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Governance styles
Re-thinking governance and public policy

Michael Howlett, Giliberto Capano, and M. Ramesh

Introduction: what is governance?

Governance is a general concept which describes some of the complexity of political and policy
processes by focussing on the relationships existing between governments and the governed.
Policy making is an arena full of actors who are not only vertically structured but also linked
together by a series of informal relationships (Solomon 2008; Richardson 2012), and we need
to understand how these work so that society is steered. The use of the term ‘governance’ helps
to capture these additional aspects of government and governing, where a multitude of actors
interact in both formal and informal ways (for example, international relations, international
political economy, global studies).
Despite a great deal having been written on governance in recent years, many questions
remain about fundamental aspects of the subject. This is especially the case in both defining
and understanding governance modes or styles and their dynamics, the subject of this chapter.
After at least two decades of discussion and debate around the term, however, there is now
a fair degree of agreement among public policy scholars as to what governance is and what it
does. This governance lens is useful in helping us understand how political power is distributed
and exercised and how policy problems are dealt with by it.
The concept of governance is also useful from a policy perspective, since it enables us to
reduce the apparently chaotic reality of policy making by describing sets of state and societal
relationships as different ‘modes of governance’ which affect and direct policy making in spe-
cific ways. Many varieties of governance exist, both cross-nationally and cross-sectorally, and
understanding why this is the case and how it has come about is important for the future of
governance and policy studies. Each variety or mode of governance can be seen as a governance
style with important ramifications for policy making and policies.
Three specific aspects of governance are critical in understanding the differences between
governance styles and their impact of policy-making styles: dynamics, strategy and capacity. The
notion of governance dynamics suggests that styles of governance identified in earlier studies may
not be stable but rather dynamic. These change over the course of time, as governments adopt
different architectural features and mix policy tools in different ways.

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Governance strategy is a concept which reflects this ability of governments to alter govern-
ance arrangements and give them their dynamic character. It suggests that behind every mode
of governance lies a specific undertaking as different policy actors seek the best arrangement
to attain their purposes. This is particularly true of governments, since they continue to be in
charge of systemic responsibility and are the most powerful authoritative actors in virtually all
societies.
Governance capacity is a third critical concept, one which emphasizes that not every choice
of governance mechanism is likely to be equally successful in terms of attaining policy goals.
Every governance arrangement must be effective, that is, capable of resolving political and
policy problems, but simply designating or advocating a specific arrangement does not ensure
its success.
Each of these aspects of governance styles and their implications for policy studies are set out
in the following.

Governance thinking: the concept of governance in political

science and public administration
Political and policy reality cannot be grasped only by observing the behaviour of those actors
who are formally granted power (governments, parliaments, courts). This does not mean that
hierarchy does not matter (Heritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Goetz 2008; Bell and Hindmoor
2009; Lynn 2012), rather just that many other actors participate in policy making, pursuing
their own interests and ideas; and there are many places beyond the state where such par-
ticipation may be witnessed. There will always be a degree of hierarchy in any governance
mode, because governments exist and have to do their job, but this blends with other principles
of coordination and coexists with market-driven principles and network-oriented behaviour.
A focus on ‘governance’ mechanisms and modes helps address this complexity and its implica-
tions for policy making.
In its simplest form, hierarchical governance is usually distinguished from market and
network-based governance as ideal types (Williamson 1975). Political scientists commonly use
typologies as a methodological tool with which to order reality and grasp the most important
aspects of a political phenomenon, and there is a vast array of typologies in governance studies.
The typological tradition gives a succinct picture of what the more important dimensions of
any governance arrangement are. Many scholars emphasize the fundamental principles of coor-
dination on which a governance arrangement can be based. Considine and Lewis, for exam-
ple, focus on hierarchy, network and enterprise bases of state-societal linkages (2003), as does
Howlett (2019). By using the dichotomization of implicit and explicit rules and of hierarchical
and non-hierarchical interaction, he has proposed four types of governance arrangements: legal,
network, corporate and market. Borzel (2010) on the other hand focusses above all on the
institutionalized structure of governance by distinguishing between hierarchy, competition and
the negotiating system.
This is the basis of the ‘mode’ approach to understanding governance. After lengthy, heated
debate among policy scholars, the original dichotomies proposed by a first generation of govern-
ance scholars – between old (hierarchical) governance and new (non-hierarchical) governance –
have been superseded. Only those with a specific normative afflatus continue to see current
governance as something totally different from ‘old’ governance (Rhodes 1997; Dorf and Sabel
1998; Zeitlin 2011).

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Not only are such dichotomies historically inaccurate, many scholars have pointed out that
the features of the new governance arrangements often promoted as effective responses to
changes in state-societal arrangements (polycentrism, flexibility, cooperation, deliberation,
non-coerciveness) also seem to be less effective than expected, and above all, that their effec-
tiveness and enforcement are closely linked to the presence and actions of public institutions
and their own fundamental resources (authority, financial means, information and organization)
(Davis 2002; Richards and Smith 2002; Kooiman 2003; Heritier and Eckert 2008; Gunning-
ham 2009; Lynn 2010).
In an alternative ‘dimensions’ approach, governance is understood as a shift away from a
common starting point along a spectrum from hierarchy to network. Treib et al. (2007), for
example, focus on three pairs of dichotomies related to both coordinative modes and tools and
actors involved in specific arrangements (soft vs. hard law; only public actors vs. only private
actors; hierarchy vs. market). Howlett et al. (2009) and Tollefson et al. (2012) have gone beyond
the focus on the fundamental coordination mechanisms characterizing the previous typologies
and assume that governance arrangements fulfil a multi-dimensional space in that each can be
more, or less, hierarchical, and thus more, or less, plurilateral, with corresponding possibilities
in their institutional, political and regulatory dimensions.
All of these typologies offer important insights into the ways in which governance arrange-
ments can be designed; nevertheless, they only portray a rather general picture of what govern-
ance is. Governance arrangements are usually composed of a prevailing coordinating principle
(hierarchy, market, network) accompanied by other principles (it is quite rare to find a monopo-
listic governance arrangement, that is, an arrangement governed or monopolized by just one
coordinating principle). The reason for this is not only the ever-present shadow of hierarchy,
but also that policy making is usually characterized by the asymmetric coexistence of different
coordinating principles. For example, in education policy – even in the more market-driven
systems (for example, in the Netherlands or England) – policy instruments such as institutional
autonomy and competition are accompanied by the supervision of public institutions and work
through the involvement of several stakeholders in a network-based system (Woessman 2007;
OECD 2010) Over the course of time, the balance between these constituent principles may
change as a result of the pressure or actions of the most important actors and may shift in a
specific direction (towards the increased institutional autonomy of schools, or on the contrary,
towards the more intrusive role of the state by means of a closer link between funding and
national testing). This way of working can be found in all policy fields. Governance is ever
changing.
In a policy context, governance is treated as affecting problem-solving activity, with dif-
ferent kinds of problems calling for different kinds of governance leading to different kinds of
policy responses. Hence, for example, ‘new governance’ often simply means that new actors
have entered the policy-making arena and new policy instruments (contracts, partnership,
recommendations, participation, benchmarking, learning) have been added to the traditional
policy-steering toolkit. These changes are undoubtedly important, since they have increased the
complexity of policy making and thus its possible dynamics, direction and equilibria, but do not
represent a sharp, distinctive non-linear break with the past.
Several further elements also emerge from the governance literature which merit consid-
eration in relation to their impact on policy making. Firstly, these typologies do not offer any
further information about how a prevailing governance arrangement is chosen; this is a matter
for further theorization as we explain later. Secondly, recent research shows how hierarchy is
always present, at least potentially, in every governance arrangement, albeit in different forms
(Hill and Lynn 2005; Heritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Goetz 2008; Borzel 2010; Lynn 2010;

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Capano 2011), and this constant factor slips away in many typological efforts in which it appears
as only one of the principles of coordination. Finally, the typological approach only manages to
account for the some prevailing trends in governance arrangements and policy designs, but it is
inherently limited by the fact that very often, real governance arrangements consist of complex
policy mixes, that is, of a blend of different coordinating principles and their respective policy
instruments (Capano et al. 2012).
The actual workings of governance arrangements are further analyzed to get a better grasp
of their dynamics (because they change over time and very often are characterized by different
policy mixes), of their strategic nature (since they are the products of the actions and interactions
of policy actors driven by specific goals), and of their capacity (that is, how likely governance
arrangements can be effective in relation to certain important collective goals).
Taken together these elements make up a governance ‘style’, which is an important determi-
nant of policy responses and policy designs (Howlett 2019). Each of these elements is discussed
in turn in the following sections.

Understanding governance dynamics

Relating governance thinking to policy making requires a dynamic orientation, since the way
in which society and its political processes are steered can radically change, at least in terms
of the intensity of this steering process (Hogwood and Peters 1983). This means that govern-
ance arrangements and workings should be analyzed from a diachronic perspective. A mode
of governance thus is not stable but rather in equilibrium, meaning the mix of coordinating
principles and policy instruments adopted at time 0, which persists until one of the components
is changed, is only temporary and subject to fluctuation.
Very often, the intrinsically dynamic character of governance is not taken into considera-
tion, and scholars tend to portray a static picture of the reality of governance, characterized
by diachronic punctuations. This tendency is evident in all studies of the ‘demise of the state’
produced during the 1950s and ’60s, which a couple of decades later was reversed by a series
of studies on the ‘return of the state’ (Evans et al. 1985; Evans 1997). The same could be said
about the ‘new public management’ (NPM) movement, which has often been assumed to have
radically changed the ways in which public policies are steered, governed and managed (Aucoin
1990; Lane 2000; Barzelay 2001). Once again it too was reversed in recent years by a significant
body of work underlining the partial, contextualized impact of NPM itself (Lynn 2006; C. Pol-
litt and G. Bouckaert 2000, 2009; Ramesh and Howlett 2006; Ongaro 2009).
That is, it is clear that even in the past, governments were not the sole decisional forces, at
least not in democratic political systems, and even dictatorial and totalitarian systems encoun-
tered resistance from many elements of society. However, thinking about the dynamics of gen-
eral modes of governance in recent years has focussed on shifts away from governments to
societal actors and has attributed this change to two converging factors. On the one hand, it
notes a trend towards the current fragmentation of the policy-making process, during which
a number of actors, including interest groups, NGOs and social movements, have found new
room for manoeuvre they may not have had in the past and notes the fact that many countries
have decentralized their political institutional arrangements in response to these changes. On
the other hand, studies have also shown that this change has been intentionally pursued by
governments, following the discovery that the traditional command-and-control approach to
steering was inefficient and ineffective and that the involvement of other actors in policy mak-
ing could help temper the constant social pressure they were under. These counter forces have
generated what may appear at first sight to be a radical change of the way in which society is

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steered, involving more actors and making decision-making more horizontal, less hierarchical,
but on closer inspection emerges to be a complex new trend in designing the ways of governing.
The ways in which policy is steered in many countries and sectors at present are less mono-
centric than previously, as they are characterized by the presence of a plethora of policy actors;
however, whether this means a reduced degree of hierarchy and greater cooperation is a matter
for empirical research to establish and cannot be taken for granted. Furthermore, the use of new
policy tools does not mean that they do not need to be hierarchically addressed, at least from a
distance, through various other policy instruments that governments adopt in such cases: instru-
ments such as financial incentives, periodic evaluation, the request for transparent processes and
so on (Howlett 2019).
In order to understand governance dynamics, we need to focus on certain important aspects
of a diachronic development, namely initial equilibrium; directionality; temporal dimension; and
relationships with the external environment, which ‘traditional’ governance studies have largely
ignored.
The initial equilibrium refers to the specific configuration of governance arrangements and
policy instruments at time 0. This implies defining the kind of balance to be found between
the general principles of coordination, how such principles are implemented with regard to
the chosen policy tools, and which types of actor are present. These relations with the external
environment represent a complex aspect of governance dynamics, which needs to be simplified
if theoretical and conceptual progress is to occur. The first form in which these relationships
take place is within the boundaries of the constitutional arrangement of the state. Unitary,
regional and federal state structures have different effects on governance arrangements. As we
know from the works on scholars such as Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 2002, the greater the
number of institutional venues that policy actors may use to pursue their interests, for example,
the greater likelihood there will be that changes will also occur to governance equilibria. The
second important aspect is the nature of interest groups (Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Binderkrantz
and Krøyer 2012). The more pluralistic the external environment, the greater the pressure on
governance dynamics will be. On the contrary, if the social environment is organized in a more
corporatist way, then governance dynamics will be subjected to less pressure for change. The
third important external factor is the social relevance of the policy field. The more a policy field
is considered important in the public’s eye, the more it will be subjected to external pressures
which can affect governance dynamics.
The directionality of governance dynamics means focussing on the logics of their develop-
ment. Governance arrangements may change in either an incremental or a radical way, thus
moving away from the initial equilibrium point in terms both of the mix of general coordi-
nating principles and policy instruments and of the set of actors involved. However, the real
challenge is that of understanding whether the direction of governance dynamics is reversible,
that is, whether it is subject to oscillation over time, returning to previous equilibrium points
and mixes.
Understanding the temporal dimension of governance dynamics gives us the sense of the
historical sequence through which governance dynamics develop. Governance dynamics can
develop in a punctuated way, with long periods of stability followed by periods of radical
change; however, such dynamics may also develop according to a continuous process character-
ized by the occasional micro-change (the progressive calibration of specific policy instruments)
while the equilibrium between the general principles of coordination remain apparently the
same (although an incremental change in policy instruments can lead to a more radical degree
of change in the medium/long term).

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The strategic nature of governance

Very often, governance arrangements are viewed from a functionalist perspective, as a structure
of institutionalized relationships by means of which certain systemic functional requirements
are met and structural-functional needs are satisfied. However, this does not help us understand
the intrinsic dynamics of governance or the importance of actors’ behaviour to it (Peters 2012;
Mayntz 2004).
Governance in this sense can be seen as a strategic dimension of policy making. This
means that actors know that the features of governance arrangements and the types of policy
instruments adopted have an impact on the interests they are pursuing and that the positions/
roles they have in the existing governance arrangement represent a fundamental source of
power and/or influence. This awareness justifies the emphasis that all governments have
placed on continually re-designing governance arrangements within policy fields in order to
better accomplish their goals. At the same time, this awareness underlies the ongoing battle
over policy instruments and the features of governance arrangements (which can be defined
as ‘meta-governance’).
Governments, for example, are interested in achieving public policy results according to
their respective electoral manifestos and in resolving contingent policy problems. Governments
play a central role in governance changes and shifts: they are constantly searching for solutions to
their policy and political problems, and very often changes in the components of governance –
from ministerial reorganization to stakeholder limitation or enhancement – represent a highly
promising way forward.
Regarding policy problems, most governments and especially democratic ones subject to
the whims of the ballot box are intrinsically committed to offering better performing policies,
and they are very often the first to promote governance reforms in order to do so. It should be
assumed that it is in the interests of government to adopt those instruments and equilibrium
in governance arrangements which in a specific context may help build effective policies. The
increasing role of the ‘market’ principle of coordination in many policy fields is governments’
response to the financial crisis afflicting ‘the big state’. NPM policy instruments have been
adopted by governments in order to make public administration more accountable and respon-
sible. As far as political problems are concerned, governments are continuously faced with the
problem of having to legitimize their decisions outside the normal route of democratic parlia-
mentary procedures.
This means that the governance toolkit can provide certain solutions to the issue of political
and social consensus, for example. The stable involvement of specific interest groups in govern-
ance arrangements, or the structural openness of such arrangements, may represent a strategic
decision designed to ensure government’s control of the agenda and the significant probability
of effective implementation.
Governance arrangements thus lie at the heart of the constant battle for power constituting
the very substance of politics and policy making. While actors pursue their substantial contin-
gent policy goals, at the same time they try to gain advantages but always in relation to existing
governance arrangements. Thus trade unions, for example, would prefer a more corporatist
form of governance, or at the very least a series of very impermeable arrangements, while large
firms would prefer strongly market-oriented governance arrangements and social movements
highly decentralized, polycentric arrangements together with deliberative policy-making tools,
and so on. It is clear that not all policy actors are successful in their battle for such arrangements
and that the losers must operate within a governance design which is not their preferred one.

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Thus, from this point of view, the impact of governance styles on policy making should also
be studied at the ‘meta-governance’ level by focussing on the ‘battle’ for governance arrange-
ments (Howlett 2009).
Furthermore, observation of the strategic behaviour of policy actors in the governance bat-
tle is of fundamental importance to an understanding of why, very often, within the context
of structural multilevel policy making, actors change behaviour according to the level of gov-
ernance. Structurally speaking, the governance game is a multi-level one, and thus the power/
position preferences of actors may vary according to the governance equilibrium at each level
and to the kind of links (strong/loose) that exist between the different levels of governance.
By abandoning a structuralist or a functionalist perspective and assuming the strategic nature
of policy actors’ behaviour, our understanding of governance development becomes more real-
istic but also more complex. It becomes more realistic because the analysis of policy actors’ stra-
tegic behaviour enables us to get a better understanding of what practical governance actually
is and of how and why it changes. It is by viewing the development of governance in terms of
actors’ strategies that the real role of the state and government can be understood; and it is from
this micro-perspective that the real nature and impact of existing governance arrangements on
policy making can be understood.

The importance of governance capacity

There is a need to focus on governance capacity in order to get a better understanding of the
effectiveness of governance arrangements once launched. Fukuyama (2016) has hypothesized
that governance is the government’s ability to make and enforce rules and to deliver services. He
suggests that scholars should pay attention to two critical dimensions which have been neglected
in the literature: state capacity and autonomy. The idea is that the different varieties of govern-
ance found in different countries and sectors can be explained by variations in capacity and
autonomy of governments, but also that capacity and autonomy can vary over time and across
instrumentalities, size and levels of government.
Most literature and research, however, has focussed on the architectural features of govern-
ance arrangements, and we have suggested additional work should be done on which actors
or types of relationship matter in governance. However, attention also must be paid to the real
effects of changes in governance on policy and governance outcomes.
There are several reasons why we should also focus on the capacities of governance. The first
is that governance arrangements are institutionalized patterns of behaviour whereby public poli-
cies are designed, and commonly perceived problems are handled and possibly resolved. This
results in the inescapable problem of the importance of the capacity of governance arrangements
to deliver policy results. Secondly, governance arrangements also represent one of the places
where the power game leading to legitimization of the social order is played out. Thus, we need
to understand how governance arrangements can preserve political consensus and legitimation,
both of which are prerequisites for successful policy attainment. Thirdly, governance changes
(that is, changes in the dynamics and strategic aspects of governance) cannot be understood
without a more detailed analysis of the capacity of governance.
Governance capacity is not the same as good governance in its different definitions (World
Bank 1994; Fukuyama 2013; Pierre and Peters 2005), state or government capacity (Besley and
Persson 2011), quality of government (Rothstein 2011), systemic sustainability in governing
pooled resources (Ostrom 1990), or the capacity to produce optimal or good regulation (Jor-
dana and Levi Faur 2004). All of these things can help define aspects of governance capacity,
although they are too partial or too prescriptively oriented to identify with capacity as such.

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The quality of government, that is, the ability to maintain social order and to effectively
decide and implement democratically legitimized policies (Matthiews 2012), are significant
aspects of governance capacity. Policy capacity focusses on performance in the respective policy
field: if performance is perceived as satisfactory, then the existing governance arrangement
will persist, otherwise a decision may be taken to change that governance arrangement and/or
policy instrument in order to improve policy performance or to redefine policy issues.
Political capacity means the capacity to maintain the political consensus both of those actors
involved and of those not involved and to preserve the general perception of legitimacy. When
the political aspect of governance does not work, this constitutes a situation in which the inher-
ited governance arrangement is challenged by actors (not necessarily new ones) demanding a
role (if outsiders) or a stronger role (if insiders).

Conclusion: the idea of governance styles and their impact

on policy making
The idea of governance styles provides a diachronic perspective on the varying policy instru-
ments and institutional features which steer the movement of private actors. The development
of specific governance modes over time and the directionality of governance dynamics impact
directly the nature of policy making and the choices of policy tools and programs which emerge
from policy-making processes. How this affects the balance and relationship between both pub-
lic and private actors and how innovations in instruments affect this balance are key questions.
Some governance arrangements, for example, promote collaboration while others promote
competition and contention.
And, of course, governance modes can ‘fail’. These failures of different modes of governance –
governments, markets and networks – in specific circumstances from stagflation to excess pri-
vatization are well recognized in the literature. What is less recognized is that while all three
modes suffer from severe limitations, they do not all afford the same level or type of risk. In
situations where both market and network failures are likely and substantial, hierarchical gov-
ernance may remain a preferred option even in the face of various government failures since at
least the needed services will be delivered, although perhaps inefficiently distributed in a techni-
cal sense and in all likelihood not as responsive to users’ preferences.
These propensities make it even more important that policy-makers take into account gov-
ernance modes and styles when fashioning policies. In choosing instruments and programs, gov-
ernments need to understand the nature of the problem they are trying to address and the tools
they have at their disposal to address it, which are directly affected by the innate features of exist-
ing governance modes. These must be matched to the problem they seek to address while the
dynamics and the capabilities of governments and their societal partners to successfully imple-
ment the best option in any given governance situation similarly needs to be carefully assessed
and addressed if governance-induced policy failures are to be avoided (Howlett 2009, 2019).

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