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issues. And supposing that a rise to 6 or 6½ per cent. would
produce a contraction in the demand for accommodation of a single
million, as before, the total operation on the issues would be as
follows:—
E
We have not alluded in the text to the effect of our
proposed system, in reducing the enormous fluctuations
in the rate of discount produced by the operation of the
Act of 1844; but this is a feature of the question too
important to be altogether passed over without
reference. In his examination before the Committee of
the House of Lords on Commercial Distress, Mr. J. H.
Palmer, a very competent authority, declared, that in his
whole experience he had never known such vicissitudes
in the rates of interest and discount as since the
passing of the Act; and the greater number of the
witnesses were unanimous in deploring the excessive
injury inflicted on the community by those vicissitudes.
Now, one essential part of the operation of the
governmental charges of 1, 2, and 4 per cent. would be
the reduction of those violent oscillations within more
salutary limits; as we have just now seen that 3½ to 4
per cent. would be the probable minimum, and 6 to 7
per cent. the probable maximum, at which the Bank of
England would ever grant accommodation, and that
moreover it would only be in extraordinary cases that
the range of variation would exceed from 4 to 6 per
cent.
F
“About the same time the Government had occasion
to borrow of the banking department about £3,500,000
to pay the April dividends. The banking department,
consequently, for a while, limited their discounts; and
even refused to grant loans on Exchequer bills. Great
pressure was consequently felt, though it did not last
for a long time. Now it is alleged that if the Act of 1844
had not existed, the Directors would have allowed the
gold to be exported without immediately contracting the
notes in circulation. They would have lent the money
required by the Government, without refusing the loans
and discounts to the public: and the contraction of the
circulation, by being extended over one or two months,
instead of a few weeks, might have produced no
inconvenience,”—Practical Treatise on Banking, by J. W.
Gilbart. F.R.S. Fifth Edition. Page 129.
G
“Had the Act of 1844 not been in existence, the
Bank of England (as in the case of the West India loan,
and of previous loans) might have lent out the money
before the time of payment arrived, and no
apprehensions would have been entertained. The notes
in circulation would have been largely increased for a
few days, and then again have subsided to the former
amount. As it was, the payment was not made through
any virtue in the Act; and had it been required under
different circumstances, or when the banking
department had a smaller reserve, it could not have
been made at all.”—Practical Treatise on Banking, by
J. W. Gilbart, F.R.S. Fifth Edition. Page 128.
Now very few words will suffice to show that our proposed
system would be as well adapted to the exigencies of those
occasional advances, as to the more normal requirements of the
circulation. It must, we think, be conceded, that if an advance be
made for some definite individual purpose, such as those referred to,
the money so advanced will not continue any length of time in
circulation, but will return into the Bank without producing a sensible
effect on prices or on credit. But this being granted, it clearly follows
that a system which is only intended to prevent such an over issue
as would have the effect of raising prices, ought not to interfere with
some indispensable advance which would necessarily be temporary,
and would therefore exert no influence on prices. Be that as it may,
however, our system would be equally applicable to both cases. For,
if the advance be really for a permanent purpose, its effect will be
precisely similar to any other advance of equal extent; if
considerable, it will raise the rate of interest and thereby diminish
the amount of accommodation required in other quarters; so that
the currency in the hands of the public will still be preserved at an
expedient level. On the other hand, if the advance be made for
some individual application, the governmental charge will only be
imposed for the few days during which the money will be actually in
circulation, and will therefore cause no sensible inconvenience to the
Bank; while the necessary effect of its imposition, will be either to
recover the money at the termination of that period, or else, by
inducing the Bank to raise its rate of interest, to produce a
contraction equivalent to the amount of expansion. In short, the
operation of the proposed system, will be such that unless the
amount of notes advanced in such circumstances be really required
for the purpose of currency, they will not continue in circulation, but
will inevitably return to the Bank at the earliest possible period.
It may be considered necessary that we should make a brief
reference to some of the schemes that have been recently proposed,
for the regulation of the currency. The only one of these that
appears to have met with much attention, is that suggested by Mr.
Glyn, in his examination before the Committee of the House of Lords
on Commercial Distress. His proposal was, that the whole
responsibility of the circulation should be left in the hands of the
Bank of England, but that the Bank Court should include certain
persons appointed under Act of Parliament, who should have, not an
absolute veto upon the proceedings of the Court, but the right,
when they dissented from the majority, to submit the reasons for
that dissent in writing, or even lay them before Parliament from time
to time. To this he would not add any regulations with respect to the
management of the currency, with a view to the exchanges, or to
any other circumstances, but would leave that entirely to the
determination of the Court and the Commissioners. As coming from
a practical banker of such experience as Mr. Glyn, this proposal is
certainly entitled to an attentive and respectful consideration. To us
it appears, however, that several weighty objections oppose
themselves to its adoption. To one of these we assign great practical
influence, independently of all considerations of principle. We
apprehend that the adoption of such a measure would almost
inevitably establish very undesirable relations between the Bank and
the Parliament or Government of the day. It is not to be assumed
that Commissioners appointed by Act of Parliament, are necessarily
more likely to be infallible than Directors selected by the proprietors
of the Bank; but even if this were assumed as probable, it would not
still follow that it would be at all expedient that such Commissioners
should be invested with the power of becoming public accusers of
the Directors, on any occasion in which the latter might not assent
to their recommendations. The ultimate effect of such a measure
could hardly fail to be, that the Commissioners, if men of large
abilities, would come to be regarded in the light of dictators whose
proposals the Directors would often shrink from negativing, through
a natural aversion to have their proceedings investigated, and
perhaps condemned, by Parliament.
But there are higher considerations than even this, on which we
should mistrust the expediency of such a plan. It does not appear, so
far as we recollect, whether Mr. Glyn would repeal the provisions
requiring the Bank to purchase all gold which may be presented at
£3 17s. 9d. per ounce, and recur entirely to the measure of 1819;
but we cannot see why, if the Bank Court are to have the sole
responsibility of the amount of unrepresented notes to be held in
circulation, they might not also be entrusted with the complete
management of the issues on bullion, and, therefore, why the above
provisions might not be altogether repealed. Now, whatever may be
the defects of the Act of 1844, it is, we believe, disputed by few
whose opinions are entitled to respect, that the operation of this part
of the system has been in the main beneficial, and that on the whole
the measure of 1844 has been a very great advance upon that of
1819. If however, Mr. Glyn only contemplated the issue of
unrepresented notes, when he recommended entrusting the whole
responsibility to the Bank Court, there still appear very serious
objections to his proposal, taken even with this limitation. Amongst
others we may again repeat what we have already strenuously
insisted on, that it is time that the Bank of England should render
some better equivalent than at present for the privilege of issue. But
independently of this consideration, we do not consider that the
course which the Bank Court has adopted at various periods
throughout the past half century, has been sufficiently judicious to
justify our entrusting so unfettered a capacity for good or evil to its
care, even though guided in its decisions by the advice of any
number of Commissioners appointed under Act of Parliament. A very
considerable discretionary power must undoubtedly be confided to
the Bank Directors, but we cannot perceive that past experience
would justify the extension of that discretion to the absolute control
either of the unrepresented issues or of the rate of interest. Thus,
while we would place no absolute restriction upon the Bank, either
with regard to the amount of its issues or to its rate of interest, we
would certainly endeavour to devise such measures as would
prevent the Bank, on the one hand, from exerting itself to keep too
large an amount of unrepresented notes in circulation, and on the
other, from loaning and discounting at too low a rate of interest, and
thereby directly contributing to stimulate excessive speculation. And
both of these objects we believe would be completely and judiciously
effected through the adoption of the scale of charges already
described; as the imposition of the minimum rate would necessarily
prevent the rate of interest from falling too low in speculative
periods, while the operation of the three ascending rates, as a
whole, would produce a rise in the rate of interest directly
proportionate to the efflux of gold and the increased demand for
accommodation in times of pressure.
We are far from certain, however, that Mr. Glyn intended to
express himself so forcibly against the adoption of any regulations,
as the tenor of his language might appear to indicate. In several
other parts of his evidence before the same Committee, we may
very fairly refer to him in striking corroboration of our views. For, not
only does he unite with us in reprobating the effect of the low rate
of interest at which the Bank accommodates the public when money
is abundant, in stimulating excessive speculation, and not only does
he advocate the essential importance of maintaining a more equable
rate of interest than has hitherto been the case, but he even
expresses his entire approval of the plan of imposing a governmental
charge upon the £3,000,000 of unrepresented notes which the Bank
is allowed to issue on securities. “I am not aware of the terms upon
which it is advanced to the Bank of England, but my idea was, that
the additional three millions ought not to have been advanced to the
Bank of England by the issue department, except upon such a rate
of interest as would have regulated the amount of notes out; that
whenever money was worth only 3½ per cent. they should not have
had the whole of that three millions issued; thus acting upon the
circulation and lowering the value of money.” Now, in this important
passage is contained the most essential feature of the system we
propose; the only difference of any moment consisting in this, that
the principle which Mr. Glyn would apply to a certain portion of the
circulation, we should desire to see extended, with the necessary
modifications, to the total amount of the unrepresented issues.
We are strongly disposed to think that Mr. Glyn, Mr. Tooke, and
several other leading opponents of the Act of 1844, have been
carried too far in their objection to any system of regulations,
through witnessing the mischievous effects of the inflexible
restrictive clauses of that Act. So far as Mr. Tooke, however, is
concerned, while shrinking from prescribing any absolute regulations
on the subject of the currency, he has not omitted to offer some
valuable suggestions as to the principles by which the Court of
Directors should be guided in its management. He recommends that
the average amount of bullion should be £12,000,000, the maximum
being £18,000,000, and the minimum £6,000,000; and assuming 4
per cent. to be the average rate of interest, he supposes a drain to
set in while the bullion is at its maximum. In such circumstances he
would suffer the drain to reduce the gold to £12,000,000, and would
then raise the rate of interest to 6 per cent., at which he would
maintain it until the gold had fallen to £6,000,000, below which
amount he does not consider it probable that the efflux would ever
be likely to descend. In case it should exceed that point, however, he
would then allow the Bank to take measures for its own security, by
restricting its discounts or otherwise; but as soon as the bullion
again amounted to £6,000,000, he would recur to the rate of 6 per
cent. and would adhere to the same until the treasure should again
attain its maximum of £18,000,000.
If taken merely as a rough outline of the mode in which the
Bank Directors should control their issues, we see little to object to
in this plan of Mr Tooke’s, but in its specific details it would hardly
bear a close examination. Its principal defect, perhaps, regarded
under this aspect, consists in its appearing to recommend a series of
violent transitions. We ran hardly think that its eminent proposer
would suddenly raise the rate of interest from 4 to 6 per cent. at any
particular stage in the efflux of bullion, or vice versa, or that he
intended the preceding as other than an approximate statement of
the mode in which the rate of interest ought to be raised in
proportion as the drain proceeded. But apart from this consideration
it seems somewhat inconsistent that, while he would strongly
recommend the adoption of some such plan by the Directors, he
would refrain from enacting any regulations that would have the
tendency to ensure their practical adherence to it. Now, in this
respect, we must, although reluctantly, dissent from the views of Mr.
Tooke. We should not feel satisfied with merely advising the Bank
Court as to the proper course to be pursued, and leaving the whole
responsibility of so doing in their hands, but we would adopt such
regulations as, while leaving them their own sphere of action
sufficiently unfettered, would still impart a very sensible stimulus to
their adoption of the proper course. For, while we admit that the
Government has not the right to determine on the rate at which the
Bank of England should grant accommodation, we strenuously
maintain that it has the right to impose an equitable rate of interest
on the amount of unrepresented notes which it allows the Bank to
issue, and that it has an equal right to adopt the ascending principle,
as a means of inducing the Bank to adhere to a similar rule in
making its advances to the public.
There is one conclusion, however, as we have already observed,
on which a large majority of the highest authorities, scientific and
practical, are fully agreed, viz., that the present system of currency
is extremely defective, and ought to be amended in the ensuing
session of Parliament. The restrictive clauses of the Act of 1844 are,
we think, likely to be repealed whenever the subject is presented for
reconsideration. But if the remedial measures are confined to the
mere repeal of those provisions; there will be little practical
difference between the new system and that established by the law
of 1819. We must once more repeat, that neither experience nor
sound principle would justify the placing so serious a responsibility
as the unrestricted issue of notes unrepresented by bullion, under
the uncontrolled direction of the Bank of England. And if this be
admitted, the question at once presents itself what is the nature of
the control which the State ought to exercise over such issue. It
must not consist of the simple limitation of the number of notes
issued; for either that would be ineffectual, or would repeat the error
of the Act of 1844. Nor must it consist of the legislative enactment of
certain rates of interest at which the Bank should accommodate the
public; for that would be an unwarrantable interference with the
functions of the Bank. We know of no other legitimate course,
therefore, save that already propounded, viz. the imposition of
certain rates of interest on the amount of notes which the State may
authorize the Bank to issue, and which the latter would not issue
unless it derived a profit from the transaction. The adoption of this
course would not involve the assumption of any undue prerogatives
on the part of the Government; for if the State consents to transfer
the privilege of issuing paper money from itself to any banking
company, it unquestionably possesses the right to require an
adequate equivalent for the exercise of the privilege thus
transferred. And if the principle be once admitted, that the State has
the right to impose certain equitable rates of interest upon the
unrepresented issues of the Bank of England, we think it follows
indisputably, on grounds which we need not here repeat, that the
mode in which those rates should be assigned, should be that of an
ascending principle.
To proceed still further, we think it no less expedient that
whenever our currency system shall undergo revision, that revision
shall be made as complete as practicable. And if so, we do not see
how the subject of the country banks of issue can escape
consideration. The advantages of having a single bank of issue are
now so generally admitted that the chief, if not the only difficulty
which would be likely to obstruct the question would be that relating
to the mode of protecting the country banks from any unnecessary
loss arising from the deprivation of their privilege. And of several
methods in which this might be accomplished, we think by far the
best and simplest would be that of allowing the present banks of
issue to retain the privilege for a certain equitable number of years,
on the single condition of gradually diminishing their issues, on such
a plan that they would altogether cease at the expiration of the
stipulated period. The question of the number of years that should
be allowed is a matter of detail; but, for our part, we consider that
ten would be amply sufficient for this purpose. The gradual
substitution of Bank of England paper for the notes withdrawn would
present no difficulty; as all that would be necessary is, that the Bank
of England should be permitted to increase its normal issues on
equitable conditions in proportion as the country notes diminished,
until, at the expiration of the stipulated period, the former would
have totally replaced the latter. We see no objection, therefore,
either of principle or of practice, to any of the leading features of the
plan we have just propounded: and so far as the minuter details are
concerned, we think they might safely be entrusted to the care of
any intelligent body of public men who would honestly endeavour to
carry the principles themselves into execution.
THE END.
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when
a predominant preference was found in this book;
otherwise they were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected;
occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were
retained; occurrences of inconsistent hyphenation have
not been changed.
A vertical white blemish near the left margin partly-
obscured the text of many page images. Transcribers
were able to reconstruct the affected words, but the line
also went through the second digit of some numbers,
particularly in multiple occurrences of what was judged
to be “£11,000,000”. It is possible that the correct value
for some of those was “£14,000,000”.
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