatory pricing occurs when
dominant firms set prices below cost to drive competitors out of the market, with plans to
recoup losses later through monopolistic pricing.6 While consumers may benefit from low
prices in the short term, this practice reduces competition and market choice over time. 7 For
instance, in Zimbabwe’s transport sector, companies like J&J and Cargo Carriers leverage
economies of scale to set prices that small players cannot match. This discourages new
entrants and consolidates their dominance.8

Exclusive dealing forces customers to purchase solely from a dominant firm, restricting
market access for competitors.9 In Zimbabwe’s borehole drilling sector, Nakiso Borehole's
control over supply chains exemplifies this practice. Such arrangements stifle competition by
limiting opportunities for smaller firms to compete effectively. 10 Refusal to supply occurs
when dominant firms withhold essential inputs from competitors. This is evident in the
poultry industry, where Irvines, a subsidiary of Innscor, refused to supply Chicken Slice with
chickens, citing competition concerns.11 By restricting access to critical goods, dominant
firms can weaken competitors and consolidate their market power, distorting competition and
raising barriers to entry.12 Tying arrangements compel customers to buy an additional product
or service to access a desired one. 13 In Zimbabwe, warranties on Mercedes-Benz vehicles are
tied to servicing exclusively at Zimoco, restricting consumer choice. This practice increases
market power and limits competition in the tied market, disadvantaging independent service
providers.14 Price squeezing involves a dominant firm selling inputs at high prices while

5
CUTS Monograph on Investment and Competition Policy #6, All About Competition Policy & Law For the
Advanced Learner, CUTS Centre for International Trade, Economics & Environment, Jaipur, 2000.
6
Paragraph 8 of the FIRST SCHEDULE(Sections 2 and 42), Zimbabwe’s Competition Act [Chapter 14:28].
7
Stiglitz, J.E., 2002. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
8
Posner, R.A., 2001. Antitrust Law. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Kühn, K., & Vives, X. (1995).
Information Exchanges among Firms and the Effects of Market Structure. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 13(5), 565-577.
9
Paragraph 10 of the FIRST SCHEDULE(Sections 2 and 42), Zimbabwe’s Competition Act [Chapter 14:28]
10
Baker, J. B. (2003). The case for antitrust enforcement. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4), 27-50;
Whinston, M. D. (2003). Exclusive dealing. Journal of Political Economy, 111(1), 8-44.
11
Posner, R. A. (1976). Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective. University of Chicago Press.
12
Shapiro, C. (2000). Theories of Oligopoly Behavior. In Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 3, pp. 329–
414). Elsevier; Khan, Lina M. (2017). Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox. The Yale Law Journal, 126(3), 710-805.
13
Kovacic, W. E. (2007). "Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Effects of Market Power." Antitrust Law Journal,
74(2), pp. 515-552.
14
Areeda, P., & Hovenkamp, H. (2014). Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application.
4th ed. Wolters Kluwer Law & Business; Adams, W. J., & Yellen, J. L. (1976). Commodity Bundling and the
Burden of Monopoly. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(3), 475-498.
lowering the price of its final product.15 In Zimbabwe’s liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
market, Environ Gas reportedly sells below the regulated price to increase volumes, making it
difficult for competitors to survive. This practice undermines competition and can eventually
lead to monopoly pricing. While market dominance can foster efficiencies, its abuse harms
competition, consumers, and innovation. Regulatory bodies like Zimbabwe’s Competition
and Tariff Commission (CTC) must actively enforce anti-competition laws to address these
practices. Strengthening policy frameworks, ensuring fair access to supply chains, and
supporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs) through subsidies or innovation funding are
critical to counteracting abusive dominance. By fostering equitable competition, the integrity
of Zimbabwe’s markets and consumer welfare can be preserved.

Damage to Competition and Consumers

Abusive practices by dominant firms harm competition and consumer welfare. 16 Predatory
pricing can initially benefit consumers but eventually eliminates competition, leading to
higher prices and reduced quality.17 Exclusive dealing and refusal to supply limit consumer
choice, concentrating market power in a few firms, which may stifle innovation and drive up
prices.18 Tying arrangements force consumers to buy bundled products, reducing competition
in both the primary and secondary markets, and limiting consumer choice. 19 Lastly, price
squeezing disrupts the supply chain by making it difficult for suppliers to remain profitable,
leading to market exits and higher prices for consumers. 20 These practices create a vicious
cycle where the lack of competition results in inflated prices, reduced quality, and fewer
choices, ultimately harming consumer welfare.21

Abusive practices as defined by the Competition Act, Zimbabwe

Excessive pricing and price discrimination are significant concerns in competition law,
particularly in markets with dominant firms.22 Excessive pricing refers to firms setting prices
above competitive levels, often due to monopolistic or dominant positions. 23 The Competition
Act [Chapter 14:28] of Zimbabwe addresses this by focusing on prices linked to restrictive
practices.24 Investigating excessive pricing requires analyzing the underlying factors—such
15
Wright, J. D. (2007). The Price of Monopoly Power: The Retrospective Approach to Antitrust. In Antitrust
Policy and Vertical Restraints.
16
Klein, B., & Murphy, D. J. (2008). Predatory pricing: Strategic theory and legal policy. Journal of Law &
Economics, 51(3), 619-653.
17
Posner, R. A. (2001). Antitrust law: A policy approach. University of Chicago Press.
18
Sidak, J. G., & Teece, D. J. (2009). Dynamic competition in antitrust law. Journal of Competition Law &
Economics, 5(4), 557-592.
19
Whinston, M. D. (2006). Lectures on antitrust economics. MIT Press.
20
Bork, R. H. (1978). The antitrust paradox: A policy at war with itself. Free Press.
21
Fox, E. M. (2003). Antitrust and the spirit of competition. Harvard Law Review, 116(6), 1210-1269.
22
Bork, R. H. (1978). The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself. Free Press.
23
Robert Anderson, Timothy Daniel and Alberto Heimler, ‘Abuse of Dominance’, in A Framework for the
Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy, The World Bank, Washington D.C., and
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris, 1999.
24
Kaplow, L. (2003). The Competitive Effects of Price Fixing. Harvard Law Review, 116(4), 874-933.
[Link]
as market power, cost structures, and competitive conditions—rather than simply the price
points themselves.25 This ensures that regulations do not undermine firms' legitimate costs,
such as research and development, while addressing anti-competitive behaviors. 26 However,
determining what constitutes "excessive" pricing remains a challenge for regulators due to
complexities in cost assessments.

Price discrimination occurs when different prices are charged for the same product or service
based on customer characteristics, unrelated to production costs. 27 While it can sometimes
enhance market efficiency or offer consumer benefits, price discrimination becomes
problematic when employed by dominant firms to reduce competition. 28 For instance, a
dominant firm might lower prices to undermine local competitors, eliminating competition
and potentially establishing a monopoly.29 Once competitors are driven out, the firm can
increase prices, harming consumers through reduced choice and higher costs. 30 Price
discrimination can also create barriers to entry for smaller firms, stifling innovation and
reinforcing market concentration.31 Regulatory scrutiny is necessary to differentiate between
competitive and anti-competitive pricing practices, ensuring that markets remain fair,
accessible, and conducive to innovation and consumer welfare.32

Tied selling involves requiring consumers to buy a secondary product (tied product) with a
primary product (tying product), even if unrelated. 33 This practice can reduce consumer
choice, create barriers to entry, and allow dominant firms to engage in price discrimination by
forcing additional purchases.34 Full-line forcing, a variant of tied selling, requires customers
to buy an entire product range.35 Refusal to deal occurs when a dominant firm withholds
access to essential resources from competitors, restricting competition. Although firms are
not required to cooperate, such strategic refusal is deemed anti-competitive if it harms market
competition by suppressing rivals.36

25
Cuts International (n1 above) 5.
26
Whish, R., & Bailey, D. (2015). Competition Law. 8th ed. Oxford University Press.
27
Stiglitz, J. E. (1987). Price discrimination and competition. In The Economics of Market Structure (pp. 201-
224). W.W. Norton & Company; Stiglitz, J. E. (1989). Price Discrimination and the Economics of Information.
The American Economic Review, 79(5), 847-867. [Link]
28
Competition Bureau Canada (2019). Abuse of Dominance Enforcement Guidelines. Available
at: [Link]
dominance-enforcement-guidelines [Accessed 12 Nov. 2024].
29
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press.
30
Competition Commission of Zambia (2021). Frequently Asked Questions About Dominance and Abuse of
Dominance. Available at: [Link] [Accessed
12 Nov. 2024]; Comanor, W. S. (1985). Market Power and Price Discrimination. In M. A. Adelman (Ed.), The
Economics of the Firm (pp. 118-134). Princeton University Press.
31
Baker, J. B. (2003). The case for antitrust enforcement. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4), 27-50.
[Link]
32
Varian, H. R. (1989). Price discrimination. In Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 1, pp. 597-654).
Elsevier.
33
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press.
34
Shelanski, H. A. (2000). Price Discrimination and Antitrust Policy. Antitrust Law Journal, 68(1), 45-63.
35
Chen, Y., & Schwartz, A. (2000). "Price Discrimination and Competition," Review of Industrial Organization,
17(3), 269-280.
Regulation of Dominant Firms in Zimbabwe

The regulation of dominant firms in Zimbabwe is governed by the Competition Act (Chapter
14:28), which aims to promote competition and prevent anti-competitive practices. 37 The Act
defines "substantial market control" as the ability to influence prices above or below
competitive levels for a significant period (Section 2(2)). Authorities use a rule of reason
approach, assessing whether a practice impedes competition and if there are countervailing
benefits justifying the practice.38 This framework helps balance consumer protection with
allowing firms to operate efficiently, ensuring that market dominance does not lead to unfair
trade practices that harm competition and consumer welfare. 39 The Competition and Tariff
Commission (CTC) is responsible for investigating and penalizing anti-competitive practices,
particularly abuses by dominant firms.40 While the CTC can declare monopolistic situations
unlawful under Section 31(2) of the Act, it lacks explicit provisions for regulating mergers,
which complicates its ability to address potential anti-competitive consolidations. 41
Furthermore, the absence of a general prohibition against abuse of dominance creates
ambiguity in enforcement, limiting the Commission’s ability to act when firms exploit market
power without clear legal recourse. There is a checklist of potential remedies for abuse of
dominance, and these include cease-and-desist orders, fines based on factors such as severity,
firm size, and unlawful profits, and divestment of firms. 42 While the CTC has the authority to
impose these measures, challenges remain in enforcing them effectively. 43 For example,
repaying undue profits is difficult to quantify, and informal settlements may become
exceptions rather than the norm. The Administrative Court, with review and appellate
jurisdiction, provides an essential check on the CTC's orders, ensuring they align with legal
standards. However, this process can contribute to delays, complicating timely enforcement
of competition regulations. Overall, the CTC’s ability to ensure fair market competition is
hindered by resource limitations and legal ambiguities.

South African Regulation of dominance- The Competition Act 89 of 1998

36
Evans, D. S. (2003). The Antitrust Economics of Tying: A Comprehensive Overview. Review of Industrial
Organization, 22(2), 149-171; Anderson, R., Daniel, W., & Heimler, A. (1999). Competition Law and Policy: A
Comparative Analysis of the US, the EU, and the UK. Oxford University Press.
37
Section 31(2) of the Zimbabwe’s Competition Act
38
Bain, J. S. (1956). Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing
Industries. Harvard University Press.
39
Section 32(2) of the Act
40
CUTS International (2021). Dominance and Abuse of Dominance. Available
at: [Link] [Accessed 12 Nov. 2024].
41
Bishop, S., & Walker, M. (2010). The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application, and
Measurement. 3rd edn. Sweet & Maxwell.
42
Robert Anderson, Timothy Daniel and Alberto Heimler, ‘Abuse of Dominance’, in A Framework for the Design
and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy, The World Bank, Washington D.C., and Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris, 1999.
43
See for example, Gavilan, M. (2017). Competition Law in Developing Countries: Theories and Cases from
Africa and Asia. Routledge; Harrison, J. (2011). Competition Law and Policy in the European Union. Oxford
University Press; Khan, L. (2017). The Case for ‘Big’ Antitrust: Rethinking Competition Policy for the Digital Age.
Yale Law Journal, 127(3), 567–624.
South Africa’s Competition Act 89 of 1998 aims to foster fair competition and prevent anti-
competitive practices in the economy. 44 Section 8 of the Act prohibits the abuse of a
dominant position, such as predatory pricing, exclusive dealing, and price discrimination
(Competition Act [No. 89 of 1998], 1998). The Competition Commission investigates
complaints, while the Competition Tribunal adjudicates these cases. Penalties for violations
are severe, with administrative fines up to 10% of a firm’s annual turnover as outlined in
Section 59 (South African Competition Tribunal, 2014).45 The Act mandates that the Tribunal
conducts hearings in public, ensuring transparency and fairness. 46 Its decisions are subject to
judicial review by the Competition Appeal Court, providing additional oversight. 47 In Federal
Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Limited v The Competition Commission &
Another, the Competition Appeal Court clarified that penalties under Section 59 are civil, not
criminal, and serve as corrective measures rather than punitive (Federal Mogul case). 48 The
Court emphasized that the Tribunal, while impartial, is not a standard court, and
administrative penalties are intended to address the harm caused by anti-competitive conduct
without the full protections of criminal law. 49 This framework ensures fair competition and
protects consumers, balancing enforcement with procedural fairness.

Comparative Analysis of Enforcement Effectiveness between Zimbabwe and South

Africa

The enforcement of competition law in Zimbabwe and South Africa reveals notable
differences in legal clarity, resources, and case law history. South Africa’s Competition Act
89 of 1998 provides a comprehensive framework for regulating anti-competitive practices,
including the abuse of dominance under Section 8, which explicitly defines various forms of
abusive conduct, such as predatory pricing and price discrimination (Competition Act [No. 89
of 1998]). This legal clarity enables effective enforcement by the Competition Commission
and Competition Tribunal, as evidenced by cases like Competition Commission v. Federal
Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd [2003] ZACT 43. Furthermore, South Africa’s
corporate leniency policy encourages firms to report cartel activities in exchange for reduced
penalties, further strengthening enforcement efforts. In contrast, Zimbabwe’s Competition
Act (Chapter 14:28) lacks clear definitions of anti-competitive behavior, particularly
regarding the abuse of dominance, leading to ambiguity in enforcement. The Competition and
Tariff Commission (CTC) struggles with limited resources and capacity, as seen in its case
against Innscor Africa Limited for failure to notify a merger. 50 Zimbabwe’s public awareness
of competition law is also low, with fewer outreach initiatives compared to South Africa,
where the Competition Commission promotes consumer and business education on
44
Competition Act 89 of 1998; Lévêque, F., & Ménière, Y. (2004). Competition Law and Economics in the
European Union. Edward Elgar Publishing.
45
Section 59 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998
46
S 52(2) of the SA Act
47
S 5 of the SA Competition Act
48
Applications for interim relief, where the standard of proof is the same as that of proof in a High Court on a
common law application for an interim interdict in terms of s 49C(3).
49
S 52(4) of the SA Competition Act
50
Harrison, J. (2010) Competition Law and Policy in the European Union and South Africa: A Comparative
Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
competition rights.51 South Africa benefits from well-resourced enforcement bodies, which
have a strong track record in addressing anti-competitive practices. 52 In contrast, Zimbabwe’s
enforcement is hindered by fewer resources and a less developed case law history. 53 The
South African Competition Tribunal holds public hearings, ensuring procedural transparency,
while Zimbabwe’s administrative processes lack such clarity. 54 South Africa’s extensive case
law history, including decisions like Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty)
Limited v The Competition Commission & Another, provides guidance for future
enforcement actions, a resource Zimbabwe currently lacks.55

Way forward for Zimbabwe’s Competition Framework

To enhance Zimbabwe's competition regulation, insights from South Africa’s Competition

Act 89 of 1998 can provide a robust framework for reform. One critical recommendation is to
introduce clearer definitions and explicit provisions regarding the abuse of dominance in
Zimbabwe’s Competition Act (Chapter 14:28). The current lack of specific prohibitions
against anti-competitive practices creates ambiguity and hinders enforcement by the
Competition and Tariff Commission (CTC). 56 Adopting clear definitions similar to South
Africa’s Section 8, which outlines abusive practices like predatory pricing, exclusive dealing,
and price discrimination, would provide a stronger legal foundation for the CTC to combat
market abuses. Another vital recommendation is to increase the resources and capacity of the
CTC.57 South Africa’s competition authorities benefit from substantial budgets, enabling
comprehensive investigations and market monitoring. Zimbabwe should allocate more
resources to enhance the CTC’s capabilities, facilitating thorough enforcement of competition
laws. Additionally, a corporate leniency program could incentivize firms to report anti-
competitive behavior, fostering a culture of transparency and compliance. Establishing a
dedicated appellate body, similar to South Africa’s Competition Appeal Court, would
improve procedural fairness in Zimbabwe’s competition enforcement. 58 Currently, the
Administrative Court handles reviews, but a specialized body would bring a more informed
approach to competition issues, ensuring consistent decisions based on economic principles. 59
51
Khan, L. M. (2017) Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox. Yale Law Journal, 126(3), pp. 710-805.
52
Competition Commission v. Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd [2003] ZACT 43
53
Competition Commission of South Africa (2020). Guidelines on Abuse of Dominance. Available
at: [Link] [Acces
sed 12 Nov. 2024].
54
Norton Rose Fulbright (2020). Zimbabwean Competition Authority Prohibits Merger and Issues Fines for Gun-
Jumping. Available at: [Link]
competition-authority-prohibits-merger-and-issues-fines-for-gunjumping [Accessed 12 Nov. 2024].
55
Corder, H. (2009) 'The Role of the Competition Tribunal in South Africa’s Competition Law System', South
African Law Journal, 126(4), pp. 798-815; Mackintosh, S. (2012) 'Public Interest and Competition Policy in
South Africa', Law and Development Review, 5(2), pp. 245-275.
56
Bishop, S., & Walker, M. (2010). The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and
Measurement. 3rd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell.
57
Ehlermann, C. D., & Laudati, F. (2018). The Reform of EU Competition Law: A Study of the New Economic
Governance and the Role of Competition Authorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
58
Harrison, J. (2017). Competition Law and Policy in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
59
Makhaya, G., & Roberts, S. (2013). Competition Policy and the Economy in South Africa: A Historical
Perspective. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Press.
Public awareness campaigns, like those in South Africa, would also empower consumers and
businesses to identify and report anti-competitive practices. 60 Finally, adopting a rule-of-
reason approach would offer flexibility in enforcement while ensuring legitimate business
practices are not penalized.61 This balanced approach would help Zimbabwe navigate
complex market dynamics and better protect consumer welfare. In conclusion, by
implementing these recommendations, Zimbabwe can strengthen its competition framework,
promoting fair competition and supporting economic growth.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, the persistent abuse of dominance by firms, despite the presence of
competition laws in both Zimbabwe and South Africa, underscores the critical gaps in
enforcement and regulation. While both countries have codified legal frameworks to address
anti-competitive practices, their effectiveness is undermined by insufficient clarity, limited
resources, and weak institutional capacity. Zimbabwe’s Competition Act (Chapter 14:28)
lacks precise definitions of anti-competitive behavior, impeding the Competition and Tariff
Commission’s ability to take effective action. In contrast, South Africa’s Competition Act 89
of 1998 provides a more robust framework, enabling clearer enforcement and stronger
protection of consumer welfare. To bridge this gap, Zimbabwe must adopt clearer legal
definitions of dominance, enhance the resources available to regulatory bodies, and build
stronger institutional mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement. Establishing an appellate
body and implementing a corporate leniency program would be key steps toward improving
enforcement efficiency. By learning from South Africa’s successful regulatory strategies,
Zimbabwe can create a competitive market environment that promotes innovation, protects
consumers, and fosters economic growth. Strengthening competition law will not only align
Zimbabwe’s framework with international best practices but also create a marketplace where
anti-competitive behavior is actively deterred, benefiting businesses and consumers alike.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Legislation

Zimbabwe’s Competition Act [Chapter 14:28].

The South African Competition Act.

60
Nitsche, R., & Haucap, J. (2010). Competition Policy and Market Structure: Theory and Evidence. Berlin:
Springer.
61
Vickers, J. (2005). The Economics of Market Dominance and Monopoly. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Case Law
Competition Commission v. Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd [2003]
ZACT 43.

Articles

Anderson, Robert, Daniel, Timothy, & Heimler, Alberto (1999). "Abuse of Dominance," in A
Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy. The World
Bank, Washington D.C., and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Paris.
Baker, Jonathan B. (2003). "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 17(4), 27-50.
Whinston, Michael D. (2003). "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Political Economy, 111(1), 8-
44.
Shapiro, Carl (2000). "Theories of Oligopoly Behavior," in Handbook of Industrial
Organization (Vol. 3, pp. 329–414). Elsevier.
Kovacic, William E. (2007). "Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Effects of Market Power,"
Antitrust Law Journal, 74(2), 515-552.
Areeda, Philip, & Hovenkamp, Herbert (2014). Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust
Principles and Their Application (4th ed.). Wolters Kluwer Law & Business.
Adams, William J., & Yellen, Janet L. (1976). "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of
Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(3), 475-498.
Wright, Joshua D. (2007). "The Price of Monopoly Power: The Retrospective Approach to
Antitrust," in Antitrust Policy and Vertical Restraints.
Klein, Benjamin, & Murphy, Dennis J. (2008). "Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and
Legal Policy," Journal of Law & Economics, 51(3), 619-653.
Sidak, J. Gregory, & Teece, David J. (2009). "Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law,"
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 5(4), 557-592.
Whinston, Michael D. (2006). Lectures on Antitrust Economics. MIT Press.
Bork, Robert H. (1978). The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself. Free Press.
Fox, Eleanor M. (2003). "Antitrust and the Spirit of Competition," Harvard Law Review,
116(6), 1210-1269.
Kaplow, Louis (2003). "The Competitive Effects of Price Fixing," Harvard Law Review,
116(4), 874-933.
Shelanski, Howard A. (2000). "Price Discrimination and Antitrust Policy," Antitrust Law
Journal, 68(1), 45-63.
Chen, Y., & Schwartz, A. (2000). "Price Discrimination and Competition," Review of
Industrial Organization, 17(3), 269-280.
Evans, David S. (2003). "The Antitrust Economics of Tying: A Comprehensive Overview,"
Review of Industrial Organization, 22(2), 149-171.
Comanor, William S. (1985). "Market Power and Price Discrimination," in The Economics of
the Firm (pp. 118-134). Princeton University Press.

Books

Viscusi, W. Kip, Vernon, John M., & Harrington, Joseph E. (1998). Economics of Regulation
and Antitrust (2nd ed.). The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
CUTS Monograph on Investment and Competition Policy #6, All About Competition Policy
& Law For the Advanced Learner. CUTS Centre for International Trade, Economics &
Environment, Jaipur.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2002). Globalization and its Discontents. W.W. Norton & Company.
Posner, Richard A. (2001). Antitrust Law (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press.
Kühn, Klaus, & Vives, Xavier (1995). Information Exchanges among Firms and the Effects
of Market Structure, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13(5), 565-577.
Tirole, Jean (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press.
Competition Law and Policy: A Comparative Analysis of the US, the EU, and the UK.
Oxford University Press.
Competition Commission of Zambia (2021). "Frequently Asked Questions About Dominance
and Abuse of Dominance." Available at: CCPC Zambia [Accessed 12 Nov. 2024].
Gavilan, M. (2017). Competition Law in Developing Countries: Theories and Cases from
Africa and Asia. Routledge.
Harrison, John (2011). Competition Law and Policy in the European Union. Oxford
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Online Resources

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CUTS International (2021). Dominance and Abuse of Dominance. Available at: [Link]
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Norton Rose Fulbright (2020). "Zimbabwean Competition Authority Prohibits Merger and
Issues Fines for Gun-Jumping." Available at: [Link]
africa/blog/2020/07/zimbabwean-competition-authority-prohibits-merger-and-issues-fines-
for-gunjumping [Accessed 12 Nov. 2024].
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[Accessed 12 Nov. 2024].