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 LYONS
A SHORT HISTORY
FIFTH EDITION
ISBN-13: 978-0-205-66056-8
ISBN-10: 0-205-66056-8
9 0 0 0 0
Routledge

www.routledge.com 9 780205 660568

 Contents v

Pushing along New Guinea’s Coast 167 The Battle of the Atlantic
A Chain around Rabaul 167 Continues 215
The Central Pacific Offensive 168 Bismarck’s First and Last Voyage 216
The Taking of Tarawa and Makin 168 Crisis and Resolution in the North
The Leap to Kwajalein 169 Atlantic 217
The Neutralization of Truk 170 Supply Routes to Russia 219
Assault on the Marianas 171 No Guaranteed Victory 220

16 The Tide Turns in Russia: 20 Target Germany: The Allied Bombing

Stalingrad and Beyond 174 Offensive 221
New German Goals in the USSR 174 Strategic Bombing 221
The Struggle for Stalingrad 177 Britain Takes the Offensive 223
The Germans on the Defensive 179 The Americans Join In 224
Operation Citadel 180 The Destruction of Hamburg 225
The Germans Begin to Crumble 182 The Allies Regain the Upper Hand 226
The Soviets Roll On 182 Was It All Worthwhile? 229
The Warsaw Uprising 183
Soviet Successes in the Baltic States 21 Total War and the Home
and the Balkans 185 Fronts 230

17 The Tide Turns in North Africa: Germany: From Limited Liability

El Alamein to Tunisia 187 to Total War 230
German Utilization of Labor 231
The “Sideshow” in North Africa 187 The Decline of Living Standards 232
Rommel Drives into Egypt 188 Resistance in Germany 232
The Second Battle of El Alamein 190 Britain: Toward Total Mobilization 233
Problems of a Marriage Life in Wartime Britain 235
of Convenience 192 The American Giant Awakens 236
Allied Differences on Strategy 193 Measures against
The Invasion of French North Japanese-Americans 236
Africa 196 Mobilization of U.S. Industry 237
The Tunisian Campaign 198 American Minorities in the War 238
The Final Push in Tunisia 200 The Role of American Women 238
Feeding the Nation and More 239
18 Probing the Underbelly: The Soviets Rebound
Sicily and Italy 202 from Disaster 239
The Allied Invasion of Sicily 202 Hunger Stalks the Land 241
Consequences of Allied Success The Great Patriotic War 242
in Sicily 204 Japan: Conflict of Interest 243
Onto the Mainland 205 Japan’s Labor Policies 244
Changes in Allied Command The “Valley of Darkness” 245
and Strategy 207
THE TRIUMPH OF THE ALLIES
19 War in the Atlantic 210
22 Cross-Channel Invasion at Last:
The Balance of Power at Sea 210 D Day to the German Border 246
The U-Boat: Key to Victory? 211
Combating the U-Boat 211 Teheran and Allied Strategy 246
The Struggle for the Preparing for the Invasion 247
Mediterranean 214 The Invasion Begins 249
vi Contents

An Attempt on Hitler’s Life 252 25 The Collapse of Japan 279

The Allies Break Out 253
The Southern Invasion: The Return to the Philippines 279
Anvil-Dragoon 253 The Battle of Leyte Gulf 280
The Allies’ Swift Advance 254 Progress on Land 283
The Push to Cross the Rhine 256 The Agonizing Fight for Iwo Jima 284
The Importance of D Day 257 The Costly Struggle for Okinawa 285
The Pacific Submarine War 288
Fire from the Sky 289
23 The End of the Thousand-Year
Both Sides Woo the Soviets 290
Reich 258
Advent of A New Age:
The Battle of the Bulge 258 The Atomic Bomb 290
The Struggle for the Colmar Forcing Japan’s Surrender 292
Pocket 260 Postmortem: Was Atomic
The Soviet Assault on Poland 261 Force Necessary? 293
The Yalta Conference 262
The Allied Drive to the Rhine 263 Aftermath 295
Crushing the Axis in Italy 265
The Allies Overrun the Reich 266 The Physical Costs of the War 295
The Nazi Death Camps Fall 267 Prosecuting War Criminals 296
High Drama in Berlin 268 Political Repercussions 297
The Bitter End 269 Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe 297
U.S. Aid to Western Europe 299
The Cold War 300
24 War on the Periphery:
The Spread of Democracy 302
China, Burma, India 271
Civil War in China 303
The Chinese Situation 271 Events in Korea Lead to War 303
British Raids on Burma 273 Withdrawal from Empire 304
India’s Internal Instability 274 The End of the Cold War
The Co-Prosperity Sphere 275 and Beyond 305
The Units of Death 275
Allied Squabbles over Strategy 276 Additional Reading 307
The Campaign to Retake Burma 276
A Change of Plans for China 277 Index 319
 Preface

When the first edition of World War II: A Short Another change poses the question of whether
History appeared in 1989, the conflict had already the United States made a mistake in linking its
inspired over 70,000 volumes. The number has interests too closely to those of China during the
risen steadily since then. In this fifth edition, I diplomatic crisis that culminated in the Japanese
again have incorporated material from the vast attack on Pearl Harbor. Still another gives greater
array of new literature, along with suggestions credit to U.S. lend-lease aid to Russia than was
from readers. In particular, I have changed the the case in earlier editions. I have also modified
format of the book in three important ways. To my appraisal of the Battle of Midway. While still
provide greater continuity to the narrative of the emphasizing its importance, I demonstrate that until
war in the Pacific, the material in former Chapter late 1943, the U.S. and Japan continued to strug-
24, covering the period from early 1943 to mid- gle to gain the initiative in the Pacific.
1944, is now to be found in Chapter 15, entitled Among the multitude of other changes through-
“America Gains the Initiative in the Pacific.” It fol- out the book, I have contrasted the war aims of
lows three chapters dealing with the earlier stages Germany and Japan, elaborated on the divisions
of the Pacific conflict. Similarly, I have placed the in French society before and during the German
section on the 1942 German offensive in Russia invasion, corrected the erroneous notion that
and the Stalingrad debacle in new Chapter 16, Patton and Montgomery engaged in a “Race to
entitled “The Tide Turns in Russia: Stalingrad and Messina” during the Sicilian campaign, focused
Beyond,” which also includes the material in for- more on the myriad of problems confronting
mer Chapter 21, detailing the events on the East- Eisenhower in making the decision as to when to
ern Front during 1943–1944. Finally, the period invade Normandy, and emphasized the effects of
of the North African war, from the summer of the war on decolonization in Africa and the Mid-
1942 to the German surrender in Tunisia, is to be dle East. I have also done my best to eliminate
found in new Chapter 17, “The Tide Turns in any mistakes from the following pages.
North Africa: El Alamein to Tunisia.” My basic purpose in this edition is still the
The new edition places greater emphasis on the same as that which prompted me to write the first:
ideological aspects of the German war against the to satisfy the needs of the college student in the
Soviet Union, including the notorious “Commissar classroom as well as those of the general reader.
Order,” as well as the complicity of the Wehrmacht At the same time, I have sought to provide a rela-
in Nazi atrocities on the Eastern Front. It also pays tively brief synthesis of the work of other scholars
more attention to Stalin’s initial failure to react to that the professional historian will find useful.
the invasion and the Soviet murder of German With these aims in mind, I have endeavored nei-
prisoners. I have increased coverage of the Holo- ther to overestimate the reader’s knowledge of
caust, including a consideration of the reasons why the subject nor to insult his or her intelligence by
the Western Allies were not able to intercede in being too elementary. In pursuit of this elusive
behalf of the European Jews. I have also stressed goal, I have attempted to fashion a book that is
the coexistence of collaboration and resistence in readable, informative, understandable, and inter-
occupied countries and have raised the question of esting. Each reader will determine how well I
whether resistence was always worth the price. have succeeded.

vii
viii Preface

Though focusing primarily on the Second not to mention arguments, with Professor James D.
World War, I have examined the many factors that Sadkovich, that helped to alter my view of Italy’s
combined to cause that terrible calamity as well as performance in the war to some extent. My good
the most significant effects of the conflict. Obvi- friend and colleague Professor David B. Danbom
ously, in a work of this scope, it has been neces- provided me with inspiration by example as well
sary to deal selectively and summarily with the as strong personal support. I also greatly appreci-
highly complex history of the decades preceding ate the encouragement and suggestions of Profes-
the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 and the period sor A. Harding Ganz.
that followed the defeat of Germany and Japan in I am indebted, too, for the many valuable sug-
1945. I have also striven to present a balanced gestions offered by the readers who found my
account that does justice to both the European manuscript worthy of publication. These include
and Pacific theaters of operations and the connec- James P. Shenton, Columbia University; Joseph W.
tions between them. The global conflagration gave Bendersky, Virginia Commonwealth University;
birth to innumerable controversies, and I have David Detzer, Western Connecticut State Univer-
done my best to analyze the most important of sity; John A. Maxwell, West Virginia University;
these while often presenting my own views as to Robin F. A. Fabel, Auburn University; Donald L.
the best interpretations to place on them. Layton, Indiana State University; Robert Maddox,
Any author incurs numerous debts in writing Pennsylvania State University; Charles L. Ponce de
and publishing a book. Mine start with the late Leon, SUNY Purchase; Nancy Wingfield, North-
Professor Harold C. Deutsch, whose masterful ern Illinois University; Neil Heyman, San Diego
course at the University of Minnesota kindled my State University; Mary Kathryn Cooney, Lourdes
fascination with the Second World War. Thanks College; Christopher J. Fischer, Indiana State Uni-
also go to the many students who enrolled in my versity; and Roger Lotchin; University of North
own World War II course at North Dakota State Carolina at Chapel Hill.
University during a period of over two decades. My gratitude for their encouragement also goes
Their obvious interest helped stimulate my dedi- with much affection to my children—Mary, Mike,
cation to this project. Professor Archer Jones offered and Nancy. Finally, I must pay tribute to my late
encouragement and advice during his years as wife, Joan, who was a constant source of support
dean of the College of Humanities and Social Sci- during my labors on the first three editions.
ences. I must also acknowledge my discussions, Michael J. Lyons
 CHAPTER ONE

World War I:
The Great Turning Point

Some readers may wonder why a book on World the nineteenth century. This process affected not
War II begins with a chapter on World War I. only the Great Powers—Britain, France, Germany,
There is a good reason for this, however. Without Austria-Hungary, and Russia—but many smaller
at least a brief consideration of the first conflict countries as well. Early twentieth-century nation-
and its momentous effects, it is extremely diffi- alism tended to be of a narrow, selfish, and stri-
cult, if not impossible, to understand why World dent type. Rabid nationalists saw their own
War II came to pass. The two wars were closely nations as superior and looked toward other
linked. World War I dragged on for four bloody countries with contempt and hostility. To be sure,
years and resulted in enormous political and eco- most people were not so extreme in their outlook.
nomic upheaval in Europe and, to some extent, But many took great pride in their nation and
the world. Governments and peoples struggled often exaggerated its accomplishments. Govern-
throughout the 1920s and 1930s to solve the ments were willing to go to the brink of war or
many problems created by the conflict. Most of beyond to safeguard what they considered to be
their efforts failed, and this failure contributed “national interests” or to avenge supposed insults
significantly to the outbreak of World War II. to national honor.
World War I erupted directly out of a crisis This burgeoning nationalism coincided with
triggered by the assassination of the Archduke large-scale industrialization in much of Western
Franz Ferdinand, heir to the thrones of the dual and Central Europe and to a lesser extent in east-
monarchy of Austria-Hungary, by a Bosnian Serb ern portions of the continent. The nineteenth
terrorist on June 28, 1914. Within a month this century also experienced a vast increase in popu-
crisis led to war between Austria-Hungary and lation and the transformation of society in many
Serbia. All of the Great Powers of Europe as countries from one that had traditionally been
well as Japan soon found themselves drawn rural and agrarian to one that was largely urban
into the struggle, and eventually the United States and industrial. These changes occurred with rela-
followed their lead. tive speed and contributed to the erosion of tradi-
tional values, including religious beliefs, among
Europe Prior to World War I many people. To some, nationalism became a sort
of secular substitute for religion. The concentra-
World War I has aroused more controversy tion of large portions of the population in cities
regarding its origins than any other war. Although and the development of more efficient communi-
the crisis that followed the assassination led cations and a popular press facilitated the dis-
directly to the conflict, many factors helped cre- semination of nationalistic propaganda.
ate an atmosphere of tension in the decades The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
before 1914. Some historians consider these fac- also witnessed the growth of representative politi-
tors as more important than the crisis itself and cal institutions in many countries and the exten-
view the war as the inevitable result of their sion of the right to vote in parliamentary elections
interaction. to the poorer classes of society. The development
Among the factors that contributed to World of a system of mass education, at least at the pri-
War I was the growth of nationalism throughout mary level, played an important role in this

1
2 The Origins of World War II

democratizing trend. But at the same time, wealth century. They engaged in a scramble to acquire
and the actual exercise of political power colonies in Africa, Asia, and other parts of the
remained concentrated in a small percentage of “underdeveloped world.” Although imperialistic
the population. The landowning aristocracy, which rivalry led to some heated disputes, the powers
had dominated Europe for centuries, retained its had settled most of them well before 1914. But
importance and tended to merge with the wealthy some of them had profound and ongoing effects.
capitalists, who controlled large industries, and
directed powerful financial institutions. Industrial The Growth of National Rivalry
society held the promise of a better life, but to the
poorer classes, expectations often proved greater The development of two rival alliance systems in
than achievements. Although the standard of the years prior to 1914 proved especially critical.
living rose, millions still remained victims of The first of these, the Triple Alliance, was the cre-
poverty. And while countries such as Britain and ation of Otto von Bismarck. As minister-president
France had become democracies, the political of Prussia, Bismarck had been primarily responsi-
systems of Germany and Austria-Hungary had ble for combining the various German states in a
the appearance of democracy but lacked the sub- united Germany and became the country’s first
stance. Their elected parliaments possessed only chancellor in 1871. The new Germany repre-
limited power, while the heads of state and their sented the greatest triumph of nineteenth-century
ministers controlled the formation and imple- nationalism and became the leading military and
mentation of policy. In Russia, there was not even industrial power in Europe. But Bismarck had
the appearance of democracy. made enemies during the unification process,
Many members of the industrial working class most notably France, which Prussia had defeated
turned to labor unions and socialism as a way out in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. This
of their dilemma. These movements opposed conflict eliminated French resistance to German
nationalism and appealed to the international sol- unification and forced France to give up two
idarity of the workers. They also preached the provinces, Alsace and part of Lorraine, to Germany.
need to preserve peace and opposed expenditures To provide his country with security against a
on armaments. Many Socialists subscribed in the- possible French attempt to gain revenge and
ory to the Marxist doctrine of revolution to over- destroy his achievement, Bismarck set out to
throw the existing political and economic system. acquire allies.
But in practice most of them were moderate and His quest led to the formation of the Triple
willing to work peacefully for reforms. Radical Alliance during the period 1879–82. This defen-
parties appealed to many from the lower middle sive alliance linked Germany, Austria-Hungary,
class, especially small businessmen and indepen- and Italy. In the event that an outside power
dent craftsmen who felt threatened by Big Busi- should attack one of the members of the alliance,
ness and Big Labor. Others found solace in the the other two would be obligated to go to war.
emotional stimulus of nationalism, which cut Bismarck also attempted to maintain a close rela-
across class lines. tionship with Russia by negotiating a separate
Industrialization accelerated economic compe- treaty with that country. But after his retirement
tition among European powers, which vied for in 1890, his successors allowed the agreement to
markets and raw materials. But at the same time, lapse, fearing that it conflicted with Germany’s
they continued to enjoy a large volume of trade other commitments. This action provided France
with one another. This tended to reduce the inten- with an opportunity to pursue friendlier relations
sity of their competition. As patterns of trade with the Russians. These efforts culminated in a
became extensive within Europe and between the defensive alliance in 1894. Russia’s need for capi-
continent and other parts of the world, however, tal to finance its industrialization program and
the economy grew more complex, international, France’s willingness to provide the funds con-
and interdependent. Economic rivalry also pro- tributed to this agreement.
vided an impetus to a new flowering of imperial- Britain later overcame its traditional dedication
ism among the Great Powers in the late nineteenth to what it called “splendid isolation” and made
 World War I: The Great Turning Point 3

separate agreements with France in 1904 and forces were necessary to defend them from
Russia in 1907. Each of these agreements merely aggression. But their staff officers drafted strategic
settled colonial issues that had caused problems plans that were offensive in character. In case of
in the past, but in the following years, Britain war, they intended to put them into operation as
drew closer to both countries. This three-cornered quickly as possible. They considered speed to be
relationship became the Triple Entente and served essential. In a crisis situation, demands for swift
as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance. mobilization could create intolerable pressure on
The British tightened their connection with civilian officials to resort to war rather than wait
France largely because of their growing fear of for the other side to strike first.
Germany. The decision of the German emperor,
Wilhelm II, and Admiral Alfred Tirpitz to increase The Seeds of Conflict in Europe
greatly the size of Germany’s navy, starting in
1898, contributed significantly to that concern. During the decade before 1914, the powers
Britain had long possessed the world’s largest focused their attention to a large extent on the
navy. As an island nation dependent on massive Balkan area of southeastern Europe, where a
imports of food and raw materials, it viewed any number of crises erupted. Austria-Hungary and
threat to its naval supremacy as a danger to its Russia had long been rivals for political and eco-
existence. But Wilhelm and Tirpitz considered a nomic influence in the Balkans. The emergence of
large fleet necessary for a world power and ques- nationalism among the various Balkan peoples
tioned Britain’s right to dictate naval strength. complicated this rivalry. These national groups
The rather truculent nature of German foreign had been subject to the rule of the Ottoman Turks
policy also alarmed the British, especially in con- for centuries. But during the late nineteenth and
nection with two crises over the North African early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman Empire
territory of Morocco. In the first of these in 1905, declined to such an extent that it earned the
Germany challenged France’s efforts to transform unenviable reputation as the “sick man of
Morocco into a protectorate, which Britain had Europe.” The Balkan nationalities took advantage
sanctioned in their 1904 agreement. German of this weakness gradually to win their indepen-
leaders believed that if confronted by such a cri- dence. By 1913, the Turks had lost all of their
sis, Britain would desert France, and this would Balkan holdings except for the predominantly
wreck their newly formed friendship. But con- Turkish area bordering the straits that linked the
trary to German expectations, the British sup- Black Sea with the Mediterranean.
ported the French and even initiated military staff Among the states that emerged from this long
talks with them. During the second crisis, in process was Serbia. Its existence posed a special
1911, Germany again pressured France over its problem for the dual monarchy of Austria-
encroachment on Morocco, and again Britain Hungary, which was a glaring exception in an age
sided with the French. This time, the two powers of nation-states. It was a multinational empire,
began naval staff talks. These ongoing discussions consisting of minorities that differed from one
led to the development of plans to coordinate another in language, customs, historical develop-
their armies and navies in case of war with ment, and religion. In fact, the two dominant
Germany. In 1914, shortly before the outbreak of nationalities—the Austrians, who were ethnically
war, Britain and Russia inaugurated conversations German, and the Hungarians—comprised less
between their naval staffs. than half the population. The Austro-Hungarian
European powers also increased their military government had long viewed nationalism as a
and naval strength and devised strategic plans force that could lead to the country’s disintegra-
that they intended to put into operation in case of tion into its component national parts. Among
war. New technology facilitated the creation of the dual monarchy’s nationalities was a Serbian
weapons of increasing sophistication and destruc- minority that lived in territories bordering Serbia.
tiveness, and industrialization enabled their mass The Serbian government hoped eventually to
production. As in the case of their alliances, the absorb these kinsmen into a “greater Serbia.” To
powers contended that these military and naval complicate matters even more, Russia treated
4 The Origins of World War II

Serbia as a client state. Both the Russians and provided for an invasion of France by way of
Serbs were Slavic peoples. In the early twentieth Belgium. The British responded to this action by
century, Austria-Hungary became obsessed by declaring war on Germany.
what it viewed as “the Serbian menace.” This Italy refused to support its partners in the
menace materialized with the creation of a secret Triple Alliance, contending that Austria-Hungary
Serbian nationalist society that took the name and Germany were the aggressors. Italy pointed
Union of Death or the Black Hand. It was this to the fact that its only obligation was to take
organization that carried out the assassination of action in case of an attack on one of them. The
Franz Ferdinand in 1914. Italians remained interested onlookers until April
The Austro-Hungarian government responded 1915, when they sided with the Allies—Britain,
to the assassination with outrage; however, it France, and Russia. They did so in return for
could not decide how it should deal with Serbia. Allied promises of compensation at Austria-Hun-
At this critical point, Germany pledged to support gary’s expense as well as in the Middle East and
whatever action the dual monarchy deemed nec- Africa. Japan also declared war on Germany but
essary, even if it meant war with Serbia’s protector, confined its efforts to the Far East and Pacific,
Russia. Armed with this “blank check,” Austria- where the Japanese quickly seized a number of
Hungary finally issued an ultimatum to Serbia German colonial outposts. The Central Powers—
that, if accepted, would have reduced the nation Germany and Austria-Hungary—managed to lure
to a virtual satellite state. Although the Serbs Turkey and Bulgaria into the conflict on their
agreed to comply with most of the ultimatum’s side.
demands, they balked at certain points that they The war that came in 1914 was not inevitable.
felt were incompatible with their independence. To be sure, conflicting national interests and the
Austria-Hungary responded by declaring war on existence of the alliances contributed to the out-
July 28, hoping to deal with Serbia in isolation. break of hostilities. But the war was nevertheless
the result of the inability of the powers to solve
The War Spreads the 1914 crisis. This failure was due to human
error, especially Germany’s blank check, Austria-
But Russia rallied to Serbia’s aid by mobilizing its Hungary’s belief that it could localize the war, and
reserves, an act preparatory to military action. Russia’s decision to mobilize. It does not appear
Since the Russians assumed that war with Austria- that any of the Great Powers desired a general
Hungary would also mean war with Germany, conflict, but once the Austro-Hungarians issued
they had only one plan, which provided for their ultimatum to Serbia, the crisis took on a
mobilization against both countries. Germany, momentum of its own. The necessities of mobi-
taking for granted that a conflict with Russia lization and strategic plans quickly swept Europe
would also embroil it in hostilities with France, into war.
issued ultimatums to both. Germany asked Russia Civilians and soldiers alike greeted the out-
to cease mobilization and France to declare neu- break of war with nationalist pride and enthusi-
trality in case of war between Germany and Russia. asm. To them, it was a great adventure. Millions
Neither agreed, and by August 3 Germany was at lined the streets to cheer and throw flowers to
war with both powers. the brave warriors as they marched through
Despite its close relationship with France, Berlin, Vienna, and Paris. One young German
Britain hesitated at first but entered the conflict recruit was so overjoyed when he received his
when Germany sent forces into tiny Belgium. uniform and weapons that he shouted, “War is
This violated an agreement that the Great Powers like Christmas!” The mood soon changed.
had made in 1839 to guarantee Belgium’s perma-
nent neutrality. The British had traditionally Miscalculations and Illusions
opposed any power that attempted to seize this
area because of its location across the channel At first, none of the European powers realized the
from Britain. Germany justified its aggression on type of conflict they had unleashed. Most leaders
grounds of military necessity. Its strategic plan seriously underestimated the length of the war, its
 World War I: The Great Turning Point 5

costliness in lives and wealth, and its impact on When the war began, General Helmuth von
the very foundations of European politics and Moltke, who had taken over as chief of staff, put
society. They expected a short war, basing their the Schlieffen plan into effect. At first, all went
assumption on the fact that since the defeat of well, and the Germans were nearing Paris by early
Napoleon in 1815, most European wars had been September. But Moltke had reduced the striking
brief, lasting only a few weeks or months. They power of the right wing to strengthen his forces
also anticipated that the development and mass along the German border where he anticipated a
production of powerful new weapons in the years French attack. He also shifted additional troops to
leading up to 1914 would give the advantage to the eastern front to help resist an unexpected
the offense rather than the defense. It seemed Russian offensive. As a result, the German spear-
obvious that the side that possessed the greatest head did not have sufficient strength to execute
offensive strength would win. its turn to the southwest of Paris. Instead, it had
The Central Powers especially counted on a to shorten its front and wheel to the northeast of
short war because a long conflict was almost the capital, and as it did, the French counter-
certain to go against them. The Allied countries attacked the German flank.
possessed larger manpower reserves, greater indus- In the desperate struggle that followed, the
trial strength, and access to the resources of the Allies forced the Germans to halt their offensive.
rest of the world. They also used their superior This First Battle of the Marne proved to be the
naval strength to impose a blockade that cut off decisive encounter of the war. It denied Germany
the Central Powers from the other continents. a quick victory and condemned it to fight a
The Allies virtually encircled their enemies, with prolonged two-front conflict. Although Moltke
Britain and France on the west, Russia on the received the blame for the German failure, it
east, and Italy on the south. Despite the fact that appears that the Schlieffen plan had little chance
German armies operated within the borders of of success under any circumstances. It was far too
both France and Russia from 1914 on, the Cen- ambitious and would soon have encountered
tral Powers were in effect the besieged nations, at such extreme supply problems that it would have
least until the collapse of Russia late in the war. failed even if Moltke had attempted to carry out
Germany, the most powerful of the Central Schlieffen’s instructions to the letter. In fact, a
Powers, had taken a two-front war for granted in stronger right wing would have compounded
its long-range military planning. But the Germans these logistic difficulties.
realized that they could not win such a conflict
unless they defeated France and Russia one at a A Long and Bloody Deadlock
time in quick, decisive fashion. Their strategic
plan, which aimed at accomplishing the first stage As the short-war illusion faded, hostilities on the
of this task, was not new. It was the work of Gen- western front degenerated into a bloody war of
eral Alfred von Schlieffen, who had retired as attrition. The two sides began to dig in and
army chief of staff in 1906. Schlieffen called for gradually created opposing systems of trenches,
the Germans to concentrate powerful forces in extending across southwestern Belgium and
the west while remaining on the defensive against northern France from the English Channel to the
Russia. He envisioned a thrust through neutral Swiss border. The front had no flanks, and thus
Belgium that would avoid the fortifications along for the next four years both the Allies and
France’s northeastern border. German troops Germany tried to break the deadlock by means of
would then swing into France, led by an over- direct assaults using millions of men. Unfortu-
whelmingly powerful right wing that would nately, the new and terrible weapons, which the
advance to the southwest of Paris before wheeling Great Powers had developed prior to the war,
to the east. If all went according to plan, the proved especially well suited for defensive war-
Germans would encircle the main enemy armies fare. They included vastly improved rifles, the
and force France to capitulate within six weeks. machine gun, and artillery of tremendous range
After this great victory, Germany would shift its and velocity. This concentrated firepower pre-
strength eastward to deal with the Russians. vented either side from gaining a breakthrough
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6 The Origins of World War II

and inflicted hundreds of thousands of casualties but, as usual, their drive eventually stalled.
in each major offensive. Again, casualties were high for both sides, the
Another deadlock developed on the eastern Russians suffering most with close to half a mil-
front, even though this vast area provided far lion dead, wounded, and missing and another
greater room for maneuver. After halting Russia’s 400,000 prisoners. Hundreds of thousands of
offensive in the great Battle of Tannenberg in others deserted.
August 1914, the Germans carried out a major The horrible events of 1916 struck the bel-
offensive in 1915 that drove the enemy out of ligerent powers with stunning psychological
much of its western territory. The Russians suf- impact. Verdun, although a French victory, left
fered appalling casualties, and the Germans cap- the army on the verge of rebellion. When France
tured over a million prisoners. But despite this resorted to another suicidal offensive in the
demoralizing setback, Russia refused to make spring of 1917, large-scale mutinies actually took
peace. This confronted the Germans with a place. The British had to shoulder most of the
dilemma. Should they continue to advance deeper burden during the remainder of the year, while
into the vast expanse of Russia or halt their oper- the French restored order and morale among
ations and concentrate on the western front dur- their forces. The Brusilov offensive had virtually
ing 1916? After considerable debate, they chose finished both the Russian and Austro-Hungarian
the latter solution. armies as important factors in the war. Even the
The man responsible for this decision was proud German army was never quite the same
General Erich von Falkenhayn, who had suc- after Verdun and the Somme and found itself
ceeded Moltke as chief of staff. Falkenhayn stretched too thin in too many places.
devised a master plan to win the war in the west On the home front, war weariness increased,
during 1916. It involved a huge offensive against and support for peace grew among the civilian
the French fortress city of Verdun with the pur- populations. The winter of 1916–17 was particu-
pose of inflicting such heavy losses that France larly harsh, adding to the suffering. Both sides
would be forced to leave the war. This assault, toyed with the possibility of a negotiated settle-
designed to “bleed France white,” began in February ment, but neither was willing to settle for a peace
and continued for months. It did cost the French without compensation.
375,000 casualties, but the Germans suffered
335,000 of their own, and France did not make The Resort to Total War
peace.
Britain was active, too. It had started the war Instead of peace, the new concept of “total war”
with a small volunteer military force but resorted gradually took shape. It focused on the relation-
to conscription early in 1916 and by the summer ship among war and politics, technology and the
had created a mass army. General Sir Douglas economy, and the need to mobilize, not only the
Haig, commander of the British Expeditionary armed forces, but the civilian population as well
Force, opened an offensive along the Somme in an all-out effort to gain victory. The ability to
River in July 1916 with French assistance. But his achieve this goal varied considerably from coun-
hopes for a major breakthrough proved as illu- try to country. The Western Allies and Germany
sory as Falkenhayn’s dream of victory at Verdun. gained the most success in this endeavor. They
The Battle of the Somme continued until also resorted to stronger leadership completely
November. When it ended, the British had sus- dedicated to victory. In Britain, David Lloyd
tained 420,000 casualties, the French 200,000, George, a fiery Welshman, became prime minister
and the Germans 450,000. This fearful carnage in December 1916. The equally combative
had resulted in no appreciable change in the Georges Clemenceau, who had earned the nick-
battle line. name “the Tiger,” took over as premier of France
The Russians also returned to the offensive in in 1917. The governments of both countries
the summer of 1916. Under the leadership of assumed virtual dictatorial power and subordi-
General Alexei Brusilov, they scored impressive nated everything to their war efforts, but at least
early successes against the Austro-Hungarians, civilian officials remained in charge.
 World War I: The Great Turning Point 7

Y
Europe, 1914 - 1918

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Europe, 1914–18

In Germany, the military increasingly domi- degree. Their achievements were remarkable. The
nated the government. Field Marshal Paul von war’s insatiable demand for manpower on the
Hindenburg succeeded Falkenhayn as chief of battlefield quickly led to a shortage of male work-
staff after the failure at Verdun. He and General ers in munitions plants. Women in accelerating
Erich Ludendorff pressured Chancellor Theobold numbers took their place, especially in France
von Bethmann-Hollweg out of office in 1917 and Britain. This pattern was to be repeated in
when he appeared too receptive to a negotiated World War II. The task of large-scale economic
peace. Bethmann’s successor, Georg Michaelis, mobilization proved far more difficult for Austria-
proved to be little more than a puppet for Hungary, Italy, and Russia. Their less well devel-
Hindenburg and Ludendorff. oped economies and weaker governmental
The governments of all three countries con- structures left them more dependent on aid from
centrated their economies almost totally on the their allies. Again women replaced many male
war effort. They allocated resources as well as labor workers in war industries. Russia’s isolation from
and coordinated production to an unprecedented the Western Powers also sharply limited the
8 The Origins of World War II

FIGURE 1-1 Allied troops advance on the western front. (National Archives and Records
Administration)

amount of assistance it could receive. All the state. This would create a buffer between France
warring countries appealed to their peoples for and Germany. The French also hoped to weaken
support and continued sacrifice. Germany to such an extent that it would be
The European powers had blundered into the unable to make war on France in the future. And
conflict so unexpectedly in 1914 that they ini- they hoped to acquire German colonies in Africa
tially had few, if any, clear war aims. All of them as well as Turkish possessions in the Middle East.
believed they were fighting in defense of their Britain had no territorial ambitions in Europe but,
national independence or at least national inter- like France, desired colonial compensation at the
ests. None of them considered itself to be the expense of Germany and Turkey.
aggressor. Of the major powers, only Italy entered Russia expected to oust Turkey from control
the war with definite aims. Soon after hostilities of the straits. This cherished dream had long
began, however, other belligerents formulated been contrary to the interests of both Britain
specific war aims. With the realization that the and France, which had desired to keep Russian
struggle was going to be long and bloody, leaders naval power out of the Mediterranean. But in
and important segments of the public concluded 1915, fearing that Russia might make a sepa-
that it must result in gains that would help justify rate peace, the Western Powers conceded to
the terrible slaughter and the strain on their Russia control over the straits after the war.
economies. Italy had entered the conflict to obtain territory
along the Austrian border—the Trentino on the
The Territorial Imperative north as well as the port city of Trieste and the
peninsula of Istria to the east. Italy also desired
On the Allied side, France hoped from the start to a sizable strip of Austria’s coastline along the
regain Alsace-Lorraine. But as time passed, French Adriatic Sea.
leaders began to covet Germany’s coal-rich Saar, a As for the Central Powers, Austria-Hungary
small area bordering France on the northeast. had been confused from the start about what it
They also favored removing German control over expected to gain from the conflict. In fact, Hun-
the Rhineland, the region to the west of the Rhine garian leaders had agreed to war only on condi-
River, and establishing an independent Rhenish tion that Austria-Hungary would not acquire
 World War I: The Great Turning Point 9

any Serbian territory. They believed that the primitive compared to those of Germany and
absorption of additional Serbs would only create Britain. It proved quite inadequate to supply the
greater internal problems. And the Austro- needs of both the armed forces and the civilian
Hungarians immediately suffered defeats at the population. Shortages of all kinds developed early
hands of not only the Russians but the Serbs as and became more pronounced as the conflict con-
well. This ominous beginning seemed to indi- tinued. The Russian transportation system also
cate the wisdom of seeking a quick end to the broke down under the unprecedented demands of
war. Instead, they continued to persevere, and modern warfare. To make matters worse, the gov-
Germany came to their rescue with the 1915 ernment of Tsar Nicholas II was inefficient, cor-
offensive, which drove the Russians deep into rupt, and unpopular. War weariness grew steadily.
their own territory. The Germans also directed a Early in March 1917, a revolt broke out in
campaign in which their troops joined with Petrograd, the capital. It started as demonstra-
those of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria to crush tions against the food shortage that soon became
Serbia. But this salvation ultimately proved fatal riots. Workers showed their sympathy by going
to the dual monarchy because the war became on strike. The government ordered the city’s
more and more unpopular with the subject army garrison to put down the unrest, but the
nationalities, kindling desires for independence. soldiers deserted to the rebels. Revolution spread
Austria-Hungary’s increasing reliance on its ally rapidly to other cities, and it soon became appar-
also transformed the empire into a German ent that virtually no one was willing to defend
satellite. As the war continued, its primary aim the discredited regime. Within a week, Nicholas II
came to be one of self-preservation. had bowed to increasing demands for his abdica-
By far the most extensive aims were those of tion, ending the 300-year rule of the Romanov
Germany, although these fluctuated according to dynasty.
the fortunes of war. They provided for absorption The weak Russian parliament now established
of an additional iron-rich slice of French Lorraine a provisional government to lead the country
as well as Luxembourg and either annexation of until a constituent assembly could draft a consti-
Belgium or its conversion into a satellite state. tution for a permanent political system. But the
The Germans harbored far greater ambitions in provisional government was reluctant to hold
Eastern Europe. These included acquisition of elections for the assembly in the unsettled atmos-
almost all of Russia’s western territory—the phere and also refused to seek a negotiated peace.
provinces bordering the Baltic Sea, Poland, and This obstinate policy eroded the government’s
the vast area of the Ukraine. Germany’s intentions support. Its failure to enact a land reform pro-
in these areas are not clear, but it certainly gram also alienated the peasants. Workers and
planned some annexations and the establishment soldiers increasingly rallied to the Bolsheviks, a
of satellite states. The Germans also anticipated revolutionary Marxist Socialist party.
establishing a sphere of influence in the Balkans. Under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, the
They visualized creating a German-dominated Bolsheviks sought to win control of the soviets,
European customs union that would make them councils that workers and soldiers had organized
economically supreme. In addition to this vast early in the revolution. The soviets had remained
increase of German power in Europe, they also in existence despite the formation of the provi-
proposed to take over a number of French, sional government and represented a threat to its
British, and Belgian colonies in Africa. rule. By October, the Bolsheviks had gained a
majority in the soviets of Petrograd, Moscow, and
Revolution in Russia several other industrial cities. In early November,
they moved against the provisional government
As the war continued, the pressures on each of the and quickly gained control of much of European
powers increased steadily. Russia was the first to Russia.
crack under the strain. Although the Russian Lenin had promised to secure peace if the
economy had experienced some industrializa- Bolsheviks came to power and now set out to ful-
tion in the years prior to 1914, it still remained fill that pledge. It proved difficult because the
10 The Origins of World War II

Germans insisted on exceedingly harsh terms. It ocean liner Lusitania with the loss of over 1,000
was not until March 1918 that the Bolsheviks lives, including 128 Americans. Allied propa-
finally agreed to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This ganda proved especially effective at portraying the
settlement, required Russia to give up most of its Germans as barbaric “Huns.” And American loans
Baltic provinces, much of Russian Poland, and the to Allied powers created an economic stake in
Ukraine, as provided in the German war aims. their victory.
Germany also extracted such far-reaching trade But the primary factor that brought the United
concessions that Russia became a virtual eco- States into the war was Germany’s policy of unre-
nomic dependency. stricted submarine warfare, which resulted in the
sinking of several American ships in early 1917.
The War Outside Europe This policy was a calculated risk designed to force
Britain out of the war. The Germans realized that
Although Europe remained its epicenter, the the British were dependent on large-scale imports
conflict was, nevertheless, a “world war” with of food and other supplies. They hoped that they
hostilities in far-flung theaters of operations. In would be able to starve Britain into submission by
addition to Japan’s seizure of German posses- sinking large numbers of both Allied and neutral
sions in East Asia and the Pacific, Allied forces ships in the waters around the British Isles. The
conquered Germany’s colonies in Africa and gamble failed. Not only did it bring the United
engaged in an ill-advised, long, bloody, and unsuc- States into the war, but also the British were able
cessful attempt to seize the Turkish straits to combat the submarine menace and continue
linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. the struggle.
They also drove the Turks out of Palestine, Syria, Despite a large population and great economic
and Mesopotamia (later Iraq) with long-lasting resources, America was a negligible military
repercussions. power in early 1917, with only 110,000 men
The Allies also received help from their over- under arms. Before the United States could help
seas empires. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and in the actual fighting, it had to raise a mass army
South Africa, which had become self-governing through conscription, train it, and transport it to
dominions within the British Empire, all con- France. This new and powerful force was not
tributing troops. India, which did not enjoy ready for action until the summer of 1918. In the
dominion status, also provided soldiers. In addi- months that followed Russia’s departure from the
tion, both Britain and France utilized colonial war, Germany attempted to defeat the British
contingents from their possessions in Africa. Not and French before America became a factor. The
surprisingly, these contributions kindled expecta- Germans unleashed a series of offensives between
tions among the peoples of both empires that they March and July 1918, but the Allies managed to
would gain concessions from London and Paris hold out, and during the last offensive, fresh
after the war. American divisions began to make a major contri-
bution. After stopping the final German drive, the
Allies took over the offensive and applied unre-
The U.S. Role
lenting pressure. On August 8, “the black day of
Meanwhile, the United States had entered the war the German army,” the whole enemy front began
on the side of the Allies in April 1917. Many to fall back. German military leaders realized that
Americans had been sympathetic to the Allied they had lost the war.
cause from the start of the war. They had much
more in common with democratic Britain and An End to the Nightmare
France than with the more authoritarian regimes
of the Central Powers. They also were appalled by Soon afterward, dramatic events unfolded far
the German shooting of Belgian hostages in to the southeast. An Allied army had been
reprisal for civilian attacks on soldiers, the encamped in northern Greece since 1915, when
shelling of the beautiful Gothic cathedral at it had arrived too late to prevent neighboring
Reims, France, and the sinking of the British Serbia from being overrun by the Central Powers.
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Bischoff (F.) Das alte Recht der Armenier in Polen, Oesterr. Blättern f.
Literatur, Nos. 28, 33, 37, 39, Vienna, 1857.

Das alte Recht der Armenier in Lemberg, Sitzungsb. Akad. Wiss., phil.-hist.
Classe, xl. pp. 255–302, Vienna, 1862.

Brosset (M. F.) Détails sur le droit public arménien, extraits du code
géorgien du roi Wakhtang, Jour. Asiat. sér. 2, ix. pp. 21–30, Paris, 1832.

Kohler (J.) Das Recht der Armenier, Zeits. f. vergleichende

Rechtswissenschaften, vii. pp. 385–436, Stuttgart, 1888.

Brosset (M. F.) Monographie des monnaies arméniennes, Bull. Scient.

Acad. Sc. vi. pp. 33–64, St. Pet. 1837.

Langlois (V.) Numismatique de l’Arménie dans l’antiquité, Paris, 1859, 4o.

Sibilian (C.) Numismatique arménienne, Rev. de l’Orient, sér. 3, xii. pp.

193–205, Paris, 1860.

Thomas (E.) Early Armenian coins, in Collection of Miscellaneous Essays

on Oriental Subjects, p. 62, Lond. 1868.

Anon. The Hidden Church on Russian soil. II. The Douthobortsi, by a

Russian, Theosophical Rev. xxv. pp. 201–13, Lond. 1899.

Tchertkoff (V.) and Tolstoy (L.) Christian Martyrdom in Russia (The

Dukhobortsy), Lond. 1897.

See also Vereschaguine (B.) under Travel in the Nineteenth Century.

Anon. Die deutschen Kolonisten in Transkaukasien (statistics of German
colonies), Russische Rev. xv. pp. 108–13, St. Pet. 1886.

Bent (J. T.) Notes on the Armenians in Asia Minor, Jour. Manch. Geog.
Soc. pp. 220–22, Manchester, 1890–96.

Goehlert (V.) Die Armenier in Europa und insbesondere in Oesterreich-

Ungarn, Das Ausland, lix. 489–91, Stuttgart, 1886.

Stark (H. H.) Armenians in India, Calcutta Rev., Calcutta, 1894.

Le Brun (C. de) Voyages ... en Perse, etc. (Armenians of Julfa, portrait of
Armenian woman, vol. i. pp. 232 seq.), Amsterdam, 1718, 2 vols. fol.

Nicolay (—) Schiffart in die Türckey ... (short account of Armenia, picture
of an Armenian merchant), Nuremberg, 1572.

Papazean (—) National antiquities of Armenia. Collection of photographs,

chiefly of monasteries, descriptive text in Armenian. (In Oriental Reading
Room, Brit. Mus.). Vagharshapat (Edgmiatsin), 1889–92, obl. fol.

Racinet (M. A.) Le Costume Historique, vol. iii. (pictures of Armenians

and Kurds), Paris, 1888.

III. ARMENIAN LITERATURE

Brosset (M. F.) Collection d’historiens Arméniens, St. Pet. 1874–76, 2 vols.
8o.

Dulaurier (E.) Recherches sur la chronologie arménienne, Paris, 1859, 4o.

Recueil des historiens des Croisades, Documents arméniens, Paris, 1869,
fol.

Gelzer (H.) Article “Armenien” in Real-Ency. f. protestantische Theologie,

Leipz. 1897. See also Krumbacher, Geschichte der byzantinischen
Litteratur, zweite Auflage, Munich, 1898, being vol. ix. of I. von Müller’s
Handbuch d. klass. Altertums-Wissenchaft.

Langlois (V.) Collection des historiens anciens et modernes de l’Arménie,

Paris, 1867–69, 2 vols. large 8o.

Neumann (C. F.) Versuch einer Geschichte der armenischen Litteratur,

Leipz. 1836, 8o.

Nève (F.) L’Arménie Chrétienne, Louvain, 1886, 8o.

Patkanean (K.) Catalogue de la littérature arménienne depuis le

commencement du ive siècle jusque vers le milieu du xviie, Bull. Acad. Sc.
ii. pp. 49–91, St. Pet. 1860.

In Russian. Bibliographical Sketch of the historical literature of Armenia

(from Trans. of Intern. Congress of Orientalists, St. Pet. 1876, pp. 455–
511), St. Pet. 1880, 8o.

Sukias Somal (P.) Quadro della storia letteraria di Armenia, Venice, 1829,
8o.

Brosset (M. F.) Variétés Arméniennes (secret ciphers and Arab figures),
Bull. Acad. Sc. vii. pp. 90–99, St. Pet. 1864.

Revue de la littérature historique de l’Arménie, Bull. Acad. Sc. xxii. pp.

303–12, St. Pet. 1877.

Dashian (J.) Katalog der armenischen Handschriften in der k. k. Hof-

Bibliothek zu Wien (deutsch-armenisch), Vienna, 1891.
Katalog der armenischen Handschriften in der Mechitharisten Bibliothek zu
Wien (deutsch-armenisch), Vienna, 1895.

Dulaurier (E.) Littérature arménienne, Rev. de l’Orient, sér. 3, iii. pp. 95–
106, Paris, 1856.

Kalemkiar (G.) Katalog der armenischen Handschriften in der k. Hof- und

Staatsbibliothek zu München (deutsch-armenisch), Vienna, 1892.

Korganof (—) Lettre de M. Korganof, procureur du Synode Arméno-

Grégorien à l’Académie (catalogue of library at Edgmiatsin, notice of
Brosset’s articles, etc.), Bull. hist.-phil. Acad. Sc. i. pp. 59–64, St. Pet. 1844.

Langlois (V.) Mémoire sur les origines de la culture des lettres en Arménie,
Rev. de l’Orient, sér. 3, xiv. pp. 200–23, Paris, 1861.

Mourier (—) La bibliothèque d’Etchmiadzine et les MSS. arméniens

(Armenian miniature painting, trans. from Russ. of Uvarov in Trans. of
Archæological Congress at Tiflis, published at Moscow, 1882), Tiflis, 1885.

Schrumpf (G. A.) On the progress of Armenian studies, Trans. Oriental

Congress, 1892, i. pp. 540–53. Lond. 1893.

Strzygowski (J.) Das Etschmiadzin-Evangeliar, Beiträge sur Geschichte

der armenischen, ravennatischen und syro-ägyptischen Kunst, Vienna,
1891.

Tcheraz (M.) Les études Arméniennes en Europe, L’Arménie, Jan. 15, seq.,
Lond. 1890.

Armenian Writers Translated

Agathangelos. Fifth century. History of King Tiridates and the conversion

of Armenia to Christianity by St. Gregory the Illuminator, Constantinople,
1709; Venice, 1862. New edition of Greek text by De Lagarde (P.),
Göttingen, 1887.

Translations:

Ital.—Tommaseo (N.) Storia di Agathangelo, Venice, 1843, 8o.

French, with Greek text, in Langlois’ Collection. See supra.

Gutschmid (A. von) Agathangelos, Kleine Schriften iii., Leipz. 1892, 8o.

Anania of Shirak (astronomer and mathematician) 7th century. Calendar,

Venice, 1821; St. Pet. 1877.

Brosset (M. F.) Extrait d’un manuscrit Arménien relatif au calendrier

Géorgien, Jour. Asiat. x. sér. 2, pp. 526–32, Paris, 1832.

Anonymous. 5th century. Life of St. Nerses the Great and genealogy of the
family of St. Gregory the Illuminator, Venice, 1853.

Translation:

French.—In Langlois’ Collection.

Arakel of Tauris. 17th century. History, 1602–61, Amsterdam, 1669.

Translation:

French—In Brosset’s Collection. See supra.

Brosset. Des historiens Arméniens des xviie et xviiie siècles, Mém. Acad.
Sc. xix. sér. 7, pp. 1–60, St. Pet. 1873.

Aristakes of Lastivert. 11th century. History of the invasion of the Seljuk

Turks, Venice, 1845.

Translation:
 French—Prudhomme (E.) Rev. de l’Orient, sér. 3, xv. pp. 343–70; xvi. pp. 41–59,
158–84, 268–86, 289–318; xvii. pp. 5–33, Paris, 1863–64.

Asoghigh (Stephanos) of Taron. 11th century. Universal History, from the

Creation to A.D. 1004, Paris, 1854; St. Pet. 1885.

Translation:

French—(Books I. and II.) Dulaurier (E.), Paris, 1883, 8o.

Chamchean (Michael) 18th century. History of Armenia from B.C. 2247 to

A.D. 1780, Venice, 1784–86, 3 vols. 4o.

Translation:

English (abridged)—Avdall (J.), Calcutta, 1827, 2 vols. 8o.

David Anyaght (the Philosopher) 5th century. Theological and

philosophical treatises and translations.

Neumann (C. F.) Mémoire sur la vie et les ouvrages de David, philosophe
Arménien du ve siècle, Jour. Asiat. iii. sér. 2, pp. 49–86; 97–153, Paris,
1829.

Eghishe or Elisœus. 5th century. History of Vardan and of the wars of the
Armenians, Constantinople, 1764.

Translations:

English—Neumann (C. F.), Lond. 1830, 4o.

Italian—Cappelletti (C.), Venice, 1840, 8o.

French—Karabaghy (G.) Soulèvement national de l’Arménie chrétienne au ve

siècle contre la loi de Zoroastre, Paris, 1844, 8o, and in Langlois’ Collection.
Nève (F.) L’Arménie chrétienne, pp. 299–316. See supra.

Eznik Koghbetzi (of Kolb or Kulpi) 5th century. Refutation of various

sects, Smyrna, 1761; Venice, 1826.

Translations:

French—Le Vaillant de Florival (P. E.), Paris, 1853, 8o, and in Langlois’
Collection (Book II.).

German—(Book IV.) Neumann (C. F.) Zeits. f. d. hist. Theologie, i. pp. 71–78.
Leipz. 1834.

Dulaurier (E.) Cosmogonie des Perses d’après Eznig, auteur arménien du

ve siècle, Rev. de l’Orient, sér. 3, v. pp. 253–62, Paris, 1857.

Wickering (A. de) Eznik de Gog’ph et son traducteur français, Rev. de

l’Orient, sér. 3, iii. pp. 207–16, Paris, 1856.

Faustus of Byzantium. 4th and 5th centuries. History of Armenia, A.D.

317–85, Constantinople, 1730.

Translations:

French—In Langlois’ Collection.

German—Lauer (M.), Cologne, 1879.

Latin—Fragments in Procopius, De Bello Persico.

Menevischean (P. G.) Faustus von Byzanz und Dr. Lauer’s deutsche
Uebersetzung, Zeits. f. d. Kunde des Morgenlandes, iii. pp. 51–68, Vienna,
1889.

See Gelzer (H.) Die Anfänge der armen. Kirche, Berichte der k. sächs.
Gesell. Wiss. pp. 109–74, Leipz. 1895.
Ghevond or Levond. 8th century. History of the Invasion of Armenia by
the Arabs, Paris, 1856.

Translation:

French—Chahnazarian, Paris, 1856, 8o.

Gregory the Illuminator. 3rd century. Discourses attributed to, Venice,

1838; Vagharshapat, 1896.

Translation:

German—Schmid (J. M.), Regensburg, 1872, 8o.

Gregory Magistros. 11th century. Poems, Venice, 1868. Letters, not

published.

Langlois (V.) Mémoire sur la vie et les écrits du prince Grégoire Magistros,
Jour. Asiat. xiii. sér. 6, pp. 4–64, Paris, 1869.

Gregory of Narek. 10th century. Prayers, Venice, 1784.

Homilies and Odes, Venice, 1827.

Collected works, Venice, 1840.

Nève (F.) L’Arménie chrétienne, pp. 256–68.

Hethum II. (King of Cilicia) 14th century. Poem on the history of Armenia,
published with the Armenian Bibles of Amsterdam, 1666, Constantinople,
1705; Venice, 1733.

Translation:

French—In Dulaurier’s Recueil. See supra.

Langlois (V.) Extrait du poème du roi Héthoum II., Bull. Acad. Sc. iv. p.
289, St. Pet. 1862.

Indgidgean (L.) 19th century. Ancient Armenia, Venice, 1835, 4o.

Translation:

Italian—Cappelletti (G.), Turin, 1841, 3 vols. Geographical description of ancient

Armenia, Venice, 1822, 4o.

Brosset. Description de l’ancienne Géorgie turke, comprenant le pachalik

d’Akhaltzikhé et le Gouria, Jour. Asiat. xiii. sér. 2, pp. 459–87, Paris, 1834.

John Katholikos. 10th century. History of Armenia from the origin of the
world to A.D. 925, Jerusalem, 1843.

Translation:

French—Saint Martin (J.), Paris, 1841, 8o.

Boré (E.) De l’action du Christianisme sur la société arménienne, Jour.

Asiat. i. sér. 3, pp. 209–38, Paris, 1836.

Nève. L’Arménie chrétienne, pp. 317–40.

Kirakos of Gandzak. 13th century. History of Armenia, A.D. 300–1265,

Moscow, 1858; Venice, 1865.

Translations:

French—Brosset, Deux historiens Arméniens, St. Pet. 1870–71, 2 vols. 4o;

Dulaurier (extracts) in Recueil, and in Jour. Asiat. xi. sér. 5, Paris, 1858.

See Brosset, Additions à l’histoire de la Géorgie, Hist. ancienne, pp. 412–

37, St. Pet. 1851.
Koriun. 5th century. Life of St. Mesrop, Venice, 1833.

Translations:

German—Welte, Tubingen, 1841.

French—In Langlois’ Collection.

Lazar of Pharpi. 5th century. History of Armenia, A.D. 388–485, Venice,

1783.

Translation:

French—In Langlois’ Collection.

Karabaghy (G.) Abrégé de la vie ... du Prince Vahan le Mamigonien,

Paris, 1843, 8o.

Maghakia Abegha. 13th century (?). History of the nation of archers

(Invasion of the Mongols to A.D. 1272), St. Pet. 1870.

Translation:

French—Brosset, Additions a l’histoire de la Géorgie, Hist. ancienne, pp. 438–67,

St. Pet. 1851, 4o.

Mattheos of Edessa. 12th century. Chronicle from A.D. 952–1136,

continued by Gregory the Priest to 1162, Jerusalem, 1869.

Translation:

French—Dulaurier, Paris. 1858, 8o.

Chahan de Cirbied. Notice de deux manuscrits arméniens contenant

l’histoire de Matthieu Eretz, Paris, 1812, 4o.

Dulaurier. Recueil, pp. 1–201.

Nève. L’Arménie chretienne, pp. 341–70.

Mkhithar of Ayrivank. 13th century. Chronological history to A.D. 1289,

Moscow, 1860.

Translation:

French—Brosset, Mém. Acad. Sc. xiii. sér. 7, pp. 1–110, St. Pet. 1869.

Brosset. Etudes sur l’historien Arménien Mkhitar d’Aïravank, Bull. Acad.

Sc. viii. pp. 391–416, St. Pet. 1865.

Moses of Khorene. Date uncertain. History of Armenia, Amsterdam, 1695;

Venice. 1843.

Translations:

Latin (with Armenian text)—Whiston (G. and G.), Lond. 1736, 4o.

Italian—Cappelletti (G.), Venice, 1841, 8o. Tommaseo (N.), Venice, 1849–50, 8o.

German—Lauer (M.), Regensburg, 1869.

French (with Armenian text)—Le Vaillant de Florival (P. E.), Paris, 1841, 2 vols.
8o; and in Langlois’ Collection, vol. ii. See also, for his sources, ibid. vol. i.
translations of Mar Apas Catina, Bardesanes, The Pseudo-Bardesanes, Lerubna of
Edessa, The Pseudo-Agathangelos, and list of lost fragments of Greek historians
preserved in the writings of Armenian authors.

Baumgartner (A.) Dr. M. Lauer und das zweite Buch des Moses
Chorenazi, Leipz. 1885.

Burckhardt (—) Review of Carrière’s Légende d’Abgar (sources of Moses

of Khorene), Byzantinische Zeitschrift, pp. 426–435, Leipz. 1807.

Carrière (A.) Moïse de Khoren et les généalogies patriarcales, Paris, 1801,

8o. Nouvelles sources de Moïse de Khoren, Vienna, 1893, 8o, and
Supplément, 1894. La légende d’Abgar dans l’histoire d’Arménie de Moïse
de Khoren, Paris, 1895, 8o.

Gildemeister (J.) Pseudokallisthenes bei Moses von Khoren, Zeits. deuts.

Morg. Gesell. xl. pp. 88–91, Leipz. 1886.

Gutschmid (A. von) Moses von Khoren, Klein-Schriften, iii. pp. 332–38,
Leipz. 1892, and in English in Encyclopædia Britannica, Lond. 1883. Ueber
die Glaubwürdigkeit der armenischen Geschichte des Moses von Khoren,
Kleine Schriften, iii. pp. 282–331, Leipz. 1892.

Khalathianz (G.) Zur Erklärung der armenischen Geschichte des Moses

von Chorene, Zeits. f. d. Kunde des Morgenlandes, vii. pp. 21–28, Vienna,
1893.

Langlois (V.) Étude sur les sources de l’histoire d’Arménie de Moïse de

Khorene, Bull. Acad. Sc. iii. pp. 531–83, St. Pet. 1861.

Petermann (—) Die schriftlichen Quellen des Moses Chorenensis, Berichte

Verhand. Akad. Wiss. pp. 87–104, Berlin, 1852.

Saint Martin (J.) Notice sur la vie et les écrits de Moïse de Khoren, Jour.
Asiat. ii. sér. 1, pp. 322–44, Paris, 1823.

Vetter (P.) Das Sibyllen-Zitat bei Moses von Choren, Theol. Quartalschrift,
pp. 465–74, Tubingen, 1892. Das Buch des Mar Abas von Nisibis (sources
of Moses of Khorene), Stuttgart, 1893.

Geography, Marseilles, 1683; Lond. 1736, 4o, with Latin trans.; Paris,
1819, 8o, with French trans.; Venice, 1881, 8o, with French trans.

Translations:

Latin—Whiston (G. and G.), Lond. 1736, 4o.

 French—Saint Martin (J.) in Mémoires sur l’Arménie, vol. ii., Paris, 1819, 8o;
Soukrean (A.), Venice, 1881, 8o.

Treatise on Rhetoric, Venice, 1796, 1843.

Baumgartner (A.) Ueber das Buch “Die Chrie,” Zeits. deuts. Morg. Gesell.
xl. pp. 457–515, Leipz. 1886.

Nerses Clayetzi (of Romkla) or Snorhali (the Gracious), Katholikos.

1066–1173. Elegy on the fall of Edessa, Madras, 1810; Calcutta, 1832;
Paris, 1828.

Poems, Venice, 1830.

Pastoral letter with Latin translation, Venice, 1830.

Synodal Address and Letters, Venice, 1848.

Prayer (translated into thirty-six languages), Venice, 1810, 1862, 1882.

Translations:

Latin—Cappelletti (J.) Opera omnia, Venice, 1833.

French—(Synodal address) Dulaurier (E.) Histoire, rites, dogmes et liturgie de

l’Église arménienne; (Elegy on the fall of Edessa) extracts in Dulaurier’s Recueil,
pp. 223–268, Paris, 1855.

Avdall (J.) Memoir of life and writings of St. Nierses Clajensis, surnamed
the Graceful, Pontiff of Armenia, Jour. Asiat. Soc. Bengal, v. pp. 129–57,
Calcutta, 1836.

Monike (D. G. v.) Nierses Klaietsi ... und dessen Gebete, Zeits. f. hist.
Theol. i. pt. ii. pp. 67–104, Leipz. 1832.
Nève (F.) Le patriarche Nerses IV. dit Schnorhali, L’Arménie chrétienne,
pp. 269–86.

Nerses of Lambron. 12th century. Synodal Address to Council of Romkla,

Venice, 1787.

Treatise on the institutions of the Church, Venice, 1847.

Letters, etc. (with letters of Gregory Tegha) (Katholikos, 1173–80), Venice,

1838.

Translations:

Italian—(Synodal Address) Aucherian (P.) (with Armenian text), Venice, 1812.

German—(Synodal Address) Neumann (C. F.), Leipz. 1834.

French—In Dulaurier’s Recueil: Reflections sur les institutions de l’Église

(extraits); Lettre adressée au roi Léon II.

Orbelean Stephanos. 13th century. History of Siunia, Paris, 1859;

Moscow, 1861.

Translations:

French—Brosset, St. Pet. 1864–66, 2 vols. 4o.

Brosset. Projet d’une collection d’historiens arméniens inédits, Bull. scient.

Acad. Sc. viii. pp. 177–89 and ix. pp. 253–68, St. Pet. 1841–42.

Traduction de l’histoire d’Etienne Orbélian, Bull. Acad. Sc. vi. pp. 500–1,
St. Pet. 1863.

Histoire des princes Orbélians, ibid. viii. p. 177, 1865.

See also Saint Martin, Mém. sur l’Arménie, Paris. 1819, vol. ii. pp. 1–300,
for French trans. of a work attributed to Stephanos Orbelean, published in
Madras, 1775, about which see Sukias Somal, Quadro della storia letteraria
di Armenia, pp. 119–20, Venice, 1829, 8o.

Samuel of Ani. 12th century. History to A.D. 1179 (continued by unknown

author to A.D. 1337), Vagharshapat, 1893.

Translations:

Latin—Zohrab, Milan, 1818; and in Migne’s Patrologiæ cursus completus, ser.

Græca, xix. pp. 599–742, Paris, 1844–64.

French—In Brosset’s Collection.

Brosset. Samuel d’Ani, revue générale de sa chronologie, Bull. Acad. Sc.

xviii. pp. 402–42, St. Pet. 1873.

Dulaurier. Recueil, pp. 445–68; and see his Recherches sur la chronologie
arménienne.

Sebeos. 7th century. History of Heraklius, Constantinople, 1851; St. Pet.

1879.

Translations:

Russian—Patkanean (K.), St. Pet. 1862.

German—(part) Hübschmann (H.) Zur Geschichte Armeniens und der ersten

Kriege der Araber, Leipz. 1875, 8o.

Prudhomme (E.) Essai d’une histoire de la dynastie des Sassanides, etc.,

Jour. Asiat. sér. 6, vii. pp. 101–238, Paris, 1866.

Sembat (the Constable) 13th century. Chronicle, Moscow, 1856; Paris,

1859.

Translation:
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