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Impact of Inverter Based Resources on System Protection

Article in Energies · February 2021

DOI: 10.3390/en14041050

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Article

Impact of Inverter Based Resources on System Protection

Aboutaleb Haddadi 1, Evangelos Farantatos 1,*, Ilhan Kocar 2 and Ulas Karaagac 3

1 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Grid Operations and Planning Group, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA;
ahaddadi@[Link]
2 Polytechnique Montreal, Electrical Engineering Department, Montreal, QC H3T 1J4, Canada;

[Link]@[Link]
3 The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Department of Electrical Engineering, Hong Kong;

[Link]@[Link]
* Correspondence: efarantatos@[Link]

Abstract: Inverter-based resources (IBRs) exhibit different short-circuit characteristics compared to

traditional synchronous generators (SGs). Hence, increased uptake of IBRs in the power system is
expected to impact the performance of traditional protective relay schemes—set under the assump-
tion of a SG-dominated power system. Protection engineers need to study these challenges and de-
velop remedial solutions ensuring the effectiveness of system protection under higher levels of IBRs.
To address this need, this paper studies the impact of IBRs on a variety of protective relay schemes
including line distance protection, memory-polarized zero sequence directional protective relay el-
ement, negative sequence quantities-based protection, line current differential protection, phase
comparison protection, rate-of-change-of-frequency, and power swing detection. For each protec-
tion function, potential misoperation scenarios are identified, and recommendations are provided
to address the misoperation issue. The objective is to provide an improved understanding of the
way IBRs may negatively impact the performance of traditional protection schemes as a first step
towards developing future remedial solutions ensuring effective protection under high share of
IBRs.

Keywords: renewable energy resources; wind turbine generator; photovoltaic inverter; power sys-
tem protection; negative sequence quantities-based protection; frequency protection; German grid
Citation: Haddadi, A.; Farantatos,
code
E.; Kocar, I.; Karaagac, U. Impact of
Inverter Based Resources on System
Protection. Energies 2021, 14, 1050.
[Link]
1. Introduction
Received: 23 December 2020 The integration of renewable energy resources in the power system is increasing
Accepted: 12 February 2021 worldwide due to recent advancements and the continuously decreasing cost of wind
Published: 17 February 2021 turbine generator (WTG) and photovoltaic (PV) cell technologies. Solar plants, as well as
Type IV WTGs (also referred to as full-size converter (FSC)) and Type III WTGs (also re-
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neu-
ferred to as doubly-fed induction generator (DFIG)) are connected to electrical grids
tral with regard to jurisdictional
through power electronic converters, thus in this paper are referred to as inverter-based
claims in published maps and insti-
resources (IBRs).
tutional affiliations.
This power electronic interface is a fundamental physical difference between IBRs
and traditional synchronous generators (SGs) which results in different fault current char-
acteristics [1,2] and requires fundamental changes in the conventional computation meth-
Copyright: © 2021 by the authors.
odology of short circuit currents [3–5]. The fault current of a SG is of high amplitude,
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
uncontrolled, and predominantly defined by the electrical parameters of the source and
This article is an open access article the impedance of short-circuit path; by contrast, the fault current of an inverter-based re-
distributed under the terms and con- source (IBR) typically has a low amplitude and is tightly controlled through fast switching
ditions of the Creative Commons At- of power electronics devices dependent upon manufacturer specific and often proprietary
tribution (CC BY) license ([Link] IBR control scheme. In summary, the fault current response of an IBR is low-amplitude
[Link]/licenses/by/4.0/). and non-universal.

Energies 2021, 14, 1050. [Link] [Link]/journal/energies

Energies 2021, 14, 1050 2 of 22

The different fault current response of an IBR has an anticipated impact on the per-
formance of legacy protective relays [6–27]. Traditionally, relays have been set with ex-
pectation of fault current signatures of a SG-dominated power system, i.e., a high ampli-
tude and inductive short-circuit current, which enable them to operate where they should
and not operate where they should not. Increased IBR level and the ensuing change in
short-circuit behavior of the power system may mean that these two fundamental princi-
ples of power system protection cannot be met. This presents a challenge for protection
engineers to identify such misoperation scenarios and develop remedial solutions to en-
sure efficient protection under high shares of IBRs, which is addressed in this paper.
Several references have studied the performance of protective relay schemes under
IBRs including line distance protection [6–13,16,18], negative sequence components based
protection [8,15–21,24–26], communication-assisted protection [15,24,25], fault identifica-
tion (FID) [15,24,25], rate-of-change-of-frequency (ROCOF), and power swing protection
[14,16,27]. This paper reviews the key findings of these studies; further, the paper studies
for the first time the performance of memory-polarized directional overcurrent protective
relay elements, line current differential (LCD) protection, and phase comparison (PC) pro-
tection under IBRs. In addition to identification of potential IBR-related protection misop-
eration issues, the paper provides recommendations on how to circumvent the misopera-
tion. A considered solution is the adoption of the recent grid code requirement for IBR
negative-sequence current (I2) control, e.g., per VDE-AR-N 4120 Technical Connection
Rules [28] (referred hereafter to as the “German grid code”), and the paper studies its
effectiveness in addressing the misoperation issues. The objective of the paper is to pro-
vide an improved understanding of the way IBRs may negatively impact the performance
of traditional protection schemes as a first step towards developing future remedial solu-
tions ensuring effective protection under high share of IBRs.
It should be mentioned that the paper considers IBRs connected to an AC transmis-
sion system, and DC/DC converters or DC power system are not within the scope of the
paper. The case studies and simulation tests have been conducted within the EMTP soft-
ware environment.

2. Short-Circuit Response of IBRs

The most influential factor determining the fault response of an IBR is the control
scheme which manages the fast switching of power electronic devices to achieve a number
of control objectives. A key objective is to constrain the magnitude of current within the
thermal withstand capability of power electronic switches. Other control objectives may
be imposed by grid code. This dependence on control scheme and power electronic as-
pects leads to the following typical IBR fault current characteristics.
 Fault current amplitude: The amplitude of the continuous fault current contributed
by an IBR has a nonlinear dependence on inverter terminal voltage [29] and is typi-
cally low since it is constrained by the converter current limiter to values close to
nominal load current. Table 1 presents the fault current contribution of an example
Type IV-based IBR as a function of terminal voltage. Figure 1a compares the fault
current of a SG, a Type III-, and a Type IV-based IBR for a given unbalanced fault. As
shown, for the same induced short-circuit voltage, the positive-sequence current (I1)
and I2 contributed by a Type IV IBR have the lowest amplitude, with amplitude of
I1 being close to nominal load current and amplitude of I2 being close to zero. This
low amplitude fault current may negatively impact the performance of protection
functions using a supervising overcurrent element such as a distance relay.
 Fault sequence quantities: The inverter fault current does not include zero-sequence
component (although zero-sequence current may still flow at the terminals of an IBR
when connection to earth is provided by a transformer with a high-side, wye-
grounded winding.) Further, I2 is typically partially or entirely suppressed depend-
ing on the inverter control [1]. Figure 1a shows that the I2 of a Type IV IBR is close to
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 3 of 22

zero due to the nature of the traditional inverter coupled control scheme [3]. This lack
of I2 may lead to protection misoperation problems, and hence grid codes have re-
cently added requirements for IBR I2 injection during unbalanced faults. An example
is the German grid code [28] which requires IBRs to inject a reactive I2 based on the
characteristic curve of Figure 2 defined by a characteristic proportional gain k with a
recommended value between 2 and 6. Figure 1a shows the impact of k={2, 6} on the
fault response of the Type IV IBR. As shown, I2 increases with the increased gain;
nevertheless, I1 decreases since the total amplitude of the converter current is limited.
 Fault current power factor/phase angle: The fault current of an IBR has a dynamically
changing phase angle depending on IBR control scheme and the amplitude of in-
verter terminal voltage, as shown in Table 1 [29]. Further, in contrast to a SG whose
fault current is predominantly inductive, the fault current of an IBR may be either
resistive, inductive, or capacitive. The control mode considerably impacts the angu-
lar relationship between on-fault voltages and currents near the IBR which is re-
quired by some protection functions (e.g., directional elements) for correct operation.
Figure 1b compares the relative phase angle of I2 and negative-sequence voltage (V2)
for a SG, a Type III-, and a Type IV-based IBR. As shown, for the SG and Type III IBR,
I2 is predominantly inductive (i.e., I2 injected by the generator into the grid leads V2
by about 90°.) However, the behavior is different under Type IV where I2 is predom-
inantly capacitive (lagging V2 by about 90°.) This changed angular characteristics
may lead to misoperation of protection functions relying on the phase angle of I2/V2
for proper operation. The paper provides examples of such misoperation problems.
This could be addressed by reactive I2 injection, e.g., based on the German grid code,
in which case the phase angle becomes predominantly inductive, as shown in Figure
1b for k={2, 6}.
 Fault current duration: The amount of time an inverter can continuously inject over-
current into the grid during a fault depends on the inverter control and thermal limits
of the power electronics.
 Rate of change of frequency: IBRs have no inherent rotational inertia (some grid
codes mandate that wind generators have the capability to provide a synthetic iner-
tial response [30]). Hence, large-scale integration of IBRs is expected to increase the
rate of change of system frequency following large system disturbances such as loss
of a major generation infeed. Furthermore, faster power swings are expected under
high shares of IBRs due to the reduced inertia.
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 4 of 22

(a) (b)
Figure 1. (a) Comparison of the amplitude of I1 and I2 of a SG, a Type III-, and a Type IV-based inverter-based resources
(IBR) under the German grid code with various values of characteristic proportional gain k; (b) Phasor of V2 and I2 of a
SG, a Type III-, and a Type IV-based IBR under the German grid code with various values of characteristic proportional
gain k.

Figure 2. Characteristic curve for IBR I2 injection based on the German grid code [28].
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 5 of 22

Table 1. Fault current contribution of an example Type IV-based IBR as a function of terminal
voltage.

After 5 Cycles
V1 (pu) I1 (pu) Angle (I1/V1) (°)
1.00 1.00 0.00
0.90 1.13 −10.20
0.80 1.15 −20.35
0.70 1.15 −31.45
0.60 1.15 −44.08
0.50 1.15 −60.41
0.40 1.15 −90.00
0.10 1.15 −90.00

3. Review of Impact of IBRs on System Protection

The different fault current characteristics of IBRs has an anticipated impact on the
performance of legacy protective relays—set with the expectation of short-circuit charac-
teristics of a SG-dominated power system. This necessitates revision of their performance
under IBRs, identification of potential misoperation scenarios, and development of reme-
dial solutions to circumvent the issue and ensure effective protection under IBRs. This
section studies the impact of IBRs on a variety of commonly used transmission system
protection schemes. Table 2 presents a summary of key findings.

Table 2. Summary of the main findings regarding the impact of IBRs on system protection.

Expected Protection Challenge due to

Protection Function Potential Solution
IBR
• Minimally set phase overcurrent su-
pervision.
• Provide IBR dynamic I1 or I2 reactive
current injection together with addi-
tional countermeasures to attain an ac-
ceptable level of phase distance relia-
The lower amplitude of fault current
bility (e.g., per the German code).
under IBRs and lack of enough super-
• Use zero sequence overcurrent pro-
vising current may lead to failure to
tection for ground fault protection (As-
trip.
suming the IBR to be connected
Line distance protection through a transformer that is a source
of zero-sequence current (I0)).
• Back up undervoltage protection to
safeguard against risk of phase dis-
tance relay not picking up due to IBRs.
The dynamically changing source im-
pedance under IBRs may leads to un-
Assessing the risk requires detailed
predictable and inconsistent dynamic
three-phase analytic model simulation
expansion of mho circle, thus reducing
of the IBR control system.
reach accuracy and increased risk of
over- or under-reach.
Lack of inertia and faster IBR control
response time may lead to a considera- • Forcing self-polarization when the
Memory-polarized zero sequence di-
ble shift in the phase angle of voltage phase angle shift exceeds a pre-speci-
rectional protection
during a fault, thus causing an incor- fied threshold.
rect directionality decision.
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 6 of 22

• Applying memory voltage angle

compensation whereby the phase an-
gle of the locked memory voltage is au-
tomatically compensated with a sup-
plemental phase shift quantity.
• Use directional zero-sequence pro-
tection for ground fault protection (as-
Lack of I2 contribution by IBRs may suming the IBR to be connected
lead to lack of enough supervising I2, through a transformer that is a source
causing the element not to assert. of I0).
• IBR dynamic I2 reactive current in-
Negative sequence based directional jection under unbalanced faults.
ground fault protection • Use directional zero-sequence over-
current protection for ground fault
The changed phase angle of I2 under protection (assuming the IBR to be
IBRs may lead to an incorrect direc- connected through a transformer that
tionality decision. is a source of I0).
• IBR dynamic I2 reactive current in-
jection under unbalanced faults.
Provide IBR dynamic I2 reactive cur-
Lack of I2 contribution by IBRs may
Negative sequence overcurrent ele- rent injection together with additional
lead to lack of enough supervising I2,
ments countermeasures to attain an accepta-
causing the element not to assert.
ble level of overcurrent reliability.
A malfunctioning Directional Negative
• Use Permissive Overreaching Trans-
Sequence Overcurrent (67Q) element
fer Trip scheme (POTT) scheme with
causes the impacted relay to communi-
zero-sequence and echo logic.
cate an incorrect permissive trip/block
• Provide IBR dynamic I2 reactive cur-
signal to the remote relay, leading to
rent injection.
Pilot Protection an incorrect trip decision.
Directional Comparison Blocking
• Minimally set overcurrent supervi-
scheme (DCB) may have difficulty in
sion elements for distance relays.
sensing faults on its line due to low
• Backup phase undervoltage and neu-
levels of fault currents produced by
tral overvoltage elements
IBRs.
• Provide IBR dynamic I1 or I2 reactive
The changed fault current patterns un-
current injection together with addi-
der IBRs may cause LCD to mistakenly
LCD tional countermeasures to attain an ac-
classify an internal fault as external
ceptable level of phase distance relia-
and fail to operate.
bility.
High IBR integration leads to larger
system ROCOF events which are po-
tentially sufficient to trigger the
Increase the ROCOF setting.
ROCOF ROCOF protection system, leading to
undesired tripping of embedded gen-
eration units with potentially destabi-
lizing consequences of the network.
Reduced inertia under IBRs increases
the rate of change of swing impedance Reduce the time delay setting of the
Power Swing Protection vector, and the Power Swing Blocking PSB function based on the fastest
(PSB) function may mistakenly inter- swing in presence of IBRs.
pret such faster swings as a system
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 7 of 22

fault and fail to declare a power swing

condition.
IBRs may impact the impedance trajec-
tory of the most severe stable swing, Modify the settings of the OST element
potentially causing the Out-of-Step- based on the most severe stable swing
Tripping (OST) to misinterpret a stable under IBRs.
swing as unstable.
The dynamically changing source im-
pedance under IBRs may change the Recalculate the location of optimal lo-
optimal location for implementation of cation of OST under IBRs.
the OST.

3.1. Line Distance Protection

References [16,18] have illustrated that IBRs may negatively impact the performance
of a distance relay in two ways, namely reduced reach accuracy and misoperation due to
lack of enough supervising current.

3.1.1. Reduced Reach Accuracy

This impact relates to the dynamic expansion of a memory-polarized mho distance
circle [31,32]. Basically, memory polarization causes mho distance circle to exhibit an ini-
tial expansion whose characteristics depend on the amplitude and phase angle of source
impedance behind the relay. In traditional SG-dominated power systems, this impedance
is predictable and consistent allowing the reach to be calculated to provide an additional
resistive fault coverage capability. By contrast, under IBRs the impedance becomes varia-
ble due to the dynamically changing internal impedance of IBRs, thus leading to incon-
sistent expansion of the mho circle. This reduces the resistive fault coverage capability and
may lead to further over- or under-reach problems.
To illustrate this misoperation, a simulation study has been conducted on a 230/115
kV multi wind park (WP) test system shown in Figure 3a. The model represents a portion
of an actual North American transmission system. A distance relay on bus (1) protects the
line connecting bus (1) to bus (2). The relay uses a memory-polarized mho circle charac-
teristic. A mid-line phase-A-to-ground fault with a fault resistance of Rf=1.6 Ω (equivalent
to 20 Ω on the primary side of current transformer (CT) and voltage transformer (VT)) has
been applied on the protected line. The mho element of the line distance relay uses cross
polarization with a memory duration of 0.2 s providing an initial resistive reach of ap-
proximately 1 Ω when the source impedance behind the relay is characterized by a strong
system. Given that this initial resistive reach is smaller than the fault resistance, successful
distance relay operation means that zone 1 should not pick up. The fault has been simu-
lated under two scenarios: (i) Scenario 1 in which the corridor connecting bus (1) to bus
(6) is closed and the impedance behind the relay is characterized by a strong connection;
and (ii) Scenario 2 in which the corridor is open, e.g., due to a scheduled maintenance, and
hence the impedance is characterized by the dynamically changing source impedance of
the three WPs connected to bus (1). The simulation test has been conducted within the
EMTP software environment [33] using a generic EMT model of a wind generator [34].
Figure 3b shows the dynamic expansion of the mho circle under the two scenarios.
As shown, in Scenario 1 where connection to a strong grid is available, the mho circle
expands to approximately 1Ω as predicted, and the expanded mho circle does not include
the fault impedance trajectory, as expected. However, in Scenario 2 the mho circle exhibits
a larger expansion exceeding the calculated reach of 1 Ω, and zone 1 unintentionally picks
up. The cause of this unintentional operation is the dynamically changing source imped-
ance of the WPs on bus (1).
Recommendations—Reference [18] has provided further examples of such a misop-
eration and shown that the extent of this expansion is variable depending on factors such
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 8 of 22

as WP operating conditions, number of WTG units in service, and wind speed. Given
these effects, assessing the risk of over- or under-reach and reduced reach accuracy re-
quires detailed three-phase analytic model simulation of IBRs [7].

(a) (b)
Figure 3. (a) The 230/115 kV test system and (b) comparison of dynamic expansion of a memory-polarized distance mho
circle under synchronous generators (SG) and IBR.

3.1.2. Misoperation due to Low Supervising Current

The operation of a distance relay is commonly supervised by some minimum phase
current. This element ensures that distance relay elements get activated only when the
current amplitude is larger than a pre-specified threshold. The low amplitude of fault cur-
rent under IBRs may result in lack of enough supervising current, thus leading to misop-
eration of the distance element.
To illustrate this misoperation, a pilot protection scheme protecting the line connect-
ing bus (3) to bus (4) is considered. The scheme is realized by forward zone 2 of two dis-
tance relays on buses (3) and (4) looking toward the protected line. The phase distance
element is supervised by a phase over current element with a pickup setting of Ipkp=0.5
pu. A 100 ms phase-A-to-phase-B fault has been applied at 95% of the protected line from
the relay on bus (4). Zone 2 of the phase distance element should instantaneously pick up
and communicate a permissive trip key to the remote relay. The fault has been simulated
under two scenarios: (i) Scenario 1, denoted by SG in the figure, in which the corridor
connecting bus (4) to bus (6) is closed, and hence the fault current measured by the dis-
tance relay on bus (4) is predominantly supplied by a strong system and (ii) Scenario 2,
denoted by IBR in the figure, in which the corridor is open, and hence the fault current is
exclusively supplied by the WP on bus (4) which is an FSC type.
Figure 4a and 4b show the response of the distance relay in Scenario 1 and Scenario
2, respectively. As shown, in Scenario 1 with a strong grid the apparent fault impedance
trajectory enters zone 2, the measured fault current If=4.56 pu is above the pickup thresh-
old of Ipkp=0.5 pu, and zone 2 successfully picks up and instantaneously issues Z2_pkp
signal. By contrast, in Scenario 2 with IBR, the measured fault current becomes If=0.46 pu
which is below the pickup threshold, the supervising overcurrent element does not pick
up, and the zone 2 distance element fails to pick up. The cause of this misoperation is lack
of enough supervising current due to the low amplitude of the fault current contribution
of the WP on bus (4).
Recommendation—Potential solutions to circumvent this type of misoperation are: (i)
minimally set phase overcurrent supervision; and (ii) back up undervoltage protection [7].
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 9 of 22

(a) (b)

Figure 4. Comparison of response of a distance relay to a fault in zone 2 under (a) SG and (b) IBR.

3.2. Zero Sequence Memory Polarized Directional Protective Relay Element

A zero-sequence directional element differentiates between faults in the forward and
reverse directions by comparing the phase angle of on-fault I0 to that of a reference polar-
izing voltage [35]. Given that on-fault voltage amplitude may be too small to be accurately
measured, the polarizing quantity is commonly defined based on a memory voltage. This
memory polarization approach assumes that the phase angle of voltage does not signifi-
cantly change during a fault. While this assumption is valid in traditional SG-dominated
power systems due to system inertia, it may no longer be valid under high shares of IBRs
due to reduced inertia and typically faster IBR control response time. This can potentially
lead to faster changes in system voltage and frequency and cause a larger shift in the phase
angle of the on-fault voltage with respect to the memory voltage. This increased difference
may lead to an incorrect directionality decision [36,37].
To illustrate this misoperation, the 230/115 kV test system of Figure 3a has been con-
sidered. The distance relay on bus (4) uses a neutral directional overcurrent element (67N)
to supervise the ground distance element. The 67N element is cross polarized with a
memory duration of 0.2s with forward and reverse regions marked by “Forward” and
“Reverse” in the phasor diagrams of Figure 5. A bolted phase-A-to-ground fault is applied
on the protected line which is in the forward direction with respect to the relay. Successful
operation means that the 67N element declares forward direction and allows the ground
distance element to operate. Two scenarios have been considered: (i) Scenario 1, denoted
by SG in Figure 5, in which the corridor connecting bus (2) to bus (3) is closed, and hence
the fault current measured by the relay is predominantly supplied by the SG-dominated
power system behind bus (2); and (ii) Scenario 2, denoted by IBR in Figure 5, in which the
corridor is open and hence the fault current is exclusively supplied by the WP connected
to bus (4).
Figure 5a,b show the phasor diagram and response of the 67N forward element un-
der SG. As shown, subsequent to the fault, the on-fault voltage deviates from the po-
larizing voltage only by about 11°, the short-circuit current lagging by about 90°
falls within the forward zone, and the 67N element successfully declares forward direc-
tion. Figure 5c,d show the response under IBR. As shown, in contrast to the previous case,
exhibits a significant phase shift of about 65° with respect to , the short-circuit cur-
rent I lagging by about 90° falls outside the forward zone, and the 67N element fails
to declare forward direction. The cause of this misoperation is the larger shift of with
respect to V due to the faster control response time of WPs.
Recommendation—Potential solutions to circumvent this misoperation include: (1)
forcing self-polarization when the phase angle shift exceeds a set threshold and (2) apply-
ing memory voltage angle compensation whereby the phase angle of the locked memory
voltage is automatically compensated with a supplemental phase shift quantity [36].
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 10 of 22

Figure 5. Phasor diagram and response of 67N element under the two scenarios of Section 3.2: (a) phasor diagram under
SG; (b) response of 67N under SG; (c) phasor diagram under IBR; and (d) response of 67N under IBR.

3.3. Negative Sequence Components Based Protection Schemes

Several protective relaying functions are based on negative sequence quantities
which indicate an unbalanced fault. These include Instantaneous Negative Sequence
Overcurrent (50Q), Negative Sequence Time Overcurrent (51Q), 67Q, communication-as-
sisted protection, phase selection/fault identification (FID), and differential protection.
Quad ground distance element also uses negative-sequence quantities [38,39] but is not
considered in detail in this paper. References [8,15,16,18,25,26] have studied potential
misoperation scenarios for these schemes due to IBRs. These misoperation issues originate
from two key differences between the fault current characteristics of IBRs and conven-
tional SGs, namely lower amplitude and changed phase angle of I2. The lower amplitude
may cause misoperation of 50Q and 51Q which rely on the amplitude of I2, and the
changed phase angle may lead to misoperation of 67Q which uses the angular relationship
between I2 and V2. A potential solution to these misoperation problems is to require I2
control by IBRs during an unbalanced fault. The German grid code is an example of such
a requirement, and it has been shown to be capable of resolving the misoperation issues
in some cases [25,26].

3.3.1. Instantaneous/Time Negative Sequence Overcurrent Element (50Q/51Q)

These elements operate when the amplitude of I2 exceeds a set threshold. Their suc-
cessful operation relies on the assumption that I2 is present in substantial levels during an
unbalanced fault. When the source is a SG, the amplitude of I2 is typically large enough
to exceed the pickup setting and successfully operate the elements. By contrast, the low
amplitude I2 under IBRs may not be sufficient to operate the elements, thus causing their
misoperation.
To illustrate a misoperation example, the test system of Figure 6 has been considered
which represents a portion of a 315/230/120kV transmission system including five gener-
ation units. An overcurrent relay denoted by R50 on bus (6) containing a 50Q element is
used to protect the line. The negative-sequence pickup current is set at 0.25 pu. A perma-
nent single phase-A-to-ground denoted by AG1 has been placed on the line connecting
bus (6) to bus (7) at t=5s. Successful operation means the 50Q element asserts instantane-
ously. Three generation scenarios have been considered where the five generation units
are based on: (i) traditional SGs; (ii) Type IV-based IBRs with no I2 control; and (iii) Type
IV-based IBRs with I2 control based on the German grid code with k=2. Figure 7 shows
the time-domain amplitude of I2 and quasi steady-state values measured at 5.2 s by relay
R50 under the three generator scenarios. As shown, under SG the amplitude of I2 is 0.68
pu which is above the pickup setting, and the 50Q element successfully asserts. Under
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 11 of 22

Type IV with no I2 injection, the amplitude is 0.09 pu which is below the pickup, and the
50Q element fails to assert. Given that 50Q/51Q elements are commonly used in conjunc-
tion with other protective elements, their misoperation (failing to detect fault) may pose a
risk to the reliability of the power system.
Recommendation—A potential solution to the misoperation of 50Q/51Q is IBR I2
control, e.g., based on the German code. Figure 7 shows that by adopting this solution in
the above case study, the amplitude of I2 is increased to 0.57 pu and the 50Q misoperation
is resolved.

Figure 6. Schematic diagram of the 315/230/120 kV test system.

Scenario I2 (pu)
SG 0.68
Type IV WTG 0.09
Type IV WTG, German code 0.57

Figure 7. Negative-sequence fault current due to fault AG1 under SG (green), Type IV wind turbine generator (WTG) with
no I2 control (red), and Type IV WTG under the German grid code (blue).

3.3.2. Directional Negative Sequence Overcurrent (67Q)

This element determines the direction of a fault by comparing the phase angle of I2
to that of V2 [38]. The concept is that a forward/reverse fault causes I2 to lead/lag V2 by
ideally 90°. This assumption stems from the highly inductive nature of the negative-se-
quence network in a SG-dominated grid. Given that under IBRs I2 may be inductive/re-
sistive/capacitive, the assumption may no longer be valid, leading to an incorrect direc-
tionality decision by 67Q.
An example of such a misoperation is the 2014 event in a north American transmis-
sion system where a directional negative sequence overcurrent element failed to correctly
identify the direction of a fault near a Type III WTG [26]. The reference has shown that
use of POTT scheme with zero-sequence and echo logic fixes the misoperation. Figure 8
shows the system, fault records, and simulation of the event in EMTP. The system voltage
is 230 kV. There are three WPs, namely Quality which is a Type III-based WP and Dokie
which consists of two Type III-based WPs. A transmission line denoted by 2L308 connects
the WPs to a hydro station. A relay in the DKT substation uses a directional negative se-
quence element looking towards line 2L308. A phase-B-to-ground fault 9.5-km from DKT
substation occurred evolving into a phase-B-to-C-to-ground fault after three cycles. The
fault was in the forward direction of the relay, but the forward element did not assert.
Figure 8 shows the actual relay records and simulation results. The current and voltage
phasors in all cases have been obtained two cycles into the BG fault. As shown, the for-
ward element only asserts transiently since I2 leads V2 by a phase angle close to 180°
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 12 of 22

which corresponds to the reverse zone. The cause is the resistive I2 contribution of the
WPs. The results show an agreement between the recorded and simulated phase angle of
voltage and current phasors. The discrepancy in the amplitude of sequence currents is
due to modeling differences and unavailability of the full data of the system. The
Recommendation—Potential solutions to this misoperation include: (i) use of direc-
tional zero sequence elements instead of directional negative sequence elements for
ground fault protection (assuming the IBR to be connected through a transformer that is
a source of I0) [26]; (ii) IBR reactive I2 injection under unbalanced faults (e.g., per the Ger-
man grid code) [25,26].

Figure 8. Simulation of an actual misoperation of a directional negative sequence element due to a Type III WTG [26].

3.3.3. Communication-Assisted Protection

The misoperation of 67Q can lead to further protection malfunctions when 67Q is
used as part of another protection scheme, e.g., in communication-assisted protection.
This section shows this impact for the POTT scheme; similar impacts can be shown for
other pilot schemes including permissive underreaching scheme (PUTT) and DCB, as
shown in [18].
In the POTT scheme, the overreaching distance element (zone 2) at each line termi-
nals sends a permissive trip key to the remote terminal. Directional elements including
67Q2 and 67Q3 are also used in some applications for more sensitive fault detection for
unbalanced faults and can either supplement or replace ground distance (zone) elements
in communications-assisted trip schemes. Each terminal trips upon receipt of the remote
permissive key and the local permissive signal. The use of 67Q renders POTT prone to
malfunction under IBRs. Basically, a possible incorrect directionality decision by 67Q
causes the impacted POTT scheme not to key the permissive trip signal to the remote re-
lay. It should be mentioned that the use of negative-sequence directional supervision in
pilot protection is for additional security benefit but is not essential.
To illustrate this misoperation, A POTT scheme has been added to the test system of
Figure 6 to protect the line connecting buses (6) and (7), and fault AG1 has been applied
on the line. The POTT scheme is realized by two multi-function relays denoted by R1 and
R2 using 21G_Z2 (ground distance zone 2) and 67Q. The POTT scheme should instanta-
neously trip. Successful POTT operation requires both 21G_Z2 and 67Q2 to be picked up
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 13 of 22

by R1 and R2, the permissive trip to be keyed to the respective remote relay, and 21G_Z2
of each relay to trip on receipt of the permissive trip. Three generation scenarios have been
considered where the generators are (i) SGs; (ii) Type IV-based IBRs with no I2 control;
and (iii) Type IV-based IBRs with I2 control based on the German grid code with k=2.
Figure 9 shows the results. Under SG the operation is successful since R1 sees the
fault in zone 2 and forward direction, issues both 21G_Z2 and 67Q2, and keys permission
to trip to R2. Similarly, R2 sees the fault in zone 2 and forward direction, issues both
21G_Z2 and 67_QF, and sends a permissive trip signal to R1. Under Type IV with no I2
control, 67_QF of R1 asserts only transiently. Hence, R1 fails to send a permissive signal
to R2, and POTT fails to trip for the in-zone AG1 fault. The malfunctioning element is 67Q
of R1, and the cause is the changed phase angle of I2 due to Type IV-based IBRs. The
misoperation problem is resolved under the German grid code. In this case, due to the
reactive I2 injection of WP3 and WP4, the 67Q element of R1 successfully issues 67_QF,
permissive trip is sent to R2, and POTT successfully operates.
Recommendation—Potential solutions to eliminate this misoperation include: (i)
POTT scheme with zero sequence and echo logic [26]; and (ii) IBR dynamic I2 reactive
current injection (e.g., the German code). Reference 7 has provided further solutions to
eliminate misoperation of DCB including minimally set overcurrent supervision elements
for distance relays, direct transfer trip (DTT), and backup phase undervoltage and neutral
overvoltage elements.

Figure 9. Response of POTT to a ground fault on the protected line under SG, Type IV-based IBR with no I2 control, and
Type IV-based IBR with I2 control based on the German code.

3.3.4. Fault Identification Logic

The FID scheme (or also known as phase selection) is used by protective elements to
identify the type of a fault, i.e., single-phase-to-ground, or phase-to-phase, and the faulted
phase(s) [35,40–43]. In one implementation of the FID logic the phase angle relationship
between I2 and I0 is used to identify the faulted phase loop [40]. The changed phase angle
of I2 under IBRs may lead to an incorrect fault identification by this FID logic.
To illustrate this impact, fault AG1 is applied in the test system of Figure 6, and a
distance relay denoted by 21R1 on bus (6) is used to detect the faulted phase. Figure 10
shows a graphical representation of the FID logic which uses the three colored sectors and
the respective phase angle of IA2 to IA0 to classify a fault [40]. Assuming the phase angle
of IA0 vector to be the reference, the fault is classified as {AG/BCG}, {CG/ABG}, or
{BG/ACG} when IA2 vector falls within the yellow, green, or red sector, respectively.
Three generation scenarios have been considered where the generators are: (i) SGs; (ii)
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 14 of 22

Type IV-based IBRs with no I2 control; and (iii) Type IV-based IBRs with I2 control based
on the German grid code with k=2. As shown, under SG IA2 lags IA0 by about -4° which
falls within the AG sector, and the FID successfully declares an AG fault. Under Type IV
IBR with no I2 control, IA2 leads IA0 by about -140° which falls within the CG sector, and
the FID scheme mistakenly declares a CG fault. The cause of this incorrect fault identifi-
cation is the changed phase angle of I2 due to the Type IV IBRs. Under Type IV German,
IA2 lags IA0 by about -4° which is within the AG sector, and the scheme successfully de-
clares an AG fault.
It should be noted that this current-based FID only operates if the fault produces
sufficient I2 and I0, otherwise FID is performed using voltage. The impact of IBRs on the
voltage-based FID has not been studied in this paper.

Figure 10. Graphical representation of the sectors of fault identification (FID) and the correspond-
ing phase selection decision: IA2 and IA0 phasors due to fault AG1 under SG (green), Type IV
with no I2 control (red), and Type IV under the German grid code (blue).

Discussion—The above case studies suggest that IBR I2 control may resolve some of
the misoperation issues in some cases. Nevertheless, this solution faces limitations since
IBRs are essentially current limited devices. Even when required to inject I2 during unbal-
anced faults, the magnitude of this current would be limited. The limitation exists because
the phasor sum of I1 (active and reactive) and I2 in any given phase cannot exceed the
current limit of the converter. As such, the full extent of this behavior on traditional pro-
tection schemes is still unknown especially when the penetration of IBRs is significantly
high throughout the interconnection.

3.4. Line Current Differential Protection

The LCD protection (87L) is a communication-assisted protection scheme which is
used in applications such as protection of critical lines where an exceptionally secure pro-
tection is required and very short lines where distance relays may be inadequate [44]. LCD
responds to the sum of current entering its zone of protection. Ideally, this sum is close to
zero under all events except for an internal fault, and hence can be used as an indicator of
an internal fault. The 87L elements include phase-segregated (87LP), negative-sequence
(87LQ), and zero-sequence (87LG) differential elements. Existing LCD scheme include tra-
ditional LCD [45] and vendor-specific current-ratio plane (Alpha Plane) scheme [46,47].
The traditional scheme uses the amplitude of the sum of terminal currents; if the ampli-
tude is above a user-defined threshold, an internal fault is declared. The Alpha Plane
scheme uses the complex ratio of terminal currents; if this complex ratio falls within the
operate region of a user-defined characteristic in the complex plane (Alpha Plane), an in-
ternal fault is declared.
The different fault current signatures of IBRs may cause an LCD relay to encounter a
different current flow pattern compared to that of a SG-dominated power system. If these
differences are significant, the fault current may fall within an incorrect region of the LCD
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 15 of 22

characteristic, and the relay may mistakenly classify an internal fault as external. This im-
pact may be different for the traditional scheme compared to Alpha Plane scheme due to
the use of different detection algorithms.
To demonstrate the effect, two simulation tests have been conducted to study the
performance of an Alpha Plane LCD and a traditional LCD in the 500-kV two-source test
system of Figure 11a. The LCD scheme protects the line connecting bus L to bus R. The
source on bus R is a Thevenin equivalent representing a SG-dominated power system.
The source on bus L represents three generation scenarios: (i) SG; (ii) type IV-based IBR
with no I2 control; or (iii) Type IV-based IBR with I2 control.

3.4.1. Traditional LCD

Figure 11b shows the response of a traditional LCD scheme to a phase-A-to-ground
mid-line fault. The scheme uses single slope characteristic with a slope of 50%. The area
above/below this characteristic defines the operate/restrain region of the LCD. A variety of
faults at different locations and fault resistance values have been simulated, each marked
by “x”. Two generation scenarios have been considered where the source on bus L repre-
sents: (i) a SG; and (ii) a Type IV based IBR with no I2 control. Since the fault is inside the
protection zone, the LCD should pick up. As shown, in all considered scenarios the fault
trajectory is within the operate region of the LCD, and the fault is successfully detected.
Hence, the results suggesting no misoperation exclusively due to IBRs; at very high fault
resistance values the fault is not detected, but this occurs under both SG and IBR.

3.4.2. Alpha Plane LCD

Figure 11c shows the trajectories of the 87L elements of an Alpha Plane LCD under
the AG fault. Any point outside the circular characteristic indicates an internal fault. Prior
to the fault the operating point is inside the restrain region, and an internal fault causes
the trajectory to move into the operate region. Under SG, the current ratio of 87LA and
87LQ elements departs from the restraint point and enters the operate region, and the
elements successfully operate. Nevertheless, under Type IV with no I2 control the trajec-
tories remain inside the restrain zone, the 87LA and 87LQ elements fail to assert, and the
internal fault is not detected. The cause of 87LQ misoperation is the low amplitude and
changed phase angle of the I2 contribution of the Type IV IBR which produces a post-fault
operating point inside the restraining region. The different I2 characteristics also contrib-
utes to the misoperation of 87LA. Under Type IV-based IBR with I2 control, the misoper-
ation is fixed for both 87LA and 87LQ elements. The trajectory of the 87LQ element exits
the restraining zone due to the increased amplitude of I2 and settles in an operating point
close to the real axis since the terminal I2 currents are almost fully in phase. The trajectory
of the 87LA element also exits the restrain zone due to the changed phase angle of ILA
caused by the injected reactive I2.
Recommendation—The simulation case study suggests a risk of Alpha Plane LCD
misoperation under IBRs. Conducted simulations further show the possibility of fixing
the misoperation through IBR I2 control. In contrast to Alpha Plane LCD, traditional LCD
seems to be immune to an IBR-related misoperation.
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 16 of 22

(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 11. (a) The 500 kV two-source test system; (b) trajectories of a traditional LCD for a phase-A-to-G fault at different
locations and various fault resistance values under SG and Type IV WTG with no I2 control; and (c) trajectories of an
Alpha Plane LCD for a phase-A-to-ground fault under SG, Type IV WTG with no I2 control, and Type IV WTG with I2
control based on the German grid code.

3.5. Rate-Of-Change-Of-Frequency and Power Swing Protection

With increasing penetration of IBRs, asynchronously connected to the power system,
and reduction in the amount of online synchronous resources, system inertia declines.
This low inertia operation may negatively impact the performance of protection schemes
designed with the expectation of large inertia under traditional SGs. This ROCOF and
power swing protection.

3.5.1. Rate-Of-Change-Of-Frequency
ROCOF protection is used to detect unintentional island formation in a power system
[48–52]. This is performed by measuring the rate of change in frequency; a rapid change
in frequency in a short period is indicative of an island formation and should trigger a trip
of the generation source or the point of interconnection transformer to de-energize the
island. Traditionally, the settings of ROCOF relays have been selected with the expecta-
tion of high inertia operation. Different regions use different ROCOF settings with values
ranging from 0.1 Hz/s to 1 Hz/s [52,53].
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 17 of 22

With reduced system inertia due to IBR penetration, the ROCOF after loss of a gen-
erator may exceed the setting since ROCOF is inversely proportional to system inertia.
Consequently, ROCOF relays may mistakenly interpret the high ROCOF as an islanding
event and cause unnecessary tripping of IBRs across the system. The outcome is a power
imbalance which may be greater than planned for, with potentially destabilizing conse-
quences for the network.
Figure 12 illustrates this effect using a simulation study conducted on a European
transmission system test case [14]. In this test, a dynamic event was simulated under in-
creasing levels of IBR integration, and ROCOF was captured in each case. The results
show the increased ROCOF as a function of increased IBR integration level. When IBR
integration is 0% (all generators are SGs), the measured ROCOF is 0.16 Hz/s. However, in
an operating condition where IBRs displace 65% of the MW generated by SGs, the ROCOF
increases to 0.37 Hz/s. This trend may result in ROCOF values exceeding the setting of the
relays thus causing a misoperation.
Recommendation—To eliminate this misoperation, a solution is to increase the
ROCOF setting in the grid code. Examples of such revisions include National Grid UK
which has revised its grid code to increase the ROCOF Loss-of-Mains setting from
0.125Hz/s to 1Hz/s [54] and EirGrid in Ireland which has increased the setting from
0.5Hz/s to 1Hz/s [55]. A drawback of this approach is the resulting desensitization of is-
landing protection.

Figure 12. Rate-of-change-of-frequency (ROCOF) as a function of IBR integration level.

3.5.2. Power Swing Detection and Protection

Power swing is a temporal variation of power flow caused by system disturbances
such as line switching, generator disconnection, and the loss or connection of large blocks
of load [56–59]. During a power swing, system voltages and currents change, and protec-
tive relays which measure these quantities may interpret such variations as a fault and
unintentionally trip needed equipment. Power swing protection protects a power system
against such undesired tripping by differentiating between a fault and a power swing and
blocking the operation of a target relay in the event of a power swing. The detection is
based on the consideration that the rate of change of swing impedance is slow during a
power swing since the rate is subject to the large rotational inertia of machines. By con-
trast, the rate is very fast during a fault as it is determined by the time-constant of the
signal filtering mechanism of the relay.
Power swing protection has two main functions: (i) PSB which differentiates between
a fault and a power swing by measuring the rate of change of swing impedance; and (ii)
OST which distinguishes between a stable and unstable swing and initiates system parti-
tioning in the event of an unstable swing to avoid a widespread outage. The settings of
the PSB and OST functions are determined based on swing characteristics; the settings of
the PSB function are determined based on the fastest rate of change of swing impedance,
and the settings of the OST function are calculated from the swing impedance trajectory
of the most severe stable swing.
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 18 of 22

The reduced inertia and changed dynamic characteristics under IBRs may change the
swing trajectory of a power system, thus resulting in the following detrimental impacts
[14,16,27]:
 PSB function: The increased rate of change of swing impedance vector may cause
PSB to mistakenly interpret a power as a system fault and fail to declare a power
swing condition. A potential solution is to reduce the time delay setting of the PSB
function by finding the fastest swing in presence of IBRs. Figure 13a illustrates this
misoperation by comparing the simulated swing impedance trajectory simulated un-
der a SG-dominated power system and under 25% IBR integration. The PSB function
measures the rate of change of impedance using an outer and a middle characteristic
and a time delay setting of three cycles. Under SG, the swing crosses the outer and
middle elements at t =5.154s and t =5.213s, respectively, corresponding to a time
delay of 3.5 cycles. Since this time delay is larger than the PSB setting of 3 cycles, the
function successfully detects the power swing and blocks the corresponding zone
elements of the supervised distance relay. However, under 25% IBR the swing
crosses the outer and middle elements at t =5.128 s and t =5.173 s, respectively, cor-
responding to a time delay of 2.7 cycles which is less than the PSB time delay setting.
Consequently, the function fails to detect the swing, the impedance trajectory enters
zone 2, and the distance relay unintentionally declares a fault on a healthy line. The
cause of this misoperation is the higher rate of change of swing impedance caused by
reduced inertia under IBR. To eliminate such a PSB misoperation, a solution is to
reduce the PSB time delay. A limitation of this solution is that reducing the PSB time
delay to very small values may lead to unwanted blocking of distance relay zones by
the PSB function during a fault.
 OST function: The changed swing impedance trajectory under IBRs may cause the
OST to misinterpret a stable swing as unstable. Figure 13b shows this misoperation
by comparing the impedance trajectory of a stable swing under SG and under 50%
IBR integration. The OST function declares an unstable swing as soon as the trajec-
tory crosses the inner characteristic. Given that the simulated swing is stable, the OST
function should not assert. As shown, under SG the swing reverses direction at
3.72+j3.5Ω right before crossing the inner element, and hence the swing is success-
fully classified as stable. Nevertheless, under 50% IBR the return point is at
3.16+j3.15Ω which falls inside the inner element, thus causing the OST to mistakenly
classify the stable swing as an OOS condition. The consequence may be an unneces-
sary partitioning of the system by the OST function. Such an OST misoperation can
be avoided by modifying the settings of the inner characteristic based on the trajec-
tory of the most sever stable swing under IBRs.
 The location of EC of a power system moves as IBR generation level increases. This
is due to the changed source impedance under IBRs. The movement of EC necessi-
tates the recalculation of the location of the EC to find the optimal location to imple-
ment the OST function. EC moves toward IBRs as wind generation level increases.
 The capacity, type and GSC control options (decoupled vs. coupled) are among the
key factors that impact power swing characteristics and need to be considered in pro-
tection studies as they all influence the level of impact on PSB and OST functions in
addition to the location of EC.
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 19 of 22

(a) (b)
Figure 13. (a) Power Swing Blocking (PSB) misoperation due to faster swings under IBRs and (b) Out-of-Step-Tripping
(OST) malfunction due to changed swing trajectory under IBRs.

4. Conclusions
Given the different fault response characteristics of IBRs compared to SGs, large-scale
IBR integration may have detrimental impacts on the performance of system protection.
This paper has studied these impacts on a variety of protection functions, identified po-
tential misoperation challenges, and provided potential solutions to circumvent the issues
and ensure effective protection under IBRs. These impacts largely stem off from the low
amplitude and changed phase angle of fault current contribution of IBRs and lack of in-
herent rotational reduced inertia. Table 2 presents a summary of the main findings of the
paper.
Future research directions include evaluating the recommended solutions to the
identified protection misoperation issues. Specifically, IBR I2 control as one of the poten-
tial solutions has limitations since IBRs are current limited devices. Even when required
to inject I2 during unbalanced faults, the amplitude of this current would be limited be-
cause the phasor sum of I1 and I2 in any given phase cannot exceed the current limit of
the converter. Furthermore, increased I2 injection leads to reduced I1 contribution which
may in turn lead to other protection challenges. As such, the full extent of IBR I2 control
on traditional protection schemes is still unknown especially when the penetration of IBRs
is significantly high throughout the interconnection. Another research direction is to
study the impact of grid forming IBRs on the performance of system protection. Given
their different control, these IBRs are expected to have a different impact on system pro-
tection compared to that of grid following IBRs studied in this paper.

Author Contributions: A.H. led the analytical work, methodology development, simulation stud-
ies, and writing of the paper. E.F. provided the overall vision and guidance. I.K. provided the sim-
ulation software and guidance on simulation studies. I.K., U.K., and E.F. provided the simulation
models. E.F., I.K., and U.K. reviewed and edited the paper. All authors have read and agreed to
the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: The data presented in this study are available on request from the
corresponding author.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Energies 2021, 14, 1050 20 of 22

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