Foundations of Human Rights Theory
Foundations of Human Rights Theory
Langlois
Introduction
Understanding the history of human rights is crucial for understanding current debates and challenges
in human rights theory.
Although human rights are described as universal, inalienable, and inherent, the modern concept of
rights is recent.
The idea of human rights emerged from Western history and thought.
Historical figures like Socrates, Jesus, Confucius, and the Buddha did not speak in terms of “universal
human rights” despite facing injustices.
Today, human rights are a globally recognized framework for addressing injustice.
Understanding how this idea developed and spread is key to how we justify and theorize human
rights today.
The demand for freedom drove the American colonists to revolt against British rule.
This led to the US Declaration of Independence (1776)—the first major document of the “age of
rights.”
Although earlier rights documents existed (e.g., Bill of Rights, 1774; Virginia Declaration, June 1776),
Jefferson’s Declaration was more poetic and radical.
Thomas Jefferson asserted that all men should be free and equal, and that people are entitled to
rights protections against governments.
These protections were later formalized in the US Constitution (1789) and its first ten amendments,
known as the Bill of Rights (1791).
Inspired by the American example, the French also revolted against a despotic monarchy.
This led to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) in France.
The French declaration emphasized universal rights—“all men are born free and equal in rights”
(Article 1).
Both the American and French declarations laid the foundation for liberal democracy.
These were not just political documents but philosophical statements about legitimate government
and human equality.
They promoted an egalitarian view of humanity, central to modern human rights thinking.
Philosophical Questions
1. Political Impact of Rights Declarations
The political influence of rights declarations like the US Declaration of Independence and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen continues even today.
However, philosophical challenges to these ideas have existed since their inception.
Both supporters and critics questioned the foundations of so-called natural and imprescriptible rights.
Early rights declarations were based on moral principles called natural rights, drawn from natural law.
In Christian thought, natural law was believed to come from God’s moral order in creation.
John Locke supported this view, connecting natural rights with divine law.
But during the Enlightenment, Christian theism began losing authority, replaced by human reason as
the ultimate source of truth.
This shift weakened the logical foundation of the Christian natural law → duty → rights framework.
Thinkers like Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes proposed that rights should come from our common
humanity, not God’s will.
Samuel Pufendorf tried to revive natural law theory, but the broader cultural shift favored individual
moral autonomy.
Over time, rights came to be seen as inherent to humans—inalienable and natural, but not necessarily
divine.
This boosted political use of rights but weakened their philosophical justification.
Without appeal to God, nature offered no consensus on values, making natural rights philosophically
fragile.
Believed rights should emerge from historical traditions and institutions, not from universal ideals.
Rights should be national (e.g., Englishmen’s rights) rather than human rights.
Imposing universal rights, he warned, would cause chaos and tyranny—as seen in the French
Revolution.
Argued that rights not based on actual law (positive law) are unreal metaphysical fictions.
Advocated for legal reform and practical governance, not idealistic rights rooted in religion or nature.
Rights like liberty and property benefited entrepreneurs, not the working class.
Saw rights as tools of capitalist domination, obstructing true equality and emancipation.
Believed only a revolutionary restructuring of society could achieve real freedom and well-being.
5. The Irony of the Rights Revolution
Just as natural rights became politically powerful and widespread, philosophers and political thinkers
grew skeptical.
The idea of natural rights became a popular political weapon but a philosophically contested concept.
The rights revolution had real-world influence, but lacked a universally accepted philosophical
foundation.
World War II (1939–1945) marked a turning point in global consciousness about human rights.
The Holocaust, in which six million Jews were exterminated, and the broader horrors of total war
shocked the moral conscience of the world.
The UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) later described this as having “outraged the
conscience of mankind.”
In response to Nazi atrocities, Western societies turned back to natural law principles to assert justice.
Nuremberg Trials (1945–1949) were conducted under natural law principles, not based on existing
written international laws.
o Nazis were charged with "crimes against humanity"—a concept not clearly defined in formal
law at the time.
o The moral basis was that such crimes were universally wrong and recognizable by any
reasonable human being, rooted in natural law.
These events reaffirmed the idea that positive (written) law should be judged by a higher moral
standard.
The United Nations (UN) was formed in 1945 to promote peace and human rights.
In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the UN.
o Article 1: Declares all humans are “born free and equal in dignity and rights.”
o The language echoes natural rights philosophy, but within a modern, international, and
secular framework.
Although the UDHR aims to be universal, it is based on Western liberal political philosophy.
It reflects:
o Natural law itself had become philosophically problematic by the mid-20th century.
o The UDHR assumes universal values that are not historically or culturally universal.
5. Three Generations of Rights (Box 1.4)
The UDHR embodies three categories (or “generations”) of human rights, conceptualized by Karel Vasak:
Focus: Group identity, cultural rights, environmental rights, and global peace.
6. Criticism of Universality
Its “universal” character is based on the belief (not empirical fact) that:
Proponents of human rights believe these are not just legal entitlements, but moral obligations that
should be embedded in both national and international political systems.
The UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) expresses these moral demands forcefully, but
doesn’t explain or justify them philosophically.
The UN Human Rights Commission (which drafted the UDHR) deliberately avoided debating the moral
or philosophical justifications for rights.
Why? Because the members came from diverse cultural and ideological backgrounds—getting them
to agree on a philosophical foundation would have been nearly impossible.
So, their strategy was practical: agree on the norms (rules), and set aside the deeper “why” questions.
o This is explained in Box 1.5, which emphasizes consensus without a shared philosophical
foundation.
But the rights it outlines are based on a specific tradition—liberal Western political thought.
o But many cultures, religions, and traditions do not share these values or interpret them
differently.
Many proponents of human rights assume that liberal values (like individual liberty, equality, freedom
of speech) are self-evident or universally true.
This assumption is similar to older natural law theories that claimed some truths were “self-evident.”
But in reality, not everyone accepts liberal values, and cultural differences challenge the universality
claim.
Human rights advocates must be able to defend these rights through reasoned arguments, especially
to those who do not already agree.
It’s not enough to assume human rights are obvious—we need to explain why they matter, morally
and philosophically.
One modern approach says: “We already have human rights—look at the laws, treaties, and
institutions that protect them.”
This is called the legal positivist argument: rights exist because they are written into law and enforced
by international institutions.
o This approach reduces rights to legal constructs, ignoring their moral foundation.
o It contradicts the idea that human rights are inherent and should exist even when they are not
protected by law.
The historical development of human rights was driven by the belief that moral rights existed first, and
law should reflect and protect them.
Laws don’t create rights—they are meant to institutionalize and enforce moral truths.
This means that human rights claims are most powerful when made by those who do not yet have
legal protection.
Explained by Jack Donnelly: Often, the people who most need human rights don’t actually possess
them legally.
Yet, they can still morally claim them, based on their human dignity.
This paradox shows that human rights must be rooted in moral belief, not just legal frameworks.
The ability to claim rights in unjust conditions depends on people recognizing shared moral standards.
Human rights are moral in nature, and laws are tools to enforce these morals.
The philosophical justification of rights remains crucial—especially in a diverse world where not all
societies share the same assumptions.
Without moral grounding, human rights become fragile—dependent only on legal recognition, which
can be taken away.
The challenge is to persuade others—across cultures and beliefs—that certain moral principles (like
dignity, freedom, equality) should be universally respected.
Modern human rights have their roots in Western liberal political theory, which emphasizes the value of the
individual. Although there are different strands of liberalism, they all share one foundational idea:
Every human being has inherent moral worth and should never be used merely as a means to an end.
– This idea is best captured by Immanuel Kant.
However, various philosophers and theorists justify human rights in different ways—through dignity, reason,
autonomy, needs, and more. Let’s explore each one:
1. Human Dignity
Main idea: Humans have rights because they possess inherent dignity.
This view has religious origins, especially in Christian thought, where human beings are believed to be
made in the image of God (imago dei).
Because human dignity comes from God, it provides a moral foundation for universal rights.
2. Reason
Main idea: Rights are grounded in our rational agency—our ability to make purposeful, reasoned
decisions.
Because we are rational beings, we need certain freedoms (like liberty, education, health) to fulfill our
rational potential.
Thus, rights are necessary to support the conditions under which reason can be exercised.
3. Autonomy
Main idea: A good human life is one that is self-directed—people should be free to make their own
choices.
Therefore, rights exist to protect the freedoms that allow people to live autonomously.
Main idea: All people should be treated equally—not because they are the same, but because they
have equal moral worth.
1. Equal treatment – Everyone gets the same legal rights and opportunities (e.g., one person, one
vote).
2. Treatment as an equal – People are treated with equal respect, even if they need different
things to thrive.
This view has shaped many democratic institutions and civil rights movements.
5. Needs
If these needs are universal, then the claim to them as rights is also universal.
To meet these needs, certain freedoms must be guaranteed (e.g., movement, access to information).
This approach connects second-generation rights (like the right to education or healthcare) with basic
survival and dignity.
6. Capabilities
Main idea: Rights should focus on what people are capable of doing and being.
Capabilities like being educated, healthy, or socially engaged are seen as essential to a dignified life.
Rights should ensure that everyone has the real freedom to develop and use these capabilities.
This view is often used in gender justice debates and development ethics.
7. Consensus
Main idea: Instead of grounding rights in one particular theory (e.g., religion, autonomy, reason), we
should focus on what diverse groups agree on.
This pragmatic approach builds on overlapping consensus—common ground across different cultures
or philosophies.
Limitation: It requires a shared background culture (often liberal), and might collapse if that consensus
weakens.
Summary Table:
Reason Rational agency requires rights for its fulfillment Alan Gewirth
Justification Core Idea Key Thinker
Autonomy Rights protect the ability to lead self-directed lives Joseph Raz
Equality Equal moral worth deserves equal respect and treatment Ronald Dworkin
Capabilities Rights ensure real freedom to develop human potential Sen & Nussbaum
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) claims to apply to all humans everywhere, regardless of
culture, religion, or political system. However, this claim faces serious philosophical and practical challenges,
both from outright rejections of human rights and from attempts to modify or critique the foundations on
which the concept of universality is built.
a. Cultural Relativism
Definition: Belief that norms, values, and morals are culture-specific. What’s right or wrong depends
on local customs and traditions.
Claim: Since human rights emerged from Western liberal traditions, they’re only appropriate for
Western societies.
Argument: Human rights are not neutral values but tools used by powerful Western nations to exert
political and cultural dominance.
Suggests human rights are part of a neo-colonial agenda, dressed up as moral concern.
Inconsistency: If all truths are relative, then the relativist’s own belief (that relativism is true) is also
just relative, undermining their argument.
Self-refuting: A true relativist can’t prioritize tolerance or respect as universal values, because those
too would be culturally bound.
Ironically, relativists often promote liberal values (like tolerance), showing they may just be confused
liberals.
Empirical cultural relativity: Acknowledges that cultures differ, but doesn’t necessarily reject shared
values.
The issue is how we respond to difference, and that depends on our philosophical stance.
Anti-imperialists argue against human rights using universal values (freedom, tolerance), which
contradicts their rejection of universality.
Their claims often mirror liberal arguments, suggesting an implicit belief in some universal principles.
Hypocrisy of some leaders: They use anti-imperialist rhetoric internationally to demand respect, but
deny basic rights to their own citizens domestically.
o E.g., religious or authoritarian leaders demand freedom for their groups but deny it to internal
dissenters.
Key Insight:
Anti-universalist critiques often inadvertently reaffirm liberal values, thereby reinforcing the case for
universal human rights.
Liberal justifications for rights often assume certain human qualities (like reason, autonomy).
o Essentialist: They claim certain traits (e.g., reason) are essential to all humans.
Problem: There’s no universal agreement on what traits define "humanness", making the claim of
universal rights philosophically shaky.
➤ Historical Exclusion:
The "rights of man" historically meant rights for men, excluding women from full citizenship and
participation.
➤ Feminist Contributions:
o UN Charter
o CEDAW (1979)
Public vs. Private divide: Liberals protected private life from state intrusion, but feminists argue this
leaves women vulnerable, as most abuses (e.g., domestic violence, reproductive rights) occur in the
private sphere.
Institutions and theories still reflect male-centered experiences and may not adequately protect
women’s rights.
Reformists: Believe the system can be improved to better include women's concerns.
Radicals: Argue that the current framework is so flawed it needs to be replaced altogether.
6. Religious Challenges
Some religions view human rights as alien or incompatible with their worldviews.
➤ Different Responses:
Integration: Some religious groups see human rights as compatible with their own teachings (e.g., the
Catholic Church post-Vatican II).
➤ Theoretical Debate:
Or should they be translated into diverse traditions so that they are more genuinely embraced?
7. Group Rights
Rights that only apply to members of certain groups (cultural, religious, ethnic, gender, etc.).
Arise from the reality that some groups face systemic exclusion and need special protection.
➤ Liberal Concerns:
Worry: If the group’s rights dominate, individuals may lose the right to exit, dissent, or speak freely.
But if they override individual rights, they may conflict with human rights principles.
Normative foundations refer to the philosophical and ethical traditions from which the concept of
human rights has emerged.
The dominant normative tradition behind human rights is liberal political theory, and prior to that,
natural law theory. These traditions emphasize individual liberty, autonomy, reason, and inherent
dignity.
When human rights are rooted in liberal theory, they reflect liberal values—freedom of speech,
equality, individual autonomy, etc.
However, people from other traditions (e.g., religious, communitarian, Confucian, or indigenous
philosophies) may have different views about what values matter most.
The political conflict arises when liberal values are treated as the only universal basis for human
rights, potentially marginalizing other cultural or philosophical perspectives.
Key Debate:
Should liberalism remain the foundation for human rights globally?
Declarations like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) are not divine revelations or
purely objective truths.
They are products of negotiation and compromise, crafted by committees under political authorities,
such as the United Nations.
What gets included or excluded in these documents depends on who is at the table and what political
compromises are necessary.
For instance, during the drafting of the UDHR in 1948, there were clashes between Western liberal
democracies, the Soviet Union, and developing countries, each with differing political ideologies.
Hence, these documents reflect specific historical and geopolitical contexts, not some eternal truth.
Putting human rights into action—like identifying abuses, protecting victims, or enforcing rights—
requires political decisions and state intervention.
Determining what counts as a “human rights abuse” often depends on local context, cultural norms,
or political interests.
For example, child marriage might be seen as a violation in one society but a traditional practice in
another.
Enforcing rights—e.g., arresting a dictator or intervening in a civil war—often requires military, legal,
or diplomatic power, and such actions are never neutral.
This is why applying human rights law looks different across countries and cultures.
Historically, the language of rights was used to fight state tyranny and protect individual and group
freedoms.
Today, the human rights project still challenges power structures, whether it’s authoritarian
governments, systemic racism, patriarchy, or economic injustice.
Advocating for human rights means taking a political stance—you are challenging injustice and
demanding reform.
But doing so depends on local political realities. In some places, activists are celebrated; in others,
they are arrested, exiled, or killed.
So the fight for rights is not abstract or universal in practice—it is rooted in specific political struggles.
Groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International promote Western definitions of rights
(like political freedom), which may not align with the basic needs and realities of people in non-
Western societies (e.g., safety, food, education).
In regions like Darfur, human rights advocacy has encouraged rebel groups to provoke massacres for
media attention, thereby prolonging war and worsening suffering. Similar mistakes happened in Biafra
(1960s).
The article defends regimes like Rwanda’s, which, though authoritarian, have delivered economic
growth, security, and social stability. Human rights groups criticize such regimes for lack of political
freedoms, ignoring the practical improvements in people’s lives.
Human rights should not be applied in a vacuum. Instead of measuring governments by Western
standards, the focus should be on whether they are improving lives in real, material ways.
The movement is criticized for having an absolutist, one-size-fits-all mindset, often led by privileged
individuals far removed from the realities of life in the Global South.
The article calls for a reformed human rights movement that is self-aware, politically informed, and
rooted in the lived experiences and needs of people rather than abstract ideals.
The appointment of James Hoge as chairman of Human Rights Watch is seen as an opportunity for
reform. His realist and global perspective might help ground human rights work in practical realities
rather than moral dogma.
The author urges the movement to adopt a more humble, context-sensitive approach, echoing
historian Barbara Tuchman’s wisdom:
“Humanity may have common ground, but needs and aspirations vary according to circumstances.”
There is a divide between the practical urgency of human rights activism and the abstract theoretical work of
philosophy.
Explanation:
Philosophers debate the nature of rights, legitimacy of government, and the "good life."
These two domains (practical and theoretical) need integration, but often remain disconnected.
Main Idea:
Jack Donnelly argues that a global consensus gives human rights their legitimacy and universality.
Explanation:
Donnelly claims that human rights are "almost universally accepted" at least as ideal standards.
Even if not all rights are practiced, their verbal acceptance by most states indicates their moral appeal.
He argues we can use this consensus to work through most problems without solving deep philosophical issues.
Freeman’s Critique:
Donnelly concedes that cultural relativism is logically impeccable but doesn’t adequately refute it.
Donnelly also contradicts the individual-rights ethos of human rights by using majority consensus to override
minority dissent.
Main Idea:
Cultural relativism challenges the universality of human rights by suggesting that moral values are culturally bound.
Explanation:
Some cultures may not recognize the concept of the "human being" as having moral significance.
Relativism undermines the claim that human rights apply everywhere, for everyone.
Governments use cultural relativism and sovereignty to deflect criticism for rights violations.
Freeman’s Point:
Activists must respond not just with legal arguments, but with moral reasoning.
Relativism poses deep ontological (what exists) and epistemological (how we know) challenges to human rights.
Key Thinkers:
Main Ideas:
These philosophers argue that there are no absolute philosophical foundations for human rights.
All values—including human rights—are historically contingent, shaped by language, culture, and politics.
a) Rorty’s Sentimentalism:
We don’t need reason or logic to defend rights—empathy and solidarity are enough.
Human rights are part of a liberal narrative, not a metaphysical truth.
Concepts like “oppression” or “rights” are not based on human essence but are part of discursive formations.
c) MacIntyre’s Rejection:
He argues rights are like witches or unicorns—they don’t exist because no justification for them has ever
succeeded.
Freeman’s Response:
Anti-foundationalism leaves rights defenseless against cultural relativists and authoritarian regimes.
While anti-foundationalism emphasizes moral humility, it also undermines human rights’ authority.
Main Idea:
Gewirth provides a rational, logical basis for human rights by grounding them in human agency.
Key Points:
Therefore, everyone must value these as necessary goods—and claim rights to them.
If I value these for myself, logic compels me to recognize the same rights in others.
1. I am an agent.
4. Because I am not special, I must accept that all agents have these rights.
Freeman’s Critique:
Gewirth assumes a universal definition of agency and reason, which may not apply cross-culturally.
Main Idea:
Donnelly sees human rights as contingent (historically specific), while Gewirth views them as necessary (universal and
rational).
Explanation:
Donnelly believes rights are based on a shared vision of human dignity, which is socially constructed.
Freeman points out this makes Donnelly's theory circular—he relies on consensus to justify dignity and dignity
to justify the consensus.
Taylor’s Criticism:
Charles Taylor warns that without strong sources, high moral standards like human rights become parasitic—they draw
legitimacy from older ideas they’ve discarded.
Main Idea:
We can construct a pragmatic foundation for human rights by combining ideas from multiple theorists.
Raz: Rights protect interests, and interests are grounded in ultimate values (like dignity), which are culturally
resilient.
Dworkin: Each person has a right to equal concern and respect—a moral axiom, not a deduction.
Outcome:
A foundation that is not logically necessary but is morally compelling and widely shared.
Encourages engagement with other cultures without abandoning the core of human rights.
Main Idea:
Explanation:
A hybrid approach, recognizing the moral weight of shared values, is the best practical path forward.
Human Rights at the United Nations 1955-1985: The Question of Bias - Jack
Donnelly
1. Core Argument: Bias Is Real but Not Fatal
Main Point:
Donnelly argues that there has been systematic political bias in the UN’s human rights work, but it's not beyond reform
and has modestly improved in the 1980s.
Explanation:
He investigates charges of ideological bias—especially accusations that the UN favors Third World and Soviet-bloc
countries, while unfairly targeting Western-aligned states. His analysis uses quantitative data on meeting times and
resolutions from 1955–1985.
Main Point:
2. Selective targeting of regimes (e.g., South Africa, Chile, Israel) while ignoring others with equally bad or worse
records.
Explanation:
Rights bias occurs when certain rights (like economic/social) are emphasized over others (like civil/political).
Regime bias occurs when countries are scrutinized or protected based on political alliances—not human rights
performance.
Main Point:
Donnelly uses meeting time data in the Commission on Human Rights and Third Committee as an indicator of priority.
Explanation:
Main Point:
Civil and political rights got more attention than expected—but in very narrow ways.
Explanation:
Rights like freedom from racial discrimination and arbitrary detention dominated discussions.
Political rights (e.g., free elections, opposition participation) and freedom of expression were rarely discussed.
Economic and social rights were discussed vaguely, without specific implementation debates.
Third World and Soviet-bloc states controlled the agenda and protected themselves by avoiding discussions that
might expose their own abuses.
Main Point:
Certain regimes—South Africa, Chile, and Israel—were consistently condemned, while other abusive regimes were
ignored or praised.
South Africa: Heavily criticized for apartheid (justifiably), but other African states with mass atrocities were
ignored (e.g., Uganda, Equatorial Guinea).
Israel: Singled out for actions in the occupied territories, but countries like Syria, Indonesia (East Timor), and
Soviet bloc states faced little or no scrutiny.
Chile: Harshly criticized for civil/political abuses, while Brazil, Paraguay, Philippines, and Zaire were spared.
Main Point:
Explanation:
The 1503 Procedure (confidential) expanded in the 1980s and included countries from all blocs.
However, the General Assembly remained politically biased, targeting U.S. allies more often than Soviet ones.
Main Point:
Despite past issues, Donnelly finds a decline in bias—especially in the Commission on Human Rights.
Explanation:
Main Point:
The UN’s standard-setting role is strong, but monitoring and enforcement are politically compromised.
Explanation:
UN documents like the Universal Declaration and International Covenants offer a universal framework.
However, enforcement mechanisms are weak and often reflect geopolitical interests, not universal moral
standards.
Some causes like Tibet’s struggle for autonomy get widespread global attention, while others—like the Uighurs in China
—remain mostly ignored. Both face serious oppression, but only one has international celebrities and widespread
support. The difference? Visibility and appeal to global audiences, not necessarily greater suffering.
The idea that all causes get equal attention based on how much they suffer is a myth. Instead, local groups are in a
constant competition—like in a marketplace—where they must fight for limited attention, sympathy, and funding from
international donors and NGOs.
To succeed globally, local movements often repackage their struggles in ways that appeal to Western ideals—like human
rights, environmentalism, or anti-globalization. For example, the Ogoni people in Nigeria gained support only after they
emphasized environmental issues over ethnic discrimination.
Large NGOs like Amnesty International and Greenpeace act as “gatekeepers.” They choose who gets help based on
strategy, values, and feasibility—not just how serious the problem is. Many worthy groups get ignored simply because
they don’t fit the NGO’s agenda or lack connections.
Movements with strong, relatable leaders often succeed because these individuals can gain media attention and
represent the cause effectively. Think of the Dalai Lama, Rigoberta Menchú, or Subcomandante Marcos. They became
symbols of their struggles and attracted global backing.
To attract international support, groups often change their message. The Zapatistas in Mexico dropped their socialist
message and instead focused on indigenous identity and anti-globalization—topics that resonated more with global
activists and media.
The internet, TV, and cell phones were supposed to level the playing field, but many poor or remote groups still lack
access. Even if they have a website or social media, that alone doesn’t guarantee international interest. The Zapatistas,
for example, relied heavily on Western supporters to spread their message online.
Many NGOs have good intentions but also operate like businesses. They want to protect their image, be efficient with
resources, and avoid risky or complicated causes. As a result, they often support easier, cleaner, more media-friendly
struggles—even if others are more urgent.
People like to believe that the global civil society (NGOs, activists, media) is fair and caring. But in reality, it's shaped by
politics, strategy, and image. Many truly deserving causes are left behind—not because they aren’t important, but
because they can’t “sell” themselves to the world.