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Working Paper
332

THE WELFARE FUND MODEL

OF SOCIAL SECURITY
FOR INFORMAL SECTOR WORKERS
The Kerala Experience

K. P. Kannan

April 2002
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Working Papers published since August 1997 (WP 279 onwards)

can be downloaded from the Centres' website ([Link])
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THE WELFARE FUND MODEL OF SOCIAL SECURITY

FOR INFORMAL SECTOR WORKERS
The Kerala Experience

K. P. Kannan

April 2002

This paper is an outcome of the research project on Collective Care

Arrangements Among Workers and Non-Workers in the Informal Sector
sponsored by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram
and funded by the Indo-Dutch Programme of Alternatives in Development
(Project No. 4.3.3). A first draft of this paper was prepared during a one-
month sabbatical in May 2001 at the International Institute for Asian
Studies, Amsterdam. The author would like to thank Jan Breman,
S Mahendra Dev, Renana Jhabwala, Sudha Deshpande and Alakh Sharma
for discussions and comments on the subject. An earlier version of the
paper written at the instance of the Task Force on Unorganised Labour
constituted by the Government of Madhya Pradesh was discussed in the
Workshop on Unorganised Labour in Madhya Pradesh held in Bhopal
during April 1-2, 2002. This Task Force chaired by Renana Jhabwala
(with the author as one of the members) is examining the feasibility of
replicating the Welfare Fund Model for the informal sector workers in
Madhya Pradesh. The author would like to record his special thanks to
Shaji K. Francis for his research assistance. The usual disclaimers apply.
This paper will be published in The Indian Journal of Labour Economics,
Vol. 45, No.2. April-June 2002 (forthcoming)
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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the evolution of the institution of ‘Welfare

Funds’ for informal sector workers in the State of Kerala in India. The
Kerala experience, which is now thirty years old, reflects what the workers
in the informal sector could achieve in countries like India given the
contemporary political context and the democratic political framework
of the State. But it required sustained collective action on the part of the
workers. The paper finds that while the Welfare Fund Model of collective
care arrangements for the informal sector workers in Kerala showed
considerable innovation in its design and organisation, its functioning
is embedded in the bureaucratic system giving rise to a number of
problems. Even then the Model offers a minimum of social security to
the informal sector workers who are unprotected. Therefore the question
of replicating this Model with suitable modifications to other States in
India as well as to other countries, where there are no social security
arrangements for informal sector workers, is worth pursuing.

JEL Classification : I 30, I 38, J 50

Key words : collective care, informal sector workers, Kerala, social

security, welfare funds.
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Introduction

Mutually beneficial collective care arrangements by workers to

take care of risks and uncertainties are not unknown in labour history.
But they were by and large arrangements not only for the workers but
also by the workers, hence called mutual benefit societies or friendly
societies. Such mutual benefit societies were quite prominent in the
lives of the working class right from the early phase of industrialisation
in the present day industrially advanced countries (see e.g., van der
Linden 1996). The emergence of such mutual benefit societies was
indeed a reflection of the collective response to the insecurity and
vulnerability experienced by the working class at a time when neither
the employers nor the state came forward to address those issues. Workers’
mutualism was also a prominent feature of the early mobilisation of the
labouring poor in Kerala. These were quite minimal but were expressions
of a high degree of solidarity. Mutual help was extended during times
of death, marriage, strikes and extreme economic hardships. Such initial
acts of mutualism later on helped in the design and articulation of
institutional forms of social security for the workers in the informal
sector, both in rural and urban areas.

The Welfare Fund model of social security for informal sector

workers in Kerala is now more than 30 years old. It started with the
formation of a Welfare Fund for the toddy tappers in 1969. The Kerala
approach reflects what the workers in the informal sector could achieve
in countries like India given the contemporary political context and the
6

democratic political framework of the state. But it required sustained

collective action on the part of the workers. This precondition had
already been achieved in Kerala. For that reason, the collective care
arrangements in the form of Welfare Funds were constituted with the
active participation of the state. In fact the state played and continues
to play the leading role in the initiation and management of the Welfare
Funds. The organised workers, through their unions, articulate their
demands and exert pressure on the state government. The employers
are, by and large, unwilling but co-operating partners since the larger
political context and the political economy of power relations do not
provide them with the choice to opt out of such arrangements. Their
participation is therefore a pragmatic one within the framework of their
economic rationality for accumulation.

To begin with, the establishment of collective care arrangements

in the form of Welfare Funds was not high in the agenda either of the
workers’ unions or of the political parties to which they are affiliated. A
nuance reading of the politics of labour suggests that welfare
arrangements were quite low in their agenda. It was the limitations of
radical political mobilisation of labour in the context of a pluralist and
electoral democratic polity that forced the political unions to search for
solutions for employment and livelihood vulnerability. In that sense,
the constitution of Welfare Funds was not even a second-best solution
but a third-best one. This calls for some clarification.

Trade unions emerged as a powerful labour institution in Kerala

over a long period of time. Historical factors played an important role in
this development. These were the early proletarianisation of a large
segment of the traditional labour force, the social reform movements for
attaining social dignity for the poor and those considered socially
backward, nationalist politics accompanied by a radical political
 7

movement which explicitly incorporated all sections of the labouring

poor and organised them in trade unions. The context has been referred
to as a “historical conjuncture” (for details, see Kannan 1988). This
development was indeed a watershed in the evolution of labour markets,
as it exists today, in Kerala. Within a short span of time it was instrumental
in the erosion of traditional labour relations as embodied in patron-
client relationships and the inter-linkage between land, labour and credit
markets. Labour relations increasingly became formal, impersonal and
contractual. Yet they retained the basic characteristic of stratification
and segmentation embedded in the traditional social order. The former
relates to the hierarchy of occupations depending on the nature of the
job, earnings and security and the latter would refer to the boundaries
existing within a given stratum of the labour market. The main sources
of these features seem to lie in the institution of caste (reflecting social
stratification) and gender considerations manifested in the vulnerable
position of women workers. In a situation of high unemployment, the
strategies of labour unions, dictated by short-term considerations, seem
to have strengthened the segmentation characteristics by falling back
on caste and/or gender considerations. This is related to their strategy of
maximising earnings of the ‘insiders’ by controlling entry into the labour
market. However the objective situation in Kerala was such that there
was only a small segment of the economy which could approximate to
capitalist enterprises and therefore to a classical type of capital-labour
relations. Given the strong anti-capitalist ideology and the strategy of
peasant-worker alliance, all situations characterised by relations of
labour exploitation were considered appropriate for unionisation. This
logic was further reinforced in the context of competitive populism
when, in the sixties and seventies, political parties in Kerala had to
fiercely contest for gaining political power through elections. What the
Congress Socialists and later Communists once initiated became the
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‘model’ for all political parties, most of them offshoots of either the
Congress Party or the Communist Party. Thus an overwhelming
proportion of workers in the informal/unorganised sector was organised
in unions.

However, trade unions found it difficult to approximate the

situation in the unorganised sector to that of the modern industrial
sector. Yet the historical experience of organisation of workers was that
of the industrial model. While the political ideology was to fight
capitalism (in non-agricultural employment) and was stressing the
ideology of socialism, the operational part of trade union functioning
was to improve the conditions of work, earnings and the economic
security of workers. A close reading of trade union functioning in Kerala
suggests that the model before them was that of modern industrial
employment characterised by higher wage rates, stable employment,
better working conditions, non-wage benefits and long term economic
security. In brief, the objective was to improve the ‘labour status’ and
income. In our interpretation this would imply a movement away from
vulnerability towards stability in employment and income. The ultimate
objective may be construed as a position equivalent to that in, what is
referred to in the standard literature, the primary labour market. In
pursuing this model, almost relentlessly, the unions have succeeded to
a remarkable extent in breaking down the conventional differences
between the organised and unorganised or formal and informal sectors,
and in its place given rise to another labour market phenomenon of
‘insiders’ vs. ‘outsiders’. Here the notion of insider denotes primarily
union membership with or without stable employment. In the process a
number of labour institutions, borrowed from the ‘industrial relations
model’ were transplanted into the realm of informal sector workers. These
were Minimum Wage Committees and Industrial Relations Committees.
What was not in the ‘industrial relations model’ but introduced for the
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informal sector workers were the labour co-operatives and collective

care arrangements in the form of Welfare Funds. However, the relative
failure of the labour co-operatives in terms of economic viability (with
a few honourable exceptions) to take care of employment and social
security requirements of the workers gave rise to the setting up of Welfare
Funds.

In situations of stable employment, the above strategy of

improving conditions of work and wages would generate real increases
in earnings and other benefits. But that was not the case with most
sectors, including “factory” type employment in such industries as coir
weaving and cashew processing. Unions were faced with the most
difficult of situations with regard to retaining, let alone expanding,
employment for existing workers. This ‘forced’ the unions to resort to
two options considered feasible in the prevailing circumstances. One
was the demand, directed at the state, for setting up labour cooperatives,
and the other was to adopt a closed shop strategy with regard to labour
market entry.

The major labour cooperatives in Kerala are those of toddy tappers

(now defunct), beedi workers, handloom weavers, coir processing workers
and cane and bamboo workers, and a few groups of casual labourers in
loading and unloading work. These were set up in response to the
demand by the unions, and they did not have (nor did they seek to
develop it subsequently) managerial and even organisational capabilities
(beyond recruiting members) so crucially needed to sustain cooperatives
within the prevailing competitive market framework. This was because
the cooperatives were thought of as a defensive strategy in times of
crisis, mainly responding to threats to the employment of existing
workers.
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The closed shop strategy of unions was to protect the employment

of its members. However, it created a situation of exclusion of those
workers who were unable to get into the unions and thus to the labour
market. This was because unions control entry into many labour markets
in Kerala. Examples are that of headload work, cashew factory work,
toddy tapping, public works, and coconut climbing. As a result union
membership has become the primary criterion for occupational identity
for purposes of eligibility in social security arrangements such as
receiving a state pension and/or membership in a Welfare Fund.

The Emergence of Welfare Funds

It is in this background that we need to understand the emergence

of Welfare Funds as a specific form of collective care arrangement for
the workers in the informal sector. The first-best solution in the context
of radical political mobilisation was, of course, a revolution in favour of
the working class. That was the initial motivation for the mobilisation
of labour by Congress Socialists and later by Communist Party workers.
With the attainment of independence by the country and the
establishment of a parliamentary democracy, this initial objective gave
way to protecting and enhancing workers’ rights and their share of
earnings. Hence the second-best solution in terms of organising workers
for higher wages, non-wage benefits and improved working conditions.
In Kerala this also reached its limits quite early given the very slow pace
of modern industrialisation and the concomittant expansion of the
organised sector. In such labour intensive manufacturing and related
activities as coir processing and manufacturing, the strategy of pushing
for higher earnings led to its logical consequence of technological
changes. However, the political unions, in their eagerness to protect
current employment, fiercely opposed technological changes, often in
a Luddite fashion. This happened in one of the most labour intensive
activities in agriculture as well – rice cultivation. This led to migration
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of industries to other regions in India and in rice cultivation to shifting

of the land to less labour intensive cultivation. By mid-seventies the
limitations of militant political unionism began to clash with the
developmental imperatives of a low income agrarian economy. Given
the highly articulate nature of workers, thanks to the earlier four decades
of political mobilisation, the political parties realised the need for some
form of institutionalised forms of welfare arrangements lest they lose
the support of the labouring poor. The chronology of the establishment
of Welfare Funds lends credence to this argument. Only one Welfare
Fund was established in the sixties and that too in 1969 under special
circumstances. This was for the Toddy Tappers who were one of the
early radicalised sections of the rural workers. The establishment of the
Welfare Fund was a consequence of the limitations of wage bargaining
at the end of which the employers chose to leave the business. A take
over of production and distribution of the toddy through a workers’
cooperative did not go much forward. It was in this background the
Toddy Tappers Welfare Fund was set up with the active intervention of
the government, then led by one of the two communist parties, the
Communist Party of India. There was no intention at that time to extend
this form of collective care to other sections of workers in the informal
sector for almost a decade. However, in 1977 another Welfare Fund
known as the Kerala Labour Welfare Fund was set up for workers in
small scale factories, plantations, shops and cooperative institutions.
The political perception changed drastically by the early eighties. The
seventies witnessed a fierce contestation in unionising the hitherto non-
unionised workers in the informal sector as a result of the split in the
trade union – the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) - led by the
undivided Communist Party of India. This led to the proliferation of
unions along party lines led by not only the three main parties –
Communist Party of India, the breakaway Communist Party of India
(Marxist) and the Indian National Congress (I) which also witnessed a
12

split in 1969 – but many regional parties. Thus during the eighties nine
Welfare Funds were set up covering workers in such diverse occupations
as loading and unloading (known as head-load workers), motor transport,
clerks working with legal advocates, artisans, fish workers and hand
loom workers. To this should also be added such groups as cashew and
coir processing workers dominated by women. Given the wide political
acceptance of this form of collective care arrangement under the initiative
of the state, the process continued in the nineties with the setting up of
another seven Welfare Funds. The list of Welfare Funds so far set up is
given in Table 1. Such a list is impressive not only in its numbers but
also in the coverage of diverse groups of workers in the informal sector,
a phenomenon we think is likely to be a rare one in the contemporary
developing countries.

At the core of this form of collective care arrangement was the

spirit of mutualism i.e., taking care of individual risks through collective
contributions and providing some social security at the end of the
working life. Unlike the historical experience of workers in the advanced
industrial societies of today, this arrangement did not stop with the
mutualism among workers. Given the political nature of workers’
mobilisation and the existence of a democratic state, the arrangement
was an institutional innovation by bringing in the participation and
contribution of employers, however defined, and the organisational
support (sometimes financial contributions) of the government. Thus
these Welfare Funds offer some form of social security at the end of the
working life, social insurance in the event of sickness, accident and/or
death and a measure of welfare arrangements in the form of assistance
for housing, education of children and marriage of daughters. In certain
cases where the Welfare Funds are not in a position to provide old age
pension, the state came out directly to provide such pensions from the
budget (see Kannan 2001).
Table 1: Welfare Funds, Beneficiaries and Source of Financing
Name of the fund
Year of starting Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions Sources of finance

(1) (KTWWF 1969) Toddy workers are defined as any person who is directly Government : Nil
Kerala Toddy Workers or indirectly in the production (tapping), collection and Employer :
Welfare Fund (S) distribution of toddy for his livelihood. All toddy shops/ 13 % of workers wage
premises are covered under the Act (Fund). Employee :
8 % of workers wage

(2) (KLWF, 1977) Workers in factories, plantations employing 10 Government :

Kerala Labour Welfare employees and above, shops and commercial Vary year to year. So far Rs. 40 lakhs
Fund (S) establishments employing two and above and co- have been allotted.
operative institutions employing 20 workers and Employer :
above are covered by the Fund. Rs. 8 per half year per worker
Employee :
Rs. 4 per half year per worker
(3) (KHEDLWWF, 1983) A ‘Head load Worker’ is defined as an individual Government : Nil
Kerala Head load Workers who works for an establishment either directly or Employer:
Welfare Fund (S) through a contractor for wages, in loading, unloading, 25 % of the workers’ wage
carrying on head or in a trolley, any article from any (including gratuity 5%)
place. But this does not include a person engaged by Employee: * 10 % of wage **
an individual for domestic purposes. For general fund.

13
 14
Name of the fund
Year of starting Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions Sources of finance

(4) (KMOTWWF, 1985) A person who is employed for wages in a motor Government: Nil
Kerala Motor Transport transport undertaking directly or through an agency to Employer:
Workers Welfare Fund (S) work in a professional capacity on a transport vehicle, 13 % of the workers’ wage
like driver, conductor, cleaner, station staff, checking Employee: 8 % of the workers’ wage
staff, cash clerk, time keeper, watchman or attender. An
employee becomes eligible for membership on
completion of three months of service.
Government: Rs. 90 per year per member
(5) (KADCLWF, 1985) A person who functions as an Advocate Clerk,
registered under the Kerala Advocate Clerk Welfare Act Employer: Nil
Kerala Advocate Clerk
who is within the age limit of 20 and 70 are eligible for Employee:
Welfare Fund (NS)
membership in this scheme. Rs. 60 per annum per member

Workers in the informal sector such as Tree Climbers,

Government:
(6) (KARSWWF, 1986) Gold Smiths, Carpenters, Shoe Makers, Beedi Makers,
Kerala Artisans and Skilled Potters, Chakku Oil Extractors, Cycle Rickshaw Rs. 2 per every Rs. 10 contributed by
Workers Welfare Fund (NS) Workers, Gunny Bag Collectors, Cycle Repairers, Watch the worker
Repairers, Milk and News Paper Distributors,
Ice Makers, Milk Extractors, Photographers, Tailors, Employer: Nil
Barbers, Dhobies and also all other workers who are
not covered by any of the welfare schemes in the state, Employee:
within the age limit of 20 and 58 are eligible for Rs 10 per month per worker
membership in this scheme
Name of the fund
Year of starting Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions Sources of finance

(7) (KCSHWWF, 1988) A cashew worker is any person who is engaged in Government:
Kerala Cashew Workers any form of employment in the processing of Twice the amount contributed by the
Relief and Welfare Fund(S) cashew. The scheme applies to cashew workers and employer
their dependants (husband/wife, unmarried
daughters and minor sons and parents, minor Employer:
brothers and unmarried sisters, fully dependant on Rs. 1 per worker per working day
the beneficiaries). He/she is eligible for welfare
benefits of the Fund, provided he/she is resident of Employee:
the state., with a minimum of five years in the 50 ps per worker per working day
industry, annual income not exceeding Rs. 3600 and
is not covered by ESI/Maternity Benefit Scheme

The workers who are employed for wages under Government: 10 % of workers' wage
(8) (KKHWWF, 1989)
employers, contractors, in co-operative or self-
Kerala Khadi Workers Employer:
employed for subsistence in Khadi industries are
Welfare Fund (S) 10 % of workers’ wage
eligible to be a member of the Scheme.
Employee:
10 % of workers’ wage

15
 16
Name of the fund
Year of starting Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions Sources of finance

(9) (KCORWWF, 1989) Coir worker is any person who is employed for Government:
Kerala Coir Workers wages to do any work in connection with the
Grant which is twice the amount contributed by
Welfare Fund (S) various processess in the coir industry and who
the workers
gets his wages directly or indirectly from the
Employer:
employer, dealer or producer of coir products.
* 1% of the turnover.
This will include contractors or agents and anyone
* Co-operative society Rs. 1 per month per
who depends mainly on the coir industry for his
worker and others Rs. 2 per month per worker
livelihood and any person employed in coir
Employee:
industry (self employed). The Scheme also
Rs. 1 per month per worker
covers their dependants.
Government:
It covers all fishermen who are employed for
(10) (KFMWF, 1989) wages in a fishing vessel or self employed Contribution for pension and group insurance
Kerala Fishermen fishermen who are registered as members of premium
Welfare Fund (S) Fishermen’s Welfare Society. Employer:
* Dealer 1% of the turn over.
* Vessel owner Rs. 1 to Rs. 7 per month for nine
month.
* Net owner Rs. 1 per month,
* Farm owners 2 % of value of fish caught
Employee:
* 3% of value of fish caught or 3 % of wage.
* And Rs. 30 per worker per year
Name of the fund
Year of starting Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions Sources of finance
(11) (KHNDLWWF, 1989) Any person who is engaged in any activity related to Government:
Kerala Handloom Workers Handloom Industry and who gets his/her wages Twice the workers’ and self-employers’
Welfare Fund (S) directly or indirectly from the employer or contractor contribution
and all others who depend mainly on the Handloom Employer:
industry for his/her livelihood are included (self * 1% of annual turn over and an amount equal
employed). The scheme also covers their to workers contribution
Employee:
dependents.
* Rs. 1 per month
* Rs. 2 per month by self-employers
(12) (KABWWF, 1990) Abkari workers are Arrack - Foreign Liquor Government:
Kerala Abkari Workers workers who are not covered by the Toddy Rs. One lakh for pension purpose (1994-95)
Welfare Fund (S) Workers Welfare Fund. Employer:
15% of workers’ wage (including 5% gratuity)
Employee:
10% of the workers’ wage
(13) (KCONWWF, 1990) The scheme extends to two homogeneous Government:
Kerala Construction categories of workers, namely (a) the Construction 10 % of initial member’s contribution per annum
Workers Welfare Fund (S) Workers (workers employed in any construction Employer:
such as masons, carpenters, bricklayers, excluding * 1% of the construction cost
supervisory functionaries like Engineers etc) and * Yearly contribution made by the contractors
(b) Quarry Workers (workers engaged in quarrying (Rs. 100 to Rs.1000)
including stone-crushing, but not including Employee:
supervisors) Monthly contribution per member-slabs Rs.

17
10, Rs. 15 and Rs. 25
 18
Name of the fund
Year of starting Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions Sources of finance

(14) (KAGWWF, 1990) All Agricultural Workers who are engaged in the Government: Nil
Kerala Agricultural agriculture operation within the age limit of 18-60 Employer:
Workers Welfare Fund (S) years and are covered by the Kerala Agricultural Land Owners’ contributions are 0.5-1 hector:
Workers Act 1974 are eligible to obtain welfare Rs. 10 per year and others (>1h.) Rs.15
benefits of the fund. Employee:
Rs. 2 per month per worker

(15) (KLOTAWF, 1991) Lottery Agent: A person who is a regular agent Government:
Kerala State Lottery Agents and holds a valid identity folder as mentioned in 20% of the members’ contribution
Welfare Fund (NS) Kerala State Lottery Rules 1977 Employer: Nil
Employee:
Category A/B Rs. 15 / 10 per month

A person who functions as a Document Writer or Government:

(16) (KDSVWF, 1991) Kerala
as a Scribe or Stamp Vendor and is licensed under 10% of the members’ contribution
Document Writers, Scribes
the Kerala Document Writer’s (Licence Rules) or Employer: Nil
and Stamp Vendors
the Kerala Manufacture and Sale Stamp Rule Employee:
Welfare Fund (NS)
1960). Membership is open to any person holding Category A/B Rs. 15 / 10 per month
a valid licence and aged below 60 years.
Name of the fund
Year of starting Beneficiary groups and qualifying conditions Sources of finance

(17) (KAURWWF, 1991) An autorikshaw worker means a person employed Government:

Kerala Auto Rickshaw directly or indirectly or by himself through 10 % of the workers’ contribution
Workers Welfare Fund (S) ownership (self employed) of the vehicle (auto Employer:
rickshaw) in a professional capacity (either a Rs. 10 per month per worker
goods carrier or passenger carrier). The scheme is
voluntary and the workers within the age group of Employee:
28 to 58 are eligible to join the Scheme. Rs. 20 per month per worker

(18) (KAWHWF, 1991) Persons who are working in Anganwadi (Day Government: (Employer)
Kerala Anganwadi Care centre like health workers, teachers and 10% of the members’ contribution
Workers & helpers are expected to be covered by this Fund. Employee:
Helpers Welfare Worker Rs 20 per month and Helper Rs. 10
Fund (NS) per month

Tailors are defined as any person who is directly or Government:

(19) (KTAWWF, 1994)
indirectly employed by employers, contractors, 10 % of the workers’ contribution
Kerala Tailors Welfare
agents or by himself through ownership of tailoring Employer:
Fund (S)
shops. Rs. 5 per month per worker
Employee :
Rs. 10 per worker and Rs. 15 per self-
employee per month

19
Note: S refers to Statutory bodies and NS to Non Statutory bodies
20

Although there is a similarity in the nature of benefits offered,

there are some variations as to the emphasis and the magnitude of such
assistance. These are not without importance or consequence and we
will discuss them later in this paper.

The Model

As we mentioned earlier, the Welfare Fund arrangement is

modelled after the social security and insurance cover arrangements
available to the workers in the formal sector. Within the limited financial
capacity, these Funds have also conceived of some measure of welfare
provisioning. The underlying model has the following characteristics:

(i) providing a measure of social security, insurance and welfare

assistance to the workers;

(ii) creation of a tripartite body consisting of the representatives of

the workers, employers and the government with veto powers for
the government on policy issues;

(iii) a bureaucratic organisational mode with the chief executive

appointed by the government and staff drawn from the
government departments;

(iv) mandatory financial contribution from the workers and employers

with the exception of a few ‘voluntary’ funds; and

(v) minimal financial contribution by the government except in cases

where the workers are directly under the government activities
(i.e. government as employer) or where paying capacity of the
workers is deemed very low.

The initiative for setting up a Welfare Fund usually comes through

a political process wherein the political parties and their unions make a
public demand for it. Since labour relations have come to occupy a
 21

central stage in the politics of the state and consequently on public

policy, there exists a remarkable degree of political consensus on the
setting up of Welfare Funds as in the case of collective bargaining.
Given the emergence of party-affiliated trade unions in almost all
occupations, all political parties, big and small, have come to see the
Welfare Funds as an opportunity to extend their political patronage and
concern for the workers. The political consensus has often taken the
shape of competitive populism given the enthusiasm with which political
parties belonging to the two major coalitions have gone about setting
up Welfare Funds for workers. The existence of such a political consensus
has made it easy for a government to introduce legislation on the creation
of a particular Welfare Fund. The legislative discussion would often
centre on the details of the constitution, definition of workers, financial
contribution by workers, employers and the government and related
aspects.

Once the legislature comes out with an enactment, the executive

wing of the government (in this case the Department of Labour) would
set up a tripartite body consisting of the representatives of the workers,
employers and the government. Workers’ representation is usually in
the form of nomination of the leaders of the main unions active in a
particular occupational group. Given the political consensus and the
alternation of one or the other political coalition in government,
representation is usually ensured to the main unions irrespective of
their political affiliation. This is a remarkable feature of
institutionalisation of labour politics in Kerala where no particular party
can have a dominating presence either in government or in trade unions.
Over time this system of nomination has taken the character of open
political patronage to trade union leaders by their political bosses. Most
of them are ‘professional union leaders’ who may or may not have a
background of work in the concerned occupation. If such nominations
22

have taken the character of ‘rent seeking behaviour’ it is not an isolated

one. It should be seen as part of the larger system of ‘political rent
seeking’ that has contributed much to the decline in ‘self-less’ service
characteristic of politics of an earlier era compared to the ‘self-centred’
and ‘sectional-interest oriented’ politics in recent times.

Employers’ representation is also through nominations either of

the employers’ organisations or prominent employers in a given
occupation. Since employers as a group have accepted the institution
of collective bargaining and care arrangements through Welfare Funds,
their participation is more out of necessity than out of a conscious
policy. They also ensure that such participation is used to articulate
their views and grievances.

Nomination of government representatives is often done

bureaucratically with little concern for assessing the nominees’ expertise
and interest. The concerned officials of the Labour Department and
Finance Department are the usual nominees. Others may belong to
departments that look after the industry or occupation. The Chief
Executive is usually a senior government official on deputation from a
department.

The administrative support system is the organisational form of

the Welfare Fund. Employees from government departments staff the
system.

During the legislative process, one of the most debated aspects of

the Welfare Funds is the definition of ‘worker’ who will be covered by
the arrangement. This is not only due to the multiple nature of the jobs
often performed by workers but also by the overlapping nature of some
Welfare Funds. Through systematic union intervention, the labour
 23

market for the informal sector in Kerala gives very little scope for a
worker to practice multiple jobs once he/she becomes a union member.
In fact this is one of the strategies of the unions to create a closed shop
model and a strict occupational identity. However, often workers in one
occupation may find eligible for more than one Welfare Fund. For
example, masons and carpenters come under the definition of
construction workers but they are allowed to register under the Artisans
and Skilled Workers Welfare Fund. Such anomalies are gradually getting
eliminated as unions keep a watchful eye on the definition of the worker
and the eligibility for registration in a particular Welfare Fund. Since
the definitional aspect of who is considered a worker in these informal
sector activities is quite important, especially for other states in India or
countries outside, we have given in Table 1 the official definitions used
for various Welfare Fund legislations in Kerala.

Contributions

An important aspect of the Welfare Fund formation is in fixing the

contributions of the workers, employers and in some cases of the
government itself. Table 1 also gives details of the contribution of the
stakeholders. However, we could not discern any underlying principle
for the determination of their financial contributions. During informal
discussions, we came across the argument of differential capacity to pay
but we doubt whether this principle will stand the test of a careful scrutiny.
In the section on Critical Assessment we shall deal with the economic
and political factors in the determination of the contributions. Suffice it
here to say that contributions vary widely as between occupations and
groups of workers. This is not only for the workers but also for the
employers and that of the government. Out of the 19 Welfare Funds set
up so far, the government contributes directly to 15 of them. Here again
there is no well-stated principle underlying such a consideration. In
24

some cases where there is no contribution, it should however be

mentioned that government pays a state pension (old age) for such
workers as in the case of agricultural labourers. The contribution of the
employers has run into certain legal difficulties. While in some cases,
the contributions are regularly collected, in some others the employers
are unwilling to pay the contribution and have questioned it in the
court of law. Economic factors are a key to understanding the differential
behaviour. Wherever the product market allows the employer to shift
the burden to the consumer, there have been less resistance in paying
their contributions. On the other hand, in product markets where the
employers are price takers such as in the marine export market, rice
market, etc. the unwillingness has been open and the policy challenged
legally.

Administration

Since administration of the Funds is with the government, they

are like the departments of the government in terms of their style of
functioning. The considerable innovative skills evident in the designing
and coverage of the Funds are however not deployed in the administrative
set up. Therefore the administrative form hardly gives any flexibility or
room for innovation according to the requirements of each Fund.
Members to the Boards of Directors are nominated by the government
and the representation is more or less equal from all three sides i.e.,
unions, employers and government. Although the Boards of Directors
are the ultimate body for deciding the policies and functioning of the
Funds, the concerned government department wields considerable power
of veto through a system of ‘sanctions’. For example, the annual reports
and accounts have to be sent to the government for sanction (approval).
Further, prior permission is required for revision of rates of contributions
and benefits to the workers. Given that the Chief Executive Officer is a
 25

government employee, the day-to-day effective control also rests with

the government.

The establishment expenses are borne out of the income of the

respective Funds. Here again the Boards of Directors do not seem to
have any effective control. The fees and allowances payable to board
members, salaries and other benefits to the administrative staff, routine
administrative expenses including equipment, travel etc., contribution
to provident funds of the staff are all borne by the income of the Fund.
Thus, ironically a part of the contributions of the informal sector workers
go to take care of the cost of maintaining the secure jobs of the
government employees. We were given to understand that not more
than ten percent of the total income of a given Fund is supposed to be
spent as establishment charges (i.e. administrative cost). However, only
7 out of 16 Funds considered (as in 1992-93) are found to have conformed
to this ceiling (see Table 3). However, it must be noted that the absolute
amounts are on the higher side when compared to the amount disbursed
as benefits to the members. This fact alone point to the strange fact that
the savings of the informal sector workers is used to maintain the
employment and income of the formal sector workers in government
service. This is an important aspect of the working of the Welfare Funds
that calls for closer scrutiny and periodic monitoring by the government
to ensure that administrative expenses are kept to the minimum.

Coverage

An important yardstick of the effectiveness of the Welfare Funds

would be their coverage. It must however be pointed out that the
estimation of coverage poses some important methodological problems
as there are no reliable estimates of the number of workers in each
occupational group. The estimates given in the census reports can be a
reliable source but this applies to only a few categories of workers such
26

as agricultural labourers, fish workers, construction workers who are in

the informal sector and have been given separate occupational
classification. For a number of occupations, workers are clubbed in
such broad category as workers in food processing (that would include
cashew workers and toddy tappers). However, the concerned government
departments seem to have come out with some estimates of total workers
and these could be used to work out the coverage ratio on the basis of
the members enrolled in each Fund. Table 2 shows the estimated total
workers and the workers enrolled in each Welfare Fund. Out of the 19
Funds for which data are available (18 Funds implemented by the
Government of Kerala and the one for Beedi and Cigar workers by the
Government of India), three Funds show coverage of above ninety
percent, one having cent per cent coverage. Another five shows between
fifty and ninety percent. If we include the Welfare Funds for Khadi
workers and agricultural labourers who are close to 50 percent coverage,
the average coverage of these 11 Funds works out to 58 per cent. For the
remaining eight, the coverage ranges from 6 to 32 per cent. We believe
that the lower coverage in some may be due to the very high estimates of
the number of total workers. For example, the estimated number of total
workers for ‘artisans and skilled workers’ group is 40 lakhs that would
work out to nearly one-third of the total workers in Kerala! The fact that
some of the artisanal and skilled workers belong to other Welfare Funds
might also have contributed to the reported low coverage. For example,
handloom weavers would be legitimately been treated as ‘artisans’ and
yet they would not belong to this Fund, as there is a separate Fund for
them (KHNDLWF). Similarly workers engaged in traditional fishing are
also treated as artisans but they have also a separate Fund. The same is
the case with such workers as carpenters and masons (who would belong
to the Fund for construction workers). The Kerala Labour Welfare Fund
(KLWF) also comprises workers from a number of occupations and
 27

Table 2. The Coverage Ratio (realised) by various Welfare Funds

Sl. Name Estimated Workers Coverage
No. Workers as on covered as on Ratio
March 1994 March 1994 (%)

1 KAWHWF 20,000 20,000 100

2 KTWWF 45,000 44,991 99.9
3 KCSHWRWF 1,31,000 1,23,699 94.4
4 KABWWF 15,000 13,800 92.0
5 KFMWF 2,40,000 1,97,129 82.1
6 KDSWF 4,000 3,255 81.4
7 KLWF 6,00,000 4,22,000 70.3
8 KCONWWF 5,00,000 2,85,000 57.0
9 KADCLWF 5,000 2,569 51.4
10 KAGWWF 20,00,000 9,61,000 48.1
11 KKHWWF 26,840 12,293 45.8
12 KLOTAWF 10,000 3,242 32.4
13 KMOTWWF 1,26,474 31,329 24.8
14 KCORWWF 3,84,000 72,908 19.0
15 KHNDLWF 2,50,000 26,000 10.4
16 Beedi & Cigar
Workers WF 2,50,000 25,520 10.2
17 KAUTRWWF 77,875 5,052 6.5
18 KHEDLWWF 2,00,000 11,077 5.5
19 Total 48,85,000 22,60,864 46.3
20 KARSWWF 40,00,000* 3,25,000 8.1
Note: * This seems to be a highly inflated figure as it works out to one-
third of the total workforce in Kerala. Many artisan groups have separate
Welfare Funds and hence this estimate calls for closer scrutiny. We have
therefore kept this Fund out of our calculation of the coverage ratio.
Source: Various Departments of the Government of Kerala and the
administrative reports of Welfare Funds.
28

establishments such as those working in shops and other commercial

establishments, small factories, plantations, motor repair workshops and
co-operative societies. The definition of worker for this Welfare Fund is
not only defined so broadly but also intended as a residual category for
workers who do not belong to any of the other Funds. Recent
developments have shown that this Fund is losing its importance since
one of the main group of workers – tailors – have been successful in
getting a new Welfare Fund established for them in 1994. Similar
overestimation is also likely in the case of head load workers. For these
reasons, the reported coverage ratio is likely to be an underestimate.

Even while keeping the above limitation in mind, it needs to be

pointed out that the enrolment of workers in a given Fund is a function
of the attractiveness of the expected benefits. In that respect, some of
the Funds do not seem to attract the workers. These are particularly so in
the case of autorickshaw workers and handloom workers. In the case of
head-load workers, the estimate refers to their total number in the state
as a whole whereas the Welfare Fund coverage is limited to urban markets
only.

Benefits From the Funds

As stated earlier, the Funds are meant to provide a measure of

social security and insurance for workers who are vulnerable to risks
and uncertainties and do not have any other institutional protection
arising from their employment status. To this basic objective, almost all
Funds have also provided a measure of welfare assistance to workers in
which housing and education appear as the most prominent ones. In
Appendix 1 we have compiled the social security, insurance and welfare
benefits of individual Funds. Social security benefits are mainly in the
form of a provident fund that will be given to the worker on
superannuation, a monthly pension (only 8 Funds), and payment of a
 29

gratuity (also in selected cases only). Social insurance is in the form of

an ex-gratia payment in the event of disability or death and a modest
payment in the event of treatment for ill health. Welfare assistance
consists of financial assistance for housing, education of children, and
marriage of daughters. Given the importance of education in Kerala and
the premium attached to it even by the poorer households, it should not
come as a surprise that educational assistance figures in the welfare
benefits of a number of Funds. A notable provisioning by the Funds
which is neither an ‘insurance’ nor a ‘welfare’ is the financial assistance
for meeting the funeral expenses of the worker. This may sound amusing
in a context where birth and death are usually a kinship/community
responsibility. However, from the point of labour history, this is hardly
amusing. For, in the European context one of the most prominent
assistance of mutual benefit societies was that of meeting funeral
expenses. As van der Linden (1996) points out, although the worker
often worked without dignity, the need for conducting his funeral in
dignity was underlined by this form of assistance. Here the contemporary
Kerala mutualism among workers resembles so closely to that of the
western historical experience that reminds one of certain core concerns
of labour regarding human dignity. The benefits of the various Funds
are briefly discussed below.

(i) Provident Fund: Only three Funds – toddy tappers, motor

workers and abkari (workers in liquor shops) workers – provide for a
provident fund. In the case of toddy tappers both workers and employers
contribute to the provident fund whereas in the case of motor workers
the contribution of workers are repaid with interest. For abkari workers
the net credit on retirement is used for financing a monthly pension. The
workers in these three categories are all male and as such hardly any
female workers in the informal sector enjoy this benefit.
30

(ii) Gratuity: In the formal sector the provision of gratuity is in

the form of a lump sum payment, calculated as a share of the earnings of
the workers by taking into account the number of years, in the form of a
final payment as a gratuitous reward. This form of social security for old
age has been incorporated in eight out of the 19 Funds set up so far.
Toddy tappers, head load workers, workers in liquor shops (called abkari
workers), autorickshaw drivers, document (legal) writers, advocate clerks
and agricultural workers are provided with this benefit. Here again one
should note that, with the exception of agricultural workers that include
women, all others include only male workers. The inclusion of
agricultural labourers should be seen in the light of the inability of the
government to implement the Agricultural Workers Act and hence as a
relief to this section of workers. Moreover, the Fund for agricultural
labourers hardly provide for any other benefit. Taken together, the
provision for a provident fund and a gratuity payment covers only 10
out of the 18 Funds. Toddy tappers alone enjoy both the benefits.

(iii) Monthly Pension: This is incorporated in eight Funds.

However, it should be kept in mind that agricultural labourers, who
constitute the single largest group in the work force, receive an old age
pension directly from the state.

(iv) Disability and Accident Cover: The concern for disability/

death arising out of accidents has been so strong that all the Funds
have provided for some cover. However, the relatively politically
influential sections of workers have provided for a monthly pension
in the event of permanent disability. In all others it is a lump sum ex-
gratia payment from the Fund except in the case of fishworkers who, in
addition to an ex-gratia, also have a group insurance cover. There is
no uniformity in the payment of ex-gratia. What seem to weigh is the
political profile of the workers and the status of the work performed.
 31

The lowest ex-gratia is in the case of the agricultural labourers who, of

course, contribute their labour to the basic productive sector of the
economy but usually find themselves at the lower end of social security
arrangements.

(v) Health cover: There is no formal insurance cover provided

to the workers. It is usually in the form of reimbursement of a part of the
expenses incurred for medical treatment. Only 10 Funds (out of 17)
provide for some financial assistance in the event of treatment for illness
and/or accident. Those who enjoy this benefit are toddy tappers, head-
load workers, workers in small scale factories and shops, motor workers,
artisans and skilled workers, khadi workers, coir workers, fish workers,
handloom workers and construction workers. Here again the excluded
category includes agricultural labourers. Coir workers seem to have an
edge over others in the sense that the health cover is extended to all
members of the family whereas it is applicable to only the worker in
other cases.

(vi) Unemployment relief: Given the vulnerability of informal

sector workers in terms of the absence of reliable and regular employment,
one would have thought that assistance during periods of unemployment
would have been a priority for the Welfare Funds. But this is not the
case. Only four groups of workers have this benefit. In the case of fish
workers, it is provided in the form of thrift collected during the peak
season and distributed during the lean season of fishing. The low priority
attached to unemployment assistance reflects the low political priority
attached to this problem in Kerala. The politics of labour has assigned
a very high priority to the rights, entitlements and security of the workers
whereas those who are unemployed have not received much political
attention. This bias seems to have been carried through even while
designing collective welfare schemes.
32

(vii) Educational assistance: A majority of Funds have provided

for this assistance, 13 out of 17. These are usually for the education of
the children. A number of Funds have instituted incentives for children
who do well in their education.

(viii) Housing assistance: The relatively powerful groups of

workers such as toddy tappers, head-load workers, workers in liquor
shops and construction workers have this benefit. To this should be
added the handloom weavers who are not economically powerful as the
above but seem to enjoy political backing. For the majority of workers
there is no provision for housing assistance. However, there are several
housing schemes for the poor in Kerala that this aspect of social security
has been quite seriously addressed as part of the state government’s
poverty alleviation programmes (see Kannan 2001).

(ix) Marriage assistance: The parents of the daughters usually

incur marriage expenses. Since this has become an important social
custom with obligations to spend for the wedding function, this is an
important responsibility of the households involving lump sum
expenditure. Here again the coverage is only partial with nine out of 17
having this benefit.

(x) Funeral expenses: As we mentioned before funeral assistance

has figured in most of the Welfare Funds. However five of them do not
have any provision for it.

A Critical Assessment

Before we comment critically on the functioning of the Welfare

Funds it must be stated at the outset that this model of providing a
modicum of social security for the workers in the informal sector has
been a remarkable one. Kerala now has an accumulated experience of
implementing this model for more than three decades. In this respect,
 33

Kerala has been a pioneer in the Indian context in incorporating social

security for the poor in public policy. The Welfare Fund model should
be seen in this larger context as complementary to the basic social
security provided by the state. The coverage of occupations in the
informal sector has been quite wide although coverage in terms of workers
has a significant gap, if not a wide one. Given the nature of employment
in informal sector and its geographical spread, the coverage of workers
should be reckoned as impressive, if not complete. The Welfare Funds
now cover workers in the informal sector both in agriculture and non-
agricultural occupations, cutting across rural-urban and gender
differences. These Funds have sought to address the concerns of social
security, insurance and welfare albeit in the minimalist sense. Along
with the universalistic and basic social security programmes (such as
food security, access to school education and primary health care), the
State-assisted social security programmes in Kerala have imparted a
sense of dignity and self-esteem to the workers in the informal sector.
The contribution of the labour movement and the pro-poor state policies
laid the foundations for the evolution of such a broad-spectrum social
security arrangement.

Having recognised the importance and achievements of Kerala,

we must also point out to certain fundamental weaknesses. The structural
characteristics of a low income agrarian economy still operates in Kerala
as a constraint in enhancing the scope and benefits of the social security
arrangements in general and the Welfare Funds in particular. Although
the growth performance of the Kerala economy in the nineties has
recovered to around 6.5 percent per annum, the low level of per capita
income, as with the rest of the Indian economy, continues to be a fact of
life. This constraint can be overcome only through a higher rate of
investment and the structural transformation of the economy. In particular,
the low labour productivity in agriculture and industry has to be tackled.
34

The prospect for enhancing investment is there – thanks to the continuing

flow of remittances by Keralites working in the Gulf countries – but the
infrastructure bottlenecks as well as an earlier negative image continue
as major constraints (see Kannan 2002). The latter one is being overcome
with some success but the problems of inefficiency in the management
of the infrastructure sector is proving to be a formidable one.

However, these larger constraints cannot be used as an excuse for

some of the weaknesses in the functioning of the Welfare Funds. There
are several issues of policy and performance that can be improved upon
with a view to enhancing the benefits to the workers in the informal
sector. A select list of such issues, which we think are important, is
discussed here.

Differential Benefits and Ability to Pay: A perusal of the criteria

for contributions as well as benefits shows wide variations as between
the different Funds. While absolute amounts in contributions may vary,
there is no reason why rates of contributions should vary from one to the
other. Similarly the benefits also show wide variations. The justification
given for the latter is that the ability to pay differs from one occupation
to another. This may well be so but there is need for some uniformity in
the type of benefits. For example, the social security components could
comprise provident fund, gratuity and a monthly pension (wherever the
workers are not covered by a state pension). The social insurance
component should take care of compensation for ill health, accident
and death. These two types of benefits could have been incorporated in
all Welfare Funds as common benefits. Welfare benefits could be
according to the ability to pay. There is therefore need for a rethinking
on this aspect of the designing of Welfare Fund benefits. In those Welfare
Funds where the ability to pay is the least there is a need for financial
assistance from the state. This aspect has been tacitly recognised by the
 35

Kerala government because the State makes contributions to those Funds

where the total contribution from the employers and workers has been
insufficient to meet the stipulated benefits. Examples in this respect are
the Fishermen’s Welfare Fund, the Coir Workers Welfare Fund and the
Handloom Workers Welfare Fund. There is however a need for evaluating
the need for government contributions and the actual collection of
contributions (efficiency criterion) as against the ability to pay of workers
(equity criterion).

Collecting Contributions from Employers: Employers in Kerala

have been contributing to the different Welfare Boards not out of
philanthropy or concern for his fellow countrymen who are his workers,
but because this has become a statutory requirement in most cases. The
general hostility towards working class is evident in the agricultural
sector where the legislation for a Welfare Board has been challenged at
each stage in civil courts since 1974. In the fisheries sector, exporters
resorted to a two-week strike in the year 2000 against a one-percent levy
on their turnover towards the Welfare fund. There are some Welfare
Funds (5 out of 17) in 1992-93 (as given in Table 3) that are struggling
to find economic viability due to lack of co-operation from the
employers.

Coverage of Workers: The fact that on the whole about one-half

of the workers in the informal sector of the state have been brought
under one or another welfare fund till 1995 shows that significant number
of workers are now enrolled in the Welfare Funds. This percentage
however refers to the 18 Welfare Funds and the estimated total number
of workers in those occupations. We have left out the Kerala Labour
Welfare Fund because of the overestimation of the workers. The total
number of workers enrolled in the Welfare Funds comes to around 26
lakhs in Kerala. This is quite impressive. The other side of the picture,
 36
Table 3. Mobilisation and Use of Funds under various Welfare Funds (1992-93) (Rs. Lakhs)

SL Name Pension Gratuity Other social Saving or Dis- Employer-Worker Government Total Investment as on 31st
No. Retirement insurance saving (+ or -) contribution contribution contribution March 1995
benefit program
1 KTWWF 598.2 (60) 163.1(16.4) +12.6 (+12.7) 996.12 - 996.16 (100) 15656.84
2 KLWF - 12.13 (49.8) -5.98 (-23.1) 24.34 - 24.34 (100) 105.46
3 KHEDLWWF 16.21 (0.9) 160.72 (8.4) +1607.4 (+84.4) 1906.47 - 1906.5 (100) 1448.26
4 KMOTWWF 23.5 (11.6) 0.29 (0.1) +142.83 (+70.4) 203.02 - 203.02 (100) 1560.67
5 KADCLWF 0.46 (12.8) 0.28 (7.8) +2.21 (+61.7) 1.43 2.15 3.58 (100) NA
6 KARSWWF 3.54 (0.8) 28.96 (6.6) +397.17 (+90.2) 366.96 73.40 440.36 (100) 1135
7 KCSHWWF 41.1 (18.6) 31.18 (14.1) +128.23 (+58) 161.00 60.00 221.00 (100) 559.2
8 KKHWWF 0.06 (0.02) - +190.94 (+94) 124.14 79.00 203.14 (100) 175.3
9 KCORWWRF 70.7 (96.4) 8.59 (11.7) -17.61 (-24) 58.4 15.00 73.4 (100) 554.74
10 KFMWF 278.9 (70.6) 36.79 (10.7) +28.9 (+7) 97.43 297.32 394.75 (100) 134.5
11 KHNDLWWF 15.0 (70.3) 0.41 (1.9) -8.46 (-39.6) 12.35 9.00 21.35 (100) 20
12 KABWWF - 4.19 (0.15) +786.2 (+95.2) 825.52 - 825.52 (100) 3852
13 KCONWWF 70 (0.3) 79.9 (16.4) +335 (+69) 487.38 - 448.38 2135
14 KAGWWF - 3.29 (1.8) +144.75 (+78.6) 184.04 - 184.04 (100) 321.21
15 KLOTWWF 0.25 1.70 NA 9.91 NA NA NA
16 KDSVWF - 0.6 (4.8) -3.64 (-29.4) 9.9 2.5 12.4 (100) NA
17 KAUTRWWF - 0.40 (2.6) -0.51 (-3.3) 14.21 1.42 15.63 (100) 65
Total
Total 1051 (17.4) 533.26 (8.8) 3854.56 (64) 5483 540 6023 (100) 27733.18

Note : Figures in the bracket show the amount as the percentage of total contribution
NA: Not Applicable
 37

however, is that a majority of the workers in the informal sector of the

economy as a whole are out of the Welfare Funds. As per the 1991
Census Kerala ’s Worker Participation Rate (WPR) is 38 percent and this
worked out to a total number of 120 lakh workers. Around 12 lakhs are
in the organised sector and this gives a figure of around 108 lakhs in the
informal sector. If we leave out the category of farmers (who are landed
and classified as ‘cultivators’ in the census), the workers in the informal
sector work out to around 90 lakhs. Given coverage of 26 lakhs this
works out to a coverage ratio of around 29 per cent. The lower coverage
ratio in some Welfare Funds is due to their non-statutory status and as
such membership is on a voluntary basis. There is also a likelihood that
some of the Welfare Funds’ schemes and benefits are not attractive enough
to canvas more workers, e.g., Kerala Lottery Agents Welfare Fund and
the Kerala Document Writers, Scribes and Stamp Vendors Welfare Fund.

Mobilisation of Funds and Its Management: On the basis of the

available figures (for 1995) we find that around 70 percent of the Funds
mobilise resources that exceed their total expenditure. However, there
are wide variations in the proportion of the contribution spent on
distributing benefits to the members. This varies from less than one
percent in the case of khadi workers and abkari workers and about two
percent in the case of agricultural labourers and lottery agents to 108
percent in the case of coir workers (see Table 3). It should be stressed
that the low share is found among the most important section of informal
sector workers i.e. agricultural labourers. The others in this category are
khadi workers, abkari workers (workers in the country liquor shops),
lottery agents, document writers and autorickshaw drivers. Given the
high share of women in the agricultural labourers, the least beneficial
group in terms of gender is the women workers. Most Funds have also
accumulated significant amounts in investments. The highest is the
Toddy Tappers Welfare Fund, which has been in existence since 1969
38

followed by the Funds for the liquor shop workers, construction workers,
motor transport workers and head-load workers. As in 1995 the
outstanding investment comes to around Rs.277 crores. Clearly there is
need for evaluating the investment of each Fund, their collections and
disbursements to the members. The low share of disbursements in some
Funds is a matter of concern since this hardly provides any meaningful
social security for the members. The fact that the disbursements do not
reflect either the contributions or the accumulated funds could give rise
to problems of credibility in the long run. It also implies that the present
generation of workers may be benefiting at the cost of past generations.
Clearly these tendencies are not desirable for the Funds, given that their
proclaimed aim is to cater to the welfare of workers. It can also lead to
the credibility of the Funds being in jeopardy as the contributors may
accuse that the Funds are not being used for the welfare of the workers.

Cost of Administration: Though it has been generally accepted

that the administrative cost of each Fund should not exceed 10% of the
total income of the respective Fund; nearly half of them are operating
above this stipulated amount. The main reason for this state of affairs is
that each of the 19 Welfare funds in the state has its own separate and
independent administrative bodies, thus multiplying the total overhead
costs. From Table 3 it becomes clear that some of the welfare boards are
operating at such high administrative cost that they raise basic questions
on the motive behind running welfare funds. The share of administrative
expenses in total income varies from 1.24% in the case of KDSVWF to
as much as 73.3% in the case of KLWF and 67.4% in KHNDLWWF.

Instead of calculating the administrative cost as a percentage of

total income, a far more relevant ratio is to express it as a percentage of
the total welfare payments – a sort of transaction cost of welfare
distribution. If this cost exceeds the benefit transferred, certainly the
 39

scheme involves undesirable implications. This is given in Table 4 for

1992-93. Unfortunately 8 out of the 17 Welfare Funds show that the
administrative cost exceeds the total welfare payments (i.e. above 100
percent). In some it shows such ludicrous figures. For example, in the
Khadi Workers Welfare Fund the administrative cost is 200 times (20,000
percent) that of the welfare payment; in the Agricultural Workers Welfare
Fund it was 11 times (1094 percent) and in Document Scribes and Vendors
Welfare Fund it was 26 times (2573 percent). In reality what this means
is that there is very little by way of welfare payments despite collection
of contributions from the stakeholders. These Funds seem to function
to serve the interests of the bureaucracy entrusted to manage them.
These Funds, it must be pointed out, are a bloat on the fair name of the
Welfare Fund model of social security arrangement for the workers in
the informal sector in Kerala.

This is yet another irony of a system that was established to

serve the interests of the workers in that it has ultimately turned out to
be an exercise in self-serving for the bureaucratic interests. However,
a unified and common administrative body to cater to all the Welfare
Funds need not necessarily be a solution to the problem. This is because
of the possible conflict of interest as between different groups of workers
with differential ability to pay on the one hand and employers with
different occupational interests to protect on the other. There is also
the danger of giving rise to a monolithic bureaucracy that could become
less sensitive to the requirements of the worker members. This calls
for a careful evaluation of the administrative arrangement keeping in
view the need for participation by the workers and employers and
responsive to their specific needs and problems. Periodic monitoring
and performance evaluation of the Welfare Funds by independent
agencies could be thought of as a possible answer to the current
problems.
40

Table 4: Administrative expenses of the Welfare Funds as percentage

of total welfare payments, 1992-93

Name of the Welfare Fund %

Kerala Khadi Worker’s Welfare Fund (KKWWF) 20000

Kerala Document Scribes & Vendors Welfare Fund (KDSVWF) 2573

Kerala Lottery Workers Welfare Fund (KLOTWWF) 1101

Kerala Agricultural Workers Welfare Fund (KAGWWF) 1094

Kerala Abkari Worker’s Welfare Fund (KABWWF) 839

Kerala Autorickshaw Workers Welfare Fund (KAUTRWWF) 382

Motor Transport Worker’s Welfare Fund (KMOTWWF) 153

Kerala Labour Welfare Fund (KLWF) 147

Kerala Handloom Worker’s Welfare Fund (KHNDLWWF) 93

Kerala Advocate Clerks Welfare Fund (KADCLWF) 85

Kerala Head Load Worker’s Welfare Fund (KHEDLWWF) 69

Kerala Construction Worker’s Welfare Fund (KCONWWF) 45

All Schemes Average 37

Kerala Artisans & Skilled Workers Welfare Fund (KARSWWF) 33

Kerala Cashew Worker’s Welfare Fund (KCSHWWF) 28

Kerala Fishermen’s Welfare Fund (KFMWF) 16

Kerala Coir Worker’s Welfare Fund (KCORWWF) 15

Kerala Toddy Taper’s Welfare Fund (KTWWF) 14

Source: Calculated from Table 3.
 41

Gender Equity: Another important aspect which we notice when

we go through the profiles of the Welfare Funds is that it is precisely the
Funds created for the relatively weaker sections among the workforce
and sectors which are predominated by women that are still struggling
for financial viability (e.g. cashew, handloom, coir) whereas the more
powerful and vociferous male sections of the workers seem to have
ensured a better deal for themselves. (e.g. toddy, head-load and
autorickshaw workers). It is equally true that it is precisely for these
more vociferous and militant sections that the more diverse schemes as
well as higher economic benefits are provided for in the Welfare Funds.
(e.g. Kerala Toddy Workers Welfare Fund and Head-load Workers Welfare
Fund - See Appendix 1).The fact is that even now women’s issues seem
to be not at the centre stage of debate and policy even in Kerala when it
comes to their participation and problems in the labour market. This is
in sharp contrast to their achievements in social development as in
controlling the birth rate, enhancing literacy and schooling, life
expectancy and so on. Even ‘progressive’ political parties who ought to
begin this change also seem disinclined to encourage women to be the
leaders, prompting them or relegating them to be only one among many
leaders under their control.

Some Larger Issues: An important feature that we observe in the

welfare scenario in Kerala is that the patronage relations that once existed
has now been replaced by political patronage of the working class and
the poor by major political parties. Though political parties favouring
their vote banks is not a new phenomenon, the scale and brazenness of
its manifestation giving rise to competitive populism may be reaching
alarming proportions. This does not augur well either for the poor or for
the society at large as such tendencies could lead to the degeneration of
the system and the civil society in the long run. Given the ‘bandwagon’
effect seen commonly in many other fields, almost all smaller political
parties too emulate this kind of patronage relations.
42

It may also be noted that in some Welfare Funds the contribution

by government as well as employers have been stipulated as a function
of and provisional to employees’ contribution, which has, compromised
the very financial viability of the scheme. That is, since the employee’s
contribution is set at a low level the contribution by the other two
stakeholders too has been relatively small affecting the very viability of
the scheme (e.g., advocate clerks welfare fund, handloom welfare fund,
artisan and skilled workers welfare fund).

Since Welfare Funds are constituted on an occupational basis, the

entry to and exit from the labour market tends to be controlled by unions
since recruitment of membership is primarily routed through unions.
Since a new entrant to the market implies additional economic burden
to the employers, they collude with the existing employees to avoid
this additional burden. At least in the case of some of the Welfare Funds
the constitution of a Welfare Board in a particular segment has resulted
in the existence of a segment of workers who are ‘unregistered’ and
hence do not obtain any benefits of the Fund. This once again brings to
the fore the irony of the ‘insider-outsider’ problem in the functioning of
trade unions.

It is also to be noted that those Welfare Funds, which have

successfully ensured the contribution of the employers, are the ones,
which ensured economic viability. Instances of this can be found in
Construction Workers Welfare Fund (KCONWWF), which ensured
economic contribution from the employers by stipulating that the plan
for any construction activity would be sanctioned only if the employer
or contractor paid 1% of the total construction cost to the Welfare Fund
in advance. Another instance is the Abkari Workers Welfare Fund
(KABWWF), which too has a single and effective point of collection of
contribution of employers.
 43

The ever-increasing demand for more and more Welfare Funds for
each and every sub-sector of the informal sector can only be viewed as
a desperate reaction of the workers for a measure of social security in an
unprotected labour market. Given a long history of mobilisation and
organisation and pro-poor policies of the governments in power, the
working and living conditions of an average worker in the informal/
unorganised sector in Kerala is perceptibly better than that of two/three
decades ago. As a result, the scenario of abysmal sub-human poverty
evident in most parts of India are now a rare phenomenon in Kerala.
However, one of the biggest challenges facing Kerala remains i.e. the
problem of unemployment. This is closely related to the nature and
pace of growth and structural transformation of the Kerala economy.
This throws up issues beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say
that the recent recovery in economic growth has not been adequate to
confront the problem of unemployment seriously. Further challenges in
the form of liberalisation of the Indian economy have also emerged in a
powerful way. Reducing unemployment and enhancing the social
security cover to the majority of the people are two crucial issues that a
liberalised economy will have to face. The Welfare Fund model of
Kerala provides some useful pointers to alleviating the problem of
insecurity among the workers in the informal sector.

K. P. Kannan is Fellow and Indian Planning Commission Chair

Professor of Development Economics at the Centre for Development
Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. His main areas of research interests
are: Labour Studies, Poverty and Human Development, and Political
Economy of Development. Email contact:kpkannan@[Link]
44

References
Charyulu U.V.N. (1975), ‘The Kerala Agricultural Workers Act, 1974 –
A Critical Appraisal’ in Indian Labour Journal, March.
Duvvury, Nata and Sabu. M George (1997), Social Security in the
Informal Sector – A Study of Labour Welfare Funds in Kerala,
(mimeo), Centre for Development of Imaging Technology,
Trivandrum.
George Jose (1984): Politicisation of Agricultural Workers in Kerala. A
Study of Kuttanad, Indian Institute of Regional Development
Studies, Kottayam.
Kannan, K.P (1988), Of Rural Proletarian Struggles: Mobilization and
Organization of Rural Workers in Southwest India, Oxford
University Press, Delhi.
Kannan, K.P. (2001), ‘State-assisted Social Security for Poverty
Alleviation and Human Development: Kerala’s Record and its
Lessons’ in Dev, Mahendra, [Link]. (eds.) (2001), Social and
Economic Security in India, Institute for Human Development,
New Delhi.
Kannan, K.P. (2002), Kerala’s Gulf Connection: Emigration, Remittances
and Their Macroeconomic Impact 1972-2000, Working Paper
No. 328, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.
Kurien, John and Paul, Antonyoto (2001), Social Security Nets for
Marine Fisheries, Working Paper No. 318, Centre for
Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.
[Link] (1996), Dynamics of Agrarian Struggle, ANMOL
Publications Pvt Ltd, New Delhi.
Pillai [Link] (1992), Social Security Schemes for Workers in
Unorganised Sector: A Case Study of Head Load Workers Welfare
Schemes in Kerala, [Link] Thesis, Centre for Development
Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.
 45

Van der Linden, Marcel (1996): Social Security Mutualism: The

Comparative History of Mutual Benefit Societies, Peter Lang,
Berne.

Vijayasankar, P.S (1986): The Urban Casual Labour Market in Kerala –

A Study of the Head-load Workers of Trichur, [Link] Thesis,
Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

Reports

Government of Kerala (1997): Report of the Task Force on Social Security

and Welfare, State Planning Board, Thiruvananthapuram.

Government of Kerala (1996): Social Security Initiatives in Kerala,

State Planning Board, Thiruvananthapuram.
46

Appendix 1: Welfare Fund Benefits

Name of Pension PF, Gratuity etc Disability, Children’s’

the Fund Death Education

A pension Net credit to the Disability Non refundable

KTWWF scheme has account of the allowance advance
recently been worker Rs:125 per (deductible) from
evolved and it (provident fund month. Funeral his contribution
offers Rs. 100 a/c) and gratuity expense Rs. Rs. 1200 or 50%
per month to paid with 2,000. of his
retirees who interest contribution,
has up to ten (currently 11%) whichever is
years member- onsuperannuation, lower.
ship and also retirement or on
offers an his death.
additional Gratuity is 50%
amount of Rs. of the monthly
10 per month average of
of every year wages for each
that comes completed year
after the 10th of service
year at the subject to
Fund. maximum of 20
month’s wages.

KLWF No Since the Fund Ex-gratia Rs. Scholarship on

provision. is an Insurance 1000, the basis of
Fund, there is Permanent merit. It varies
no retirement disabled Rs. from Rs. 50 to
benefit. 2500, Funeral Rs. 1000 per
expense year (primary to
Rs. 200. professional).

KHED- Pension Every member Ex-gratia benefit Education grant-

LWWF scheme not will be paid an Rs. 2000. Rs.100 Rs. 100 per year
yet evolved amount at the rate per month to per child and
of 10 percent of permanently scholarship varies
total wages disabled members from Rs. 100 to
earned during the till his death or Rs. 2000.
entire period of lump sum amount
service. This is of Rs. 10000.
 47

Medical Marriage & Unemployment Housing Special

Maternity Allowance

Non-refundable Non- refundable provided he Members can

advance of his refundable advance in must have at withdraw
three months advance from case of least three funds from
wage or 50% of his unemployment, month wage his account in
his contribution, contribution. provided he at the Fund. order to pay
whichever is But he should have the insurance
lower. should have at least Rs. premium.
For cancer at least 500 at the
treatment, he Rs.500 at fund.
will be paid the Fund. Refundable
Rs.3000 as Non-
grant (non-
deductible)

Medical grant No No provision No provision Tour subsidy

(non-deductible) provision 10 ps per k/m
of Rs. 1,500 and subsidy
(maximum for food and
amount) accomodation
on holiday
home,
Kumali.

Medical grant up Interest free loan Holiday Rs.40000 for Bonus

to Rs. 2000 under of Rs 3000 or allowance the construc- payment -
medical three month of Rs. 30 tion of a new 11% of total
reimbursement wage whichever per day for house and wages earned
scheme. is lower for seven days Rs10000 for by the
marriage and his repairing, as member
purpose. average refundable during each
wage for advance which year in
should be connection
Cont'd.....
48

Name of Pension PF, Gratuity etc Disability, Children’s’

the Fund Death Education
their lump- sum Under group
retirement benefit insurance
or gratuity. If scheme
there is no much Rs.20000, if
amount Rs. accident death
10,000 as special occurs. And
superannuation funeral expenses
assistance is of Rs. 500.
disbursed,
provided he
should have 100
days of work in
each year.

KMOT- No provision Net amount in the Ex-gratia benefit Non-refundable

WWF P.F account and Rs. 5000 and advance for
gratuity paid with funeral assistance education which
interest (currently Rs1000. should not exceed
9%) at the time of Rs. 1200.
superannuation or Provision for
on his death. scholarship.

KADC- No provision At the time of Since there is No

LWF retirement, he will special provision provision
be paid according for an advance
to his service. If clerk who is aged
he completed 30 between 35 and
years, he will be 70 years, exgratia
paid Rs. 10,000. varies from
Rs.1000 (up to 60
years) to Rs 2500
(for 71-75 years)
Funeral assistance
is Rs. 500.
 49

Medical Marriage & Unemployment Housing Special

Maternity Allowance
two days. repaid within with Vishu or
Also, financial 15 years with Onam festival.
assistance in minimum Also provision
connect-ion interest. for festival
with natural allowance
calamity. (maximum Rs.
2000).

Non-refundable An advance Provision for Non- No special

advance from his (deductible) of unemployment refundable schemes.
contribution. 50% of his allowance. advance,
contribution for which consists
marriage of 12 month
purpose. wages and DA
or his own
contribution
with interest,
provided he
must have at
least Rs. 750
at the Fund.
Also, there is
provision for
unemployment
allowance.

No provision No provision No provision No provision No special

schemes

Cont'd.....
50

Name of Pension PF, Gratuity etc Disability, Children’s’

the Fund Death Education

KARS- No provision Since there is no Ex-gratia Scholarship

WWF provision of P.F Rs.10000, ranges from Rs.
& gratuity, the Disability 300 to
net amount at the allowance Rs. Rs. 1500
Fund (only 100 per month,
membership Funeral
contribution) expenses Rs.
with interest is 500.
given back at the
time of
retirement or
death. This
amount varies
from Rs.600 to
Rs. 50,000
depending on
service.

KCSH- Minimum two Since the Fund Ex-gratia Rs.2500 Scholarship- Rs.
WRWF year is an Insurance under special 500 to Rs. 2000
membership, 60 Fund, No consideration like per annum. Cash
years, Rs.100 provision for death, illness or award of Rs.
per month for P.F, gratuity permanent 1000 per student
ordinary worker and other lump- disablement. (only for SSLC
and Rs. 200 per sum retirement Funeral expense and Pre-degree
month under benefit of Rs. 500 for a students)
staff category. member and Rs.
Family pension 250 for pensioner
in the event of but it is deductible
death of the from his
pensioner . contribution.

KKH- Minimum 10 Since the fund is Rs. 5000, if Non-refundable

WWF years as a member, an Insurance permanent advance of Rs.
60 years, Rs. 60 to Fund, No disability occurs. 1500 or 25% of
Rs.180 per month provision for Funeral assistance contribution can be
depending on P.F, gratuity Rs. 350. withdrawn for
service. If his and other lump higher education.
service is less than
sum retirement Education grant
10 years, he is
eligible to get only benefit (non-deductible)
his contribution. Rs.250.
Family pension in
the event of death
of the pensioner at
the same rate.
 51

Medical Marriage & Unemployment Housing Special

Maternity Allowance
Loans for
Medical aid up to Marriage No No provision purchasing tools
Rs. 500 (injuries assistance of provision subject to
in the course of Rs. 1000 to maximum
work). any person of amount of
members Rs2000 or 75%
family. of his
Maternity
benefit of Rs.
500 at two
times
(members
only)

No provision Only maternity Supply of No special

benefit at two free ration or schemes.
times to those payment of
who are not cash
covered under assistance
ESI scheme during
(Rs. 500) continuous
unemployment
subject to
availability of
the funds.

Up to 50% of 50% of Provision for Rs 8 or 50% of

contribution for contribution as non-refundable contribution
his or her marriage advance 25% whichever is
dependent for assistance to of his lower for paying
medical treatment any member of contribution for the insurance
and also the family. purchasing land premium.
provision for Maternity and 75% for
maximum medical benefit of Rs. the construction
grant 300 at two of house.
Rs. 250. times

Cont'd.....
52

Name of Pension PF, Gratuity etc Disability, Children’s’

the Fund Death Education
KCOR- Minimum two Since the Fund is Ex-gratia benefit Scholarship for
WWF year an Insurance Rs. 5000, if higher education-
membership, Fund, No disability occurs. Rs. 500 to
60 years, Rs provision for P.F, Rs. 100 per month Rs.1500 per year
75 per month gratuity and other till retirement age on the basis of
and family lump sum (60 years ) and merit.
pension in the retirement benefit. funeral expense of
event of death Rs. 200.
of the
pensioner.

KFMW- Rs.100 per Since the Fund is Ex-gratia Rs. District wise cash
WF month. an Insurance 15000. Group award for SSLC
Fund, No insurance covers students which
provision for P.F, accidental death ranges from
gratuity and other (Rs. 25000) and Rs.3000 to Rs
lump sum partial disability 1000.
retirement benefit. (Rs 12500).
Funeral assistance
(member) Rs.
1000 and Rs. 300,
if the person is a
dependent

KHN Rs. 100 per Since the fund is Ex-gratia Non-refundable

DL- month. an Insurance Rs. 5000 advance for
WWF Fund, No workers children
provision for P.F education
gratuity and other (maximum advance
lump- sum Rs.1000).
retirement benefit
 53

Medical Marriage & Unemployment Housing Special

Maternity Allowance
Medical grant of Grant of No provision No provision No special
Rs. 350 per year Rs.1000 in schemes.
to any person in connection
the family with marriage
. and Rs.300 as
maternity
benefit at two
times to those
who not
covered under
ESI scheme.

Medical grant up Interest free Financial Provision for

to Rs.500, if it is loan of Rs. assistance in Hut insurance
an accident case. 1200 along case of with 50%
with Rs300 natural subsidy in
(grant) as calamity like paying
marriage fish disease, insurance
assistance. fire, ban on premium.
Financial trawling. Therefore up to
assistance who Rs 3000, risk
goes for premium is
sterilisation. Rs.6.75 and up
to Rs.5000, risk
premium Rs
11.25. Under
craft/cattamaram
insurance
scheme, there is
no subsidy and
the risk
premium is
Rs.22 for every
Rs.100.

Non-refundable Non- Provision Non-refundable No special

advance not refundable for advance from schemes.
more than Rs. advance of unemployment housing loan of
500 Rs.2,000 for allowance. 12 month
marriage salary or his/
purposes. her total
contribution ,
whichever is
lower.

Cont'd.....
54

Name of Pension PF, Gratuity etc Disability, Children’s’

the Fund Death Education
KAB Minimum At the time of Ex-gratia Rs. 5000, Scholarship for
WWF three years, retirement a Funeral expense higher education
60 years, Rs. member is entitled Rs.500. (Pre-degree to
200 to to obtain only professional
Rs.300 gratuity as the course).
(maximum) retirement benefit
per month. and the net credit
(balance) in the
Provident Fund
account is kept for
financing their
pension scheme.
KCON- Minimum Since the fund Ex-gratia Rs. Non-refundable
WWF one year is an Insurance 5000, Funeral advance of Rs.1000
member- Fund, No expense Rs. 500. per education
ship, 60 provision for purpose.
years, Rs. 75 P.F, gratuity and Scholarship Rs.
per month to other lump- sum 300 to Rs.1200 on
Rs. 300 retirement the basis of merit.
(maximum) benefit.
per month
(depending
on service).

KAG- No provision Only lump-sum Ex-gratia benefit Scholarship

WWF retirement Rs 1000. ranging from
benefit. If a Rs.500 to Rs.
member covers 1500.
40 years, he is
entitled to Rs.
25,000. If it is
three years (mini-
mum), he will be
paid Rs. 5,000.

KLO No provision Retirement age 60 Ex-gratia benefit No

TAWF years and above. for A-class provision
Lump- sum members Rs.
retirement benefit 10000 and B-
depending on his class members
service. If he Rs.7000.
completed 40
years, he will be
paid Rs. 62,700.
 55

Medical Marriage & Unemployment Housing Special

Maternity Allowance
So far no No provision Provision for No special
provision. housing loan schemes.
(refundable) of
12 months wages
or his total
contribution,
whichever is
lower provided
he should have at
least Rs 750 in
the Fund.

Non-refund- Non-refundable Provision for Members can

able advance up advance of not housing loan withdraw the
to Rs. 500 will more than Rs (refundable) required
be provided for 2000 from his provided he amount to pay
medical contribution. should have insurence.
treatment. Grant of three years
Rs.500 at two membership.
times as
maternity
benefit to
women
workers.

So far no No provision No provision No provision No special

provision schemes.

So far no No provision No provision No provision No special

provision. schemes.

Cont'd.....
56

Name of Pension PF, Gratuity etc Disability, Children’s’

the Fund Death Education
KDSV- No provision Retirement age Ex-gratia benefit No provision
WF 60 years and for A-class
above, lump members
sum retirement Rs.10,000 and B-
benefit class members
depending on Rs.7,000.
services. If he
completed 35
years, he will be
paid Rs. 37,749.

KAUR- No provision Retirement Ex-gratia Not yet

WWF benefit Rs10,000 . disbursed.
depending on
completed years
of service.
Retirement age
58. If he
completed 40
years, he will be
paid Rs. 125000

Source: Government of Kerala, (1996) Social Security Initiatives in

Kerala, State Planning Board, Thiruvananthapuram
 57

Medical Marriage & Unemployment Housing Special

Maternity Allowance
So far no No provision No provision No provision No special
provision. schemes

Not yet Marriage Provision for Non-refundable

disbursed. assistance not non- loan for
yet disbursed. refundable purchasing
housing loan auto-rickshaws.
from his
contribution.
58

CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

LIST OF WORKING PAPERS

(From 1991 onwards)

MRIDUL EAPEN Hantex: An Economic Appraisal.

September, 1991, W.P.242

SUNIL MANI Government Intervention in Commercial Crop Development:

A Case of Flue Cured Virginia Tobacco.
November, 1991, W.P.243

K. PUSHPANGADAN Wage Determination in a Casual Labour Market: The

Case Study of Paddy Field Labour in Kerala.
January, 1992, W.P.244

K.N. NAIR & S.P. PADHI Dynamics of Land Distribution: An Alternative

Approach and Analysis with Reference to Kerala.
January, 1992, W.P.245

THOMAS ISAAC Estimates of External Trade Flows of Kerala - 1975-76 and

1980-81.
March, 1992, W.P.246

THOMAS ISAAC, RAM MANOHAR REDDY, NATA DUVVURRY Re-

gional Terms of Trade for the State of Kerala.
March, 1992, W.P.247

P. MOHANAN PILLAI Constraints on the Diffusion of Innovations in Kerala:

A Case Study of Smokeless Chulas.
March, 1992, W.P.248

R. ANANDRAJ Cyclicality in Industrial Growth in India: An Exploratory

Analysis.
April, 1992, W.P.249

T.M. THOMAS ISAAC, RAM MANOHAR REDDY, NATA DUVVURY

Balance of Trade, Remittance and Net Capital Flows: An Analysis of
Economic Development in Kerala since independence.
October, 1992, W.P.250

M. KABIR, T.N. KRISHNAN Social Intermediation and Health Transition:

Lessons from Kerala,
October, 1992, W.P.251
 59

SUNIL MANI, P. NANDAKUMAR Aggregate Net Financial Flows to India:

The Relative Importance of Private Loan vis-a-vis Foreign Direct
Investments.
August, 1993, W.P.252

PULAPRE BALAKRISHNAN Rationale and the Result of the Current

Stabilisation Programme.
November, 1993, W.P.253

K.K. SUBRAHMANIAN, P. MOHANAN PILLAI Modern Small Industry in

Kerala: A Review of Structural Change and Growth Performance.
January, 1994, W.P.254

DILIP [Link] Becoming Hindu and Muslim : Identity and Conflict in

Malabar 1900-1936.
January, 1994, W.P.255

D. NARAYANA Government Intervention in Commodity Trade: An Analysis

of the Coffee Trade in India.
January, 1994, W.P.256

K.J. JOSEPH, P. NANDAKUMAR On the Determinants of Current Account

Deficits: A Comparative Analysis of India, China and South Korea.
January, 1994, W.P.257

K.K. SUBRAHMANIAN, K.J. JOSEPH Foreign Control and Export Intensity

of Firms in Indian Industry.
February, 1994, W.P.258

PULAPRE BALAKRISHNAN, K. PUSHPANGADAN Total Factor Produc-

tivity Growth in Indian Manufacturing - A Fresh Look.
April 1994, W.P.259

D. NARAYANA, K.N. NAIR Role of the Leading Input in Shaping Institutions:

Tendency in the Context of Irrigation Uncertainty.
May, 1994, W.P.260

G. MURUGAN, K. PUSHPANGADAN Pricing of Drinking Water: An Appli-

cation of Coase Two-part Tariff.
December, 1994 W.P.261

MOHANAN PILLAI On the Mexican Crisis.

December, 1995, W.P.262

SUNIL MANI Financing Domestic Technology Development through the Ven-

ture Capital Route.
December, 1995, W.P.263
60

T.T. SREEKUMAR Peasants and Formal Credit in Thiruvithamcore: The State

Institutions and Social Structure 1914-1940.
December, 1995 W.P.264
AMITABH Estimation of the Affordability of Land for Housing Purposes in
Lucknow City, Uttar Pradesh (India): 1970-1990.
March, 1996. W.P.265
K. PUSHPANGADAN, G. MURUGAN, K. NAVANEETHAM Travel Time,
User Rate & Cost of Supply: Drinking Water in Kerala, India:
June 1996. W.P.266
K.J. JOSEPH Structural Adjustment in India: A Survey of Recent Studies &
Issues for Further Research,
June 1996 W.P.267
D. NARAYANA Asian Fertility Transition: Is Gender Equity in Formal Occupa-
tions an Explanatory Factor?
October, 1996 W.P.268
D. NARAYANA, SAIKAT SINHAROY Import and Domestic Production of
Capital Goods from Substitution to Complementarity,
October 1996. W.P.269

NEW SERIES
W.P. 270 ACHIN CHAKRABORTY On the Possibility of a Weighting Sys-
tem for Functionings December 1996

W.P. 271 SRIJIT MISHRA Production and Grain Drain in two inland Re-
gions of Orissa December 1996

W.P. 272 SUNIL MANI Divestment and Public Sector Enterprise Reforms,
Indian Experience Since 1991 February 1997

W.P. 273 ROBERT E. EVENSON, K.J. JOSEPH Foreign Technology Li-

censing in Indian Industry : An econometric analysis of the choice of
partners, terms of contract and the effect on licensees’ performance
March 1997

W.P. 274 K. PUSHPANGADAN, G. MURUGAN User Financing & Collec-

tive action: Relevance sustainable Rural water supply in India. March
1997.

W.P. 275 G. OMKARNATH Capabilities and the process of Development

March 1997

W. P. 276 V. SANTHAKUMAR Institutional Lock-in in Natural Resource

Management: The Case of Water Resources in Kerala, April 1997.
 61

W. P. 277 PRADEEP KUMAR PANDA Living Arrangements of the Elderly

in Rural Orissa, May 1997.
W. P. 278 PRADEEP KUMAR PANDA The Effects of Safe Drinking Water
and Sanitation on Diarrhoeal Diseases Among Children in Rural
Orissa, May 1997.
W.P. 279 U.S. MISRA, MALA RAMANATHAN, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN
Induced Abortion Potential Among Indian Women, August 1997.
W.P. 280 PRADEEP KUMAR PANDA Female Headship, Poverty and
Child Welfare : A Study of Rural Orissa, India, August 1997.
W.P. 281 SUNIL MANI Government Intervention in Industrial R & D, Some
Lessons from the International Experience for India, August 1997.
W.P. 282 S. IRUDAYA RAJAN, K. C. ZACHARIAH Long Term Implica-
tions of Low Fertility in Kerala, October 1997.
W.P. 283 INDRANI CHAKRABORTY Living Standard and Economic
Growth: A fresh Look at the Relationship Through the Non- Paramet-
ric Approach, October 1997.
W.P. 284 K. P. KANNAN Political Economy of Labour and Development in
Kerala, January 1998.
W.P. 285 V. SANTHAKUMAR Inefficiency and Institutional Issues in the
Provision of Merit Goods, February 1998.
W.P. 286 ACHIN CHAKRABORTY The Irrelevance of Methodology and
the Art of the Possible : Reading Sen and Hirschman, February 1998.
W.P. 287 K. PUSHPANGADAN, G. MURUGAN Pricing with Changing
Welfare Criterion: An Application of Ramsey- Wilson Model to Ur-
ban Water Supply, March 1998.
W.P. 288 S. SUDHA, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN Intensifying Masculinity of Sex
Ratios in India : New Evidence 1981-1991, May 1998.
W.P. 289 JOHN KURIEN Small Scale Fisheries in the Context of Globalisation,
October 1998.
W.P. 290 CHRISTOPHE Z. GUILMOTO, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN Regional
Heterogeneity and Fertility Behaviour in India, November 1998.
W.P. 291 P. K. MICHAEL THARAKAN Coffee, Tea or Pepper? Factors
Affecting Choice of Crops by Agro-Entrepreneurs in Nineteenth
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W.P. 292 PRADEEP KUMAR PANDA Poverty and young Women's Em-
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W.P. 293 MRIDUL EAPEN Economic Diversification In Kerala : A Spatial
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W.P. 294 K. P. KANNAN Poverty Alleviation as Advancing Basic Human

Capabilities: Kerala's Achievements Compared, May, 1999.
W.P. 295 N. SHANTA AND J. DENNIS RAJA KUMAR Corporate Statis-
tics: The Missing Numbers, May, 1999.
W.P. 296 P.K. MICHAEL THARAKAN AND K. NAVANEETHAM
Population Projection and Policy Implications for Education:A
Discussion with Reference to Kerala, July, 1999.
W.P. 297 K.C. ZACHARIAH, E. T. MATHEW, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN
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W.P. 298 D. NARAYANA, K. K. HARI KURUP, Decentralisation of the
Health Care Sector in Kerala : Some Issues, January, 2000.
W.P. 299 JOHN KURIEN Factoring Social and Cultural Dimensions into
Food and Livelihood Security Issues of Marine Fisheries; A Case
Study of Kerala State, India, February, 2000.
W.P. 300 D. NARAYANA Banking Sector Reforms and the Emerging
Inequalities in Commercial Credit Deployment in India, March, 2000.
W.P. 301 P. L. BEENA An Analysis of Mergers in the Private Corporate
Sector in India, March, 2000.
W.P. 302 K. PUSHPANGADAN, G. MURUGAN, Gender Bias in a
Marginalised Community: A Study of Fisherfolk in Coastal Kerala,
May 2000.
W.P. 303 K. C. ZACHARIAH, E. T. MATHEW, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN ,
Socio-Economic and Demographic Consequenes of Migration in
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W.P. 304 K. P. KANNAN, Food Security in a Regional Perspective; A View
from 'Food Deficit' Kerala, July 2000.
W.P. 305 K. N. HARILAL, K.J. JOSEPH, Stagnation and Revival of Kerala
Economy: An Open Economy Perspective, August 2000.
W.P. 306 S. IRUDAYA RAJAN, Home Away From Home: A Survey of Oldage
Homes and inmates in Kerala, August 2000.
W.P. 307 K. NAVANEETHAM, A. DHARMALINGAM, Utilization of
Maternal Health Care Services in South India, October 2000.
W.P. 308 K. P. KANNAN, N . VIJAYAMOHANAN PILLAI, Plight of the
Power Sector in India : SEBs and their Saga of Inefficiency November
2000.
W.P. 309 V. SANTHAKUMAR AND ACHIN CHAKRABORTY,
Environmental Valuation and its Implications on the Costs and Benefits
of a Hydroelectric Project in Kerala, India, November 2000.
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W.P. 310 K. K. SUBRAHMANIAN. E. ABDUL AZEEZ, Industrial Growth

In Kerala: Trends And Explanations November 2000
W.P. 311 INDRANI CHAKRABORTY Economic Reforms, Capital Inflows
and Macro Economic Impact in India, January 2001
W.P. 312 N. VIJAYAMOHANAN PILLAI Electricity Demand Analysis
and Forecasting –The Tradition is Questioned, February 2001
W.P. 313 VEERAMANI. C India's Intra-Industry Trade Under Economic
Liberalization: Trends and Country Specific Factors, March 2001
W.P. 314 [Link] AND MALA RAMANATHAN Delivery Compli-
cations and Determinants of Caesarean Section Rates in India - An
Analysis of National Family Health Surveys, 1992-93, March 2001.
W.P. 315 ACHIN CHAKRABORTY The Concept and Measurement
of Group Inequality, May 2001.
W.P. 316 K. P. KANNAN AND N. VIJAYAMOHANAN PILLAI The
Political Economy of Public Utilities: A Study of the Indian
Power Sector, June 2001.
W.P. 317 K. J. JOSEPH AND K. N. HARILAL India's IT Export Boom:
Challenges Ahead. July 2001.
W.P. 318 JOHN KURIEN AND ANTONYTO PAUL Social Security
Nets for Marine Fisheries-The growth and Changing
Composition of Social Security Programmes in the Fisheries
Sector of Kerala State, India. September 2001.
W.P. 319 K. C. ZACHARIAH, P. R. GOPINATHAN NAIR AND
S. IRUDAYA RAJAN Return Emigrants in Kerala:
Rehabilitation Problems and Development Potential. October
2001
W.P. 320 N. VIJAYAMOHANAN PILLAI, K. P. KANNAN, Time and
Cost Over-runs of the Power Projects in Kerala, November
2001.
W.P. 321 VEERAMANI C. Analysing Trade Flows and Industrial
Structure of India: The Question of Data Harmonisation,
November 2001.
W.P. 322 K. C. ZACHARIAH, The Syrian Christians of Kerala:
Demographic and Socioeconomic Transition in the Twentieth
Century, November 2001.
W.P. 323 V. K. RAMACHANDRAN, MADHURA SWAMINATHAN,
VIKAS RAWAL, How have Hired Workers Fared? A Case
Study of Women Workers from an Indian Village, 1977 to
1999. December 2001.
64

W.P. 324 K. P. KANNAN, N. VIJAYAMOHANAN PILLAI, The

Aetiology of the Inefficiency Syndrome in the Indian Power
Sector Main Issues and Conclusions of a Study. March 2002.
W.P. 325 N. VIJAYAMOHANAN PILLAI, Reliability and Rationing
cost in a Power System. March 2002.
W.P. 326 K.C. ZACHARIAH, B.A. PRAKASH, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN,
Gulf Migration Study : Employment, Wages and Working
Conditions of Kerala Emigrants in the United Arab Emirates.
March 2002.
W.P. 327 K. RAVI RAMAN, Bondage in Freedom, Colonial Plantations
in Southern India c. 1797-1947. March 2002.
W.P. 328 K. P. KANNAN, K. S. HARI, Kerala's Gulf Connection
Emigration, Remittances and their Macroeconomic Impact
1972-2000. March 2002.
W.P. 329 J. DEVIKA, Imagining Women's Social Space in Early
Modern Keralam. April 2002.
W.P. 330 ACHIN CHAKRABORTY, The Rrhetoric of Disagreement
in Reform Debates April 2002.
W.P. 331 SURESH BABU, Economic Reforms and Entry Barriers in
Indian Manufacturing. April 2002.
65
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