Chapter 5 Behavior

Uncertainty and Consumer

+

Questions for Review

risk
a person is risk averse? Why are some people likely to be
say that
1. What does it mean toare risk lovers?
averse while others a
marginal utility of income and prefers a certain income to
diminishing and
A risk-averse person has a
income. A risk lover has an increasing marginal utility of income
gamble with the same expected income when the expected value of the
uncertain income
a certain
prefers an uncertain income to
extent, a person's risk preferences are like preferences for different
equals the certain income. To some leamed from parents or others, and we cannot easily say why
vegetables. They may be inbon or taking risks. But there are some economic factors
that
others like
some people are isk averse while a wealthy person is more likely to take risks
than a moderately
preferences. For example,
can affect risk
wealthy person can better handle losses. Also, people are more likely to
well-off person, because the time) than when stakes
office pools around NCAA basketball
take risks when the stakes are low (like
are high (like losing a house to fire).
measure of variability than the range?
2. Why is the variance a better outcome.
difference between the highest possible outcome and the lowest possible
Range is the how likely each
highest and lowest, and it does not consider
Range ignores all outcomes except the is based on all the outcomes and how likely they are to occur.
outcome is. Variance, on the other hand, mean outcome by its probability, and thus
Variance weights the difference of each outcome from therange.
than the
is a more comprehensive measure of variability
15% and
George has $5000 to invest in a mutual fund. The expected return on mutual fundA is
3. 10%. Should George pick mutual fund A or fund
B?
the expected return on mutual fund B is
for each fund, but also on the variability
George's decision will depend not only on the expected return findA has a higher standard
preferences. For example, if
of each fund's retuns and on George's riskaverse,
deviation than fund B, and George is risk then he may prefer fundB even though it has a
choose fundA even if its
lower expected return. If George is not particularly risk averse he may
retun is more variable.
utility? Can you think of a case in
4. What does it mean for consumers to maximize expected
which a person might not maximize expected utility?
the highest
To maximize expected utility means that the individual chooses the option that yields
average utility, where average utility is the probability-weighted sum of all utilities. This theory
requires that the consumer knows each possible outcome that may occur and the probability of each
outcome. Sometimes consumers either do not know all possible outcomes and the relevant probabilities,
or they have difficulty evaluating low-probability, extreme-payoff events. In some cases, consumers
cannot assign a utility level to these extreme-payoff events, such as when the payoff is the loss of the
consumer's life. In cases like this, consuners may make choices based on other criteria such as risk
avoidance.

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 Chapter 5 Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior 79

5. Why do people often want to insure fully against uncertain situations even when the premium
paid exceeds the expected value of the loss being insured against?
Risk averse people have declining marginal utility, and this means that the pain ofa loss increases at
an increasing rate as the size of the loss increases. As aresult, they are willing to pay more than the
expected value of the loss to insure against suffering the loss. For example, consider ahomeowner
who owns ahouse worth s200,000. Suppose there is asmall 0.001 probability that the house will
burn to the ground and be a total loss and a high probability of 0.999 that there will be no loss. The
expected loss is 0.001(200,000) +0.9959(0) =S200. Many risk averse homeowners would be willing
to pay alot more than $200 (like S400 or S500) to buy insurance that will replace the house ifit buns.
They do this because the disutility of losing their $200,000 house is more than 1000 times larger than
the disutility of paying the insurance premium.
6. Why is an insurance company likely to behave as if it were risk neutral even if its managers are
risk-averse individuals?

A large insurance company sells hundreds of thousands of policies, and the company's managers
know they will have to pay for losses incured by some of their policyholders even though they do
not know which particular policies will result in claims. Because of the law of large numbers,
however, the company can estimate the total nunber of claims quite accrately. Therefore, it can
make very precise estimates of the total amount it will have to pay in claims. This means the
company faces very little risk overall and consequently behaves essentially as if it were risk neutral.
Each manager, on the other hand, cannot diversify his or her own personal risks to the same extent,
and thus each faces greater risk and behaves in a much more risk-averse manner.
7. When is it worth paying to obtain more information to reduce uncertainty?
It is worth paying for information if the infomation leads the consumer to make different choices
than she would bave made without the information, and the expected utility of the payoffs (deducting
the cost of the information) is greater with the information than the expected utility of the payoffs
received when making the best choices without knowing the information.
8. How does the diversiflcation of an investor's portfolio avoid risk?
An investor reduces risk by investing in many assets whose returns are not highly corelated and,
even better, some whose returns are negatively correlated. Amutual fund, for example, is a portfolio
of stocks of many different companies. If the rate of retum on each company's stock is not highly
related to the rates of return earned on the other stocks in the portfolio, the portfolio will have alower
variance than any of the individual stocks. This occurs because low retuns on some stocks tend to be
offfet by high retuns on others. As the nunber of stocks in the portfolio increases, the portfolio's
variance decreases. While there is less risk in a portfolio of stocks, risk cannot be completely
avoided: there is still some market risk in holding a portfolio of stocks compared to a low-risk asset,
such as a U.S. govemment bond.

9. Why do some investors put a large portion of their portfolios into risky assets, while others
invest largely in risk-free alternatives? (Hint: Do the two investors receive exactly the same
return on average? If so, why?)
Most investors are risk averse, but some are more risk averse than others. Investors who are highly
risk averse will invest largely in risk-free alternatives while those who are less risk averse will put a
larger portion of their portfolios into risky assets. Of course, because investors are risk averse, they
will demand higher rates of return on investments that have higher levels of risk (i.e., higher
variances).
So investors who put larger amounts into risky assets expect to eam greater rates of return than those
who invest primarily in risk-free assets.

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80 Pindyck/Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, Eighth Edition

10. What is an endowment effect? Give an example of such an effect.

An endowment effect exists if an individual places a higher value on an item
as compared to the value she places on the same item when it is not in her
that is in her possession
possession.
some people might refuse to pay $5 for a simple coffee mug but would also refuse to sell the
For example,
mug for $5 if they already owned it or had just gotten it for free. same
11. Jennifer is shopping and sees an attractive shirt. However, the
price of S50 is more
willing to pay. A few weeks later, she finds the same shirt on sale for $25 and buys [Link] she is
friend offers her S50 for the shirt, she refuses to sell it. Explain Jennifer's behavior. Whena
To help explain Jennifer's behavior, we need to look at the
reference point from which she is making
the decision. In the first instance, she does not own the shirt so
she is not willing to pay the $50 to
buy the shirt. In the second instance, she will not accept S50 for the shirt from her friend because her
reference point has changed. Once she owns the shirt, the value she attaches to it
Individuals often value goods more when they own them than when they do not. This increases.
endowment effect. is called the

Exercises
1. Consider a lottery with three possible outcomes:
S125 will be received with probability 0.2
S100 will be received with probability 0.3
$50 will be received with probability 0.5
a. What is the expected value of the lottery?
The expected value, EV, of the lottery is equal to the sum of the
probabilities:
returns weighted by their

EV= (0.2)(S125) + (0.3)(S100) + (0.5)($50) = S80.

b. What is the variance of the
outcomes?
The variance, o, is the sum of the squared
probabilities: deviations from the mean, S80, weighted by their
d= (0.2)(125 80)+ (0.3)(100- 80) + (0.5)(50 80) =
S975.
C. What would a risk-neutral person pay to
play the lottery?
A risk-neutral perSon would pay the expected
value of the lottery: S80.
2. Suppose you have invested in a new
computer company
factors: (1) whether the U.S. Congress passes a tariff whosetheprofitability depends on twvo
and (2) whether the U.S. economy grows raising cost of Japanese computers
slowly or quickly. What are the four mutually
exclusive states of the world that you should be concerned about?
The four mutually exclusive states may be
represented as:
 Chapter 5 Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior 81

Congress passes tariff Congress does not pass tariff

Slow growth rate State 1: Slow growth with tariff State 2: Slow growth without tariff
Fast grovwth rate State 3: Fast growth with tariff State 4: Fast growth without tariff

3. Richard is deciding whether to buy a state lottery ticket. Each ticket costs $1, and the
probability of winning payoffs is given as follows:

Probability Return
0.50 $0.00
0.25 $1.00
0.20 $2.00
0.05 $7.50

a. What is the expected value of Richard's payoff if he buys a lottery ticket? What is the
variance?

The expected value of the lottery is equal to the sun of the returns weighted by their
probabilities:
EV= (0.5)X0) + (0.25)(S1.00) + (0.2)(S2.00) + (0.05)(S7.50) = S1.025
The variance is the sum of the squared deviations from the mean, S1.025, weighted by their
probabilities:
ß = (0.5)(0 1.025) +(0.25)(1 - 1.025) +(0.2)(2 1.025) + (0.05)X(7.5 1.025), or
ß= 2.812.
b. Richard's nickname is No-Risk Rick" because he is an extremely risk-averse individual.
Would he buy the ticket?
An extremely risk-averse individual would probably not buy the ticket. Even though the
expected value is higher than the price of the ticket, S1.025 > S1.00, the difference is not
enough to compensate Rick for the risk. For example, if his wealth is $10 and he buys a $1.00
ticket, he would have S9.00, S10.00, S11.00, and S16.50, respectively, under the four possible
outcomes. If his utility function is U= ,where Wis his wealth, then his expected utility is:
EU = (0.5)(905) + (0.25)(10º5) + (0.2)(1 105) + (0.05)(16.505) = 3.157.
This is less than 3.162, which is his utility if he does not buy the ticket (U(10) = 10 = 3.162).
Therefore, he would not buy the ticket.
c. Richard has been given 1000 lottery tickets. Discuss how you would determine the smallest
amount for which he would be wiling to sell all 1000 tickets.
With 1000 tickets, Richard's expected payoff is S1025. He does not pay for the tickets, so he
cannot lose money, but there is a wide range of possible payofis he might receive ranging from
SO (in the extremely unlikely event that all 1000 tickets pay nothing) to S7500 (in the even more
unlikely case that all 1000 tickets pay the top prize of $7.50), and virtually everything in between.
Given this variability and Richard's high degree of risk aversion, we know that Richard would be
willing to sell all the tickets for less (and perhaps considerably less) than the expected payoff of
S1025. More precisely, he would sell the tickets for Si025 minus his risk premium. To find his
selling price, we would first have to calculate his expected utility for the lottery winnings. This

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82 Pindyck/Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, Eighth Edition

would be like point F in Figure 5.4 in the text, except that in Richard's case there are thousands
of possible payoffs, not just two as in the figure. Using his expected utility value, we then would
find the certain amount that gives bim the same level ofutility. This is like the $16,000 income at
point Cin Figure 5.4. That certain amount is the smallest amount for which he would be willing
to sell all 1000 lottery tickets.
d. In the long run, given the price of the lottery tickets and the probability/return table, what
do you think the state would do about the lottery?
Given the price of the tickets, the sizes of the payoffs and the probabilities, the lottery is a money
loser for the state. The state loses S1.025 - 1.00 = SO.025 (two and a half cents) on every ticket it
sells. The state must raise the price of a ticket, reduce some of the payoffs, raise the probability of
winning nothing, lower the probabilities of the positive payoffs, or some combination of the above.
4. Suppose an investor is concerned about a business choice in which there are three prospects
the probability and returns are given below:
Probability Return

0.4 $100
0.3 30
0.3 -30

What is the expected value of the uncertain investment? What is the variance?
The expected value of the return on this investment is
EV= (0.4)(100) + (0.3)(30) + (0.3)(-30) = $40.
The variance is

o= (0.4)(100 40) + (0.3)(30- 40) +(0.3)(-30 40) =2940.

5. You are an insurance agent who must write a policy for a new client named Sam. His company,
Society for Creative Alternatives to Mayonnaise (SCAMD, is working on a low-fat, low-cholesterol
mayonnaise substitute for the sandwich-condiment industry. The sandwich industry will pay
top dollar to the first inventor to patent such a mayonnaise substitute. Sam's SCAM seems like
a very risky proposition to you. You have calculated his possible returns table as follows:
Probability Return Outcome
0.999 1,000,000 (he fails)
0.001 S 1,000,000,000 (he succeeds and sells his formula)
a. What is the expected return of Sam's project? What is the variance?

The expected return, ER, of Sam's investment is

ER= (0.999)(-1,000,000) + (0.001)(1,000,000,000) = S1000.
The variance is

d= (0.999\-1,000,000 - 1000)°+ (0.001)(1,000,000,000 1000), or

o=1,000,998,999,000,000.
b. What is the most that Sam is willing to pay for insurance? Assumne Sam is risk neutral.

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 Chapter5 Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior 83

Suppose the insurance guarantees that Sam will receive the expected return of S1000 with
certainty regardless of the outcome of his SCAM project. Because Sam is risk neutral and
because his expected return is the same as the guaranteed return with insurance, the insurance has
no value to Sam. He is just as happy with the uncertain SCAM profits as with the certain
outcome guaranteed by the insurance policy. So Sam will not pay anything for the insurance.
C. Suppose you found out that the Japanese are on the verge of introducing their own
mayonnaise substitute next month. Sam does not know this and has just turned down your
final offer of $1000 for the insurance. Assume that Sam tells you SCAM is only six months
away from perfecting its mayonnaise substitute and that you know what you know about
the Japanese. Would youraise or lower your policy premium on any subsequent proposal
to Sam? Based on his information, would Sam accept?
The entry of the Japanese lowers Sam's probability of a high payoff. For example, assume that
the probability of the billion-dollar payoff cut in half. Then the expected outcome is:
ER = (0.9995)(-$1,000,000) +(0.0005)((S1,000,000,000) =-$499,500.
Therefore you should raise the policy premium substantially. But Sam, not knowing about the
Japanese entry, will continue to refuse your offers to insure his losses.
6. Suppose that Natasha's utility function is given by u(I)=/101, where I represents annual
income in thousands of dollars.
a. Is Natasha risk loving, risk neutral, or risk averse? Explain.
Natasha is risk averse. To show this, assume that she has $10,000 and is offered a gamble of a
S1000 gain with 50% probability and a S1000 loss with 50% probability. The utility of her
current income of $10,000 is u(10) =Jho10) = 10. Her expected utility with the gamble is:
EU =(0.5)10(11)) +(0.5)(/109)) =9.987 <10.
She would avoid the gamble. If she were risk neutral, she would be indifferent between the
S10,000 and the gamble, and ifshe were risk loving, she would prefer the gamble.
You can also see that she is risk averse by noting that the square root function increases at a
decreasing rate (the second derivative is negative), implying diminishing marginal utility.
b. Suppose that Natasha is currently earning an income of $40,000 (= 40) and can earn that
income next year with certainty. She is offered a chance to take a new job that offers a 0.6
probability of earning S44,000 and a 0.4 probability of earning S33,000. Should she take the
new job?

The utility of her curent salary is 1040)= 20. The expected utility of the new job is
EU=(0.6)(J10(44)) +(0.4)(/10(33)) =19.85,
which is less than 20. Therefore, she should not take the job. You can also detemine that
Natasha shold reject the job by noting that the expected value of the new job is only S39,600,
which is less than her current salary. Since she is risk averse, she should never accept arisky
salary with a lower expected value than her curent certain salary.
C. In (b), would Natasha be willing to buy insurance to protect against the variable income
associated with the new job? If so, how much would she be willing to pay for that
insurance? (Hint: What is the risk premium?)
This question assumes that Natasha takes the new job (for some unexplained reason). Her expected
salary is 0.6(44,000) + 0.4(33,000) = S39,600. The risk premium is the amount Natasha would be

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84 Pindyck/Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, Eighth Edition

willing to pay so that she receives the expected salary for certain rather than the risky salary in
her new job. In (b) we determined that her new job has an expected utility of 19.85. We need to
find the certain salary that gives Natasha the same utility of 19.85, so we want to find I such that
u() = 19.8S. Using her utilityfunction, we want to solve the following equation: /ho =19.85.
Squaring both sides, 10l = 394.0225, and I = 39.402. So Natasha would be equaly happy with a
certain salary of S39,402 or the uncertain salary with an expected value of $39,600. Her risk
premium is S39,600 39,402 = S198. Natasha would be willing to pay S198 to guarantee her
income would be $39,600 for certain and eliminate the risk associated with her new job.
7. Suppose that two investments have the same three payoffs, but the probability associated with
each payoff differs, as illustrated in the table below:
Payoff Probability (Investment 4) Probability (Investment B)
S300 0.10 0.30

S250 0.80 0.40

$200 0.10 0.30

A. Find the expected return and standard deviation of each investment.

The expected value of the retun on investment A is
EV= (0.1)(300) + (0.8)(250) + (0.1)(200) = $250.
The variance on investment A is
G= (0.1)(300 250) +(0.8)(250 - 250) +(0.1)X200 250) =500,
and the standard deviation on investment A is G=/500 = $22.36.
The expected value of the return on investment B is

EV= (0.3)(300) + (0.4)(250) + (0.3)(200) = $2.50.

The variance on investment B is
d= (0.3)(300 - 250) + (0.4)(250 - 250 + (0.3)(200 - 250)= 1500,
and the standard deviation on investment B is G=1500 = $38.73.
b. Jill has the utility function U=51, where I denotes the payoff. Which investment will she
choose?
Jill's expected utility fromn investment A is
EU= (0.1)(5 x 300) + (0.8)5 x 250) + (0.1)(5 x 200) = 1250.
Jill's expected utility from investment B is
EU= (0.3)(5 x 300) + (0.4)XS x 250) +(0.3)(5 x 200) = 1250.
Since both investments give Jill the same expected utility she will be indifferent between the two.
Note that Jill is risk neutral, so she cares only about expected values. Since investments A and B
have the same expected values, she is indifferent between them.
C. Ken has the utility function U=5/I. Which investment will he choose?
Ken's expected utility from investnent A is
 Chapter S Uncertainty and Consuner Behavior

EU= (0.1(5W300 +(0.8)(5)N250 +(0.1)(5N200 =78.98.

Ken's expected utility from investment B is
EU= (0.3)X5W300+ (0.4)(5N250 +(0.3)(5)N200 =78.82.
Ken will choose investment A because it has a slightly higher expected utility. Notice that Ken is
risk averse, and since the two invest1nents have the same expected retun, he prefers the
investment with less variability.
d. Laura has the utility function U=5/. Which investment willshe choose?
Laura's expected utility from investment A is
EU (0.1)(5 x300) +(0.8)(5 ×250)+ (0.1)X(5 x200) =315,000.
Laura's expected utility from investment B is
EU= (0.3)(5 x300') +(0.4)(5 x250) +(0.3)(5 x200) =320,000.
Laura will hoose investment Bsince it has a higher expected utility. Notice that Laura is a risk
lover, and since the two investments have the same expected return, she prefers the investment
with greater variability.
8. As the owner of a family farm whose wealth is $250,000, you must choose between sitting this
season out and investing last year's earnings ($200,000) in a safe money market fund paying
5.0% or planting summer corn. Planting costs $200,000, with a six-month time to harvest. If
there is rain, planting summer corn will yield Ss00,000 in revenues at harvest. Ir there is a
drought, planting will yield $50,000 in revenues. As a third choice, you can purchase AgriCorp
rought-resistant summer corn at a cost of $250,000 that will yield S500,000 in revenues at
harvest if there is rain, and $350,000 in revenues if there is a drought. You are risk averse, and
your preference for family wealth (VW) is specified by the relationship U)=/W. The
probability of a summer drought is 0.30, while the probability of summer rain is 0.70. Which
of the three options should you choose? Explain.
Calculate the expected utility of wealth under the three options. Wealth is equal to the initial
$250,000 plus whatever is carned growing com or investing in the safe financial asset. Expected
utility under the safe option, allowing for the fact that your initial wealth is $250,000, is:
E(U) = (250,000 + 200,000(1 + 0.05))>= 678.23.
Expected utility wvith regular corn, again including your initial wealth, is:
E(U) = 0.7(250,000+ (500,000 - 200,000)) +0.3(250,000 + (50,000 - 200,000))
= 519.13 + 94.87 = 614.

Expected utility with drought-resistant corn is:

E(U) =0.7(250,000 + (500,000- 250,000))+0.3(250,000+ (350,000 - 250,000)
= 494.975 + 177.482 = 672.46.
You should choose the option with the highest expected utility, which is the safe option of not
planting corn.
Note: There is a subtle time issue in this problem. The returns from planting com occr in 6 months
while the money market fund pays 5%, which is presumably a yearly interest rate. To put everything
on equal footing, we should compare the returns of all three alternatives over a 6-month period. In
this case, the money market fund would earn about 2.5%, so its expected utility is:

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 E(U)=(250,000 + 200,000(1 +0.025)°= 674.54.
This is still the best of the three options, but by a smaller
margin than before.
9. Draw a utility function over income u) that describes a man who
is a risk lover when his
income is low but risk averse when his income is high. Can you explain why such a utility
function might reasonably describe a person's preferences?
The utility function will be S-shaped as illustrated below. Preferences might be like
this for an
individual who needs a certain level of income, I*, in order to stay alive. An increase in income
above I* will have diminishing marginal utility. Below I, the individual will be a risk lover and will
take unfavorable gambles in an effort to make large gains in income. Above *, the individual will
prchase insurance against losses and below J* will gamble.
Uility

UL)

Income

10. A city is considering how much to spend to hire people to monitor its parking meters. The
following information is available to the city manager:
Hiring each meter monitor costs $10,000 per year.
With one monitoring person hired, the probability of a driver getting a ticket each time he
or she parks illegally is equal to 0.25.
With two monitors, the probability of getting a ticket is 0.5: with three monitors, the
probability is 0.75; and with four, it's equal to 1.
With two monitors hired, the current fine for overtime parking is $20.
a. Assume first that all drivers are risk neutral. What parking fine would you levy, and how
of deterrence
many meter monitors would you hire (1, 2, 3, or 4) to achieve the current level
against illegal parking at the minimum cost?
two
If drivers are risk neutral, their behavior is influenced only by their expected fine. With is
the expected fine
meter monitors, the probability of detection is 0.5 and the fine is $20. So,
city can hire one meter monitor
(0.5)($20) + (0.5)(0) = $10. To maintain this expected fine, thedecrease the fine to $13.33, or hire
and increase the fine to $40, or hire three meter monitors and
four meter monitors and decrease the fine to S10.
S10,000 per year, you
If the only cost to be minimized is the cost of hiring meter monitors at
meter monitors. Hire only one monitor and
(as the city manager) should minimize the number of deterrence.
increase the fine to S40 to maintain the current level of

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 b. Now assume that drivers are highly risk averse. How would your answer to (a) change?
If drivers are risk averse, they would want to avoid the possibility of paying parking fines even
more than would risk-neutral drivers. Therefore, a fine of less than S40 should maintain the
current level of deterrence.
c. (For discussion) What if drivers could insure themselves against the risk of parking fines?
Would it make good public policy to permit such insurance?
Drivers engage in many forms of behavior to insure themselves against the risk of parking fines,
such as checking the time often to be sure they have not parked overtime, parking blocks away
from their destination in non-metered spots, or taking public transportation. If aprivate insurance
firm offered insurance that paid the fne when aticket was received, drivers would not wory
about getting tickets. They would not seek out unmetered spots or take public transportation; they
would park in metered spaces for as long as they wanted at zero personal cost. Having the
insurance would lead drivers to get many more parking tickets. This is referred to as moral
hazard and may cause the insurance market to collapse, but that's another story (see Section 17.3
in Chapter 17).
It probably would not make good public policy to permit such insurance. Parking is usually
metered to encourage efficient use of scarce parking space. People with insurance would have
economize
no incentive to use public transportation, seek out-of-the-way parking locations,to orfnd
on their use of metered spaces. This imposes a cost on others who are not able a place to
park. If the parking fines are set to efficiently allocate the scarce amount of parking space available,
then the availability of insurance will lead to an inefficient use of the parking space. In this case,
it would not be good public policy to permit the insrance.
risk
A moderately risk-averse investor has 50% of her portfolio invested in stocks and 50% in
line
free Treasury bills. Show how each of the following events will affect the investor's budget
and the proportion of stocks in her portfolio:
a. The standarddeviation of the return on the stock market increases, but the expected return
on the stock market remains the same.

From Section 5.4, the equation for the budget line is

investing in
where R is the expected return on the portfolio, Ry is the expected return from
deviation of the
the stock market, Rfis the risk-free retun on Treasury bills, , is the standard on the
return from investing in the stock market, and g is the standard deviation of the return
portfolio. The budget line is linear and shows the positive relationship between the retum on
the portfolio, R, and the standard deviation of the return on the portfolio, p, as shown in
Figure 5.6.
The slope of
this case am. the standard deviation of the return on the stock market, increases.
budget line's
the budget line therefore decreases, and the budget line becomes flatter. The of portfolio return,
intercept stays the same because R, does not change. Thus, at any given level riskier without a
the portfolio now has a higher standard deviation. Since stocks have become
will
compensating increase in expected return, the proportion of stocks in the investor's portfolio
fall.
standard deviation of the stock
b. The expected return on the stock market increases, but the
market remains the same.

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