RESERVA TRONCAL OR RESERVA LINEAL

- Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.

Maria Mendoza, et al. vs. Julia Policarpio Delos Santos, et al.

Facts:

This case revolves around three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, previously owned
by Gregoria Mendoza, which through certain events, came to be owned and registered under
Julia Policarpio Delos Santos. Gregoria inherited these lands from her father, Exequiel, after the
passing of her parents. Upon Gregoria’s death without heirs in 1992, Julia Policarpio Delos
Santos adjudicated the properties unto herself. The petitioners, who are descendants of
Gregoria’s uncles, contend that the properties should be subject to reserva troncal under Article
891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and thus, reserved for them.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) originally ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordering the
reconveyance of the lands to them. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision,
leading to the petitioners seeking a review from the Supreme Court of the Philippines. They
argued the properties were indeed reservable and should revert to them under the law of
reserva troncal.

### Issues:

1. Whether the properties in dispute are reservable properties under the principle of
reserva troncal.

2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties.

### Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Court found that reserva troncal was not applicable for several reasons:
– The law of reserva troncal requires a direct lineal transference of property; however, Julia
Policarpio Delos Santos, who came to own the properties, was not an ascendant of Gregoria
but a collateral relative.
– The petitioners, being fourth-degree relatives (first cousins of Gregoria), do not qualify as
reservatarios under the law of reserva troncal, as they are beyond the third degree of
relationship required.
– The Court also clarified misunderstandings about the principle of reserva troncal and
underscored that the petitioners’ claim could not hold since the prerequisites for such a
claim—direct lineal descent and within the third-degree relationship—were not met.

DE PAPA v. CAMACHO 24 Sept 1986

This case involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal to
determine:

a. Whether defendant Dalisay is entitled to the entirety of 7 parcels of land in question, OR

b. Whether plaintiffs Francisca, Manuel and Nicolas as uncles and aunts of Faustino are
reservatarios of ½ share of all the land inherited by their brother-in-law Eustacio from Faustino,
and therefore each entitled, along with Dalisay, to 3/4ths share of rentals from tenants. In the
lower court, all the parties submitted a "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise” to
establish their family relationship and claims.

a.7 parcels of land are involved: 4 from Romana, 3 from Balbino Tioco. i. Defendant Dalisay’s
great-grandmother Romana donated 4 parcels to plaintiff’s sister Toribia, who died in 1915 and
left such to children Faustino and defendant’s mother Trinidad.

After Balbino died in 1928, 3 parcels of land were given to Toribia, which again devolved upon
Faustino and Trinidad. b. Now that Faustino and Trinidad got 7 parcels of land, they had ½
proindiviso shares. Both shares went to Dalisay, but Faustino’s share went to her through
Dalisay’s grandfather Eustacio under reserva troncal. i. When Faustino died in 1937, he left his ½
pro-indiviso share to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the
property subject to a reserva troncal. ii. In 1939 Trinidad died in 1939, and her father Eustacio in
1965, both intestate, with their only descendant Dalisay. c. Defendant Dalisay owns ½ of the 7
parcels of land as her inheritance from mother Trinidad. What is disputed is the other ½ from
Faustino. The lower court declared plaintiffs and defendant entitled, as reservatarios, to one-
half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions [Fact 1(b)], thus this appeal by
Dalisay.

ISSUE: Whether all nearest relatives of descendant Faustino (praepositus) within the third
degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon
death of the inheriting ascendant (reservista) by the rules on intestate succession

RULING

NO. RULE: Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came. (811), RATIO: 1.

Plaintiffs have no right to the reversionary property: As aunt and uncles, respectively, of
Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, defendant-
appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, although they are related to him within the same degree as
the latter. a. Plaintiffs excluded by other collaterals: In case of intestacy nephews and nieces of
the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts, uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.
To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code
were cited and applied. i. Art. 1009: absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to other collaterals being called to succeed. ii. Spanish Civil Code of
1889: Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 stated that brothers and sisters and nephews
and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals
succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely
placed the spouse on par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the
deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.
b. Plaintiffs would normally have been excluded: Had the reversionary property passed directly
from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded
by the defendantappellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason

2. why a different result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property was
delayed by the interregnum of the reserva" i.e., the property took a "detour" through an
ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.
Definition of reserva troncal: a special rule designed to assure the return of the reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its dissipation into and by relatives of the reservista. The stated purpose of the
reserva is accomplished once the property devolves to the specified relatives of the line of
origin (Padura v. Baldovino) a. Preference of reservatarios: Following the order prescribed by
law in legitimate succession when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree,
the right of the nearest relative, reservatario over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of one more remote. i.
Intestate succession within groups of relatives in the same degree: The reserva troncal
determines the group of relative reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but
within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by applicable rules of
ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. In the relations
between one reservatario and another of the same degree Art. 891 becomes inapplicable;
wherefore, the shares of each in the reversionary property should be governed by ordinary
rules of intestate succession. ii. Limited application: Given the circumstance that the reserva
being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to
accomplish the purpose of the law. The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view
of the new Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the
suppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-
980).

NOTES: 1. The right of representation: cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a
reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil
Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated
persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property
came. Relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such. 2. Double share of immediate
collateral of whole blood: If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of
degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share
for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative. a. Proximity of
degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the
rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and
nephews of half blood. b. That nephews of whole blood should take a share twice as large as
that of nephews of half-blood is in accordance with Article 1006, CC.

This was the ruling in Padura vs. Baldovino, where Justice J.B.L. Reyes wrote the opinion of the
Court. In that case, the reservatario was survived by 11 nephews and nieces of the praepositus
in the line of origin, 4 of whole blood and 7 of half blood, and the claim was made that all
should get reversionary property in equal shares. Reservatarios: The reservable property is not
part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of it by will as long as reservatarios
exist. The reservatario receives the property and acquires a life interest in such as a conditional
heir of the descendant prepositus, said property merely reverting to the line of origin from
which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. Reservatarios
inherit from the descendant praepositus, upon surviving the reservista, as heirs mortis causa
(Padura v. Baldovino). Intestacy proceedings: These are not necessary to determine the right of
a reservatario where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of
the reservista over property subject to reserva troncal identifies the reservatario and there are
no other claimants to the latter's rights as such. The reservatario nearest to the prepositus
becomes, by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property (Cano v. Director of Lands).

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.

Requisites of Reserva Troncal

1. That the property was acquired by a descendant (called “praepositus” or propositus) from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give
anything in return;

2. That said descendant (praepositus) died without an issue;

3. That the same property (called “reserva”) is inherited by another ascendant (called
“reservista”) by operation of law (either through intestate or compulsory succession) from the
praepositus; and
4. That there are living relatives within the third degree counted from the praepositus and
belonging to the same line from where the property originally came (called “reservatarios”).
(Art. 891; Chua v. CFI of Negros Occidental, Branch V, 78 SCRA 412; Rabuya, Civil Law Reviewer,
pp. 634-‐635)

Rights of Reservista

In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latter’s wish or
by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively.

Nature of interest of reservatario

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) said
property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally
stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being
reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more
than a than interest in the reservable property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands,
105 Phil. l5.)

Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the
property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might
frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their
right in the registry of property even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar,
Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).

This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the
reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the
reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing
(Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).

The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant (prepositus) of
whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6,
6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27,
1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property."
Gonzales v. CFI of Manila, 104 SCRA 479 (1981)

Disposition of property by reservista

Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista)
together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no
part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property
continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant
has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the
predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot
part of the property, if he has at the same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).

TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION: RULES APPLICABLE TO DISPOSABLE FREE PORTION

A. Institution of (Voluntary) Heirs

Concept (Art. 840; Art. 841, pars. 1 and 2)

Art. 840. Institution of heir is an act by virtue of which a testator designates in his will the
person or persons who are to succeed him in his property and transmissible rights and
obligations.

Art. 841. A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such
institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so instituted
should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.

In such cases the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with
and the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs.

Designation of heir
a) Rule (Art. 843)

Art. 843. The testator shall designate the heir by his name and surname, and when there are
two persons having the same names, he shall indicate some circumstance by which the
instituted heir may be known.

b) Effect of omission of name (Art. 843, 2nd par.)

Even though the testator may have omitted the name of the heir, should he designate him in
such manner that there can be no doubt as to who has been instituted, the institution shall be
valid.

c) If two persons have same names (Art. 843, 1st par.; Art. 844, par. 2)

Art. 843. The testator shall designate the heir by his name and surname, and when there are
two persons having the same names, he shall indicate some circumstance by which the
instituted heir may be known.
Art 844 If among persons having the same names and surnames, there is a similarity of
circumstances in such a way that, even with the use of the other proof, the person instituted
cannot be identified, none of them shall be an heir.

d) Effect of error (Art. 844, 1st par.)

Art. 844. An error in the name, surname, or circumstances of the heir shall not vitiate the
institution when it is possible, in any other manner, to know with certainty the person
instituted.

Disposition in favor of unknown persons

a) General rule (Art. 845)

Art. 845. Every disposition in favor of an unknown person shall be void, unless by some event or
circumstance his identity becomes certain. However, a disposition in favor of a definite class or
group of persons shall be valid.

b) Exceptions (Art. 845; Art. 959)

Art. 959. A disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be
understood to be in favor of those nearest in degree.

Institution without designation of shares (Art. 846)

Art. 846. Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts.

Some individually designated, others collectively (Art. 847)

Art. 847. When the testator institutes some heirs individually and others collectively as when he
says, "I designate as my heirs A and B, and the children of C," those collectively designated shall
be considered as individually instituted, unless it clearly appears that the intention of the
testator was otherwise.

Institution of brothers and sisters (Art. 848)

Art. 848. If the testator should institute his brothers and sisters, and he has some of full blood
and others of half blood, the inheritance shall be distributed equally unless a different intention
appears.

Instituting a person and the latter’s children (Art. 849)

Art. 849. When the testator calls to the succession a person and his children they are all
deemed to have been instituted simultaneously and not successively.
Institution based on false cause
a) General rule (Art. 850)
b) Exception (Art. 850)

Art. 850. The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not
written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if
he had known the falsity of such cause.

c) Requisites for exception to apply

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur:

First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;

Second, the cause must be shown to be false; and

Third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

PRETERITION

Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not
named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor
assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited – tacitly depriving the heir
of his legitime. Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also
receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime.

In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the
testator’s inheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.

Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation. (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the
institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are
not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition
of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy. Morales v. Olondriz, G.R. No.
198994, February 3, 2016

Requisites (Art. 854, pars. 1 and 2)

1. The heir omitted is a forced heir (in the direct line);

2. The omission is by mistake or thru an oversight.

3. The omission is complete so that the forced heir received nothing in the will. (111 Padilla,
Civil Code Annotated, 1973 Edition, pp. 224-225) (Parenthetical addendum supplied).
Acain v. IAC, 155 SCRA 100 (1987)

Effects of preterition (Art. 854, pars. 1)

Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the
institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are
not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition
of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy. Morales v. Olondriz, 783
SCRA 151 (2016)

Distinguished from invalid disinheritance

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by
law.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those
of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the
institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under
Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", but
only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in
the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion
of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17
SCRA 458

Substitution of Heirs
1. Simple substitution
a) Definition (Art. 857)

Art. 857. Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted.

b) Variations (Art. 860(2); Art. 862(3))

Art. 860. Two or more persons may be substituted for one; and one person for two or more
heirs.

Art. 862. The substitute shall be subject to the same charges and conditions
imposed upon the instituted heir, unless and testator has expressly provided the
contrary, or the charges or conditions are personally applicable only to the heir
instituted.

c) When simple substitution takes place (Art. 859, pars. 1 and 2)

Art. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs
instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be
incapacitated to accept the inheritance.

A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the
three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided.

d) Effects of simple substitution (Art. 862)

Art. 862. The substitute shall be subject to the same charges and conditions imposed upon the
instituted heir, unless and testator has expressly provided the contrary, or the charges or
conditions are personally applicable only to the heir instituted.

2. Fideicommissary substitution
a) Concept (Art. 863)

Art. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of
the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or
first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator.

In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and
to transmit the same later to the second heir. the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom
the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary.
Rabadilla v. CA, 334 SCRA 522 (2000).
b) Requisites for substitution to become fideicommissary (Art. 863)

1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.

2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole
or a part of the estate.

3. A second heir. De Perez v. Garchitorena, 54 Phil. 431 (1930).

c) Requisites for validity of FS (Arts. 863 and 864; Art. 865, par. 1; Art.
867(1))

Art. 864. A fideicommissary substitution can never burden the legitime.

Art. 865. Every fideicommissary substitution must be expressly made in order that it may be
valid.

Art. 867. The following shall not take effect:

(1) Fideicommissary substitutions which are not made in an express manner, either by
giving them this name, or imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute obligation to deliver
the property to a second heir;

Case:

A first heir who is primarily called to enjoy the assets.

A clearly imposed obligation on that heir to preserve and transmit all or part of the estate to a
third party.

A second heir.

To these requirements, the ruling of November 18, 1918, adds one more: that the
fideicommissary heir must have a right to the inheritance assets from the moment of the
testator’s death, since the heir is to succeed the testator and not the fiduciary. Crisologo v.
Singson, 4 SCRA 491 (1962).

Effects of invalid FS (Art. 868)

Art. 868. The nullity of the fideicommissary substitution does not prejudice the validity of the
institution of the heirs first designated; the fideicommissary clause shall simply be considered as
not written.
Effects of valid FS (Art. 863; Art. 866)

Art. 866. The second heir shall acquire a right to the succession from the time of the testator's
death, even though he should die before the fiduciary. The right of the second heir shall pass to
his heirs.

Prohibition against alienation (Art. 870; Art. 904, par. 2)

Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more
than twenty years are void.

Art. 904. The testator cannot deprive his compulsory heirs of their legitime, except in cases
expressly specified by law.

Cases:

The clause, insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned, does not violate Article 870 of
the Civil Code.

The codal provision does not need any interpretation. It speaks categorically. What is declared
void is the testamentary disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year period. In the
interim, such a provision does not suffer from the vice of invalidity. It cannot be stricken down.
Time and time again, We have said, and We now repeat, that when a legal provision is clear and
to the point, there is no room for interpretation. It must be applied according to its literal terms.
Rodriguez v. CA, 137 Phil. 371 (1969); Orendain, Jr. v. Trusteeship of the Estate of Doña
Margarita Rodriguez, 591 SCRA 285 (2009).

Accretion in Testamentary Succession

1. Concept (Art. 1015)

Art. 1015. Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or more persons are called to the
same inheritance, devise or legacy, the part assigned to the one who renounces or cannot
receive his share, or who died before the testator, is added or incorporated to that of his co-
heirs, co-devisees, or co-legatees.

2. Accretion in testamentary succession (Art. 1021)

Art. 1021. Among the compulsory heirs the right of accretion shall take place only when the free
portion is left to two or more of them, or to any one of them and to a stranger.

Should the part repudiated be the legitime, the other co-heirs shall succeed to it in their own
right, and not by the right of accretion.
3. Requisites for accretion by operation of law with respect to DFP (Art. 1016;
Art. 1017, pars. 1 and 2; Art. 1022)

Art. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take place in a testamentary succession, it
shall be necessary:

(1) That two or more persons be called to the same inheritance, or to the same portion thereof,
pro indiviso; and

(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the testator, or renounce the inheritance, or
be incapacitated to receive it.

Art. 1017. The words "one-half for each" or "in equal shares" or any others which, though
designating an aliquot part, do not identify it by such description as shall make each heir the
exclusive owner of determinate property, shall not exclude the right of accretion.

In case of money or fungible goods, if the share of each heir is not earmarked, there shall be a
right of accretion.

4. How co-heirs, co-devisees, or co-legatees divide the vacant share (Art.

1019)

Art. 1019. The heirs to whom the portion goes by the right of accretion take it in the
same proportion that they inherit.

E. Legacies and Devises

1. Concept (Art. 782)

Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law.

Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts of real and personal property are respectively
given by virtue of a will.

2. To be taken from free portion

3. In case of predecease
4. If thing already belonged to legatee or devisee (Art. 930; Art. 932; Art. 933,
2nd par.)

Art. 930. The legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator
erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not
belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the
disposition shall take effect.
Art. 932. The legacy or devise of a thing which at the time of the execution of the will already
belonged to the legatee or devisee shall be ineffective, even though another person may have
some interest therein.

If the testator expressly orders that the thing be freed from such interest or encumbrance, the
legacy or devise shall be valid to that extent.

5. Revocation of legacy or devise by operation of law (Art. 957(1)(2)(3))

Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:

(1) If the testator transforms the thing bequeathed in such a manner that it does not retain
either the form or the denomination it had;

(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part
thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect
only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong
to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not
thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of
the right of repurchase;

(3) If the thing bequeathed is totally lost during the lifetime of the testator, or after his death
without the heir's fault. Nevertheless, the person obliged to pay the legacy or devise shall be
liable for eviction if the thing bequeathed should not have been determinate as to its kind, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 928.