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 America’s Global Advantage

For over sixty years the United States has been the largest economy and
most powerful country in the world. However, there is growing specu-
lation that this era of hegemony is under threat as it faces huge trade
deficits, a weaker currency, and stretched military resources. America’s
Global Advantage argues that, despite these difficulties, the US will
maintain its privileged position. In this original and important con-
tribution to a central subject in International Relations, Carla Norrlof
challenges the prevailing wisdom that other states benefit more from US
hegemony than the United States itself. By analysing America’s structural
advantages in trade, money, and security, and the ways in which these
advantages reinforce one another, Norrlof shows how and why America
benefits from being the dominant power in the world. Contrary to pre-
dictions of American decline, she argues that American hegemony will
endure for the foreseeable future.

carla norrlof is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political

Science at the University of Toronto.
America’s Global
Advantage
US Hegemony and
International Cooperation

C a r l a Nor r l of
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,
São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo

Cambridge University Press

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521765435
© Carla Norrlof 2010

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the

provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part
may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published in print format 2010

ISBN-13 978-0-511-67737-3 eBook (NetLibrary)

ISBN-13 978-0-521-76543-5 Hardback

ISBN-13 978-0-521-74938-1 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy

of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication,
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
To family and friends
Contents

List of figures page ix

List of tables x
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiii

1 Introduction  1
The puzzle 4
The argument 5
Methodology and value added 6
Plan of the book 8
2 The forms and consequences of hegemonic leadership 11
The forms of hegemonic leadership 12
The consequences of American hegemony 15
The evolution of the United States’
hegemonic position 17
Measuring disproportionality 22
Conclusion 29
3 Cooperation under hegemony 30
The emergence of international institutions
and the neorealist challenge 31
Size matters 35
The public goods assumption 38
Revised size model 40
Systemic stability and hegemonic decline 49
Conclusion 54
4 International trade cooperation 57
Trade theories 57
What ‘good’ is free trade? 67

vii
viii Contents

The significance of trade deficits 72

The reward of ongoing trade deficits 88
Buying power as a source of bargaining power 94
How the United States controls the global
equilibrium through the trade regime 96
Bargaining rounds and ministerial meetings 103
Conclusion 113
5 Interactive effects between monetary
and commercial power 115
How monetary privilege facilitates commercial expansion 116
How commercial strength reinforces monetary privilege 141
Conclusion 165
6 The security card 167
The security–dollar nexus 168
The asymmetry in risk premiums 171
Defense commitments and humanitarian interventions 184
Unilateralism vs. multilateralism, private vs. public goods 185
Conclusion 191
7 Credible threats and regional competition 192
Geographically coherent regionalism in East Asia 198
Euro Power 206
Conclusion 244
8 Conclusion 247

References 253
Index 271
Figures

2.1 Ranking of GNI per capita, PPP page 26

3.1 Production curve for public goods 43
3.2 Public good benefits and provision costs 44
4.1 Bank assets as share of GDP, 2008 81
4.2 De-leveraging as share of GDP, 2008 82
4.3 Value added, net income, and number of American
majority-owned foreign affiliates 92
4.4 Country share of top 25 firms in the world, 2008 93
4.5 Country share of top 2,000 firms in the world, 2008 93
4.6 America’s share of world merchandise trade 95
4.7 America’s share of world trade in services 97
5.1 America’s share of world capital flows
and liabilities 120
5.2 Balance of income and return differential 123
5.3 Capital and exchange rate gains for the United States 129
5.4 Savings dynamics 137
5.5 Chinese yuan, Hong Kong dollar, and Malaysian
ringgit per US$ 143
5.6 Euro, Japanese yen, South Korean won, Taiwanese
dollar, and Indonesian rupiah per US$ 143
5.7 Dollar against major currencies 157
5.8 Dollar cycles, 1971–85: G-7 currency per US$ 163
5.9 Dollar cycles, 1985–2009 165
6.1 Cost of war  190
7.1 World capital market shares  215

ix
Tables

2.1 Cross-country comparison of military expenditures page 20

2.2 World GDP shares 21
2.3 World export shares 23
2.4 World import shares 24
2.5 R ivals’ share of the United States’ capital
market (indicators) 25
5.1 Key currency functions 117
5.2 Return differentials, select economies 126
5.3 Share of East Asian countries’ exports to the United States 144
5.4 Major reserve holders 153
5.5 Major foreign holders of Treasury securities 159
6.1 American military successes/defeats and changes
in financial flows 179
7.1 Euro and dollar invoicing in extra-euro-zone trade 209
7.2 Non-euro-zone countries’ invoicing in euros,
2001 and 2004 210
7.3 Non-euro-zone countries’ invoicing in euros, 2006 212
7.4 Currency share of world (foreign exchange) reserves 217

x
Preface

When I began inquiring about the distribution of benefits from trade,

I was first looking at countries’ relative capacity for trade expan-
sion, synergies between import and export growth, and the determi-
nants of commercial bargaining power. After some time, I realized
that evaluating countries’ relative propensity for raising imports and
exports, and any advantage tied to it, required a parallel assessment
of countries’ ability to absorb foreign investment and to invest in
other countries. Analyzing commercial gains allocation meant get-
ting to work on the politics of investment and monetary relations,
and wading through more data than any scholar without a research
assistant could possibly wish for. In the meantime, there was renewed
interest in cross-border financial transactions in the economics discip-
line, a string of unprecedented current account deficits in the United
States, euro success, and China’s rise. One moment there was talk of
America as empire, the next forecasts of American decline. But just
how much systemic variation is there between the account of America
the indispensable power and America the weak? This led me to con-
sider the structural features at the basis of a country’s relative stand-
ing in the world and the relationship between these features. Was
there a bargaining advantage associated with being the largest power
in the world, or was it better to be a free-riding smaller power, as
so many scholars surmised? My research not only suggests that the
United States benefits from being the most dominant power today,
but that it will continue to be the greatest power for the foreseeable
future. Not all gains are quantifiable in monetary terms but come
in the form of an unusually wide policy autonomy window, i.e., a
longer time horizon and a greater capacity for risk-taking. Because
of the leverage the United States has over other states, it has con-
siderable leeway to pursue policies that would be suicidal if under-
taken by any other country. This is not to say that the United States
is above all constraint or invulnerable, but rather that it is in a better

xi
xii Preface

position to gain from international economic relations than are other

states – not all of the time, of course, but most of the time. This claim
will seem obvious to many readers but is surprisingly controversial in
the International Relations and Political Economy literature, where
Olson’s public goods argument has been completely internalized and
where any finding that is not counterintuitive is frowned upon. While
I understand that American decline is inevitable in the long run, my
analysis adds a cautionary note to all the speculation about imminent
decline, which is by no means restricted to our own time but goes
back to the 1970s, and never quite seems to materialize in the thun-
derous fashion that would sound the end of the American era.
Watching the full dread of the financial crisis play itself out in the
United States while waiting for reader reports added unwelcome sus-
pense to the review process. Although clearly this is not a book about
the credit crunch, it includes aspects of the crisis and fundamentals
in the banking sector relevant to assessing America’s clout, its relative
position, and future prospects.
Acknowledgments

In writing this book I have benefited from the insight, kindness, and
generosity of many people. My greatest debt is to Joseph Carens, who
read several versions of this manuscript and offered piercing com-
ments, along with unfailing friendship and support. The man deserves
a medal for his mentoring and benevolent engagement. When few
could see what I was up to, Jennifer Nedelsky took the time to sit
down and talk to me about my project, gently pushing me to exhume
the core of my argument. David Welch read several chapters several
times and offered his expertise and enthusiasm from start to finish.
David Welch and Melissa Williams opened their home and made me
feel as good as I possibly could when nothing was going my way.
Three distinguished IPE scholars made a big difference. Duncan
Snidal has offered advice and encouragement since I defended my the-
sis. In characteristic good-spirited fashion, he provided trenchant com-
ments on an early version of the manuscript, and welcomed revisions
to his model of hegemonic stability theory. Even though we had never
met, I sent Benjamin Cohen a paper that engaged with his work, and
he responded with unprecedented speed, delivering detailed challen-
ging comments. With the same attention to specifics, and tremendous
kindness, he then offered guidance on a subsequent paper. Likewise,
Joseph Grieco graciously agreed to chair an APSA panel when I con-
tacted him out of the blue. In his supportive, congenial way, he then
provided incisive comments on my paper and gave me excellent advice
on how to re-frame it. Robert Pahre also agreed to participate on
the same panel. His thorough criticism helped improve my paper and
another one as well. Other participants on the panel, Frank Grundig
and Hugh Ward, also offered insightful comments and support.
Vinod Aggarwal gave me a critical but sympathetic reading of an
early draft of the introductory chapter, which helped me advance my
project. Louis Pauly and Steven Bernstein delivered thoughtful com-
ments on the introductory chapter as well. Martin Osborne shared

xiii
xiv Acknowledgments

his reflections on a game-theoretic model. Mark Brawley gave me

extremely useful comments on a paper on the IPE of investment, and
invited me to talk on the rivalry between the dollar and the euro at
McGill. Csaba Nikolenyi offered useful pointers and a generous read-
ing of a paper on America’s external liability position. Carol Bertaut
sent me a dataset, and a co-authored paper, on cross-border secur-
ities, and took the time to answer a series of questions in very precise
terms. Cedric Tille looked at a rough draft on external imbalances
and offered valuable feedback including recommendations for further
reading. In response to e-mail, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas took the
time to clarify some of the criticism that economists at the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors had leveled against his work with Helene
Rey. I also owe a special thanks to three political economists at the
Graduate Institute of International Studies – Urs Luterbacher, Cedric
Dupont, and David Sylvan – where I did my PhD. My supervisor, Urs
Luterbacher, gave me what game-theoretic tools I have, and the atten-
tion and space I needed to develop my own ideas. His views on my
work, his encouragement, and his friendship have been invaluable.
Cedric Dupont shaped my way of thinking about international insti-
tutions and offered me an affiliation, a desk, and moral support at a
critical juncture of this book project. David Sylvan taught me to ques-
tion assumptions in the IPE literature, and gave me incredibly useful
advice on the very first proposal for this book project.
Several colleagues at the University of Toronto, in addition to the
ones already mentioned, offered advice and encouragement. Many
thanks to: David Cameron, Ran Hirschl, Matt Hoffman, Rebecca
Kingston, Nancy Kokaz, Neil Nevitte, and Grace Skogstad. I would
also like to acknowledge Robert Vipond, Ragnar Buchweitz, John
Miron, and John Coleman, for giving me the time and resources to
complete this project.
The editors at Cambridge University Press have been terrific. John
Haslam was quick on the mail and reassuring when I was impatient
for the reviews. Equally fast to turn things around, Carrie Parkinson
provided patient, gentle reminders for approaching deadlines, includ-
ing the ones that I missed. Rosina Di Marzo facilitated every step of
the production process, and Juliet Doyle did a great job editing the
text. I am also immeasurably grateful to the anonymous reviewers
who offered illuminating and constructive commentary.
Acknowledgments xv

I would also like to officially acknowledge previous publications.

Parts of chapters 4 and 5 appeared earlier, in different form, in the
Canadian Journal of Political Science, and parts of chapter 7 in
Cooperation & Conflict.
Finally, special thanks to my family, Eva-Carin, Claes, Sofia, and
Håkan, as well as Karl and other members of my extended family for
love and support, and to Isabelle and Marwa for feedback on these
chapters and impeccable friendship. This book is for you.
1 Introduction

Short on cash before his ship comes in, Antonio seals a bond with
Shylock to sustain the profligacy of loyal, dear Bassanio. Cunningly,
Shylock extends the credit with the proviso that, should Antonio fail
to honor the bond, Shylock is entitled to a pound of Antonio’s flesh.
Predictably, Antonio’s fortune is not homeward bound. With unmiti-
gated glee, Shylock claims the bond. But enforcing the bond proves
difficult. The rules of the game are interpreted in such a way that
Shylock must forego his bond unless he claims it in a way which spills
no Christian blood – a way which is clearly impossible. All ends well
except for Shylock. Antonio is richer by Shylock’s misfortune and
so, indirectly, is Bassanio, having used the loan to conquer princess
Portia, who is as good a catch as anyone ever was.
The main themes of Shakespeare’s play, The Merchant of Venice,
are familiar. Friendship juxtaposed to love, greed to sacrifice. But it is
literally a story of debt, and figuratively an account of the possibility
of taking advantage of debt when being in debt is as fluid and decep-
tive as the Seas of Venice.
In sixteenth-century Venice, Christian rules favored Christian bor-
rowers over Jewish lenders. Shylock tried to bring that order down by
funding the untenable spending habits of Bassanio, whom Antonio
felt obliged to protect. Much by way of commercial and financial
interactions has changed in the course of half a millennium yet there
are striking parallels to mull over. This book argues that American
liabilities are strategic because the prevailing order in trade, money,
and security makes it possible for the American people – the Bassanios
of this world – to enjoy a cornucopia of foreign goods. Alarmist bells
notwithstanding, if, by financing American consumption, China is
banking on the demise of American hegemony, it is betting on the
same terrible odds that sealed the fate of poor Shylock.
The United States has been the most powerful country in the world
for more than sixty years. Throughout this period, it has had the

1
2 Introduction

world’s largest economy and the world’s most important currency.

For most of this time, it had the world’s most powerful military as
well – and its military supremacy today is beyond question. We are
truly in an era of US hegemony, a unipolar moment, a Pax Americana,
which has enabled Americans to enjoy the highest standard of living
in human history.
Is this privileged position being undercut by serial trade deficits?
The pessimists are growing more numerous by the day. They see the
country’s spendthrift ways as a disaster waiting to happen. They warn
that the cavernous gap in merchandise trade, well above 6 percent in
2006, is an ominous sign of competitive slippage. In 2008, the liabil-
ities acquired to finance the shortfall in exports reached an amazing
29 percent of GDP. A falling dollar, military overstretch, the rise of
the euro, the rise of China, and progressively deeper integration in
East Asia are among the factors that many believe herald the immi-
nent decline of American hegemony.
In my view, the doomsayers are mistaken. I argue that American
hegemony is stable and sustainable. While the United States certainly
does face a number of challenges, an analysis of the linkages between
trade, money, and security shows that American power is robust.
This book is a story about why and how American hegemony
works, and what other states would have to do to emulate or, on other
grounds, thwart, America’s power base. As I will show, the United
States benefits from running persistent trade deficits as a result of its
special position in the international system. I will argue that any com-
parably situated country would choose to pursue the same cyclical
deficit policy as the one encouraged by the US government. A series
of size advantages cut across trade, money, and security: the size of
the American market, the role of the dollar, and American military
power interact to make a trade deficit policy rewarding and buffer the
United States from the extreme consequences that a sustained deficit
policy would otherwise have.
Based on new research in economics on valuation adjustments (i.e.,
capital and exchange rate gains), and data analysis of my own, this
study draws attention to the economic advantages for the United States
of having the key currency. In addition to benefits in the form of seignor-
age, the United States gains substantially from valuation adjustments,
reinforcing policy autonomy and the gains derived from the asymmetry
in the structure of borrowing and lending. I also lean on new economic
Introduction 3

research on valuation adjustments to supplement the conventional

view of why military preeminence is necessary for key currency sta-
tus. Military power has been seen as important in enforcing debt repay-
ments, but there is clearly a need to rethink the connection between
reserve status and military power in the present systemic context where
the reserve currency country has the world’s largest external liablities.
We have seen erroneous predictions of American decline before. In
the 1970s, the combination of high inflation, high interest rates, high
unemployment, the Vietnam War, political and military challenges
from China and the Soviet Union, and the economic rise of Japan led
to eerily similar forecasts. Pessimists then, as today, underestimated
the longevity of American power. The main reason the United States
has continued to occupy a unique place in the international system is
because a sufficient number of major and lesser powers have a strong
interest in maintaining America at the top of the hierarchy. To bring
America down would take a deliberate, coordinated strategy on the
part of others and this is simply not plausible. As much as the United
States benefits from the space it has carved out for itself in the current
world order, its ability to reap unequal gains will remain unless and
until allies start to incur heavy losses under American dominance.
Even that, by itself, will not be sufficient to sink American hegemony.
A strong alternative to American rule will have to come into view for
things to fundamentally change. At present, no credible alternative is
in sight. The United States is not invincible but its dominance is cur-
rently steady.
Those who are inclined to think that American hegemony will per-
sist – at least for a while – tend to dwell on the claim that the United
States is providing a range of public goods to the benefit of all at its
own expense. This is a chimera. The United States is self-interested,
not altruistic. The illusion of benevolence has meant that very little
attention has been given to uncovering the mechanism through which
the United States gains disproportionately from supplying a large
open market, the world’s reserve currency, and a military machine
capable of stoking or foiling deadly disputes. This book exposes the
mechanism through which the United States reaps unequal gains and
shows that the current world system, and the distribution of power
that supports it, has built-in stabilizers that strengthen American
power following bouts of decline. Although all dominant powers
must eventually decline, I will show that the downward progression
4 Introduction

need not be linear when mutually reinforcing tendencies across vari-

ous power dimensions are at play. Specifically, I will demonstrate how
the United States’ reserve currency status produces disproportionate
commercial gains; how commercial power gives added flexibility in
monetary affairs; and, finally, how military preponderance creates
advantages in both monetary and trade affairs.

The puzzle
This book grows out of my attempt to understand a particular puzzle
in international political economy, the ongoing American trade deficit.
In absolute terms, the American deficit, which in 2006 amounted to
$753 billion, is the largest ever.1 Net external liabilities also exploded,
starting in the middle of the 1990s, and peaked at $4.2 trillion in
2008. Even as a share of GDP, these figures (5.7 percent and 23 per-
cent respectively) are high in comparison with other industrialized
countries. Is it a coincidence that the country with the most potent
military force and the largest capital and consumer market is able
to get away with accumulating deficits and debt? If not, why is the
American experience a coup instead of the usual curse?
Large sustained trade deficits are usually seen as a liability and a
sign of weakness in an increasingly competitive international econ-
omy. When countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, South and Central
America run deficits for prolonged periods something of a national
emergency is proclaimed as private investors pick up and leave. In
order to be persuaded to stay, official investors – both governments
and international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF –
demand reform and attach different levels of conditionality to their
policy prescriptions. Caught in this bind, deficit countries are forced
to sacrifice significant policy flexibility to prevent massive capital out-
flow. Given the inherent tendency of all governments to maximize pol-
icy autonomy, developing countries often choose import-restricting
policies as a way of eschewing excessive deficits. Middle-rank traders,
consisting of super-developing countries such as China, Brazil, and
India on the one hand, and advanced economies such as Japan (and
until recently, the euro-zone) on the other, have looser constraints.
But they have for the most part reaped big benefits by prioritizing

1
BEA 2009a, BEA 2008a, BEA 2009b.
The argument 5

exports over imports, since it enables them to use world markets to

compensate for slack domestic demand or to expand their industrial
base and absorb excess labor.
If it is generally wise to shun a deficit policy, why has the single
most dominant state in the international system opted for policies
which have systematically provoked a shortfall between exports and
imports for twenty-seven of the thirty-seven years of the post-Bretton
Woods era? Answering this question requires an understanding of
how and why the United States enjoys a privileged position in the
modern international economic order.

The argument
In sketching my argument, I will show that the United States gains
both materially and in terms of policy autonomy from running per-
sistent deficits because of its multi-purpose power base. It gains eco-
nomically by absorbing more capital and goods from the rest of the
world and through capital and exchange rate gains on the international
investment position (IIP). 2 It also gains in terms of policy autonomy.
Because foreigners have a wide range of incentives to invest in dollar-
denominated assets (in the United States) and, when necessary, help
soft-land the economy, the United States can adjust imbalances over a
longer time horizon. The gain in policy flexibility means it can adjust
imbalances using its preferred policy instruments, and that its ‘pol-
icy error’ threshold is higher than it is for other countries. Therefore,
it can more easily avoid the kind of shock therapy that is normally
associated with a consistent pattern of trade deficits and high exter-
nal liabilities.
My claim is not merely that America has benefited from its hege-
monic position but that it has benefited disproportionately, and that
the system through which it benefits is sustainable. By disproportion-
ate I mean that it has received more than what it ‘pays’ for the public
goods it provides, and that it reaps a higher benefit than other states. I
argue that the United States reaps increasing returns in trade, money,
and security – in other words, that it gets more back than it puts in. In
the trade realm, it systematically absorbs more imports than it gives

2
The net international investment position (NIIP) is the difference between
American claims on foreigners and foreign claims on Americans.
6 Introduction

back to the world in the form of exports. In the monetary sphere, it

makes more money from its lending than it pays on its borrowing. In
the security domain, it is well known that the United States spends
more on security than all other states combined. Just how much mile-
age the United States gets on its military spending is not common
knowledge, however. At least part of the reason the United States has
been able to attract capital on a grand scale is that it provides a safe
investment environment, which is tied to a strong tradition of prop-
erty rights protection, and the ability to secure American territory
militarily. A portion of defense spending has also been used to protect
and expand foreign investments, and to protect allies. The economic
return on this stabilizing role has been huge in terms of allied support
for dollar adjustment.

Methodology and value added

In this book, I adopt the analytical framework from economics that
treats agents as rational actors seeking to achieve economic gains
and avoid economic loss. The primary agents in this case, however,
are states, not firms, and I am particularly interested in exploring
the logic of economic action for a state possessing attributes that the
United States has today, namely the largest domestic economy, the key
world currency, and the strongest military. I argue that these attributes
give the United States certain positional and structural advantages in
the international economic system, including advantages in shaping
the institutions of the international economic system, and that, as a
result, the United States gains disproportionately from international
economic institutions and interactions. This notion of disproportion-
ality will be assessed in precise theoretical and empirical terms.
To avoid misunderstanding, let me make three points clear right
away. First, I am not claiming that the United States is the only state
to gain from international economic activity. For reasons that will be
explored in more detail later, all states gain from cooperating in an
international economic system in which trade across state borders is
relatively free, in which there is a stable, abundant, and liquid cur-
rency that can be used for purposes of international exchange, and
in which relations between states are peaceful rather than violent.
These three goods interact. Even if trade is permitted, it will not take
place to any considerable extent unless there is a viable international
Methodology and value added 7

currency and relations between states are peaceful. The existence of

an international currency does not matter much unless there is a lot of
trade and the viability of such a currency is in various ways depend-
ent on military backing. Finally, peace and security have economic
benefits. So, the question is not whether all gain from international
cooperation but rather how the gains from economic cooperation
(and any costs associated with cooperation) are allocated among
various states. My claim is that the United States is able to get other
states to bear some of the costs that one would expect it (or any other
similarly situated state) to bear on its own, that it gains in ways that
others cannot, and that it is more able than other states to structure
the rules and institutions of international economic life to its advan-
tage. In sum, the international economy is a system of asymmetrical
cooperation in which the United States has an advantaged position
and enjoys disproportionate gains as a result. Some might see this as
a proposition so obvious as not to be worth stating, but I will show in
chapter 2 that it is not a view that has been embraced by the major-
ity of scholars in international relations and that even those who are
sympathetic to the view rarely spell out the precise ways in which the
United States enjoys a position of privilege or how it is able to achieve
disproportionate gains.
Second, the purpose of this book is not to criticize or praise the
United States for its policies. I seek merely to understand and explain,
or, more cautiously, to show the close fit between what a rational state
actor, seeking to achieve economic gain and avoid economic loss,
would do if positioned like the United States and what the United
States has actually done. The whole point of the underlying frame-
work is that any rational actor would pursue a similar course, so there
is no purchase within this framework for praise or blame. Instead,
the obvious question is why other states, which are presumably seek-
ing their own economic advantage as well, do not try to challenge
the positional advantages of the United States. I try to show that the
courses pursued by other states are also economically rational, given
the constraints they face and the obstacles in removing those con-
straints. Chapter 7, in particular, considers what major actors in Asia
and Europe would have to do to reduce or even take over the pos-
itional advantages enjoyed by the United States and why it is so dif-
ficult for them to do so, although they can make a little headway in
some areas, and where they can, they do.
8 Introduction

Finally, I want to emphasize that this is a book about international

political economy, not a book about all aspects of international rela-
tions. I am not claiming that states are only seeking economic gains
in their policies or that this would provide a good framework for
thinking about, say, international security issues. Although I do pay
attention to the ways in which the dominant military position of the
United States contributes to its positional advantage in the inter-
national economy and yields direct and indirect economic benefits, I
do not claim that the United States’ military policy is primarily driven
by the pursuit of economic advantage. This book does not attempt to
give a full account of the motivations for military expenditures, nor
am I claiming that all military expenditure is economically rational
in the sense that the economic benefits gained from those expendi-
tures always outweigh their costs. In the same vein, I do not view
national security as reducible to economic strength or foreign policy
as reducible to the pursuit of economic gain. In assuming that states
are rational economic actors in the sphere of international political
economy, I do not rule out that states sometimes pursue values in
their foreign policies, nor do I mean to suggest that international life
is reducible to international political economy.

Plan of the book

This book consists of seven chapters, apart from this introduction and
a conclusion. The next chapter (chapter 2) offers descriptive indicators
of America’s hegemonic position and places the argument in relation
to the literature on hegemony in international political economy.
Chapter 3 is conceptual. It models cooperation under hegemony
and shows that the hegemon is often in a good position to reap dis-
proportionate benefits from providing public goods as a result of its
ability to credibly threaten exclusion. Its ability to shift gains in its
favor is, however, variable and depends at least as much on the rela-
tive power gap between other Great Powers as on its own preponder-
ance. Paradoxically, the hegemon actually acquires a greater capacity
to shift gains in its favor as it declines.
Chapter 4 examines the sources of trade according to different
theories – Traditional (the Classical and Neo-Classical approach)
and New Trade theories. The analysis will be familiar to political
economists but I have included it for the benefit of readers not well
Plan of the book 9

versed in the economics of trade. I have left out class-based theor-

ies, such as Dependencia and World Systems theories because of their
uneasy fit with mainstream economic theory. Some of the critiques
voiced by these perspectives – for instance, the difficulty in rectifying
unequal gains from trade and the politicization of commercial inter-
actions – are, however, echoed in the analysis. The aim of chapter 4
is to demonstrate how firm and country size determine trade policies
and patterns, and to explain the significance of trade deficits. After
unpacking the trade deficit, relating it to other deficits (and external
liabilities), and emphasizing the danger associated with them, I argue
that they have been beneficial for the United States and even a source
of bargaining power, which has been used to advance American com-
mercial interests.
Chapter 5 explains the rationality of American hegemony, and
demonstrates how the United States benefits from serial trade deficits
and from having net external liabilities. I argue that American privil-
ege cuts across trade and monetary matters (currency and investment)
and look at the interactive effects between trade and monetary affairs.
The chapter provides a thorough examination of how the United
States’ special position in the monetary domain has produced com-
mercial advantages, and how commercial power has enhanced mon-
etary gains. For example, a strong dollar has subsidized American
imports while only minimally affecting American sales from foreign
locations, partially offsetting the negative impact on American export
performance. A weak dollar, on the other hand, has increased exports
from the United States with imports declining relatively slowly des-
pite weakening terms of trade. This is because foreign producers are
ready to lower their prices in order to compensate for the implicit tax
which a low dollar represents. This allows foreigners to maintain and
expand exports to the United States. I discuss the extent of the gains
that flow from the structure of America’s trade and investment links
with other countries, and in what measure these gains are general-
ized, rewarding other countries as well. At the end of the chapter, I
discuss to how this advantage might be exhausted in the future.
Chapter 6 relates military and economic power. According to pre-
vailing wisdom, the special currency country must also be the domin-
ant military power so that it can persuade countries to repay loans in
case they default. But if this rationale is correct, countries should not
be willing to lend extensively to the United States since in addition to
10 Introduction

having the world’s largest external liabilities, it is the world’s biggest

military power. The fact that military power cannot be used to col-
lect American debt does not preclude a connection between military,
monetary, and commercial power. I make a different argument about
how the United States has used military power to promote economic
interests. The claim is in four parts. First, military means were used to
keep the European Great Powers out of the western hemisphere in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As a result, American
lending, including the dollar, could be extended over a large area.
Second, widely regarded as safe, foreign investors have been willing
to pay a security premium to invest in the American market. Third,
the United States has intervened militarily for economic reasons,
both for narrow economic purposes, in support of American business
interests, and for broader economic goals in order to provide a stable
political context in which economic exchange can take place, and in
order to safeguard the current capitalist structure from Communist
encroachment. Fourth, and last, the United States is obliged by treaty
to defend roughly fifty countries. These interventions, whether to
push back aggressors, or for humanitarian reasons, have purchased
goodwill and provided Great Powers with an interest in preserving an
American-centered world order.
Chapter 7 examines two trends in world affairs that could prove
damaging to the United States. The rise of the euro and heightened
military cooperation in Europe on the one hand, and, on the other
hand, stronger commercial links in East Asia, which could create
viable alternatives to American power over the long term. In their
current form, however, neither development is likely to upset the sta-
tus quo because of internal rivalries, institutional deficiencies, and
dilemmas of sovereignty. For reasons explained in chapter 3, it is not
sufficient for the combined power base of the European Union and
East Asia to exceed that of the United States. To create an alternative
to American power, a cohesive entity, whether in the form of a single
state or a cooperative effort, must alone command greater resources
than the United States. Barring this, the only other trigger for change
is for Great Powers to experience substantial and painful loss as a
result of American policies, provoking them to openly defy American
hegemony. More exploitative policies on the part of the American
government could change the calculus of strategic interaction.
2 The forms and consequences of
­hegemonic leadership

Everyone knows that the United States is special but there is little
agreement as to whether being special has been a net positive for the
United States and even less agreement about what it has meant for
the world. The default position is to view America as unique because,
unlike Great Powers in the past, it has used its dominance to every-
one’s benefit.1 The claim is not simply that there are positive external-
ities as a result of the hegemon’s supply of public goods but that most
of the benefits accrue to other states who, even though they do not
pay for public goods, cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits
associated with them. 2 This is known as hegemonic stability theory,
and is a belief in the benevelont hegemon. While this approach has
been challenged in the past under the headings coercive, malevolent,
and exploitative hegemony, none of these labels fits easily with the
incentives behind American hegemony or its consequences. Although
the literature is replete with objections to the characterization of the
United States as a benevolent hegemon, I am not aware of any other
work that gives a theoretically and empirically grounded account of
precisely how the United States reaps disproportionate benefits across
multiple issue areas.3
In this book, I understand American hegemony as being broadly
beneficial and especially beneficial for the United States. To be sure,
my claim is not that the United States comes out ahead in every
imaginable situation but that it benefits disproportionately most of
the time, and as a direct result of structural advantages. The challenge
for me is to devise appropriate measures for disproportionality and to
uncover the mechanism through which the United States promotes its
interests. While the United States has declined relative to some states,
and it is inevitable that it will one day lose its dominant position, its

1
Keohane 1984; Kindleberger 1981. 2 Olson 1965.
3
For two classics, see Russett 1985 and Strange 1987.

11
12 The forms and consequences of hegemonic leadership

ability to extract unequal gains implies that the shape of its power
curve is a lot more irregular than the debate about its superpower
status suggests.
I start this chapter with a discussion of the standard benevolent
hegemon thesis and contrast it with other varieties of hegemonic lead-
ership – the coercive and exploitative strands of hegemony – and point
to the problems these approaches have in capturing essential features
of American hegemony. As a second and related point, I will argue
that these models of hegemony do not give a convincing account of
the repercussions of American leadership in the world system. My goal
in this book is to dispel the idea that other states have had more to
gain from American hegemony than America itself. To the contrary,
I will show that the United States has gained relative to other states,
and that these gains are due to its special position within the inter-
national system across three key issue-areas – trade, monetary rela-
tions, and security affairs – as well as the interactive effects between
these. To make this point, I begin the section on the consequences
of American hegemony by sketching a rough portrait of the United
States’ basic strategy within these domains. The common enabling
factor across different spheres is size. A number of hegemonic indica-
tors are presented in order to demonstrate that the United States is
uniquely large in the security and economic arena. These descriptive
statistics, tables, and graphs cover a period ranging from a quarter
of a century to nearly half a century, and offer a clear view of how
the United States’ hegemonic position has evolved. The subsequent
section explores different ways to think about disproportionality and
highlights some drawbacks with certain intuitive measures.

The forms of hegemonic leadership

Following the seminal work of Charles Kindleberger, international
relations scholars have largely accepted the idea that the United States
is a benevolent hegemon that provides public goods.4 Such goods
involve non-rival benefits which states cannot be prevented from
enjoying. This notion has had a profound impact on how we con-
ceive the relationship between the United States and other countries.
Because states gain whether or not they contribute to international

4
Kindleberger 1973, 1986a.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
vituperatione et calumnia p. 260. Pro membranarum lectione
χράνειον substitui κρανίον.) 38. Προδότου τινὸς χαχῶς αὐτὸν
λέγοντος, ἔφη " Χαίρω ἐχθρός σου γενόμενος" σὺ γὰρ οὐ τοὺς
ἐχθρούς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς φίλους κακῶς ποιεῖς. (Antonius et Maximus
Serm. de vitup. et cal. p. 260.) Διογένης πρὸς τὸν λοιδορούμενον
αὐτῷ" Ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε cnjus finis non foret magnanimitas et animi robur,
non autem corporis vires. 27. Diegenes homines avaros hydropicis
comparabat : illos enim argento plenos, hos autem aqua refertos
plus desiderare, idque utrosque cum sua pernicie. Namque animi
affectiones ipsis eo magis intendi, quo magis votorum suorum
compofes fierent. 28. Diogenes Cynicus conspicatus quendam qui se
divitém anum amare simularet : Ad. Aanc , inquit , non oculum, sed
dentem adjecit. 29. Diogenes magna et multa simul accipientes
perpauperes appeilabat. 30. Diogenes interrogatus, quaenam essent
immanissimoe belluze, respondit : In montibus ursi et leones , in
civitatibus vero publicani et delatores. 31. Diogenes Cynicus
philosophus rogatus a quodam, cur aurum palleret, respondit : quia
insidiatores multos habet. 32. Reprehensionem Diogenes alienum
bonum esse dicebat. 33. Diogenes ajebat : Canes quidem cateri
inimicos mordent : ego vero amicos , ut incolumes servem. 34.
Diogenes interrogabat Platonem , num Leges scriberet. Aunuebat
ille. Quid ita? scripsistine Rempublicam? Sane. Quid igitur? ea
respublica legibus non erat. temperata? Erat. Quid igitur te denuo
Leges scribere attinuit? 35. Rectene de Platone sic pronuntiaverit
Diogenes : Quid nobis prodest vir, qui diu jam philosophatus nemini
molestiam attulit ? aliorum esto judicium. Fortasse existimabat
philosophi orationem debere ea dulcedine esse temperatam , quae
exuleeratos morderet. 36. Sanare mortuum et senem monere, idem
est. 37. Malediclis a calvo. vexatus : Tibi quidem, inquit, injuriam non
facio, capillos autem laudo tuos qui malum caput fugientes
defluxerint. 38. Quum a proditore contumeliis laceraretur : Gaudeo,
inquit, quod tecum inimicitiam. suscepi; tu enim non inimicis, sed
amicis malum affers. 39. Diozenes conviciatori cuidam : Non magis,
inquit,
 DIOGENIS FRAGMENTA. ΟΥ̓́ , v , δὶ Ὁ , Y M ΔῈ τῶν ἐμοί,
ἔφη, πιστεύει τις εὐφημοῦντι σέ, οὔτε σοὶ ἐμὲ βλασφημοῦντι.
(Antonius et Maximus Serm. de obloquentibus p. 262.) 40. Διογένης
ἄσωτον ἥτει μνᾶν" τ' δια τί τοὺς ἄλλους τριώδολα, ἐμὲ δὲ μνᾶν
αἰτεῖς; ἔφη" Παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἐλπίζω mW λαθεῖν, παρὰ δὲ σοῦ
οὐχέτι. (Stobzeus Eloril. XV, 9 Διογένους. Idem narrant Diogenes
Laertius lib. VI, 67 et Antonius Melissa Serm. de pro odigalitate p.
264 ed. Wechel.) AT. ᾿Αλέξανδρος ὃ βασιλεὺς πληρώσας ποτὲ
ὀστέων πἰγέτα; ἔπεμψε Διογένει τῷ Κυνικῷ φιλοσόφῳ. Ὃ δὲ λαδὼν
εἶπεν: Κυνιχὸν μὲν τὸ βρῶμα, οὐ βασιλιχὸν δὲ τὸ δῶρον. (Antonius
et Maximus de beneficentia p. 277. Rescripsi Διογένει pro
membranarum lectione Διογένη.) 42. Ὃ αὐτὸς εἶπε εν, τῆς αὐτῆς
ἅμαρτ διδόναι οἷς μὴ δεῖ, xal τὸ μὴ διδόναι οἷς (Antonius et Maximus
de beneficentia, p. 977.) 43. Διογένης ἐρωτηθεὶς ómó τινος, διὰ τίνα
αἰτίαν οἵ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς μὲν προσαιτοῦσι διδόασι, τοῖς δὲ
φιλοσοφοῦσιν οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεν- Ὅτι χωλοὶ! μὲν χαὶ τυφλοὶ ἴσως
ἐλπίζουσι γενέσθαι, φιλόσοφοι δὲ οὔ, (Antonius et Maximus de
beneficentia p. 277. Idem dictum refert Diogenes Laertius lib. VI,
56.) 44. Διογένης £v συμποσίῳ τινί, πολλοῦ αὐτῷ οἴνου δεδομένου,
τοῦτο ᾿Επεὶ δέ τι govzo* "E&v γὰρ ἔφη, ἐχπίω, ἀπόλλυται, ἀλλὰ 8, ^
οὐ δὲ etm ὄντος, , m. ίας εἰναι τὸ "p δεῖ Ar CESAR cv ESEJ SEV, νες
αὐτὸν εὐξυ.GO. ΕἸ ΄ EN αὐτὸν, οὐ μονῶν αὐτὸς κάμε
προσαπόλλυσι. 303 (Antonius et Maximus Serm. de ebrietate p. 3o».
Scripsi δεδομένου ; codd. διδομένου.) Διογένης ἔφη, τῶν ἀνθρώπων
ἐνίους τὰ δέοντα λέγοντας ἑαυτῶν οὐχ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς
λύρας χαλὸν φθεγγομένας οὐχ αἰσθάνεσθαι. (Stobzeus Floril. XXIII,
10. Idem apophthegma citant etiam. Antonius et Maximus Serm.
περὶ φιλαυτίας Ῥᾶβ. 349.) ἐρωτηθεὶ ὶς τίνες ἀταράχως ζῶσιν, εἷ-πεν"
Οἱ μηδὲν ἑχυτοῖς ἄτοπον συνειδότες. (Stobeus Floril. XXIV, 13
Σωχράτους. Sed scribendum videtur Διογένους, quoniam hoc dictum
cum ea que sequitur apud Stobzum sententia τίς γὰρ ἂν χτλ.
cohzret.) λ τι" ^ EN Cra 47. I s γὰρ ἂν ἧττον φοθοῖτό τι ἢ θαρσοίη
μάλιστα, ἢ ὅστις αὑτῷ μιηδὲν συνειδείη χαχόν:; (Stobzus Floril. XXIV,
14 Διογένους.) Ὃ Διογένης ἔλεγε, τὴν Μήδειαν σοφήν, ἀλλ᾽ οὗ
φαρμακίδα, γενέσθαι. Λαμόάνουσαν γὰρ μαλαχοὺς ἀνθρώπους x«i τὰ
σώματα διεφθαρμένους ὑπὸ τρυφῆς, ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις xal τοῖς
πυριατηρίοις διαπονεῖν xol ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν χαὶ σφριγῶντας" ὅθεν
περὶ αὐτῆς $v7vat τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι τὰ κρέα ἕψουσα νέους ἐποίει.
(Stobaeus Floril. XXIX, 95. Διογένους. Posui cum Meinekio
πυριατηρίοις; ets πειρατηρίοις.) 49. Διογέ ἕνης πρὸς τὸν φιλόσοφον
εἰναι φήσαντα, ἐρωτῶντα δὲ ἐριστιχῶς" Καχόδαιμον, ἔφη, τὸ
βέλτιστον τῶν ἕν τῷ βίῳ τοῦ φιλοσόφου λυμαινόμενος τῷ λόγῳ 46.
Σωχράτης φιλοσοφεῖν φής. (Stobzus Floril. XXXIII, 14.) 50. Τῶν
συνόντων τις μειραχίσχων Διογένε εἰν ἔρωτώμενος ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ,
ἐσιώπα. ὋὉ δὲ Pon: Οὐχ οἴει τοῦ mihi te. laudanti credent homines,
quam tibi me calumnianti. 40. Diogenes a decoctore minam petebat;
a quo quum interrogaretur, cur cceteros triobola posceret, ipsum
autem minam, respondit : A4 caferis rursus me accepturum spero,
abs te vero non amplius. 41. Alexander, Macedonum rex, discum
ossibus refertur aliquando Diogeni Cynico misif. Quem ubi accepit
Dioges: Est quidem, inquit, cibus caninus, sed. donum minime
regium. 4?. Idem (Diogenes) dixit, qui indignis daret, eum tam esse
in vitio quam qui dignis non daret. 43. Diogenes a quodam rogatus,
quam ob causam liomines pecuniam mendicis darent, philosophis
verc minime largirentur : Quia suspicantur, inquit, fore uf claudi
fortasse ac caci fiant, philosophi autem. nequaquam. 44. Diogenes in
convivio aliquo, postquam ei multum vini datum est , id effudit.
Quum vero quidam eum reprehenderent : Si, inquit, Aoc ebibero,
non solum ipsum perit , sed me quoque simul perdit. 45. Diogenes
ait, homines nonnullos opportuna loquentes sibi non auscultare,
sicut lyra? bene sonantes sonos suos non perciperent. 46. Socrates
rogatus , quinam tranquille viverent : Z/i, inquit, qui nullius delicti
sibi conscii sunt. 47. Quis enim minus metuat aliquid vel majorem
fiduciam prz se ferat, quam qui nullius sceleris sibi conscius est? 48.
Diogenes dicebat, Medeam sapientem fuisse, non veneficam. Quum
enim molles nacta esset homines, qui corpora luxu corrupta
haberent, exercitationibus eam et sudationibus ita excoluisse istos,
ut membris vigor et robur juvenile rediret : indeque famam exiisse,
illam humanas carnes coquendo quosdam juvenes reddidisse. 49.
Diogenes cuidam philosophum se profitenti , pugnaciter autem
interroganti, O oiser, inquit, qui id. quod in philosophi vita optimum
est disceptatione corrumpens philosophari te contendas. 50.
Adolescens quidam ex illis qui cum Diogene versabantur,
interrogatus ab eo, tacebat. Tum Diogenes : Non
 304 αὐτοῦ εἶναι εἰδέναι τε ἃ λεχτέον, xol πότε, σιωπητέον
καὶ πρὸς τίνα; (Stobzus Floril. XXXIV, χρειῶν. Recepi Meinekii
conjecturam μειραχίσχων, codd. μειραχίων.) Διογένης ἤτησέ χήπου
ἰσχάδων τρεῖς " στειλεν, Οὕτως, μυρία. (Stobzeus Floril. XXXVI, 21.
Διογένους. Addidi ἕν ex Jacobsii conjectura. At Diogenes Laertius lib.
VI, 26 hoc modo rem refert : Διογένης οἶνόν ποτε ἥτησεν αὐτόν
(Πλάτωνα), τότε δὲ xot ἰσχἄδας " , ce E J 3 c OR ΩΣ τς τυ πὶ 1 :
χεράμιον ὅλον ἔπεμψεν αὐτῷ. Kat ὃς d φησίν, 16 ix τῶν Δίωνος ποτε
Πλάτωνα τῶν ἐχ τοῦ e τ A ὡς δ᾽ ἐχεῖνος μέδιμνον ἀπέἔφη, xat
ἀποχρίνει ἕν ἐρωτηθεις ἂν Seu δύο xai δύο πόσα X5 Οὕτως οὔτε
πρὸς τὰ αἰτούμενα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτώμενα ἀποχρίνη. ραντολόγον.)
Διογένης ] βασιλίσσας - πολλοὺς γὰρ τωσι. (Stobaus Flóril. LXV, 15.)
53. Διογένης θεασάμενος μειράκιον εὔμορφον χαὶ διὰ τοῦτο
φιλούμενον € ἔφη" Σπούδ δασον, μειράχιον, τοὺς τοῦ σώματος ἐ
ἐρᾶστ τὰς εἰς τὴν Ψυχὴν μεταγαγεῖν. (Antonius et Maximus Serm. de
pulchritudine p. 566. Sed Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 58 ita :
Ὁεασάμενος μειράκιον φιλοσοφοῦν" Εὖγε, ἜΞΩ: ὅτι MN 61006 ,
οὔτε E Ξ ᾿Ἔσχωψε δὴ ὡς ἀπετοὺς τοῦ σώματος ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς
ψυχῆς κάλλος μετάγεις.) 54. Τοὺς ἀλαξάστροις ^ εὐειδεῖς xol
ἀπαιδεύτους ὁμοίους ἔφη εἶναι ἔχουσιν ὄξος. (Antonius et Maximus
Serm. de pulchritudine p. 566.) δ, Διογένης ἀποδράντος τοῦ οἰκέτου
οὐχ ἐφρόντιζε, δεινὸν εἶναι λέγων, εἰ Διογένης μὲν χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ζῆν
οὐ δύναται, αὐτοῦ δ᾽ ἐχεῖνος χωρὶς δύναται. (Βιτοθλασιιβ. Floril.
UXH, 47 Διογένους. Diogenes pulas cjusdem esse, et qux dicenda
sint. scire, et quando , et qua tacenda sint, et apud quem ? 51.
Diogenes quondam a Platone tres ex ejus horlo caricas peliit; quum
aulem ille medimnum ipsi misisset : Iia. etiam, inquit, unwm
interrogatus respondes sexcenta. 52. Diogenes formosas meretrices
reginas appellabat : multos enim facere quae przeciperent. 53.
Diogenes conspicatus adolescentem pulchritudine insignem, qui
idcirco amaretur : O0 adolescens, inquit, da operam , ut corporis
amatores ad animum traducas. 54. Speciosos et eosdem indoctos
alabastris acetum conüinentibus similes esse ajebat. 55. Diogenes,
quum servus aufugisset, minime de ea re sollicitus erat, absurdum
esse dicens, se quidem sine CYNICORUM FRAGMENTA. xai τίνα ]
Laertius lib. VI, 55 : * ^ πρὸς τοὺς συμδουλεύοντας τὸν AL CIA E rA
REORUM, ἤρθη e ποῦραντα αὐτοῦ δοῦλον ζητεῖν" "Γελοῖον, ἔφη, εἰ
Ν] ἄνης μὲν γωρὶς Διογένους ζῇ, Διογένης δὲ χωρὶς Mávou οὐ
δύναται. Elianus var. hist. lib. XII, cap. 28 : Διογέ vg ἡνίχα ἀπέλιπε
τὴν πατρίδα, τς αὐτοῦ τῶν οἰχετῶν ἠχολούθει, ὄνομα Μάνης, ὃς οὐ
φέρων τὴν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ διατριδὴν ἃ ἀπέδρα. Προτρεπόντι τῶν δέ
τινων ζητεῖν αὐτόν, ἔφη: Οὐχ αἰσχρόν, ΜΙ] άνην μὲν μὴ δεῖσθαι , , ,
T Διογένους, Διογένην δὲ Mávows; Οὗτος δὲ 6 οἰχέτης εἰς Δελφοὺς
ἀλώμενος ὑπὸ χυνῶν διεσπάσθη, τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ δεσπότου δίκας
ἐχτίσας, ἀνθ᾽ ὧν ἀπέδρασεν.) 56. Διογένης χοινολοῚ γουμένας
γυναῖχας θεασάμενος ἔφη: Ἀ σπὶς παρ᾽ ἐχίδνης φάρμαχον δανείζεται.
(Antonius et Maximus Serm, de mulieribus improbis p. 509.) 57.
Z'exos , ὅστις εὐτύχησεν ἐν τέχνοις, χαὶ μὴ ᾿πισήυοις συμφοραῖς
ὠδύρετο. (Stobzus Floril. LXXV,. 10. Διογένους, al. Διχαιογένους.
Diogeni tragico attribuit hos versus F. G. Wagner Fragm. "Tragic. p.
105 ed. Paris., ratus ab eo Euripidis Orest. vs. 535 seq. imitando
effingi. Alii locum. Euripidis esse voluerunt, Vid. Nauck. Fragm.
Tragic. p. 602.) B8. Διογένης ἐρωτηθεὶς πῶς δεῖ πατέρας χαὶ υἱοὺς
ἀλλήλοις προσφέρεσθαι, ἔφησεν, εἰ μὴ περιμένοιεν ὕπ᾽ ἀλλήλων,
ἀλλὰ διδόντες φθάνοιεν. ᾿Ἐπιειχῶς δ᾽ ὃ πατὴρ διὰ τὸ
προευεργετηχέναι, εἰ μὴ 3 , ΄ ». NUT ex 8.5 » Xi» EU πασγοι,
τάχεως ἄχθεται ὃ δὲ Utog EV TOU χα! οὐχ αἰτηθῆναι ἀξιοῖ αἰτεῖν
[Stobeus Floril. ΧΧΧΠΙ, 23 Διογένους. Scripsi cum Meinekio ἔφησεν,
codd. φησίν.) 59. Διογένης ἐρωτηθείς, τί γῇ βαρύτερον βαστάζει:
ἔφη: Ἄνθρωπον ἀπαίδευτον. (Antonius et Maximus de eruditione et
pirilosophia p. 706.) 60. Ἀστρολόγου δέ τινος κατ᾽ ἀγορὰν
ἐπιδειχνύντος servo vivere non posse, illum autem posse sine
Diogene. 56. Diogenes conspicatus mulieres inter se colloquentes :
Aspis, inquit, a vipera venenum mutuatur. 57. Beatus ille prole qui
felix fuit, nullove certe indoluit insigni malo. 58. Diogenes
interrogatus , quales mutuo patres et filios exhibere se oporteret,
respondit, bene eos esse facturos, si illa quie requiruntur przestando
petitiones invicem praevenirent. Merito autem pater, ut prior
beneficiorum auctor, nisi vicissim accipiat, in iram praeceps est ; at
filius insolentius se effert, nec patrem orare dignatur. 59. Diogenes
interrogatus, quod onus terra gravissimum suslineret , respondit :
Hominem indoctum. 60. Quum astrologus quidam in foro stellas in
tabella
 : DIOGENIS FRAGMENTA. ἔν τινι πιναχίῳ καταγράφους
τοὺς ἀστέρας, xol φάσχοντος,, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ πλανώμενοι τῶν
ἀστέρων, ἐπαχούσας - Μὴ ψεύδου, εἶπεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε" οὐ γὰρ οὗτοί
εἶσιν oi πλανώμενοι, ἀλλὰ οὗτοι, δείξας αὐτῷ τοὺς
παραχαθεζομένους. (Stobzus Floril. LXXX, 6.) 61. Διογένης,
πυνθανομένου τινός, τίνες τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐγενέστατοι" Οἱ
χαταφρονοῦντες, εἶπε, πλούτου, δόξης, ἥδονῆς, ζωῆς, τῶν δὲ
ἐναντίων ὑπεράνω ὄντες, πενίας, ἀδοξίας, πόνου. θανάτου. (Stobzus
Floril. LXXXVI , 19 Διογένους.) 05. Διογένης ἰδὼν τοὺς Ἀναξιμένους
οἰχέτας πολλὰ σχεύη περιφέροντας, ἤρετο, τί πόντων, Ἀναξιμένους:
Οὐχ αἰδεῖταῖ, φησί, ταῦτα ἔχων ἅπαντα, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν μὴ ἔχων;
(Maximus Serm. de divitiis et paupertate p. 758.) Διογένης ἔλεγε,
μήτε ἐν πόλει πλουσίᾳ μήτε ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἀρετὴν οἰχεῖν δύνασθαι.
(Stobaus Floril. ΧΟΠῚ, 35 Διογένους.) 6i. Διογένην τὴν πενίαν
αὐτοδίδαχτον ἔφη εἶναι ἐπιχούρημα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν: ἃ γὰρ ἐχείνην
πείθειν τοῖς λόγοις πειρᾶσθαι, ταῦτ᾽ ἐν ἔργοις τὴν πενίαν ἀναγχάζειν.
pus Floril. XCV, 1x Διογένους.) - Διογένης, ὀνειδίσαντος αὐτῷ τινος
πενίαν μοχϑηραῦ, ἔ ἔφη: Διὰ μὲν πενίαν οὐδένα πώποτε
στρεδλούμένον εἰδον, διὰ δὲ κακίαν πολλούς. (ϑιοιθαειιβ Floril. XCV,
12 τοῦ αὐτοῦ.) 66. Διυγένης τὴν πενίαν ἔλεγεν αὐτοδίδαχ ἀρετήν. -
m 1 32 voc: ταῦτα! "τῶν δὲ εἰτον εἰναι aliqua depictas ostenderet
diceretque : En stell; errantes, :| audiens Diogenes : Ne mentire,
inquit, sodes. Stella enim non errant , sed. isti, monstratis qui
assidebant. 61. Diogenes sciscitante quodam, qui nobilissimi
homines essent : ConZemtores , inquit, opum , glorix, voluptatiset
vitz ; contrariis autem, paupertate, infamia, labore et morte majores.
62. Diogenes Anaximenis servos conspicatus multa vasa
circumferentes , cujus ea essent, quiesivit. Quum autem illi
Anaximenis esse respondissent : Ecquid pudet eum, inquit, Ac omnia
habere, quum se ipsum non habeat ? 63. Diogenes dicebat, neque in
civitate opulenta neque in domo locum virtuli esse posse. 64.
Diogenes paupertatem nativum ad philosophiam presidium esse ait;
quae enim philosophia verbis persua- | dere conatur, ea
paupertatem ipsis rebus cogere. 65. Diogenes, quum homo
improbus paupertatem i ipsi exprobraret , respondit : Atqui propter
paupertatem ego neminem unquam torqueri vidi, propter malitiam |
vero multos. Pu. Gne. n 305 (Stobaeus Floril. XCV, 19 Διογένους.) 67.
Διογένης, ὀνειδίζοντος αὐτῷ τινος πενίαν: Καχόδαιμον, εἶπεν, οὐδένα
ποτὲ τυραννοῦντα διὰ πενίαν ἑώραχα, διὰ δὲ UT τοὺς πάντας. n
(Stobaus Floril. XCVII, 26 Διογένους.) 68. * Q θνητὸν ἀνδρῶν xai
ταλαίπωρον γένος, ὡς οὐδέν ἐσμεν πλὴν σχιαῖς ἐοιχότες, βάρος
περισσὸν γῆς ἀναστρωφώμενοι. ( Antonius et Maximus Serm. de vitz
inzqualitate 2 807.) 69. Σωχράτης ἐρωτηθείς, τίνες εὐδαίμονες,
εἶπεν" Οἷς xol φρένες ἀγαθαὶ xat λόγος πρόσεστιν. (Stobaeus Floril.
CHI, 19 τοῦ αὐτοῦ i. e. Σωχράτους. Sed apertum est hanc
sententiam cum sequenti, quam Stobzus Diogeni tribuit, coh:erere.)
70. Εὐδαιμονία γὰρ μία ἐστὶ τὸ εὐφραίνεσθαι cuvεχῶς, χαὶ μηδέποτε
λυπεῖσθαι, ἐν ὁποίῳ δὴ ἂν τόπῳ ἢ χαιρῷ ὑπάρχη τις. (Stobaeus
Floril. CIH, 20 Διογένους. Posui cuvεχῶς, codd. ἀληθινῶς.) 7ι.
Εὐδαιμονίαν γὰρ ταύτην εἶναί φαμεν ἀληθινὴν τὸ τὴν διάνοιαν "xol
τὴν ψυχὴν ἀεὶ ἐν ἥσυχίᾳ xal ἱλαρότητι διατρίδειν. (Stobaeus Floril.
CHI, 21 τοῦ αὐτοῦ.) 72. Διογένης περιπεσὼν δ᾽ αὖ τισι συμπτώμασιν
ἔλεγεν" Εὖγε, ὦ τύχη, ὅτι Eon ἀῤῥένως προέστηχας. "Ev δὲ τοῖς
τοιούτοις καιροῖς χαὶ τερετίζων ἀνεφώνει. (Stobaeus Foril. CVIIE, 7x
Διογένους. Reposui ————— 8 τοὺ ον 66. Diogenes paupertatem
virtutem nativam esse dicebat. 67. Diogenes, quum paupertas ipsi a
quodam objiceretur : Miser, inquit; ego neminem unquam ob pauper
tatem regnare vidi, sed cunctos ob divitias. 68. O mortale et
&erumnosum hominum genus, quam nihil sumus nisi umbris similes,
lanquam terrz pondus inutile vagantes, 69. Diogenes interrogatus,
quinam essent felices , respondit : Illi in quibus bona mens et ratio
inest. 70. Unica enim felicitas versatur in eo, ut semper lzetemur
neque unquam moerore, urgeamur, quocunque loco ac lempore
simus. 71. Namque hanc felicitatem veram esse dicimus, quae lalis
sit, ut mens et animus perpetuo non magis tranquillitati quam
hilaritati indulgeant. 72. Diogenes rursus quum in calamitates
quasdam incidisset, ait: Bene facis, o fortuna, quod viriliter mihi
patrocinata es. Idem in hujusmodi casibus efiam clara voce
cantitabat. 30
 - CYNICORUM 806 cum Meinekio περιπεσὼν δ᾽ αὖ τισι.
Vulgo περιπεν ἕν τισι vel δ᾽ ἂν τισι.) 73. Διογένης ἰδὼν γραῦν
χαλλωπιζομένην, εἶπεν" Εἰ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας, πεπλάνησαι, εἰ δὲ
πρὸς τοὺς νεχρούς, μὴ βράδυνε. ( Antonius Serm. de senibus
inhonestis et imprudentibus p. 875.) 74. Διογένης ὃ Kuvixóc,
ὀδυρομένου τινός, ἐπειδὴ ξένης ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν, εἰπεν" Τί ὀδύρη, ὦ
μάταιε: 7, ^ e e NS € , M , Ju ^ » πανταχόθεν γὰρ fj ὁδὸς ἣ αὐτὴ εἰς
“Ἄδου. (Antonius et Maximus Serm, p. 878.) 75. Διογένης, εἰπόντος
τινός. Χαλεπόν ἐστι τὸ ζῆν" 5. Διογένης; εἰπόντος τινός, Χαλ στι τὸ
ζῇ Οὔχ, εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ χαχῶς ζῆν. (Stobzus Floril. CXXI, 26
Διογένους.) 76. Ἔλεγεν ὃ Διογένης, ὅτι ἂν μὲν χύνες αὐτὸν “: ν ͵ c
xA b MM Ὁ σπαράξωσιν, Ὑρχανία ἔσται ἣ ταφή" ἂν δὲ γῦπες e
DYSON EN ^Y NS E CUPEN, ἅπτωνται, ἸΙνδική" ἂν δὲ υηδεὶς
προσέλθῃ, ὃ χρόνος χαλὴν ποιήσει τὴν ταφὴν διὰ τῶν
πολυτελεστάτων, FREI ET de morte ε ἡλίου xai ὄμδρου. (Stobzus
Floril. CXXIIL, 11 Διογένους, Quum Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhon. Hypot.
ΠῚ, 227 pag. 185 ed. Fabr. scribàt mortuorum cadavera quosdam
Indorum vulturibus inhumata projecisse, facile erat, locum
corruptum corrigere. Sexti verba sunt : Ὑρχανοὶ δὲ χυσὶν αὐτοὺς
ἐχτίe θενται βοράν, ᾿Ινδῶν δὲ ἔνιοι γυψίν. Similiter de Persis
Herodotus lib. I cap. 140 : τάδε μέντοι ὡς χρυπτόμενα λέγεται xat
οὐ σαφηνέως περὶ coU. ἀποθα, € , , , 3 m , [4 νόντος, ὡς οὐ
πρότερον θάπτεται ἀνδρὸς Πέρσεω ὃ , M ^ € ἋΣ ΡΝ fh b! ^ ΄ - ,
νέχυς πρὶν ἂν ὑπ᾽ ὄρνιθος ἢ χυνὸς £)xuc07. Μαγους μὲν γὰρ
ἀτρεκέως οἶδα ταῦτα ποιέοντας. Itaque pro membranarum lectione
ἁπτέωνται reposui ἂν δὲ wltima autem 6 χούνος χαλλίω ER ER UNS)
ἂν δὲ γῦπες, ἁπτέον vel t 5 SR, γῦπες ἅπτωνται, Ivo, M M ^N τὴν
ταφὴν διὰ τῶν FRAGMENTA. πολυτελεστάτων, ἡλίου καὶ ὄμόρου"
mutavi in ὃ χρόνος χαλὴν ποιήσει τὴν ταφὴν διὰ τῶν
πολυτελεστάτων, ἡλίου xa Op. oov. ) 77. Διογένης τοὺς ῥήτορας τὰ
δίχαια μὲν ἔφη ἐσπουδακέναι λέγειν, πράττειν δὲ οὐδαμῶς. (Antonius
et Maximus Serm. de doctrina et litteris p. 933.) 78. Διογένης ἔφη
νομίζειν δρᾶν τὴν Τύχην ἐφορυῶσαν αὐτῷ xai λέγουσαν: Τοῦτον δ᾽
οὐ δύναμαι βαλέειν χύνα λυσσητῆρα. (Stobzus Eclog. lib. II cap. 7,
21 Διογένους, pag. 348 ed. Heeren. [ pag. 98 ed. Meinek.] Kescripsi
ἐφορμῶσαν αὐτῷ pro eo. quod in codicibus legitur ἐνορῶσαν αὐτῷ.
Ceterum Homeri locus est Iliad. lib. VIIT, 299.) 79. Δεινὸς ἦν
χατασοδαρεύσασθαι τῶν ἄλλων, xal τὴν μὲν Εὐχλείδου σχολὴν ἔλεγε
χολήν, τὴν δὲ Πλάτῶνος διατριδὴν κατατριόήν, τοὺς δὲ Διονυσιαχοὺς
ἀγῶνας μεγάλα θαύματα μώροις ἔλεγε" χαὶ τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς ὄχλου
διαχόνους. ( Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 24.) 80. Ἔλεγεν, ὡς ὅτε μὲν
ἴδοι χυδερνήτας Ev τῷ βίῳ, xul ἰατροὺς xai φιλοσόφους,
συνετώτατον τῶν ζῴων πάλιν τοὺς ὄνειροχρίτας χαὶ μάντεις χαὶ τοὺς
προσέχοντας τούτοις, ἢ τοὺς ἐπὶ δόξῃ καὶ πλούτῳ πεφυσημένους ,
οὐδὲν ματαιότερον νομίζειν ἀνθρώπου. (Diogenes Laertius lib. VI,
24. Scripsi συνετώτατον τῶν ζῴων νομίζειν εἶναι, codd. συνετώτατον
τῶν ζῴων εἶναι.) sr. Πλάτωνα ἐν δείπνῳ πολυτελεῖ κατανοήσας ἐλάας
οὖχ ἁψάμενον: Τί, φησίν. ὃ σοφὸς εἰς Σιχελίαν ζῶν τούτων χάριν,
νῦν παραχει-μένων οὖκ ἀπολαύεις ; Kat ὅς - ᾿Αλλὰ νὴ τοὺς θεούς,
φησί, Διόγενες, χἀχεῖ τὰ πολλὰ περὶ ἐλάας χαὶ τὰ 7 bj ^ γομίζειν εἶναι
τὸν ἄνθρωπον" ὅτε δὲ πλεύσας τῶν τρᾶπε LL LLLLLLLLLLLLLLL
—————————————————————————————————
————— 73. Diozenes anum comtam conspicatus : Si vivis, inquit,
in errore versaris ; sin autem mortuis, ne cunctare. 74. Diogenes
Cynicus, lamentante quodam, sese in peregrina terra moriturum
esse : Quid lamextaris, inquit, o stulte? Undique enim. eadem via ad
inferos est. 75. Diogenes, quum dixisset quidam : Molestum est
vivere : Non, inquit, sed male vivere. 76. Diogenes dicebat, si canes
cadaver suum lacerarent, Hyrcaniam sepulturam fore; sin vultures
esitarent, Indicam ; at si nullam hujusmodi animal accederet,
temporis beneficio pulchra se sepultura affectum iri, corpore
pretiosissimis rebus , sole et imbribus, consumto. 77. Diogenes
oratores id quidem studuisse ait, ut verbis hominum jura tuerentur;
at minime, ut juste agerent. 78. Diogenes exislimare se ait videre
Fortunam in ipsum irruentem dicentemque : As/ Aunc non potui
tetigisse canem rabiosum. 79. Erat autem acerrimus caeterorum
exagitator, ideoque Euclidis scholam demta prima littera χολήν i. e.
bilem appellabat, porro Platonis disputationem consumtionem, item.
ludos Dionysiacos magna stultorum miracula , oratores denique
turbze ministros vocabat. 80. Dicebat sibi in vita humana
gubernatores intuenti, medicos item et philosophos , animalium
omnium sollerlissimum videri hominem; contra si somniorum
interpretes contemplaretur et vates et qui istis auscultarent vel qui
gloria et divitiis superbirent, tum nihil se homine ineptius esse
arbitrari. $ 81. In ccena lauta olivas non gustare Platonem
animadvertens : Quid est, inquit , quod, sapiens qui sis, horumque
ciborum gratia in Siciliam profectus, jam tamen appositis iis non
utaris ? Tum Plato : A/ per deos, in 
 DIOGENIS FRAGMENTA. τοιαῦτα ἐγενόμην. Ὁ δέ- τί οὖν
ἔδει πλεῖν εἰς Συραχούσας: ἢ τότε ἣ ᾿Ἀττιχὴ οὐχ ἔφερεν ἔλάας: (
Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 25. Scripsi ἐλάας "οὐχ ἁψάμενον, codd.
ἐλάας ἁψάμενον. Praeterea ] περὶ ἐλάας xai τὰ τοιαῦτα pro πρὸς
ἐλάας xai τὰ τοιαῦτα.) 82. Πατῶν αὐτοῦ (τοῦ Πλάτωνος) στρώματα
χεχληχότος φίλους παρὰ Διονυσίου, ἔφη" Πατῶ τὴν Πλάτωνος
χενοσπουδίαν. Πρὸς ὃν 6 Πλάτων: “Ὅσον, ὦ Διόγενες, τοῦ τύφου
διαφαίνεις, δοχῶν μὴ τετυφῶσθαι. Οἱ δέ φασι τὸν Διογένην εἰπεῖν:
Πατῶ τὸν Πλάτωνος τῦφον, τὸν δὲ φάναι" “Ετέρῳ γε τύφῳ,
Aióγένες. (Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 26. Czeterum φίλους παρὰ
Διονυσίου intelligimus amicos a Dionysio Athenas missos. Verba
ἑτέρῳ γε τύφῳ explicat "Tertullianus Apolog. cap. 46: Ecce lutulentis
pedibus Diogenes superbos Platonis toros alia superbia deculcat.
Vere autem M. Antoninus lib. XII, 32 : ὃ γὰρ ὑπ᾽ ἀτυφία τῦφος
τετυφωμένος πάντων χαλεπώτατος.) 83. ἜΕρωτηθείς, ποῦ τῆς
“Ἑλλάδος ἴδοι ἀγαθοὺς ἄνὃρας; Ἄνδρας μέν, εἶπεν, οὐδαμοῦ, παῖδας
δὲ ἐν Λαχεδαίμονι. (Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 27.) 81.
Σπουδαιολογουμένῳ ποτὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς προσήει. ἐπέδαλε τερετίζειν-
ἀθροισθέγτων δέ, ὠνείδισεν, ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τοὺς φληνάφους
ἀφιχνουμένων σπουδαίως, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ σπουδαῖα βραδυνόντων
ὀλιγώρως. (Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, »7.) 85. Ἔλεγε περὶ μὲν τοῦ
παρορύττειν xai λαχτίζειν ποτε n ——M
—————————————————————————-———————
307 ἀγῳνίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ δὲ χαλοχἀγαθίας οὐδένα.
(Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 27. De voce παρορύσσειν vide interpretes
ad Theocrit. IV, 1o. ) 86. Τοὺς γραμματιχοὺς ἐθαύμαζε ᾿Οδυσσέως
χαχὰ ἀναζητοῦντας, τὰ δὲ τὰ μὲν τοῦ ^ EI ἴδια ἀγνοοῦνκ M Ὁ τας"
xoi μὴν xai τοὺς μουσιχοὺς τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ λύρᾳ d mL s Ἢ χορδὰς
ἁρμόττεσθαι, ἀνάρμοστα δὲ ἔχειν τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ TEE θ ἐν το Ὁ 2 E
PES Ζθη τοὺς μαθηματιχοὺς ἀποδλέπειν μὲν πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον l 3 τ καὶ
τὴν σελήνην, τὰ δὲ ἐν ποσὶ πράγματα παρορᾶν" τοὺς ῥήτορας τὰ
δίκαια μὲν ἐσπουδαχέναι λέγειν, ; ΞΜ T em πράττειν δὲ οὐδαμῶς"
ἀλλὰ μὴν xol τοὺς φιλαργύρους : esr EUM ψέγειν μὲν τὸ ἀργύριον,
ὑπεραγαπᾶν δέ. (Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 27—26. Conf. Seneca
epist. 86.) 7 , ^ A -“ 5 , M * 87. Κατεγίνωσχε δὲ xai τῶν
ἐπαινούντων μὲν τοὺς δικαίους. τοὺς πολυχρηματίας. ( Diogenes
Laertius lib. VI, 58.) iE ; An ARCU Wie RENT, M οτι χρημάτων ἐπάνω
'etev, ζηλουντων Oz Arr SESS e ΤΟΣ : 88. Exívet δ᾽ αὐτὸν xat τὸ
θύειν μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ὕ τὰ τῆς ὑγιείας Ὁ δειπνεῖν. Ἄγασθαι δὲ xai τῶν
δούλων, oi λαδροφαγοῦντας δρῶντες τοὺς 3 ; ἐσθιομένων.
(Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 98.) TELE STR nid bees $9. Ἔπήνει τοὺς
μέλλοντας γαμεῖν xai μὴ qaὝ NS —P ΣΙ Ξ, ^ Ὁ »v Ὁ δεσπότας
μηδὲν ἄρπαζοιεν τῶν μοῦντας, χαὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας χαταπλεῖν xal μὴ
χαταπλέοντας, καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας πολιτεύεσθαι xal μὴ
πολ'τευομένους, xal τοὺς παιδοτροφεῖν xal μὴ παιδοροφοῦντας, καὶ
τοὺς παρασχευαζομένους συμόιοῦν τοῖς ; ι υνάσταις χαὶ μὴ
προσιόντας. τ ^ ο quit, Diogenes, et olivis et aliis hujusmodi cibis
plerumque vescebar. Rursus Diogenes : Quid ergo Syracusas
navigare attinuit ? an. Attica olivas tunc non Jerebat ? 1 82.
Presentibus Dionysii quibusdam, quos Plato invifaverat, amicis,
Diogenes, stragulis ejus conculcatis , inanc Platonis studium sese
dixit pedibus calcare. Zvi Plato sic respondit : Quantos vero, o
Diogenes, spiritus tibi sumsisti, licet arrogantis speciem minime
prabeas? Alii autem referunt Diogeni dicenti, Platonis fastum calco :
At alio fastu, Diogenes, Platonem statim respondisse. 83.
Interrogatus, ubinam in Graecia viros fortes vidissel: Viros quidem,
inquit, nusquam, pueros vero Lacedamone. 84. Quum aliquando de
rebus gravibus disputaret nemoque audiendi studio incensus ad
ipsum. accederet , cantare insliluit ; quum igitur multi undique
convenissent, eos increpavit , quod nugas audire festinarent, seriis
aulem aures prebere contemtim morarentur. 85. Homines cerlare
dicebat de fossione et calcitratu ; de probitate autem et honestate
neminem cum alio contendere. 86. Grammaticos mirabatur in Ulixis
quidem mala inquirere, sua aulem ignorare; musicos item fides
nervis ccntendere , animi vero moribus incompositos esse; porro
mathematicos solem et lunam intuentes , quze ante pedes essent,
neglizere ; oratores etiam id quidem studuisse, ut verbis hominum
jura tuerentur, at minime , ut juste agerent; avaros denique
vituperare quidem argentum, sed tamen vehementer amare. $7. Eos
quoque reprehendebat, qui viros probos, ut pecunie contemtores,
laudarent, sed tamen pecuniosos imitarentur. 88. Commovebatur
vero etiam eorum more qui pro bona valetudine diis sacrificarent,
sed in ipsa re divina facienda bene ccenando valetudinem
negligerent. Servos quoque se mirari ajebat, qui, quum edaces
dominos viderent, nihil ciborum raperent. 89. Laudabat eos qui
uxores quidem ducturi essent, sed tamen non ducerent, et qui ad
terram appulsuri non appellerent, quique rempublicam administraluri
non administrarent, et qui pueros educaturi non edücarent , denique
qui ià darent operam, ut cum potenlibus viverent, nec tamen illos
adirent. 20.
 308 ( Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 20. lta emendandum censeo
hunc locum cum Turnebo Advers. lib. XXVI cap. 34. Nam in veteribus
libris hzc leguntur: τοὺς μέλλοντας γαμεῖν xol μὴ γαμεῖν, χαὶ τοὺς
μέλλοντας χαταπλεῖν xal μὴ καταπλεῖν, xat πολιτεύεσθαι χαὶ μὴ
πολιτεύεσθαι, χαὶ τοὺς παιδοτροφεῖν xxl μὴ παιδοτροφεῖν.) . [Ἔλεγε
δεῖν τὰς χεῖρας ἐπὶ τοὺς φίλους ἐκτείνειν μὴ συγχεχαμμένοις τοῖς
δαχτύλοις. ( Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 29. Sententia est quam
Kuhnius his verbis expressit : non tribus aut quatuor digitis dandum
amicis , quemadmodum thuris aliquot grana aris imponi solebant,
sed plena manu et remissis digitis. ) or. Ἔλεγε τῷ Ξενιάδη τῷ
πριαμένῳ αὐτόν, δεῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας En nit Καὶ γὰρ ἰατρὸς 3 HG » -
Ace cet εἰ δοῦλος εἴη, πεισθῆναι δὲεῖν αὐτῷ. φησιν ἐν τῷ
ἐπιγραφομένῳ Διογένους , Sum MSOYISESL UL Sj πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ, εἰ
xat δοῦλος εἴη. A , ἢ χυδερνήτης * Ed6ouAog δέ E “ E T — A URS ἢ
πρᾶσις, οὕτως ἄγειν τοὺς παῖδας τοῦ Ξενιάδου μετὰ τὰ λοιπὰ
μαθήματα, ὥστε ἱππεύειν, τοξεύειν, δονᾶν., τῇ PME οὐχ σφεν» y
ἀχοντίζειν. "Επειτα ἐν ἘΣ - SCREENS ἘΞ WM] τος ἐπέτρεπε τῷ
παιδοτρίόη, ἀθλητικῶς ἄγειν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐρυθήματος χάριν χαὶ
εὐεξίας. Κατ δὲς πολλὰ ποιητῶν x«i συγγραφέων xot τῶν αὐτοῦ ,
Διογένους" (ov δὲ οἱ παῖI ET RCM πᾶσάν τε ἔφοδον σύντομον, πρὸς
τὸ εὐμνη, 2 , 32}. Y ΕΣ ^ L2 uóveutov, ἐπήσχει,. ᾿Εν οἴχω τε
ἐδίδασχε διαχονεῖςE WE EM , qn σθαι λιτῇ τροφῇ χρωμένους, xa
ὕδωρ πίνοντας. "Ev χρῷ χουρίας τε χαὶ ἀχαλλωπίστους εἰργάζετο, xal
πχύτονας xai ἀνυποδήτους, xxi σιωπηλούς, χαθ᾽ αὗἘξῆγε δ᾽ αὐτοὺς
xot X ; ἐπὶ χυνηγεσία. Οἱ δὲ χαὶ αὐτοῦ Διογένους ἐπιμέλειαν τοὺς
βλέποντας ἐ ἐν ταῖς δὸδοῖς. CYNICORUM FRAGMENTA. ἐποιοῦντο,
xal πρὸς τοὺς ς γονέας αἰτητιχῶς εἶχον. *0 δ᾽ αὐτός φησι παρὰ τῷ
Ξενιάδῃ χαὶ γηρᾶσαι αὐτόν, χαὶ θανόντα ταφῆναι πρὸς τῶν υἱῶν
αὐτοῦ. Ἔνθα xal πυνθανομένου τοῦ Ξενιάδου πῶς αὐτὸν θάψειεν,
ἔφη" H , » Y T Ὁ "En πρόσωπον. "Too δὲ ἐρομένου" Διὰ τί; Ὅτι SE 5
μετ᾽ ὀλίγον, εἶπε, μέλλει τὰ χάτω ἄνω στρέφεσθαι. ἹῬοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὸ
ἐπιχρατεῖν ἤδ Uc Μαχεδόνας, ἢ το δὲ πιχρατεῖν ἤδη τοὺς αχεδόνας, ἢ
Ξ EN ἐχ ταπεινῶν. ὑψηλοὺς γίνεσθαι. (Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 3o.
31. 3». Posui ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐρυθήματος χάριν, codd. ἀλλὰ αὐτὸς ,
ἐρυθήματος χάριν. Pro ἐπὶ χυνηγεσία Henr. Stephanus ἐπὶ χυνηγέσια
scribi volebat. ) 92. Θαυμάζειν ἔφη, εἰ χύτραν μὲν xal λοπάδα
ὠνούμενοι σχοποῦμεν xal χομποῦμεν, ἀνθρώπου δὲ μόνη τῇ ὄψει
ἀρχούμεθα. (Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 30.) 93. Φωνήσας ποτέ, ᾿Ιὼ
ἄνθρωποι, συνελθόντων χαθίχετο τῇ βαχτηρία, εἰπών". ᾿Ανθρώπους
ἐχάλεσα, οὐ καθάρματα. ( Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 32.) E , P QNS
3:01 ΩΝ 94. ἰσαγαγόντος τινὸς αὐτὸν εἰς οἶχον πολυτελῆ 9 χαὶ
χωλύοντος πτύσαι, ἐπειδὴ ἐχρέμψατο, εἰς τὴν ὄψιν ἔπτυσεν, εἰπών,
χείρονα τόπον μὴ εὕρηχέναι. (Οἱ δὲ τοῦτο Ἀριστίππου φασί.) (
Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 35.} E E. » M ' ᾿ , 95. Ἀιναπήρους ἔλεγεν
οὗ τοὺς χωφοὺς xat τυφλούς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας πήραν. (
Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 53.) 96. ΕἸἰσελθών ποτε ἡμιξύρητος εἰς
νέων συμπόσιον πληγὰς ἔλαδε. Μετὰ δὲ ἐγγράψας τὰ ὀνόματα εἰς
λεύχωμα τῶν πληξάντων, περιήει ἐξηυμένος" ὥστε αὐτοῦ 90.
Dicebat manus ad amicos non contractis digilis protendi oportere.
91. Dicebat Xeniadi, emtori suo, ipsum sibi, quamvis servus esset,
obtemperare debere. Nam et. medico vel gubernatori, si servussit,
tamen obediri oportere. Eubulus autem in libro, qui inscribitur
Diogenis auctio, ait eum Xeniadis filios ita instituisse, ut post
perceptas reliquas disciplinas equitarent, sagittarent, funda lapides
excuterent, denique jacularentur. Deinde in palzestra non.
permittebat luctandi magistro eos athletarum in morem exercere,
sed tantum ad colorem rubicundum ori inducendum et ob bonam
corporis habitudinem. Tenebant vero pueri multa poetarum
aliorumque scriptorum ef ipsius quoque Diogenis dicta memoriter ;
omnemque illis doctrinze ralionem, ut facile memoria
comprehenderetur, breviter expositam inculcabat. Domi eliam
ministrare eos docebat, vili cibo εἴ αι potu contentos. Tonsos ad
cutem incomtosque erudiebat, porro sine tunicis ac discalceatos,
tacilos etiam €t se solos inler viam intuentes. — Insuper ad
venationes €os educebat. Contra isti Diogenis ipsius curam agebant,
alque a parentibus pelebant, ut eum sibi commendatum haberent.
Idem [ Eubulus? ait illum etiam apud Xeniadem consenuisse , et fato
perfunctum ab ejus filiis esse sepultum. Ibi percontante Xeniade,
quomodo sepeliri vellet : 7n faciem, inquit. Tum illo, quie ejus rei
causa foret, quaerenle: Quoniam , inquit, paulo post inferiora
sursum vertentur. Dixit autem hoc, quia Macedones jam
praevalerent, velex humilitate in fastigium emergerent atque
attollerentur. 32. Mirari se ait, quod quum ollam quidem ef patinam
emturi diligenter intus non sine tinnitu consideremus , sola in
homine emendo externa specie contenti simus. 93. Quum clamasset
aliquando : Heu Aomines! convenissentque plurimi, baculo illos
verberavit dicens : Homines, non purgamenta , vocavi. ἥ 94. Quum
ipsum aliquis in domum magnificam induxisset, atque exspuere
prohibuisset, exscreans faciem prohibentis conspuit, locum fediorem,
in quem exspuere posset, se non invenisse dicens. At alii Aristippum
hoc fecisse auctores sunt. 93. ᾿Αναπήρους i. e. mancos, vocabat non
surdos aut cscos, sed qui peram non haberent. 96. Ingressus
aliquando semirasus juvenum convivantium cenationem verberibus
ab iis acceplus est. Postea vero eorum nomina a quibus pulsatus eral
tabelle in 
 DIGGENIS FRAGMENTA. αὐτοὺς ὕδρει περιέθηχε.,
χαταγινωσχομένους xat ἐπιπληττομένους. (Diogenes Laertius lib. VI,
33. Pseudodiogenes in Epistola ad Melesippum : ἤκουόν σε
λελυπῆσθαι, ὅτι τὰ ᾿Αθηναίων τέχνα πληγὰς ἡμῖν ἐνέτεινε μεθύοντα,
χαὶ δεινὰ πάσχειν, εἰ σοφία πεπαρῴνηται. Εὐ δ᾽ ἴσθι, ὅτι τὸ Διογένους
μὲν ἐπ ΡΠ ΡΤ Ὴ SA oir. &pern ós οὐχ ἡσχονθηι ἐπεὶ ὑἱὴτε ; D ER
ἤχθη σῶμα ὕπο τῶν μεθυόντων. e duda πέρυχεν ὑπὸ φαύλων, μήτε
αἰσχύνεσθαι.) Ἔλεγεν ἑαυτὸν χύνα εἶναι τῶν ἐπαινουμένων, ὡλὰ
μηδένα τολμᾶν τῶν ἐπαινούντων συνεξιέναι ἐπὶ τὴν θήραν.
(Diogenes Laertius lib .VI, 33. Est autem 2 τὴν θήραν
interpretandum de virtutis et honestatis studio, quo sensu Aristoteles
apud Athenzeum lib. XV p. 695 A dicit ἀρετά, πολύμοχθε γένει Booz
zio θήρ eux. κάλλιστον βίῳ. Sic apud Lucianum in Vitarum auctione
cap. 8 Diogenes ait : στρατεύομαι GE ὥσπερ Ἣ ραχλῆς ἐπὶ τὰς
ἡδονὰς οὐ χελευστός, ἀλλ᾽ ἑχούσιος, ἐχχαθᾶραι τὸν βίον
προαιρούμε-voc. ) 98. Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, μὲν οὖν, εἶπεν, ἄνδρας, σὺ
δὲ ( Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 33. Similiter idem 43 : Ὀλυμπίασι τοῦ
χήρυχος ἀνειπόντος, Nux Διώξιππος ἄνδρας" Οὗτος μὲν δὴ
ἀνδράποδα, ἄνδρας δὲ ἐγώ. Vid. Dion. Chrysost. orat. XI. 5. Πρὸς
τοὺς εἰπόντας" Γέ Τί ἐδ, ἔφη, εἰ δολιχὸν ἔδραμον, πρὸς τῷ» τέλει
ἔδει ces ; Πύθια νιχὼ ἄνδρας: ᾿Εγὼ r 3 NCUPS SN ανοραποῦα. ^ DS
x. gov εἰ, x«t λοῖπον ἄνες" ἀνεῖναι χαὶ μμἡ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεῖναι;
(Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 34.} 100. Κατέλχδέ ποτε Δημοσθέ
πανδοχεί: ἃ ἀριστῶντα" " τοῦ δὲ ὑποχωροῦντος, ἐν Ἣν τὸν δήτος ox
'Tosoózo, » c y , £21 μᾶλλον ἔση ἐν τῷ πανδοχείῳ. ( Diogenes
Laertius lib. VI, 34. Sed operc pretium est cum iis quz Diogenes
prodit conferre saripta atque ex collo suspensa gerens circumibat; ita
ut illos injuria afficeret, qui idcirco vituperationem et objurgalionem
non effugiebant. 97. Canem se esse ajebat ex iis qui laudarentur;
verum laudantium neminem secum venatum exire audere. 98.
Dicenti euidam, viros se Pythiis superare : Viros, inquit, ego; tu vero
mancipia. 99. Quum ipsi diceretur : Senez es ; conquiesce igitur er
labore. Quid vero , ait, si stadium currerem , ad calcem oportere!
segni cursu et non potius incitato contendere? 100. Offendebat
aliquando Demosthenem oratorem in deversorio prandentem ; qui
quum in interiorem partem secederet : Eo magis, inquit, eris in
deversorio. , 101. Quum peregrini quidam Demosthenem videre
cuperent, medium intendens digitum : Hic, inquit, nobis est ille
populi Atheniensis rector. ἢ 909 Alianum var. hist. lib. IX cap. XIX ita
scribentem : Ἠρίστα ποτὲ Διογένης ἐν χαπηλείῳ" ἔνθα παριόντα
Δημοσθένη ἐχάλει: τοῦ ὃὲ μὴ ὑπαχούσαντος, Αἰσχύνη,, ἔφη,
Δημόσθενες, παρελθεῖν εἰς χαπηλεῖον ; xai μὴν χαὶ ὃ χύριός σου χαθ᾽
ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἐνθάξε εἴσισι, τοὺ - , 3 * M ῃ᾽ “' ^m τοὺς ὀημοτας
MEYOV χαι τοὺς χαῦ ἕνα OT AoOv* ὅτι οἵ δημηγόροι χαὶ ot ῥήτορες
δοῦλοι τοῦ πλήθους εἰσί. Aliter. denique Plutarchus in libello
Quomodo quis suos in virtute sequenda sentire possit profectus vol.
VII pag. 260 ed. Hutten. : χάριεν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Διογένους πρός τινα
νεανίσχον ὀφθέντα ἐν χαπηzy. ; λείῳ, χαταφυγόντα (εἶπεν)
ἐνδοτέρω oc γίνῃ.) 101. Ξένων ποτὲ θεάσασθαι θελόντων Δημοσ
θένην, τὸν μέσον δάχτυλον ἐχτείνας" ὃ ᾿Αθηναίων δημαγωγός.
(Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 34.) 102. ᾿Εχθαλόντος δέ τινος ἄρτον χαὶ
αἰσχυνομένου ἀνελέσθαι. εἰς τὸ χαπηλεῖον" σ M Ὅσῳ γὰρ δ᾽ ; ἢ ύ
μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ χαπηλείῳ γεῖς s Οὗτος ἡμῖν, ἔφη, ἐστὶν βουλόμενος
αὐτὸν νουθετῆσαι, χεράμου ; Se S 2 τράχηλον δήσας ἔσυρε διὰ τοῦ
Κεραμειχοῦ. (Diogenes Laertius lib. VE, 35.) - » M "NN I M ^ 103.
Διιμεῖσθαι ἔλεγε τοὺς χοροδιδασχάλους" καὶ γὰρ ἐχείνους ὑπὲρ τόνον
ἐνδιδόναι ἕνεχα τοῦ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἅψασθαι τοῦ προσήχοντος τόνου.
(Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 35.) I04. Τοὺς πλείστους ἔλεγε παρὰ
δάχτυλον patveσθαι. ᾿Ιξὰν οὖν τις τὸν μέσον προτείνας πορεύηται,
ϑόξει μαίνεσθαι" ἐὰν δὲ τὸν λιχανόν,, οὐχέτι. ( Diogenes Laertius lib.
VI, 35.) 105. Τὰ πολλοῦ ἄξια μιηδενὸς ἔλεγε πιπράσχεσθαι, χαὶ
ἔμπαλιν" ἀνδριάντα γὰρ τρισχιλίων πιπράσχεσθαι, χοίνιχα δὲ ἀλφίτων
δύο χαλχῶν. (Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 35.) npo , Sm - Ub HnY ea
106. Τῷ πριαμένῳ αὐτὸν Ξενιάδη φησί" γε ὅπως τὸ προσταττόμενον
ἃ ποιήσεις. Τοῦ δὲ εἰπόντος" Ἄνω 102. Quum"panem aliquis
imprudenter abjecisset eumque pr:e. pudore tollere nollet, Diogenes
hominem reprehendere cupiens alligatum lagenc collum per
Ceramicum trahebat. 103. Imitari se dicebat chori magistros : illos
enim proeuntes acutius sonare, ut reliqui legitimum sonum
funderent. 104. Plérosque dicebat propter unum digitum pro insanis
haberi. Si quis igitur medio digito porrecto incederet, eum desipere
videri; sin autem indice porrecto, sapere. 3 105. Pretiosissima
quaeque gratis constare ajebat et contra ; statuam enim tribus
drachmarum millibus vendi, polentze vero cheenicem duobus zereis.
106. Xeniadee qui ipsum emerat : Agedum, inquit, fac quod
praecipitur. Qui quum ei opposuisset illud : Sursum fIuun! amnium
fontes, respondit : A/ si medicum ager
 310 E ποταμῶν χὼρ οὔσι zat εἰ δὲ ligi v, ἔφη, Mis ίω νοσῶν,
οὐχ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐπείθου, ἀλλ᾽ εἶπες Xv , ὡς" ἄνω ποταμῶν χωροῦσι
παγαί; ( Diogenes Laertius lib. VE, 36. Scripsi: ὃ ποιήσεις, codd.
ποιήσης. ---- ἢ ὡς ; codd. ὡς zv. — Est autem Euripidis in Medea
versus 411 : ἄνω ποταμῶν ἱερῶν χωροῦσι παγαί, xot δίχη xoi πάντα
πάλιν στρέ-qui postea in proverbii consuetudinem : παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν
S NE ' ἐπειδὴ οἵ ποταμοὶ φεται, venit. Zenobius Centur. HI, 56
ὑπεναντίως λεγομένων ἢ γενομένων, ἄνωθεν χάτω ῥέουσιν, οὐ
κάτωθεν ἄνω.) 107. Ἤθελέ τις παρ᾽ αὐτῷ φιλοσοφεῖν" ὃ δέ οἵ
σαπέρδην δοὺς φέρειν, ἐποίησεν ἀχολουθεῖν. Ὥς δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αἰδοῦς ῥίψας
ἀπῆλθε, μετὰ χρόνον ὑπαντήσας αὐτῷ χαὶ γελάσας λέγει, Τὴν σὴν
χαὶ ἐμὴν φιλίαν σαπέρδης διέλυσε. Διοχλῇς δ᾽ οὕτως ἀναγράφει.
Εἰπόντος τινὸς ᾿Ἐπίταττε fv, Διόγεν VEG, ἀπαγαγὼν αὐτὸν 3 αὐτῷ: 2
M ἀνησαμένου δέ, Τὴν ἡμιωφολίου τυρὸν ἐδίδου φέρειν, σήν, ἔφη,
xx ἐμὴν φιλίαν ἡμιωδολίου τυρίον διαλέλυχε. (Diogenes Laertius lib.
VI, 36.) 108. Θεασάμενός ποτε παιδίον ταῖς χερσὶ πῖνον ἐξέῤῥιψε τῆς
πήρας τὴν χοτύλην, εἰπών: Παιδίον με νενίχηχεν εὐτελείᾳ. ᾿Εξέδαλε
δὲ χαὶ τὸ τ τρυδλίον, διμοίως παιδίον θεασάμενος, ἐπειδὴ χατέαξε τὸ
σχεῦος, τῷ χοίλῳ ἄρτου Ψωμίῳ τὴν φαχῆν ὑποδεχόμενον.
(Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 37. Scripsi τῷ χοίλῳ ἄρτου Vou», codd. τὸ
κοίλῳ ἄρτῳ τοῦ Ψωμίου. Cf. Plutarchus in libello Quomodo quis suos
in virtute sequenda sentire possit profectus vol. VII pag. 254 ed
Hutten. Simplicius ad Epicteti Enchirid. cap. 46 p. 273 ed. Salmas.
Seneca Epist. 9o. Hieronymus adv. Jovinianum lib. II. Huc spectat.
Antiphili epigramma. An180]. lib. V : Ἢ πήρη χαὶ χλαῖνα, xaX ὕδατι
πιληθεῖσα Μᾶζα, xxi fj πρὸ ποδῶν ῥάδδος ἐρειδομένη. CYNICORUM
FRAGMENTA. Καὶ δέπας ἐκ κ χεράμοιο σοφῷ χυνὶ μέτρα βίοιο "Age
χὴν τούτοις ἦν τι περισσότερον. Κοίλαις γὰρ πόμα χερσὶν ἰδὼν
ἀρύοντα βοώτην, Εἶπε: Τί χαί σε μάτὴν, ὄστραχον, ἠχθοφόρουν; In
eandem sententiam Ausonius Epigr. 53 : Pera, polenta, tribon,
baculus, scyphus, arcta supellex [βία fuit Cynici : sed putat hanc
nimiam. Namque cavis n cernens potare bubulcum, Cur, scyphe, e,
dixit, gesto Supervacntm ?) 109. Συνελογίζετο δὲ x«i οὕτως: Τῶν
θεῶν ἐστι πάντα" φίλοι δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ τοῖς θεοῖς" χοινὰ δὲ τὰ τῶν
φίλων: πάντα ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν σοφῶν. (Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 37.)
10. Θεασάμενός n τε γυναῖκα ἀσχημονέστερον τοῖς προσπίπτουσαν,
βουλόμενος αὐτῆς περιελεῖν τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν, προσελθὼν εἶπεν:
Οὐχ εὐλαδῇ, ὦ γύναι, μἡ ποτε θεοῦ ὄπισθεν foci) τος (πάντα γάρ
ἐστιν «-m αὐτοῦ πλήρη) icy: ἡμονήσης ; ( Diogenes Laertius lib. VI,
37.) ur. Τῷ 'AcxXazu) ἀνέθηχε πλήκτην στόμα πίπτοντας ἐπιτρέχων
συνέτριδεν. ( Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 38.) 113. Εἰώθει λέγειν, τὰς
τραγιχὰς ἀρὰς αὐτῷ συνὴνTU ἔέναι" εἶναι γοῦν" LM ὃς τοὺς ἐπὶ
Ἄπολις, Got πατρίδος ἐστερημέ t6, ἄοιχος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος,
πτωχός, πλανήτης, βίον ἔχων τοὐφ᾽ ἡμέραν. ( Diogenes Laertius lib.
VI, 38. Quod idem refert /Elianus var. hist. lib. ΠῚ cap. 29 his verbis :
“Διογένης ὃ Σινωπεὺς συνεχῶς ἐπέλεγεν ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ, ὅτι τὰς Ex
τραγῳδίας ἀρὰς αὐτὸς ἐκπληροῖ χαὶ ὑπομένει" εἶναι γὰρ πλάνης,
ἄοικος, πατρίδος ἐστε ρημένος, πτωχός, δυσείμων, βίον ἔ Ey ov
ἐφήμερον.) 113. Γἔφασχεν ἀντιτιθέναι τύχη μὲν ν θάρσος, νόμῳ δὲ
φύσιν, πάθει δὲ λόγον. à emisses, non obtemperasses illi, sed.
diceres : Sursum fluunt amnium fontes ἢ 107. Quidam sub Diogene
magistro philosophari volebat, cui illé saperdam gestandum dedit et
se sequi jussit. Qui quum pudore commotus abjecto pisce abiisset,
aliquanto post Diogenes ei occurrens ridensque : Tuam, inquit, e£
meam amicitiam saperda dissolvil. Diocies autem sic rem perscribit.
Dixerat illi nescio quis : Impera nobis, Diogenes. Tum ille abducto
vilem caseum ferendum dedit. Verum isto hoc detrectante : Tuc,
inquit, et meam amicitiam vilis caseus dissolvit. 108. Quum esset
aliquando puerum cavis bibentem manibus intuitus, cotylam e pera
ejecit dicens : Puer me frugalitate superavit. Ejecit etiam calinum,
quia item puerum, vasculo fracto , vidisset concavo panis frusto
lenLes coctas excipere. 109. Ratiocinabatur vero etiam sic : Omnia
deorum sunt: diis autem amici sapientes sunt : amicorum vero
cuncta communia : omnia ergo sunt sapientum. 110. Conspicatus
aliquando mulierem indecore coram diis prostratam eamque
superslitione ievare cupiens, accessit propius illamque sic allocutus
est : Non vereris , mulier, ne forle stante a tergo deo / ejus enim
emnia plena sunt) parum decenter te geras? 111. Gallum pugnacem,
qui alios humi prostratos incursu conferebat, /Esculapio sacravit.
112. Solebat dicere, tragicas exsecraliones sibi evenisse; esse enim
se exsulem, domo ejectum, patria extgrrem, pauperem, palanlem,
vitam in dies habentem. 113. Ajebat se opponere fortunze quidem
confidentiam, ! legi vero naturam , perturbationi denique rationem. 
 DIOGENIS FRAGMENTA. (Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 38.) In,
Ἔν τῷ Κρανείῳ ἡλιουμένῳ αὐτῷ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπιστάς φησιν’ Αἴτησόν
με ὃ θέλεις" καὶ ὅς, ᾿Αποσχότησόν μου, φησί. (Diogenes Laertius lib.
VI, 38. Cf. Plutarcb. vit. Alex. cap. 14 ; Simplicius ad Epictet, cap. 21
Ρ- 123 ed. Salmas ; Valerius Maximus lib. Εν 58. Cicero Tuscul. V,
aur) n5. Maxo& τινος ἀναγινώσχοντος, καὶ πρὸς τῷ τέλει τοῦ βιδλίου
ἄγραφόν τι παραδείξαντος, Θαῤῥεῖτε, ἔφη, ἄνδρες" γῆν ὁρῶ. (
Diogenes 1 Laertius lib. VI, 38.) 116. Πρὸς ᾿ τὸν συλλογισάμενον, ὅτι
κέρατα ἔχει, ἁψάμενος τοῦ μετώπου, ᾿Εγὼ μέν, ἔφη, οὐχ δρῶ.
Ὁμοίως xal πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, ὅτ: χίνησις οὐχ ἔστιν, ἀναστὰς
περιεπάτει. ( Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 39. Agitür hic de syllogismo
quem Hieronymus in epist. 83 cornutum vocat, velut : quod non
perdidisti , habes; atqui cornua mon. perdidisti, ergo cornua habes.
l]ta ratiocinanti quum respondere posset Diogenes : quod perdidi ,
non habeo; atqui cornua, si quando habui, perdidi, ergo cornua non
habeo, maluit re factoque quam verbis et argumentatione eum
refutare. Caeterum quod ad ultima ὁμοίως xxi τὸν εἰπόντα xA.
attinet, de ipso. Diugene interpretanda sunt, qua de Cynico quodam
Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhonic. Hypot. lib. ΠῚ cap. 8 in hunc modum
scribit : διὸ x«i τῶν Κυνιχῶν τις ἐρωτηθεὶς χατὰ τῆς χινήσεως λόγον,
οὐδὲν ἀπεχρίνατο' ἀνέστη ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐδάδισεν" ἔργῳ xo διὰ τῆς
ἐνεργείας παριστάς, ὅτι ὑπαρχτή ἐστιν ἣ χίνησις.) 17. Πρὸς τὸν
λέγοντα περὶ τῶν μετεώρων" lloσταῖος, ἔφη, πάρει ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
: (Diogenes Laertius lib. VI, 39. ) 118. Εὐνούχου μοχθηροῦ
ἐπιγράψαντος ἐπὶ τὴν οἷχίαν- Μηδὲν εἰσίτω χαχόν- Ὃ οὖν χύριος,
ἔφη, τῆς οἰχίας ποῦ εἰσέλθη: —————————————————*
114. Apricanti ipsi in Craneo quum Alexander superverisset, ait :
Pe/e a me quod vis. Atille : Noli, inquit, mihi umbram facere. * 115.
Diu multumque aliquis legerat, quumque in fine libri nibil amplius
scriptum esse ostendisset, Diogenes . Bono, inquit, animo este, viri ;
jam terram video. 116. Homini argumentis quibusdam colligenti ,
Diogenem habere cornua, manu frontem contrectans : Equidem,
inquit, illa non animadverto. Similiter quodam motum esse negante,
surgens deambulabat. 117. De superis ac coelestibus disscrenti : €st,
inquit, quum de calo descendisti? 118. Quum eunuchus quidam
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