X Rule 81 Bond of Executors and Administrators

10.1 Bond to be Given Issuance of Letters; Amount; Conditions

131. Tan Vs. Go Chiong Lee, G.R. No. 21969, September 25, 1924 - Sette

Fisher, DeWitt, Perkins & Brady for appellants.

Del Rosario & Del Rosario and Palma, Leuterio & Yamzon for appellee.

- When Go Bung Kiu was alive, Go Chiong Lee was his encargado (manager)

- Kiu died in China on April 15, 1920

- April 16, 1920: Lee was appointed special administrator of the estate, with Tio Liok,
Ang Changco and Manuel Go Tianuy as sureties on his bond worth 30K

- Lee’s status was eventually changed to administrator (May 25)

- On the same day, Lee filed a motion that he be allowed to operate 2 stores
belonging to the estate

- [CFI] granted such authority. However, on the original copy of the order, the
judge inked the following words in Spanish: Condition that he furnish a written report
each month

§ Another bond of 30K was required. After which, he was given letters of
administration

- Lee continued duties until he was relieved by Maximina Tan (Oct 28, 1921)

- During this period, the administrator filed 3 reports (May – Sep), (Oct-July 1921),
and a final report

- The committee on claims later rendered its report, admitted and proved, of
claims worth 69K

- 1 month later, the court ordered the following tenor:

§ The admin is immediately ordered to pay out of estate funds to each

party mentioned in the report of the committee on claims, the whole
amount appearing therein

- Lee states that he had already paid creditors the sum of 16,700 on July 29, 1921.
Payments were made without preference to any creditor, considering there are many
debtors to the estate. Most importantly, he cites that the 2 establishments which he
operates have slow sales

- The inventory made by the Admin alleged merchandise value on hand at the
time of deceased is 39K; outstanding credits were 61K, or a combined gross of 100,816

- However, CPA Pangalinan stated that the estate was worth 28K when Lee
became admin, while it was worth 8K when he ceased to be admin. A loss of 19K!
Debts of the estate allowed by the commissioner on claims reached 69K
- The last report made by the administrator discloses, however, that there may be
P21,009.77 on hand which can be used to satisfy the claimants. The present
administratrix is running the estate with apparently profitable results.

- A table of amounts are being claimed by plaintiff Maxima Tan, now the present
administrator. The court DISALLOWED 3 claims from the table and allowed only 1

2 sub-issues:

Ø Whether Lee had a lack of authority as administrator to run the 2 stores of the
estate

- The permission to operate the stores were given upon his appointment as
“administrador definitivo”

- He acted as such for over a year without being challenged by anyone

- It would be preposterous to suppose that the authority to run the stores ceased.
The only reasonable deduction is that the permission was transmitted as soon as he
was appointed general admin.

Ø Whether Lee failed to render the monthly reports, as a condition of his appointment
as admin

- Lee’s atty had knowledge of the condition of monthly reports.

- The administrator was repeatedly ordered by the courts to submit reports without
specifying monthly accounts. On three occasions the administrator rendered his
accounts, without anyone protesting

- Court finds it implausible that furnishing monthly reports would have stopped such
losses. Court believes that a more reasonable assumption is that running such business
is inherently risky. (An adverse testimony from tailor Vidal Reynes, was found by the
court as not impressive)

The standard of responsibility of the administrator is best measured as in essence the

responsibility of a bailee. Like any bailee, he must pursue his discretion honestly and in
good faith, or he will become personally liable, to those who are interested in the
estate, for waste, conversion, or embezzlement. But where an administrator, entrusted
with the carrying on of an estate, acts in good faith and in accordance with the usual
rules and methods obtaining in such business, he will not be held liable for losses
incurred.

MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not Lee is personally liable for the estate debts?

NO. Court finds that his personal liability and the sureties on his bond for losses incurred
by the estate during his administration, has NOT been proved.

Lee allegedly failed to inventory 850 sacks of corn, but the court was not impressed
with this allegation.

There are legal provisions that an administrator who has qualified shall, within 3 months
after appointment, return to the court a true inventory of the real and personal
property of the deceased, which come into his possession or knowledge, and that the
administrator shall be chargeable in his account with such properties which come into
his possession. The administrator is accountable on his bond along with the sureties for
the performance of these legal obligations.

Law provides how the estate debts shall be paid, and that after the return of the
report of the committee on claims, the court shall then order the payment of debts
and the distribution of assets.

The committee on claims adjudged that the debts amount to 69K. Also, it is not
disputed that payment was made. However, the anomaly is that not all creditors were
paid due to the hit and miss method followed by the administrator.

Court finds that administrator attempted to follow the order to the best of his ability.
Since the projected profit is seen to pay the extent of the claims. Thus, in these same
proceedings, the administatrix on her own motion, or by the creditors at their own
motion, may recover the excess imprudently paid out to certain creditors.

For all the foregoing, the judgment modified to the extent that the plaintiff shall only
have and recover from the defendants jointly and severally the amount of P6,375, with
legal interest from the date when the complaint was presented. Without costs. So
ordered.

10.2 Bond of Executor Where Directed in Will; When further Bond Required

10.3 Bonds of Joint Executors and Administrators

10.4 Bond of Special Administrator

XI Rule 82 Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation, and Removal of Executors

or Administrators

11.1 Administration Revoked if Will Discovered; Proceedings thereupon

11.2 Court may Remove or Accept Resignation of Executor or Administrator

132. Quasha Vs. LCN Const., G.R. No. 174873, August 26, 2008 - Jessa

Summary: A case involving the denial of a motion for payment of litigation expenses
and the issue of whether awards to the heirs constituted a partial and advance
distribution of the estate, with the Court of Appeals ruling that the awards violated
distribution rules and attorney's fees should be borne by the clients, not the estate,
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Facts:
● Raymond Triviere passed away on 14 December 1987. On 13 January 1988,
proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his
widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere.
● Atty. Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and Atty. William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the
Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond
 Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the
deceased in April 1988.
● In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion
for Payment of their litigation expenses. Citing their failure to submit an
accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under administration, the
RTC denied in May 1995 the Motion for Payment of Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha.
● After Atty. Quasha's death in 1996, Atty. Redentor Zapata took over as counsel
for the Triviere children.
● On September 6, 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for
Payment, which the RTC granted in part on June 12, 2003, but reduced the sums
to be paid.
● LCN opposed the motion, arguing that the administrators had not submitted an
accounting and that their claim was still outstanding.
● The RTC denied LCN's Motion for Reconsideration, leading LCN to file a Petition
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which ruled in favor of LCN, deleting the
awards to the heirs and attorney's fees.
● The petitioners then sought review from the Supreme Court.
● Petitioner Quasha Law Office asserts that it is not within the purview of Section 7,
Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court since it is not an appointed administrator of
the estate.
● Petitioner’s Argument: When Atty. Quasha passed away in 1996, Atty. Syquia
was left as the sole administrator of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere. The
person of Atty. Quasha was distinct from that of petitioner Quasha Law Office;
and the appointment of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate did not
extend to his law office. Neither could petitioner Quasha Law Office be
deemed to have substituted Atty. Quasha as administrator upon the latter's
death for the same would be in violation of the rules on the appointment and
substitution of estate administrators, particularly, Section 2, Rule 82 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Hence, when Atty. Quasha died, petitioner Quasha Law Office
merely helped in the settlement of the estate as counsel for the petitioner
children of the late Raymond Triviere.

Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in nullifying the award of attorney's fees to the co-
administrators?

Ruling:
● The Supreme Court modified the Court of Appeals' decision, ruling that the
Quasha Law Office is entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00 for legal services
rendered to the Triviere children, to be paid by the Triviere children. The
administrators' fees for Attorneys Syquia and Quasha are to be determined by
the RTC and chargeable to the estate.

Ratio: The Quasha Law Office was not a co-administrator of the estate after Atty.
Quasha's death, as there was no evidence of the issuance of letters of administration
to the law office or any of its lawyers. Therefore, the prohibition in Section 7, Rule 85 of
the Revised Rules of Court against charging professional fees for legal services
rendered by an attorney-administrator did not apply. The Quasha Law Office is entitled
to attorney's fees for the legal services it rendered to the Triviere children, to be paid
from their shares upon final distribution of the estate. The administrators' fees for
Attorneys Syquia and Quasha are to be determined by the RTC and chargeable to
the estate.

Corollary thereto, Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides in clear and
unequivocal terms the modes for replacing an administrator of an estate upon the
death of an administrator, to wit:
Section 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. x x
x.

When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the

remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless
the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining
executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable
person.

The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any
of its lawyers substituted Atty. Quasha as co-administrator of the estate. None of the
documents attached pertain to the issuance of letters of administration to petitioner
Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers at any time after the demise of Atty. Quasha
in 1996. This Court is thus inclined to give credence to petitioner's contention that while
it rendered legal services for the settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the
time of Atty. Quasha's death in 1996, it did not serve as co-administrator thereof,
granting that it was never even issued letters of administration .

133. Suntay III Vs. Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012 - Mary

Facts: The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990.
Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five
grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel;
and two illegitimate... grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico's and
Cristina's only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by
the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her
siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the
separation... of Isabel's parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel's parents, along
with her paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a
case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually...
acquitted.

In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging
her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void and of no
effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco.

Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed
a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the
same special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City
(JDRC-QC)... granted their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was
subsequently reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of
respondent Isabel's testimony in court that her grandparents' visits caused her and her
siblings stress and anxiety.

On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina's death, Federico adopted
his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.

On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina's
estate Federico, opposed the petition

Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel's petition for letters of administration on the
ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being
an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel's parents' marriage being
declared null... and void.

However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and

her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage
based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio
I,... who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the
decedent, Cristina.

Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent's
estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico.

On 13 November 2000, Federico died.

Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision
appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina's intestate estate

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC,
revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as
administratrix of the subject estate

As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the
ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of
Cristina's estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico's estate.

Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on
the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored
and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that
Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does
not deserve to become a co-administrator thereof.

Issue: Whether the removal of Emelio III was proper.

Ruling: YES. Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III's
demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the
evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the
estate. Respondent Isabel... points out that after Emilio III's appointment as
administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the
subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as
evidenced by the following:

1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory,
omitted in the partial inventories[34] he filed therewith properties of the estate[35]
including several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits,... jewelry, shares of stock, motor
vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section 1,[36] paragraph a, Rule
81 of the Rules of Court.

2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico's settlement of the
decedent's estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly
belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially), and which contained a
declaration that the... decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for
Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.[37]

In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to
the following imputations of Isabel that:

[Emilio III] did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;

[T]he inventory [Emilio III] submitted did not include several properties of the decedent;

[T]hat properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different
individuals or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and

[W]hile some properties have found their way to [Emilio III], by reason of falsified
documents;[38]

Emilio III refutes Isabel's imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and
performing the functions of administrator of Cristina's estate:

1. From the time of the RTC's Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, Isabel, in
her pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III's assumption of
that office, arguing that "[t]he decision of the [RTC] dated 9 November 2001 is
not among the judgments... authorized by the Rules of Court which may be
immediately implemented or executed;"
2. The delay in Emilio III's filing of an inventory was due to Isabel's vociferous
objections to Emilio III's attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision
was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof,
and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedent's
estate, such that it cannot constitute a complete and total listing of the
decedent's properties; and
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as private
complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the
prosecutor of a possible motu... propio dismissal of the cases.

While we can subscribe to Emilio III's counsel's explanation for the blamed delay in the
filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to
complete, in the course of the settlement of a decedent's estate, we do not find any
clarification on

Isabel's accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory,
which properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be
knowledgeable about.

The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator
rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which
became proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate
court and by his... inaction on two occasions of Federico's exclusion of Cristina's other
compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.

As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to
faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedent's estate with the end in view of
distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of
Emilio

III's omission and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his
unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those
immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.

In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted
litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep
aversion for each other. To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, improbable, for
the two to... work as co-administrators of their grandmother's estate. The allegations of
Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III
that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive home
the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears
detrimental to the decedent's estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has
shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent
Isabel, immediately interested... in the said estate.

134. Co Vs. Rosario, G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008 - Kit

Facts:

1. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, in Sp. Proc. No. M-4615,
appointed the petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as special administrators of the
estate of the petitioner’s father, Co Bun Chun.
2. Later, the trial court removed the petitioner from his position as special co-
administrator on motion of the other heirs.
3. The petitioner nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co (Alvin), as special co-
administrator, and on August 31, 1998, the RTC appointed Alvin to the role.
4. On January 22, 2002, the RTC revoked Alvin’s appointment as special co-
administrator. The trial court cited Alvin's involvement in several criminal cases,
which cast doubt on his fitness and suitability to perform the duties of co-
administrator.
5. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this revocation, but the RTC denied the
motion on May 14, 2002.
6. Petitioner then brought the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. The CA affirmed the revocation of Alvin’s appointment
on October 28, 2003.
7. The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, questioning
the CA’s decision before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin
Milton Co’s appointment as special co-administrator.

Ruling: The petition was denied, and the Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed. The
Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
revoking Alvin’s appointment. It noted that the appointment and removal of special
administrators is discretionary and not bound by strict rules governing the removal of
regular administrators. The trial court acted within its discretion in removing Alvin, as the
criminal cases filed against him created doubt about his suitability to act as special
co-administrator, given the fiduciary nature of the position. The Court emphasized that
the decision was based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles and was not
characterized by arbitrariness or despotism. The trial court was also directed to
promptly appoint a regular administrator.

135. Mendiola Vs. CA, G.R. No. 92999, October 11, 1990 - Kha

FACTS: Carlos Mendiola died on December 28, 1984 and was survived by his spouse,
Florentina and his children namely, Reynaldo (herein petitioner), Redentor, Ernestina,
Edgardo, Manuel, Enrico, Ricardo, and Marilou all surnamed Mendiola (herein private
respondents). A petition for probate of the decedent's will was filed on March 30, 1987
with the RTC-Pasig. Said court allowed the will and issued letters of testamentary in
favor of the petitioner who was declared executor in the will.

Later on, private respondents moved for the removal of the executor and
subsequently moved for the appointment of Redentor. The motion was granted and
the petitioner was removed. Redentor was declared as executor. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but it was denied by the court. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court; hence, petitioner filed
this petition for review. The latter averred that his removal was not supported by
evidence and he was not given his day in court.

ISSUE: Was the removal of the petitioner as executor proper?

RULING: Yes. There was sufficient evidence to support his removal namely, his failure to
pay the estate tax and to render an accounting of the estate and settle the same
according to law, and has involved the other heirs in a suit because of his own deeds.
Thus, his removal was in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which
states that "[ilf an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle
the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its
discretion, may permit him to resign." Under this provision, the court which appointed
the executor has the discretion to remove the same. Also the determination of a
person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the
sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment
is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error.

136. Cotia Vs. Jimenez, G.R. No. L-12132, December 22, 1958 - Sette

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila relieving the
petitioner-appellant, Elena Cotia, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
Mariano Cotia and appointing in her stead the Philippine Trust Company.
It appears that Elena Cotia was appointed administratrix on June 13, 1950. Failing to
submit an account of her administration up to June 18, 1955, she was ordered by the
lower court, on motion of the oppositors-appellees to submit said accounting. During
the hearing of the statement of accounts subsequently presented by Elena Cotia, it
was established that she spent for family expenses and attorney's fees the total sum of
P64,650 without prior judicial authority. The oppositors-appellees therefore filed a
motion for her removal as administratrix not only because she neglected to submit the
accounting required by the Rules and to settle the estate, but because she had made
unauthorized disbursements.

We are of the opinion that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in removing the
administratrix, Elena Cotia. The appealed order finds express sanction in Section 2, Rule
83, of the Rules of Court, which provides that the court may remove an administrator
who neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law. What is
more, the family expenses and attorney's fees in the aggregate amount of P64,650
paid by the administratrix out of the estate without previous authority of the court, is
seemingly in disregard of Section 3, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court, to the effect that the
widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person shall receive, under
the direction of the court, such allowances as are provided by [Link]

Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.

137. Cobbarubias Vs. Dizon, G.R. No. L-225. February 26, 1946 - Jessa

Facts:
● In special action No. 70686, entitled Intestate of the late Pilar Leyba y
Cobarrubias, initiated on July 5, 1945, the applicant Magdalena Cobarrubias
filed on the same date an urgent motion, alleging that the deceased Pilar
Leyba had deposited her jewelry worth P4,500 in the security section of the Bank
of the Philippine Islands.
● She asked to be appointed special administrator, and that she be authorized to
remove said jewels from the bank.
● In her request, Magdalena Cobarrubias stated that she was the only forced heir
of the late Pilar Leyba.
● Accepting these allegations as valid, the Honorable Judge Dizon on the same
date, July 5, 1945, appointed Magdalena Cobarrubias as special administrator
on P200 bond.
● On July 17, 1945, the Court, upon learning of the true facts that are contrary to
the allegations made by the applicant in her application and in her urgent
motion, issued an order revoking that of July 5, 1945, appointing Magdalena
Cobarrubias special administrator , and that of July 6, 1945, authorizing her to
withdraw the jewelry from the bank

Issue: WON the court abused its discretion when it revoked appointment of applicant
as special administrator?

Ruling:
● The court did not abuse its discretion, nor did it act outside its jurisdiction when it
revoked the appointment of the appellant as special administrator and revoked
the order authorizing her to withdraw the deposited jewelry from the bank . The
 power of the Court of First Instance to annul the appointment of an
administrator, when the appointment has been obtained through false or
incorrect representations, is indisputable.
● Report confirmed by the motion of the same petitioner who requested the
"suspension of publication and postponement of the hearing" because she
wanted "to have time to arrange an extrajudicial partition with her co-heirs," the
Court had ample reason to revoke said orders even without notification to the
administrator: the intestacy is not initiated for the benefit of the administrators
but of the heirs.
● Here, she misrepresented that she was the sole heir when in fact the deceased
had two minor children.

138. Uy Vs. CA, G.R. No. 167979, March 15, 2006 - Mary

DOCTRINE: A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all
the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration.
The practice of appointing co-administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited.
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-
administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their
judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons
satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate;
and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desire to have
another competent person associated with him in the [Link] Jose K.C. Uy
(Deceased) died intestate on August 20, 1996 and is survived by his spouse, Sy Iok Ing
Uy, and his five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy, Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia, Lilen S. Uy
and Wilson S. Uy (Petitioner).

On February 18, 1997, Special Proceedings No. 97-241 was instituted and Lilia Hofileña
was appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased. On June 9,
1998, Judge Ramon B. Posadas revoked Lilia Hofileña's appointment as special
administrator and denied her petition to be appointed as regular administrator.
Meanwhile, letters of administration were granted to petitioner, who took his oath of
office as administrator on June 23, 1998.

Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) in his motion to intervene sought to be

appointed as administrator as he is not only the brother of the decedent but also a
creditor who knows the extent of the latter's properties. Thus, the trial court, while
retaining petitioner as administrator, appointed a private respondent as co-
administrator of the estate.

Petitioner asserts that his appointment as a regular administrator is already final,

unassailable or res judicata; that the inferior court has no authority to re-open the issue
of the appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator;
that the private respondent is not only alien to the estate but has a conflict of interest
with it; that the trial court's appointment of private respondent as co-administrator
constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of [Link]/S
Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing a private
respondent as co-administrator to the estate of the [Link] NO. The main
function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons
either summarily or through the process of administration. In the case at bar, the trial
court granted letters of administration to the petitioner and thereafter to the private
respondent as co-administrator. Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the
preference to whom letters of administration may be granted is as follows: SEC. 6.
When and to whom letters of administration were granted? — If no executor is named
in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving
husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or
wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty
(30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of
the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor
competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.

The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the

attendant facts and circumstances. In Sioca v. Garcia, this Court set aside the order of
preference, to wit:

It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason
disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the
estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is
unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The determination of a person's
suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment
of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be
interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in
error. Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those
immediately interested in the estate.

In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the trial court.
Instead of removing the petitioner, it appointed a private respondent, a creditor, as
co-administrator since the estate was sizeable and the petitioner was having a difficult
time attending to it alone. In fact, the petitioner did not submit any report regarding
the estate under his administration. In its March 16, 2000 Order, the trial court found
thus:

Going over all the arguments of the parties, after the hearing has been set relative
thereto, this Court has observed that indeed the judicial administrator had not
submitted to the Court any report about the Estate under his administration except
those involving the cases he filed and/or intervened in other branches. This may be
due to his being inexperienced, but this fact will not be reason enough to remove him
from the administration of the Estate as Judicial Administrator thereof. However,
considering that the Intervenor is claiming to be the patriarch of the Uy family and
who claims to have enormous knowledge of the businesses and properties of the
decedent Jose K.C. Uy, it is the feeling of this Court that it will be very beneficial to the
Estate if he be appointed co- administrator (without removing the already appointed
Judicial Administrator) of the Estate of Jose K.C. Uy, if only to shed more light to the
alleged enormous properties/businesses and to bring them all to the decedent's Estate
pending before this Court.

A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of
a regularadministrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. The practice of
appointing co-administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited. In Gabriel v.
Court of Appeals, this Courtreaffirmed that jurisprudence allows the appointment of
co-administrators under certain circumstances,to wit: Under both Philippine and
American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for
various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times
to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that are
opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the
deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a
person entitled to the administration of an estate desire to have another competent
person associated with him in the office.

Thus, the petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot re-open the issue of the
appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator is
erroneous. In probate proceedings,considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in
modifying or revoking its own orders as long as the proceedings are pending in the
same court and timely applications or motions for such modifications or revocations
are made by the interested parties. In the instant case, the estate of the deceased
has not yet been settled and the case is still within the jurisdiction of the court.
VILLAROMAN

139. De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-6476, November 18, 1955 - Kit

Facts: Francisco de Borja, as executor of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco's estate,
sought a mandamus against Judge Bienvenido A. Tan. Francisco wanted the judge to
approve and admit the record on appeal and give due course to the appeal.

The case began on October 25, 1940, when Francisco filed for the probate of Josefa
Tangco's Last Will and Testament. The will was probated on April 2, 1941, naming
Francisco as executor.

Heir Jose de Borja initially appealed the probate decision but later withdrew his
appeal. The case records were destroyed during World War II but reconstituted on
January 1, 1946. Francisco qualified as executor and administrator on March 26, 1946.
Due to Francisco's physical inability to administer the estate, the lower court
appointed Crisanto de Borja as co-administrator on August 25, 1951.

Crisanto qualified on August 29, 1951. On April 9, 1952, the trial court appointed Jose
de Borja as co-administrator without petition or notice, leading Francisco, Matilde, and
Crisanto to move for reconsideration. The motion was indirectly denied on August 14,
1952, and Crisanto's appointment was revoked. Francisco, Matilde, and Crisanto filed
a notice of appeal on July 22, 1952. Judge Tan disapproved the record on appeal on
December 27, 1952, deeming the appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator
interlocutory and not appealable. This led to the petition for mandamus.

Issue: Is the appointment of a co-administrator in a probate case appealable?

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the appointment of a co-administrator is

appealable. The petition for mandamus was granted, directing Judge Tan to approve
the record on appeal and give due course to the appeal.

Ratio: The Court reasoned that a co-administrator performs all the functions and duties
and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, except that he is not alone in
the administration.

This makes the order appointing a co-administrator appealable.

The Court distinguished this from the appointment of a special administrator, which is
not appealable under Rule 105, Section 1(e), because a special administrator is
appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose.

The powers and functions of a special administrator are quite limited, whereas a co-
administrator has the same powers and functions as a regular administrator.

Given Francisco de Borja's physical and mental disability, which rendered him an
administrator in name only, the appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator was
effectively equivalent to appointing a sole regular or general administrator.

Therefore, the appointment was appealable, and the lower court's refusal to approve
the record on appeal was incorrect.

140. Matute Vs. CA, G.R. No. 26751, January 31, 1969 - Kha

Facts: On August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-
blood brother of both the petitioner and the herein respondent Matias S. Matute, filed
in Special Proceeding (settlement of the Matute estate) a petition praying for the
removal of Matias as co-administrator and his appointment in such capacity.
Carlos alleged that for a period of more than two years from the date of his
appointment, said Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a true, just and
complete account of his administration and that he is not only incompetent but
also negligent in his management of the estate under his charge consisting of
five haciendas.

The respondent Matias opposed the allegation that it is completely without basis
and false. Records show that he made an accounting and the same was
submitted to the court. That his competence to act as administrator has been
established to the satisfaction of the court. It appears that during the reception of
evidence conducted on December 29, 1965 by the probate court, Carlos S.
Matute and the other heirs submitted their respective lists of exhibits in support of their
motion to ousts Matias.

On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a written objection to the admission of the movants’
exhibits on the ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or
mere photostatic copies of supposed originals which were never properly identified
nor shown in court. four days later, the Counsel for Matias filed with leave of Court a
“Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence” which avers that there is no sufficient
evidence on record to justify and support the motions for the removal of the herein co-
administrator Matias S. Matute.

The probate court issued an order removing Matias S. Matute as co-administrator.

Hence, the certiorari. The respondent contends that the disputed order removing
him as co-administrator is a patent nullity. Upon the other hand, the petitioner
advances the reason in support of the order of removal that the probate judge
accorded the respondent all the opportunity to adduce his evidence but the latter
resorted to dilatory tactics such as filing a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence.

Issue: Whether or not Rule 33 regarding judgment on demurrer to evidence is

applicable to special proceedings such that its’ disregard by the probate court
amounts to grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling: Yes. Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that in the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as far
as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. The application of the above
cited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by the
Rules. Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the
controverted order removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him
the opportunity to adduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that
he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his behalf in the event of
denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence. The Court view that the
above actuation of the probate judge constituted grave abuse of discretion
which dooms his improvident order as nullity.

141. Hilado Vs. CA, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009 - Sette

PRINCIPLE/S:

Special Proceedings
a) Who may be intervene in a Settlement of Estates
 - Has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court.
- Must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent and expectant. (Batama Farmers’ Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. vs. Hon. Rosal., 149 Phil. 514, 519 (1971).

b) Basis of the meaning of Intervenor in a Special Proceeding

Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
RULE 19 – Intervention - Section 1. Who may intervene. — A person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of
an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or
not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
(2[a], [b]a, R12)

c) Why Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable in a

Special Proceeding?
Rule 72 - Section 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence
of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
- Section 2, Rule 72 provides that “[i]n the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable to special proceedings.” We can readily conclude that
notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does
not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent
claim. The definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.

d) Instances an “interested person” may participate in the testate or

intestate proceedings.
(1) Section 1, Rule 79 - recognizes the right of "any person interested" to
oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for
administration;"
(2) Section 3, Rule 79, - mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the
petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any
other persons believed to have interest in the estate;"
(3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to
petition for the allowance of a will;
(4) Section 6 of Rule 87 - allows an individual interested in the estate of the
deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s
title or interest therein;"
 (5) Section 10 of Rule 85 - requires notice of the time and place of the
examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons
interested;"
(6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89 - requires the court to give notice "to the
persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and
(7) Section 1, Rule 90 - allows "any person interested in the estate" to
petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.

e) Claims which must be filed under the notice to creditors required under
Rule 86
RULE 86 - Claims Against Estate - Section 5. Claims which must be filed
under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against
the decent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decent, must be
filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor
or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already
commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer
the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set
off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor
of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly
before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.
- Claims based on contract, whether express or implied, even if
contingent can be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.
- Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to
be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. (Aguas v. Llemos,
et al., 116 Phil. 112 (1962); Leung Ben v. O'Brien, 38 Phil. 182, 189-194 (1918)
Reason: These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and
may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.

f) How Claims Based on Civil Actions For Tort or Quasi-delict are Brought
Against the estate.
RULE 87- Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators - Section 1.
Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but
to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person
or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
- Claims based on Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict are brought against
the estate through Sec. 1 of Rule 87
 g) A person who is not considered an “interested person” cannot
intervene in an intestate proceeding; Exceptions.
General Rule: A person who is not considered an “interested person”
cannot intervene in an intestate proceeding.
Exception: Such persons not deemed “interested persons” may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly
provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect
their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by
which such interests can be protected.

h) Effect of the Exception to the General Rule

Claimants will have the right to be furnished with copies of all processes
and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the
pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate.
Reasons: They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the
Rules of Court.
- Petitioners would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate
proceedings and this would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies
should their interests be compromised.

RULE 135 - Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers - Sec 2.
Publicity of proceedings and records. — The sitting of every court of justice shall
be public, but any court may, in its discretion, exclude the public when the
evidence to be adduced is of such nature as to require their exclusion in the
interest of morality or decency. The records of every court of justice shall be
public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person,
at all proper business hours, under the supervision of the clerk having custody of
such records, unless the court shall, in any special case, have forbidden their
publicity, in the interest of morality or decency.

i) Instances when notice has to be given to interested parties under Rule

135 of the Rules of Court
(1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 - time and place of examining and allowing the
account of the executor or administrator;
(2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 - concerning the petition to authorize the executor
or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber real estates; and;
(3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 - regarding the hearing for the application for an order
for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has
acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases
filed by the petitioners.

j) Proper remedy for complaints against the general competence of the

administrator,
RULE 82 - Section 2. Court may be remove or accept resignation of
executor or administrator. Proceeding upon death, resignation, or removal. — If
an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a
duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
 otherwise incapable or insuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove
him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or
administrator dies, resign, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator
may administer the the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to
act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration
may be to any suitable person.
- It is the proper remedy to seek the removal of the administrator.
- A creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek
such relief.
Reason why a creditor who has contingent claim on the estate can seek
such remedy:
The interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of
sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good
faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose

FACTS: Well-known sugar magnate Benedicto died intestate. He was survived by his
wife and only daughter. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases
against Benedicto involving the petitioners. Benedicto’s wife filed with the RTC a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor. RTC issued an order
appointing her as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband and issuing
letters of administration in her favor.

Petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela praying

that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the
intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed disputing that the petitioners do
not have the legal personality to do so.

RTC and CA denied such manifestation/motion. CA dismissed the petition citing that
the claims of petitioners against the decedent were contingent or expectant, as these
were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts. Hence, this
present petition.

ISSUE/S:
1) WON the petitioners can intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto
Benedicto?
2) WON the claims of petitioners can be filed under the notice to creditors
required under Rule 86?
3) WON petitioners can still intervene in any matter in the intestate proceeding
even if they are not considered “interested persons” who can intervene in the
case?

RULING:
1) NO. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court. Case law has
consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.”
The claims of petitioners against the decedent are contingent or expectant, as these
were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts. Hence
petitioners cannot to intervene in the intestate proceedings.

2) NO. The claims that can be filed under RULE 86 are enumerated under Section 5 of
the said rule. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict is not among those enumerated.
Hence petitioner’s claims does not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the
notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These actions, being as they are civil,
survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the
administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Hence, the merits of petitioners’ claims
against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not
in the intestate proceedings.

3) YES. The petitioners have no general right to intervene. But they may be allowed to
seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under
the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate,
and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be
protected. Hence petitioners are granted the right to be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as
the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. The reasons for this is that they
are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court.

11.3 Acts Before Revocation, Resignation, or Removal to be Valid

142. Estate of Wolfson Vs. Wolfson, G.R. No. L-28054, June 15, 1972 - Jessa

Doctrine: From the book of De Leon

Facts:
● Rosina Marguerite Wolfson passed away on September 14, 1965, in San
Francisco, California.
● A petition for letters of administration was initially filed in the Philippines by Atty.
Manuel Y. Macias on behalf of Ricardo Vito Cruz.
● It was later discovered that Rosina had left a will, which was probated in
California, naming Wells Fargo Bank as the executor and the University of
Michigan as the residuary beneficiary.
● Wells Fargo Bank appoints Manila-based attorneys, including Arturo del Rosario,
to manage Rosina’s estate.
● Atty. Arturo del Rosario petitions to convert Special Proceedings No. 63866 into a
testate proceeding for probate of Rosina’s will.
● Manuel Y. Macias files a separate petition for probate (Special Proceedings No.
67302) in Branch VI, without the knowledge of Ricardo Vito Cruz.
● Multiple motions and oppositions are filed regarding the jurisdiction and
consolidation of both proceedings.
● Consolidation of Special Proceedings No. 67302 with Special Proceedings No.
63866 is ordered by Judge Manuel Barcelona of Branch VIII.
 ● Judge Barcelona dismisses Special Proceedings No. 67302.
● Motion for reconsideration by Macias is denied.
● Macias appeals the dismissal and the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 67302 by Branch VIII is valid.

Ruling:
● The Supreme Court held that under Section 1 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
jurisdiction over estate settlement is exclusive to the court first taking
cognizance. Therefore, the court first hearing Special Proceedings No. 63866
correctly exercised jurisdiction over Rosina’s estate to the exclusion of all others.
● The dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 67302 was affirmed since continuing
with it would violate the prohibition against multiplicity of suits.
● The conversion of an intestate proceedings into a testate one is "entirely a
matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of the court." Special
Proceedings No. 63866 was first instituted on January 10, 1966 by petitioner-
appellant himself as an intestate proceedings because he did not know then
that Rosina Marguerite Wolfson died with a will and three codicils, in behalf of
Ricardo Vito Cruz praying for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of
the said Ricardo Vito Cruz. Said proceedings was raffled to Branch VIII of the
Manila Court of First Instance. By virtue of said petition, appellee Ricardo Vito
Cruz was appointed special administrator and assumed the duties thereof after
qualifying therefor.

11.4 Powers of New Executor or Administrator; Renewal of License to Sell Real

Estate

XII Rule 83 Inventory and Appraisal; Provision for Support of Family

12.1 Inventory and Appraisal to be Returned within Three Months

143. Hilado Vs. CA, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009 - Mary

Facts: well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May

2000... survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix
Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino... two pending civil
cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners

Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor... value of the assets of the decedent to be P5
Million, "net of liabilities."

RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of...
her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor

In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as

among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated
before the Bacolod City courts

RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal... report pertaining to the estate... petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,[9] praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings

RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners
are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in
the intestate proceedings.

Court of Appeals promulgated a decision[12] dismissing the petition and declaring

that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings.

Hence, the present petition

Issues:

lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings
of the estate of Roberto Benedicto... they prayed that they be henceforth furnished
"copies of all processes and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as the
pleadings filed by administratrix

Benedicto with the said court... prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of
the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax... appraisers of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the
same.

moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator
of her verified annual account, and,... upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other
parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate

In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the
right to enforce the judgment... against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent
may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?

Ruling:

Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has
a legal interest... in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x"

While the language of Section 1, Rule

19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings,
case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be
actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and...
expectant."[

The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special
proceedings under the Rules of

Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n
the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as
far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings."... notwithstanding Section 2 of
Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a
decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention"
under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate... contingent claims.

even if... it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance
with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had
sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.

Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any persons interested
in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate
proceedings... it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as
they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders

Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to
be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.

These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced... against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the
records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its
administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other
civil case[21] was... already pending review before this Court at the time of
Benedicto's death.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only
pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in
litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate...
left subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified... in taking
cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is
determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching
consequence in the determination... and distribution of the estate.

Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real
or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to...
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against the executor or administrator."

Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against
a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in
their favor, the estate of the decedent... would have already been distributed, or
diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.

while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly
provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief... sought is necessary to protect their
interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such
interests can be protected.

petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection
with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of
the estate... running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies
should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under

Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate
concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court...
records in the intestate proceedings.

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate

proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of
court processes and pleadings upon them.

We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to

perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is
not the party... entitled to do so.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct.
Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their
prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

Principles:

Section

1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance
of letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;

Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for
letters of administration to... the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons
believed to have interest in the estate;

Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to petition for the
allowance of a will;

Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in... the estate of the
deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent's title or
interest therein;

Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the...
examination and allowance of the Administrator's account "to persons interested;

Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons
interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or
encumbrance of the properties of... the estate

Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an
order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all
obligations are either satisfied or provided for

This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning
ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another
person... should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory
if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim
and caprice of the heirs x x... x... the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated:

"[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs,
intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same,
but not for a decision on... their action."... the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that
the... assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be
duly satisfied.

144. In re: Estate of Reyes, G.R. No. L-24092, October 28, 1936 - Kit

Facts: the parents of Andres Reyes leased certain parcels of land from the Spanish

government. Upon their death dur- ing the

Spanish regime, their son Andres Reyes succeeded them in said lease and the Jatter
afterwards purchased said leased lands as friar lands from the Insular Government in
the years 1909,1910 and 1921, it appearing of record that he was married to Luciana

Farlin

On October 1, 1910, Luciana Farlin also acquired by purchase from the Insular
Government certain parcels of friar land

After the death of Luciana Farlin... her surviving spouse, Andres Reyes, contracted a
second marriage with the herein applicant-appellant Felisa Camia.

During her marriage to Andres Reyes, Felisa Camia also purchased a parcel of friar
land

Andres Reyes died

He was survived by his wife, ... the herein executrix and appellant Felisa Camia, his
only son had with her... and his daughter by his first marriage

Felisa Camia qualified... as executrix of the estate left... by the... deceased husband
Andres Reyes.

The appellee Juana Reyes de llano filed her opposition to this account... claiming that
some of the items of expenses stated therein... are unnecessary and inaccurate.

Issues:

whether or not the oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de llano is still entitled to impugn,
by means of the testimony of the witness Benedicto A. llano,... the valuation or
appraisal of the properties of the deceased Andres Reyes, made by the
commissioners on claims and appraisal and contained in their report of May 8, 1933.

whether the parcels of land designated by the letters e, f, g, h, i, j, k, I and m in the

inventory of the executrix-appellant Felisa Camia de Reyes are private properties... of
the deceased Andres Reyes or are properties of his conjugal partnership with his wife
by his first marriage, Luciana Farlin.

Ruling:

It is inferred from the above-quoted order that what was declared final and
conclusive was the report of the commissioners on claims and appraisal with respect
to the claims of Albino Galeca, Rafaela Dominguez, Raymundo Samson, Filomena
Dominguez and Felisa Camana,... who took no appeal from the resolution of said
commissioners rejecting the claims in question. Section 773 of the Code of Civil
Procedure grants the creditor of a deceased person the right to appeal to the
competent Court of First Instance from the... disallowance, in whole or in part, of his
claim by the committee on claims and appraisal, and failure to exercise this right
within the period and in the manner prescribed by section 775 of said Code makes
the committee's resolution final and... prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction
over the matter

Apparently the statute does not require approval of the committee's appraisals by
the court; but doubtless exceptions thereto might be taken by the executor or
administrator upon whom a copy... was served. The purpose of the inventory and
appraisal of the estate of the decedent is to aid the court in revising the accounts
and determining the liabilities of the executor or administrator and in making a final
and equitable distribution (partition)... of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the
administration of the estate."

It is very clear, therefore, that the committee's appraisal of the estate of the
deceased is not conclusive and the court is not bound to adopt it.

Therefore, the court a quo committed no error in permitting Benedicto A. llano to

testify for the purpose of impugning the committee's appraisal of the estate of the
deceased.

145. Sebial Vs. Sebial, G.R. No. L-23419, June 27, 1975 - Kha

Facts: Gelacio Sebial died in 1943, he had 3 children with his 1st wife Reoncia
(Roberta's mother) and 6 other children with his 2nd wife Dolores, (Benjamina's
mother). In 1960, Benjamina filed for the settlement of her father's estate and her
appointment as administrator. This petition was opposed by Roberta on the ground
that said estate had already been apportioned and that she should be the one
appointed as administrator and not Benjamina. The Court appointed Benjamina and
found that the alleged partition was invalid and ineffective. So the letters of
administration were issued and a notice to the creditors was issued on the same date.

The opposition motion for reconsideration was denied. For the possibility of an
amicable settlement, the court ordered both sides to give a complete list of the
properties of the decedent with segregation for each marriage.

In Nov. 1961, the lower court approved the administrator's inventory (second one) or
six months from the appointment. Roberta then moved for the motion reconsideration
alleging as ground that the court has no jurisdiction to approve the inventory as it was
filed beyond the 3-month period. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Did the court lose jurisdiction to approve the inventory which was made 6
months after the appointment?

Ruling: NO. Under section 1 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, the prescribed three-
month period is not mandatory. Once a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration is filed with the proper court and the publication of the notice of
hearing is complied with, said court acquires jurisdiction over the estate and retains
such until the probate proceedings is closed. Hence, even if the inventory was filed
only after the three-month period, this delay will not deprive the probate court of its
jurisdiction to approve it. However, under section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court,
such unexplained delay can be a ground for an administrator's removal.
 146. Aranas Vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 1516407, January 15, 2014 - Sette

Case Summary (G.R. No. 156407)

Case Background and Parties Involved

● The case of Aranas v. Mercado involves a dispute over the inclusion of certain

properties in the inventory of Emigdio S. Mercado's estate.

● Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate and left behind several properties.

● Thelma M. Aranas, one of his children from his first marriage, filed a petition for

the appointment of Teresita V. Mercado, Emigdio's second wife, as the

administrator of his estate.

Teresita's Appointment as Administrator and Inventory Submission

● Teresita V. Mercado was granted letters of administration and submitted an

inventory of the estate.

● The inventory excluded certain properties that Thelma claimed should be

included.

RTC's Decision and Teresita's Motion for Reconsideration

● The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted Thelma's motion to amend the inventory

and ordered Teresita to include the properties in question.

● The RTC also directed Teresita to render an account of her administration of the

estate.

● Teresita filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the properties had

already been transferred to Mervir Realty Corporation and should not be

included in the inventory.

● The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that the parties had

agreed to submit to its jurisdiction on the issue of which properties should be

included in the inventory.

Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals

 ● Teresita and her co-respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of

Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion in

including the properties in the inventory.

● The CA partially granted the petition, reversing the RTC's orders insofar as they

included certain properties in the inventory.

● The CA held that the properties had already been transferred to Mervir Realty

and should not be included in the estate.

Appeal to the Supreme Court

● Thelma appealed the CA's decision to the Supreme Court.

● The Supreme Court held that the CA had erred in concluding that the RTC

committed grave abuse of discretion.

● The Supreme Court emphasized that the RTC, as an intestate court, had the

authority to determine which properties should be included in the inventory, and

its determination was provisional and subject to revision.

● The Supreme Court also noted that the inclusion of the properties in the

inventory was necessary for the resolution of issues of collation and

advancement to the heirs.

● The Supreme Court therefore reversed the CA's decision and reinstated the

RTC's orders.

Supreme Court's Decision and Rationale

● The Supreme Court granted Thelma's petition and reversed the CA's decision,

reinstating the RTC's orders to include certain properties in the inventory of

Emigdio Mercado's estate.

● The Supreme Court held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion

in making its determination.

● The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of including the properties in

the inventory for the resolution of important issues in the administration of the

estate.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 156407)

Facts:

● Emigdio S. Mercado passed away intestate on January 12, 1991.

● He left behind his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado, and their five children:

Allan, Felimon, Carmencita, Richard, and Maria Teresita.

● Emigdio had two children from his first marriage: Franklin L. Mercado and Thelma

M. Aranas.

● Emigdio owned various properties, including shares in Mervir Realty Corporation

and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation.

● He assigned some real properties to Mervir Realty in exchange for corporate

stocks and sold a property in Badian, Cebu, to the same corporation.

● On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu

City for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate,

which was granted without opposition.

● Teresita submitted an inventory of Emigdio's estate, listing only personal

properties worth P6,675,435.25.

● Thelma claimed that other properties were excluded and moved for an

amendment of the inventory.

● The RTC ordered Teresita to amend the inventory and be examined under oath.

● After a series of hearings, the RTC found that the inventory excluded certain

properties and ordered Teresita to include them.

● Teresita and other heirs sought reconsideration, which was denied.

● They then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which

partly granted their petition, reversing the RTC's orders regarding the inclusion of

certain properties in the inventory.

● The CA held that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

● Thelma then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of

discretion in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory

notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or

exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his

lifetime?
 2. Was certiorari the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?

Ruling:

● The Supreme Court reversed the CA's decision and reinstated the RTC's orders,

directing the inclusion of the disputed properties in the inventory.

● The Supreme Court held that certiorari was the proper recourse to assail the

RTC's interlocutory orders.

Ratio:

● The Supreme Court found that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of

discretion in directing the inclusion of the disputed properties in the inventory.

● The RTC's determination was provisional and subject to revision, as the properties

in question were still registered in Emigdio's name or were part of his estate.

● The RTC had the authority to include all properties known to belong to the

decedent in the inventory, regardless of their registration status.

● The CA erred in concluding that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion,

as the RTC's actions were based on valid legal and factual grounds.

● The Supreme Court also held that certiorari was the proper remedy to challenge

the RTC's interlocutory orders, as they were not final and did not dispose of the

case entirely.

● The RTC's orders were necessary to facilitate the administration and distribution

of the estate, and the CA should not have interfered with the RTC's discretion in

this matter.

12.2 Certain Article Not to be Inventoried

12.3 Allowance to Widow and Family

147. Moore Vs. Wagner, G.R. No. L-25842, March 18, 1927 - Jessa

Facts:
● During the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
deceased Samuel William Allen, the court, upon petition of the widow of said
deceased, entered an order, dated March 5, 1925, requiring the administrator
to give said widow and her daughter Avelina Allen an allowance of P80.
 ● The special administrator appointed in the case objected to the allowance of
the widow upon the ground that the estate is insolvent, in view of the claims
presented and apporved by the committee on appraisal and claims.
● Attorney P. J. Moore, in behalf of severall creditors of the estate, also entered his
opposition to said order of the court upon the same ground.

Issue: May support be demanded when the liabilities exceed the assets of the estate
of the deceased spouse?

Ruling:
Mr. Manresa wisely observed "That the support does not encumber the property
of the deceased spouse, but the general estate, and that by the general estate or the
inventoried estate is meant the dowry or capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the
indebtedness exceed the residue of the estate, the wife can always be allowed
support as part payment of the income of her property. In any case, the support is
given prior to the termination of the liquidation of the partnership, and it does not
seem logical to deny the same before knowing exactly the result of the liquidation, just
because of the fear that the liabilities will exceed the estate, or on the ground of
estimates more or less uncertain, and without any sufficient proof of its reality. The
judge or the administrator, as the case may be, must grant the support referred to in
article 1430, when the same is requested, and if the creditors believe that they are
prejudiced by such an action, by separating from the estate a part of its income, they
can appeal to the court therefrom, by satisfactorily proving that there is no property or
asset that may, in any case, be allotted to the interested parties. It having proven that
no property, either private or conjugal, pertains to the surviving spouse or the heirs of
the deceased, the support cannot be granted, because this, in effect, according to
article 1430, is only an advance payment on account of the respective share of each
partner."

Such is the case now before us. It appears from the record that the liabilities
exceed the assets of the estate of Samuel William Allen and that his widow, by her own
admission, had not contributed any property to the marriage. Wherefore, it is unlawful,
in the present case, to grant the support, having the character of an advance
payment to be deducted from the respective share of each partner, when there is no
property to be partitioned, lacks the legal basis provided by article 1430.

148. Santero Vs. CFI, G.R. No. L-61700, September 14, 1987 - Mary

Facts:
Petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero and Willy Santero are the
children begotten by the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private
respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of
the seven children begotten by the same Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both set of
children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since neither of their
mothers, was married to their father Pablo. A motion for allowance was filed by
private respondents which the CFI of Cavite granted. The remaining three children of
Anselma, Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed Santero, were also included in the
motion for allowance. Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to
any allowance since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully
employed and one is married. Issue: W/N private respondents are entitled to
allowance/support? Held: Yes. The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of
the New Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code. The fact that private
respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should
not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.
While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated
children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her
children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina
and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their
shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil
Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to
receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right
cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule.
Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate
spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here)
149. Estate of Ruiz Vs. CA, G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996 - Kit

**Facts:**
On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will, naming his heirs: his only
son Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine, and Maria Angeline, all daughters
of Edmond Ruiz. Hilario Ruiz died on April 12, 1988. Following his death, the cash
component of his estate was distributed among the heirs per the will, though Edmond
Ruiz, the executor, delayed probate actions.

On June 29, 1992, Maria Pilar filed a petition for the probate of the will and for letters
testamentary to be issued to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond opposed the petition alleging
undue influence but withdrew his opposition on May 14, 1993. Consequently, the will
was admitted to probate on May 18, 1993, and Edmond was issued the letters
testamentary on June 23, 1993.

Edmond leased out a property part of the estate on November 2, 1992, and was
ordered by the court to deposit the rental payments. Subsequently, Edmond
requested funds for real estate taxes and other charges, motions for funds were
granted in smaller amounts, and on July 28, 1993, Edmond filed an ex-parte motion for
the release of deposited rent funds. Maria Pilar opposed and filed motions for the
release of funds to the heirs and for a certificate of allowance for the will.

On August 26, 1993, the trial court denied Edmond’s motion but granted Maria Pilar’s
motion, ordering the release of rent payments and transfer of property titles to the heirs
upon a bond filing. Edmond moved for reconsideration, which was partially granted in
terms of fund release for administration costs but held other matters in abeyance
pending notice to creditors. Edmond filed further administrative fund requests and
appealed the trial court’s decisions to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial
court’s orders on November 10, 1994, and January 5, 1995.

Edmond sought review from the Supreme Court claiming grave abuse of discretion by
the Court of Appeals.
**Issues:**
1. Whether the probate court had the authority to grant support allowance to the
testator’s grandchildren.
2. Whether the probate court properly ordered the release of property titles to heirs
before the estate’s debts and obligations were settled.
3. Whether the probate court correctly restricted Edmond’s possession of the estate’s
properties for administrative purposes.

**Court’s Decision:**
– On the Support Allowance: The Supreme Court ruled that the allowance for support
specified in Section 3 of Rule 83 pertains only to the widow and minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased, not extending to grandchildren regardless of
their minority or incapacity. Thus, it annulled the probate court’s order granting
allowances to the grandchildren.
– On the Release of Property Titles: The court decided that distribution of estate
properties (including title release) should occur only after debt and obligation
payments or upon the distributees posting a bond. Finding that conditions for an
advance distribution were unmet (with unpaid taxes and uncertified estate status), the
court annulled the probate court’s order for title release.
– On the Executor’s Rights: It reaffirmed that Edmond, as executor, could retain
necessary possession of estate properties for settling debts and administrative
expenses. However, it was prudent for the probate court to demand accounting
before releasing additional funds to Edmond.

**Doctrine:**
– The right of the executor to possession and administration of estate assets is limited to
the necessity of settling debts and expenses (Rule 84, Section 3).
– Provisions for support allowances under Section 3 of Rule 83 are restricted to the
widow and minor or incapacitated children, not extending beyond to other relatives
like grandchildren.
– Distribution of estate properties should strictly comply with Rule 90 of the Revised
Rules of Court, specifically ensuring all debts and obligations, including estate taxes,
are settled or bonded if distributed in advance.

150. Heirs of Jose Sy Bang vs. Bang G.R. No. 114217, Oct. 13, 2009 - Kha
XIII Rule 84 General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators
 13.1 Executor or Administrator to Have Access to Partnership Books and Property

13.2 Executor or Administrator to Keep Buildings in Repair

13.3 Executor or Administrator to Retain Whole Estate to Pay Debts, and to

Administer Estate Not Willed

151. Estate of Ruiz Vs. CA, G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996 - Sette

FACTS:

Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond
Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial
cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. 2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his
estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance
with the decedents will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did
not take any action for the probate of his fathers holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was private respondent Maria
Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition
for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. 3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the
ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate - the house and lot at No. 2
Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline4 - was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third
persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch
Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the
one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993,
Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent
after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate. 5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate
taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of
P7,722.006
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will.
Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and
ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of
a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued on June 23,
1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-Parte
Motion for Release of Funds. It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited
with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and
concurrently filed a Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for
Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. Montes prayed for the release of
the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and
for the distribution of the testators properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and
the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioners motion for release of funds
but granted respondent Montes motion in view of petitioners lack of opposition. It thus
ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedents three granddaughters. It
further ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties
bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a
bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to
respondent Montes motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court
failed to consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was
withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract
over Valle Verde property had been renewed for another year. 7
Despite petitioners manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered
the release of the funds to Edmond but only such amount as may be necessary to
cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support of the testators three
granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the
inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to
respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from
the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.

ISSUE: Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before
payment of the estate’s debts and obligations, has the authority to distribute the
estate: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the
testator’s grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to
grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

RULING:

The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the
estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such
provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in
the inheritance.

Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet
been inventoried and appraised.

1. No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the
funds of the decedent’s estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and
children” and does not extend it to the deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their
minority or incapacity.

2. No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.

3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of

the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised “so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration, He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents’
properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of
all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his
administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and
estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity,
propriety and justness.
 152. De Hilado Vs. Jocson, G.R. No. L-462, October 18, 1939 - Jessa

Doctrine: (From the book of De Leon) Is court intervention required before an executor
or administrator may enter into a lease agreement over the decedent's estate?
Answering this question, the Supreme Court held that entering into a lease contract is
merely an act of administration for which no court order is required to render it valid.

Action: Appeal from an order of the CFI of Occidental Negros

Facts:
● On February 8, 1935, the administatrix Estefania Fenix of the intestate of the
deceased Rafael Jocson, executed in favor of appellant Jesus R. Nava a
contract of lease period of five crop years, over certain properties of the estate,
at a stipulated rental of P1,000 a year.
● The contract was entered into without the intervention of the court acting in the
intestate proceedings.
● On July 23, 1936, appellee herein, Conception Jocson de Hillado, filed a motion
in said proceedings, praying that the administratix be required to explain certain
details in the matter of said lease; and in reply to the answer filed by said
administratrix, she prayed that the contract be declared null and void.
● The court in its order of December 6, 1936, declared the contract null and void
and ordered the administratix to lease the lands compromised in the contract to
the highest bidder at public auction.
● Jesus R. Nava, the lessee, filed a motion asking that the order be set aside, it
having been issued without jurisdiction.
● The motion was denied, and he appealed.

Issue: Can the lower court annul, in the intestate proceedings, a contract of lease
executed by the administratrix without its intervention.

Ruling:
● The contract here in question being a mere act of administration, could validly
be entered into by the administratrix within her powers of administration, even
without the court's previous authority. And the court had no power to annul or
invalidate the contract in the intestate proceedings wherein it had no
jurisdiction over the person of the lessee. A separate ordinary action is necessary
to that effect. Order is accordingly reversed, with costs against appellee.

153. San Diego Vs. Nombre, G.R. No. L-19265, May 29, 1964 - Mary

Petitioner/s: MOISES SAN DIEGO, SR.

Respondent/s: ADELO NOMBRE and PEDRO ESCANLAR No such limitation on the power of
a judicial administrator to grant a lease of property placed under his custody is provided
for in the

Doctrine: The provisions on agency should not apply to a judicial present law. Under Art.
1647, it is only when the lease is to be administered. A judicial administrator is appointed
by the court. He is not only recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot be instituted
the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate. without
special authority. Thus, regardless of the period of the lease. Before entering into his duties,
he is required to file a bond. There is no need for special authority unless the contract is to
be circumstances are not required in agency. The agent is only answerable to recorded in
the Registry. his principal. The protection that law gives the principal in limiting the powers
and rights of an agent stems from the fact that control by the principal Rule 85, Sec. 3 of
the ROC authorizes a judicial administrator to can only be through agreements. Whereas,
the acts of a judicial administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by will, for
administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the purposes of
liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise appointing court. all acts of
administration without special authority of the Court; such as the leasing the property. And
where the lease has been formally: entered into, the court cannot, in the same
proceeding, annul the (1) Respondent Adelo Nombre was the duly constituted judicial
same. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator. As such, he
leased one of the properties of the estate administrator or the heirs to annul the lease. —a
fishpond—to Pedro Escanlar, the other respondent. The terms of the lease was for 3 years,
with a yearly rental of P3,000. The (6) On appeal to the SC, petitioner contends that Art.
1878(8) limits the transaction was done without previous authority or approval of the right
of a judicial administrator to lease the real property without prior Court. court authority
and approval, if it exceeds 1 year. The lease in favor of Escalanlar, being 3 years and
without court approval, is therefore (2) A year after, Nombre was removed as
administrator, and was void. replaced by one Sofronio Campillanos. Escalanlar was cited
for contempt for allegedly refusing to surrender the fishpond to the newly Issue: W/N the
provisions on Agency should apply in this case. (NO) appointed administrator. Held: (3)
Subsequently, Campillanos filed a motion for authority to execute a lease contract over
the fishpond, in favor of petitioner Moises San The provisions on agency should not apply
to a judicial administrator. A Diego, for 5 years with a yearly rental of P5,000. Escalanlar
was not a judicial administrator is appointed by the court. He is not only notified of the said
motion. Nombre, on the other hand, is opposed to representative of said Court, but also
the heirs and creditors of the estate. the motion, pointing out that the fishpond was leased
by him to Before entering into his duties, he is required to file a bond. These Escalandar for
3 years. He alleged that the validity of the lease circumstances are not required in the
agency. The agent is only answerable to a contract entered into by a judicial
administrator who must be recognized his principal. The protection which law gives the
principal in limiting the unless declared void in a separate action. powers and rights of an
agent stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be through agreements.
Whereas, the acts of a judicial (4) The lower court declared the contract in favor of
Escanlar null and administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the
void for want of judicial authority and that San Diego offered better appointing court.
lease conditions than Escanlar. In light of this, Escanlar agreed to increase the rental to
P5,000 after the termination of his original Fallo: The decision of the CA was affirmed.
contract. However, the trial judge stated that such contract was fraudulent and executed
in bad faith because Nombre was removed as administrator and the rentals of the
property was inadequate.

XIV Rule 85 Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators

14.1 Executor or Administrator Chargeable with All Estate and Income

 14.2 Not to Profit by Increase or Lose by Decrease in Value

14.3 When Not Accountable for Debts Due Estate

14.4 Accountable for Income from Realty Used by Him

14.5 Accountable if He Neglects or Delays to Raise or Pay Money

14.6 When Allowed Money Paid as Cost

14.7 What Expenses and Fees Allowed Executor or Administrator:

Not to Charge for Services as Attorney;
Compensation Provided by Will Controls Unless Renounced

154. De Gala-Sison Vs. Maddela, G.R. No. L-24584, October 30, 1975 - Kit

**Facts:**
1. **Initial Probate Proceedings:** Generoso de Gala died, and Iluminada de Gala-
Sison was appointed administratrix of his estate. On August 29, 1952, Judge Vicente
Santiago ordered Sison to include certain jewelry in the estate inventory and deposit
cash (P40,998.56) with a bank.
2. **Appeal and Certiorari:** The Court of Appeals affirmed the 1952 order on February
2, 1961. However, the Supreme Court modified it on July 31, 1963, reducing the deposit
amount to P39,240.15 due to approved expenses by Sison.
3. **Execution of Modified Order:** On October 7, 1963, Socorro Manalo moved for
execution of the July 31, 1963 Supreme Court decision. Judge Maddela, on October
16, 1963, ordered compliance with the jewelry inclusion and cash deposit.
4. **Non-compliance and Manifestation:** Sison filed an amended inventory but did
not deposit the funds. She argued via a manifestation on November 29, 1963, that
several deductions (including advances, allowances, and expenses) reduced her
deposit obligations.
5. **Respondent Judge’s Order:** On August 21, 1964, Judge Maddela rejected Sison’s
contention for further deductions, reaffirming her obligation to deposit P39,240.15.
Motions filed by Sison on September 17, 1964, for reconsideration and other
allowances were subsequently denied on May 10, 1965.
6. **Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration:** Sison filed another motion for
reconsideration on May 26, 1965. She sought approval of expenditures and
deductions she previously outlined.
7. **Certiorari Petition Filed:** Before the lower court could act on her new trial motion,
Sison petitioned for certiorari to annul the orders mandating the deposit and denying
her other motions.

**Issues:**
1. Did Judge Maddela commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the deposit of
P39,240.15 despite Sison’s contention of entitlement to further deductions?
2. Can Sison as administratrix be reimbursed for specific expenses and be granted
advances and allowances against her distributive share pending proper probate
court approval?
3. Is a certiorari petition appropriate given that a motion for new trial/reconsideration
was still pending before the lower court?

**Court’s Decision:**
1. **Deposit Order and Grave Abuse of Discretion:** The Supreme Court dismissed the
certiorari petition, stating that it is premature due to the pending motion for new trial.
The correctness of the P39,240.15 deposit order depends on verifying the legitimacy of
Sison’s claimed expenses, allowances, and inheritances, which should be determined
by the probate court.
2. **Reimbursement and Advances:** The Court reiterated the probate court’s
discretion to approve or deny reimbursement and advances upon proper evidentiary
presentation. Since the motion for new trial sought an opportunity to submit receipts
and evidence of expenses, the probate court was the proper forum for such matters.
3. **Appropriateness of Certiorari Petition:** The Court emphasized exhaustion of
available remedies in the lower court before filing a certiorari petition. Since the lower
court had not yet addressed Sison’s reconsideration motion, the petition was
premature. Certiorari cannot substitute existing remedies like appeals or pending
motions.

**Doctrine:**
– The probate court retains authority to ascertain and approve expenses, allowances,
and inheritances in estate administration, adhering to proper procedures and
evidentiary support.
– A petition for certiorari is extraordinary and should only address jurisdictional defects
after all other remedies are exhausted.

155. De Guzman Vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29276, May 18, 1978 - Kha

Facts: Deceased testator was survived by 8 children and his will was probated Letter
of administration were issued to his son Doc Victorino pursuant to an order of the court
in a special proceeding. One of the properties left was a residential house,
adjudicated to the 8 children pro-indiviso, each being given a 1/8 share. The project
of partition was signed by all children and approved by court order dated April 14,
1967, but subject to the outcome of the instant accounting incident:
o Administrator (Victorino) submitted 4 accounting reports for June 1974-
September 1967
o 3 heirs interposed objections to his disbursements, which breakdown consists
of: expenses for the improvement and renovation of the house, living
expenses of Librada de Guzman while occupying the home without paying
rent and other expenses (which will be mentioned more specifically in the
ratio)
o the probate court instructed the administrator not to make these
expenses without first seeking authority of court – such was obtained by order. It
is from that order that the oppositors now appeal to the SC

Issue: WON the expenses made by the administrator were “necessary expenses in the
care, management and settlement of the estate”—YES to some, NO to others,
discussed in the ratio.

Ratio:
Preliminaries
 ● court cited important provisions. The one cited below is the only important one
for the ratio. But if you wanna check the others: sec. 1(c) rule 81, sec. 8,9,10 rule
85
● An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary expenses in the care,
management, and settlement of the estate... entitled to possess and
manage the decedent’s real and personal estate as long as it is necessary for
the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration... accountable
for the whole decedent’s estate which has come into his possession, with all the
interest, profit, and income thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such
estate as is sold by him, at the price at which it was sold (Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs. 1
and 7, Rule 85, Rules ofCourt).

I. expenses for the renovation and improvement of the family home:

➢ includes repair of terrace and interior, bathroom, fence
➢ According to the oppositors they’re not necessary expenses of administration,
as clarified in the Lizarraga case: administration expenses should be those which
are necessary for the management of the estate, for protecting it against
destruction or deterioration, and, possibly, for the production of fruits. They are
expenses entailed for the preservation and productivity of the estate and its
management for purposes of liquidation, payment of debts, and distribution of
the residue among the persons entitled thereto.
➢ SC: the partition was pro-indiviso; 5 of the 8 consented to the expenses; they
obviously redounded to the benefit of the owners—preservation of home and
social standing. Thus, probate court did not err

II. expenses incurred by Librada de Guzman as occupant of the house without paying
rent:
➢ Includes house help, light and water bill, gas, oil etc.
➢ Probate court allowed the use of estate income for this simply because the
occupancy of that heir did not prevent the others from themselves occupying
also
➢ SC: these were personal expenses, inuring only to her benefit and should not be
charged against the estate. She should shoulder these. Trial court erred in
approving these

III. other expenses:

➢ Includes Steno notes, representation expenses, expenses in celebration of the
first death anniversary
➢ SC: all disallowed because they have nothing to do with care, management
and settlement of estate. Only expenses for lawyer’s subsistence and gift to the
physician attending to the deceased when he was still alive should be allowed

156. Lacson Vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 86250, February 26, 1990 - Sette

Facts:

On August 26, 1987, the private respondent, Ephraim Serquina, petitioned the
respondent court for the probate of the last will and testament of Carmelita Farlin. His
petition was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 127-87 of the respondent court, entitled "Re
Testate Estate of Carmelita S. Farlin, Ephraim J. Serquina, Petitioner." He also petitioned
the court in his capacity as counsel for the heirs, the herein petitioners, and as
executor under the will.
The petition was not opposed and hence, on November 17, 1987, the respondent
court issued a "certificate of allowance," the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing, the Court hereby renders certification that subject
will and testament is accordingly allowed in accordance with Sec. 13 of Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court.

On March 14, 1988, Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a "motion for attorney's fees" against
the petitioners, alleging that the heirs had agreed to pay, as and for his legal services
rendered, the sum of P68,000.00.

Thereafter summonses were served upon the heirs "as if it were a complaint against
said heirs” directing them to answer the motion.

Thereafter, the heirs filed their answer and denied the claim for P68,000.00 alleging
that the sum agreed upon was only P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly already paid.

After pre-trial, the respondent court rendered judgment directing the respondent heirs
to pay their lawyer the sum of P65,000.00 as true and reasonable attorney's fees which
shall be a lien on the subject properties. Cost against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

On October 21, 1988, eleven days after the heirs received a copy of the decision, the
latter filed a notice of appeal.

On November 7, 1988, the respondent court issued an order directing the heirs to
amend their notice of appeal.

On October 27, 1988, the respondent court issued an order "noting" the notice on
appeal "appellants [the heirs] having failed to correct or complete the same within
the reglementary period to effect an appeal."

On November 24, 1988, the respondent court issued yet another order denying the
notice of appeal for failure of the heirs to file a record on appeal.

Thereafter, Atty. Serquina moved for execution.

On December 5, 1988, the respondent court issued an order granting execution.

The petitioners submit that the decision, dated October 26, 1988, and the orders,
dated October 27, 1988, November 24, 1988, and December 5, 1988, respectively, are
null and void for the following reasons: (1) the respondent court never acquired
jurisdiction over the "motion for attorney's fees" for failure on the part of the movant,
Ephraim Serquina, to pay docket fees; (2) the respondent court gravely abused its
discretion in denying the heirs' notice of appeal for their failure to file a record on
appeal; and (3) the respondent court also gravely abused its discretion in awarding
attorney's fees contrary to the provisions of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules of Court.

Atty. Serquina now defends the challenged acts of the respondent court: (1) his
motion was a mere incident to the main proceedings; (2) the respondent court rightly
denied the notice of appeal in question for failure of the heirs to submit a record on
appeal; and (3) in collecting attorney's fees, he was not acting as executor of
Carmelita Farlin's last will and testament because no letters testamentary had in fact
been issued.

We take these up seriatim.

I.

Anent docket fees, it has been held that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.

Although the rule has since been tempered,[12] that is, there must be a clear showing
that the party had intended to evade payment and to cheat the courts, it does not
excuse him from paying docket fees as soon as it becomes apparent that docket fees
are indeed payable.

In the case at bar, the "motion for attorney's fees" was clearly in the nature of an
action commenced by a lawyer against his clients for attorney's fees. The very
decision of the court states:

This case is an out-growth from Sp. Proc. No. 127-87 of same Court which was long
decided (sic). It resulted from the filing of a petition for attorney's fees by the lawyer of
the petitioner's heirs in the case against the latter.

Upon the filing of the petition for attorney's fees, the heir-respondents (sic) were
accordingly summoned to answer the petition as if it were a complaint against said
heirs who retained the petitioner as their lawyer in the said case.[13]

In that event, the parties should have known, the respondent court in particular, that
docket fees should have been priorly paid before the court could lawfully act on the
case, and decide it.

It may be true that the claim for attorney's fees was but an incident in the main case,
still, it is not an escape valve from the payment of docket fees because as in all
actions, whether separate or as an offshoot of a pending proceeding, the payment of
docket fees is mandatory.

Assuming, therefore, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Serquina's demand for attorney's
fees in the sum of P68,000.00 is valid, he, Atty. Serquina, should have paid the fees in
question before the respondent court could validly try his "motion".

II.

With respect to the second issue, it has been held that in appeals arising from an
incident in a special proceeding, a record on appeal is necessary, otherwise, the
appeal faces a dismissal.[14] It has likewise been held, however, that in the interest of
justice, an appeal, brought without a record on appeal, may be reinstated under
exceptional circumstances. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It is noted, however, that the question presented in this case is one of first impression;
that the petitioner acted in honest, if mistaken, interpretation of the applicable law;
that the probate court itself believed that the record on appeal was unnecessary; and
that the private respondent herself apparently thought so, too, for she did not move to
dismiss the appeal and instead impliedly recognized its validity by filing the appellee's
brief.

In view of these circumstances, and in the interest of justice, the Court feels that the
petitioner should be given an opportunity to comply with the above-discussed rules by
submitting the required record on appeal as a condition for the revival of the appeal.
The issue raised in his appeal may then be fully discussed and, in the light of the briefs
already filed by the parties, resolved on the merits by the respondent court.[15]

In the instant case, the Court notes the apparent impression by the parties at the
outset, that a record on appeal was unnecessary, as evidenced by: (1) the very
holding of the respondent court that "[i]t is now easy to appeal as there is no more
need for a record on appeal … [b]y merely filing a notice of appeal, the appellant
can already institute his appeal …;"[16] (2) in its order to amend notice of appeal, it
did not require the appellants to submit a record on appeal; and (3) Atty. Serquina
interposed no objection to the appeal on that ground.

In any event, since we are annulling the decision appealed from, the matter is a dead
issue.

III.

As we have indicated, we are granting certiorari and are annulling the decision
appealed from, but there seems to be no reason why we can not dispose of the heirs
appeal in a single proceeding.

It is pointed out that an attorney who is concurrently an executor of a will is barred

from recovering attorney's fees from the estate. The Rule is specifically as follows:

SEC. 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for
services as attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. An
executor or administrator shall be allowed the necessary expenses in the care,
management, and settlement of the estate, and for his services, four pesos per day for
the time actually and necessarily employed, or a commission upon the value of so
much of the estate as comes into his possession and is finally disposed of by him in the
payment of debts, expenses, legacies, or distributive shares, or by delivery to heirs or
devisees, of two per centum of the first five thousand pesos of such value, one per
centum of so much of such value as exceeds five thousand pesos and does not
exceed thirty thousand pesos, one-half per centum of so much of such value as
exceeds thirty thousand pesos and does not exceed one hundred thousand pesos,
and one-quarter per centum of so much of such value as exceeds one hundred
thousand pesos. But in any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement
has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity
on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed. If
objection to the fees allowed be taken, the allowance may be re-examined on
appeal.

If there are two or more executors or administrators, the compensation shall be

apportioned among them by the court according to the services actually rendered
by them respectively.
When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the
estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him.

When the deceased by will makes some other provision for the compensation of his
executor, that provision shall be a full satisfaction for his services unless by a written
instrument filed in the court he renounces all claim to the compensation provided by
the will.[17]

The rule is therefore clear that an administrator or executor may be allowed fees for
the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover attorney's
fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such a compensation is
in the nature of executor's or administrator's commissions, and never as attorney's fees.
In one case,[18] we held that "a greater sum [other than that established by the rule]
may be allowed 'in any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has
been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity on
the part of the executor or administrator.'"[19] It is also left to the sound discretion of
the court.[20] With respect to attorney's fees, the rule, as we have seen, disallows
them. Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court set aside the sum of P65,000.00 as
and for Mr. Serquina's attorney's fees, to operate as a "lien on the subject
properties,"[21] the trial judge must be said to have gravely abused its discretion
(apart from the fact that it never acquired jurisdiction, in the first place, to act on said
Mr. Serquina's "motion for attorney's fees).

The next question is quite obvious: Who shoulders attorney's fees? We have held that a
lawyer of an administrator or executor may not charge the estate for his fees, but
rather, his client.[22] Mutatis mutandis, where the administrator is himself the counsel
for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay therefor.

In that connection, attorney's fees are in the nature of actual damages, which must
be duly proved.[23] They are also subject to certain standards, to wit: (1) they must be
reasonable, that is to say, they must have a bearing on the importance of the subject
matter in controversy; (2) the extent of the services rendered; and (3) the professional
standing of the lawyer.[24] In all cases, they must be addressed in a full-blown trial and
not on the bare word of the parties.[25] And always, they are subject to the
moderating hand of the courts.

The records show that Atty. Ephraim Serquina, as counsel for the heirs, performed the
following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. That after the order of allowance for probate of the will, the undersigned counsel
assisted the heirs to transfer immediately the above-mentioned real estate in their res-
pective names, from (sic) the payment of estate taxes in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue to the issuance by the Registry of Deeds of the titles, in order for the heirs to
sell the foregoing real estate of 10,683 sq. m. (which was also the subject of sale prior
to the death of the testator) to settle testator's obligations and day-to-day subsistence
being (sic) that the heirs, except Zena F. Velasco, are not employed neither doing any
business;[26]
The Court is not persuaded from the facts above that Atty. Serquina is entitled to the
sum claimed by him (P68,000.00) or that awarded by the lower court (P65,000.00). The
Court observes that these are acts performed routinely since they form part of what
any lawyer worth his salt is expected to do. The will was furthermore not contested.
They are not, so Justice Pedro Tuason wrote, "a case [where] the administrator was
able to stop what appeared to be an improvident disbursement of a substantial
amount without having to employ outside legal help at an additional expense to the
estate,"[27] to entitle him to a bigger compensation. He did not exactly achieve
anything out of the ordinary.

The records also reveal that Atty. Serquina has already been paid the sum of
P6,000.00.[28] It is our considered opinion that he should be entitled to P15,000.00 for
his efforts on a quantum meruit basis. Hence, we hold the heirs liable for P9,000.00
more.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) GRANTING the

petition and making the temporary restraining order issued on January 16, 1989
PERMANENT; and (2) ORDERING the petitioners to PAY the private respondent, Atty.
Ephraim Serquina, attorney's fees in the sum of P9,000.00. The said fees shall not be
recovered from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

14.8 When Executor or Administrator to Render Account

157. Tumang Vs. Laguio, G.R. No. L-50277, February 14, 1980 - Jessa

Summary: The court rules that the executrix of an estate must render a supplemental
accounting of all cash and stock dividends received after the approval of her final
accounts, as the duty to account cannot be waived and must be performed before
the administration is closed.

Facts:
● The case "Estate of Tumang v. Laguio" involves the administratrix-appellee,
Magdalena A. Tumang, managing the estate of the late Dominador Tumang.
● Initially heard in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga under Special
Proceeding No. 1953.
● Magdalena Tumang filed a petition to close the testate proceedings for herself
and her two children, Melba Tumang Ticzon and Nestor A. Tumang, claiming
they had received their adjudicated properties.
● Guia T. Laguio and her minor children opposed the petition, arguing not all
properties were delivered and partial termination was not permissible.
● Magdalena Tumang withdrew her petition and filed a "Compliance" pleading,
asserting full payment of estate and inheritance taxes and no pending claims.
● The court denied a motion to require an accounting from the administratrix on
February 5, 1971, stating the final accounting had been approved.
● Guia T. Laguio and her children filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied on August 16, 1971, on the grounds that accepting the cash dividends
 without requiring an accounting constituted a waiver of their right to question
the correctness of the dividends.
● The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals, as it
involved purely legal issues.

Issue:
1. Should the court have required the executrix to render an accounting of the
cash and stock dividends received after the approval of her final accounts?
2. Have the petitioners waived their right to demand such accounting by
accepting the dividends without requiring an accounting?

Ruling:
1. Yes, the court should have required the executrix to render an accounting of the
cash and stock dividends received after the approval of her final accounts.
2. No, the petitioners have not waived their right to demand such accounting by
accepting the dividends without requiring an accounting.

Ratio:
● Under Section 8 of Rule 85, an executor or administrator must render an account
of their administration within one year of receiving letters testamentary or of
administration and must render further accounts as required by the court until
the estate is wholly settled.
● The dividends in question were not included in the final accounts rendered by
the executrix.
● The duty to account for all assets of the decedent's estate is a fundamental
responsibility that cannot be waived or disregarded.
● The approval of the final accounts did not divest the court of jurisdiction to
require a supplemental accounting.
● The interests of all parties would be better served and the conflict resolved if an
additional accounting was made.
● The court disagreed with the lower court's finding that the petitioners had
waived their right to an accounting by accepting the dividends without
requiring one.
● The duty to account is a necessary duty that must be performed and acted
upon by the court before the administration is finally closed.
● The orders of the lower court dated February 5, 1971, and August 16, 1971, were
set aside, and the executrix was ordered to render a supplemental accounting
of all cash and stock dividends and other properties of the estate that came
into her possession after the approval of her final accounts.

14.9 Examinations on Oath with Respect to Account

14.10 Account to be Settled on Notice

158. Hilado Vs. CA, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009 - Mary
Facts: Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000; survived by his wife, private
respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only
daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino two pending civil cases against
Benedictoinvolving the petitioners. Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for the
issuance of letters ofadministration in her favor which was granted by the RTC of
Manila. The value of the assets of the decedent is P5 Million, "net of liabilities." In the List
of Liabilities attached to the inventory, the private respondent included as among the
liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the
Bacolod City courts. RTC required private respondents to submit a complete and
updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate. Then, petitioners filed
with the Manila RTCa Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they
be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings. RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground
that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of
Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
Hence, the present petition.

Issue/s: 1. WON creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim have the right to
participate in the settlement proceeding by way of intervention under Rule 19.

2. WON petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of the deceased, are
entitled to copies of all the processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceeding. Ruling:#1 Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth
under Rule 19does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent [Link] definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingentclaims. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that anintervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either ofthe parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to
be adversely affected by adistribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court x x x" While thelanguage of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude
petitioners from intervening inthe intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held
that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct
and immediate, and not simplycontingent and expectant."

#2 In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide
acreditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect
ofthe testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances
whensuch persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while
there is nogeneral right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seekcertain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided
for under theRules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in
the estate,and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can
beprotected. Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of
theintestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the
serviceof court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the
creditorin seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in
accordance withthe rules will be duly satisfied. Nonetheless, in the instances that the
Rules on SpecialProceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the
petitioners as"interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when
notice has to begiven to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in
reference to the timeand place of examining and allowing the account of the
executor or administrator; (2)Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize
the executor or administrator tosell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber real estates; and; (3)Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the
application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the
administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the
pending cases filed by the petitioners.

14.11 Surety on Bond may be Party to Accounting