03A

IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
THE PEACE PALACE
THE HAGUE
THE NETHERLANDS

IILS INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2025

THE CASE CONCERNING THE FUSCIMA BELT

THE REPUBLIC OF RONGTON

COMPENDIUM for the APPLICANT

1. Armed Activities On The Territory Of The Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo V. Uganda),

Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, (Dec. 19) ................................................................................ 2

2. Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20) .............................................. 3

3. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua

(Nicaragua v. United States of America) ......................................................................... 6

4. Centre for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) & Minority Rights Grp. Int’l (on behalf of

Endorois Welfare Council)................................................................................................ 9

5. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) ............................. 4

6. Dickson Car Wheel Co. (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 669, 678 (Gen.

Cl. Comm’n 1931) ............................................................................................................ 10

7. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 .................... 5

8. Rainbow Warrior Affair (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 215, Award (Apr. 30, 1990) ......... 7

9. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov.

28, 2007) .............................................................................................................................. 8

10. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980

I.C.J. 3 (May 24)................................................................................................................. 8

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Armed Activities On The Territory Of The Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo V. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, (Dec. 19)

• Case, cited in the context - The jurisprudence of the ICJ in DRC v. Uganda further
makes clear that state involvement is a necessary prerequisite for making a state
responsible for the actions of a third party.46 The absence of any state involvement
absolves the Kingdom of Rongton from any and all responsibility for the actions of the
activists. Citation no. 46, page 13
• Citation - 2005 I.C.J. 168
• Court - International Court Of Justice
• Date – 19 December, 2005
• Bench - President Shi; Vice-President Ranjeva; Judges Koroma, Vereshchetin,
Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Elaraby,
Owada, Simma, Tomka, Abraham; Judges Ad Hoc Verhoeven, Kateka; Registrar
Couvreur.
• Facts - On 23 June 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) filed in the
Registry of the Court Applications instituting proceedings against Burundi, Uganda
and Rwanda “for acts of armed aggression committed . . . in flagrant breach of the
United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity”. In
addition to the cessation of the alleged acts, the DRC sought reparation for acts of
intentional destruction and looting and the restitution of national property and
resources appropriated for the benefit of the respective respondent States.
• Conclusion of the judgement - The Court concluded that By sixteen votes to one,
Finds that the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military activities against the
Democratic Republic of the Congo on the latter’s territory, by occupying Ituri and by
actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces
having operated on the territory of the DRC, violated the principle of non-use of force
in international relations and the principle of non-intervention.

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Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20)

• Case, cited in the context - In the Asylum Case, this Court recognised that asylum,
unless used as a cover for insurgency, does not amount to interference. Citation no. 75,
page 19
• Citation - 1950 I.C.J. 266
• Court - INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
• Date – 20 December, 1950
• Bench President Basdevant; Vice-President Guerrero; Judges Alvarez, Hackworth,
Winiarski, Zoričić, De Visscher, Sir Arnold Mcnair, Klaestad, Badawi Pasha, Krylov,
Read, Hsu Mo, Azevedo; M. Alayza Y Paz Soldán And M. Caicedo Castilla, Judges
Ad Hoc; M. Garnier-Coignet, Deputy-Registrar.
• Facts - The granting of diplomatic asylum in the Colombian Embassy at Lima, on 3
January 1949, to a Peruvian national, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, a political leader
accused of having instigated a military rebellion, was the subject of a dispute between
Peru and Colombia which the Parties agreed to submit to the Court. The Pan-American
Havana Convention on Asylum (1928) laid down that, subject to certain conditions,
asylum could be granted in a foreign embassy to a political refugee who was a national
of the territorial State. The question in dispute was whether Colombia, as the State
granting the asylum, was entitled unilaterally to “qualify” the offence committed by the
refugee in a manner binding on the territorial State — that is, to decide whether it was
a political offence or a common crime. Furthermore, the Court was asked to decide
whether the territorial State was bound to afford the necessary guarantees to enable the
refugee to leave the country in safety.
• Conclusion of the judgement In its Judgment of 20 November 1950, the Court
answered both thes questions in the negative, but at the same time it specified that Peru
had not proved that Mr. Haya de la Torre was a common criminal. Lastly, it found in
favour of a counter-claim submitted by Peru that Mr. Haya de la Torre had been granted
asylum in violation of the Havana Convention.

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Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9)

• Case, cited in the context - The Kingdom of Rongton has not breached the standard of
due diligence established by this Court in United Kingdom v. Albania. This decision
of this Court in United Kingdom v. Albania requires actual or foreseeable knowledge
that such actions would be committed. In the present case, the facts indicate that the
Kingdom of Rongton had absolutely no knowledge of the plans of the activists, nor was
there any information available to the Applicant that would have allowed them to
foresee the events that took place. Citation no. 52, page 15
• Case, cited in the context -Further, it is a well settled to principle that it is illegal for a
State to make incursions into the territory of another State even if with bona fide
intention to gather evidence of alleged wrongdoing Citation no. 68, page 13
• Citation - 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22
• Court - INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
• Date – April 9, 1949
• Bench Acting President Guerrero ; President Basdevant ; Judges Alvarez, Fabela,
Hackworth, Winiarski, Zorieic, De Visscher, Sir Arnold Mcnair, Klaestad, Badawi
Pasha, Krylov, Read, Hsu Mo, Azevedo ; M. Eeer, Judge Ad Hoc.
• Facts - It arose out of the explosions of mines by which some British warships suffered
damage while passing through the Corfu Channel in 1946, in a part of the Albanian
waters which had been previously swept. The ships were severely damaged and
members of the crew were killed. The United Kingdom seised the Court of the dispute
by an Application filed on 22 May 1947 and accused Albania of having laid or allowed
a third State to lay the mines after mine-clearing operations had been carried out by the
Allied naval authorities. The case had previously been brought before the United
Nations and, in consequence of a recommendation by the Security Council, had been
referred to the Court.
• Conclusion of the judgement A second Judgment, rendered on 9 April 1949, related
to the merits of the dispute. The Court found that Albania was responsible under
international law for the explosions that had taken place in Albanian waters and for the
damage and loss of life which had ensued.

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Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7

• Case, cited in the context - As noted by the ICJ in Gabčíkovo Nagymaros, necessity is
not a self-judging doctrine and must not be invoked if other lawful means were
available.. Citation no. 19, page 5
• Citation - 1997 I.C.J. 7
• Court - INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
• Date – 25 September, 1997
• Bench President Schwebel; Vice-President Weeramantry; Judges Oda, Bediaoui,
Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek; Judge Ad Hoc Skubiszewski ; Registrar Valencia-Ospin
• Facts - On 2 July 1993 the Governments of the Republic of Hungary and of the Slovak
Republic notified jointly to the Registry of the Court a Special Agreement, signed at
Brussels on 7 April 1993, for the submission to the Court of certain issues arising out
of differences which had existed between the Republic of Hungary and the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic regarding the implementation and the termination of the
Budapest Treaty of 16 September 1977 on the Construction and Operation of the
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Barrage System and on the construction and operation of the
“provisional solution”.
• Conclusion of the judgement In its Judgment of 25 September 1997, the Court
asserted that Hungary was not entitled to suspend and subsequently abandon, in 1989,
the works on the Nagymaros project and on the part of the Gabčíkovo project for which
it was responsible, and that Czechoslovakia was entitled to proceed, in November 1991,
to the “provisional solution” as described by the terms of the Special Agreement. On
the other hand, the Court stated that Czechoslovakia was not entitled to put into
operation, from October 1992, the barrage system in question and that Slovakia, as
successor to Czechoslovakia, had become Party to the Treaty of 16 September 1977 as
from 1 January 1993. The Court also decided that Hungary and Slovakia must negotiate
in good faith in the light of the prevailing situation and must take all necessary measures
to ensure the achievement of the objectives of the said Treaty, in accordance with such
modalities as they might agree upon. Further, Hungary was to compensate Slovakia for
the damage sustained by Czechoslovakia and by Slovakia on account of the suspension
and abandonment by Hungary of works for which it was responsible, whereas, again

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 according to the Judgment of the Court, Slovakia was to compensate Hungary for the
damage it had sustained on account of the putting into operation of the dam by
Czechoslovakia and its maintenance in service by Slovakia.

Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua

• Case, cited in the context - In Nicaragua v. USA, the ICJ established that to make a
state liable for the acts of a private third party, it must be established that the state had
effective control over said party. In the present case, there is no evidence whatsoever
to indicate the Rongton exercised any form of control over the activists. citation no. 42
Page 12
• Case, cited in the context - The decision in Nicaragua v. USA56 makes clear that
coercion is a necessary prerequisite to the violation of national sovereignty. In the
instant case, there is absolutely no element of coercion exerted against Wakanda.
Citation no. 56 Page 15
• Citation - 1986 I.C.J. 14
• Court - INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
• Date - 27 JUNE, 1986
• Bench - President Nagendra Singh ; Vice-President De Lacharrière ; Judges Lachs,
Ruda, Elias, Oda, Ago, Sette-Camara, Schwebel, Sir Robert Jennings, Mbaye,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen ; Judge Ad Hoc Colliard
• Facts - On 9 April 1984 Nicaragua filed an Application instituting proceedings against
the United States of America, together with a Request for the indication of provisional
measures concerning a dispute relating to responsibility for military and paramilitary
activities in and against Nicaragua.
• Conclusion of the judgement - The Court upheld that it had jurisdiction to entertain
the application filed by Nicaragua. Further, it stated that there is no justification on the
part of the USA to use collective self-defense connected with the military and para-
military activities in and against Nicaragua. Nicaragua is entitled to compensation.

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Rainbow Warrior Affair (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 215, Award (Apr. 30, 1990)

• Case, cited in the context - It is therefore necessary for the Respondent to demonstrate
that the Kingdom of Rongton had a duty under international law which it failed to
discharge. Citation no. 51, page 14
• Citation - 1950 I.C.J. 266
• Court - France-New Zealand Arbitration Tribunal
• Date – 30 April 1990
• Bench Jiménez de Aréchaga, Chairman; Sir Kenneth Keith and Professor Bredin,
Members).
• Facts - In July 1985 a team of French agents sabotaged and sank the Rainbow Warrior,
a vessel belonging to Greenpeace International, while it lay in harbour in New Zealand.
One member of the crew was killed. Two of the agents, Major Mafart and Captain
Prieur, were subsequently arrested in New Zealand and, having pleaded guilty to
charges of manslaughter and criminal damage, were sentenced by a New Zealand court
to ten years' imprisonment.1 A dispute arose between France, which demanded the
release of the two agents, and New Zealand, which claimed compensation for the
incident. New Zealand also complained that France was threatening to disrupt New
Zealand trade with the European Communities unless the two agents were released.
• Conclusion of the judgement France, having admitted responsibility, focused its
efforts on the repatriation of its servicemen. This was agreed to by New Zealand on the
condition that they would serve out the rest of their sentences. A compromise was
reached by the mediation of the UN secretary general to three-year sentences on the
French atoll of Hao (at a French naval base). France ultimately returned both agents to
mainland France and freed them by May 1988, after less than two years on the atoll. In
terms of reparations, France initially offered an official apology and acknowledgement
of breach of international law. Additionally, the UN secretary-general awarded New
Zealand US$6.5 million and a further NZ$3.5 million to establish the New Zealand /
France Friendship Fund. This is in addition to compensation which France paid to
Pereira's family and to Greenpeace (settled privately)

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Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28,
2007)

• Case, cited in the context - In Saramaka People v. Suriname, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights held that the State must recognise and protect the property rights of
Indigenous communities, especially when their subsistence and cultural survival are at
[Link] no. 7, page 2
• Case, cited in the context- In Saramaka People v. Suriname28, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights held that FPIC must be obtained where the impact of a state
project is significant. There is no doubt that permanent relocation from ancestral lands
meets this threshold. Citation no. 28 Page 8
• Citation - Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 172 (2007
• Court - Inter-American Court of Human Rights
• Date – 28 November, 2007
• Bench Sergio García Ramírez, President Cecilia Medina Quiroga, Vice-President
Manuel E. Ventura Robles, Judge Diego García-Sayán, Judge Leonardo A. Franco,
Judge Margarette May Macaulay, Judge Rhadys Abreu Blondet, Judge Pablo Saavedra
Alessandri, Secretary Emilia Segares Rodríguez, Deputy Secretary.
• Facts - Suriname (defendant) sold logging and mining concessions on the traditional
territory of the Saramaka people (plaintiff) without consulting the Saramaka. The Saramaka
brought an action in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights under the American
Convention on Human Rights (the convention).
• Conclusion of the judgement The Court found unanimously that Suriname had
violated: Article 21 (Right to Property), in relation to Articles 1(1) (Obligation to
Respect Rights) and 2 (Domestic Legal Effect) of the Convention, to the detriment of
the Saramaka people

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980
I.C.J. 3 (May 24)

• Case, cited in the context- Additionally, there can be no parallels drawn between the
present case and the case in USA v. Iran. In USA v. Iran, the Iranian government was
held responsible after Iranian militants attacked the American embassy in Tehran as the

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 Iranian government endorsed the actions of the militants after they attacked the
embassy. In the present case, there was no ex-post facto endorsement of the actions of
the activists by the Kingdom of Rongton. Citation no. 45, page 13
• Citation - 1980 I.C.J. 3
• Court - INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
• Date – 24 May, 1980
• Bench President Sir Humphrey Waldock ; Vice-President Elias ; Judges Forster, Gros,
Lachs, Morozov, Nagendra Singh, Ruda, Mosler, Tarazi, Oda, Ago, El-Erian, Sette-
Camara, Baxter ; Registrar Aquaron
• Facts - The case was brought before the Court by Application by the United States
following the occupation of its Embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants on 4 November
1979, and the capture and holding as hostages of its diplomatic and consular staff.
• Conclusion of the judgement It pointed out that while, during the events of 4
November 1979, the conduct of militants could not be directly attributed to the Iranian
State — for lack of sufficient information — that State had however done nothing to
prevent the attack, stop it before it reached its completion or oblige the militants to
withdraw from the premises and release the hostages.

DOMESTIC CASES

Centre for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) & Minority Rights Grp. Int’l (on behalf of
Endorois Welfare Council)

• Case, cited in the context- The African Commission’s ruling in Endorois v. Kenya
reinforces that relocation that severs spiritual and territorial ties constitutes cultural
harm, regardless of whether physical violence or direct assimilation occurs. Citation
no. 17, page 7
• Citation CMRD v. Kenya, Decision, Comm. 276/2003 (ACmHPR, Nov. 25, 2009)
• Court - African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 46th Session
• Date – 29 November, 2009
• Bench ACTING VICE-CHAIRPERSON: Reine Alapini-Gansou
COMMISSIONERS: Catherine Dupe Atoki, Musa Ngary Bitaye, Mohamed Fayek,
Mohamed Bechir Khalfallah, Soyata Maiga, Mumba Malila, Kayitesi Zainabo Sylvie,
Pansy Tlakula, Yeung Kam John Yeung Sik Yue

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 • Facts - The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights considered a
complaint brought by the Endorois community, an indigenous group forcibly removed
from their ancestral lands in Kenya to make way for a wildlife reserve. The community
alleged that the government acted without proper consultation, compensation, or
resettlement, and that the displacement disrupted their way of life, cultural practices,
and access to essential resources. They claimed violations of several provisions of the
African Charter, including the rights to property, culture, religion, natural resources,
and development.
• Conclusion of the judgement In its 2009 judgment, the African Commission found
that Kenya had violated the Endorois’ rights under the Charter. The Commission
emphasized that the community’s ancestral lands were central to their identity and
cultural survival and that their eviction without free, prior, and informed consent
breached international human rights standards. The Commission ordered Kenya to
restore the Endorois’ land, compensate them, and ensure their participation in decisions
affecting their development. This case marked a historic affirmation of indigenous
land and cultural rights within the African human rights framework.

Dickson Car Wheel Co. (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 669, 678 (Gen. Cl.
Comm’n 1931)

• Case used in the context In Dickson Car Wheel Company (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican
States, the Mexico-United States General Claims Commission held that in order for a
State to be attributed international responsibility, is necessary that “an unlawful
international act be imputed to it, that is, that there exists a violation of a duty imposed
by an international juridical standard”. Citation 50
• Summary: In Dickson Car Wheel Co. (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States (1931), the
U.S. company sought compensation for non-payment of goods—specifically, railroad
wheels—delivered to the Mexican government during the revolutionary period. The
case was heard by the U.S.–Mexico General Claims Commission, which had to decide
whether the revolutionary or de facto Mexican government’s failure to pay constituted
a breach of international obligations. The Commission held that even revolutionary
governments, once they come to power and benefit from prior transactions, assume
responsibility for those acts. It found Mexico liable, stating that failure to pay for goods

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legally delivered amounted to a denial of justice and a violation of international law.
This case affirmed the principle that a state may be held accountable for the commercial
obligations of its predecessor regimes, especially when it retains the benefits.

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