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Managing the Shore Establishment

By Captain Howard Norman Kay, USN
December 1977

Proceedings

Vol. 103/12/898
ARTICLE

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The presumption seems to be that the four-striper who has excelled during
a command at sea is thereby capable of c°mmanding one of the Navy’s
sprawling bases °r stations. But the fact is that successful Management of a
diversified shore establishment bears little, if any, similarity to c°mmanding a
surface ship, submarine, or a*r wing at sea.
In the early 1970s, certain organizations ashore were designated “major
commands,” their commanding officers to be named by selection boards as are
those chosen to command major warships. Spurring this decision was a desire
to provide more major command opportunity when the number of billets afloat
was diminishing rapidly. Secondly, the move was an attempt to upgrade, at
least at the senior echelon, management of the Navy’s multi-billion- dollar shore
establishment.
This was a halting and, at best, limited first step toward bringing some
semblance of professional, top-level military management on the part of unre-
stricted line officers to the Navy's shore facilities. For while we extol
“professionalism,” a seemingly imperishable buzzword, as the key to success
on, beneath, and above the seas, we have stopped well short of introducing a
professional approach to the operation of most shore stations and bases.
Despite designating certain installations as major commands, we still find most
naval shore stations managed by amateurs. They are well intentioned—and, for
the most part, competent—but neophytes, nevertheless.
Having invested $75,000 or more in a freshly- minted ensign, we send him to
extensive basic warfare schools to “enhance professionalism”—often before he
sets foot aboard his first ship. Subsequently, we lay on that officer a six-month
pre-department head course in the name of professionalism. We may select
him for technical postgraduate training, then send him on to prospective
executive officer and commanding officer schools.

Only after spending the better part of 20 years on board ship and in the
classroom preparing professionally for his assignment does a four-striper finally
emerge as commanding officer of a major combatant. Similarly, the senior
aviator dons the mantle of carrier air wing commander after a regimen of profes-
sional upgrading consisting for the most part of prolonged association with
aircraft and those who fly them. Submariners follow an even narrower path.

ATLANTIC FLEET AUDIO VISUAL COMMAND

COMMANDANT FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Entrance
NAVY
COMMISSARY STORE

HOWS OF ORERAflQW

Subspecialists of whatever warfare speciality move in and out of their

increasingly exotic spheres by way of formal education and on-the-job
experience.
The one major endeavor of the unrestricted line community untouched by any
discernible trace of programmed professional preparation is the management
and direction of the Navy’s sprawling bases, stations, and related shore
activities. The conspicuous vacuum in professional preparation exists despite
the fact that those directing major installations ashore manage most of the
Navy’s 280,000 civilian workers, some 250,000 uniformed military personnel,
$11 billion in capital and plant investment, and an annual expenditure of more
than $2 billion. They exercise responsibilities comparable to positions for which,
in the civilian world, only the finest and most experienced executive talent could
compete.
One can easily accept the premise that an officer should not be considered
qualified to take command of a destroyer squadron or cruiser without years at
sea interspersed with related duty ashore. But, by what logic are senior officers
considered qualified, in some instantaneous and miraculous fashion, to take the
reins of a civilian-military shore command without substantial or meaningful
experience in the complex and specialized management demands of such an
establishment? Yet, this is precisely the case in today’s otherwise professionally
oriented Navy, largely because an officer is selected to command a major
shof1 establishment based on his successful career at sea- The fact is, however,
that successful managemc^ of a major, diversified shore establishment is a ch^
lenge of the first magnitude which bears little, ^ any, similarity to commanding a
surface ship, sU marine, or airwing at sea. Those who have co manded both at
sea and ashore understand that tn are a number of major points of contrast
betwe^ command afloat and top executive manager^
ashore. u5 t
A commanding officer at sea frequently ^ make real-time, clearly drawn
decisions which sp^ the difference between survival and cataclysm, >■ whether
to turn to port or starboard, ring up flan '
aft,
every
must be accounted
‘°rce
s time
slow to two-thirds, launch aircraft or look for more favorable winds, secure a
boiler or steam it. These are spontaneous reactions, which gestated, however,
through 20 years of experience. On the other hand, tarely should the manager
of a major shore establishment make decisions which are
instantaneously, 0r even quickly executed. Most of his actions must ke carefully
contemplated and studied. Rarely are issues ashore either black or white. Most
are gray, and frequently the manager must choose the least undesirable of
several options.
The commanding officer at sea deals directly with highly specialized groups of
fellow military profes- Sl°nals accustomed and compelled to respond quickly
I t0 his orders or requests. The manager of a major shore establishment, on the
other hand, deals simul- I taneously with military personnel who are
frequently as new to the shore establishment as he, with tenant c°mmanders who
may be senior to him, with civil- lans and their unions, and with contractors over
"'hom very little direct control of performance can be euforced.
A commanding officer at sea relies on the knowl- e^ge that he has a clearly
defined and easily recognized chain of command upon which he can count. A
Manager ashore soon discovers that he has not one chain only, but rather a
number of chains leading in uferent directions. They reach to his own immediate
bosses, other commands he is to support, he Civil Service Commission, and a
bewildering array of bureaus, agencies, boards, or other offices in ashington.
The often duplicative and overlapping guidance—the “who’s in charge?"
syndrome when uficult issues must be faced—is a windmill on 'hfrh a new shore
commander can blunt his lance lrrevocably.
If need be, the commander at sea can demand hour er endless hour from his
subordinates in order to Accomplish his mission. He operates in a
milieu ere charisma, elan, and personal leadership still °unt. The commander of a
major shore establish- ^etlt knows that every hour of his civilian work
P - - mm. muii uc accounted for and every ^Ud-sapping hour of overtime strictly
regulated. To ^eUiand additional effort from his military personnel not from his
civilian employees creates schisms ^'hin his command. He finds, too, that his
organi- j 10n may be so sprawling geographically that it is jj. fusible for him to be
seen frequently by most of (j-S employees. Thus, it becomes difficult to project
laTSe^ Personally throughout his domain, particu- ^ fre mtends to deal effectively with
the count- | Ss Problems of the everyday world that pile restlessly on his desk.
The commanding officer afloat knows that those to whom he must answer—the
squadron, type, or fleet commanders—have a firsthand knowledge of his
problems, nurtured by command of ships or aircraft units of their own. He can
address them, therefore, in terms they understand and appreciate. While they
may not always provide the response he would like to hear, at least he knows
that his problems have been considered by officers who have, themselves,
been tempered by command at sea and thus understand his perspective. The
manager of a shore establishment, on the other hand, realizes that those on the
military staffs to whom he must refer his problems frequently know less about
the management of shore establishments than he does.
Afloat commands have similar administrative structures, similar goals and
objectives, and engage in similar operations. There is congruity of operating
funds, personnel allowances, and missions. The commanding officer ashore, on
the other hand, because of locale, mission, and often unique operating
conditions, must frequently determine his own priorities, establish his own
goals, and meld the dollars, people, and resources at his command to ac-
complish a myriad of diversified, often unrelated, and sometimes competitive
functions.
In brief, unlike his seagoing contemporary who has grown in company with the
men, ships, and aircraft whose efforts he directs, the shore commander arrives
at his command barely speaking the language of the organization, let alone
knowing the rules of engagement. While he may be buttressed by knowl-
edgeable civilian subordinates, his military personnel have had little, if any,
experience in their roles What are some of the specific problems facing the
shore commander which bear little resemblance to those encountered by his
seagoing running mates?
First, and frequently overriding, are matters related to financial management.
The manager ashore is immersed in the budgetary process. He must formulate
and then constantly defend, ride herd over, and review his budget. There is a
bottom line, and the shore commander must learn to live with it. He is unlike the
commanding officer afloat who has little to say concerning his annual operating
budget, which is generally a standard sum provided to like ships. A shore
commander’s budget is subject to trade-offs involving, among other things,
materials, utility costs, labor performed by his own employees and that
performed through contractors. All are influenced by edicts flowing directly from
a multitude of disconnected sources—the Office of Management and Budget,
the Chief of Naval Material, major claimants, and even the White House.
While the shore commander need not be a professional money manager, he
must be able to converse knowledgeably and comfortably with his comptroller.
Survival itself depends upon his ability to compete with skilled budget analysts,
auditors, and financial managers lying in wait around every bend in the road.
The budget in turn translates into jobs. The commander at sea need never
worry about a payroll. The manager ashore, however, must constantly contend
with the business of hiring and firing. Jobs and people—sometimes thousands
of them—all have a direct effect on his ability to perform his mission and,
parenthetically, on the economic viability of the local civilian community.
Linked intimately with the work force is the complex field of civilian personnel
management. How many senior commanders come to their jobs ashore having
more than a superficial knowledge of the rules and regulations which govern the
day-to-day activity of the more than a quarter million civilians who serve the
naval establishment? There are, among others, regulations concerning
overtime, grievance procedures, promotions and repromotions, performance
evaluations, reductions in-force, and retention rights. How many naval officers
understand the delicate relationship between the civilian and military labor
forces who, despite wide differences which separate their modi operandi, must
work harmoniously side by side in order to accomplish common goals? What
does the neophyte shore commander who has grown up with SAR, MPI, and
CPA know of EEO, AAP, and
RIF?
, u
Another combination of letters of more than
academic interest to the line officer in command ashore is ‘'AFGE," American
Federation of Government Employees. Until recently, government unions were
essentially docile, more honored in form than substance. Lately, however,
government-associated unions, particularly AFGE, have taken on a more ag-
gressive stance. The shore establishment manager, therefore, most be able to
handle himself skillfully and knowledgeably when union contracts are
negotiated, grievances addressed, and strikes encountered from a contractor’s
union or, conceivably in the future, a government union.
Contributing to the increased aggressiveness of government unions is the
threat, or at least the perception of a threat, posed by the Office of Management
and Budget. The OMB has called for substantial increases in the substitution of
contracted labor for that traditionally provided by civil servants, particularly blue-
collar workers. The thought that labor provided by private enterprise can
substitute for civil service employees across a broad spectrum of the blue-
collar work force is not new. However, OMB has recently issued guidelines
which, if followed to their ultimate conclusions, would have a dramatic effect on
thousands of civil service workers. The issue is fundamental and pervasive, and
its resolution promises to be traumatic. Caught in the middle of this conflict
between the bureaucratic summit in Washington and the workers in the field are
uniforme shore establishment managers, some of whom may well find
themselves defendants in federal courtrooms
before the matter is resolved.
Suffice it to note at this point that a naval officer employing large numbers of
blue- and/or white-collar employees must have an intimate knowledge of a the
issues involved in this highly complex and volatile matter. At stake are
thousands of jobs, millions of dollars in government contracts, and the very abil-
ity of the shore commander to manage his command effectively.
Another high-stakes game ashore involves clubs and messes. With few
exceptions, the Navy’s clubs are wallowing knee-deep in alligators. Since July
1974, some 20% of all the Navy’s officers’ clubs have folded. Fewer than half of
those remaining are operating in the black. Many enlisted and chief petty
officers’ clubs are also in extremis. Clubs have fallen victim to a wide range of
modern-day afflictions: changes in life-style, an unsympathetic Congress, in-
flation, an unrealistic mandated package of excessive wage scales and
benefits, and mediocre management- Those clubs surviving do so by parlaying
good lucK and fine management on the part of professional club executives.
The shore commander who “owns” clubs must be able to recognize when they
are slipping beyond the point of no return so that effective, longterm solutions
might be sought rather than just a
series of short-lived fixes.
Operating a club system which generates six-dig1 monthly sales figures is hardly
a sport for amateurs of the faint of heart. Profit margin and survival are finely
balanced. If a club does not serve enough high-profit alcoholic beverages, it will
inevitably fail. If it serves too many, it runs the risk of being labeled a “pusher.”
More and more consideration being given to consolidating all clubs in an area^
enlisted, chief, and officer. Weighed against the operating efficiencies of a
consolidated club must the question of patron support. A commanding o cer
must also identify his clubs’ basic or potentih constituencies, e.g., the active
duty population, population displaced from a former closed mess, re tired
persons, and civil servants, all with subsets 0 married or single, old or young,
and male or female' These and other knotty problems can hardly be a
indicated by a commanding officer whose only previous knowledge of club
operations was gained during periodic rounds of liars’ dice and overcooked
steaks.
The demise of the closed mess and the requirement to eliminate all but a few
mess management specialists from the operations of bachelor officers quarters
have also radically altered the entire concept °f quarters for bachelor officers
and enlisted persons (BOQs/BEQs). Operating these frequently enormous hotel
complexes requires a mix of financial acumen and top-drawer managerial ability,
particularly since fecent rulings by Congress mandate that they be largely self-
sustaining (i.e., show a profit) yet be comfortable and acceptable to the
residents. What might happen to the BOQ/BEQ system if the tenants were
offered the opportunity, currently under consideration, to accept basic allowance
for quarters and hve on the local economy is conjectural.
Other non-appropriated fund activities are also being subjected to increasing
congressional and fiscal constraints. Special service operations that in the
past were highly subsidized now face relentless pressure to become self-
sufficient. Commands unwilling or unable to pay the freight are doomed to see
their recre- atl°n programs atrophy. No longer, therefore, can a special services
officer be a twilight-tour officer content to spend his waning days handing out
basketballs or a freshly caught ensign who is not yet qual- •fied to pursue a
warfare specialty. Rather, what is required is a manager with strong financial
background who can budget and skillfully administer a ^ega-dollar operation.
Law and order are prime concerns of many shore commanders. During the
recent past, hundreds of residents of transient disciplinary barracks have seri-
°osly impeded the day-to-day operations of large shore establishments. These
individuals must be me- hculously administered and moved expeditiously trough
the pipeline. As a related matter, correc- tJonal centers are operated under a
magnifying glass, ar>d the least hint of irregularity brings the inspectors tanning,
adding to and complicating an already Crushing workload. A shore commander
may also maintain a mixed security force—civil servants, contracted civilians,
and military personnel, Navy and arine—who might well outnumber the
constabulary of the local civilian community. The force must e properly
coordinated to ensure good order and mscipline.
In some areas the commander of a large naval P °re establishment oversees
thousands of military atnily quarters. He provides municipal services, Utilities,
recreation, and security comparable to those ervices required by a small town
and administered
by a mayor or town manager. He also provides industrial, logistic, and
administrative services to tenant and supported activities operating within his
fence line. Frequently, as the senior commander, he serves as the area
coordinator,” providing other shore commanders in a broad geographic region
the same guidance and overall authority that the senior officer present afloat
provides to seagoing units.
Because shore establishments are frequently industrial or large administrative
complexes, they are voracious consumers of energy. A shore commander must
provide innovative and effective measures to conserve his energy resources:
electricity, water, steam, and oil. He must be dynamic in his efforts to reduce the
flow of dollars which pay for them. In the foreseeable future, it is entirely
possible that the survival of a shore facility in a locale where energy costs are
high may depend upon the commander’s successful efforts to reduce the cost
of heating, lighting, or fueling his base.
The commander who operates retail outlets, i.e., navy exchanges or
commissary stores, must recognize that not only are these morale-enhancing
services subject to constant scrutiny and frequent criticism from “competitors” in
nearby civilian communities but, in the case of exchanges, they provide the
wherewithal to keep the recreation program going. To be successful, his stores
must be competitive, innovative, efficient, and satisfying to their customers. He
must, therefore, be alert to the kind of store management that is productive and
sales-enhancing but does not improperly encroach upon the domain of private
business interests outside the gates.
Far more than his seagoing counterpart, the shore commander must come to
grips gracefully and easily with the modern male/female Navy to extract from it
maximum productivity. He must know that “equal employment opportunity” and
“affirmative action” are more than catchwords. Daily he deals with large
numbers of retirees, dependents, members at large of the civilian work force,
and those civilians beyond the perimeter who affect his organization.
In an era of base closures and reductions, a shore manager may encounter a
variety of problems which result when part of his station has been declared ex-
cess to the Navy’s needs. He then becomes an intermediary between the Navy,
the General Services Administration, state, local, and other federal government
agencies, and private enterprises. The process involving the divestiture of
property from the government and its subsequent acquisition by the civilian
community is often long and complicated.
Compounding the problem of too many apertures in the pipeline which can, and
often do, drain off a shore commander’s resources is the seeming lack of
coordination among the agencies providing those basic resources. His military
manpower flows from the Bureau of Naval Personnel with allowances juggled
by claimants along the way. He is thus subjected to military personnel
restrictions which, for most shore managers, mandate operating at officer
strengths well below allowance and, in the case of many enlisted ratings, at
figures approaching 50-60% below an already austere allowance. Civilian
personnel totals are a function of the budget but, frequently, hiring freezes and
stringent ceiling levels are imposed by any of a number of authorities— some
military, others civilian—because of problems encountered at echelons far
removed from the command. Finally, the dollars required to manage shore
activities are traditionally fair game for every program manager, special projects
advocate, and politician who would have a go at “trimming the fat from the
Defense Department.
In that he is frequently the senior naval person in a community (which frequently
looks upon him as the chief executive of the largest business in town), the shore
commander must be both accessible and articulate. Often his personnel
contribute tellingly to the economic and social structure of the area. Thus, what
he says or does is newsworthy and may activate phones in congressional
offices as well as those in the statehouse or on the mayor’s desk. A manager of
a large shore establishment, therefore, is a public figure, subject to public
scrutiny and often a target for the politics which ebb and flow around him.
The list could go on. No single area mentioned constitutes in and of itself a
major segment of a shore commander’s mission such as that of direct opera-
tional support of the fleet or of training. But the point should be obvious. Simply
stated, it is that a shore establishment commander operates in an environment
far different from that on board ship. All that I have said so far is not meant to
portray the shore commander as some sort of superhuman figure or
renaissance man but rather to emphasize that he faces a different set of rules
and problems. To solve them requires skills which are in most cases foreign to
those developed during the 20 years prior to assuming the job.
Good leaders afloat can and have become good managers ashore, and expert
managers ashore can prove equally adept afloat. But it does not folio"' that the
two are necessarily interchangeable.
Granting the validity of what has preceded, ic would appear that one who
assumes the role as manager of a shore establishment should be much better
prepared for his job than has been true in the past- There are too many dollars,
too many people, and too important a mission at stake to suggest that we can
continue to prepare those whom we select to manage primarily by letting them
struggle through
12 or 18 months of on-the-job training, hoping that while learning they will not
be eviscerated by their own swords.
How then can we better prepare our unrestricted line officers to manage the
shore establishment? We must first identify those whom we are going to groom
for command ashore earlier than is now the case. It would probably best be
done at a mid-career point, for example, upon completion of command at sea
as a commander. After completing a successful mid-level command in a
warfare specialty, an officer who so requests, and is subsequently selected,
would thus be diverted into the field of shore establishment management. At
this point, he would be offered basic training and schooled in matters such as
labor relations, financial management, budget planning, non-appropriated fund
administration, civilian personnel management, and public relations fundamen-
tals to endow him with the basic credentials sufficient to assume the role of a
manager, either of a modest-sized shore establishment or as a chief staff officer
or executive officer of a major shore command. (Plans for this type of formal
classroom preparation are now in the works.)* Successful performance in this
capacity would be followed by selection to manage a major shore
establishment. The top rung on the ladder would be the largest and most
complex shore commands, of which there are only a few. Thus, the path leading
to a major shore command would diverge from that leading to a major sea
command, then converge at the time of flag selection.
Lest I be accused of advocating a wet/dry Navy, I Would ensure that an officer
managing the shore establishment not lose contact with the seagoing Navy by
remaining closely associated with the operational forces until well into his years
as a commander. It can be assumed that any individual who has handled
successfully command at sea as a commander and is highly successful in
senior management ashore would also be competitive in the selection to flag
rank, Which, by its very nature, requires an ability to plan broadly and to
orchestrate civilian and military personnel, money, and material.
Managers of large shore establishments should be retained on the job
sufficiently long to ensure continuity at a location. The rapid turnover of com-
rnanding officers at sea is difficult enough to cope with, but a seagoing
commanding officer at least
During the current fiscal year, the Navy will establish a shore station Managers
course for prospective commanding officers and executive offiCers. The three-
week course will be conducted in the Washington area in conjunction with the
Senior Line Manager Institute of the Office of Civil- *an Personnel.
packs much the same professional baggage as those who have preceded him
and those who follow. This is not the case in most shore establishments. Deci-
sions relative to the livelihood of hundreds or thousands of people, complicated
and diversified missions, and local problems which are frequently not reflected
elsewhere in a career officer’s background are extant throughout the shore
establishment; therefore, continuity of incumbency is essential.
While my expressed concern is that of better preparation for our shore
commanders, some other questions might also be asked. Where in the OpNav/
Bureau of Personnel hierarchy does one find the broadly experienced base
commander with a tough but compassionate understanding of requirements and
issues in the Navy’s shore commands? Where is the knowledgeable and
determined commitment to support these commands wherever evenhanded
policies and resources allocations will help? Where is the deep-selected
lieutenant commander or commander in the naval base organizations?
If unrestricted line officers are unable to professionalize the management of our
shore establishment, it may well be that the matter will be decided for us. The
Air Force is already conducting tests in which major bases have been turned
over to civilian contractors to run. This need not be the case. Innovative and
goal-oriented naval officers who during their first 15 or 20 years have
demonstrated an ability to produce under pressure can, with the proper
preparation, manage the shore establishment and manage it well. By so doing,
they preserve the responsiveness, flexibility, and ability to get things done which
are the hallmarks of blue suit leadership. Managing a major base, station, or
facility is a challenge of the first magnitude. It is demanding, intensely challeng-
ing, and, if done well, enormously satisfying. But it truly requires more attention
than the Navy has devoted to it.
Since his graduation from the Naval Academy in 1948, Captain Kay has
commanded the USS PC-1254, Mine Division 111, USS Esteem (MSO-438),
USS 1Vilhoite (DER-397), \JSS Johnson (DD-821), and USS Carpenter (DD-
825). He has also commanded the Mobile Training Unit, Ethiopia; Navy and
Marine Corps Reserve Training Center, Madison, Wisconsin; and the Naval
Officer Training Center, Newport. Among other duties, he has served on the
staffs of the Commander Naval Forces Far East, Commander in Chief, Pacific,
and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is the first and present commander
of the Naval Education and Training Center, a shore command created as a
result of the shore establishment realignment of 1974 which merged the Naval
Station, Naval Base, Public Works Center, Supply Center, and Naval Officer
Training Center at Newport. Captain Kay is the author of six previous
Proceedings articles.

Digital Proceedings content made possible by a gift from CAPT Roger

Ekman, USN (Ret.)

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