Unlawful Assembly: Legal Definitions and Implications
Unlawful Assembly: Legal Definitions and Implications
Is1
(c) The Legislature, or 41
(d) Any publ ic serv ant in the exer cise of
1
t the exec ution of law or legal proce sawf ul Power.
2. To resis
s.
3. To commit mischief, criminal trespass, or any th
o er offence
4. By criminal force.
ty •
(a) to take or obtain possession of any proper or
• al • 'h
(b) to depn ve any pers on of any incorpore
. ng t, or
(c) to enforce any right or supposed right
S. By criminal force to compel any person
do, or
(a) to do wha t he is not legally bound to
(b) to omit wha t he is legally entitled to do.
wful assembly th
Five or more pers ons. -To constitute an unla ere Ill
• fi e persons. They must share Ust
be more than four persons 1.e. ve or mo~
five are prosecuted for ri tin the
common object of others. Where mor e than
some of them are acquitted and thos e who are convicted are less ~ g ~t
1 an fo,,e
in number, the conviction is illegal.
assembly is the cozruno
Common object. - The essence of an unlaw:611
obJ~ct mus t be common to n
object of the persons forming assembly. The
that 1s they should all be aw all
1
I S 141
private defence. 1 . .
In Rambabu, 2 a licence was obtamed for takmg out a proces .
procession violated the conditions of licence by not observing th:•on hut th
route and by crossing the limit u~to whi~ the procession was pe pr~sctibeJ
proceed. The police and the Magistrate d1rected them not to do l'Jl\ittect to
group of processionists made a determined bid to break through ~o hut ~
cordon. It was held that the group constituted an unlawful assembI e Police
In R~ Abdul Sa~tar, 3 a proc_ession was moving on the pennitt~d
accomparued by music and was mterrupted and attacked by brickbats route
and empty bottles collected inside a mosque. All those persons indul ~ton~s
this activity were held to be members of unlawful assembly as their c~g ll\
object was to deprive the processionists of their right of way to which1on
were legally entitled. ey
Clause 5. - In order to bring a case under this section it would not b
enough to prove show of criminal force or use of criminal force to take
possession of property, unless the use of force was accompanied by so e
criminal intent. For instance, if A sees B committing theft, A is entitled ~e
arrest B under section 43 of the Cr PC, 1973. If some other persons interve 0
to secure release of the thief from A th~ir act falls within the ambit of cla:
5 of this section and they will be gmlty of the offence under section 1
Indian Penal Code. 47
Explanation.-In Moti Das v. State of Bihar,4 case the Supreme Court
noted with approval that an assembly which was lawful in its inception may
tum out into an ~awful assembly by the subsequent acts of its members
and without previous concert among its members provided others forming .
the assembly have also acquiesced in such unlawful acts. illegal acts of one
or more members, not acquiesced in by others, do not make the assembly
unlawful.
Where some persons associate themselves with the mob with innocent
motives, but they take part in the proceedings even when the assembly has
become unlawful, they will be liable as being members of an unlawful
assembly. 5 Certain persons assembled to prevent a procession by force from
passing over a certain street. They neglected the orders of police when asked
to disperse. Therefore, they were held guilty of being members of an unlawful
assembly.
Cases.-In Banwari v. State of Rajasthan,6 the accused six in number came
armed with deadly weapons and surrounded Shiv Prasad and Man Singh.
One of them shouted to exterminate the enemy while others were beating
them. It was held that none of the six accused persons who happened to be
present at the place of the occurrence and participated in assault could be
said to be there for innocent purpose. The nature of the weapon which they
were holding from the very beginning and the fact that all of them had come
together from a pretty long distance at a place which was neither in front of
their house nor in front of their land, as also the fact that all of them emerged
1. Raju, AIR 1961 Mys. 74.
2. (1945) 25 Pat. 125.
3. AIR 1961 Mys. 57.
4. AIR 1954 SC 657.
5. Periapien, (1883) 1 Weir 66.
6. (1979) Cr LJ 161 (Raj).
OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
~
~I
s d participated in the assault and went
rif11e ~ •uries suggested that all those accused away _together after causing
8 1 sti tuted thems~l_ves into
8
~f11erotJ5;:; assembly. The common object of th~on
n tJ!tlaw 5 obviously to commit criminal offenee, namel
persons compnsmg that
d
an
a~f11
blY wa
Supreme Cour t ~ Shivjee Singh v. State o . y, :nur er.
d if Bihar, . held that an
fhe hich is lawful at its commencement c
85
7
sef11~1Y at spot eo instanti (i.e. at that inst: t) evelo
p durin g the
b~come unlawful as
course
of jrlCl;t'in explanation appended to Section 141 IP~o 1
t Is not necessary to
provid assembly unlawful when it comes into' . t.
at the outset. The
re!lder ~0 rIIling an unlawful intent is not materi ets; :ce
tiJlle of encement or even for some time ~ erea • ft ass~m bly, which, at
er, IS lawful, may
jts co]llfllti become unlawful.
sobs equ~case, a quarrel started between two e on the Holi festival
In March 9, 1993. The appellant called his i;:o ns
s~n~ wh? came armed
d~Y on and sticks and st~rted throwing stones and
with fgunthe roof and opened fire causing grievous inJ·un· ntOckthrpieces from the
and
P O hot d ea • e Injured were carriedes to h ee. persons
d Th • •
to Megh nath was s Odital on tractor
one mained under treabnent for about a week. Th.e accuse persons were
and re f erpetrating the crime b nced
convicted . or §02 read with Sec. 147 ofYIPccommon intention and sente
tlilder Section •
boev er be.
member of unlawful assem bly.-Wbl
141 Being
der any assem bly an unlaw ful asse . ' mg aware of facts
whichb{;nor continues in it, is said to be a m:i ~~ :~o .:;! f joins that
COM MENT . a assembly.
asselll '
ins in an unlawful
This section makes it clear that if a person rema
unlawful, he shall be
assembly after he became aware that the assembly was
shall be liable as such.
deemed to be a mem~er of~ unlawful assembly and
lly join knowing
In order to attrb;ct. ~ sec!~ n one s~ould either intentiona
that the assem y is aw or continue to be a member after being aware
at its inception has
of the fact that an assembly though ~ot ~a~ ful
means physical presence
subsequently turned out to be so. Here continues
bly.
with the knowledge of unlawful character of the assem
~ unlawful assembly, shall
143. Puni~hln';nt.---;Whoever is a. member o!ption
descn for a term which may
be punished with 1mpnsonment of either
extend to six months, or with fine or with both.
weapon.-Whoever
144. Joining unla wful assembly arme d with deadly which, used as ~
ing
being armed with any deadly weapon, or with anyth a member of an unlawful
weapon of offence, is likely to caus e death, is either description for a
impr isonm ent of
assembly, shall be punished with
or with both.
term which may extend to two years, or with fine,
COMMENT
of the offence under
The offence unde r this section is an aggravated form
section because the
section 143. Greater puni shme nt is prescribed under this
of using force evinced
risk to public tranquillity is aggravated by the intention
thing which, if used
by carrying arms. Where the accused is armed with any
shall be liable under this
as a weapon of offence, is likely h~ cause death, he
section.
ful as \ s. 14s
145. Joining ontinuinl in
n de or c W h oe .unla: conti sembly, knnwing it
comma d to disperse.- ver jo1 8 0 nu has
knowin g ch un ~., asse111 1l been ceosminman unl~wful & be
th
rescribed bat su law bly
dispeuruse, sh all be phuans is
. hed wit anded m th Ssetn,b~;
P y law
descn•ption for a teto which may d to
h im prisonmen e 11lllJUi 1
rm exten two years, o t of eith~t
both. r W I.t h fin
e, or "'1~th?
COMMENT
This section • • t..:... .
promu auns at purosiwlg the disobedienc
lgated by a ublic serva The ord e
P nt. er must rel otf ato ny lawful
unlawful asse
mbly. a e d1'sp · order
. ersmg an
1n the case S ta te o f .
• d tO disof Jagmohan vts Oris
cuss the arre . f some of sa, a public meeting
1
on m or er s the railway w
on strike. In th • tw oof the . employees as going
e s p .
against the th m ~ g ~ e th
e ac
e akers mote th d
e ,: who were
appea G ovem c use p o uc
that thleed to e mh,:ce~o : p p o r t the strik d (one of the spea e to revolt
accusedpuhaud ers. The Hig kers) merel-y
Government no common h C o urt of Orissa h
an obje · ·t t
that meeting d the assembly as unlaw ct to mcr e . he poli · eld
do so, th~y c d id not dispe fu l, ?'erefo c e against
ould not be rse even after being c re if the persons atte the
held guilty o n
It may, howe
v er, of the offen mmanded by the po ding
be sta c e under Se lic
not succeed
in this case ted that though a cha ction 145. e to
definitely surv , but a charg rg e under Se
iv e c
members cou ed in view of the fact under Section 151, IP tion 145 could
ld be pr~sen
had. been la te~ under Se that the assembly w C could have
Section 129(1wfully given m the ction 188, IP as unlawfu
C a s th e l its
for the preovna fide exercise of p order for dis~rsal
) of Cr.P.C. b
146. Riotin ention of br o
each of pliece powers unde
assembly , or by agn,-yWhenever force ace.
~c ~ member
thereof in or vio le r
noting.
assembly, e
very memb
er of s~ch
ro nce. is ed. b
!sse8i!.~~:o us y an un
A • .n °!}!1-tye lawful
tha .n? t is. . is &'-LU [Link] object of
o f t h e off
s C O
t activity beinunply an unlawful aMssMeENT ·
ence of
mbl .
':,~f,!, i~'~ g accompanie
tethat disting
d by th
ty a Par. .
or disturbanc uished n:~ ticular state
violence 3 e o r r ~ f art. and to ~ i o : r ~ or violence.
of activity
p
e neighbours opular belief a ri:,i I t is o n l y
. . lng•redie tho ugh th a w f u~ ass e
~
n ts ,-The f 11 . m
noting : -
0 ow .• ere musm ay involve bly .2 The
ing are th t be no noise
(l) The ace • so me force
an unlawful used e ingredien or
p ers t~
(2) The aascsecm bly ons must be fi < )
used,· ve or i n e offe
o (3) The . 1
r force or m~~
Meany. memh tb
01encee animated b
and it h a ~ g er thereofv1in
persons ~nl ee of force or v i l prosemust be u
extends al y. n_ Used here in o enc cution of
Vio e,-Force is
so to folence is tha t s
l. 1977 not restrictense. It .
2. Per Pir lJ
rc e against inan d is res
3. R 0W 13 94 (Ori) u: to forc e
den J .
• • ate objects e
• v. Sharp, (195; l~~I, (1889
) P.R .N
E.R. 577.
o. 4.
OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY 351
f s. 149
t is by no me ans nec ess ary. The effect of Sec.
cons~ltation. But tha tion 149 ~a
ent on dif fer ent me mb ers of the same assembly•
be dif fer in d Y
, It wa s als o ma de cle ar that common object is determ ping .
. and e b kee
, arms carried by members,
Vlew the na tur e of assembly ect' is d.f; haviour ~
of incident. 'Common obj
members at or ne ar scene
1
com erent fro~
on int ent ion '. It do es no t require a pri or concert and a ting
'co mm
tio n 149 the emphasis is on commomon6?1ee
of mi nd s before atta ck. In Sec n ° Ject anct
no t on common intention.
lawful assembly cannot rende
Further, mere presence in un ect ;fa Person
un les s he wa s act uat ed by common object. If common obj la~fu.J
liable
no t pro ved , acc use d can no t be convicted. In order to c~n
assembly is assembI n~ict a
only membership of unlawful
pe rso n un de r Section 149 I.P.C. stoo? that ass~[Link] was unla:fu
~s not
per son sho uld hav e un der
enou~h, the view of Se ~d
the acts which fall within pur
wa s1 likely to commit any of ction
141. the conun
n ob jec t.- "In prosecution of
In prosecution of the commo n obj ect of ~n
do no t me an "du rin g the prosecution of the commo that the
object " of the common object" sho w
Th e wo rds "in pro sec uti on
assembly".
me dia tel y con nec ted with the common object of the
offence committe d wa s im act must ~
ass em bly , of wh ich the accused were members. The
unlaw ful n object
e bee n do ne wi th a vie w to accomplish the commo
suc h as hav The words "in
of th~ unlawful assembly.
attributed to the members ed as equivalent
uti on of the com mo n obj ect " have to be strictly constru
prosec 2
n object. "
to "in ord er to attain commo that the
this section it mu st be proved
In ord er to bring a case within sh the common object of the unlawful
accompli
act wa s do ne with a view to do ne in prosecution of the common obje
ct
act tho ug h no t one
assembly or the would be likely
the un law ful ass em bly wa s one which the accused 3knew tion is never
of the common object. This sec
mi tte d in pro sec uti on of nce
to be com an un lawful assembly for any offe
nis h a me mb er of
int en de d to pu any member for
mi tte d by any me mb er of it. What is required to punish st have
com
mi tte d by any oth er me mb er of the assembly is that it mu
offence com
d in pro sec utio n of the com mo n object of the assembly and that
been committe er of the assembly
per son sou gh t to be pu nis hed must have been a memb proved in
the ence. Accordingly, it must be
e of com mi ssi on of tha t off ul
at the tim
per son con cer ned wa s no t only a member of the unlawf
each case tha t the the assembly at all
em bly at som e sta ge, bu t shared the common object of ever, not
ass
l sta ges . 4
Th e sha rin g of common object would, how
the crucia object to engage
er present and sharing the
necessarily require the memb5 ble in a case
f in do ing an ov ert act . Th erefore, this section is inapplica ility in
himsel
tua l fig ht bet we en tw o par ties. Constructive criminal liab
of sud de n mu mon object. The
because of the lack of a com
suc h cases cannot be imposed together in such cases and the
individuals
du al act s can no t be gro up ed
ind ivi 6
their individual acts.
are to be held responsible for
a, (2008) 3 Cr LJ 3495 (SC).
1. State of Karnataka v. Chikkahottapp
2. fit Singh, (1959) Punj. 50.
3. [Link] uil, AIR 1957 SC 572.
a, 1976 Cr LJ 1987.
4. Musakhan v. State of Maharashtr 1976 Cr LJ 800.
,Si m P ndey v. State of Bihar,
5
r• Rajasthan, 1976 Cr LJ 674.
OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANOUILLllY
339
s 149 I .
me Court in State of Pun1ab v. Sanjiv Khan 1 laid down the
ll'e Supre
h n vicarious liab'l' •
created und er Section '149 and held as
,f'\-,
1 ity is
rinciple w e
follo~s ::rder to fa~ten vicarious liability on any member of unlawful
In
bly eth prosecu tion must prove that the act constituting th ff
.
asseOl in pro secution of common obJect of that assembly or th e o tence was
d one 1s.
done th members of that assembly knew to be likely to b e ac
as e ·tt d .
5uch . n of common ob'1ect of that assembly. Then evee commib e mf
ecutto d
proawful assembly ren ers mself 1ia
5 hi • bl ry mem er o
e under Section 149 for the crimina l
unlt/acts of any other member/s of that assembly provided . d •
b'
ac ce of common o 1ect or such that every member kn same 1s one m
turtheran
commit
.
ted.
,, ew to be like1y
to be d • s· S
It was observe m .zyaram. v., tate of M.P.,2 that common ob.1ect •
J:a t from a 'common intention . 1t does not requi·re a • 1s
au1eren . • pnor conce rt and
nunon meeting of minds before the attack.
a co It was held in Madan Singh v. State o' Bihar 3 that m • an
'J ,
unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there ere presence m
was a common
object and he shared the same or '":as actuated by that common object and
that ObJ'ect is one of those bset .out m Section 141 of Ip • .c. Where common
object of an .unlawful assem ly ? not proved, th~ accused persons cannot be
convicted with the help 0 ~ section .149• The crucral question to determine is
whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said
persons entertained one or m~re of the common objects as specified in Section
141 of I.P.C. It ~~ot be laid down a~ a general proposition of law that
unless the comnuss1on of an overt act 1s proved against a person, who is
alleged to be a member of unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a
member of an assembly. The only thing required is that he should have
understood that the assembly was unlawful and was likely to commit any of
the acts which fall ~ithin the. purview of Section 141. The word "object" means
the purpose or design and, m order to make it "common" it must be shared
by all. In other words, the object should be common to the persons, who
compose the assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware of it and
concur in it. A common object may be formed by express agreement after
mutual consultation, but that is by no means always necessary. It may be
formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly and the other
members may just join and adopt it, once formed it need not continue to be
the same. It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any stage. The
expression "in prosecution of the common objects" as appearing in Se~on 149
have to be strictly construed as equivalent to "in order to attain the common
object", it must be immediately connected with the common object by virtue
of the nature of the objects. There must be community of object and the object
may exist only upto a particular stage and no! thereafter. What th~ [Link]!1
object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular. sta?e ~f the mc1dent 1s
essentially a question of fact to be determined, keepmg m view ~e nature of
the assembly, arms carried by the members, ~d the behaviour of the
members at or near the scene _of the incident. It is not necessary un?er law
that in all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common ob1ect, the
1. (2007) 9 sec 791.
2. (2009) 2 Cr LJ 2071 (SC).
3. 2004 Cr LJ 2862 (SC).
340 INDIAN PENAL CODE
Is
whether the accused person were present and whether th • 149
common object. It is also an accepted principle that number e~dshared th
injuries is a relevant fact to deduce that the common object has d nature e
the time of incident. 1
Members knew to be likely. - The second part relates to
eveioPed ~!
where the members of the assembly knew that the offence is lika S°1luatt011
committed in prosecution of the common object. A thing is likely 1Y to be
only when it will probably . happen or. may very ~el~ happen.2 n:aPPen
t
'knew' indicates a state of mind at the time of comrruss1on of an off \Vord
not later. 3 Knowledge must be proved.4 The word "likely" means so:ce a?ld
evidence that the unlawful assembly had such a knowledge. 5 The prosee cl~ar
must prove that the accused not only knew that the offence was likel CUtion
committed but also that it was likely to be committed in prosecutior{ ~o be
0
common object of the assembly. 6 the
In K.C. Mathew,7 people gathered at dead of night armed with crack
choppers and sticks to rescue persons who were guarded by armed poll ers,
was held that they must have known that murder will be committed ~~ It
conviction for murder-cum-rioting was justified. a
8
It was_ held in Gangadh~r ~ehera v. S~ate _of Ori~sa, that the expression
'in prosecution of common obJect as appearing m section 149 has to be StrictI
cons~ed as equivalent t~ {in order to attain _the comn:1on o~ject'. It must ~
immediately connected with the common obJect by virtue of nature of th
object. There must be community of object and the object may exist only upt~
a particular stage and not thereafter.
It was further held that section 149, Indian Penal Code consists of two
parts. The first part of section means that the offence to be committed in
prosecution of the common object m~st be one which is committed with ·a
view to accomplish the common object. In order that the offence may fall
within the first part, the offence must be connected immediately with the
common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused was a member.
Even if I the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common
object of the assembly, it may yet fall under section 141 if it can be held that
the offence was such as members knew was likely to be committed.
It was also made clear that though no hard and fast rule can be laid
down under the circumstances from which the common object can be called
out, it may reasonably be collected from the nature of assembly, arms it
carries and behaviour at or before or after the scene of incident. The word
'knew' used in the second branch of the section implies something more than
a possibility and it cannot be made to bear the sense of 'might have been
known', positive knowledge is necessary.
1. Om Prakash v. State of Haryana, 2014 Cr LJ 2567 (SC); See also Lalji v. State of U.P.,
(1989) 1 SCC 437; Bhargavan and others v. State of Kera/a, (2004) 12 SCC 414; Debashis
Daw v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 9 SCC 111; Ramchandran v. State of Kera/a (2011}
9 sec 257. ,
[Link] Anjore, AIR 1975 SC 185.
3. Sindu Cope, AIR 1946 Pat. 84.
4. Hardeo Singh, AIR 1920 Pat. 795.
5. Maiyadin, 1973 Cr LJ 1203.
6. Mohammed, AIR 1946 Lah. 106.
7. AIR 1956 SC 241.
8. 2003 Cr LJ 41 (SC).
OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILL
ITY
343
1
5_149 all members not nece ssar y.-l n Ram
ert act by l 1 seventeen accused gathered at the Chandran and others
ovstate 01.r Kera a, ropriate resid
time knowm • g 1·t we11 th • • dence of accused
ctr- -v. waited for arp Immediately after seeing him at m1u re witness would
r,O· l, froJll temp ew··.....," Before inJ·ured witness coul accu sed No. 1 shouted
t,..1111 "chase d enter the house he was
~ ase h~~
iu • •
b accused No. 1 with swor~ stick. Accused
•
,
a
344 INDIAN PENAL CODE
I s. 149
may h appe n that Some of them are unid . enti fiab le or that their -d
1 entih,
d btfu l • In such cases even less than five pers ons may be convicted
•tOU
• d btfu l that ther e wer e at 1east fi ve pers . n - . B"twas
i''
1 1s ou ons no convictio \.( if
und er this Section. Onc e it is show n that. an o t·i:1ence h as been comn-. .tPoss·b
18
som e mem bers of an unla wfu l asse mbl y in
pros ecu
ti
. on
f h •• ,1 tect1h..le
then whe ther the prin cipa l offe nder has been o t e common ob· "Y
conv icted for that ,offe )ect
not, the othe r mem bers may be pun ishe d
prov ided they are founct t~c~ or
had the nece ssar y inte ntio n or kno wled ge.
Cas es.- in Bharwad Mepa v. State of Bombay,2 a,.,e
char ged with havi ng form ed unla wfu l asse twel ve nam ed perso ns
mbl y with the com mon obje;e~e
com mitt ing the mur der of thre e pers ons.
Out of twel ve only four wer!
conv icted by the Hig h Cou rt and ther efor
e an appe al was made to th
Sup rem e Cou rt, amo ng othe rs, on the. grou
cann ot be sust aine d und er this sect ion.
nd th~t conv ictio n ot
less than fi,.,:
In this case the Hig h Court has
reac hed to the conc lusio n that thou gh the
n~m b~r of pers ons composing the
asse mbl y was defi nite ly five or mor e the
iden tity of all of them was not
esta blish ed and ther efor e less than five pers
ons wer e conv icted . The Supreme
Cou rt held that conv ictio n of four.. only
circ ums tanc es was main tain able . How ever by the Hig h Cou rt in such
in Ramaswami v. State of Tamil
Nad u, 3 the six accu sed pers ons coul d not
be cons ider ed conf eder ates in the
com mon obje ct beca use thre e of them had
been acqu itted by trial court.
The abov e prin cipl e has been reite rate d
Dharampal v. State of U.P., 4 the Sup rem e by the Sup rem e Court in
Cou rt held that if the cour t holds
that the assa ilan ts wer e actu ally five in num
ber but ther e coul d be doubt as
to the iden tity of two of the alleg ed assa
ilan ts and ther efor e acqu its two of
them , the othe rs will not get the bene fit
of dou bt abo ut the iden tity of the
two accu sed so long as ther e a firm find
ing base d on goo d evid ence and
sou nd reas onin g that the part icip ants wer
e five or mor e in num ber.
In Kallu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 5 27 pers
ons wer e tried for assaulting
com plai nant . The y wer e carr ying vari ous
wea pon s with the com mon object
of caus ing inju ry. It was clea r from evid ence
that mor e than five pers ons took
part in the inci dent . But only four of them
wer e foun d guil ty and convicted.
It was held that conv ictio n of four only und
er Sect ion 149 IPC doe s not mean
that ther e was no unla wfu l asse mbl y. The
mer e fact that seve ral accu sed were
:1cquitted doe s not enab le the four who
are foun d guil ty to cont end that
,ecti on 149 IPC is inap plic able .
In Jadu Sahani v. State of Bihar, 6 prio r to the
occu rren ce ther e was no
-iction betw een the two part ies. The accu
sed pers ons cam e to the spo t duly
:me d thou gh not with a purp ose of caus ing
any inju ry to any bod y:bu t had,
: is usu al with villa gers , carr ied wea pon s
whi le out on a fish ing spot . They
ere obje cted to by com plai nan t part y resu
lting in exch ang e of hea ted wor ds.
was held that it cann ot be conc eive d that
the unla wfu l asse mbl y whic h
!W up spon tane ousl y had the
sole obje ct of caus ing mur ders but it can
ed inst antl y that the com mon obje ct of the be
asse mbl y was to caus e assa ult
. Dalip Singh, AIR 1954 SC 364.
. (1960) 2 SCR 172.
. 1976 Cr LJ 1563.
AIR 1975 SC 1917.
2006 Cr LJ 799 (SC).
1999 Cr LJ 593 (SC).
Of OFFENCES AGAIN
ST THE PUBLIC lR
ANQU\llllY
345
5 149 I ty. The degree an
cornplain~t P:grou d gravity of assa
nd . It th ult would have to
0 n the ed in thi 5 bda en transpires that th
ea sed was attributed e so le fatal injury on
pe gat1gl)dgar s·ingh ecinju ' to Laxm i
[Link]'l a11d the so1
ry on B•iku s·mgh d Y ad av by means of
an
e an s of ecease d was attr
0
arr ~ ; again by ~ e at an arro w . T he respective arro ib ut ed to Ja du
5ahc:u ~, ion of both the de ws were detected
ex an
t-tnortern d and un ceas ed. T refore it lo on
Jadu Sahan i• were • d"1 1•d he gically follows
:; t L ~ Yap~~-
each and they ha m v ua11Y guilty fo
d ~ghtly been co r offence un de r
section 302,}·h with nvicted for offenc
the ai~ of the se e of
fl'\urder thoff~nce un ction 149, l.~.C. Th
der section 302 an ey are in di vi du ~
gtrllty for -~ t touc d not read with se
ct
y
acc\lsed di_ no 0 /1 h deceased at all. Therefore they w ion 149. Remaimng
49, Indian Penal ere acquitted of ch
sectton 3 7
\lf\derln Bh
Code. arge
arosi v. State of M.P i b f
., a out our mon
h d taken place be
tw ths [Link] to the in
quarrel a in relatio ee n the dece cident some
n to raising of bo ased Baburam and the appellant N
4 D at :~ ec ea se d undary wall. On o.
accompanied. by R 12-4-1983 at abou
[Link]. some labour am het ha d ?one to V t 7
ers for cutting cr id ya ram (PW -8) to
engVa?de ram when op and while retu
of 1 ya ' the deceased cam rning from the ho
h uted to the rem • • e ne ar the chabutara of use
auung accused wh appellant No. 4
:e : ~nemy and he o were there that
sh the deceased was
No. 6 Ramjilal assa ould not be allowe~ to go an~ ki
ulted the deceased ll him. The appella
fell down on the gr with the lathi on nt
ound all _the appe his head. When
intervening, the ap lla he
pellants di d no t st nts ass~ulted him. In spite of Ram
deceased had died op assaulting. Whe het
the appellants dr n they found that
near Tiwaria of ap a~ged his body fr the
pellant No. 1 Bha om the spot to pl
(PW-10) brother of r~s1. ~e re af te r th ace
de ey ran
and l(alicharan (f W ceased lodged ~rst_ information repo away. Bachchulal
-13) were eye witn rt.
The trial court ac esses of the incide Vidyaram (PW-8)
quitted them bu t nt.
acquittal and held the High Court re
them guilty unde versed the order
The Supreme Cou r section 302/149, of
rt, in appeal, held In di an Penal Code.
that it is appellant that it is clear from
No. 6 who hit th the evidence
on that account th e deceased with
e deceased died. lathi on his head
The doctor has al an
that the cause of
death of the dece so categorically op d
is nothing in evid ased was due to ined
ence to indicate this head injury.
of incident on the th at the deceased was T here
date of occurrence to go to the plac
as per the prosecut at the given time. e
ion version ha d la The appellants ev
injuries other than this in their hands. en
the head injury Having regard to
and the parts of th
injuries were caused
, it could not be the body on which e
intention or know said that the appe the
ledge to kill the llants 1 to 5 ha d ei
of appellant no. deceased. Appella ther
1 and appellant nts 3 and 6 are th
Appellants 4 and no. 2 is the brot e sons
5 belong to a diff her of appellant
be held guilty fo erent family. The no. 1.
r an offence un appellants 1 to 5
individual acts an der Section 147 could
d no t for an offe having regard to
as there was no co nc e under Section 30 their
mmon object to at 2, Indian Penal C
appellant no. 6 R tr ode
amji Lal was he act Section 149, l~dian Penal ~ode.
Code. ld guilty under Se But
ction 302, Indian
In Bhimrao v. State Pe nal
of Maharashtra,2 the
appellant/accused
along with some
1. 2002 Cr LJ 43
22 (SC).
2. 2003 Cr LJ 1204 (SC).
346 INDIAN PENAL CODE
.
others formed an un1awfu1 assemb_ly Wlth a ~ommon . I S. l49
murder of Prabhakar Gawande. Wtth that ob1ect they ob1ec t of comm it.
went to his houstlng th~
members of the unlawful asse~~ly_ entered the
assaulted him causing grievous m1unes, consequenthouse ~f Prab hat Soll\e
to
six days Jater. Original common object ~f ac_rused. perso which he die ar ~d
ns was Only tad ~[Link]
Prabhakar but some of them afte~ ~nt~nng mto his
hous
common object to cause grievous tnJunes. Accused and e developed d~[Link]
standing outside the house and could not know whatsome others weteren_t
house. It was held that the act of those me~ bers transpired i . e Ol'\}y
assembly who entered the house cannot be attributed of original ~e the
to the memb awftt1
stood outside. Therefore, the aJ?pellan~ will be
sharing the original common obJect which was_ only liable to be puru :! "Who
They will be liable to be convicted unde r section to assau lt the deed for
352 read with s . ec\sed.
and not under section 326 read Wt"th secti•on 149• ection 1
In Racham Reddi Chenna Reddy v. State of Andh 49
ra Pradesh 1 b
months prior to the date of occurrence there was .
some dispute 'betw a out •
six
deceased and the accused relating to the passage to
the house of accus:~n the
1 to 3. The two deceased persons who were broth
ers of PW-1 natuNos.
supported PW-1. Again a week before occurrenc
e also there had b rally
altercation between the two factions on acco ~t of
some theft. On th:~ an
of occurrence PW-1 went to the house of his br?th
~r who is one of ate
deceased and both of them went _together to their
returning, the accused persons ten m num ber arme fi~ld. ~le they w~e
d with sickle, battle re
daggers and sticks, mercilessly assaulted the dece
ased. Accused No. ~es,
hacked the deceased with a sickle and then 1
others attacked with thr~t
weapons. PW-1 start ed runn ing away to save his
life. He was chased b::
could not be caught. The accused persons then bruta
lly assaulted the sec d
deceased who was returning with PW-3. It was held
that the manner in w~~
the accused persons appe ared at the scene of occu
rrence with lethal weapo
in their hand s and mercilessly assaulted the dece
ased after surrounding ~
clearly exhibits their common object to kill the dece
ased. Deceased No. 2 was
also killed almo st in identical situation and circumsta
nces. Therefore there was
no erro r in convicting the accused unde r section
302/149, Indian Penal Code.
In Rajendra Shantaram Todankar v. State of Maharashtra,2
one Mukesh Puran
and Asho k Gaur av were residing in two adjoining
localities of Bombay and
were ring lead ers of their respective gang s
invo lved in various illegal
activities. Five of the eigh t accused pers ons were
arme d severally with deadly
weap ons. They initially assa ulted the dece ased whe
n he was standing on the
grou nd floor of a mult istor ied build ing. Afte r assa
ultin g they chased him by
follo wing him on the stair case lead ing to four
th floor till the deceased fell
in a pool of bloo d. It was held that in this case
inference can be drawn that
accu sed pers ons were mem bers of unla wful
asse mbly formed with the
com mon object of fatally injur ing dece ased so as
to caus e his death. Therefore,
their conv ictio n unde r secti on 302 read with secti
on 149 of Indian Penal Code
is susta inab le. It was also obse rved that defin
ite and specific finding as to
whic h parti cula r accu sed caus ed fatal injur y need
not be recorded in such a
situa tion .
branches from the Padik and brought them to another IS. 149
open
house of one Sida Pondurang A-6 when asked PW-15 about .
branches of babul, _the latter replied that the trees _belonged r Site near th
to e:ova} of the
also questioned the right of A-6 to cut them. On the
follow· elll and. he
twentynine accused persons along with three others came
to the inf llloll\ine
branches were stacked, armed with deadly weapons such
as axe P ace wher~
bars and sticks and started removing them. On gettin
g that :ars , iron
PW-15, his brothers and associates reached there and
asked th 0 rtnanon
persons not to remove the branches. Immediately thereupon
A-1 ~accused.
axe blow on the head of Ganpati felling him down. When
the rescue of Ganpati A-2 inflicted an axe blow on his Vitho b cted an
head· whoa _went to
slumped down. All the accused persons th~n started
assaulting ~tanuy
Vithoba and other members of the complamant party
as a conse anpati,
whereof Ganpati and Vithoba breathed their last on the spot,
while Kast°ce
(PW-8), Sarja Rao (PW-12), Murlidhar (PW-14), Shesh
appa (PW-IS) ath
Jalinder (PW-17) sustained injuries.. During the incident
accused A-3 to and.
also received injuries. It was held that the evidence show
ed that the m :-7
of accused party was to remove babul branches from field O
at any cost ve
cause such injury as may be necessary for that purpose.
Some of the acCU:~
started assault immediately after reaching the spot. Othe
r persons cannot be
conclusively said to have known that murders were likely
to be committed
in prosecution of their common object so as to attrac
t the second part of
section 149. Such accused would be liable to be convi
cted unc1~r section
326/149 and not unde r section 302/149, I.P.C. But accus
ed who acted beyond
common object of unlawful assembly, however were liable
to be convicted
unde r section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code
.
In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., 1 the accused persons
were on inimical
terms with complainant party and they came on the place
of occurrence with
some deadly weapons and attacked the complainant
party in which three
persons were killed. It was held that generally no direc
t evidence is available
regarding the existence of common object which, in
each case, has to be
ascertained from the attending facts and circumstances.
When a concerted
attack is made on the victim by a large number of perso
ns armed with deadly
weapons, it is often difficult to determine the actual
part played by each
offender ·and easy to hold that such persons attacking
the victim had the
common object for an offence which was known to be likely
to be committed
in prosecution of such an object. It is true that mere innoc
ent person, in an
assembly of persons of being a by-stander does not
make such person a
member of an unlawful assembly but where the persons
forming the assembly
are shown to be having identical interest in pursuance of
which some of them
come armed others though not armed would, under the
normal circumstances,
be deemed to be the members of the unlawful assembly.
In the present call
the accused persons were held to share common object.
In Kattukulangara Mahadevan v. Majeed & Ors., 2 there was 1
,-·"'f.
political rivalary
between CPI(M) and RSS political parties. Twenty-one
accused persons along
with others belonging to CPI (M) had assembled at the
place of occurrence
and were searching for RSS workers travelling in buses
passing through there
1. 2002 Cr LJ 2024 (SC).
2. (2017)s sec 568.
Of OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRAN
QUILLITY
s 149 I 349
• . ct of unlawful assembly was to
cotrtJllon obJe passing through that attack RSS workers wh o were
place. Five accused persons attacke
BJP supporteulrshng in his death. The High Cou d the
ed res UJ.'
d rt held that merely because
deceas d'd not plan to mu r er a 'f
spe a ic person, there was no com
accused i mon
objectOn appeal, ~e Supreme Court
held this view of High Court erro
considenng that the accused had atta neous.
Bo~ever~imple injuries on non-vital cked the deceased with sticks
parts, they were liable to be con
cau;:rg5ection 326/149 and sentenced victed
to seven years imprisonment. The
un plained that mere presence of unlawf Apex
court cific
ex ove ·11 ul assembly without attribution
rt act may sti be enough to fasten · ·
~: ; Section 149, IPC. Common obje cnmmal liability vicariously
ct of unlawful assembly can be gat
from nature of _as~embly, arms _used by hered
them and the~_behaviour before and
at the time of madent. In the mstant case, mere participation
. the assembly was mc • ul t of the accused
pa ory.
m While considering the applica
bility of necessary ingredients of
149, IPC, the S~preme Court referred to th~ c~se of
Section
Bihar,1 wherein 1t was held that befo Kuld eep Yad av v. State of
~e convicting the accused with the
Section 149, the Court mu st have aid of
given a clear finding regarding nat
the common object, and that the said ure of
object was unlawful. The mere fact
the accused were armed wit h dea tha t
dly weapons would not be sufficie
prove common object unless there nt to
was an overt act on part of any of
In order to attract the provisions them.
of Section 149, every member of the
unlawful assembly must be shown
to have knowledge that an incrimi
act was done to acc?mflish the com nating
mon_ object of unlawful assembly or
knew about the likelihood of a they
particular offence being committed
furtherance of a common object. in
In the instant case, although the two
out of six accused were acquitted,
but the provision of Section 149 was
still attracted as they knew about
incriminating act being accomplished the
. •
The ratio of the case, therefore,
was that membership of unlawful
assembly falling below 5 due to acq
uittal of some, the remaining can still
convicted under Section 149 •if be
offence is proved to be commit
accomplish common object of the asse ted to
mbly which every member knew.
In Vinubhai Ranchodbhai Patel v. Raju
bhai Dudabhai Patel & Ors.,2 there
were 17 accused persons who had
allegedly murdered three persons
caused injuries to five others. There and
was omnibus accusation that all acc
committed offences falling und er Sec used
tions 143, 147 and 148 of IPC and
vicariously liable by virtue of Section were
149 for offence of murder under Sec
302, IPC. The Supreme Court stro tion
ngly depreciated the decision of the
Court for absence of clear finding trial
regarding existence o~ "w fu l asse
and number and identity of partici mbly
pants in the offence. -"Jt: .
The Supreme Court in Joseph v. Stat .
along with Shayam & Ors. v. State and e (Rep. by Inspecto : of Police),
3
~ecrded
Edwinson & Ors., reiterated requiremen
for invoking vicarious liability und er t
Section 149 and held that once the Cou
finds that ingredients of Section 149 rt
are fulfilled, every person who at
the
1. (2011) AIR sew 2404.
2. (2018) 7 sec 743.
3. (2018) 12 sec 283.
350 INDIAN PENAL CODE
I s. lSO
time of committing that offence will be a member of the unlawful
and held guilty of the offence. After that, it will not be open to the ~ selllhiy
see as to who actually committed the offence (act). However, before re 0 llrt_ to
conviction under Section 149 essential ingredients of Section 141 ; 0rding
established. Whether members' of unIawful assemblY reaIIY had common ·• ustb' he
1
to cause offence has to be decided in the light of facts and circumstan ° Ject
ces of
the case including :-
(i) nature of weapons used by such member;
(ii) manner and sequence of attack made by these members on Viefun.
(iii) circumstances under which occurrence took place. '
In the instant case, there was dispute between ~he two families With
regard to fishing at sea and appellant Joseph alo~g with others_ had ·heared
a bomb to kill the opponents. Held, common obJect under Section 149 was
not proved hence the appellant (accused) could not be convicted under Section
302, read with Section 149, IPC, instead, he was convicted under Section
302/109 of IPC.
Distinction between Section 34 and 149.-In Virendra Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, 1 the distinction between section 34 and 149 of Indian Penal
Code was made clear as follows :
When several persons numbering five or more do an act or intend to
do it both sections 34 and 149 I.P.C. may apply. Section 149 I.P.C. is of wider
import than section 34 I.P.C. and in case where section 149 applies a
constructive liability arises in respect of those persons who do not actually
commit the offence. The distinction between the two lies in-
(i) section 34 does not but itself create any specific offence whereas
section 149 does so.
(ii) Some active participation especially in crime involving physical
violence is necessary under section 34 but Section 149 does not require
it and the liability arises by reason of mere membership of the unlawful
assembly with a common object and there may be no active participation
at all in preparation and commission of crime.
(iii) Section 34 speaks of common intention but Section 149
contemplates common object which is undoubtedly wider in its scope
and amplitude than intention; and
(iv) Section 34 doe_s not_ fix a minimum number of persons who
must share the common mtention whereas Section 149 requires that there
must be at least five persons who must have some common object.
150. Hiring, or. conniving at hiring of persons to join uni,wful
assembly.-Whoev er hires or engages, or employs, or promotes or c • t
. • engagement or empl oyment of any _pers ' or ODDJves
the h 1ring, to join become a8
member of any unlawful assembly, shall b~ punish, a member of such
unlawful assembly, and for any offen which may itted b
person as a member of sueh. unIaw
_.r b . Y any such
em ly 1n e of such hiring,
engagement or employment, in t~ been a member
of such unlawful assembly, or lu ~e.. -