Trump Tariffs: Economic and

market implications
Economics and Macro Strategy

DBS Group Research

03-04-2025
Trump Tariffs: Economic and market implications

2
US Trump’s “Liberation” Day
Unlike any other day

Only a mega market

meltdown and 10% baseline tariff.
House/Senate
Republican revolt could These are across-the-board levies on all imports, effective April 5.
change Trump’s mind
“Discounted reciprocal tariff” The higher rates are for nations the
US tariff history
White House considers bad actors on trade. Japan: 24%, EU: 20%,
Average rate on Average rate on all China: 54% (34% plus 20% already levied)
dutiable imports imports
1890s
50% 20%
(McKinley) The above are in lieu of the universal 10% tariff, effective April 9
1930
(Hawley- 60% 20%
Smoot) Canada and Mexico are excluded from the reciprocal tariff regime. They
2018-19
(Trump)
10% 3% are still subject to plans to impose 25% tariffs on most imports.
2025
10-60% 20%+
(Trump)
Auto tariffs will take effect tonight. 25% tariffs on all foreign-made
Source: Tax Foundation, DBS autos as of midnight.

3
 Regional dispersion
End of re-shoring?

China has reciprocal

tariffs and past tariffs. Tariffs and vulerabilities
Adds up to over 60%
35%

30%

Share of exports to the US

Taiwan Vietnam
25%
Japan Thailand
20% S Korea
India China
15%
Philippines Indonesia
10% Malaysia
Singapore
5%
HK SAR
0%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
Reciprocal rates
Source: CEIC, DBS

4
Managing the coming crisis
Top-of-mind for a CFO

Investment Portfolio Triage. Portfolio impact, manage liquidity, and hedge

exposures where possible against market volatility

Rapid Economic Impact Assessment

Underwriting & Exposure Review. Trade credit, marine cargo, potentially political
risk, D&O for highly impacted industries

Stakeholder Communication. Board, regulators, especially MAS, key clients/brokers,

and internal teams

Capital Adequacy Check. Re-run solvency calculations based on immediate market

movements and potential future stress scenarios related to the new tariffs. Confirm
capital buffers remain sufficient.

Scenario Planning Update

Monitor Counterparty Risk

5
US Four inconsistencies of Trump’s model
Brewing macro risks

Forcing other countries

to appreciate their
currencies or stop using Can’t have the following simultaneously:
the USD will open a
massive can of
economic and financial
worms • Immigration tightening and a lower cost of living

• Tax cuts and lower fiscal deficit

• Tariffs and competitiveness

• Weaker USD and lower interest rates

6
Threats from trade war
Auto sector vulnerabilities

US: Top 10 sources of passengar car imports (2024)

USD bn % share
1 Mexico 48.4 22.7
2 Japan 39.9 18.7
3 South Korea 37.4 17.5
4 Canada 27.6 12.9
5 Germany 25.3 11.9
6 UK 9.7 4.5
7 Slovakia 6.3 2.9
8 Italy 3.9 1.8
9 Sweden 3.9 1.8
10 China 2.6 1.2
World total 213.6 100
Sources: US Census Bureau, DBS

7
Threats from trade war
Semiconductor sector vulnerabilities

US: Top 10 sources of semiconductor imports (2024)

USD bn % share

1 Malaysia 16.2 19.8

2 Taiwan 15.5 19.0

3 Vietnam 8.8 10.7

4 South Korea 8.5 10.4

5 Thailand 5.2 6.3

6 Israel 4.7 5.7

7 Mexico 2.8 3.4

8 China 2.6 3.2

9 Japan 2.5 3.0

10 Ireland 2.2 2.6

World total 81.9 100

Sources: US Census Bureau, DBS

8
Threats from trade war
Pharmaceutical sector vulnerabilities

US: Top 10 sources of pharmaceutical imports (2024)

USD bn % share

1 Ireland 73.4 29.7

2 Switzerland 21.8 8.8

3 Singapore 19.3 7.8

4 Germany 17.3 7.0

5 India 13.1 5.3

6 Belgium 12.8 5.2

7 Italy 12.2 4.9

8 China 9.2 3.7

9 Japan 7.5 3.0

10 UK 7.4 3.0

World total 246.8 100

Sources: US Census Bureau, DBS

9
Firm level Profit, market share, solvency
impact Challenges galore

Spread cost across the supply chain, all

the way to the customer

Accept hit to margins and profitability

Solvency considerations

10
Economy Risks to GDP growth
level impact Retaliations could make it worse; deal-making could make it better

2025 Risk to
Growth, yoy
forecast forecast
China 5.0% -0.5%
Hong Kong SAR 2.5% -0.5%
India 6.5% -0.4%
Indonesia 5.0% -0.5%
Malaysia 4.8% -1.0%
Philippines 5.8% -0.3%
Singapore 2.8% -0.4%
South Korea 1.7% -0.7%
Taiwan 3.0% -1.8%
Thailand 2.6% -1.5%
Vietnam 6.8% -2.0%
Eurozone 1.0% -0.3%
Japan 0.9% -0.3%
United States 2.0% -0.5%
11
Trump Tariffs: Economic and market implications

12
 China and Impact assessment of trade war
Hong Kong

Trade vis-à-vis the US (12m moving total) Additional tariff 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 54% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
(USD bn) Exports Imports Trade balance
700
Biden 620 Average tariff 21% 31% 41% 51% 61% 65% 71% 81% 91% 101% 111%
Trump 1.0
600
526 Original average
US tariff on
500 459 11%
402 Chinese exports,
390
400 362 2024
312
China exports to
300 3,887 (CNYbn)
the US, 2025
161 181 165
200
China total
26,623 (CNYbn)
100 exports, 2025

0 Share of China
Feb-15 Feb-17 Feb-19 Feb-21 Feb-23 Feb-25 exports to the 14.6%
Source: CEIC. DBS
US, 2024
Incremental US
Total Exports Imports Trade balance tariff impact on
-1.02% -2.04% -3.07% -4.09% -5.11% -5.52% -6.13% -7.15% -8.18% -9.20% -10.22%
Trump 1.0 1,793(USDbn) 572(USDbn) 1,222(USDbn) China total
exports value
Biden 2,188(USDbn) 688(USDbn) 1,501(USDbn)

Changes +22% +20% +23% Incremental US

tariff impact on
-0.25% -0.46% -0.66% -0.86% -1.07% -1.15% -1.27% -1.47% -1.68% -1.88% -2.08%
China real GDP
growth

Source: DBS
13
China and Tariff impact on China industries
Hong Kong
US import
value from
Electronics and machinery China exports to US by products (%) US average tariff on China imports (%)
China in 2023
contribute to 42% of total After universal tariff of 20% and 34%
(USD bn)
2024 averge tariff rate
exports to US Electrical
Electronics & elect. machinery 63.4 119.9
Others, Machinery Machinery 81.4
65.3
Average tariff increases 26.0 , 24.0 Miscellaneous 69.1 39.4
from 13% in 2023 to 54% Toys and sports equipment 55.5 31.6
Textiles and clothing 73.8 26.9
after the additional tariff 22.3
Automotive, Metals 72.6
Plastics and rubber 70.6 20.7
3.9
Chemicals 64.3 20.5
Nuclear Transportation equipment 77.9 16.6
Reactors, Footwear 66.9 13.1
Textiles and
Boilers, Stone and glass 71.8 6.9
clothing, 9.4
Machinery Wood products 70.2 6.7
, 17.6 Hide and skins 92.7 3.1
Chemical, Prepared foodstuffs 78.2 2.5
Furniture,
3.4 Plastics, Toys, 5.1 Vegetable products 71.1 2.1
6.0 Animal products 68.2 1.4
4.5
Mineral products 57.7 0.4
Fuel 73.9 0.2
Source: CEIC, DBS Source: PIIE, DBS

14
China and Manageable impact on HK
Hong Kong
Local manufactured goods
only contribute to 1.3% of
HK total exports in 2024, of
which 10.2% goes to US. Share of Hong Kong manufactured goods Re-export through Hong Kong (%) Share of total trade by destination (%)
This means it represents exports (%) 12
From China to US
USA
EU
ASEAN
Middle East
only 0.13% of HK total 50 HK goods to China HK goods to US
10 From US to China
16 China (RHS)
13.9
55

exports 45 2.4 14
40 35.4 51.0 50
8 12
8.2
Re-exports via HK
35
Locally manufactured goods 10 45
30
between China-US drops 25 exports contribute only 1.3%
6
8
from 10.6% in 2014 to 20
of total exports in 2024
4 2.3 6 5.2
40
5.7% in 2024 15
10.6 4 5.2
10 2 35
3.0
HK’s share of total trade of 5
0
2
1.9

the US drops from 8.7% in 0

Feb-15 Oct-16 Jun-18 Feb-20 Oct-21 Jun-23 Feb-25
Feb-15 Feb-17 Feb-19 Feb-21 Feb-23 Feb-25
0
Feb-13 Feb-16 Feb-19 Feb-22 Feb-25
30

2017 to 5.3% in 2024 vs to Source: C&SD, DBS Source: C&SD, CEIC, DBS Source: CEIC, DBS
China accounts for 50.9%
as of 2024

15
 Taiwan Threats from reciprocal tariff

Asia: Reciprocal tariff rates Asia: Exports to US/Nominal GDP (2024) Asia: Reciprocal tariff rates and
% % export exposure to the US
0 10 20 30 40 50 30 Reciprocal tariff (%)
VN 46 25.1
25 50
TH 36 VN
CN 34 20 40 CN TH
ID 32 ID TW
14.4 30 SK
TW 32 15 IN JP
IN 26 10.410.3 MY
9.4 20
SK 25 10 7.9 PH
6.8
JP 24 10 SG
5 3.5 2.8 2.6
MY 24 2.0 1.9 0
PH 17 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
SG 10 Exports to US/ GDP
VN TW TH MY HK SG SK JP CN PH IN ID
(%, 2024)
Sources: Reuters, DBS Sources: CEIC, DBS Sources: Reuters, CEIC, DBS

16
Taiwan Possible policy response

Japan South Korea Taiwan

Increasing imports
from US

Increasing
manufacturing
investment in US

Fiscal stimulus

Monetary easing

17
 India
• India was mentioned as one
of the countries at risk in
Trump’s ‘Fair and Reciprocal
Plan’

• US trade deficit with India

doubled between 2015 and
2024. US is a key trading
partner.

• Top sectors ranging from

iron & steel, pharma,
electronics, chemicals and
precious stones face a tariff
gap of 5% to 22% (average
~9%).

• India lowered sector-specific

import tariffs in the
February’s budget.

Note: These are not bilateral tariff rates from

country averages 18
 India

• US announced 26% reciprocal

tariff on India. This is 2x of the
tariff differential

• Suggests outsized role of non-

tariff barriers

• BTA first phase by fall of 2025;

keeps the door open for a
reassessment

• Exclusion of pharma and

semiconductors is net positive ~54%
(for now)

• Competitive advantage as
tariff on others is higher

• Impact is likely to be 0.3-0.5%

Note: These are not bilateral tariff rates from

country averages 19
Singapore In a relatively better position, but exposed to global
slowdown
Singapore is set to be
subjected to US baseline
tariff rate of 10%, the
lowest among ASEAN-6 Key US goods imports from Singapore in 2024
peers % of Singapore's
% of total US
Categories imports from
GDP
Singapore
The tariffs increase on Pharmaceutical preparations 3.5 45
Singapore is partly U.S. goods returned, and
mitigated by the US- reimports
0.7 9

Singapore Free Trade Other foods 0.5 6

Agreement Medicinal equipment 0.5 6
Industrial machines, other 0.4 6
Petroleum products, other 0.4 5
Singapore’s goods Semiconductors 0.3 4
exports exposure to the Cell phones and other household
US is smaller than other goods, n.e.c.
0.3 4

ASEAN-6 peers, but is Electric apparatus 0.1 2

still amongst its top 5 Chemicals-other, n.e.c. 0.1 1
goods exports Other products 1.1 14
Source: US census bureau, CEIC, DBS
destination in 2024

20
Indonesia

• Indonesia was US’s 15th

largest trade deficit country in
2024.

• US announced 32% reciprocal

tariff on Indonesia

• Surprising as Indonesia has a

more balanced tariff structure
with the US, with positive and
negative differentials. Direct growth impact (post reciprocal
tariffs) - DBS estimates
• A potential flashpoint could
Countries Growth impact
be Indonesia's strong
investment/ trade linkages Indonesia
with China Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
• Growth impact is more
Thailand
notable after higher reciprocal Vietnam
tariffs Source: CEIC, WITS, US census bureau,
DBS Note: Red=High impact;
Green=Negligible impact; Yellow=Low
impact; Orange=Medium impact;
Assessed based on relative ranking 21
ASEAN-6 The region is hit relatively hard by US tariffs

While ASEAN-6 was not

explicitly mentioned in Direct growth impact (post reciprocal
the US’s ‘‘Fair and tariffs) - DBS estimates
Reciprocal Plan’, it is
amongst the hardest hit
Countries Growth impact
Vietnam, Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesia Indonesia
were amongst the US’s Malaysia
top 15 trade deficit Philippines
partners in 2024
Singapore
Vietnam and Thailand Thailand
have the highest goods Vietnam
exports exposure to the Source: CEIC, WITS, US census bureau,
US DBS Note: Red=High impact;
Green=Negligible impact; Yellow=Low
The region will be
negatively hit, with impact; Orange=Medium impact;
greater impact on Assessed based on relative ranking
Vietnam, Thailand,
Malaysia
22
Financial markets

23
Outlook US Policy Impact – Engineered Stagflation
A range of policies Growth
which wide ranging Inflation Rates
implications.

It looks like stagflation- Tariffs

lite for a while as tariff
bites.
Tax Cuts

Policies DOGE

Immigration

Energy

24
Ta k e a w a y Tariff Use Cases
There are multiple use cases for
tariffs from Trump’s point of view.
To bring manufacturing back to the
But if revenue is important, some US
tariffs will not be negotiated away

~USD 400bn in
As a revenue source tariff revenues?

>Let’s see what

concessions will be
Tariffs As a negotiation tool offered and who will
retaliate

To safeguard key industries

“The Fed would be MUCH
better off CUTTING RATES
as U.S. Tariffs start to
transition (ease!) their way Engineer a slowdown so that the >3 cuts priced in for
into the economy,” Trump Fed would cut the year as slowdown
worries grow

25
 Yield Divergence
Dispersed performance across the
globe. Change in 10Y LCY Government Bond Yields Since Start of 2025

G10 Other EMs Asia

US exceptionalism has faded. bps

100
Turnaround seen in Japan, Germany
and China. 75

50
Tariffs
25
-Worries about high inflation and
slower growth in the US. Depressed 0
US yields. 5Y/30Y steepening.
-25
-Worries about slower growth
-50
(limited concerns on inflation) in the
rest of the world. Curve steepening -75
as Asia will utilise monetary
easing and fiscal support to -100
cushion the shock.
-125
*swaps used for HKD As of 3-Apr-25
-150 **5Y used for COP

COP
RUB
GER

SEK

GBP

THB
BRL

IDR

KRW
NOK

AUD

CAD

ZAR
CHF

NZD

USD

MXN

CNY

SGD

HKD
MYR

INR
TRY
JPY

Source: Bloomberg, DBS

26
China and Lower onshore rates on monetary easing
Hong Kong
2Y and 10Y CGB breached
resistance of 1.50% and
1.80% levels respectively
CGB yields (%) CGB curves (bps) China real interest rates (%)
Medium-term flattening vs. (%)
2.6
2Y 5Y 10Y 30Y
(bps)
80
10Y-2Y 10Y-3Y
(%)
10 1Y LPR - CPI 1Y LPR - PPI
tactical steepening 30Y-5Y 30Y-10Y
2.4 70
5 5.3
Real borrowing costs 2.2
60
3.8

remains elevated 2.0

50
0
1.92
1.8
1.73 40 -5
1.6 1.58
33.7
1.47 30
1.4 26 -10
1.2 20 18.8
18.4
1.0 10 -15
Apr-24 Jul-24 Oct-24 Jan-25 Apr-25 Apr-24 Jul-24 Oct-24 Jan-25 Apr-25 Feb-21 Feb-22 Feb-23 Feb-24 Feb-25
Source: Bloomberg, DBS
Source: Bloomberg, DBS Source: Bloomberg, DBS

27
China and Higher offshore premium ahead
Hong Kong
Short-end CNH rates are
set to rise amid volatile
RMB exchange rates CNH forward implied yields (%) and USD/CNY Offshore-onshore spread
(%)
6 1M 3M 6M USD/CNY (RHS) 7.40 (CNH implied yields vs SHIBORs) and USD/CNH
Premium of long-end Central Bank Bills issuance (bps) 1M USD/CNH (RHS)
offshore rates continue to 5
7.34 7.35 400 7.40

rise amid weak RMB 7.29

7.30
350
7.30
300
4
7.25 250
7.20
7.20
3 2.60 2.60 7.20 200
150 7.10
7.15
2 100
2.00 7.00
7.10 50
1 0
7.05 6.90
-50
0 7.00 -100 6.80
Jan-24 Jul-24 Jan-25 Jul-25 Jan-26 Jul-26 Dec-26 Apr-23 Oct-23 Apr-24 Oct-24 Apr-25
Source: Bloomberg, DBS Source: Bloomberg, DBS

28
Takeaways

Sequencing the Events

Retaliation (bad for risk) in immediate term.
Negotiations (potentially good for risk) next week ahead of 9 April deadline.

"Just as ripples spread out when a single pebble is

dropped into water, the actions of individuals can
have far-reaching effects." Dalai Lama
Asian currencies are more vulnerable to higher global trade tensions

Country-specific US reciprocal tariffs Performance of currencies

Developed Markets Asia ex Japan Developed Markets
2
Switzerland 31% China 34% % change vs. USD
1
EU 20% Taiwan 32%
Norway 15% South Korea 25% 0

UK 10% Cambodia 49% -1

% change vs. USD Apr 3 vs. Mar 7
Japan 24% Laos 48% -2
Australia 10% Vietnam 46% GBP CAD EUR CHF NZD JPY AUD
New Zealand 10% Myanmar 44%
Asia ex Japan
Thailand 36% 2
BRICS new Indonesia 32% 1
members
Malaysia 24% 0
Philippines 17% -1
-2
Singapore 10% -3
US allies
India 26% INR PHP TWD CNH SGD KRW MYR VND IDR THB
Source: The White House China Plus One

Sources: DBS Research and Bloomberg data. Updated: 3 April 2025

 China to maintain stable USD/CNY for now
PBOC Governor PBOC has a calibrated approach to maintain CNY stability
Pan Gongsheng
assumed office in July 2023 7.40
— USD/CNY PBOC starts buying US tariffs 10% 20%
govt bonds (CNY 1 trn)
7.30 — Fixing Rate
Discourage
7.20
one-way “sell CNY” bets
7.10
First Fed cut
Tight Fixing Rate 7.00 (50 bps) Temporary
mostly in 7.10-7.20 range suspension of CNY
New PBOC Governor PBOC buys
6.90 bond purchases
CNY200bn
Final Fed hike
of govt bonds
More tolerance for 6.80
Forecasts 1Q25 2Q25 3Q25 4Q25
USD/CNY to rise vs. Fixing DBS GR 7.26 7.34 7.32 7.29
6.70
to the upper limit of ±2% band Consensus 7.33 7.35 7.35 7.40
6.60
Jan-23 Jul-23 Jan-24 Jul-24 Jan-25

Sources: DBS Research, Bloomberg data and consensus. Last updated: 3 Apr 2025
31
Trump’s tariffs addresses “China Plus One” strategy into Southeast Asia

US trade deficit with China remains wide China's total trade with SE Asia
USD billion overtook the US and the EU
Trump 1.0 Joe Biden 1100
0 USD bn, 12M rolling sum
1000
EU
-100 900
US
-200 800
ASEAN
700
-300
600
-400
500
-500 400
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Sources: DBS Research and Bloomberg data. Updated: 25 Mar 2025

 A New World Order is taking shape

Foreign Minister Unipolarity  Multipolarity

Vivian Balakrishnan
Parliamentary address on Free trade  Protectionism
the changing world order
on March 3, 2025
Multilateralism  Unilateralism
“A new world order is
taking shape and Globalisation  Hyper nationalism
characterised by
profound unpredictability,
instability, and volatility.” Openness  Xenophobia

Optimism  Pessimism

33
 Economic Geostrategic upheaval Weakened
fragmentation  Law of the Jungle global institutions
Foreign Minister
Vivian Balakrishnan Retaliatory tariffs Severely eroded Significantly impaired
lead to global trade war • sovereign equality the ability to
“We may be reverting to a • political independence
• collectively respond
time when the world is Supply chains • territorial integrity to global threats
divided into blocs
regionalize & bifurcate e.g. WHO & pandemic
controlled by big powers.”

“The post-WW2 rules- Flashpoints • safeguard the

3 levers weaponized
based international order by Big Powers commons
• NATO/Ukraine vs.
that benefitted Singapore Russia - WTO & free trade
• tariffs
is under serious strain.” • financial systems • Taiwan Straits - UN Resolution on
climate change
• technology • South China Seas

34
Scope for credit spreads to widen as exuberance is tempered

IG credit spreads: US vs EU vs Asia ex-Japan HY credit spreads: US vs EU vs Asia ex-Japan

AXJ USD credit: IG AXJ USD credit: HY
% ann % ann
US credit: IG US credit: HY
2.00 EU credit: IG 6.00 EU credit: HY
1.80
1.60 5.00
1.40 4.00
1.20
1.00 3.00
0.80
0.60 2.00
0.40 1.00
0.20
0.00 0.00
Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan
23 23 23 23 24 24 24 24 25 23 23 23 23 24 24 24 24 25
Source: Bloomberg, DBS Source: Bloomberg, DBS

Sources: DBS Research and Bloomberg data. Updated: 25 Mar 2025

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