International Relations
Response paper
MGL_K7_Nguyen Thi Ngan
The Return of the Chinese Tribute System? Re-viewing the Belt and Road
Initiative _ John Hobson & Shizhi Zhang
In this paper, I will briefly summarize an article by John Hobson &
Shizhi Zhang on The Belt and Road Initiative and the Chinese Tribute
System and also express some of my ideas on this topic.
1) What is Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)?
In September 2013, during his visit to Kazakhstan after being elected
President of China, Mr. Xi Jinping announced a grand plan called the
"Silk Road Economic Belt." A month later, during his visit to Indonesia
and attendance at the 21st Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Summit in Bali, the Chinese President continued to announce the "World
Maritime Silk Road" in the 21st century, officially announced to the world
the grand plan One Belt - One Road (OBOR).
OBOR is a super project including a network of roads, railways, oil
and gas pipelines, seaport systems, fiber optic cables,
telecommunications networks... connecting China to the rest of the
world. rest of the world through more than 65 countries and territories.
OBOR includes two main routes: the "Silk Road Economic Belt" on land
and the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road".
2) Summary of the article
a) The questions being asked in the article (there are two
questions)
- Could the BRI be considered a neo-tribute system or a Chinese
tribute system 2.0 (CTS 2.0)?
- If so, what are the implications for the present international system
and the dominance of the US, as well as for governments
participating in the BRI?
b) The author’s main arguments
- There is no proof of an explicit Chinese strategy for economic
exploitation of BRI national economies (despite occasional
practices of economic exploitation of local employees by some
Chinese businesses), nor do we see evidence of political influence
or cultural assimilation to Chinese norms of society having a role in
either the BRI or the CTS.
- According to the authors, China is only interested in building a
particular relationship with other "developing countries," tying
them all together into a harmonic collective rather than spreading
its political authority and challenging US hegemony.
3) Response to the paper
To some extent, I agree with the authors that China probably does not
want to confront American hegemony and challenge the present world
order. However, the impacts of China's BRI projects in several countries
are no longer simply economic relationships but have affected numerous
aspects of social and political life.
A typical example is China's increasing presence in Southeast Asia,
causing noticeable alterations in this region. Southeast Asia has long
played an essential role in China's economy, not because of the 30 million
overseas Chinese living there, but because ASEAN countries are all tied
into supply chains focused on China. And although they rarely say so
publicly, most ASEAN nations have long viewed their giant northern
neighbor cautiously. In contrast, Cambodia, under Hun Sen, has opened
its doors to welcome China. In return for China's gifts, Cambodia has
proven to be a loyal ally, frustrating ASEAN's efforts to counter China's
excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea.
Lending to build infrastructure projects is, of course, not a bad thing.
However, the projects that China supports are often not aimed at
supporting the local economy but rather at creating favorable conditions
for China to have easier access to natural resources or to open up its
markets for cheap, low-quality Chinese export goods. In many cases,
China even sends its construction workers to work, leading to fewer jobs
created for locals.
In a sense, the poor performance of those projects is beneficial for
China. After all, the more significant the debt burden on small countries,
the greater China's influence over those countries. As if that weren't
enough, China has taken extra steps to ensure these countries won't be
able to escape their debts. In exchange for adjusting the debt repayment
period, China requires countries to give it contracts to build additional
projects, thereby making its debt crisis last forever. In October (2016),
China canceled $90 million in debt for Cambodia just to win new large
contracts.
Sri Lanka is the most typical case. Although a small country, Sri Lanka
is strategically located between China's eastern ports and the
Mediterranean. Chinese President Xi Jinping has called Sri Lanka a vital
factor in completing the Maritime Silk Road. About a decade ago, China
lent billions of dollars to Sri Lanka to develop infrastructure projects,
including building roads, expanding railways, and building seaports,
airports, and stadiums. Some projects, like the Lakvijaya Power Plant
about 80 miles north of Colombo, have helped power some of the
country's most rural, underdeveloped areas. However, most other
projects do not bring in the expected profits. For example, Sri Lanka's
Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which opened in 2013 near
Hambantota, is currently known as the world's most deserted airport. Sri
Lanka originally built the airport to accommodate 1 million passengers
annually, but it is operating at a loss. Most notably, the Hambantota
deep-water port did not generate enough income to repay debt, forcing
this country of 22 million people in 2017 to lease it to China for a long
term of 99 years to "beggar" a debt of 1.1 billion USD. Critics in Sri
Lanka see this as an example of China's "debt trap diplomacy."
The Belt and Road Project may not be the neo-tribute system China
wants to develop in modern times. But in some respects, this project also
contains the characteristics of economic exploitation. One might argue
that choosing to borrow from China belongs to the states; China does not
force anyone to take its money. Therefore, the term economic
exploitation in this case is not persuasive. However, I would argue that if
someone exploits the underdevelopment and the greed of leaders in
developing countries to gain lucrative investments, it is an act of
exploitation. If so, it is clear that the purpose of the Belt and Road
strategy is not to build relationships of peace and cooperation for mutual
development but only to focus on building China's strength with
resources from other countries.
