UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI

DISSERTATION

MASTER OF LAW (LL.M)

Under the guidance and supervision of

DR. UMESH ASWAR
&
DR. RAJESHRI N. VARHADI
University of Mumbai, Fort
On

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE VS. MEDIA

TRIALS: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE

SUBMITTED BY:
NAME: PRADIPKUMAR PRAKASHRAO DESHMANE
LL.M (SEMESTER IV) GROUP IV (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW)
ACADEMIC YEAR 2024-25
 PREFACE
Pursuant to the approval granted by the guiding Professor/in-charge Dr. Umesh
Aswar and Dr. Rajeshri Varhadi, the researcher has chosen the topic titled
"Presumption of Innocence vs. Media Trials: A Human Rights Perspective" as his
Dissertation for LL.M. Group IV (Human Rights Law), Semester-IV.

The principle of presumption of innocence is a cornerstone of criminal

jurisprudence and a fundamental human right recognized under both national and
international legal frameworks. It ensures that every accused person is treated as
innocent unless proven guilty by a competent court of law. However, the growing
influence of media—especially in high-profile criminal cases—has led to the rise
of media trials, where individuals are often judged and condemned in the court of
public opinion long before legal proceedings conclude. From a human rights
perspective, such trials severely undermine the right to a fair trial, the right to
dignity, and the presumption of innocence. In India, where media houses wield
substantial influence and often operate with little regulatory restraint, media trials
have, at times, resulted in reputational damage, psychological trauma, and public
prejudice against the accused, irrespective of the final judicial verdict. This conflict
raises serious concerns about the balance between freedom of the press and the
rights of individuals facing trial. This dissertation explores this tension through the
lens of human rights law, seeking to critically examine how judicial integrity and
individual freedoms can be protected in an age dominated by media sensationalism.

The researcher extends his thanks to his friends, seniors, family, and peers whose
unwavering encouragement and guidance proved instrumental throughout the
course of this academic journey.

PRADIPKUMAR PRAKASHRAO DESHMANE

LL.M. Semester IV Group IV Human Rights Law

 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the Dissertation titled “PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

VS. MEDIA TRIALS: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE” submitted by
“MR. PRADIPKUMAR PRAKASHRAO DESHMANE”, LL.M 2nd year, Group
IV, in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree in Masters
in Law (LL.M) with specialization in Human Rights and International Law at
Department of Law, University of Mumbai, is the product of research carried out
under my guidance and supervision. This research works has been conducted by
the researcher as per the research norm prescribed thereof and therefore
recommended to be submitted for evaluation.

DR. RAJESHRI VARHADI DR. UMESH ASWAR

Head of Department, Supervisor/Guide
Department of Law, Department of Law,
University of Mumbai University of Mumbai

Date:
Place: University of Mumbai
 DECLARATION

As required by University, I, Mr. Pradipkumar Prakashrao Deshmane, hereby

declare that the work embodied in this dissertation titled "PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE VS. MEDIA TRIALS: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE"
forms my own contribution to the research work carried out under the guidance of
Dr. Rajeshri Varhadi and Dr. Umesh Aswar at the University of Mumbai.

This work has been prepared for the partial fulfilment of the degree of Master of
Laws (LL.M.) and the same has not been previously submitted to any examination
of this University or any other University.

I further declare that the content of this project work is an outcome of my own
research work and same has never been reproduced from other source. The
reference taken are appropriately mentioned and properly acknowledged.

MR. PRADIPKUMAR PRAKASHRAO DESHMANE

(Researcher)

2nd Year, LL.M. Semester – IV

Group IV: Human Rights Law

Department of Law, University of Mumbai

Date:

Place: University of Mumbai

 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Rajeshri Varhadi, whose unwavering

support, scholarly insight, and invaluable guidance have been instrumental
throughout the course of this dissertation. Her mentorship has significantly
enriched my understanding of the subject and inspired me to approach the research
with a critical and human rights-oriented perspective.

I am equally thankful to Dr. Umesh Aswar for his constant encouragement,

constructive feedback, and thoughtful suggestions that have helped me refine my
work and maintain academic rigor. His insightful inputs have played a vital role in
shaping the final outcome of this research.

I am deeply indebted to both of them for their time, patience, and commitment in
guiding me through this academic endeavor. Their contribution has been central to
the successful completion of this dissertation.

MR. PRADIPKUMAR PRAKASHRAO DESHMANE

(Researcher)

2nd Year, LL.M. Semester – IV

Group IV: Human Rights Law

Department of Law, University of Mumbai

Date:

Place: University of Mumbai

 INDEX

[Link]. PARTICULARS PAGE NO.

1 INTRODUCTION 1-19

2 REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE 20-40

3 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (HISTORICAL 41-67

GROWTH OF THE RESEARCH)

4 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 68-112

5 ANALYSIS OF INDIAN LEGISLATION AND 113-153

GOVERNMENT POLICIES

6 JUDICIAL TRENDS/CASE LAWS 154-175

7 CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 176-184

8 BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES 185-187

 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. General Introduction

In a democratic society governed by the rule of law, the presumption of innocence

is a foundational principle of criminal jurisprudence — a safeguard ensuring that
an individual is considered innocent until proven guilty by a court of law. This
doctrine not only underpins the fair trial rights enshrined in national constitutions
and international human rights instruments but also reflects the moral compass of
a just society. However, in the age of 24/7 news cycles, viral social media, and
sensationalist reportage, this cardinal principle is increasingly under siege.

Media trials — where individuals are effectively pronounced guilty by the press
before any judicial verdict — pose a grave challenge to the integrity of the justice
system. While the media plays a vital role in disseminating information and holding
institutions accountable, its unchecked influence in criminal matters has often led
to public prejudice, character assassination, and erosion of the accused's rights. This
phenomenon creates a parallel court of public opinion, often based on incomplete
facts, speculation, and emotive narratives, undermining judicial neutrality and
fairness.

This dissertation seeks to explore the tension between the constitutional right to a
fair trial — specifically the presumption of innocence — and the growing practice
of media trials in India. It examines this clash through a human rights lens,
analyzing the legal, ethical, and societal dimensions involved. The study also
reflects on how international legal standards and comparative jurisprudence address
similar concerns, aiming to draw insights for potential reform and regulatory
frameworks.

In an era where perception often precedes proof, this dissertation poses a critical
question: Can justice truly be served when the court of law is overshadowed by the
court of media? The introduction sets the tone for an in-depth exploration of this

2
conflict, its implications for human dignity, and the need to strike a balance between
freedom of the press and the rights of the accused.

2. Definitions (Conceptual Analysis of Key Words)

 Presumption of Innocence: A legal doctrine enshrined under Article 11 of

the UDHR and Article 14(2) of the ICCPR, it ensures that the burden of
proof is on the prosecution and not the accused.

 Media Trial: Refers to the widespread media coverage and commentary on

legal proceedings or accusations, often resulting in public opinion forming
before a court judgment is passed.

 Human Rights Perspective: Involves evaluating state and non-state

actions through the lens of international human rights standards such as
right to fair trial, privacy, and dignity.

3. Historical Growth of the Research

Historically, the principle of presumption of innocence has evolved through

common law systems and international legal instruments. With the advent of
electronic and social media, media trials have emerged, particularly in high-profile
cases (e.g., Jessica Lal, Aarushi Talwar, and Sushant Singh Rajput cases in India).
This development has created a tension between two constitutional values: freedom
of the press and right to a fair trial.

4. Significance of Research

The significance of this research lies in its timely and critical examination of the
conflict between two powerful democratic principles: the right to a fair trial and

3
freedom of the press. In a fast-evolving media landscape where public narratives
are often shaped before formal investigations are complete, this study highlights
the urgent need to reassess the impact of media trials on the presumption of
innocence, a core tenet of human rights and criminal justice.

This research is particularly relevant to the Indian legal context, where high-profile
criminal cases frequently become media spectacles. By analyzing such instances
through legal and human rights frameworks, the study sheds light on how media
trials can lead to prejudicial public opinion, judicial interference, and irreparable
damage to the reputation and dignity of the accused — often violating Articles 14,
19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution.

Furthermore, this research contributes to the broader discourse on media

accountability and the ethics of journalism. It seeks to bridge the gap between legal
safeguards and media conduct, advocating for regulatory and policy measures that
can preserve both freedom of expression and the integrity of the judicial process.

On a theoretical level, this dissertation adds value to the existing body of

scholarship by incorporating a comparative and human rights perspective,
exploring how international jurisdictions have addressed similar tensions, and
proposing reforms suitable for the Indian context.

Ultimately, the research aspires to serve as a resource for legal professionals,

policymakers, journalists, and scholars, fostering a balanced approach where justice
is not only done but is seen to be done — free from media-induced prejudice and
public hysteria.

5. Aims And Objectives of The Research

Aims:

The primary aim of this research is to critically examine the conflict between the
presumption of innocence and the practice of media trials from a human rights
perspective, with a focus on the Indian legal system and relevant international

4
standards. The study seeks to evaluate how unregulated media coverage affects
the fundamental rights of the accused and to explore legal and policy measures
that can strike a balance between freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial.

Objectives:

1. To analyze the legal concept of presumption of innocence as enshrined in

the Indian Constitution, criminal law, and international human rights
instruments.

2. To examine the role and influence of media — both print and electronic
— in shaping public opinion in criminal cases.

3. To evaluate the impact of media trials on the right to a fair trial, due
process, judicial independence, and the human dignity of the accused.

4. To review landmark judgments and case studies from Indian and

international courts that deal with media trials and their consequences.

5. To assess the legal and ethical responsibilities of the media in reporting

ongoing criminal proceedings.

6. To explore regulatory mechanisms, guidelines, and best practices from

comparative jurisdictions to address media overreach.

7. To recommend balanced and constitutionally sound reforms that can

protect the rights of the accused while preserving the freedom of the press.

6. Scope And Limitations of The Research

Scope:

1. Thematic Focus:
This research focuses on the legal and human rights implications of media

5
 trials in the context of the presumption of innocence. It examines how pre-
trial media coverage affects the rights of the accused, the integrity of
judicial proceedings, and the broader principles of natural justice.

2. Jurisdictional Focus:
While the primary focus is on the Indian legal system, the research also
includes comparative analysis of selected jurisdictions such as the United
Kingdom, United States, and Canada to understand global approaches
toward regulating media conduct during criminal proceedings.

3. Legal Frameworks Analyzed:

The study critically examines provisions of the Indian Constitution, the
Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), relevant
sections of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and international human
rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

4. Judicial Precedents:
The research reviews landmark Indian and international case laws where
courts have addressed the impact of media coverage on ongoing trials and
the rights of the accused.

Limitations:

1. Jurisdictional Constraints:
The study does not provide an exhaustive analysis of all global legal
systems. The comparative analysis is limited to select jurisdictions with
well-documented jurisprudence on media trials.

2. Media Coverage Selection:

The research primarily considers high-profile criminal cases that received
substantial media attention. Lesser-known cases or vernacular media
coverage may not be comprehensively covered.

6
 3. Empirical Data:
The study is doctrinal and analytical in nature. It does not involve primary
empirical research such as interviews, surveys, or quantitative analysis due
to constraints of time and resources.

4. Technological Scope:
While the role of traditional and digital media is discussed, the study may
not fully delve into emerging forms of media such as AI-generated news
or algorithm-driven content dissemination, which could be areas for future
research.

7. Utility of The Research

This research holds significant utility across academic, legal, institutional, and
policy-making domains. By critically analyzing the clash between presumption of
innocence and media trials from a human rights perspective, it contributes to a
deeper understanding of how legal protections can be upheld in the face of
increasing media influence.

1. Academic Contribution:

The dissertation adds to the body of interdisciplinary scholarship at the intersection

of criminal law, constitutional law, media ethics, and human rights. It provides a
nuanced and comparative framework for students, researchers, and academicians
interested in the evolving relationship between media freedom and judicial fairness.

2. Legal and Judicial Relevance:

The study highlights pressing concerns for judges, advocates, and legal
practitioners regarding media influence on sub judice matters. It reinforces the
importance of safeguarding judicial independence and the accused’s rights in the
face of public opinion shaped by premature media narratives.

3. Policy and Legislative Insight:

7
This research can inform law commissions, parliamentary committees, and
regulatory authorities such as the Press Council of India about the need for clear,
constitutionally compliant guidelines to prevent trial by media. It also proposes
policy reforms that can balance freedom of expression with the right to a fair trial.

4. Media Ethics and Professional Practice:

For journalists, editors, and media houses, this study serves as a resource to
understand the legal and ethical boundaries of reporting on criminal proceedings.
It encourages responsible journalism that respects both public interest and
individual rights.

5. Public Awareness and Civic Literacy:

By demystifying legal concepts like presumption of innocence and contempt of

court, the research can help educate the public about their role in maintaining the
sanctity of legal processes and resisting media sensationalism.

8. Research Questions

This study is guided by the following core questions that aim to explore the tension
between media practices and fundamental legal rights in the Indian and comparative
contexts:

1. What is the legal significance of the presumption of innocence in the Indian

criminal justice system and international human rights law?

2. How do media trials impact the right of an accused to a fair trial and the
broader principle of natural justice?

3. To what extent does media coverage influence public perception, judicial

proceedings, and the ultimate outcome of cases in India?

4. What are the existing legal safeguards, constitutional provisions, and

judicial guidelines in India to curb trial by media?

8
 5. How have courts in India and other democracies like the UK, USA, and
Canada addressed conflicts between media freedom and the right to a fair
trial?

6. What regulatory reforms or policy recommendations can be suggested to

strike a balance between freedom of the press and the protection of the
accused’s human rights?

9. Formulation of Hypothesis

The research is based on the assumption that there exists a significant and growing
conflict between the principle of presumption of innocence and the practice of
media trials, which poses a threat to the right to a fair trial and the dignity of the
accused. The hypotheses formulated for the purpose of this study are as follows:

Primary Hypothesis:

 Media trials adversely affect the presumption of innocence and undermine

the accused’s fundamental right to a fair trial as guaranteed under Indian
constitutional law and international human rights instruments.

Secondary Hypotheses:

1. There is a lack of effective legal and regulatory frameworks in India to

prevent media interference in subjudice matters.

2. Media coverage in high-profile criminal cases often leads to public

prejudice and judicial pressure, compromising the neutrality of the legal
process.

3. International jurisdictions have adopted more effective checks and balances

to manage the conflict between media freedom and fair trial rights, which
can offer useful models for reform in India.

9
 4. A balanced approach can be achieved through judicial guidelines,
legislative action, and ethical journalism that respects both freedom of the
press and the rights of the accused.

10. Research Methodology

The methodology adopted for this dissertation is doctrinal and analytical, with a
strong focus on legal interpretation, case law analysis, constitutional provisions,
and international human rights standards. The study is grounded in qualitative
research methods and primarily involves critical examination of secondary sources.

1. Nature of the Research:

 Doctrina Research:

This research involves the systematic study of legal principles, statutes, judicial
decisions, constitutional provisions, and academic literature related to the
presumption of innocence, media trials, and human rights.

 Analytical Research:

A critical analysis is conducted to understand the interaction between media

practices and legal safeguards, including how media trials have shaped public
perception and judicial discourse in high-profile criminal cases.

2. Sources of Data:

 Primary Sources:

o The Constitution of India (especially Articles 14, 19, and 21)

o The Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Code of Criminal Procedure

(CrPC)

o The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

o Landmark Judgments of Indian courts and international courts (e.g.,

ECHR, UK Supreme Court, US Supreme Court)

10
 o International Instruments such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)

 Secondary Sources:

o Books, academic journals, and commentaries on criminal law,

media law, and human rights

o Reports by the Law Commission of India, Press Council of India,

and human rights organizations

o Media articles, editorials, and investigative journalism accounts for

selected case studies

o Comparative legal literature from jurisdictions like the UK, USA,

and Canada

3. Tools and Techniques:

 Legal Interpretation: To understand and interpret statutory and

constitutional provisions relevant to the subject matter.

 Case Law Analysis: In-depth study of judicial precedents where courts have
ruled on matters involving media interference and fair trial rights.

 Comparative Study: To analyze how other legal systems balance media

freedom with the presumption of innocence.

 Doctrinal Critique: To evaluate existing laws, suggest reforms, and assess

their practical utility from a rights-based perspective.

4. Method of Citation:

 The dissertation follows the Bluebook (20th Edition) citation format for
uniformity and academic integrity.

5. Limitations:

11
  The study is limited to qualitative analysis and does not involve empirical
methods such as interviews, field studies, or surveys due to time and
resource constraints.

 Focus is placed on high-profile cases where media influence has been

prominent, rather than an exhaustive review of all criminal trials.

11. Sources of Information

This research draws upon a wide array of primary and secondary sources to develop
a well-rounded and authoritative analysis of the conflict between media trials and
the presumption of innocence, from both legal and human rights perspectives.

1. Primary Sources:

These include legal documents, statutes, judicial decisions, and international

instruments that directly inform the core of the research:

 Statutory Provisions:

o Constitution of India – Articles 14, 19(1)(a), and 21

o Indian Penal Code, 1860

o Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

o Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

o Press Council Act, 1978

 Judicial Pronouncements:

o Landmark judgments from the Supreme Court of India and High

Courts

o Relevant decisions from foreign courts (UK, US, Canada) and

international bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights

 International Human Rights Instruments:

12
 o Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948

o International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966

2. Secondary Sources:

These provide interpretation, context, and critical commentary on the legal issues
discussed:

 Books and Treatises:

o Commentaries on criminal law, media law, and human rights law by

reputed scholars and jurists

o Textbooks on constitutional law and principles of natural justice

 Academic Journals and Law Reviews:

o Indian Journal of Constitutional Law

o National Law School of India Review

o Harvard Human Rights Journal

o Journal of Media Law & Ethics

o Articles from databases such as JSTOR, HeinOnline, and SCC

Online

 Reports and Policy Documents:

o Reports of the Law Commission of India (e.g., 200th Report on Trial

by Media)

o Guidelines by the Press Council of India and News Broadcasting

Standards Authority (NBSA)

o Reports by NHRC and international NGOs like Human Rights

Watch or Article 19

 Media Coverage and Case Studies:

13
 o News articles, editorials, and opinion pieces from leading national
and international media houses (e.g., The Hindu, Indian Express,
BBC, The Guardian)

o Documented instances of high-profile media trials in India (e.g.,

Aarushi Talwar case, Sushant Singh Rajput case, etc.)

3. Online Resources and Legal Databases:

 Legal Databases:

o SCC Online

o Manupatra

o Indian Kanoon

o Westlaw & LexisNexis (for comparative research)

 Government & Institutional Websites:

o Supreme Court of India ([Link]

o Law Commission of India ([Link]

o Ministry of Law and Justice ([Link]

o Press Council of India ([Link]

12. Developments

The dissertation will consider recent legal and policy developments:

 Supreme Court guidelines on media reporting.

 Law Commission of India’s 200th report on trial by media.

 Recommendations by the Press Council of India.

 Impact of digital media and social media platforms on public perception and
judicial outcomes.

14
General Scheme of Chapterization

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

 Overview: Introduces the tension between the legal doctrine of presumption of

innocence and the practice of media trials in India.

 Key Concepts: Defines core terms — presumption of innocence, media trial,

human rights perspective.

 Importance: Highlights constitutional and international legal standards

(Articles 14, 19, 21 of Indian Constitution; Article 11 of UDHR, Article 14 of
ICCPR).

 Context: Rise of 24/7 news, social media, and public perception shaping guilt
before court verdicts.

 Objectives & Questions: Lays out doctrinal, comparative, and reform-oriented

aims with clear research questions and methodology.

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURES

 Scope: Comprehensive doctrinal and jurisprudential review of scholarly

writings, legal instruments, and case law.

 Themes Reviewed:

 Presumption of Innocence: Historical roots, global legal norms, Indian

case law.
 Media Trials: Evolution, influence on public perception, distortion of fair
trial.

15
  Human Rights Frameworks: Analysis of ICCPR, UDHR, ECHR cases
like Allenet de Ribemont v. France.
 Judicial Commentary: Rulings in Sahara v. SEBI, R.K. Anand, Jessica
Lal case.

 Conclusion: Establishes the need for enforceable media ethics and legal reform
due to recurring infringement of fair trial rights.

CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (INCLUDE HISTORY AND ITS

DEVELOPMENT)

 3.1 to 3.6: Explores the historical evolution of the presumption of innocence

from Roman law to Indian constitutional interpretation.

 Media’s Legal Role: Tracks the media's shift from objective reporting to active
interference (e.g., post-liberalization India).

 Emergence of Conflict: Chronicles friction between media and judiciary in

landmark Indian cases like Aarushi Talwar, Sushant Singh Rajput, Jessica Lal.

 Global Comparisons: Refers to UK, US, and ECHR responses and their
historical roots.

 Conclusion: Urges for contextual understanding of how historical

developments have led to today’s legal-media collision.

CHAPTER 4: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

 Comparative Jurisdictions:

16
  USA: First vs Sixth Amendment tensions, Sheppard v. Maxwell and use of
gag orders.
 UK: Contempt of Court Act, 1981, strict liability doctrine.
 Canada: Charter Sections 2 & 11(d), Dagenais v. CBC.
 Australia/New Zealand: Suppression orders, media protocols.

 International Human Rights:

 UDHR Article 11(1), ICCPR Article 14(2), General Comment No. 13.

 Global Best Practices: Synthesizes lessons for India from different systems to
manage prejudicial media.

 Conclusion: Emphasizes universality of the conflict and urges human rights-

based reform in India.

CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF INDIAN LEGISLATION AND GOVERNMENT

POLICIES

 Legal Framework: Covers IPC, CrPC, Indian Evidence Act, Contempt of

Courts Act.

 Media-Specific Regulations: PCI Act, IT Act & Rules 2021, Cable TV Act.

 Judicial Response: Analyzes landmark cases like Sahara v. SEBI, Romila

Thapar v. UOI.

 Challenges: Lack of binding codes, weak enforcement, digital loopholes.

 Recommendations: Proposes SOPs, statutory reform, digital media rules,

ethical journalism education.

17
CHAPTER 6: JUDICIAL TRENDS/CASE LAWS

 Indian Cases:

 Sahara India Real Estate v. SEBI (postponement orders).

 R.K. Anand v. Registrar (sting operations and judicial interference).
 Arun Jaitley v. State of UP (criticism vs contempt).
 Romila Thapar v. UOI (leaks and presumption of innocence).
 Media-influenced trials: Jessica Lal, Sheena Bora, Sanjay Dutt, etc.

 Judicial Themes:

 Recognition of media’s power.

 Limits on press freedom when fair trial is at risk.
 Gaps in enforcement of media accountability.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

 Conclusion:

 Affirms erosion of fair trial rights due to media overreach.

 Urges a recalibration of constitutional values — balancing Articles 19 and
21.

 Recommendations:

 Enact Media Conduct Law.

 Strengthen PCI.
 Create independent media regulator.
 Codify judicial SOPs.
 Train judges and police.
 Extend digital accountability.

18
 Adopt international best practices.

19
 CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE

20
 CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE

Chapter 2.1: Understanding the Presumption of Innocence

The presumption of innocence is one of the foundational principles of criminal

jurisprudence and a key element of fair trial rights under both domestic and
international human rights frameworks. At its core, it guarantees that an
individual accused of a crime is to be treated as innocent until proven guilty by a
court of law. This principle is not only procedural in nature but also philosophical
and ethical, reinforcing the inherent dignity and worth of the individual in the face
of state prosecution.

Historical Origins

The roots of the presumption of innocence can be traced to Roman law,

particularly the maxim “Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat”—the
burden of proof lies upon him who affirms, not on him who denies. The concept
evolved significantly during the Enlightenment era. Thinkers like Sir William
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769)1, famously
asserted: “It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”
This principle became a cornerstone of liberal legal traditions.

In modern law, the doctrine gained widespread acceptance through constitutional

protections and international human rights instruments. The development of
adversarial legal systems in common law jurisdictions embedded the presumption
of innocence into procedural safeguards and criminal trial processes.

1
[Link]

21
International Human Rights Instruments

The presumption of innocence is enshrined in major international legal

documents:

Article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948):

“Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law in a public trial…”

Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966):

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.”

Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950):

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until

proved guilty according to law.”

These provisions collectively emphasize that the burden of proof is on the

prosecution, and no person should be treated as guilty before a lawful conviction.

The Presumption of Innocence in Indian Law

Though not explicitly stated in the Indian Constitution, the presumption of

innocence is implicitly protected under Article 21—the right to life and personal
liberty. The Indian judiciary has reaffirmed this principle as part of the right to a
fair trial.

22
In Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 6992, the Supreme Court stated
that “presumption of innocence is a human right.” It further elaborated that this
right is a part of Article 21, and the State must justify its interference with liberty
through a fair, just, and reasonable procedure.

Similarly, in State of U.P. v. Naresh (2011) 4 SCC 3243, the Court emphasized
that the burden lies on the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and until that is done, the accused must be presumed innocent.

Additional procedural protections reinforcing this principle are enshrined in the

Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), such as:

Section 313: Allows the accused to explain circumstances appearing against them.

Section 437 and 439: Deal with the grant of bail, underlining that detention before
conviction must be the exception, not the rule.

Section 101–104 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Lay down the burden of
proof, placing it squarely on the prosecution.

Burden and Standard of Proof

The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to establish guilt. The standard is
“beyond reasonable doubt”—a high threshold that reflects the seriousness of

2
AIR 2004 SUPREME COURT 3249
3
2011 AIR SCW 1877

23
depriving someone of their liberty. The presumption of innocence operates to
ensure that unless this standard is met, an accused cannot be punished.

In V. D. Jhangan v. State of U.P. AIR 1966 SC 1762, the Supreme Court held that
suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of legal proof.

This presumption continues until the completion of all stages of appeal. Even a
conviction by a trial court does not extinguish the presumption of innocence
entirely until all appellate remedies are exhausted.

Presumption in Practice: Limitations and Challenges

While the principle is well-established, its application is often undermined in

practice. Several laws in India create statutory presumptions which shift the
burden of proof to the accused. For example:

Section 113A and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act presume abetment of suicide
and dowry death under specific circumstances.

Section 29 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act,

2012 and Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS)
Act shift the burden to the accused.

The Supreme Court has expressed concerns about such reverse burden clauses,
cautioning that while they may serve legislative intent, they must be interpreted
strictly to avoid violating Article 21.

24
In State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar4, the Court reiterated that while
statutory presumptions are constitutional, they must be exercised within a
framework that ensures fair trial rights.

Presumption of Innocence vs. Social Perception

One of the most pressing contemporary issues is the erosion of this principle due
to media influence, public opinion, and political narratives. The portrayal of an
accused as guilty before trial, especially in high-profile cases, creates a parallel
trial by media. This prejudicial coverage leads to a societal presumption of guilt,
effectively reversing the legal principle.

Moreover, such social convictions affect employment, reputation, and even

judicial neutrality. An accused person, even if acquitted later, may suffer
irreversible damage to their dignity and standing—raising serious human rights
concerns.

Conclusion

The presumption of innocence is a vital safeguard in the criminal justice system,

essential to protecting the liberty and dignity of individuals. While Indian and
international law recognize and uphold this principle, its application is
increasingly challenged by statutory presumptions, public perception, and media
narratives. Upholding this right requires a delicate balance between justice,
freedom, and the need for responsible governance by both the State and civil
society actors.

4
1952 AIR 75, 1952 SCR 284

25
To maintain the integrity of the justice system, it is imperative that the
presumption of innocence not only remains a legal doctrine but also becomes an
integral part of public and institutional consciousness.

Chapter 2.2: Media Trials – Review of Existing Literature

Introduction

The intersection of criminal justice and media reportage has drawn increasing
attention from scholars, legal commentators, and human rights advocates. As the
traditional role of journalism expands into quasi-adjudicatory realms, the
phenomenon of media trials—where suspects are publicly scrutinized and
portrayed as guilty before judicial verdicts—has raised fundamental concerns about
due process and the right to a fair trial. This section reviews academic literature,
judicial pronouncements, and international scholarship that have explored the
implications of media trials on presumption of innocence and human rights
protections.

1. Scholarly Perspectives on Media Trials and Trial by Media

Several scholars have extensively addressed the role of the media in shaping public
perception of accused persons during ongoing investigations or trials.

 Tharini. R (2007) in “Media Trial and its Impact on Administration of

Justice” (Journal of the Indian Law Institute)5 argued that the blurring lines
between legal adjudication and media portrayal pose a real threat to natural
justice. Singh contends that televised media, in particular, often fails to
maintain neutrality, frequently sensationalizing high-profile cases and
compromising the judicial process.

5
[Link]

26
  M.P. Jain and S.N. Jain in their work on Indian constitutional law have
emphasized the tension between freedom of the press under Article
19(1)(a) and the right to a fair trial under Article 21. They note that while
press freedom is vital to democracy, it cannot be absolute when it
encroaches upon other fundamental rights.
 The IJIRL article “Media Trials: Investigative Journalism vs. Right to
Fair Trial”6 critically explores how modern media—spanning television,
cable networks, online platforms, and social media—often conducts its own
court of public opinion, effectively undermining the presumption of
innocence and right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution. The authors analyze how sensationalist reporting, particularly
in cases like Sushant Singh Rajput’s, exerts undue influence not only on
public perception but also on the judiciary and investigative agencies,
potentially biasing outcomes. Drawing on Cardozo’s insight that judges are
not immune from societal currents, the article argues that media-led trials
may pressure judicial decision-making. Although acknowledging the
indispensability of a free press in a democracy, it underscores that
unchecked media freedom, absent effective regulatory checks, can
transform journalism from public service into a threat to justice. The
comparative dimension—looking at other jurisdictions—reinforces the
urgency of judicial and legislative interventions to balance media autonomy
with due process rights.
 Avanthika Reddy's IJLSSS piece, “The Fourth Pillar on Trial: Press
Freedom and Media Ethics,”7 critically examines tensions between media
independence and fair trial rights in India. It traces how the evolutionary
role of the press—stemming from its recognition as the “fourth pillar” of
democracy—has collided with imperatives for impartial justice. Using
examples such as Sheppard v. Maxwell in the U.S. and the Derek Chauvin

6
[Link]
7
[Link]
ethics/?utm_source=[Link]

27
 trial, the article illustrates how judicial systems employ procedural remedies
to mitigate media-induced prejudice. It underscores the structural imbalance
within India’s constitutional framework, where Article 19(1)(a) (free
speech) often overrides Article 21 (right to fair trial), despite safeguards like
the Contempt of Courts Act and judicial postponement orders . High-profile
domestic cases—such as those involving Aryan Khan and Sushant Singh
Rajput—reveal how sensationalist coverage may shape public sentiment,
investigatory conduct, and even judicial decision-making. To remedy this,
Reddy advocates for a collaborative regulatory response: empowering
bodies like the Press Council of India, enforcing contempt proceedings, and
promoting media literacy so that the press can fulfill its democratic mandate
without compromising justice.

2. Media Trials and the Doctrine of Presumption of Innocence

The presumption of innocence is a legal right recognized in both common law and
international jurisprudence. Scholars have noted that media trials directly violate
this foundational principle.

 The article “Media Trials and the Erosion of Presumption of Innocence”

by Jaimini Kumar Sahu8 offers a critical assessment of how intense media
coverage in India compromises the foundational criminal justice principle
that an accused is innocent until proven guilty. Drawing on landmark cases
like Aarushi‑Hemraj and Sushant Singh Rajput, the authors argue that
sensationalist reporting—including unverified leaks, speculative narratives,
and real-time courtroom commentary—creates a prejudicial public
discourse that often precedes and potentially taints judicial outcomes (e.g.,
undue influence on witnesses, investigators, and judges). The work
interweaves domestic legal standards (Articles 19 and 21 of the Indian
Constitution, the Contempt of Courts Act, and sub‑judice doctrine) with

8
[Link]
[Link]

28
 international norms like UDHR Article 11 and ICCPR Article 14,
underscoring the disparity between aspirational legal guarantees and media
practice. It further critiques legislative–institutional gaps—such as
ineffective self-regulation by the Press Council of India—and calls for
binding statutory guidelines and judicial oversight to shield fairness and
safeguard individual dignity and due process.
 The Daily Star’s piece “Media Exposure and Presumption of
Innocence”9 critically assesses how early and extensive media coverage of
suspects can severely undermine their right to be treated as innocent until
proven guilty under fair trial standards. It highlights not only legal
implications—such as prejudicing judicial outcomes and violating sub-
judice principles—but also explores the profound personal consequences
for the accused, including social stigma, mental health challenges,
disruption in interpersonal relationships, and employment obstacles, which
can persist even after acquittal. Notably, the article draws attention to the
even greater vulnerability of juveniles, whose identities are often exposed
prematurely, resulting in long-term reputational harm and undermining of
their rehabilitation prospects. It ultimately calls for a recalibration of media
ethics and stronger protective mechanisms—legal, regulatory, and
restorative—to preserve both justice and the dignity of individuals under
trial.
 The PPT titled “Trial by Media: Legal & Constitutional Framework”10
systematically examines the intersection of media freedom and fair-trial
rights in India, framing "media trials" as coverage that shapes public
perceptions of guilt prior to judicial verdicts. It outlines the doctrine of
postponement, where courts can temporarily restrict or delay media
reporting to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings, citing cases such
as Sahara India v. SEBI and Anukul Chandra Pradhan v. Union of India.

9
[Link]
innocence-3550671
10
[Link]
[Link]

29
 The presentation highlights how even unconscious exposure to media
narratives can influence judicial officers—as acknowledged in P.C. Sen
re—and underscores the judiciary’s active role in regulating press overreach
via contempt laws. Additionally, it details India’s statutory framework
governing media conduct (e.g., Articles 19(1)(a), Contempt of Courts Act,
Press Council Act, IT Rules 2021), while also pointing to significant case
law like Nilesh Navlakha and Manu Sharma that confirms the need for
responsible reporting. Overall, the PPT contributes a well-structured
synthesis of legal doctrines, case law, and statutory safeguards—
demonstrating how the judiciary employs postponement and contempt to
strike a balance between press freedom and the presumption of innocence.

3. Judicial Observations and Legal Literature

Judicial commentary has itself contributed significantly to the academic discourse

on media trials. Several judgments serve as reference points in the literature.

 In Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. & Ors. v. SEBI (2012–13)11, the
Supreme Court addressed how premature media exposure of internal legal
communications—specifically, a confidential security proposal sent
between Sahara and SEBI counsel—violated principles of presumption of
innocence, privacy, and dignity of involved parties. The Court condemned
the media’s publication of sensitive draft documents, noting it interfered
with the administration of justice and potentially prejudiced fair hearing.
The ruling emphasized that while fair reporting is permissible, disclosure of
documents from sub judice proceedings without court sanction is
impermissible. The Court thus encouraged the formulation of clear judicial
guidelines to manage media conduct in pending cases, underscoring a

11
AIR 2012 SUPREME COURT 3829

30
 necessary balance between Article 19(1)(a) freedom of expression and
Article 21 right to fair trial.
 In R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009)12, the Supreme
Court of India grappled with the implications of a high-profile sting
operation by NDTV during the protracted BMW hit-and-run trial. The
broadcast revealed defense counsel R.K. Anand apparently attempting to
influence a key witness—Sunil Kulkarni—marking one of the most
significant instances where media coverage intersected with judicial
proceedings. The Delhi High Court found Anand guilty of criminal
contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, temporarily
stripping him of court practice and seniority. The Supreme Court upheld the
conviction, underscoring the gravity of “suborning a court witness” and
affirming the standard of proof in contempt proceedings—even if sui
generis—must meet “beyond reasonable doubt”. Crucially, the Court
acknowledged that while sting journalism serves public interest, its exercise
must not jeopardize the integrity of the judicial process or undermine the
presumption of innocence, reinforcing that media intervention cannot usurp
judicial [Link] scholars such as Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer have
written extensively on trial by media as a perversion of justice, arguing that
the press must not substitute the judge, nor should it undermine the judicial
process through selective leaks and emotive coverage.

4. International Literature and Comparative Studies

The issue of media trials is not unique to India, and international legal literature has
addressed similar challenges.

12
[Link]

31
  The SCC Online essay “Trial by Media: An International
Perspective”13 offers a comprehensive comparative overview, highlighting
the pervasive threat posed by media—especially television and digital
platforms—to the right to a fair trial. The author surveys pivotal legal
frameworks in liberal democracies, including contempt rules in the UK, gag
orders and jury protections in the U.S., and Article 6 safeguards in the
European Convention on Human Rights. Drawing on landmark cases like
Sheppard v. Maxwell, where prejudicial publicity was found to compromise
judicial impartiality, the article emphasizes that freedom of expression must
yield where it endangers due process. In India’s context, it critiques the
inadequacy of self‑regulatory mechanisms to curb sensationalist reporting
and urges a shift toward enforceable statutes to balance media autonomy
with procedural fairness.
 The article “Media Trial: Balancing Press Freedom and the Right to a
Fair Trial” from IJFMR14 critically examines how media coverage—
through sensational reporting, speculation, and dramatization—can distort
public perception and challenge the criminal justice process by effectively
conducting a parallel trial before the court delivers its verdict. It emphasizes
the media’s vital democratic role as the “fourth estate” in promoting
transparency and accountability, yet warns that unchecked media influence
can erode core legal principles such as the presumption of innocence and
fairness in judiciary proceedings. By citing high-profile examples like the
O.J. Simpson and Jessica Lal trials, the authors illustrate how extensive
media trials can sway public sentiment, pressure legal actors, and precipitate
biased outcomes. The article concludes with recommendations for ethical
journalism standards, bolstered legal protections, and calibrated regulation
to preserve both press freedom and the integrity of trials in the digital age.

13
[Link]
perspective/
14
[Link]

32
  The IJLMH article “Trial by Media: An Overview”15 critically
investigates how media outlets, especially television and digital platforms,
often assume judicial roles—rendering verdicts on individuals before courts
do—thereby threatening the presumption of innocence and fair trial rights.
The authors underline the Supreme Court’s stance that media and the
judiciary must remain within separate domains, warning that media should
facilitate public information, not supplant judicial functions. They advocate
for stronger press accountability, calling for clearer legal parameters—
beyond existing self-regulatory and contempt mechanisms—to prevent
media trials from swinging public opinion, prejudicing legal outcomes, and
generating miscarriages of justice. “Civil Liberties and Human Rights in
England and Wales” criticizes the UK media for undermining fair trial
rights, particularly under the tension between Article 10 (freedom of
expression) and Article 6 (fair trial) of the ECHR.

5. Ethical and Regulatory Discussions in Literature

Academic writing has also examined the lack of enforceable ethical norms and
regulatory gaps:

 Rajeev Dhavan (2008)16 critiques Indian media ethics in The Hindu and
academic papers, emphasizing the need for statutory guidelines that restrict
prejudicial reporting without curbing free speech.
 Madhavi Goradia Divan in her book “Facets of Media Law” (2nd ed.,
2013)17 outlines how Indian media is governed by a patchwork of self-

15
[Link]
16
[Link]
indians/[Link]
17
[Link]
divan?products_id=930&srsltid=AfmBOoqR_-
t82t8CkLHWbOAElqeyaAWFW8K4quA1xOqX9ZwGdmpMGpy2

33
 regulation, which is largely ineffective in curbing overreach. She advocates
for judicially enforced ethical frameworks with accountability mechanisms.
 Scholars from the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS)18 have discussed
the unique challenge posed by social media platforms, where
misinformation spreads rapidly and often escapes traditional media
regulation frameworks. Their papers call for urgent reform in digital media
ethics.

Conclusion

The reviewed literature overwhelmingly demonstrates that while the media plays a
crucial role in transparency and democratic accountability, unchecked media
trials can seriously undermine the presumption of innocence, fair trial rights,
and judicial impartiality. Academic consensus leans toward the need for a
balanced regulatory regime, ethical journalism, and clear judicial guidelines to
prevent media from overstepping its informational role into adjudicatory territory.

This review shows that although various scholars and judgments have engaged with
the issue, there remains a pressing need for more empirical, doctrinal, and policy-
focused research to formulate a comprehensive legal response to media trials in the
Indian context.

Chapter 2.3: Presumption of Innocence and Right to Fair Trial –

A Doctrinal and Jurisprudential Review

Introduction

The presumption of innocence is a cornerstone of modern criminal jurisprudence,

ensuring that no individual is treated as guilty unless proven so by a court of law,

18
[Link]

34
through fair and transparent legal processes. Recognized globally as a
fundamental human right, this doctrine is enshrined in international human rights
instruments and is central to constitutional democracies. This chapter undertakes a
literature review of academic writings, legal doctrines, and jurisprudential
interpretations related to the presumption of innocence and its deep-seated
connection with the right to a fair trial. It also analyzes how these principles are
articulated and protected within Indian law, while drawing comparative insights
from global legal systems.

1. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Presumption of Innocence

Legal scholars have long asserted that the presumption of innocence is not merely
a procedural device but a substantive human right with ethical and moral roots in
the principles of natural justice.

Andrew Ashworth (2006), in his foundational work “Principles of Criminal Law”,

argues that the presumption of innocence represents a moral imperative: to treat
every accused person with dignity and restraint until the full weight of legal
procedures has confirmed guilt. It is not a privilege but a manifestation of human
rights.

Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman (2004) emphasize that the burden of proof
lies squarely on the prosecution, and any presumption to the contrary would
undermine the adversarial system and open the door to arbitrary justice.

In the Indian context, Justice H.R. Khanna has been an outspoken proponent of
this doctrine, stating that the State's failure to safeguard the innocent from
stigmatization and premature judgment is an affront to democratic values.

2. Constitutional and Statutory Framework in India

India does not explicitly mention the presumption of innocence in the

Constitution, but it is considered implicit under Article 21 (Right to Life and

35
Personal Liberty) and supported by procedural law under the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 and Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act codifies the rule that the burden of proof
lies on the party asserting guilt. This aligns with the global principle ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat—the burden is on one who asserts, not on one
who denies.

Scholars such as Madhava Menon and Nandita Haksar have argued that
procedural safeguards under Indian criminal law are insufficiently enforced,
particularly during arrest, pre-trial detention, and bail hearings, where media
pressure and institutional bias often eclipse the presumption of innocence.

R. vs. Oakes (1986)19 from Canada and Woolmington vs. DPP (1935)20 from the
UK are often cited in Indian judgments to reinforce the constitutional value of
presumed innocence and the prosecution’s duty to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

3. Judicial Interpretations: Indian and Comparative Jurisprudence

Indian courts have repeatedly affirmed the centrality of the presumption of

innocence, although its practical enforcement remains inconsistent.

In Narendra Singh & Anr. v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699, the Supreme
Court declared that “the burden always lies on the prosecution and never shifts.”
The presumption is only rebuttable under specific statutory exceptions.

The case of State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan (2004) raised critical
questions about media trials interfering with the judicial process and whether pre-

19
[Link]
20
[Link]

36
trial assumptions of guilt amounted to contempt of court. Though acquitted, the
case illustrated how public narratives often undermine procedural protections.

In re: Vijay Kurle (2020), the Court warned that public campaigns branding
accused individuals as guilty, without legal conclusion, violate the right to dignity
and a fair trial.

Internationally, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Allenet de

Ribemont v. France (1995) held that public officials commenting on guilt before
judicial determination violate Article 6(2) of the ECHR.

4. Challenges in Upholding the Presumption of Innocence

Academic literature points out that the application of this doctrine faces several
systemic challenges:

Prolonged Pre-trial Detention: Scholars such as K.T.S. Tulsi and Flavia Agnes
critique India's bail jurisprudence, where undertrial prisoners—often from
marginalized communities—are imprisoned for years without conviction, thereby
effectively reversing the presumption of innocence.

Media Narratives: As detailed in Justice Dipak Misra’s observations, the

presumption of innocence is severely compromised when the media declares guilt
ahead of the courts, often leading to public pressure that influences legal
processes.

Legislative Exceptions: Some statutes, such as the NDPS Act, UAPA, and
POCSO, reverse the burden of proof under certain conditions, drawing criticism
from scholars who argue this dilutes the universality of the presumption principle.

5. International Legal Instruments and Their Influence

37
The presumption of innocence is enshrined in several international legal
instruments, which have been used in comparative jurisprudence and academic
commentary to critique and guide Indian law.

Article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that
"Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law in a public trial."

Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
reiterates the same, and India, being a signatory, is bound to uphold it in spirit.

The UN Human Rights Committee (General Comment No. 13) emphasizes that
not just judges, but law enforcement, media, and public officials must refrain
from statements or actions that would violate the presumption of innocence.

6. Scholarly Commentary and Reform Proposals

Gautam Bhatia (in Offend, Shock, or Disturb) argues that Indian constitutional
law needs a stronger normative commitment to procedural fairness, particularly in
the pre-trial phase where the accused is vulnerable to media, police, and political
influence.

Niranjan Sahoo of ORF suggests the establishment of trial decency guidelines for
media and a mandatory cooling-off period during investigations to prevent public
trials outside the courtroom.

Comparative literature from South Africa, Germany, and Canada points to

reforms such as jury insulation, judicial gag orders, and strict contempt laws that
can serve as models for India.

Conclusion

38
The literature overwhelmingly supports the notion that presumption of innocence
is not only a legal presumption but a moral and constitutional shield that protects
individual dignity against arbitrary state action and societal bias. While Indian
courts have echoed this ideal, the broader legal ecosystem—law enforcement
practices, media conduct, bail jurisprudence, and statutory exceptions—often
dilute its implementation. The reviewed scholarship calls for a stronger alignment
between India’s constitutional commitments and its judicial and procedural
realities. Moving forward, a recalibration of institutional, statutory, and societal
norms is necessary to reaffirm the inviolability of this principle.

Chapter 2.4: Conclusion

The extensive body of literature reviewed in Chapter 2 reveals a deeply

intertwined relationship between the presumption of innocence, the right to a
fair trial, and the increasingly influential role of media in legal processes. From
classical legal commentaries to modern human rights jurisprudence, scholars and
jurists consistently underscore that the presumption of innocence is not merely a
technical legal rule but a core moral principle embedded in the architecture of
democratic justice systems.

The review of domestic and international literature confirms that while this doctrine
enjoys recognition under international human rights instruments like the UDHR
and ICCPR, its real-world application is frequently compromised by statutory
presumptions, prolonged pre-trial detention, and the pervasive influence of trial
by media. Indian jurisprudence, while affirming the principle through landmark
cases such as Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. and State of U.P. v. Naresh, still
struggles with the practical enforcement of these ideals—particularly in high-
profile or politically sensitive cases.

The literature on media trials further reinforces that unchecked press coverage—
especially in the digital age—can severely distort public perception, create parallel
adjudicatory forums, and pressure legal actors into premature or biased
conclusions. Academic critiques, such as those by Tharini R., Avanthika Reddy,

39
and Jaimini Kumar Sahu, as well as institutional perspectives from bodies like the
Press Council of India and CIS, illustrate a shared concern: the lack of enforceable
regulatory safeguards against media overreach. Comparative studies from the
UK, U.S., and Europe also demonstrate that jurisdictions worldwide grapple with
similar tensions between media freedom and due process, offering India potential
models for reform.

The reviewed jurisprudence, including Sahara India v. SEBI and R.K. Anand v.
Registrar, Delhi High Court, reveals that the Indian judiciary has recognized the
disruptive power of the media in criminal adjudication. However, the absence of
uniform guidelines or a codified statutory framework often leaves the system
reactive rather than preventive. Likewise, the doctrinal review highlights that the
burden of proof, while legally mandated to rest on the prosecution, is increasingly
shifted to the accused—either through media portrayal or by statutory instruments
such as the NDPS and UAPA Acts.

Ultimately, the chapter affirms a consensus in academic and legal discourse: the
presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial are under threat in the
current socio-legal context, and there is an urgent need for:

 Judicially enforceable media ethics,

 Institutional safeguards,
 Statutory reform, and
 Civic education to restore public respect for due process.

Going forward, the dissertation will delve deeper into the legal implications,
policy recommendations, and comparative frameworks necessary to protect and
preserve these foundational rights in the face of expanding media influence and
legislative challenges.

40
 CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(HISTORICAL GROWTH OF THE RESEARCH)

GHG

41
 CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (HISTORICAL GROWTH OF

THE RESEARCH)

3.1 Introduction

Introduction

The principle of presumption of innocence and the phenomenon of media trials

represent two powerful yet conflicting narratives in modern criminal jurisprudence.
The former is a time-honoured legal doctrine that forms the bedrock of fair trial
rights and procedural justice. The latter—while rooted in the legitimate exercise of
press freedom—has evolved into a mechanism that often prejudges individuals,
shaping public opinion even before a court has pronounced its verdict. The
historical development of both concepts, and the increasing friction between them,
calls for a contextual understanding of their respective origins, growth, and eventual
intersection.

Historically, presumption of innocence developed over centuries through

philosophical, moral, and legal discourses aimed at safeguarding individual liberty
against arbitrary prosecution. It gained widespread recognition during the
Enlightenment and was later codified in international human rights instruments
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the European Convention
on Human Rights (1950). In India, although not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution, the presumption of innocence has been judicially read into Article 21,
forming a crucial part of the broader doctrine of due process.

Conversely, media trials are a more recent phenomenon, largely emerging in the
late 20th century, gaining traction alongside the liberalization of the press, the rise
of 24-hour television news, and the explosion of digital and social media platforms.

42
Initially, media served as a democratic watchdog, holding institutions
accountable. However, in high-profile criminal matters, its role has gradually
extended to influencing investigative narratives, publicly scrutinizing accused
individuals, and at times delivering parallel verdicts, thereby challenging the
sanctity of court-based adjudication.

The intersection between these two paradigms has led to serious constitutional,
ethical, and human rights debates. Scholars, jurists, and legal reformers have
increasingly warned that media overreach—particularly in sub judice
matters—can jeopardize the right to a fair trial. The Indian judiciary has
acknowledged this tension in various rulings, calling for a balance between Article
19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and Article 21 (protection of life
and personal liberty).

This chapter traces the historical growth of both the presumption of innocence
and media involvement in criminal trials. It seeks to contextualize the current
conflict by exploring the doctrinal evolution of these concepts, how they were
codified in legal systems, how the media’s role has expanded over time, and how
this expansion has brought it into direct collision with established legal principles.
Additionally, it explores the comparative historical developments in other
jurisdictions to provide a global dimension to the research.

The objective of this chapter is thus to present a historically grounded foundation

for the ongoing legal and normative debates surrounding media trials and their
impact on the presumption of innocence, particularly in the Indian human rights
context. By understanding how these two strands have evolved—sometimes in
harmony, but increasingly in conflict—this chapter sets the stage for deeper
doctrinal, judicial, and policy-oriented analyses in the subsequent sections of the
dissertation.

43
 3.2 Evolution of the Presumption of Innocence

Origins in Ancient and Classical Legal Systems

The principle of presumption of innocence, though formally articulated only in

the modern era, has deep historical roots. Its earliest manifestations can be traced
to Roman law, which established the maxim “Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non
qui negat”—the burden of proof lies on the one who asserts, not on the one who
denies. While Roman trials did not uniformly uphold what we now understand as a
right to be presumed innocent, this legal aphorism laid the foundation for later
procedural safeguards.

In Jewish Talmudic law and Islamic jurisprudence (Sharia) as well, we find

notions of evidentiary caution and the obligation of proof on the accuser. These
traditions valued fairness and caution in assigning guilt, especially in capital
offences. Similarly, Hindu Dharmashastra texts, though not formally codified in
adversarial terms, advocated for procedural rectitude and ethical judgment.

Medieval and Feudal Era: Presumption of Guilt

Despite these early influences, much of medieval Europe operated under systems
that presumed guilt, especially under inquisitorial procedures of the Catholic
Church and feudal courts. Trial by ordeal, confession-based convictions, and
torture were standard practices, offering little scope for legal defence or
presumption of innocence. The state and church acted as both accuser and
adjudicator, conflating moral suspicion with legal guilt.

However, some seeds of legal reform emerged in Magna Carta (1215), which,
although primarily a political document, initiated the idea that legal procedures
must be followed before punishment—a precursor to modern due process.

Enlightenment and the Rise of Modern Legal Theory

44
The Enlightenment era of the 17th and 18th centuries marked a revolutionary shift
in legal philosophy. Sir William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of
England (1765), famously wrote, “It is better that ten guilty persons escape than
that one innocent suffer.” This principle came to epitomize the core value
underlying presumption of innocence.

Influential thinkers such as Cesare Beccaria and Montesquieu challenged

arbitrary punishment and emphasized reason, proportionality, and individual rights
in criminal justice. Their writings were instrumental in shaping the liberal legal
order that prioritized due process, impartial adjudication, and individual liberty.

During this period, common law jurisdictions began to clearly demarcate the roles
of prosecution and defence, embedding the principle that the burden of proof must
lie on the prosecution, and guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Codification in Modern Human Rights Instruments

The horrors of World War II, especially the miscarriages of justice under
authoritarian regimes, led to the formal recognition of the presumption of
innocence as a universal human right. It became enshrined in key international
legal documents:

 Article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948):

“Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law...”
 Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966):
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
 Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950):
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent
until proved guilty...”

45
These instruments transformed the presumption of innocence from a common law
principle into a binding international legal standard, requiring states to align
their domestic laws with global human rights norms.

Indian Context: Colonial Foundations and Constitutional Evolution

In pre-independence India, the British introduced procedural safeguards through

legislation such as the Indian Penal Code (1860), Indian Evidence Act (1872),
and the Criminal Procedure Code (1898). These laws, while colonial in origin,
reflected the adversarial structure and presumption of innocence embedded in
English common law.

Post-independence, the Indian Constitution did not explicitly articulate the

presumption of innocence. However, it was judicially read into Article 21 (Right
to Life and Personal Liberty), particularly through the doctrine of “procedure
established by law”, which evolved to mean fair, just, and reasonable
procedure, especially after Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978).

Indian courts have consistently upheld this right in numerous cases:

 Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 69921

 State of U.P. v. Naresh 2011 AIR SCW 187722
 V. D. Jhangan v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 176223

In these rulings, the Supreme Court emphasized that the accused remains
innocent until proven guilty, and the burden of proof rests on the prosecution to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Contemporary Challenges and Dilution of the Principle

21
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23
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In modern times, the presumption of innocence faces multiple challenges, both
globally and in India:

 Reverse burden clauses in special laws such as the NDPS Act, UAPA,
and POCSO, where the accused must prove innocence under certain
circumstances, have raised constitutional concerns.
 Prolonged pre-trial detention of undertrial prisoners, particularly from
marginalized backgrounds, often amounts to punishment without
conviction, effectively nullifying the presumption of innocence.
 Media trials, where the press and public opinion pronounce guilt
prematurely, further erode the integrity of this principle, especially in high-
profile cases.

Medieval and Feudal Era: Presumption of Guilt

Despite these early influences, much of medieval Europe operated under systems
that presumed guilt, especially under inquisitorial procedures of the Catholic
Church and feudal courts. Trial by ordeal, confession-based convictions, and
torture were standard practices, offering little scope for legal defence or
presumption of innocence. The state and church acted as both accuser and
adjudicator, conflating moral suspicion with legal guilt.

However, some seeds of legal reform emerged in Magna Carta (1215), which,
although primarily a political document, initiated the idea that legal procedures
must be followed before punishment—a precursor to modern due process.

Enlightenment and the Rise of Modern Legal Theory

The Enlightenment era of the 17th and 18th centuries marked a revolutionary
shift in legal philosophy. Sir William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the
Laws of England (1765), famously wrote, “It is better that ten guilty persons

47
escape than that one innocent suffer.” This principle came to epitomize the core
value underlying presumption of innocence.

Influential thinkers such as Cesare Beccaria and Montesquieu challenged

arbitrary punishment and emphasized reason, proportionality, and individual
rights in criminal justice. Their writings were instrumental in shaping the liberal
legal order that prioritized due process, impartial adjudication, and individual
liberty.

During this period, common law jurisdictions began to clearly demarcate the roles
of prosecution and defence, embedding the principle that the burden of proof
must lie on the prosecution, and guilt must be established beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Codification in Modern Human Rights Instruments

The horrors of World War II, especially the miscarriages of justice under
authoritarian regimes, led to the formal recognition of the presumption of
innocence as a universal human right. It became enshrined in key international
legal documents:

 Article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948):

“Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law...”
 Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966):
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
 Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950):
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent
until proved guilty...”

48
These instruments transformed the presumption of innocence from a common law
principle into a binding international legal standard, requiring states to align
their domestic laws with global human rights norms.

Indian Context: Colonial Foundations and Constitutional Evolution

In pre-independence India, the British introduced procedural safeguards through

legislation such as the Indian Penal Code (1860), Indian Evidence Act (1872),
and the Criminal Procedure Code (1898). These laws, while colonial in origin,
reflected the adversarial structure and presumption of innocence embedded in
English common law.

Post-independence, the Indian Constitution did not explicitly articulate the

presumption of innocence. However, it was judicially read into Article 21 (Right
to Life and Personal Liberty), particularly through the doctrine of “procedure
established by law”, which evolved to mean fair, just, and reasonable
procedure, especially after Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978).

Indian courts have consistently upheld this right in numerous cases:

 Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699

 State of U.P. v. Naresh (2011) 4 SCC 324
 V. D. Jhingan v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 1762

In these rulings, the Supreme Court emphasized that the accused remains
innocent until proven guilty, and the burden of proof rests on the prosecution to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Contemporary Challenges and Dilution of the Principle

In modern times, the presumption of innocence faces multiple challenges, both

globally and in India:

49
  Reverse burden clauses in special laws such as the NDPS Act, UAPA,
and POCSO, where the accused must prove innocence under certain
circumstances, have raised constitutional concerns.
 Prolonged pre-trial detention of undertrial prisoners, particularly from
marginalized backgrounds, often amounts to punishment without
conviction, effectively nullifying the presumption of innocence.
 Media trials, where the press and public opinion pronounce guilt
prematurely, further erode the integrity of this principle, especially in
high-profile cases.

Despite these issues, the judiciary has continued to assert the value of this
principle. In K. Prithvi v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 10 SCC 713, the Court
reiterated that while statutory presumptions are constitutional, they must not
undermine the broader right to a fair trial.

Conclusion

The presumption of innocence has undergone a profound evolution—from a

philosophical and moral concept in ancient traditions to a fundamental legal
guarantee in modern democracies. While it is now recognized globally as a
cornerstone of human rights and criminal justice, its application remains fraught
with procedural, societal, and institutional challenges.

As this dissertation seeks to demonstrate, the contemporary erosion of this

principle—particularly through media overreach—necessitates a re-examination
of how legal and social institutions can reassert its value. Understanding its
historical development is not only academically essential but also normatively
urgent in protecting the rights of the accused in today’s increasingly complex
media-legal ecosystem.

50
 3.3 Historical Growth of Media’s Role in Legal Matters

Introduction

The media has historically played a vital role in shaping public discourse, acting
as the proverbial “fourth estate” that monitors and critiques state institutions,
including the judiciary. However, the evolution of media from watchdog to
prosecutor in the court of public opinion is a relatively modern phenomenon.
This section traces the historical trajectory of media involvement in legal matters,
from its initial role in public enlightenment to its controversial engagement with
criminal trials and its increasing interference in judicial independence.

Early Role of the Press: Watchdog and Informer

In the 18th and 19th centuries, during the rise of liberal democracies, the press
emerged as a critical institution for democratic accountability. Newspapers
reported on parliamentary debates, corruption, public grievances, and
occasionally on legal proceedings. Legal reportage was typically factual and
restrained, aimed at keeping the citizenry informed.

In colonial India, the press played a critical role in freedom movements, often
reporting on unjust colonial laws and trials of freedom fighters. However, press
freedom was tightly regulated under various British-imposed censorship laws
such as the Vernacular Press Act, 1878, and Indian Press Act, 1910. These
restrictions meant that detailed commentary on judicial matters was rare and
cautious.

51
3.3.3 Post-Independence India: A Free Press and Emerging Court
Reporting

With the adoption of the Constitution of India in 1950, Article 19(1)(a)

guaranteed freedom of speech and expression, including the freedom of the press.
Gradually, the Indian media began reporting on court cases with more detail and
regularity. While the judiciary was initially perceived as a sacrosanct institution,
the press started to challenge institutional opacity.

In the 1970s and 1980s, investigative journalism began to emerge as a force in

India. Landmark cases such as the Emergency period (1975–77) saw newspapers
resisting government overreach and judicial complicity. Media was still cautious
in covering criminal cases, largely sticking to verified court records.

The Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) case saw unprecedented

media interest in constitutional interpretation and laid the foundation for court
reporting as a public interest function.

3.3.4 The 1990s Liberalization and the Rise of Electronic Media

India’s economic liberalization in the early 1990s also liberalized the media
landscape. The advent of 24-hour private news channels transformed how legal
matters were reported. High-profile cases began receiving continuous, dramatized
coverage, especially during prime time slots. This shift introduced the idea of
“trial by media”, where news anchors and panelists often speculated on guilt,
analysed evidence, and suggested judicial outcomes before a verdict was
delivered.

Cases that exemplified this transformation include:

52
  Jessica Lal Murder Case (1999): Initially resulting in acquittal due to
lack of evidence, the case was retried following intense media scrutiny,
culminating in a conviction. The media was praised for its role in bringing
justice, though it also sparked concerns about media pressure on judicial
processes.
 Priyadarshini Mattoo Case (1996) and Nitish Katara Case (2002):
Both became national talking points due to relentless media coverage,
which ultimately influenced public and judicial response.

Scholars such as N. Ram and Madhavi Divan have argued that while media
coverage in these cases helped galvanize justice, they also started a trend of
bypassing due process in favour of public opinion.

3.3.5 Digital Age and the Social Media Explosion

The mid-2000s onwards marked the proliferation of digital news platforms,

social media, and YouTube-based journalism, where legal reporting became
more aggressive, viral, and less accountable. Platforms like Twitter, Instagram,
and Facebook began circulating courtroom footage, WhatsApp leaks, and real-
time trial updates, often without fact-checking.

Media’s role began expanding beyond reporting to conducting investigations,

interviewing witnesses, questioning motives of legal actors, and presenting
alternate narratives. This was visible in:

 Aarushi Talwar Murder Case (2008): The media speculated wildly,

casting suspicion on the victim’s own family, creating long-term
reputational damage despite later acquittals.
 Sushant Singh Rajput Death Case (2020): Media trials peaked with
celebrity name-calling, narcotics allegations, and leaked chats,
overshadowing police and CBI findings.

53
The press–judiciary conflict escalated as the judiciary increasingly criticized the
media for prejudicing trials and interfering in the administration of justice.

3.3.6 Judicial Response to Expanding Media Influence

The Indian judiciary has made several interventions to address media overreach:

 In R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009)24, the Supreme

Court noted that media had begun acting as an alternate forum of justice,
risking contempt and undermining due process.
 In Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI (2012)25, the Court laid
down the principle of “postponement orders”—allowing courts to delay
media reporting on sub-judice matters where prejudicial impact is
foreseeable.
 In Nilesh Navalakha v. Union of India (2020)26, the Bombay High Court
warned that trial by media violates the presumption of innocence and
could amount to contempt of court.

Despite these rulings, the lack of a comprehensive media regulation law means
that enforcement remains inconsistent, especially in the realm of digital and social
media platforms.

3.3.7 Global Parallels and Comparative Perspective

Other democracies have witnessed similar historical trends:

24
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[Link]
26
[Link]
india/#:~:text=Petitioner%20Nilesh%20Navlakha%20(PIL%20(ST,Article%2021%20of%20the%20C
onstitution.

54
  In the United States, the landmark case of Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966)27
illustrated how excessive pre-trial publicity compromised fair trial rights.
As a response, American courts introduced gag orders, jury insulation,
and venue changes.
 The United Kingdom passed the Contempt of Court Act, 1981, which
prohibits media from publishing prejudicial material once proceedings
become “active”.
 The European Court of Human Rights, in Allenet de Ribemont v.
France (1995)28, held that public statements by officials prejudging the
guilt of a suspect violated Article 6(2) of the ECHR.

These international responses offer valuable lessons for Indian lawmakers and
judges in balancing freedom of expression with judicial impartiality.

3.3.8 Conclusion

The historical growth of the media’s role in legal matters reflects a profound shift
from informative observer to judgmental commentator. While the press has
played a crucial role in ensuring transparency and public awareness, its increasing
tendency to influence, pressure, or pre-empt judicial outcomes represents a
significant challenge to the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair
trial.

The lack of robust regulation, combined with the advent of social media, has
enabled narratives that often convict individuals in the public sphere long before
any judicial pronouncement. While some cases demonstrate the media’s power to
catalyze justice, the risk of mob adjudication, selective outrage, and
institutional intimidation has become equally prominent.

27
[Link]
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[Link]

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This historical trajectory highlights the urgent need for a balanced legal
framework—one that safeguards both press freedom and judicial integrity, and
upholds the constitutional commitment to human dignity and fair trial rights.

3.4: Historical Emergence of the Conflict: Law vs Media

Introduction

The conflict between the legal process and media conduct—especially in

criminal trials—has become one of the defining challenges of contemporary
justice systems. While the judiciary operates on principles of evidence, due
process, and fairness, the media functions on speed, sensationalism, and public
appeal. This divergence of aims has led to an increasing friction between
constitutional values, notably the right to a fair trial and freedom of the press.
Historically, this conflict was latent, but with the rise of electronic media and now
social media, it has become both pronounced and urgent. This chapter traces the
historical emergence and evolution of this conflict, both in India and globally.

Foundational Tensions: Freedom of Expression vs Fair Trial

At the heart of the conflict lies the tension between two constitutional rights:

 Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of speech

and expression, including press freedom.
 Article 21, interpreted by courts to include the right to a fair trial,
emphasizes procedural justice and presumption of innocence.

Initially, these rights coexisted peacefully. The press informed the public about
ongoing legal matters without interfering in outcomes. However, as media gained

56
greater access, independence, and influence—especially in post-liberalization
India—the conflict intensified.

Judges began to caution against the media’s tendency to “cross the line from
reportage to judgment.” The press, in turn, argued that judicial oversight would
amount to censorship and restrict the media’s democratic role.

The Emergence of Trial by Media in India

The phenomenon of trial by media—where the press pronounces individuals

guilty before the courts do—emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s with the
growth of 24x7 television news.

Some landmark instances that mark the emergence of this conflict include:

 Jessica Lal Murder Case (1999): When the accused was acquitted,
massive media uproar led to a retrial and conviction. While the media was
praised for bringing justice, it also set a precedent for public pressure
influencing judicial processes.
 Aarushi Talwar Murder Case (2008): The media speculated extensively
about the guilt of the parents, leaked investigation details, and
sensationalized private aspects of their lives, even before charges were
proven. Though the Talwars were eventually acquitted, the media's
handling of the case was widely criticized as prejudicial and unethical.
 Sushant Singh Rajput Case (2020): The death of the actor triggered a
media frenzy, with channels accusing individuals without trial, hosting
accusatory panels, and promoting conspiracy theories. Courts had to
intervene to urge restraint.

57
These cases highlight how media, driven by ratings and public emotion, can
override principles of objectivity and legality, creating a parallel justice system
that often violates the presumption of innocence.

Judicial Recognition of the Conflict

Indian courts have acknowledged this conflict and attempted to define boundaries:

 In R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009)29, the Supreme

Court held that media interventions in trials can amount to contempt of
court and violate the right to a fair hearing.
 In Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI (2012)30, the Court
introduced the concept of “postponement orders”, allowing courts to
temporarily restrict publication of material that may prejudice ongoing
trials.
 In Nilesh Navlakha v. Union of India (2020)31, the Bombay High Court
criticized the media’s role in criminalizing individuals through speculative
and unverified reporting, warning that it endangers not only the accused’s
rights but also judicial integrity.

These rulings illustrate the judiciary's attempt to strike a balance—ensuring that

the freedom of the press does not become a threat to due process.

Statutory and Institutional Gaps

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AIRONLINE 2021 BOM 14

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Despite judicial efforts, India lacks a comprehensive legislative framework to
regulate trial-related media content. Some existing mechanisms include:

 Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

 Press Council of India (PCI) guidelines
 Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995
 Information Technology Rules (2021)

However, these mechanisms are fragmented, largely advisory, and often lack
enforcement power, especially in the case of online content and social media
platforms, which fall outside PCI jurisdiction.

The absence of clearly enforceable boundaries allows media outlets to report on

sub-judice matters with relative impunity, often leading to character
assassination, witness intimidation, and public trial by spectacle.

International Perspective on the Conflict

Globally, legal systems have also grappled with the media–law conflict:

 United States: In Sheppard v. Maxwell (196632), the U.S. Supreme Court

held that excessive media coverage had denied the accused a fair trial. The
court mandated use of gag orders, jury sequestration, and change of
venue to protect due process.
 United Kingdom: The Contempt of Court Act, 1981 restricts media
from reporting details that may create “substantial risk of serious
prejudice” once legal proceedings are active.
 European Union: Under the European Convention on Human Rights
(Article 6 & 10), courts have attempted to balance freedom of expression

32
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 with fair trial rights. In Allenet de Ribemont v. France (1995)33, the ECHR
ruled that premature public declarations of guilt violated the presumption
of innocence.

These examples demonstrate that the conflict is not unique to India, and
comparative legal frameworks offer possible models for reform.

Key Themes Emerging from the Conflict

From the historical trajectory of this conflict, several core themes emerge:

 Presumption of Guilt: Media narratives often portray the accused as

guilty, reversing the legal standard of presumed innocence.
 Influence on Investigations: Public outrage shaped by media coverage
can alter the course of investigations, pressuring agencies to act based on
sentiment rather than evidence.
 Judicial Intimidation: Media campaigns sometimes attempt to influence
judges by framing verdicts as public opinion issues.
 Lack of Accountability: Media channels are rarely penalized for
prejudicial reporting due to weak enforcement and political patronage.
 Digital Vulnerability: With the rise of social media, unregulated
commentary has made it harder to protect the dignity and rights of the
accused.

Conclusion

The historical emergence of the conflict between law and media is rooted in the
diverging aims of these institutions—truth through process versus truth

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60
through immediacy. While both play essential roles in a democracy, the
expansion of media into adjudicatory terrain has disturbed the fragile equilibrium
between free speech and fair trial.

As this chapter has demonstrated, this conflict has grown more pronounced in
recent decades, fueled by sensationalism, competition, and the viral nature of
digital content. The judiciary has acknowledged the dangers and attempted to
mediate the conflict, but systemic legal and regulatory reform remains limited.

Moving forward, India must develop uniform media guidelines for sub-judice
matters, statutory clarity, and institutional oversight mechanisms to restore
balance between the rights of the accused and the freedom of the press. Only then
can both institutions—law and media—function in harmony, upholding
democratic values without encroaching on each other's constitutional boundaries.

3.5: International Trends and Comparisons

Introduction

The conflict between media freedom and the right to a fair trial is not limited to
India. Across jurisdictions, democracies have wrestled with the consequences of
excessive or premature media coverage of legal proceedings. As courts attempt to
preserve judicial impartiality and the presumption of innocence, the press
simultaneously exercises its right to inform the public. Striking a balance between
these two essential principles has led to the development of legal doctrines,
statutory frameworks, and jurisprudential innovations. This section explores how
countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European
Union have addressed this tension, offering valuable comparative insights for
India.

61
3.5.2 The United States: The Sheppard Case and Media Control
Tools

The U.S. legal system strongly protects freedom of the press under the First
Amendment of the Constitution. However, it also recognizes that unrestrained
publicity can infringe upon the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees a fair and
impartial trial.

The landmark case Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) brought this
tension into sharp focus. Dr. Sam Sheppard, accused of murdering his wife, was
subjected to an overwhelming media campaign, with newspapers publishing
inflammatory headlines, speculating on his guilt, and even attacking the
credibility of the defence. The trial judge failed to shield the proceedings from
media interference.

The U.S. Supreme Court overturned Sheppard's conviction, holding that the trial
judge did not take adequate measures to protect the defendant’s constitutional
rights. The Court ruled:

“Due process requires that the accused be tried by a jury free from outside
influences.”

Following this decision, American courts began employing procedural safeguards

such as:

 Gag orders on counsel and witnesses.

 Sequestration of jurors to insulate them from media exposure.
 Change of venue to avoid local bias.
 Continuance of trials to allow media frenzy to subside.

Sheppard v. Maxwell continues to serve as a benchmark for how unchecked

media influence can compromise judicial fairness.

62
3.5.3 The United Kingdom: Statutory Regulation under the
Contempt of Court Act, 1981

The UK has addressed the issue of media interference through legislative means,
most notably the Contempt of Court Act, 1981. Under this law, once
proceedings become “active”—typically from the moment of arrest—media
outlets are prohibited from publishing material that poses a “substantial risk of
serious prejudice” to the trial.

This Act aims to ensure that:

 Jurors are not swayed by extraneous information.

 Judges are not influenced by public sentiment.
 Witnesses are not pressured or coached via media exposure.

Violations of the Act can result in heavy fines or criminal liability for publishers
and editors.

UK courts take a strict liability approach, meaning that intention to prejudice

the trial is not necessary—if the content has a substantial likelihood of
influencing justice, it is contempt. This approach has provided a clear deterrent to
sensationalist media behaviour in sub judice matters.

Furthermore, in high-profile cases such as the Stephen Lawrence murder trial,

UK courts used pre-trial reporting restrictions and anonymous jury selection to
maintain procedural integrity.

3.5.4 The European Union: ECHR and the Allenet de Ribemont

Case

63
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) protects both freedom
of expression (Article 10) and the right to a fair trial and presumption of
innocence (Article 6). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has
often been called upon to mediate conflicts between these rights.

A pivotal case is Allenet de Ribemont v. France (1995)34, where a senior police

officer made a public statement naming the applicant as the instigator of a murder
while judicial proceedings were still pending. The applicant had not yet been
convicted, and the remarks were widely reported in the media.

The ECtHR ruled that such public declarations, especially by officials of the
State, violated the applicant’s right to be presumed innocent under Article 6(2)
of the Convention. The Court held:

“The presumption of innocence may be infringed not only by a judge or court but
also by other public authorities.”

This case set a strong precedent that state authorities must refrain from making
statements that imply guilt before a legal verdict, as such declarations can
irrevocably damage the fairness of a trial.

Subsequent ECtHR rulings have reinforced the idea that public perception of
guilt, shaped by premature media or governmental assertions, poses a systemic
threat to justice.

Relevance and Influence on Indian Legal Thought

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The jurisprudence and legal reforms in the United States, UK, and EU have had a
significant influence on Indian judicial reasoning and academic scholarship.
For example:

 Indian courts have referred to Sheppard v. Maxwell35 when addressing

prejudicial media coverage, especially in Sahara India v. SEBI (2012)36.
 The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in India shares similar aims with the
UK Act, though its enforcement has been weaker.
 In R.K. Anand v. Registrar37, the Court emphasized that judicial
proceedings must be shielded from external influences, echoing ECHR
jurisprudence.

These international trends reinforce the notion that freedom of the press is not
absolute, especially when it begins to erode core judicial values like
impartiality and presumption of innocence. They also underline the need for:

 Clear statutory limits on media reporting of ongoing cases.

 Institutional mechanisms to penalize breaches.
 Judicial training and policy formulation to adapt to the digital media
landscape.

Conclusion

Across global jurisdictions, there is a growing consensus that while media

freedom is vital to democratic governance, it must be balanced against the
right to a fair trial and the integrity of the justice system. The cases of
Sheppard, Allenet de Ribemont, and the UK's legislative framework illustrate
diverse but complementary approaches to mitigating prejudicial media coverage.

35
[Link]
36
[Link]
37
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India stands at a critical juncture where it can learn from these international
experiences. By incorporating statutory safeguards, judicial innovation, and
media accountability frameworks, the Indian legal system can better reconcile
the evolving relationship between press freedom and procedural justice,
especially in the age of hyper-digital journalism.

3.6: Conclusion

The historical trajectory of both the presumption of innocence and the role of
media in criminal justice reveals a progressive but significant convergence—and
eventual clash—between two foundational principles of a democratic society: the
right to a fair trial and the freedom of the press. Each of these values has
evolved within its own domain—law and journalism—with noble aims: justice
and transparency. Yet, their expanding boundaries have now placed them in a
state of tension.

The presumption of innocence—grounded in ancient legal systems and refined

through Enlightenment philosophy, constitutional interpretation, and international
human rights law—has long served as a bulwark against arbitrary punishment and
public vilification. It ensures that individuals are not subjected to criminal
penalties or public shame without due process. Historically, this principle was
safeguarded within the courtroom, protected by rules of evidence and judicial
discretion.

In contrast, the media’s evolution from a passive observer to a dynamic actor in

criminal justice matters has significantly altered public engagement with law.
Once tasked solely with informing the public, the media now often participates in
shaping the narrative of guilt or innocence even before a court has the opportunity
to hear the evidence. With the rise of real-time reporting, digital platforms, and
social media trials, this role has intensified—leading to a growing tendency to
undermine judicial neutrality, influence witnesses, and prejudge the accused.

66
This chapter has demonstrated that the roots of the modern conflict stem from:

 The expanded societal role of the media in the justice process.

 The gradual dilution of judicial exclusivity in matters of legal
adjudication.
 The absence of robust institutional and legislative safeguards to
mediate this intersection.

Through a comparative historical lens, it becomes evident that this is not a

uniquely Indian dilemma. Jurisdictions around the world—from the U.S. to the
UK and the EU—have encountered similar tensions and have adopted various
judicial, legislative, and regulatory responses to mitigate media-induced
prejudices in sub judice matters. These global trends offer important lessons for
Indian legal reform.

As India confronts the dual challenge of safeguarding freedom of expression and

upholding due process, the role of courts, legislature, and civil society becomes
critical. The preservation of public trust in the justice system requires urgent and
balanced interventions to reaffirm that no individual should be condemned in the
court of public opinion before being tried in a court of law.

The next chapter will delve into the Legal and Judicial Frameworks governing
these principles in India and internationally. It will critically examine existing
laws, judicial pronouncements, and regulatory mechanisms that aim to resolve or
at least manage the ongoing tension between media practice and the integrity of
judicial proceedings.

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 CHAPTER 4

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

68
 CHAPTER 4

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

4.1 Introduction

The debate surrounding the presumption of innocence and media trials is not
confined to India; it is a global legal and human rights issue. Democracies across
the world have struggled to strike a balance between the freedom of the press, a
hallmark of transparent governance, and the right to a fair trial, a cornerstone of
criminal justice. The inherent tension between these two principles—enshrined in
most democratic constitutions—has prompted legal systems to develop distinct
approaches, mechanisms, and jurisprudence to protect the integrity of judicial
proceedings from the potentially prejudicial impact of media coverage.

The presumption of innocence is a universally acknowledged right found in

international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR, Article 11) and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR, Article 14). These provisions require all state
parties to ensure that accused individuals are not treated as guilty until proven so
by a competent and impartial tribunal. However, in an era of 24/7 news cycles,
digital virality, and widespread social media commentary, this principle is
increasingly under threat.

On the other hand, freedom of speech and expression, including press freedom,
is also regarded as a fundamental human right (e.g., Article 19 of the UDHR and
ICCPR). It plays an essential role in holding governments accountable, informing
the public, and ensuring transparency in judicial processes. However, unregulated
media reporting—especially during ongoing legal proceedings—can undermine
judicial impartiality, influence witnesses, and lead to trial by media, resulting in
irreversible damage to the reputation, liberty, and dignity of individuals who
have not yet been proven guilty.

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This chapter undertakes a comparative analysis of international legal systems,
highlighting how jurisdictions such as the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, the European Union, Australia, and New Zealand have responded to
the growing conflict between media freedom and judicial sanctity. It examines
case law, statutory frameworks, judicial innovations, and regulatory mechanisms
employed in these countries to manage prejudicial reporting and protect fair trial
rights.

Moreover, the chapter also explores how international human rights norms,
particularly those laid out by the United Nations Human Rights Committee and
the European Court of Human Rights, influence domestic legal developments in
reconciling this conflict. These international instruments and judgments offer
valuable insights into best practices, challenges, and the scope for reforms in
India’s own legal system.

By exploring global trends and jurisprudence, this chapter not only situates the
Indian experience within a broader legal landscape but also underscores the
universal nature of the problem. The objective is to draw lessons from
comparative models, identify gaps in India’s existing legal framework, and
highlight potential pathways for reform that protect both constitutional rights—
freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial—in equal measure.

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 4.2: United States – First Amendment vs Sixth Amendment

4.2.1 Introduction

The United States presents one of the most significant legal arenas for studying
the conflict between press freedom and fair trial rights. With a deeply rooted
tradition of First Amendment freedoms and a simultaneously robust
commitment to due process under the Sixth Amendment, the U.S. legal system
has long been engaged in balancing these two often competing constitutional
values. The American experience is particularly instructive due to its federal
structure, powerful media institutions, and the use of jury trials, where media
influence can directly affect verdicts.

4.2.2 The First Amendment: Shielding Press Freedom

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that:

“Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

press...”

This broad guarantee has been interpreted by American courts to grant the press a
high degree of autonomy in reporting matters of public interest, including judicial
proceedings. U.S. media institutions have leveraged this protection to investigate,
report, and comment extensively on criminal cases—even before a verdict is
issued.

The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) has consistently upheld
that prior restraints—government actions that prevent the media from
publishing—are presumptively unconstitutional, as held in Near v. Minnesota
(1931) and New York Times Co. v. United States (1971). As such, the
American press operates in a highly liberal environment, even in the context of
sub judice matters.

4.2.3 The Sixth Amendment: Guaranteeing a Fair Trial

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The Sixth Amendment guarantees the rights of the accused in criminal
prosecutions, including:

“the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...”

This protection is fundamental to the presumption of innocence, as it ensures

that guilt or innocence is determined solely based on evidence presented in
court—not through public or media speculation.

The use of jury trials in the U.S. heightens the sensitivity of this issue. Jurors,
drawn from the general public, can be influenced by media narratives, especially
in high-profile or emotionally charged cases.

4.2.4 The Landmark Case: Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966)

The U.S. Supreme Court directly addressed the collision between media publicity
and fair trial rights in the seminal case of Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966).

Case Background:

Dr. Sam Sheppard, a Cleveland-based physician, was accused of murdering his

wife. The case attracted sensational media attention, with newspapers publishing
prejudicial headlines, speculating on his guilt, and publicly criticizing the trial
process. The courtroom was overcrowded with reporters, and the judge failed to
impose any restrictions on media conduct.

Supreme Court Ruling:

The Court reversed Sheppard’s conviction, holding that the trial was not
conducted in a manner consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The media coverage was so pervasive and prejudicial that it was
impossible for Sheppard to receive a fair trial.

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The Court stated:

“The carnival atmosphere at trial and the failure of the judge to protect Sheppard
from the inherently prejudicial publicity... deprived him of a fair trial.”

This case remains the cornerstone of American jurisprudence on trial by media,

establishing that judges must proactively ensure courtroom neutrality,
especially in the face of intense public and press scrutiny.

4.2.5 Judicial Tools to Balance the Conflict

In the aftermath of Sheppard, U.S. courts developed a range of procedural

safeguards to manage the tension between the First and Sixth Amendments:

 Gag Orders: Courts may prohibit attorneys, witnesses, or parties from

making public comments likely to influence the outcome of a trial.
 Sequestration of Jurors: Jurors may be isolated from media and public
contact to prevent exposure to prejudicial content.
 Change of Venue: Trials can be moved to a different jurisdiction to
escape the influence of local media saturation.
 Voir Dire: During jury selection, potential jurors are questioned
extensively about their exposure to media and their ability to remain
impartial.
 Continuances: Trials may be postponed to allow media frenzy to subside.

In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart (1976), the Court emphasized that any
restriction on press freedom must meet a strict scrutiny test—demonstrating that
the restriction is necessary, narrowly tailored, and the least restrictive means
available to achieve a fair trial.

4.2.6 Contemporary Challenges

Despite these mechanisms, the rise of digital media and social networking
platforms like Twitter and YouTube has posed new challenges. Information

73
spreads instantly and often uncontrollably, making it difficult for courts to
insulate jurors or suppress prejudicial content.

High-profile cases such as those involving George Floyd, Harvey Weinstein,

and Derek Chauvin have reignited debates about media influence. Legal scholars
argue that existing protections must evolve to address viral prejudgment, social
media activism, and algorithm-driven news feeds, which blur the line between
reportage and prosecution.

4.2.7 Relevance to the Indian Context

India can draw significant lessons from the U.S. experience:

 The importance of judicial restraint mechanisms, such as postponement

orders and witness protection.
 The utility of statutory clarity on contempt and publication
restrictions.
 The challenges posed by digital media, which require regulatory
innovation beyond traditional print or broadcast media controls.

While India does not follow a jury system, the public opinion generated by
media trials can indirectly influence judicial reasoning, particularly in high-
profile or politically sensitive cases. The U.S. model offers insights into how
procedural tools and constitutional interpretation can be used to strike a functional
balance between press freedom and judicial fairness.

4.2.8 Conclusion

The United States' constitutional landscape offers a compelling example of how a

liberal media environment can co-exist with fair trial rights—provided courts are
empowered and proactive in ensuring due process. The judicial response to media
overreach in Sheppard v. Maxwell and subsequent decisions illustrates the
fragility of the presumption of innocence in a media-dominated public sphere.

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The American experience demonstrates that while freedom of the press is
essential to democracy, it must not operate at the expense of the accused’s right
to a fair and impartial trial. For jurisdictions like India, where the regulatory
environment is still evolving, the U.S. model provides a valuable comparative
framework for legislative and judicial reform.

4.3: United Kingdom – Contempt of Court and Media

Restrictions

4.3.1 Introduction

The legal framework in the United Kingdom offers one of the most structured
responses to the issue of media interference in judicial proceedings,
particularly concerning the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair
trial. While the UK upholds a strong tradition of freedom of the press, it also
emphasizes judicial impartiality as a foundational component of its criminal
justice system. This balance is largely maintained through the Contempt of
Court Act, 1981, which serves as a critical statutory tool to regulate prejudicial
reporting and maintain the sanctity of sub judice proceedings.

4.3.2 Legal Foundations: Articles 6 and 10 of the Human Rights Act, 1998

The UK's legal obligations are shaped significantly by the Human Rights Act,
1998, which incorporates provisions of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) into domestic law. Two key articles of the ECHR apply directly
to the conflict between media and fair trial rights:

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  Article 6: Right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, including the presumption of innocence.
 Article 10: Right to freedom of expression and freedom to receive and
impart information.

UK courts are often tasked with balancing these two rights. While the press is free
to report on legal matters in the public interest, it must not do so in a manner that
prejudices the outcome of a trial or undermines the legal process.

4.3.3 The Contempt of Court Act, 1981: An Overview

The Contempt of Court Act, 1981 was enacted to codify and modernize the law
of contempt in England and Wales, particularly in relation to media publications.
It primarily addresses “strict liability contempt”, which occurs when media
content creates a substantial risk of serious prejudice or impediment to active
legal proceedings, regardless of the publisher’s intent.

Key Features:

 Proceedings become “active” once a person is arrested, charged, or a

warrant is issued.
 Media outlets are prohibited from publishing material that could affect
the fairness of the trial.
 Violations can result in fines or imprisonment, even if the publisher did
not intend to prejudice the court.
 The Act applies to all forms of publication—print, television, online
media, and social media platforms.

This approach provides clarity to media professionals and serves as a powerful

deterrent against irresponsible or sensationalist reporting.

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4.3.4 Case Law: Judicial Application of the Act

UK courts have applied the Contempt of Court Act in a variety of cases to uphold
the fairness of proceedings:

 In Attorney General v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. (1987)38, The

Sun newspaper was held liable for contempt for publishing a prejudicial
article about a defendant under trial. The court reaffirmed that the risk of
influencing jurors justified the imposition of sanctions.
 In Attorney General v. MGN Ltd. (1997)39, the court found that
publishing a suspect’s previous convictions during an ongoing trial created
a substantial risk of prejudice and constituted contempt.

These cases illustrate the UK judiciary’s proactive stance in preserving the

integrity of the presumption of innocence, especially in jury trials.

4.3.5 The Role of Pre-Trial Reporting Restrictions

The UK courts have at their disposal a number of tools to prevent media-related

prejudice. One of the most important is the power to issue reporting restrictions
under Section 4 and Section 11 of the 1981 Act. These allow judges to:

 Delay publication of prejudicial material until after the conclusion of a

trial.
 Prohibit disclosure of sensitive information that could affect jurors or
witnesses.

Additionally, in sensitive cases, courts may also grant anonymity orders to

protect the identity of victims, witnesses, or even defendants.

38
[Link]
39
[Link]

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Such restrictions are not permanent bans but temporary and targeted measures
aimed at ensuring justice is served without infringing unnecessarily on press
freedom.

4.3.6 The Leveson Inquiry and Media Ethics

Following several high-profile incidents of unethical journalistic practices—

including the News of the World phone-hacking scandal—the UK established
the Leveson Inquiry (2011–2012) to examine the culture, practices, and ethics of
the press.

The Inquiry concluded that while media freedom is essential, there is a need for
greater accountability, especially in criminal matters. It recommended a new,
independent self-regulatory body, backed by statute, to enforce ethical reporting
standards. Although some of these recommendations remain unimplemented, they
have significantly shaped the public discourse on media responsibility in legal
reporting.

4.3.7 Contemporary Challenges: Digital Media and Juror Exposure

While traditional media in the UK has largely adapted to legal constraints, digital
media and social platforms pose new challenges. Jurors today have access to a
vast amount of online information, and courts have had to issue explicit
instructions prohibiting jurors from conducting internet searches related to the
trial.

Breaches of this rule can result in mistrials, contempt proceedings, or even

criminal charges against jurors. In R v. Dallas (2012)40, a juror was sentenced to

40
[Link]

78
prison for researching the defendant online and sharing the information with other
jurors—highlighting the continuing tension between modern information access
and judicial impartiality.

4.3.8 Relevance for India

India, which shares a common law heritage with the UK, can learn much from the
British experience:

 Codification of contempt law to specifically address prejudicial media

content.
 Use of clear statutory definitions of when proceedings become “active.”
 Empowerment of courts to issue publication bans or postponement
orders.
 Introduction of media conduct standards supported by independent
regulatory bodies.

These measures offer a balanced approach, respecting both press freedom and
the accused’s right to be tried fairly without being condemned in the public
sphere.

4.3.9 Conclusion

The United Kingdom’s approach to managing the interface between media

freedom and judicial fairness is characterized by proactive statutory
regulation, robust judicial enforcement, and a culture of media responsibility.
The Contempt of Court Act, 1981, stands as a model for how democratic
societies can reconcile the press’s right to inform with the public’s right to
impartial justice.

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As India grapples with increasingly aggressive media trials, the UK experience
provides a useful framework for legal reform, media accountability, and the
protection of due process in an evolving digital landscape.

4.4: European Union – European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence

4.4.1 Introduction

Within the European Union, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
plays a pivotal role in mediating the delicate balance between two competing
rights: the right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights) and the freedom of expression (Article 10 of the same Convention).
While both rights are cornerstones of a democratic society, conflicts often arise
when the press exercises its freedom in ways that may impair the fairness of legal
proceedings or erode the presumption of innocence.

The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has developed a rich body of case law that
reflects a nuanced, proportionality-based approach, assessing whether media
or official conduct has unjustifiably interfered with the right to be presumed
innocent. This section explores this balancing act, with emphasis on the landmark
case of Allenet de Ribemont v. France (1995), and reviews how select EU
member states—Germany, France, and Italy—have adopted statutory and
procedural safeguards to uphold these rights simultaneously.

4.4.2 Article 6 vs Article 10: Competing Constitutional Values

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The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), established in 1950,
enshrines both the right to a fair trial under Article 6 and freedom of
expression under Article 10:

 Article 6(1) and 6(2): Ensure that everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal,
and specifically that “everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
 Article 10(1): Affirms the right to freedom of expression, including the
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information without
interference by public authorities.

The challenge for courts is that these rights are not absolute. Both may be subject
to limitations deemed necessary in a democratic society—for example, to protect
the reputation of others, ensure public order, or maintain judicial integrity. The
ECtHR uses a balancing test to resolve conflicts between them, weighing the
necessity, proportionality, and legitimacy of any restriction.

4.4.3 The Landmark Case: Allenet de Ribemont v. France (1995)

Background:

In this case, Mr. Allenet de Ribemont was arrested in connection with a politically
sensitive murder case. Before any formal charge or trial, a high-ranking police
official publicly stated, during a televised press conference, that the applicant
was “one of the instigators of the murder.” This declaration was widely
disseminated by French media.

Judgment:

The ECtHR held that such statements violated Article 6(2) of the Convention,
which guarantees the presumption of innocence. The Court clarified that public

81
officials, particularly those in authority, have a duty to avoid making
declarations that may lead the public or press to believe in an accused’s guilt
before a judicial decision is reached.

The Court ruled:

“The presumption of innocence may be infringed not only by a judge or court but
also by other public authorities.”

This case established a clear jurisprudential threshold: even non-judicial actors

can be held accountable for actions or speech that prejudices the public
perception of an accused person.

4.4.4 Broader ECtHR Jurisprudence on Media Trials and Fair Trial Rights

Other ECtHR cases further demonstrate the Court’s efforts to balance Articles 6
and 10:

 In Worm v. Austria (1997), the Court upheld a temporary publication ban

on a journalist’s article during an ongoing trial, citing the need to protect
the accused’s presumption of innocence.
 In News Verlags GmbH & CoKG v. Austria (2000), the ECtHR stressed
that while the media has the right to report on criminal matters, this right
must not encroach on the administration of justice or unfairly vilify
individuals under trial.

The ECtHR has emphasized that freedom of the press includes duties and
responsibilities, particularly when reporting on ongoing legal matters.

4.4.5 National Practices: Germany, France, and Italy

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Germany:

German criminal law strictly protects the presumption of innocence. The German
Press Code, issued by the German Press Council, instructs journalists to avoid
prejudicing the outcome of trials. Reporting must clearly indicate when a suspect
is not yet convicted, and blurred images or initials are often used to protect
identity.

Additionally, under §5 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), freedom of expression

exists but must respect personal honour and judicial process. Violations can result
in civil or even criminal liability.

France:

In France, legal protections for presumption of innocence are codified under the
Code de procédure pénale and reinforced by the Law on the Presumption of
Innocence (2000). Media outlets must avoid implying guilt prior to conviction.
The French Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA) oversees media
compliance, and journalists may face penalties for defamation or judicial
interference.

Post-Allenet, French law increasingly mandates caution in official and media

communication. Police and public prosecutors are expressly prohibited from
making accusatory public statements before trial.

Italy:

Italian courts also uphold strict safeguards. Article 27(2) of the Italian
Constitution declares that “a defendant shall be considered not guilty until the
final judgment.” Italy's judiciary issues gag orders and reporting bans in
sensitive cases to avoid prejudicing juries or magistrates.

Moreover, Italy’s Data Protection Authority regulates how criminal suspects are
reported in the press, with an emphasis on proportionality and privacy. Courts

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may impose temporary restrictions on publication, particularly in mafia or
terrorism cases, where public sentiment is volatile.

4.4.6 Comparative Observations and Implications

The ECtHR jurisprudence and national legal practices within the EU reveal a
consistently cautious approach to media coverage of ongoing criminal trials.
Across Germany, France, and Italy:

 Legal duties of restraint are imposed on journalists, public officials, and

institutions.
 Emphasis is placed on prevention of reputational harm and bias
formation in society.
 The presumption of innocence is not merely procedural, but a
substantive right protected from both judicial and non-judicial
interference.

In comparison, India lacks codified restrictions or clear regulatory guidelines

on public commentary by officials or real-time trial coverage. The EU model
offers a compelling case for adopting statutory safeguards, media ethics codes,
and judicial oversight to prevent erosion of constitutional rights.

4.4.7 Conclusion

The European experience—particularly through the jurisprudence of the

European Court of Human Rights—demonstrates a principled and structured
approach to balancing press freedom with fair trial rights. The Allenet de
Ribemont ruling remains a landmark precedent affirming that presumption of
innocence must be respected not only inside the courtroom but also in the
public discourse shaped by authorities and the media.

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As India navigates similar tensions in its legal and media environments, the
European framework offers clear guidance on how legislation, judicial
philosophy, and ethical media conduct can co-exist to uphold the dignity and
procedural rights of accused individuals while still safeguarding freedom of
expression.

4.5: Canada – Charter Rights and Judicial Restraints

4.5.1 Introduction

Canada offers a well-balanced constitutional and judicial framework that carefully

navigates the tension between press freedom and the right to a fair trial. The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enacted in 1982, constitutionally
enshrines both freedom of expression (Section 2) and the presumption of
innocence and fair trial rights (Section 11(d)). Canadian courts have developed
jurisprudence that reflects a nuanced understanding of the risks posed by media
publicity during criminal proceedings, while also acknowledging the democratic
value of transparent justice and public discourse.

The Canadian legal system does not regard media freedom and trial fairness as
inherently contradictory. Instead, it applies a contextual balancing approach,
especially in sensitive cases. A landmark decision in this area—Dagenais v.
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1994)—marked a turning point in how
Canadian courts address conflicts between these two vital rights.

4.5.2 Constitutional Protections under the Charter

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The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes two relevant
provisions that form the constitutional backbone of the debate:

 Section 2(b): Protects freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression,

including freedom of the press and other media of communication.
 Section 11(d): Grants everyone charged with an offence the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.

Canadian courts have consistently interpreted these provisions as

complementary, but not absolute. Where conflicts arise, they are addressed
through the Oakes test, a proportionality standard derived from R v. Oakes
(1986), used to justify reasonable limitations on Charter rights under Section 1.

4.5.3 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1994)

Background:

In this landmark case, a group of Catholic priests charged with sexual abuse
sought a publication ban on a CBC documentary, The Boys of St. Vincent, which
depicted fictionalized events similar to the allegations against them. The trial
court granted the ban to protect the accused’s fair trial rights.

Supreme Court Ruling:

The Supreme Court of Canada, in a split but influential decision, reversed the
publication ban, asserting that both Section 2(b) and Section 11(d) rights must
be balanced—not subordinated one to the other.

Justice Peter Cory, writing for the majority, held:

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“A hierarchical approach which places s. 11(d) above s. 2(b) oversimplifies the
interplay of Charter rights. The rights are of equal importance.”

This case introduced what is now known as the Dagenais Test, later refined in R
v. Mentuck (2001), to evaluate whether publication bans are justifiable. Under
this test, a publication ban will only be granted if:

1. It is necessary to prevent a serious risk to the fairness of the trial.

2. Reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk.
3. The benefits of the ban outweigh the negative effects on freedom of
expression.

This balancing test remains central to Canadian law on media restraint.

4.5.4 Publication Bans and Media Access

Canadian courts may issue publication bans under the Criminal Code of
Canada, particularly:

 Section 486.4 – to protect the identity of victims, especially in sexual

offences.
 Section 517 – to restrict publication of bail hearing details, particularly to
protect the presumption of innocence and prevent tainting potential jurors.

These bans are not automatic but require judicial approval based on the
Dagenais/Mentuck framework. Importantly, bans are temporary and specific—
they must be narrowly tailored to the needs of the case.

Media Access to Courtrooms:

Canadian law generally supports open courtrooms, in keeping with the principle
that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. The public and press

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are usually permitted to attend hearings, with very limited exceptions (e.g., cases
involving national security or vulnerable witnesses).

However, cameras and live broadcasting are generally prohibited in criminal

trials to preserve decorum and prevent spectacle. Courts may allow media access
to transcripts, documents, and judgments but not real-time visuals from
proceedings.

4.5.5 Presumption of Innocence and Judicial Training

Canadian judges are trained to guard against media influence, especially in jury
trials. In many provinces, judges instruct jurors at the outset and during trials to
avoid all media coverage related to the case. Breaches by jurors can lead to
mistrials or contempt proceedings.

Additionally, the Canadian Judicial Council provides guidelines on judicial

interaction with the media, reinforcing the need for courts to avoid perceptions of
bias or publicity-led pressure.

4.5.6 Relevance for India

India can draw several important lessons from Canada’s Charter jurisprudence:

 The balanced rights approach allows both media freedom and trial
fairness to be protected without privileging one over the other.
 A structured judicial test, like Dagenais/Mentuck, would enable Indian
courts to impose media restraints on a principled basis.
 Codified provisions for publication bans can help mitigate prejudicial
publicity in sensitive or high-profile cases.

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  Judicial training and public education on media ethics and courtroom
reporting can support long-term systemic reform.

Given the rapid expansion of social media and real-time reporting in India, these
Canadian models offer robust tools for building accountable and fair judicial
communication practices.

4.5.7 Conclusion

Canada’s legal response to the interplay between press freedom and fair trial
rights is built on a rights-balancing philosophy, underpinned by constitutional
safeguards and carefully crafted judicial tools. The Dagenais decision remains a
seminal precedent, establishing that neither right can be ignored, and that
responsible reporting can—and must—coexist with the presumption of
innocence.

As India continues to grapple with the rise of media trials and the vulnerability of
the criminal justice system to public pressure, the Canadian example provides a
valuable, democratic roadmap for ensuring both accountability in the media and
fairness in the courtroom.

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 4.6: Australia and New Zealand – Judicial Management and
Media Codes

4.6.1 Introduction

Australia and New Zealand, both common law jurisdictions, have faced similar
challenges as other democracies in balancing freedom of the press with the right
to a fair trial. Both nations uphold the principle of open justice—that judicial
proceedings must be accessible and transparent to the public—but they also
recognize that unrestricted media coverage can undermine the presumption of
innocence and the impartiality of court proceedings.

To address these challenges, both countries have developed distinctive yet

comparable approaches: Australia relies extensively on statutory suppression
orders and state-level legislation, while New Zealand has adopted formal
Media Court Reporting Protocols, ethical guidelines, and statutory restrictions.
Together, these approaches provide valuable models for judicial management of
media reporting in criminal trials.

4.6.2 Suppression Orders in Australia: A Statutory Framework

Australia does not have a federal Bill of Rights, but the principles of fair trial and
open justice are protected through state legislation, common law doctrines, and
judicial discretion. Courts frequently rely on suppression orders (also known as
non-publication orders) to restrict media reporting in specific circumstances to
ensure fair trial rights are upheld.

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Legal Basis:

 Each state and territory in Australia has its own legislation governing
suppression orders. For example:
o New South Wales: Court Suppression and Non-publication
Orders Act 2010
o Victoria: Open Courts Act 2013
o South Australia: Evidence Act 1929 (Section 69A)

These laws empower courts to prohibit publication of information where it is

necessary to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice, protect the
safety of a person, or preserve the integrity of jury proceedings.

Landmark Case:

In Hogan v. Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, the High Court of Australia upheld the
constitutionality of suppression orders under the Open Courts Act, ruling that
while freedom of communication is implied, it must yield to the protection of
fair trial rights in specific circumstances.

High-profile Application:

A widely discussed instance was the Cardinal George Pell trial, where a
suppression order was issued to prevent the Australian media from reporting on
the conviction until all proceedings had concluded. Several media outlets were
later charged with contempt for breaching the order, underlining the seriousness
with which courts enforce these safeguards.

4.6.3 Media Guidelines and Judicial Oversight in New Zealand

New Zealand’s legal system similarly respects the open justice principle, while
simultaneously acknowledging the risks of prejudicial reporting. Rather than

91
relying heavily on suppression orders alone, New Zealand emphasizes ethical
regulation and court–media cooperation.

Media Court Reporting Protocols:

In 2011, the New Zealand Judiciary issued the “In-Court Media Coverage
Guidelines”, which outline:

 Conditions for media access to courtrooms.

 Procedures for obtaining permission to record or broadcast proceedings.
 Restrictions on photographing witnesses, victims, and jurors.
 Responsibilities to ensure accuracy and non-sensationalism in reporting.

These protocols encourage collaboration between the media and judiciary, rather
than confrontation. The protocols were revised in 2016 to account for digital
reporting, live tweets, and social media use during court proceedings.

Statutory Controls:

 The Criminal Procedure Act 2011 provides courts the authority to issue
suppression orders where publication would likely prejudice the fair
conduct of a trial or endanger individuals.
 Section 200 of the Act allows discretionary name suppression to protect
victims, witnesses, or vulnerable parties.
 The Evidence Act 2006 includes provisions to restrict media access to
sensitive evidence, such as graphic crime scene material.

Judicial Commentary:

In L v. R [2015] NZCA 121, the Court of Appeal reiterated that suppression

orders should be imposed sparingly, but must be used where necessary to protect
fair trial rights and the presumption of innocence. The ruling reinforced that
judges retain wide discretion to manage courtroom publicity without
undermining transparency.

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4.6.4 Balancing Open Justice with Non-Prejudicial Coverage

Both Australia and New Zealand uphold the doctrine of open justice—the idea
that public scrutiny reinforces judicial accountability and trust in the legal system.
However, courts in both countries recognize that this principle must be balanced
against:

 The risk of prejudicing jurors or witnesses.

 The danger of reputational harm to the accused.
 The importance of upholding the presumption of innocence until a
lawful conviction is reached.

Courts are empowered to:

 Delay reporting until the conclusion of a trial.

 Restrict publication of confessions, prior convictions, or untested
evidence.
 Limit media presence during pre-trial hearings or voir dire proceedings.

Notably, both jurisdictions emphasize the temporary and proportionate nature

of restrictions—suppression is a tool of exception, not rule.

4.6.5 Relevance for India

India lacks a consistent legislative or procedural framework like suppression

orders or court–media protocols. The experiences of Australia and New Zealand
offer practical insights:

 Codified authority for trial courts to restrict prejudicial media reporting.

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  Media accreditation systems and judicially sanctioned guidelines for
in-court reporting.
 Clear timelines and reasons for imposing or lifting bans, ensuring
transparency and limited intrusion on free expression.

In high-profile cases involving celebrity trials or communal tensions, Indian

courts could benefit from the preventive orientation seen in Australasian
jurisprudence, rather than relying only on post-publication contempt proceedings.

4.6.6 Conclusion

Australia and New Zealand exemplify legal systems that actively manage media
conduct through a combination of statutory regulation, judicial discretion, and
cooperative ethical codes. Their emphasis on temporary, targeted, and
reviewable restrictions provides a model of best practice for preserving both
freedom of expression and judicial fairness.

These countries demonstrate that open justice does not equate to uncontrolled
publicity. With robust safeguards, proactive court oversight, and professional
media conduct, the presumption of innocence can be meaningfully protected—
even in a media-saturated age. For India, the Australasian approach offers a
compelling pathway toward sustainable reform in balancing legal integrity and
media transparency.

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 4.7: Role of International Human Rights Instruments

4.7.1 Introduction

The principles of presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial are not
only embedded in domestic legal systems but are also protected and promoted
through international human rights instruments. These universal frameworks
serve as moral and legal standards for all nations, guiding the interpretation and
application of domestic law in accordance with global norms. In the context of
media trials, these instruments emphasize that the administration of justice must
remain free from undue influence, particularly from prejudicial public
commentary or state authorities.

Among the most influential instruments are the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), both of which assert the presumption of innocence as a
fundamental legal and moral right. These texts, along with interpretative guidance
from the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), provide valuable direction
for state parties to develop laws and practices that uphold judicial integrity in the
age of mass media.

4.7.2 Article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights is a milestone document in the history of human
rights. Although not legally binding, it has acquired customary international law
status due to its wide acceptance and influence on subsequent treaties and
national constitutions.

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Article 11(1) of the UDHR states:

“Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the
guarantees necessary for his defence.”

This provision clearly affirms the presumption of innocence as a universal

norm, applicable to all legal systems regardless of their traditions or structures.
The Article not only establishes the burden of proof on the prosecution but also
emphasizes the necessity of a public and fair trial, free from societal or political
interference.

In the context of media influence, this means that states must ensure that public
discourse—especially through mass media—does not prejudge an individual’s
guilt and must take active steps to protect accused persons from reputational harm
or undue pressure before a lawful conviction.

4.7.3 Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR)

The ICCPR, adopted in 1966 and in force since 1976, is a legally binding treaty
ratified by over 170 countries, including India. It elaborates upon the civil and
political rights contained in the UDHR and imposes specific legal obligations on
state parties.

Article 14(2) of the ICCPR states:

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.”

This clause reinforces the presumption of innocence as a non-derogable right,

meaning it cannot be suspended even during states of emergency. It mandates that

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public authorities, the judiciary, the media, and civil society refrain from
making statements or publishing content that implies guilt prior to a judicial
determination.

4.7.4 General Comment No. 13 by the UN Human Rights Committee

The UN Human Rights Committee, which monitors implementation of the

ICCPR, has issued General Comment No. 13 (1984) to interpret Article 14. The
Committee emphasizes that:

“The presumption of innocence is fundamental to the protection of human rights.

It imposes on the prosecution the burden of proving the charge, guarantees that
no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, and ensures that the accused has the benefit of doubt.”

Notably, the Committee further states that public authorities—including police,

prosecutors, and media actors—must not make public statements that suggest
an accused person is guilty. This interpretation is especially significant in
democracies where high-profile criminal trials attract intense media scrutiny.
General Comment No. 13 recommends that state parties enact legal mechanisms
to shield accused individuals from reputational harm, including the use of
defamation laws, media regulations, and judicial restraining orders.

4.7.5 Influence of International Norms on Domestic Legal and Media

Regulation

International human rights norms, while not automatically binding within national
jurisdictions, serve as guiding principles for the development and reform of
domestic laws. Many countries have drawn upon the ICCPR and UDHR to frame

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national constitutions, legislation, and jurisprudence aimed at preserving the
integrity of the justice system.

Examples of Influence:

 South Africa’s Constitution (1996) includes an explicit right to be

presumed innocent, closely modeled on Article 14 of the ICCPR.
 Germany and France have developed detailed restrictions on pre-trial
media coverage and public commentary by state officials.
 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has cited the ICCPR in
cases involving trial publicity and presumption of innocence (e.g., Allenet
de Ribemont v. France).
 India, while not having incorporated ICCPR provisions directly into its
Constitution, is a signatory and has acknowledged these standards in
several Supreme Court judgments (e.g., Francis Coralie Mullin v.
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981)).

In countries where the media lacks a binding regulatory framework, such as India,
international human rights law offers normative direction and comparative
models for establishing ethical guidelines, media ombudsmen, or statutory
safeguards to prevent prejudicial trial coverage.

4.7.6 Relevance in the Digital Era

With the rise of social media platforms, instant news, and viral content, the
risk of violating the presumption of innocence has magnified. International
instruments, while drafted in a pre-digital era, are being interpreted today to cover
digital speech and online publications.

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of

the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression has acknowledged the

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growing challenge of reconciling digital freedom with individual rights, urging
states to apply international human rights principles in the regulation of online
media, including algorithms and misinformation during criminal trials.

4.7.7 Conclusion

International human rights instruments such as the UDHR, the ICCPR, and
authoritative interpretations by the UN Human Rights Committee have played a
foundational role in shaping global understanding of the presumption of
innocence and fair trial rights. These instruments not only obligate state actors
to uphold legal safeguards but also place a moral duty upon media institutions,
civil society, and public officials to respect the dignity and rights of the accused.

As India confronts increasing instances of media-driven prejudice, these

international norms offer a clear path for legal reform, judicial guidance, and
media regulation, ensuring that public accountability does not come at the cost
of justice or constitutional due process.

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 4.8: Global Comparative Analysis

4.8.1 Introduction

A global comparative analysis of legal responses to media trials and the

presumption of innocence reveals diverse yet thematically aligned approaches
across jurisdictions. While the underlying values of press freedom and fair trial
rights are shared universally, the methods of balancing these rights vary
depending on a country’s legal tradition—notably whether it follows a common
law or civil law system. This section contrasts these traditions, evaluates the
effectiveness of statutory safeguards, contempt provisions, and judicial
discretion, and identifies best practices and challenges in implementation across
jurisdictions.

4.8.2 Common Law vs Civil Law Jurisdictions

Common Law Systems

Countries like the United Kingdom, United States, India, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand follow the common law system, where:

 Law develops through judicial precedents.

 Courts enjoy wide discretionary powers to regulate media interference.
 Open justice is a prevailing principle, but it is subject to judicial
restraints.

Key mechanisms used in these systems include:

 Contempt of court laws.

 Gag orders, sequestration of jurors, or change of venue in jury trials.

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  Publication bans, suppression orders, or postponement orders.
 Codes of ethics (e.g., New Zealand’s Media Reporting Protocols).

Civil Law Systems

Countries such as France, Germany, and Italy follow the civil law model,
where:

 Legal frameworks are codified, and statutory law prevails over judicial
precedent.
 Courts have less discretion but operate within detailed legislative
guidance.
 Legal systems prioritize confidentiality in pre-trial investigations over
public disclosure.

Key protections include:

 Strict privacy rules for the accused (e.g., restrictions on publishing

names/photos).
 Criminal penalties for premature declarations of guilt (e.g., in France).
 Specific codes for judicial communication and limitations on official
commentary.

This distinction highlights that while civil law systems rely more on preventive
legislation, common law systems often address issues reactively through court
rulings and evolving jurisprudence.

4.8.3 Effectiveness of Legal Frameworks

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Statutory Mechanisms

Statutory laws such as the Contempt of Court Act (UK), Court Suppression
and Non-publication Orders Acts (Australia), and Criminal Procedure Acts
(New Zealand) provide clear legal bases for restraining prejudicial reporting.
Their effectiveness lies in:

 Timeliness: Courts can intervene quickly.

 Enforceability: Violation leads to contempt proceedings or fines.
 Clarity: Media outlets know the boundaries in advance.

However, statutory reliance also carries risks of overreach, and must be

accompanied by judicial reasoning and sunset clauses to avoid undermining press
freedom.

Contempt Laws

Contempt of court provisions are common in many jurisdictions but are enforced
unevenly:

 In the UK, contempt laws are invoked sparingly but effectively due to
public awareness.
 In India, contempt laws exist but are underutilized in the context of media
trials.
 In the US, contempt is rarely used due to the dominance of First
Amendment protections, but judges rely on procedural safeguards instead.

Contempt laws are effective when coupled with educational efforts, judicial
restraint, and media accountability mechanisms.

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Judicial Discretion and Flexibility

Judicial discretion plays a crucial role in both systems. The Dagenais-Mentuck

test in Canada and the balancing test used in the European Court of Human
Rights exemplify how judges can navigate competing rights.

However, discretion without statutory guidance can lead to inconsistency, as

seen in some Indian judgments where courts have hesitated to impose restraints
even in highly prejudicial cases. Thus, discretion must operate within a
principled and transparent framework to ensure predictability.

4.8.4 Best Practices in Managing Media Trials

From the cross-jurisdictional analysis, several best practices emerge:

Best Practice Jurisdiction Impact

Codified contempt laws Prevents real-time prejudicial

United Kingdom
for active cases reporting

Shields jurors from pre-trial

Gag orders and voir dire United States
media exposure

Structured publication Canada Balances free speech with

ban framework (Dagenais/Mentuck) trial fairness

Judicial–media Promotes ethical, responsible

New Zealand
cooperation protocols courtroom reporting

Preserves presumption of
Protection of accused’s
Germany, France innocence during
identity
investigations

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 Best Practice Jurisdiction Impact

Accountability for France (post-Allenet de Prevents government-led

public officials’ speech Ribemont) prejudgment

These practices demonstrate that multi-pronged strategies—combining legal

restrictions, judicial training, media engagement, and ethical codes—are more
effective than isolated interventions.

4.8.5 Challenges in Implementation

Despite the availability of robust legal tools, implementation is often hampered

by:

 Digital proliferation: Online media and social networks evade traditional

regulation.
 Global content jurisdiction: What’s restricted in one jurisdiction may be
accessible from another.
 Weak enforcement mechanisms: Regulatory bodies often lack
independence or authority.
 Media resistance: Press institutions may resist restrictions, citing freedom
of expression.
 Public appetite for sensationalism: Media profits from public interest in
high-profile criminal matters, making restraint economically unappealing.

Even in jurisdictions with sophisticated legal mechanisms, institutional will,

judicial courage, and media responsibility remain critical to effectiveness.

4.8.6 Conclusion

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A comparative review of global legal systems reveals that while there is no one-
size-fits-all solution, the principles of fairness, proportionality, and
accountability underpin successful strategies to mitigate the harms of media
trials. Civil and common law countries approach the issue differently—through
codified rules and judicial discretion, respectively—but both recognize the
danger of public prejudice influencing judicial outcomes.

India can benefit by selectively integrating these international best practices:

codifying media conduct rules, defining sub judice boundaries, empowering
judges, and fostering a culture of ethical journalism. A comprehensive and
principled approach, informed by comparative learning, is the most effective path
to safeguarding both press freedom and the presumption of innocence in the
face of an evolving media landscape.

4.9: Lessons for India

4.9.1 Introduction

India, as the world’s largest democracy, upholds both freedom of the press under
Article 19(1)(a) and the right to a fair trial under Article 21 of its Constitution.
However, the increasing frequency and intensity of media trials—particularly in
high-profile criminal cases—has exposed critical gaps in legislation, judicial
enforcement, and media ethics. Drawing on global experiences, India has much
to learn from jurisdictions that have successfully implemented frameworks to
strike a balance between transparency and judicial integrity.

This section outlines key lessons India can derive from comparative legal
systems, focusing on necessary reforms and feasible models to ensure that media

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freedom does not come at the expense of presumption of innocence and the rule
of law.

4.9.2 Legislative Reforms: Need for Statutory Clarity

One of the foremost lessons from jurisdictions such as the UK, Canada, and
Australia is the importance of statutory precision in regulating media conduct
during sub judice matters.

In India:

 There is no explicit law that defines what constitutes prejudicial reporting

in sub judice cases.
 The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is vague and rarely invoked in such
contexts.
 Media regulation is fragmented across multiple bodies (e.g., Press
Council of India, News Broadcasters & Digital Association), with limited
enforcement power.

Recommendation:
India must enact clear legislation that:

 Defines sub judice reporting boundaries.

 Specifies penalties for violations, including temporary media blackouts
in sensitive cases.
 Grants courts the power to issue binding postponement or publication
orders in high-stakes trials.

4.9.3 Judicial Tools: Gag Orders and Postponement Orders

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In the United States, gag orders are routinely used to prohibit parties, lawyers,
and even witnesses from making extrajudicial statements that could influence a
trial. Similarly, postponement orders, as recognized by the Supreme Court of
India in *Sahara India Real Estate Corp. v. SEBI (2012), can be used to delay
publication of prejudicial content until the conclusion of proceedings.

Despite judicial recognition, these tools are underutilized in India due to:

 Lack of procedural rules.

 Fear of being seen as curbing press freedom.
 Absence of public awareness about their constitutional legitimacy.

Recommendation:
India should:

 Institutionalize the use of gag and postponement orders through

procedural codes (CrPC, CPC, or new trial conduct rules).
 Mandate their issuance in cases involving vulnerable victims, communal
sensitivity, or significant media interest.
 Provide judges with training and guidelines to exercise these powers
responsibly.

4.9.4 Binding Media Guidelines and Independent Regulation

A major weakness in India’s current framework is the voluntary nature of media

ethics and press guidelines. The Press Council of India and Broadcasting
associations issue advisories, but these are non-binding and often ignored by
commercial media outlets, especially digital and vernacular platforms.

In contrast:

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  France and Germany impose binding legal obligations on media houses,
including penalties for publishing prejudicial content.
 New Zealand has enforceable courtroom protocols for in-trial media
access.
 The Leveson Inquiry in the UK advocated for a statutory, independent
press regulatory body.

Recommendation:
India should:

 Establish an independent media regulator, akin to a Press Ombudsman

or Media Council, with powers to:
o Investigate complaints.
o Enforce ethical standards.
o Penalize or suspend repeat offenders.
 Create uniform and binding media conduct codes applicable to TV,
print, and online platforms, particularly for legal reporting.

4.9.5 Judicial and Legal Education Reforms

Another key lesson is the importance of judicial sensitization and public legal
education. In Canada, for instance, judges are trained to deal with media-related
issues, and jurors are instructed to avoid external influence. In Australia, judicial
conferences routinely address courtroom-media interaction.

In India, many judicial officers:

 Are reluctant to issue media restraints due to lack of training.

 Receive little to no guidance on regulating prejudicial media content.

Recommendation:

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  Include media law and fair trial protection as a mandatory component
of judicial training.
 Encourage law schools, bar associations, and media colleges to
collaborate in promoting ethical reporting and legal literacy among future
journalists and advocates.

4.9.6 Harnessing International Norms and Human Rights Standards

India is a signatory to the ICCPR, which mandates the protection of presumption

of innocence (Article 14) and freedom of expression (Article 19). These
obligations must be reflected in:

 National legislation.
 Judicial interpretations.
 Administrative frameworks regulating media behavior.

Courts should cite General Comment No. 13 and comparative jurisprudence to

develop a progressive, human-rights-centric model for balancing media
freedom and fair trial rights.

4.9.7 Conclusion

The global models reviewed across this chapter demonstrate that judicial fairness
and press freedom are not mutually exclusive—they can co-exist within well-
structured, democratically accountable systems. For India, the lessons are both
urgent and implementable. By adopting:

 Legislative clarity on sub judice reporting,

 Judicial restraint tools like gag/postponement orders,
 Binding ethical frameworks for the media,

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  And international human rights norms as interpretative tools,

India can move towards a holistic and principled approach that protects the
rights of the accused, maintains public confidence in the judiciary, and upholds
the vital role of the press as a pillar of democracy.

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 4.10: Conclusion

A review of international legal systems and human rights instruments clearly

demonstrates that the conflict between media freedom and the right to a fair trial
is a global challenge, not a uniquely Indian phenomenon. As societies evolve into
hyper-connected digital environments, the potential for media overreach,
prejudicial publicity, and erosion of the presumption of innocence increases
dramatically—necessitating careful, context-sensitive interventions by courts,
lawmakers, and regulatory bodies alike.

Throughout this chapter, a synthesis of global approaches has shown that legal
systems across continents—whether based in common law (e.g., UK, Canada,
Australia) or civil law traditions (e.g., France, Germany)—have developed a
variety of legal tools to strike a balance between transparent justice and judicial
impartiality. Mechanisms such as:

 Gag orders and publication bans in Canada and the U.S.,

 Suppression orders in Australia,
 Statutory restrictions under the UK’s Contempt of Court Act,
 Ethical reporting protocols in New Zealand,
 And strict privacy safeguards in European civil law systems,

all reflect the shared understanding that presumption of innocence cannot be

preserved without managing the media’s influence in ongoing criminal
proceedings.

Moreover, international human rights frameworks—particularly the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, and jurisprudence from the European
Court of Human Rights—provide a normative foundation that emphasizes
proportionality, fairness, and dignity in the justice process. These instruments
reinforce that freedom of expression, while vital, is not absolute when it risks

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undermining legal due process or inflicting reputational harm on individuals who
have yet to be found guilty.

India, therefore, stands at a crucial juncture where it can learn from and adapt
these international best practices to strengthen its own legal response. The
country needs a human rights–based approach to media regulation—one that
respects both democratic transparency and the accused's right to be treated as
innocent until proven guilty. Such an approach must combine:

 Legislative reform,
 Judicial training,
 Independent media oversight, and
 Adherence to international norms.

Ultimately, the way forward lies not in suppressing the media but in ensuring its
accountability, so that it serves its constitutional purpose without compromising
the fundamental principles of justice. Recalibrating the media–judiciary
relationship through informed, rights-based, and comparative strategies is not only
desirable—it is essential to preserving public trust in both institutions.

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 CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS OF INDIAN LEGISLATION AND

GOVERNMENT POLICIES

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 CHAPTER 5

Analysis of Indian Legislation and Government Policies

5.1 Introduction

India, as a constitutional democracy, places high importance on both freedom of

expression and the right to a fair trial. These principles, enshrined respectively
in Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, are foundational to
the functioning of a free and just society. Yet, the interplay between these two
rights often becomes contentious, especially in high-profile criminal cases where
media trials dominate public discourse. In such instances, the presumption of
innocence, an implicit but essential facet of Article 21, is frequently undermined
by speculative reporting, sensationalist narratives, and premature declarations of
guilt.

The expansion of India’s media landscape—encompassing print, television,

digital platforms, and social media—has intensified the risk of prejudicial
publicity in ongoing legal proceedings. The lack of comprehensive and cohesive
regulation has left significant loopholes in how media content is managed during
sub judice trials. While India possesses several statutory tools and regulatory
bodies that, in theory, provide oversight, these mechanisms are often fragmented,
non-binding, or weakly enforced, leading to inconsistency and arbitrariness in
application.

This chapter aims to critically examine the existing legislative and policy
framework in India with regard to media conduct and judicial fairness. It
evaluates how Indian laws—ranging from the Constitution, Penal Code,
Contempt laws, and press regulations—interact with media practices and
whether they succeed in protecting the presumption of innocence. It also
considers the role of government policies, judicial pronouncements, and the

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operation of regulatory bodies such as the Press Council of India, the Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting, and various broadcasting associations.

By doing so, the chapter seeks to identify both strengths and systemic
weaknesses in India’s legal response to media trials. Through an in-depth analysis
of statutes, case law, institutional roles, and enforcement trends, this chapter
builds a foundation for understanding the gaps in current protections, and sets
the stage for recommendations and reforms rooted in comparative and human
rights–oriented perspectives.

5.2: Constitutional Protections and Conflicts

5.2.1 Introduction

The Constitution of India forms the cornerstone of all legal and civil rights in the
country. At the heart of the media trial debate lie two competing constitutional
values—freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the right
to a fair trial under Article 21. Both are considered fundamental rights, and both
are essential to the functioning of a healthy democracy. However, when media
coverage veers into speculative or accusatory territory during the pendency of
criminal trials, a conflict arises between these two rights. This section explores this
constitutional tension and how Indian courts have interpreted and attempted to
reconcile these rights in the context of media trials.

5.2.2 Article 19(1)(a): Freedom of Speech and Expression

Article 19(1)(a) guarantees to every citizen the right to freedom of speech and
expression, which includes:

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  Freedom of the press,
 The right to publish and broadcast opinions and news,
 The right to comment on government and judiciary, within limits.

Indian courts have affirmed that press freedom is a vital element of democracy. In
Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi (1950)41, the Supreme Court recognized the right of
the press to criticize public institutions. In Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of
India (1985)42, the Court held that freedom of the press is implicit in Article
19(1)(a), even if not explicitly mentioned.

However, this freedom is not absolute. Article 19(2) permits the State to impose
reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of:

 Contempt of court,
 Defamation,
 Public order,
 Decency or morality,
 Sovereignty and integrity of India.

Therefore, when media coverage impairs the administration of justice or crosses

into contemptuous territory, restrictions under Article 19(2) become
constitutionally justifiable.

5.2.3 Article 21: Right to Life and Personal Liberty

Article 21 provides:

“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law.”

41
1950 AIR 129
42
1986 AIR 515

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Over the years, this article has been expansively interpreted to include a range of
substantive and procedural rights, including:

 The right to a fair trial,

 Dignity of the individual,
 The presumption of innocence.

In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the Supreme Court held that any
"procedure established by law" must be just, fair, and reasonable. Later, in Zahira
Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat (2004), the Court emphasized that a fair trial
is the foundation of the criminal justice system, and its denial constitutes a
violation of Article 21.

Thus, when media coverage leads to public prejudice, affects witness testimony, or
influences judicial reasoning, it infringes upon the accused’s constitutional
guarantee under Article 21.

5.2.4 Presumption of Innocence: A Constitutionally Embedded Principle

Although the presumption of innocence is not explicitly mentioned in the

Constitution, it is firmly embedded in Article 21 as part of the right to fair trial
and due process. This principle is also codified under Section 101 of the Indian
Evidence Act, which places the burden of proof on the prosecution.

Indian courts have consistently upheld this doctrine:

 In Dilip D’Souza v. State of Maharashtra (2002), the Bombay High Court

held that “the presumption of innocence is a human right.”
 In Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), the Supreme Court recognized it as
part of the right against self-incrimination and due process.

When the media projects an accused as guilty before trial—through headlines,

interviews, or “leaks”—it violates this constitutional guarantee and can
compromise the fairness of the trial.

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5.2.5 Judicial Balancing of Competing Rights

In India, the judiciary has attempted to balance Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21,
particularly in cases involving media trials. In the landmark judgment of Sahara
India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI (2012), the Supreme Court recognized the
power of courts to issue postponement orders to prevent prejudicial media
reporting in sub judice matters. The Court observed that freedom of expression
must be weighed against the right of the accused to a fair trial, and that courts
can intervene to prevent media interference.

Similarly, in R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009), the Court strongly
condemned media attempts to influence criminal proceedings and emphasized that
trial by media can become trial of media if unchecked.

These rulings highlight the judicial view that neither Article 19(1)(a) nor Article
21 is superior—both are co-equal and must be harmonized to preserve democratic
integrity and the rule of law.

5.2.6 Conclusion

The Indian Constitution, while committed to protecting both free speech and
personal liberty, presents a juridical tension when media conduct risks prejudicing
the outcome of criminal proceedings. While Article 19(1)(a) safeguards the media’s
right to inform and critique, Article 21 ensures the accused’s right to be presumed
innocent and tried fairly. In media-sensitive trials, unregulated reporting may not
only erode public trust in the judiciary but also violate the dignity and liberty
of the accused.

Indian courts have laid down important principles to mediate this constitutional
conflict, yet a lack of clear statutory guidelines and enforcement mechanisms
continues to pose serious challenges. A harmonious constitutional
interpretation, supported by thoughtful legislation and judicial restraint, is
necessary to protect both rights without letting one trample the other.

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 5.3: Statutory Framework Affecting Media and Trials

India’s legal system provides several statutory mechanisms that, directly or

indirectly, regulate the conduct of the media during ongoing legal proceedings.
These statutes form a critical part of the framework that seeks to protect the
presumption of innocence, ensure fair trials, and uphold judicial integrity.
However, despite their relevance, many of these laws remain under-enforced,
outdated, or ill-equipped to address the complexities of modern media,
especially in the digital age. This section examines four key legislations: the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

5.3.1 Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is a central statute designed to protect the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary. It defines two types of contempt:

 Civil Contempt (Section 2(b)): Wilful disobedience to any judgment,

decree, direction, or order of a court.
 Criminal Contempt (Section 2(c)): Publication or actions that scandalize
the court, prejudice or interfere with judicial proceedings, or obstruct the
administration of justice.

Role in Media Regulation

In the context of media trials, criminal contempt is particularly relevant. The Act
allows courts to take suo motu cognizance of media coverage that might
influence witnesses, pressure judges, or damage public confidence in the
justice system. The Supreme Court in R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994)
emphasized that while the press is free to report on court proceedings, it cannot
interfere with justice delivery.

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Limitations

Despite its potential, the Act suffers from practical limitations:

 No specific provisions addressing real-time digital or social media

coverage.
 Rare application in high-profile cases due to fears of infringing free
speech.
 Contempt actions are often reactive, not preventive.

Thus, while the Act is constitutionally valid and theoretically robust, its narrow
scope and inconsistent enforcement reduce its impact in curbing prejudicial
media trials.

5.3.2 Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860

The Indian Penal Code contains several provisions that can be invoked against
false, defamatory, or seditious media content, especially when such content
compromises an individual’s dignity or judicial integrity.

Relevant Sections:

 Sections 499–500: Define and penalize defamation. These are often

invoked in cases where media reports malign the reputation of an accused
before trial. However, the requirement of proof and the slow judicial
process make them ineffective deterrents.
 Section 182: Punishes the false provision of information to public
servants, which may be applicable in cases where media actors
deliberately misrepresent facts to law enforcement or influence
investigations.
 Section 124A: Deals with sedition—statements that incite hatred or
disaffection against the government. Though historically misused, this

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 provision has also been invoked against inflammatory media content,
especially in communal cases.

Use and Misuse

While these provisions offer tools to check irresponsible media behavior, they are
often:

 Misused to target dissenting voices, especially independent journalists.

 Ineffectual against corporate media, which often operate with legal
impunity.
 Not tailored for sub judice trial contexts, making them difficult to apply
proactively.

There is thus a pressing need to update and clarify these provisions in the
context of media-related prejudice and digital news reporting.

5.3.3 Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973

The CrPC governs the procedural aspects of criminal trials in India and contains
important provisions that can indirectly control media involvement.

Key Provisions:

 Section 327: Empowers courts to conduct in-camera trials (closed

proceedings) in certain cases, especially those involving rape or sexual
offences. Courts can also restrict media access to protect victims and
ensure trial fairness.
 Section 340: Provides mechanisms to prosecute offences against public
justice, including perjury and fabrication of evidence, which may arise due
to media influence or manipulation of narratives.

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  Sections 41 and 154: Deal with arrest and FIR registration. The media’s
reporting of arrests before charges are framed often violates the
presumption of innocence, yet there is no clear restriction under the CrPC.

Judicial Discretion

CrPC gives courts discretionary power to control access to proceedings, but this
discretion is:

 Rarely exercised to restrain media, except in exceptional cases.

 Lacks guidelines for use during high-profile or politically sensitive trials.

Thus, while the CrPC supports fair trial principles, it lacks a coherent media
policy within its procedural framework.

5.3.4 Indian Evidence Act, 1872

The Indian Evidence Act is the foundational statute for determining what
constitutes admissible and relevant evidence in court. While it does not regulate
the media directly, its principles play a vital role in reinforcing the presumption
of innocence and limiting external influence.

Key Provisions:

 Section 101: Places the burden of proof on the prosecution, reinforcing

that an accused is presumed innocent until guilt is established through
credible evidence.
 Sections 5 to 17: Define relevancy of facts, thereby excluding extraneous
or prejudicial material that may have been circulated in the media.
 Section 60: Requires direct oral evidence, rather than speculative or
hearsay material often featured in media reports.

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Media Influence on Evidentiary Process

When media trials disseminate unverified allegations, witness interviews, or

leaked evidence:

 Public opinion is shaped prematurely, leading to biased perceptions.

 Witnesses may be influenced or intimidated.
 Courts may inadvertently be pressured, despite formal rules of evidence.

Thus, while the Indian Evidence Act remains silent on media conduct, its
underlying presumption of fairness is routinely threatened by unregulated
media narratives.

5.3.5 Conclusion

The statutory landscape in India offers a range of tools to manage media conduct
during criminal trials, yet these tools are often disjointed, outdated, or under-
enforced. The Contempt of Courts Act is underutilized, the IPC offers limited
protection without adequate enforcement, the CrPC provides discretion without
guidance, and the Evidence Act, though principled, lacks protective mechanisms
against pre-trial media prejudice.

A comprehensive legislative overhaul, with harmonized statutes and new

procedural safeguards, is urgently required to address the realities of
contemporary journalism and digital communication, and to reinforce the
presumption of innocence in India’s legal process.

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 5.4: Media-Specific Laws and Regulatory Bodies

India's rapidly expanding and diversifying media landscape includes print,

broadcast, and digital platforms, each governed by separate (and often
inadequate) regulatory mechanisms. While the freedom of the press is protected
under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, the lack of cohesive and binding legal
regulation has enabled the rise of trial by media, especially in high-profile
criminal cases. This section critically evaluates the principal legislative
instruments and regulatory bodies that govern media behavior in India—namely,
the Press Council of India Act, 1978, the Cable Television Networks
(Regulation) Act, 1995, and the Information Technology Act, 2000 (along with
the IT Rules, 2021).

5.4.1 Press Council of India Act, 1978

The Press Council of India (PCI) was established under the Press Council Act,
1978, as an autonomous statutory body to uphold the freedom of the press and
ensure responsible journalism in the print media.

Role and Powers:

 The PCI issues norms of journalistic conduct, particularly regarding

fairness, accuracy, and ethical reporting.
 It can investigate complaints against newspapers and journalists
regarding professional misconduct, including sensationalism or
prejudicial coverage.
 It can summon witnesses, demand production of documents, and conduct
public inquiries.

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Limitations:

 The PCI’s decisions are advisory and non-binding; it cannot impose

penalties, fines, or revoke licenses.
 Its jurisdiction is limited to print media only; it has no authority over
television, radio, or digital platforms.
 It lacks enforcement power against powerful media houses or politically
affiliated publications.

In cases involving media trials, the PCI may issue censure or warning, but such
actions carry no legal consequences, rendering the Council ineffective in
controlling harmful reporting that violates the presumption of innocence.

5.4.2 Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995

The Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 was enacted to regulate
content dissemination on television networks across India. It is one of the key
legal frameworks governing electronic media, particularly news channels.

Key Provisions:

 The Act mandates compliance with the Programme Code and

Advertisement Code under the Cable Television Networks Rules, 1994.
 The Programme Code prohibits content that:
o Offends decency or morality,
o Contains attacks on communities or individuals,
o Prejudices the integrity of the judiciary or the outcome of legal
proceedings.

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Enforcement and Application:

 The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B) is empowered to

issue warnings, demand apologies, or even suspend channels for
violating the Code.
 In theory, the Act allows regulation of prejudicial or inflammatory
reporting by news broadcasters during pending trials.

Limitations:

 Enforcement is sporadic and politically influenced.

 The Act does not cover digital streaming, YouTube-based news, or
unregulated OTT channels.
 There is no independent regulator akin to Ofcom (UK) or ACMA
(Australia); the I&B Ministry acts as both policymaker and enforcer,
creating conflict of interest.

The Act has some potential for curbing sensationalist or biased legal reporting,
but its limited scope and executive-controlled implementation have restricted
its overall effectiveness.

5.4.3 Information Technology Act, 2000 and IT Rules, 2021

With the explosion of digital news, social media, and OTT platforms, the
regulation of online content has become central to any legal framework
addressing media trials. The Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, along
with the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media
Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, governs this domain.

The IT Act, 2000:

 Initially intended to regulate cybercrime, hacking, and data protection.

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  Section 69A empowers the government to block public access to
information that threatens public order, decency, or national security.
 It also holds intermediaries (social media platforms, websites)
responsible for taking down unlawful content upon notification.

IT Rules, 2021:

 These Rules categorize digital media into:

o News and current affairs publishers,
o OTT platforms, and
o Social media intermediaries.

Key Provisions:

 Platforms must take down prejudicial content within 36 hours of

receiving a complaint.
 Publishers are required to adhere to a Code of Ethics based on the
Programme Code of the Cable TV Act.
 A three-tier regulatory mechanism has been introduced:
1. Self-regulation by publishers.
2. Self-regulatory bodies headed by retired judges or eminent
persons.
3. Oversight by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

Concerns and Challenges:

 Critics argue the Rules grant excessive powers to the executive, allowing
for arbitrary takedown of content.
 There is no independent regulatory authority, raising questions of press
freedom and editorial autonomy.
 Enforcement has been selective, often influenced by political pressure or
public outrage.

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While the IT Act and Rules represent a step toward digital regulation, they
remain underdeveloped in relation to trial reporting, and do not explicitly
address presumption of innocence or media trials.

5.4.4 Conclusion

India’s current framework for regulating media in the context of criminal justice
is fragmented, weakly enforced, and outdated. The Press Council of India
lacks penal powers, the Cable TV Act does not cover digital media, and the IT
Rules, 2021, though progressive in structure, are limited in scope and prone to
executive overreach. None of these mechanisms provide targeted protection
against trial by media or offer specific safeguards for preserving the
presumption of innocence.

There is a pressing need for a comprehensive and unified legal regime that can:

 Address the convergence of print, electronic, and digital media.

 Provide for independent regulatory oversight.
 Mandate ethically responsible legal journalism.
 Punish violations that compromise judicial fairness.

Only through such reform can India align its regulatory approach with
democratic values, human rights standards, and the evolving demands of its
media ecosystem.

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 5.5: Government Policies and Guidelines

5.5.1 Introduction

While India has enacted various laws concerning the regulation of media and the
protection of trial rights, government policies and administrative guidelines
also play a crucial role in shaping the interaction between the media and the
judiciary. However, these policies are often reactive, fragmented, or non-
binding, and have not kept pace with the rapid evolution of media technologies
and practices. This section explores the role of ministerial advisories, judicial
policy interventions, and law reform initiatives that aim to manage prejudicial
media coverage and uphold the presumption of innocence in ongoing criminal
trials.

5.5.2 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B) Advisories

The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B) is the nodal body for
formulating media-related policies, including those pertaining to content
standards, broadcast ethics, and emergency censorship. Over the years, the
Ministry has issued several advisories and guidelines directed at broadcasters
and media outlets, especially during high-profile or sensitive trials.

Key Functions and Policies:

 Issuance of content warnings for television channels to avoid

sensationalism, speculative reporting, or naming victims in violation of
legal norms.
 Advisories asking media houses to adhere to the Cable Television
Network Rules and the Programme Code.

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  Enforcement of Section 20 of the Cable Television Networks Act,
allowing temporary suspension of channels in extreme cases of contempt
or misreporting.

Limitations:

 These advisories are not legally binding and depend on voluntary

compliance.
 They are often inconsistently enforced and sometimes viewed as tools of
political censorship rather than objective regulation.
 The I&B Ministry functions as both regulator and enforcer, lacking the
independence needed to ensure unbiased oversight.

5.5.3 Model Guidelines from the Judiciary

The Supreme Court of India and various High Courts have, over time,
developed model guidelines to address the growing concern of media
interference in judicial proceedings.

Notable Developments:

 Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI (2012):

The Supreme Court acknowledged the power of courts to issue
postponement orders to prevent media from publishing content that
could prejudice sub judice matters. The Court proposed the development
of “non-statutory guidelines” to balance Article 19(1)(a) with Article 21.
 High Court Guidelines:
Certain High Courts (e.g., Delhi, Bombay, Madras) have issued guidelines
for media access to courtrooms, including:
o Conditions for journalists to attend in-camera proceedings,
o Restrictions on photographing witnesses,

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 o Limits on social media updates during trials.

Limitations:

 These guidelines are often jurisdiction-specific and lack uniform

national implementation.
 Many are not codified, leaving their enforceability to judicial
discretion.
 They are primarily curative, rather than preventive, in nature.

5.5.4 Role of the Law Commission of India

The Law Commission of India, an expert advisory body under the Ministry of
Law and Justice, has taken significant steps to highlight the dangers of media
trials and recommend legal reforms.

200th Report (2006) – “Trial by Media: Free Speech and Fair Trial under
Criminal Procedure Code”:

This report remains one of the most comprehensive efforts to address media
interference in criminal justice. Key recommendations included:

 Prohibiting media from publishing confessions, investigative details, or

character attacks on the accused before trial.
 Introducing statutory restrictions on media reporting during ongoing
investigations.
 Amending the Contempt of Courts Act to explicitly include “trial by
media” under criminal contempt.
 Empowering courts to issue temporary publication bans on specific
information related to the case.

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Impact and Follow-up:

 Despite its clarity and foresight, the report’s recommendations remain

unimplemented.
 Successive governments have avoided enacting statutory reforms, citing
concerns about freedom of the press and political sensitivities.

5.5.5 Lack of a Unified National Media Code

Unlike jurisdictions such as the UK (Ofcom) or Australia (ACMA), India does

not have a comprehensive media ethics code mandated by law or enforced by an
independent regulatory authority.

Attempts at a “Broadcasting Services Regulation Bill” have been made multiple

times (2007, 2010, 2018), aiming to:

 Consolidate regulation across platforms,

 Enforce minimum content standards,
 Create an independent body to handle violations.

However, all such attempts have stalled due to industry resistance, political
objections, and fear of over-regulation. As a result, India remains without a
uniform, enforceable policy that ensures responsible journalism during legal
proceedings.

5.5.6 Conclusion

The existing landscape of government policies and guidelines in India reveals a

reactive, inconsistent, and largely non-binding approach to managing the
conflict between media reporting and fair trial rights. While courts and

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commissions have recognized the problem and suggested remedies, policy
implementation has been weak, and legislative inertia has blocked meaningful
change.

To safeguard the presumption of innocence and the integrity of criminal trials,

India needs:

 Codified and enforceable media conduct guidelines,

 A neutral and independent regulatory authority, and
 Better coordination between government ministries, courts, and media
stakeholders.

Only through coherent, proactive, and rights-based policy design can the state
fulfill its dual obligation of protecting both free expression and justice in an era
of high-speed, high-stakes journalism.

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 5.6: Judicial Responses to Media Trials

5.6.1 Introduction

India’s judiciary has played a crucial role in responding to the growing problem
of media trials and their impact on the presumption of innocence and judicial
independence. While legislative and policy frameworks remain fragmented, the
Supreme Court and various High Courts have, through landmark rulings,
attempted to define constitutional boundaries, lay down guiding principles, and
use their contempt powers to preserve the sanctity of criminal trials. This section
examines several key judicial decisions that have shaped the Indian legal
discourse on trial by media, and assesses the doctrines that have emerged to
safeguard fair trial rights in the face of public and press pressure.

5.6.2 Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI (2012)

Citation: (2012) 10 SCC 603

Facts & Issue:

The Sahara Group approached the Supreme Court seeking restrictions on media
reporting of court proceedings in a case involving financial irregularities. The
primary issue was whether courts had the constitutional power to temporarily
restrain publication of judicial matters to protect the integrity of trials.

Judgment & Doctrine:

The Supreme Court upheld the concept of "postponement orders", establishing

that courts could, in exceptional cases, restrict media reporting for a limited time
to avoid prejudice. The Court held that:

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  Freedom of the press under Article 19(1)(a) is not absolute.
 It must be balanced against Article 21, which guarantees a fair trial and
presumption of innocence.

Significance:

This case marked a judicial recognition of media trials as a threat to justice.

The ruling gave courts an affirmative tool to pre-emptively address prejudicial
publicity—though its use has remained rare.

5.6.3 R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009)

Citation: (2009) 8 SCC 106

Facts & Issue:

This case arose from a sting operation by NDTV exposing an attempt by senior
advocates to influence a key witness in the BMW hit-and-run trial. The issue was
whether media sting operations during a pending trial amounted to contempt and
undermined judicial fairness.

Judgment & Doctrine:

The Supreme Court held that:

 Trial by media must not interfere with the administration of justice.

 Media must act responsibly, and sting operations during trials could be
prejudicial.
 The Court initiated criminal contempt proceedings against the advocates
involved.

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Significance:

This case highlighted the judiciary’s willingness to use contempt jurisdiction to

penalize unethical conduct and to caution the media against real-time intrusions
into the legal process. It drew a clear line between investigative journalism and
trial interference.

5.6.4 Arun Jaitley v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015)

Citation: 2016 CriLJ 1432 (All HC)

Facts & Issue:

Senior advocate and politician Arun Jaitley filed a petition challenging a bailable
warrant issued against him by a lower court based on a TV panel discussion
comment about judicial decisions.

Judgment & Doctrine:

The Allahabad High Court quashed the proceedings, observing that:

 Criticism of judgments, when fair and reasonable, does not amount to

contempt.
 However, trial-related comments that imply guilt or question a pending
case can violate the sub judice rule.

Significance:

This case drew attention to the distinction between fair criticism and
prejudicial speech, reaffirming that public discourse must not compromise trial
integrity, even when expressed by public figures or experts.

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5.6.5 Romila Thapar v. Union of India (2018)

Citation: (2018) 10 SCC 753

Facts & Issue:

The case concerned the arrest of five human rights activists under the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). Media outlets published alleged confessions
and police evidence before trial or judicial scrutiny.

Judgment & Doctrine:

The Supreme Court expressed concern over:

 The leaking of case materials to the media,

 Pre-trial media reporting that painted the accused as guilty,
 And the violation of their right to a fair hearing.

Although the Court ultimately upheld the arrests, it criticized the “media
prosecution” and emphasized the importance of judicial forums—not
newsrooms—for establishing guilt.

Significance:

This case reaffirmed that media disclosure of unverified evidence can result in
public prejudice, undermining the rights of the accused and compromising
judicial impartiality.

5.6.6 Doctrinal Themes in Judicial Responses

From the above cases and others, several key judicial doctrines have emerged:

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  Balancing of Rights Doctrine: Courts stress that Article 19(1)(a) (media
freedom) must be weighed against Article 21 (fair trial rights), and neither
is supreme over the other (Sahara India).
 Postponement Orders Doctrine: Recognized as a judicial power to
prevent publication that could prejudice sub judice matters, though used
sparingly.
 Media Responsibility Doctrine: Media is expected to self-regulate and
refrain from publishing confessions, evidence leaks, or accusations
before a verdict.
 Contempt as a Deterrent: Suo moto contempt powers have been used
selectively to check extreme cases of media interference (R.K. Anand),
though often criticized for underuse in other prejudicial media trials.

5.6.7 Suo Moto Contempt and Judicial Restraint

The contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 and 215 of the Constitution allows
the Supreme Court and High Courts to initiate suo moto proceedings against
individuals or entities that obstruct the administration of justice.

Strengths:

 Offers a powerful deterrent to irresponsible media conduct.

 Can act swiftly when trials are seriously compromised.

Limitations:

 Contempt powers are rarely invoked against large media houses.

 There is no uniform test or threshold for what constitutes “prejudicial
publicity.”
 Risk of being misused to suppress legitimate dissent or investigative
reporting.

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Courts have emphasized judicial restraint—preferring education, advisories, and
narrow publication bans over broad censorship. Yet, critics argue that such
restraint often emboldens media outlets to continue sensationalist practices
without fear of sanction.

5.6.8 Conclusion

Indian courts have laid a constitutional and jurisprudential foundation for

managing media trials, recognizing their dangerous impact on due process and
public perception. Through landmark decisions, courts have articulated doctrines
that aim to balance free speech with procedural fairness, while acknowledging
the evolving nature of media influence in criminal trials.

However, in the absence of codified media laws, standard regulatory

protocols, and consistent judicial enforcement, these rulings often lack
sustained impact. The judiciary must move beyond isolated interventions and
push for systemic reforms, including standard guidelines, training of judges
and journalists, and institutional mechanisms for accountability, to protect the
integrity of India’s criminal justice system.

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 5.7 Challenges in the Indian Legal Landscape

5.7.1 Introduction

Despite the presence of constitutional safeguards and a patchwork of statutory and

regulatory provisions, the Indian legal framework has struggled to address the
growing problem of media trials. The presumption of innocence, a cornerstone
of criminal jurisprudence, is increasingly under threat from aggressive, often
sensationalist media reporting that influences public opinion and may compromise
judicial impartiality. This section identifies the key institutional, legal, and
structural challenges that contribute to the ineffectiveness of India’s current
system in preventing or responding to media interference in judicial proceedings.

5.7.2 Absence of a Binding Media Conduct Code for Court Reporting

India lacks a uniform, binding, and enforceable code of conduct for how the
media should report on judicial proceedings. While ethical guidelines exist:

 The Press Council of India issues norms for responsible journalism.

 The Cable Television Networks Rules, 1994, under the Programme
Code, prohibit content that prejudices judicial proceedings.
 The IT Rules, 2021, extend a digital code of ethics to online news
publishers.

These guidelines are non-binding, advisory in nature, and suffer from poor
implementation. There is no enforceable Media Code of Conduct specific to
court reporting, particularly concerning:

 Reporting of confessions or investigative leaks,

 Coverage of under-trial individuals,

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  Premature analysis that prejudges legal guilt.

As a result, media outlets often operate with impunity, framing accused persons
as guilty without judicial determination.

5.7.3 Fragmentation of Media Regulation Across Platforms

India’s media ecosystem is regulated by a disparate set of laws and authorities,

each dealing with different platforms:

 Print media is governed by the Press Council of India.

 Television is regulated under the Cable Television Networks Act.
 Digital news and OTT content is subject to the IT Act and IT Rules.
 Social media platforms fall under intermediary guidelines with little
oversight on content curation algorithms.

This fragmentation leads to legal loopholes where content that is banned or

penalized on one platform continues to circulate freely on another. For example:

 A TV channel may be issued a warning for a prejudicial report, but the

same clip may go viral on YouTube or WhatsApp.
 Courts have no consolidated mechanism to issue a universal take-down
or postponement order applicable across all media channels.

Such gaps in regulatory jurisdiction dilute the effectiveness of judicial and

executive interventions, especially in high-profile or politically sensitive cases.

5.7.4 Weak Enforcement by Statutory Bodies

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India’s statutory and quasi-judicial media regulatory bodies lack the legal
authority and independence required to enforce ethical norms and content
restrictions.

Press Council of India (PCI):

 Can censure or issue notices to newspapers but cannot impose penalties

or suspend operations.
 Has no jurisdiction over television or digital media.
 Often lacks credibility due to political appointments and limited public
trust.

News Broadcasters & Digital Association (NBDA):

 A private self-regulatory body for TV news channels.

 Can issue warnings or fines but cannot compel compliance.
 Membership is voluntary and excludes many major or regional players.

Broadcasting Content Complaints Council (BCCC):

 Works under the Indian Broadcasting Foundation (IBF).

 Has jurisdiction only over entertainment content, not news media.

This weak enforcement environment creates a culture of minimal

accountability, where even repeated violations of ethical norms go unpunished or
are addressed long after damage to the judicial process is done.

5.7.5 Influence of Political and Corporate Interests

One of the most pressing challenges in regulating media trials is the increasing
influence of political and corporate interests over news content. Many media
houses:

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  Are owned by large industrial conglomerates or political entities.
 Rely heavily on government advertising and corporate sponsorship,
which compromises editorial independence.
 Use coverage of legal cases for TRP ratings or political messaging,
especially in the run-up to elections or during communal tensions.

This influence often manifests in:

 One-sided coverage that echoes prosecutorial or state narratives.

 Vilification of accused individuals from politically marginalized
communities.
 Suppression of alternative legal perspectives, especially in sensitive
cases involving dissenters or human rights defenders.

Such structural biases erode the presumption of innocence, distort public

perception, and contribute to the media’s growing role as an “extra-judicial
forum” in the eyes of the public.

5.7.6 Conclusion

The challenges in India’s legal and regulatory framework for managing media
trials are both systemic and multifaceted. The absence of binding codes, the
fragmentation of regulatory authorities, the lack of enforcement powers, and
the growing nexus between media, politics, and capital all contribute to a legal
environment where the presumption of innocence is routinely violated in the
court of public opinion.

If left unaddressed, these challenges will continue to undermine judicial

credibility, individual dignity, and public trust in the legal system. Addressing
them requires legislative reform, institutional restructuring, and a national

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consensus on the ethical responsibilities of a free and fair press in a constitutional
democracy.

5.8: Comparative Gaps and Areas for Reform

5.8.1 Introduction

While India’s legal and institutional framework offers various tools to safeguard
judicial integrity, it lacks a cohesive, modern, and enforceable system for
regulating media conduct during criminal trials. When compared to jurisdictions
such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, significant
gaps emerge in India's ability to balance press freedom with the right to a fair
trial. These gaps are particularly pronounced in the digital era, where real-time
dissemination, anonymous authorship, and the viral nature of content magnify the
risks associated with trial by media. This section critically assesses the
inadequacies in India's existing approach and outlines key areas where reform is
urgently needed.

5.8.2 Inadequacy of Existing Laws in the Digital Age

The Indian legal regime—including the Contempt of Courts Act (1971), the
Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act (1995), and the Information
Technology Act (2000)—was formulated in a pre-digital or early-digital era.
These laws were not designed to handle:

 Instantaneous content dissemination via social media,

 Cross-jurisdictional publication through global servers,
 Anonymous or pseudonymous content creators, or
 Algorithmically promoted narratives on platforms like YouTube, X
(formerly Twitter), Instagram, and Facebook.

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While the IT Rules, 2021 introduced obligations on intermediaries and digital
news platforms, they lack specific provisions for sub judice reporting, media
trials, or content that could impair the presumption of innocence. Moreover,
enforcement remains weak, with platforms rarely penalized for failing to
remove prejudicial material.

In contrast, countries like Germany and France impose strict liability on

publishers for defaming or misrepresenting accused individuals during ongoing
legal processes, and many jurisdictions have specialised digital communication
laws to manage this risk. India’s failure to update its laws has resulted in
regulatory paralysis, especially in high-profile trials that unfold simultaneously
in courtrooms and across digital platforms.

5.8.3 Lack of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

Another major gap is the absence of standardized procedural guidelines for

key justice system stakeholders—judges, police officers, and prosecutors—on
how to manage media relations during pending trials.

Currently:

 Trial judges have discretionary powers under Section 327 of the CrPC
to restrict public access or media coverage, but there are no uniform
protocols to guide the use of these powers.
 Police officers routinely brief the media during investigations, sometimes
sharing photographs, confessions, or witness identities—all of which can
taint the trial.
 Prosecutors lack any binding guidelines on public communication and are
often silent when media narratives conflict with legal norms.

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This inconsistency leads to confusion, judicial overreach, or inaction, and
ultimately creates an environment where media coverage can distort public
perception or even influence judicial behavior.

In contrast, countries such as New Zealand and Canada have developed detailed
media court reporting protocols and SOPs for public authorities, which
ensure that legal communication with the media remains factual, proportionate,
and non-prejudicial.

5.8.4 Need for a Unified Legal Framework on Media and Judicial

Reporting

Perhaps the most urgent reform required in India is the creation of a

comprehensive, unified statute or regulatory framework that governs:

 Courtroom media access,

 Sub judice reporting,
 Broadcast of confessions or evidence leaks,
 Publication bans and postponement orders, and
 Penalties for violations.

This framework should draw upon international best practices and be:

 Platform-neutral (applicable to print, broadcast, and digital media),

 Enforceable (backed by regulatory authority with penal powers), and
 Protective of both Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 rights.

Additionally, a central regulatory authority, possibly in the form of a Media

and Justice Regulatory Commission, could oversee the implementation of such
a statute, issue binding ethical codes, and adjudicate disputes.

Currently, media regulation in India is spread across:

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  PCI for print,
 NBDA/BCCC for broadcast,
 MIB and MeitY for digital platforms.

This fragmentation not only results in jurisdictional gaps but also allows
violators to escape accountability by shifting platforms or exploiting regulatory
ambiguity.

5.8.5 Conclusion

India's approach to regulating media trials remains outdated, fragmented, and

reactive, lacking the robustness required in a digital information age.
Comparative analysis shows that countries with unified frameworks, judicial
training, and independent regulatory bodies are far better equipped to balance
the rights to free expression and fair trial.

To protect the presumption of innocence and ensure public confidence in the

judiciary, India must:

 Modernize its statutes,

 Establish SOPs for all actors in the criminal justice system, and
 Introduce a unified, enforceable framework for media conduct in
relation to sub judice matters.

These reforms are not only necessary but urgently required to uphold
constitutional integrity, safeguard individual rights, and restore the media’s role
as a pillar of democracy, rather than a parallel courtroom.

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 5.9: Recommendations

Introduction

Based on the preceding analysis of constitutional provisions, legislative gaps,

regulatory inefficiencies, and judicial responses, it is evident that India lacks a
coherent and enforceable mechanism to manage the conflict between media
freedom and the right to a fair trial. The absence of a dedicated legal framework
addressing sub judice reporting, coupled with weak enforcement and fragmented
oversight, has enabled media trials to erode the presumption of innocence and
distort public discourse around criminal justice.

This section offers concrete legislative and procedural reforms designed to strike
a principled balance between press freedom under Article 19(1)(a) and fair trial
rights under Article 21, in line with international best practices and
comparative jurisprudence.

Enactment of a Media Conduct Law for Sub Judice Matters

India urgently requires a dedicated statute—a “Media Conduct in Legal

Proceedings Act” or equivalent—that codifies clear standards for:

 Reporting during ongoing criminal trials,

 Restrictions on publication of unverified evidence, confessions, or
statements from the police,
 Prohibition of speculative or accusatory narratives that suggest guilt prior
to a judicial verdict.

Key features of such a law should include:

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  Definition of sub judice periods, with exceptions for public interest
reporting that is fact-based.
 Provision for temporary postponement orders at the discretion of trial
courts (based on the Sahara India v. SEBI doctrine).
 Time-bound appeals against publication bans to prevent misuse or
arbitrary restrictions.
 Specific penalties for violations, including fines and content takedowns.

Such a law would ensure legal clarity, empower judges, and impose statutory
obligations on both legacy and digital media entities.

Empowerment of the Press Council of India (PCI)

The Press Council of India (PCI) currently functions as a quasi-judicial,

advisory body without the authority to enforce penalties or compel compliance
with its rulings.

To enhance its efficacy:

 The PCI should be restructured and empowered through statutory

amendments to:
o Impose monetary penalties for ethical violations,
o Direct temporary suspension of publishing rights in extreme cases,
o Mandate apologies, retractions, or corrective notices from erring
media houses.
 Its jurisdiction should be expanded to include digital print media, blogs,
and news aggregators operating in the public domain.

Alternatively, the PCI could be integrated into a broader National Media

Accountability Commission, capable of cross-platform oversight, transparency
audits, and redressal of complaints in real time.

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Judicial Training and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

There is a critical need to develop and institutionalize judicial capacity-building

programs on media-related issues.

Recommendations:

 Introduce mandatory judicial training modules on:

o Handling media pressure during trials,
o Issuing postponement or gag orders,
o Recognizing contemptuous or prejudicial reporting.
 Create SOPs for judges, prosecutors, and police officers for media-
sensitive cases, including:
o Guidelines on when and how to restrict public access to
information,
o Directions on permissible media briefings,
o Advisory protocols on protecting witness identities and
safeguarding investigation confidentiality.

These SOPs can be issued through practice directions by the Supreme Court or
formal rules under the Criminal Procedure Code, thereby ensuring uniformity
across jurisdictions.

Establishment of an Independent Statutory Media Regulator

To replace the fragmented and often ineffective network of current regulatory

bodies (e.g., PCI, NBDA, BCCC), India must establish a constitutionally
autonomous, statutory media regulator with jurisdiction across all content
platforms—print, broadcast, and digital.

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Key responsibilities of this body should include:

 Framing and enforcing a binding Code of Ethics for court and trial
reporting,
 Monitoring media conduct during high-profile cases and issuing real-time
advisories,
 Investigating violations and imposing graduated penalties,
 Maintaining a public database of complaints, orders, and disciplinary
actions,
 Acting as a bridge between the judiciary, the media, and the public in
upholding fair trial standards.

Such a regulator must be independent of executive control, with appointments

made through multi-stakeholder committees including members from the
judiciary, civil society, media professionals, and constitutional bodies.

Harmonization with International Human Rights Standards

In drafting and implementing these reforms, India must align its domestic
regulations with its international obligations under:

 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),

particularly Article 14 on fair trial rights and Article 19 on freedom of
expression.
 General Comment No. 13 of the UN Human Rights Committee, which
prohibits public declarations of guilt prior to conviction.
 Relevant decisions of international courts, such as the European Court of
Human Rights and UN special procedures on media regulation and trial
fairness.

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India can also reference comparative frameworks from Canada, the UK, and
Australia for adaptable and effective media governance.

Conclusion

To protect the foundational values of the Constitution—justice, dignity, and

equality before the law—India must act decisively to regulate media trials
without compromising on press freedom. A multi-pronged reform approach—
legislative clarity, institutional strengthening, judicial empowerment, and
regulatory independence—is necessary to ensure that the media remains a
facilitator of public interest, not a substitute for judicial process.

By implementing the above recommendations, India can move toward a system

that respects both constitutional freedoms and procedural justice, thereby
restoring balance in the media–justice relationship and strengthening the
public’s faith in the rule of law.

5.10: Conclusion

The examination of India’s legal and policy response to media trials reveals a
system that is fragmented, underdeveloped, and reactive, rather than cohesive
and forward-looking. While constitutional protections for both freedom of speech
and the right to a fair trial exist, their intersection—especially in the context of
high-profile criminal cases—has not been sufficiently addressed through robust
legislation or institutional frameworks. As a result, the presumption of innocence,
a cornerstone of procedural justice and human dignity, is frequently jeopardized by
speculative media narratives, sensationalist coverage, and premature judgments in
the court of public opinion.

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The current statutory environment suffers from overlapping jurisdictions and
regulatory ambiguity. Laws such as the Contempt of Courts Act, Cable
Television Networks Act, and Information Technology Act offer partial tools,
but lack the specificity, coordination, and enforcement power necessary to
meaningfully regulate sub judice reporting across platforms. Furthermore, the
absence of binding ethical codes, the inability of statutory bodies like the PCI
and NBDA to enforce penalties, and the lack of judicial SOPs in media-sensitive
cases collectively contribute to a legal vacuum.

This chapter has underscored the urgent need for reform—not in the form of
excessive censorship, but through the harmonization of constitutional values. A
democracy must uphold both press freedom and judicial fairness, but neither
should be exercised at the cost of the other. The solution lies in the creation of a
balanced, rights-respecting regulatory architecture that protects individuals
from reputational harm while preserving the public’s right to know.

Drawing upon comparative practices and international human rights standards,

India must adopt a human rights–centric approach to regulating the media–
judiciary interface. This includes:

 Enacting a Media Conduct Law for sub judice matters,

 Empowering independent media regulators,
 Strengthening the judiciary’s capacity to handle prejudicial publicity,
 And ensuring that all reforms are transparent, inclusive, and constitutionally
sound.

Ultimately, the goal is not to suppress media independence but to elevate

journalistic responsibility, ensuring that justice is not only done but also seen to
be done—free from distortion, bias, and premature conclusion.

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 CHAPTER 6

JUDICIAL TRENDS/CASE LAWS

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 CHAPTER 6

JUDICIAL TRENDS/CASE LAWS

6.1 Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI

Background and Facts

In this landmark case, Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Ltd. and its group
companies were embroiled in a legal dispute with the Securities and Exchange
Board of India (SEBI) over the issuance of optionally fully convertible
debentures (OFCDs) allegedly raised without proper approval. As proceedings
unfolded, the case attracted intense media coverage, with several news channels
and newspapers broadcasting information, often without proper verification.

The Sahara group contended that such media reportage was prejudicial, not
only affecting their reputation but also threatening the fairness of the legal
proceedings. The company approached the Supreme Court seeking protection
from media trials and requested the Court to issue guidelines or restrictions on
media coverage of sub judice matters to ensure the administration of justice.

Legal Issues

The core issues before the Court were:

1. Whether courts have constitutional power to issue postponement

orders restricting media coverage of judicial proceedings.
2. How to balance freedom of speech and expression (Article 19(1)(a))
with the right to a fair trial and presumption of innocence (Article 21).

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Judgment and Observations

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of a balanced approach, upholding the right of
courts to issue temporary postponement orders under Article 129 (Supreme
Court) and Article 215 (High Courts) of the Constitution.

Key observations:

 The Court acknowledged the pernicious effect of trial by media,

particularly in criminal matters where reporting can shape public opinion
before the evidence is judicially evaluated.
 Freedom of expression is not absolute; it must be exercised responsibly,
particularly in sub judice matters.
 The presumption of innocence is a fundamental human right, and
media must not interfere with its operation by presenting the accused as
guilty before the conclusion of trial.
 The Court proposed a three-pronged test to justify postponement orders:
1. Real and substantial risk of prejudice to the fairness of the trial,
2. Necessity to prevent the risk, and
3. Proportionality of the postponement order with respect to the
extent and duration of restriction.

Significance to the Dissertation Topic

This case is a judicial milestone in articulating a constitutional framework for

regulating media trials in India. It:

 Affirms the judiciary’s authority to intervene where media conduct risks

impairing fair trial rights.
 Establishes “postponement orders” as a preventive mechanism against
prejudicial publicity.

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  Recognizes the presumption of innocence as a vital constitutional value
and offers procedural protection against its erosion by media.
 Encourages self-restraint among media organizations, while cautioning
against state-imposed blanket bans.

The decision in Sahara v. SEBI provides a pragmatic model for balancing two
competing rights—free speech and fair trial—through judicially guided
intervention, making it central to any discussion on media ethics in legal
proceedings.

6.2 R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court43

Background and Facts

This case arose out of the BMW hit-and-run trial, one of the most high-profile
criminal proceedings in India at the time. During the trial, a leading news channel,
NDTV, conducted a sting operation that captured senior advocates R.K. Anand
and I.U. Khan allegedly attempting to influence a key prosecution witness,
K.T. Anna, who had turned hostile. The footage showed conversations suggesting
efforts to manipulate testimony, thereby threatening the integrity of the ongoing
judicial process.

The Delhi High Court took suo motu cognizance of the footage and initiated
contempt proceedings. The matter was subsequently appealed to the Supreme
Court, raising important questions about professional ethics, courtroom
conduct, and the role of media during ongoing trials.

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Legal Issues

1. Whether the actions of the senior advocates amounted to criminal

contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
2. Whether the sting operation by the media, which revealed attempts to
subvert justice, was itself an interference in the judicial process.
3. What is the scope of media responsibility in reporting and exposing
unethical conduct during a pending trial?

Judgment and Observations

The Supreme Court upheld the Delhi High Court’s judgment, confirming the
conviction of R.K. Anand for criminal contempt of court under Section 2(c) of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Key observations included:

 The conduct of the advocates amounted to a direct assault on the

administration of justice.
 The integrity of the judicial process must be protected from external
manipulation, especially from legal professionals who are officers of the
court.
 The Court acknowledged the public interest value of the sting operation
but cautioned that such actions by media houses must not interfere with
ongoing proceedings or pre-judge the case.

While the media’s role in uncovering unethical conduct was appreciated, the
Court emphasized that trial by media is not a substitute for judicial
determination.

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Significance to the Dissertation Topic

This case is critical to understanding how the judiciary balances the exposé role
of media with the need to preserve judicial fairness. It contributes to the
evolving doctrine that:

 Media must act as a watchdog, not a parallel adjudicator.

 Contempt powers may be invoked when the fairness of a trial is
threatened, whether by insiders (lawyers) or external forces (media).
 The presumption of innocence must be protected not just from media
sensationalism, but also from manipulative tactics within the legal
fraternity.

In the context of Presumption of Innocence vs Media Trials, this case reinforces

the principle that justice must not only be done but seen to be done, and that
ethical conduct, responsible journalism, and judicial integrity are all
interdependent pillars of the criminal justice system.

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 6.3 Arun Jaitley v. State of UP44

Background and Facts

In this case, Arun Jaitley, a senior advocate and Member of Parliament, made
televised remarks criticizing a judicial verdict delivered by a trial court in Uttar
Pradesh. His comments, which were aired during a panel discussion on a news
channel, questioned the quality of the judicial reasoning and suggested a need for
higher judicial oversight.

Following the broadcast, a bailable warrant was issued against him by a lower
court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, treating his remarks as
scandalizing the court and lowering public confidence in the judiciary. Jaitley
challenged this order before the Allahabad High Court, arguing that his
comments fell within the ambit of fair criticism protected by the Constitution.

Legal Issues

1. Whether televised criticism of judicial decisions amounts to contempt of

court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
2. Where the line lies between fair comment and contemptuous or
prejudicial statements, especially in the context of ongoing legal matters.
3. The extent to which public figures can exercise their freedom of
expression in relation to pending court cases or verdicts.

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Judgment and Observations

The Allahabad High Court quashed the bailable warrant, holding that:

 Criticism of judgments—especially by public intellectuals, lawmakers, or

advocates—does not constitute contempt if it is made in good faith and
supported by reasoned argument.
 The freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to
analyze and critique judgments, provided such commentary does not
obstruct the administration of justice.
 Courts must exercise caution before invoking contempt powers,
especially in democratic contexts where judicial decisions are subject to
public scrutiny.

The Court emphasized that while courts deserve respect, they are not beyond
criticism, and open debate on judicial performance is a sign of a mature
democracy.

Significance to the Dissertation Topic

This case is highly relevant to the theme of presumption of innocence versus

media trials, as it draws a clear distinction between:

 Prejudicial speech that may affect trial fairness, and

 Legitimate, constitutionally protected criticism of the judiciary.

The judgment contributes to the doctrine of proportionality in contempt law,

recognizing that freedom of speech must be balanced against judicial
independence, but not automatically subordinated to it.

For this dissertation, the case exemplifies how courts can defend freedom of
expression while setting boundaries for public commentary, particularly by

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influential voices, during pending proceedings. It also provides a counterbalance
to overreach in contempt jurisdiction, reinforcing the need for judicial tolerance
in a democratic society.

6.4 Romila Thapar v. Union of India45

Background and Facts

This case arose in the aftermath of the Bhima Koregaon violence in Maharashtra
in January 2018. Following the incident, the police arrested several human rights
activists and intellectuals, including Gautam Navlakha, Varavara Rao, and
Sudha Bharadwaj, under provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act (UAPA), alleging Maoist links and conspiracy against the State.

In response, a group of eminent citizens—including Professor Romila Thapar—

approached the Supreme Court through a writ petition under Article 32, arguing
that:

 The arrests were politically motivated and infringed the activists’

fundamental rights.
 The process lacked transparency and was vitiated by media leaks of
alleged evidence—including purported letters and emails—circulated
before judicial verification.
 The release of such unverified materials in the media amounted to trial by
media, thus violating the presumption of innocence and the right to a
fair trial under Article 21.

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Legal Issues

1. Whether the arrests under UAPA were constitutionally valid and

procedurally fair.
2. Whether the dissemination of unverified materials through media
constituted prejudicial publicity that undermined the accused's right to
due process.
3. The role of state authorities in enabling media trials through selective
leaks during ongoing investigations.

Judgment and Observations

The Supreme Court, in a split decision, upheld the arrests and declined to
constitute an independent Special Investigation Team (SIT). However, the
majority judgment—while refusing to quash the FIR—expressed serious concern
over the manner in which alleged evidence had been leaked to the media prior
to judicial scrutiny.

Key Observations:

 The right to a fair trial is integral to Article 21, and media

dissemination of incomplete or prejudicial information must not
interfere with this right.
 The Court cautioned investigative agencies and the media against
premature disclosures, especially in sensitive cases involving
fundamental rights.
 Even though the arrests were deemed legally valid, the Court underlined
the need for procedural integrity and respect for the presumption of
innocence throughout the legal process.

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Significance to the Dissertation Topic

This case is particularly important because it underscores how state-enabled

media trials—through selective and sensationalized information leaks—can
damage an accused’s legal standing before any evidence is tested in court.

Key contributions to the discourse include:

 Affirmation that media narratives should not pre-empt legal outcomes.

 Recognition that the presumption of innocence is violated not only by
private media but also by state actors who leak case materials to shape
public opinion.
 A subtle but significant warning to authorities and media outlets that the
right to a fair trial is non-negotiable, regardless of the severity of
charges or public sentiment.

6.5 Sanjay Dutt vs State Through C.B.I. Bombay46

The case of Sanjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I. marked a defining moment in the
Indian legal landscape, not only because it involved a high-profile celebrity charged
under the draconian TADA Act, but also because it became a textbook example
of a media trial. From the moment of his arrest in connection with the 1993
Bombay bomb blasts, Sanjay Dutt was publicly vilified in both print and television
media, with frequent insinuations of guilt and terrorist association even before a
formal trial had commenced.

The case of Sanjay Dutt—one of India’s most widely publicized legal battles—
arose from his alleged involvement in the 1993 Bombay bomb blasts, which killed
over 250 people and injured hundreds. He was arrested under several provisions of

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the Indian Penal Code, Arms Act, and crucially, the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA). The prosecution alleged that Dutt had
received and stored prohibited weapons (an AK-56 rifle and a pistol) from the
primary conspirators involved in the terrorist act.

Though Dutt claimed he possessed the weapons for self-defense, the media from
the outset portrayed him as being deeply involved in the terror conspiracy, branding
him as “Bombay’s shame,” “celebrity terrorist,” and more. The narrative of
guilt was cemented long before charges were framed or evidence was judicially
examined.

While the Supreme Court’s ruling focused on the interpretation of TADA

provisions, bail rights, and the necessity of establishing a clear nexus to terrorist
activity, the case simultaneously unfolded in the court of public opinion. Media
outlets circulated unverified information, broadcast images of his arrest repeatedly,
and published alleged confessions and sensational claims—all contributing to a
narrative of guilt that challenged the foundational legal principle of presumption
of innocence.

Importantly, the Supreme Court took a measured approach, holding that mere
possession of weapons did not automatically fall under the purview of TADA
unless a terrorist intent or act was established. This restraint stood in sharp
contrast to the media portrayal, which often equated possession with participation
in terrorism. The judgment served as a judicial counterbalance to the premature
and speculative media narrative, reminding both the public and institutions that
guilt must be determined in court—not in headlines.

From the lens of media trials, this case illustrates several critical concerns:

 Trial by media can distort public perception, exert pressure on judicial

actors, and stigmatize the accused regardless of the outcome.

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  Media coverage that precedes or parallels court proceedings may
inadvertently influence witness credibility, public sentiment, and
prosecutorial discretion.
 Judicial decisions based strictly on evidence and statutory
interpretation, as in this case, serve to reaffirm the primacy of due
process over populist media narratives.

The Sanjay Dutt case is emblematic of how celebrity status, national security
concerns, and media sensationalism can converge to create a toxic atmosphere
that threatens the fairness of legal proceedings. Although the judiciary upheld
procedural safeguards, the overwhelming media narrative had already caused
irreparable reputational damage, illustrating the need for robust legal
regulation of trial reporting.

This case thus underscores the urgent requirement for:

 Codified standards for media conduct during sub judice proceedings,

 Greater judicial vigilance in issuing protective orders against prejudicial
publicity,
 And a broader public understanding of the principle that accusation is
not guilt.

Media Trial Dimensions

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Dutt’s case remained a fixture of media
speculation. News outlets:

 Reported on his alleged links with underworld figures without court

endorsement.
 Ran continuous footage of his arrest, court appearances, and family
reactions.
 Circulated leaked statements and confession letters, some later retracted or
ruled inadmissible.

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This non-stop coverage contributed to public prejudice, eroded the
presumption of innocence, and may have even impacted judicial officers,
prosecutors, or potential witnesses.

Lessons and Relevance to the Dissertation

The Sanjay Dutt case is a cautionary tale of media overreach in legal matters.
Despite the eventual conviction under a non-terror statute, the media had already
framed his identity in the minds of millions as a traitor and conspirator.

6.6 OTHER SIGNIFICANT CASES RELATING TO MEDIA TRIALS

The Sheena Bora Murder Case: A Study in Media-Driven Public

Adjudication47

Background and Facts

The Sheena Bora murder case surfaced in 2015, involving the arrest of Indrani
Mukerjea, a high-profile media executive and co-founder of INX Media. She was
accused of murdering her daughter Sheena Bora in 2012, allegedly with the help of
her ex-husband Sanjeev Khanna and driver Shyamvar Rai. The case was revealed
when Rai, arrested on unrelated charges, confessed to his involvement in Sheena’s
murder, leading to Indrani’s arrest.

From the very outset, the case attracted massive national media attention,
primarily because of the dramatic personal details, the celebrity status of the
accused, and the alleged cover-up involving one of India’s elite families. The

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narrative was amplified by television debates, daily headlines, and continuous
speculation around motive, timeline, and relationships.

Legal Proceedings

 Arrests were made in August 2015, and the case was investigated by the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
 Charges were framed under Sections 302 (murder), 120B (criminal
conspiracy), and 201 (causing disappearance of evidence) of the Indian
Penal Code.
 The trial is still pending as of 2025, with the accused spending several
years in judicial custody before being granted bail in 2023 (in Indrani’s
case).
 Numerous statements of witnesses and alleged confessions were leaked or
published by media houses long before judicial scrutiny.

Media Trial Dimensions

The Sheena Bora case is a paradigmatic example of trial by media, where public
perception was decisively shaped by:

 Real-time speculation on television about Indrani’s motive.

 Leakage of private emails, alleged bank records, and photographs.
 Interviews with friends, former colleagues, and extended family members,
often with little or no factual verification.
 Framing of Indrani Mukerjea as morally depraved and criminally
cunning, without awaiting trial evidence.

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This media portrayal created a narrative of certainty and guilt, long before the
court had begun to consider witness testimony or forensic material. The
presumption of innocence was functionally suspended in public discourse.

Impact on Fair Trial Rights

1. Prejudicial Publicity: Continuous coverage blurred the line between facts

and speculation, risking the impartiality of the judiciary and influencing
public opinion.
2. Stigmatization of the Accused: Indrani Mukerjea was painted as guilty in
headlines, panel discussions, and tabloid media, with implications for jury
impressions (if applicable) and institutional bias.
3. Violation of Procedural Sanctity: Investigative agencies appeared to
enable leaks, and witness statements were discussed on national television
even before they were tested in court.
4. Delayed Justice: The sensationalism surrounding the case contributed to
procedural delays, repeated adjournments, and concerns about tampering.

Judicial Response

While the trial court did not directly censure media behavior, the case did prompt
broader discussions about:

 The need for postponement orders in high-profile cases (as per Sahara v.
SEBI).
 The responsibility of law enforcement agencies to maintain
confidentiality during investigation.
 Whether trial court judges should issue gag orders in the interest of fair
proceedings.

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No direct legal action was taken against media houses in this case, highlighting the
weak enforcement of ethical standards in sub judice reporting.

The Jessica Lal Murder Case: Media Pressure and the Quest for Justice48

Background and Facts

The Jessica Lal murder case involved the shooting of model and celebrity
bartender Jessica Lal at a high-profile event in Delhi on the night of April 29,
1999. The accused, Manu Sharma (alias Siddharth Vashisht), was the son of a
powerful political figure. He was alleged to have shot Jessica point-blank after
she refused to serve him alcohol at a private party.

The case initially appeared open and shut: the crime was committed in public,
there were multiple eyewitnesses, and Manu Sharma was identified by several
individuals. Yet, in 2006, after a lengthy trial, a trial court acquitted all nine
accused, citing insufficient evidence and hostile witnesses. This verdict triggered
nationwide outrage, and the case rapidly became a symbol of the failure of
India’s criminal justice system, especially in cases involving political influence
and elite impunity.

Media Trial Dimensions

The Jessica Lal case is widely regarded as a turning point in Indian media history
for its intense, sustained, and activism-oriented coverage, particularly after the
2006 acquittal. Key developments included:

 Massive public protests fueled by TV channels, newspapers, and

celebrity endorsements.

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  Campaigns under slogans like “Justice for Jessica” were launched by
NDTV, India Today, and other outlets.
 Sting operations revealed how key witnesses had been bribed or coerced
into turning hostile.
 The media put immense pressure on law enforcement and the judiciary to
revisit the case.

This collective media effort resulted in public outrage that prompted the Delhi
High Court to fast-track the appeal, eventually resulting in the conviction of
Manu Sharma for murder later in 2006. The Supreme Court upheld the
conviction in 2010, sentencing him to life imprisonment.

Legal Outcomes

 2006 (Trial Court): Manu Sharma and all other accused acquitted due to
hostile witnesses and procedural failures.
 2006 (Delhi High Court): Overturned the trial court’s decision and
convicted Manu Sharma under Section 302 IPC (murder).
 2010 (Supreme Court): Upheld the Delhi High Court’s ruling,
emphasizing that justice must not be derailed by power or influence.

Media and Judicial Interface

The Jessica Lal case highlights the dual-edged role of media trials:

 On one hand, the public pressure created by the media was instrumental
in ensuring that the case was reopened and justice was ultimately served.
 On the other hand, the case raised concerns about public opinion
influencing judicial decisions, leading to accusations that the courts may
have bowed to media populism rather than strictly following legal
procedure.

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Although no formal contempt proceedings were initiated against media houses,
the case sparked debate over whether media activism may breach the line into
prejudicial interference, especially when courts are under intense public
scrutiny.

Significance to the Dissertation Topic

The Jessica Lal case offers a complex narrative:

 It is often cited as a success story of media-led justice, where public

opinion helped overcome institutional corruption and political
interference.
 However, it also raises fundamental concerns about fairness, judicial
independence, and the risk of conviction by public sentiment.
 The case underscores that while freedom of expression and press
activism are essential in a democracy, they must be tempered by respect
for procedural safeguards and the presumption of innocence.

It remains a powerful example of how media pressure can correct systemic

failures, but also how such pressure must be balanced and ethically guided, lest
it turn into vigilante justice through headlines.

The Delhi Gang Rape Case (Nirbhaya Case): Justice, Outrage, and Trial by
Media

Background and Facts

On the night of December 16, 2012, a 23-year-old woman, later known in the
media as Nirbhaya, was brutally gang-raped and assaulted on a private bus in
South Delhi. She succumbed to her injuries two weeks later in a Singapore

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hospital. The incident shocked the conscience of the nation and led to
unprecedented public protests, legal reforms, and intense media coverage.

Six individuals, including a juvenile, were arrested and charged with gang rape,
murder, and other offences under the Indian Penal Code. The trial was conducted
in a fast-track court due to the public and media pressure. Four adult convicts
were sentenced to death, one died in custody, and the juvenile was released after
serving the maximum three years in a reform home under the Juvenile Justice
Act.

Media Trial Dimensions

The Nirbhaya case is one of the most powerful examples of how media can
drive:

 Nationwide outrage and demand for accountability,

 Immediate legislative reform, and
 Speedy judicial action.

Media channels engaged in:

 Wall-to-wall coverage of the investigation and protests.

 Interviews with Nirbhaya’s family, lawyers, politicians, and women’s
rights activists.
 Broadcasting details of the accused, their backgrounds, and confessions.
 Campaigns demanding death penalty for the accused, leading to
enormous pressure on the judiciary.

While media played a vital role in ensuring that the case was not forgotten, it also:

 Pre-judged the guilt of the accused before formal conviction.

 Risked influencing the judiciary and trial process by creating an
environment of moral panic.

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  Named and shamed the accused across all platforms, undermining the
presumption of innocence in a highly charged social climate.

Judicial and Legislative Outcomes

 2013: Parliament passed the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,

introducing new provisions on sexual assault, including the death penalty
for certain rape cases.
 2017: The Supreme Court upheld the death sentences of the four adult
convicts.
 2020: After several rounds of mercy petitions, curative pleas, and last-
minute appeals, the convicts were executed on March 20, 2020.

Significance to the Dissertation Topic

The Nirbhaya case illustrates both the power and peril of media involvement in
criminal justice. On one hand, the public outcry and media vigilance helped
drive overdue reforms in laws related to sexual violence. On the other hand, the
case raises key concerns regarding:

 Fair trial standards in high-profile cases,

 The risk of prejudicial reporting influencing court proceedings,
 The role of media in creating “collective retribution” sentiment,
particularly during the sentencing phase.

In this context, the Nirbhaya case stands as a paradox: while media activism
catalyzed positive legal reform, it also compromised several tenets of due
process, including the presumption of innocence, particularly during the pre-
trial and trial stages.

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Conclusion

The Delhi Gang Rape case is a benchmark for studying the dual impact of media
trials in India—how they can mobilize public awareness and push the state to act,
but also how they can distort the delicate balance between free expression,
public pressure, and the principles of criminal justice. It underscores the need
for clear ethical guidelines, judicial safeguards, and media accountability to
ensure that public outrage does not override constitutional guarantees of fairness
and impartial adjudication.

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 CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

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 CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

7.1 Conclusion

This dissertation has examined the complex and evolving conflict between the
presumption of innocence, a cornerstone of fair trial rights, and media trials, a
growing phenomenon in contemporary journalism that increasingly prejudices the
rights of the accused. Through detailed doctrinal, historical, and comparative
analysis, the study has illuminated how the intersection of criminal justice,
freedom of expression, and media regulation is being renegotiated in the digital
age.

The presumption of innocence, derived from Roman law and embedded in

common law traditions, has been universally recognized as a fundamental
human right. This principle is enshrined in key international legal instruments,
notably Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and
Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). These provisions not only bind signatory states but also represent
customary international norms. In India, the Supreme Court has read this
principle into Article 21 of the Constitution, affirming it as part of the right to life
and personal liberty.

Despite these robust normative foundations, the presumption of innocence is

frequently undermined in practice. The phenomenon of media trials,
particularly in high-profile criminal cases, has grown more aggressive, where
accused individuals are vilified in public discourse before a court has even
framed charges. This trend is exacerbated by the competitive nature of modern
news media, 24/7 cycles, unregulated social media commentary, and the
increasing use of leaked investigative materials in public broadcasts.

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This dissertation has demonstrated that media trials can distort judicial
proceedings, influence the perception of witnesses, prosecutors, and even
judges, and ultimately erode public trust in the judiciary. Far from acting
merely as watchdogs of democracy, media outlets often adopt a prosecutorial
stance, which displaces the court as the arbiter of guilt and innocence.

While Indian courts have delivered progressive judgments such as Sahara India
v. SEBI (2012), where the concept of postponement orders was recognized, and
R.K. Anand v. Registrar (2009), where judicial integrity was defended against
media interference, the response has remained largely reactive and
discretionary. There is no codified legal framework governing media conduct
during pending trials. The judiciary often lacks consistent tools to regulate or
penalize prejudicial reporting, and statutory bodies like the Press Council of
India (PCI) lack enforceability and jurisdiction over new-age digital media.

Comparative legal systems offer instructive models. The United States uses a
combination of First and Sixth Amendment protections, where gag orders,
jury sequestration, and venue changes are tools to insulate the trial from
external influence, as seen in Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966). The United Kingdom,
under the Contempt of Court Act, 1981, adopts a strict liability rule that
penalizes any publication that poses a substantial risk to the fairness of
proceedings. The European Court of Human Rights, through cases like Alenet
de Ribemont v. France, has ruled that statements by public officials implying
guilt violate Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

India, however, lags in implementing equivalent safeguards. The fragmented

legal regime—spread across the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Cable
Television Networks Regulation Act, 1995, and the IT Act, 2000—has limited
applicability to modern digital platforms and fails to establish a unified protocol
for sub judice reporting. Moreover, enforcement is often selective, delayed, or
politically influenced. Investigative leaks, especially in politically sensitive

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cases, frequently find their way into media outlets, further undermining due
process.

The emergence of social media has magnified the problem. Unlike traditional
journalism, platforms like X (formerly Twitter), YouTube, and Instagram
allow users to bypass editorial oversight, contributing to mass dissemination of
misinformation, public shaming, and digital lynch mobs. Courts today are not
merely contending with biased reportage but with viral narratives that preempt
legal findings, making judicial insulation nearly impossible.

In this context, restoring the constitutional balance between Article 19(1)(a)

(freedom of speech and expression) and Article 21 (right to life and fair trial) is
no longer optional—it is a democratic necessity. This balance must be
institutionalized through a comprehensive legal framework, media
accountability, and judicial clarity.

Thus, the findings of this dissertation call for an urgent reorientation of legal
and regulatory priorities to uphold the integrity of India’s criminal justice
system and the human rights of those subject to it.

7.2 Suggestions and Recommendations

In light of the findings and the challenges identified across Indian and
comparative legal systems, the following multi-pronged
recommendations are proposed to address the tension between media
freedom and the presumption of innocence. These aim to balance
constitutional rights under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21, and ensure that

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public interest journalism does not compromise judicial impartiality or
individual liberty.

1. Enact a Statutory Media Conduct Law

India currently lacks a single, unified legislation governing media conduct during
judicial proceedings. A Media Conduct in Legal Proceedings Act should be
introduced, with provisions to:

 Define “trial by media” and set objective parameters for identifying

prejudicial publications or broadcasts.
 Specify penal consequences (fines, civil liability, and criminal penalties)
for media houses and individuals who violate sub judice norms.
 Empower courts to issue binding postponement orders, publication
restraints, or gag orders, particularly in cases involving vulnerable
parties (e.g., children, victims of sexual violence).
 Provide safe harbor clauses for investigative journalism done in good
faith without prejudicing ongoing trials.

Such legislation must be technology-neutral, ensuring that print, television, and

digital content are equally regulated.

2. Empower the Press Council of India (PCI)

The Press Council of India, under the current framework of the Press Council
Act, 1978, functions merely as an advisory body with no enforcement teeth.

To improve its effectiveness:

 The Act should be amended to convert the PCI into a quasi-judicial

regulatory authority.
 Grant the PCI powers to:

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 o Levy fines and penalties for ethical breaches in court reporting,
o Issue publication bans or direct retractions,
o Suspend or revoke registration of habitual offenders.
 Extend its jurisdiction to digital-only publications and online news
portals, which are currently unregulated by the PCI.

An empowered PCI can serve as a central ethical watchdog, promoting

accountability while preserving press freedom.

3. Establish an Independent Media Regulatory Authority

Given the inadequacy of multiple overlapping regulatory bodies (PCI, NBDA,

BCCC), there is a pressing need for a centralized, independent statutory
authority akin to the UK’s Ofcom or Canada’s CRTC.

This body should:

 Be constituted through multi-stakeholder appointment, ensuring

independence from political and corporate interests.
 Monitor all forms of media—television, newspapers, OTT, blogs, and
social platforms—for compliance with judicial reporting standards.
 Hold summary adjudicatory powers to issue corrective orders, conduct
investigations, and impose sanctions.
 Facilitate public complaints redressal and publish annual audit reports
on media performance.

Such a commission would act as a neutral interface between media freedom and
fair trial rights, with enforceable powers and transparent oversight.

4. Codify Judicial Guidelines on Media Trials

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The Supreme Court of India, using its constitutional powers under Article 141
and Article 145, should frame a model code of judicial practice addressing trial-
related media conduct. These guidelines should:

 Direct trial courts to use anonymization orders to protect the identity of

victims, minors, and vulnerable accused.
 Enable in-camera proceedings in cases of sexual violence, communal
offences, or high-profile corruption.
 Standardize the issuance of postponement or reporting restriction
orders, balancing media freedom and trial integrity.

These guidelines will bring uniformity and reduce the ad hoc nature of judicial
interventions in media-sensitive cases.

5. Judicial and Police Training

Institutional capacity-building is essential to ensure that judges, police, and

prosecutors can manage media attention responsibly.

Recommendations:

 Include media law and courtroom communication ethics in the

curriculum of judicial academies and police training colleges.
 Create media liaison protocols for police, outlining when and how press
briefings may be given.
 Prohibit police from leaking confessions, evidence, or accused details
prior to judicial verification.

This will reduce trial-stage prejudice and reinforce procedural discipline across
the criminal justice system.

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6. Introduce Digital Media Accountability Rules

The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media

Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 should be enhanced to address trial-related reporting.
Amendments should:

 Introduce a “due diligence” clause for digital publishers before posting

material on ongoing cases.
 Mandate clear disclaimers for speculative or unverified legal content.
 Enable courts to direct intermediaries to take down prejudicial content
during trials under expedited timelines.
 Require social media platforms to flag or suppress viral content that may
influence public perception of accused individuals.

Such reforms are essential to limit viral misinformation, particularly in cases

where media influence may impair judicial outcomes.

7. Encourage Media Literacy and Ethical Journalism

Media reform must go hand-in-hand with education and capacity-building in

journalism itself.

 Journalism institutes should introduce mandatory modules on:

o Ethical trial reporting,
o Sub judice restrictions,
o Human rights in criminal justice.
 News organizations should be encouraged to adopt voluntary editorial
charters and appoint internal ombudsmen to review sensitive reporting.
 Civil society organizations should promote public awareness about the
dangers of media trials and the importance of presumption of innocence.

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These steps will gradually foster a culture of restraint, accountability, and
informed reporting.

8. Adopt Global Best Practices

India should look to international jurisdictions for policy inspiration:

 United States: Implementation of gag orders, jury sequestration, and

venue transfers to minimize media impact (e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell,
1966).
 United Kingdom: Application of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981,
which penalizes publications that pose a “substantial risk” to the fairness
of a trial.
 Canada: The Dagenais/Mentuck test ensures that publication bans are
proportionate and justified in the public interest.
 New Zealand: Use of media court protocols encourages responsible
reporting while maintaining open justice.
 Germany and France: Strong restrictions on public statements by
prosecutors or police regarding pending investigations.

By adapting and localizing these global practices, India can develop a

jurisprudentially sound, rights-respecting framework to govern the media–
judiciary interface.

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