Secure Synopsis compilation for June-2025

General Studies-2
Table of contents

Indian Constitution—historical underpinnings, evolution, features, amendments, significant provisions

and basic structure. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
Q. “The Indian Constitution has not just governed India but held it together”. Analyse how it has fostered
unity in diversity. Examine how its flexible federal design has supported this cohesion. Suggest reforms for
strengthening institutional coordination. (15 M) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
Q. India’s free speech framework is eroding under the pressure of majoritarian sensitivity. Evaluate this
claim in the context of the Fundamental Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression. Discuss key
constitutional case laws. Suggest a model to protect vulnerable voices while maintaining public order. (15 M)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Q. Anti-terror laws like UAPA, designed for national security, risk becoming tools of political repression.
Evaluate the constitutional concerns and judicial responses in this context. (10 M) -------------------------------- 8
Q. Discuss the limits of constitutional silence in ensuring non-partisan behaviour of constitutional
functionaries. Evaluate how this impacts democratic accountability. (10 M) --------------------------------------- 11
Functions and responsibilities of the Union and the States, issues and challenges pertaining to the federal
structure, devolution of powers and finances up to local levels and challenges therein. ---------------------12
Q. In the absence of State support, courts often prescribe welfare remedies. Analyse the role of judiciary in
addressing social protection failures. Evaluate if this undermines executive accountability. (15 M) ----------- 12
Q. The 74th Amendment sought to institutionalise urban decentralisation. Critically analyse why this
objective remains only partially fulfilled. Examine recent trends in state-level interventions. Suggest
pathways for effective urban federalism. (15 M) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14
Separation of powers between various organs dispute redressal mechanisms and institutions. -------------16
Comparison of the Indian constitutional scheme with that of other countries. ---------------------------------16
Parliament and State legislatures—structure, functioning, conduct of business, powers & privileges and
issues arising out of these.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------16
Structure, organization and functioning of the Executive and the Judiciary—Ministries and Departments
of the Government; pressure groups and formal/informal associations and their role in the Polity. ------16
Q. “Delays in India’s district judiciary stem from deeper failures of institutional design rather than mere
underfunding”. Discuss. (15 M) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16
Q. “Judicial reinforcement of free speech remains vital in the face of non-state censorship”. Examine with
recent examples. Analyse its implications for India’s democratic resilience. (10 M) ------------------------------- 18

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 Q. How is the Governor’s role defined and limited by the Constitution? How do recurring tensions with
elected State governments affect federalism? Suggest reforms to uphold neutrality and accountability. (15 M)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19
Salient features of the Representation of People’s Act. -------------------------------------------------------------21
Appointment to various Constitutional posts, powers, functions and responsibilities of various
Constitutional Bodies. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------21
Q. What are the constitutional and statutory functions of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes
(NCSC)? Critically evaluate the effectiveness of its institutional functioning in recent years. (10 M) ---------- 21
Q. Post-retirement appointments of key constitutional authorities often blur the line between neutrality and
political alignment. Analyse their impact on institutional credibility. Assess the need for a cooling-off period.
(10 M) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22
Q. What are the constitutional provisions governing the election and tenure of the Deputy Speaker? How
does their status differ from that of the Speaker? (10 M) --------------------------------------------------------------- 24
Q. “The structure of the Finance Commission appointment process creates the perception of partisanship”.
Critically examine. How does this affect cooperative federalism in India? (15 M) --------------------------------- 25
Statutory, regulatory and various quasi-judicial bodies. ------------------------------------------------------------26
Q. What are the core constitutional and statutory foundations for mediation in India. Why is institutional
mediation gaining traction in judicial reform? How can it be made legally and procedurally robust? (15 M)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26
Government policies and interventions for development in various sectors and issues arising out of their
design and implementation. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------28
Q. What are the main reasons behind the continued incarceration of poor undertrials in India? Suggest
short- and long-term reforms to address this systematically. (10 M) ------------------------------------------------- 28
Development processes and the development industry —the role of NGOs, SHGs, various groups and
associations, donors, charities, institutional and other stakeholders. --------------------------------------------30
Welfare schemes for vulnerable sections of the population by the Centre and States and the performance
of these schemes; mechanisms, laws, institutions and Bodies constituted for the protection and betterment
of these vulnerable sections. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------30
Q. Rigid expenditure controls dilute the demand-driven design of employment guarantee schemes. Analyse
this statement. Examine how the current cap disrupts the MGNREGA implementation architecture. (10 M)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30
Q. Explain how the adoption of AI-based criminal justice tools affects the rights of marginalised groups in
India. Assess the institutional vulnerabilities that may aggravate this. (10 M)-------------------------------------- 31
Q. What are the key legal gaps in India’s approach to refugee protection? Analyse how this affects the socio-
economic integration of long-term refugees. Recommend steps to align domestic frameworks with
international best practices. (15 M) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 33
Q. Vulnerable groups often face ‘institutional invisibility’ in governance structures. Explain this idea. How
can institutions be redesigned to recognise and include the undocumented and marginalised? (10 M) -------- 34
Q. Criminal justice reform must go beyond laws to include institutional preparedness and public trust.
Discuss the institutional challenges in enforcing India’s new criminal codes. How can the system ensure
citizen-centric justice? (10 M) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 36
Issues relating to development and management of Social Sector/Services relating to Health, Education,
Human Resources.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------37

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 Q. “The future of higher education lies not in a single model but in dynamic, decentralised networks that
evolve with societal needs.” Examine the features of an ecosystem model for tertiary education. Assess its
potential to transform the future of education delivery and learning outcomes. (15 M) -------------------------- 37
Q. Why has the RTE quota failed to ensure access to quality education for underprivileged students?
Examine the limitations in school-level implementation. Suggest reforms to make inclusion pedagogically
meaningful. (15 M) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39
Issues relating to poverty and hunger. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------41
Important aspects of governance, transparency and accountability, e-governance- applications, models,
successes, limitations, and potential; citizens charters, transparency & accountability and institutional
and other measures. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------41
Q. Public officials misusing power for personal gain undermines the credibility of state institutions. Evauate
how regulatory coercion affects citizen trust. Suggest administrative measures to restore integrity. (10 M) - 41
Q. Performance-based governance models are gaining traction in India. Analyse their core features. How do
they impact institutional accountability? (10 M) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 42
Role of civil services in a democracy. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------43
Q. Examine the existing gender imbalance in India’s urban bureaucratic architecture. Analyse how this
affects service delivery and inclusivity. Suggest systemic reforms for enhancing women’s representation in
administrative and technical roles. (15 M) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 43
India and its neighborhood- relations. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------45
Q. The resurgence of China-led trilaterals in South Asia marks a turning point in regional geopolitics.
Discuss the motivations behind these alignments. Analyse the risks they pose to India’s security. Suggest a
coherent counter-strategy. (15 M) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 45
Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s
interests. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------47
Q. “Latin America is the untapped frontier in India’s quest for strategic economic diversification”. Examine
the opportunities and challenges of India’s outreach to MERCOSUR. Outline steps to strengthen India’s
presence in Latin America. (15 M)------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 47
Q In what ways does India’s current diplomatic approach fall short in shaping long-term international
opinion? Propose institutional reforms. (10 M) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 49
Q. Analyse the evolution of India’s multilateral diplomacy on cross-border terrorism since the 1990s. What
factors have limited its success? How should India align its layered diplomatic strategies to counter terrorism
effectively? (15 M) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 50
Q. The low level of intra-regional trade in South Asia reflects deeper trust and security deficits. Analyse the
roots of this deficit and its impact on regional economic potential. Also suggest a pathway for balanced
progress. (15 M) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 52
Q. Analyse India’s recent Mediterranean outreach as part of its West Asia and Europe policy. Evaluate
Cyprus’s role as a gateway for Indian economic interests in Europe. (10 M) --------------------------------------- 54
Q. “Cross-border terrorism continues to test the limits of multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO)”. Analyse. How can regional mechanisms be strengthened to ensure credible and
coordinated counter-terrorism action? (10 M) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 55
Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India’s interests, Indian diaspora.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------56

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 Q. India-Australia defence cooperation has moved beyond symbolic ties towards operational synergy.
Examine this transformation. What challenges remain in deepening integration between the two nations? (10
M) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 56
Q. U.S. tariff actions increasingly undermine WTO’s multilateral dispute resolution framework. Analyse the
legal challenges posed by U.S. tariffs. Evaluate India’s strategic response. Suggest ways India can strengthen
multilateral trade institutions. (15 M) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 59
Q. Assess how India’s participation in G-7 outreach summits reflects its evolving role in global conflict
resolution. Discuss the opportunities and risks involved. (15 M) ------------------------------------------------------ 61
Q. The collapse of bilateral arms control regimes in the Global North is fuelling a multipolar nuclear race.
Analyse. What challenges does this pose for Global South diplomacy? (10 M) ------------------------------------- 63
Q. The Iran-Israel conflict is redrawing West Asia’s strategic map amid a fragmented global order.
Enumerate the key drivers of this shift. Evaluate the risks it poses for India’s energy and trade security.
Suggest India’s optimal diplomatic posture. (15 M) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 64
Q. “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a product of the Cold War era, yet it
remains central to today’s nuclear order”. Assess the treaty’s contemporary relevance and the key challenges
it faces. (10 M) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 66
Q. Evaluate how the US-Iran escalation may impact India’s connectivity initiatives such as the India-Middle
East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC). Analyse strategic options for India to insulate its regional
interests. (10 M) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 67
Important International institutions, agencies and fora - their structure, mandate. --------------------------68
Q. “The UN Security Council remains structurally frozen in a post-1945 order”. Critically examine the need
for permanent membership expansion. Discuss the case for including India and Global South representation.
Suggest steps to democratise the Council’s composition. (15 M) ------------------------------------------------------- 68
Q. What are the key institutional roles of the IAEA in the global nuclear governance architecture? How do
recent conflicts involving nuclear sites challenge these roles? (10 M) ------------------------------------------------- 70

Indian Constitution—historical underpinnings, evolution, features,

amendments, significant provisions and basic structure.
Q. “The Indian Constitution has not just governed India but held it together”. Analyse how it
has fostered unity in diversity. Examine how its flexible federal design has supported this
cohesion. Suggest reforms for strengthening institutional coordination. (15 M)

Introduction
The genius of the Indian Constitution lies not merely in legal governance but in its ability to integrate
diverse identities into a common constitutional framework, sustaining unity amid deep plurality.

Body

How the Constitution has fostered unity in diversity

1. Single citizenship and territorial integrity: It provides one citizenship for all, ensuring a pan-
Indian identity.
o Eg: Article 1 defines India as a Union of States, and Article 5 guarantees single citizenship.

4
 2. Cultural and linguistic accommodation: It safeguards minority rights while recognising regional
languages and customs.
o Eg: Eighth Schedule lists 22 official languages; Articles 29-30 protect cultural and
educational rights.
3. Democratic decentralisation: Allows regional representation while anchoring unity through
universal adult franchise.
o Eg: Article 40 and 73rd/74th Amendments institutionalised Panchayati Raj and urban
local bodies, empowering local diversity.
4. Judicial protection of pluralism: Courts have upheld constitutional values in the face of sectarian
challenges.
o Eg: S.R. Bommai case (1994) held secularism as a basic feature, rejecting religious
interference by states.
5. Symbolic and institutional inclusion: Reservation, official languages, and federal institutions
reflect social and regional diversity.
o Eg: Article 15(4) and 16(4) enabled affirmative action for SC/ST/OBCs; National
Integration Council formed in 1961.

Role of flexible federal design in supporting cohesion

1. Strong Centre with cooperative features: Centralised powers in emergencies but shared
governance in normalcy.
o Eg: Article 356 (President’s Rule) allows unity in crises; Article 263 allows Inter-State
Council for cooperation.
2. Asymmetric federalism: Special provisions allow accommodation of regional peculiarities.
o Eg: Article 371-A to 371-J grant special status to Nagaland, Mizoram, Telangana etc.,
fostering regional inclusion.
3. Concurrent list flexibility: Both Centre and states legislate on common subjects for uniformity and
adaptability.
o Eg: Seventh Schedule List III includes education, forests, and trade, encouraging policy
alignment.
4. Financial redistribution and planning: Federal grants and Finance Commission devolution foster
balanced regional growth.
o Eg: 15th Finance Commission (2021–26) recommended vertical devolution of 41% to
states from central taxes.
5. Judicial federal balancing: The Supreme Court has mediated disputes between Centre and states
without eroding unity.
o Eg: Karnataka vs Union of India (1977) reaffirmed that federalism is part of the basic
structure.

Reforms to strengthen institutional coordination

1. Revitalise the Inter-State Council: Make it a permanent, empowered body with regular sessions
and decision-tracking.
o Eg: Punchhi Commission (2010) recommended regularisation of Inter-State Council for
Centre-State dialogue.

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 2. Institutionalise fiscal federal forums: Enhance cooperation through GST Council–like models for
other sectors.
o Eg: GST Council (Art 279A) has successfully managed multi-party negotiations on
taxation.
3. Strengthen zonal councils: Expand their role beyond security to include health, education, and
migration coordination.
o Eg: Eastern Zonal Council (2024) resolved interstate migration issue post-COVID in
Bihar-Jharkhand region.
4. Integrated digital governance platforms: Create shared policy dashboards and grievance platforms
for collaborative governance.
o Eg: Aspirational Districts Programme uses real-time data sharing across levels of
government.
5. Enforce model conduct codes across institutions: Set accountability norms for centre-state
institutional functioning.
o Eg: Second ARC (2008) recommended a uniform ethics framework for inter-
governmental relations.

Conclusion
The Constitution is not just a legal document but India’s integrative force. In an era of rising identity
assertions, unity through institutional harmony and cooperative federalism must be its evolving legacy.

Q. India’s free speech framework is eroding under the pressure of majoritarian sensitivity.
Evaluate this claim in the context of the Fundamental Right to Freedom of Speech and
Expression. Discuss key constitutional case laws. Suggest a model to protect vulnerable voices
while maintaining public order. (15 M)

Introduction
India’s civilisational ethos embraced dissent, but recent trends show a shift where public outrage is
weaponised to suppress lawful speech, threatening the spirit of free expression.

Body

Free speech under pressure of majoritarian sensitivity

1. Rise of offence-based FIR culture: Complaints are increasingly filed for "hurting sentiments" with
little legal basis.
o Eg: In 2025, Kamal Haasan was criticised by the Karnataka High Court for comments on
Tamil-Kannada language origins, citing public sentiment.
2. Targeting of reformist speech: Even academic or reformist remarks face backlash.
o Eg: A professor from Ashoka University was trolled and chastised for his opinion on
Operation Sindoor in April 2025.
3. Precedent-defying judicial trends: Recent rulings have sidelined prior SC standards in favour of
vague social sentiment.
o Eg: Calcutta High Court, in May 2025, denied bail to influencer Sharmishta Panoli for an
alleged hate post, ignoring Shreya Singhal standards.
4. Silencing of artistic or satirical speech: Content creators face action for non-violent expression.

6
 5. Blurred lines between law and outrage: Mob opinion often guides administrative action, not legal
merit.
o Eg: Nupur Sharma (2022) faced widespread legal and social backlash for a remark, though
no incitement to violence was proven.

Key case laws on free speech interpretation

1. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015): Struck down Section 66A of IT Act, ruling that mere
annoyance or offence cannot be criminalised.
o Eg: It affirmed that “offensive” speech is constitutionally protected, unless it incites
violence or threatens public order.
2. S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989): Emphasised that freedom of expression cannot be
suppressed just because it might hurt the sentiments of some.
o Eg: SC held that unless there is a clear and present danger, censorship is unjustified.
3. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962): Upheld sedition law but limited it to incitement to
violence or rebellion, not mere criticism.
o Eg: SC differentiated between vigorous criticism of the government and incitement to
violence.
4. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986): Upheld individual freedom in expression of belief
during national anthem.
o Eg: SC ruled that personal belief cannot be punished merely because it offends majority
sentiment.
5. Indibily Creative v. Union of India (2019): SC rejected calls to ban the Netflix show “Leila,”
reiterating creative liberty in fiction.
o Eg: Court affirmed that artistic content enjoys freedom unless it promotes violence or
hatred.

A model to protect free speech and public order

1. Codify ‘offence’ threshold in speech laws: Ensure clarity on what qualifies as actionable offence
under law.
o Eg: Law Commission Report 267 recommended narrowing hate speech to speech that
causes imminent threat to public order.
2. Judicial consistency and precedent adherence: Courts must refer to binding precedent to avoid
arbitrary outcomes.
o Eg: Emphasise strict compliance with Shreya Singhal and Rangarajan judgments.
3. Independent speech grievance panels: Establish non-partisan redressal boards for handling
speech-related complaints before FIRs.
o Eg: The UK’s Ofcom model ensures proportionate response to speech complaints in public
media.
4. Training for law enforcement: Police must be sensitised to constitutional safeguards before filing
speech-related FIRs.
o Eg: The 2023 MHA advisory directed states to avoid misuse of IPC sections in expression-
related complaints.
5. Protection for vulnerable and dissenting voices: Legal aid and institutional support for minorities,
journalists, and artists.
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 o Eg: UNESCO’s 2023 report recommended national frameworks to support defenders of
artistic and academic freedom.

Conclusion
India must reaffirm constitutional morality over mob morality. Free expression, even if provocative, is
the bedrock of reason, reform, and democratic resilience.

General Studies-2

Q. Anti-terror laws like UAPA, designed for national security, risk becoming tools of political
repression. Evaluate the constitutional concerns and judicial responses in this context. (10 M)

Introduction
India’s anti-terror laws like UAPA aim to address national security threats, but their misuse raises serious
concerns over erosion of constitutional rights, particularly free speech and personal liberty.

Body

Constitutional concerns arising from UAPA misuse

1. Violation of free speech and protest rights: UAPA is often invoked to suppress dissent, affecting
Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b).
 Eg: Anand Teltumbde and Mahesh Raut (Bhima Koregaon case) detained for expressing
critical views.
2. Presumption of guilt and stringent bail provisions: Section 43D(5) restricts bail, reversing
presumption of innocence under Article 21.
 Eg: Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam remain in pre-trial detention since 2020.
3. Chilling effect on civil society: Frequent targeting of journalists, students, NGOs creates fear,
deterring legitimate activism.
 Eg: Prabir Purkayastha and Amit Chakravarty (NewsClick case, 2023) arrested under
UAPA for alleged foreign funding.
4. Excessive pre-trial detention: Prolonged custody without trial amounts to punishment without
conviction, violating Article 22.
 Eg: Fahad Shah (Kashmiri journalist) released after nearly 600 days in custody.
5. Undermining habeas corpus protection: Growing use of preventive detention dilutes judicial
oversight and remedy under Article 32.
 Eg: Delhi HC bail order to Devangana Kalita, Natasha Narwal (2021) emphasized that
"protest cannot be equated with terrorism".

Judicial responses to UAPA misuse

1. Reinforcement of free speech: Courts occasionally uphold constitutional rights to limit arbitrary
application.
 Eg: Supreme Court in Zubair Case (2022) ruled that criticism of the government is not
terrorism.
2. Evolving bail jurisprudence: Judiciary scrutinizes procedural lapses while cautiously granting bail.
 Eg: Disha Ravi case (2021, SC) emphasized dissent as essential for democracy.
8
 3. Limited constitutional scrutiny: Courts often avoid directly examining UAPA’s constitutional
validity.
 Eg: Supreme Court habeas corpus dismissals (2024-25) reflect judicial restraint in
reviewing UAPA's core provisions.
4. Need for institutional safeguards: Committees have stressed the need for stronger oversight on
investigative powers.
 Eg: Law Commission 268th Report (2017); Criminal Justice Reforms (2020)
recommended independent oversight bodies.

Conclusion
Recalibrating UAPA’s framework through stronger judicial review, legal safeguards, and institutional
accountability is critical to prevent its misuse while preserving India’s constitutional democracy.

Q4. “For India’s vulnerable citizens, the Constitution is a lifeline and a quiet revolution”. Examine
this characterization in light of constitutional guarantees. Analyse how far Indian democracy has
internalized this spirit. (15 M)

Introduction

The Indian Constitution serves not merely as a legal document but as a transformative instrument, seeking to
dismantle entrenched structures of exclusion while enabling marginalized citizens to participate as dignified
equals in the nation’s progress.

Body

The Constitution as a lifeline and a quiet revolution

1. Acknowledgement of structural inequities: The Constitution confronts historical injustices of

caste, gender, and poverty instead of ignoring them.
 Eg: Article 17 abolishes untouchability, directly challenging caste hierarchies.
2. Transformation into active citizenship: It redefines vulnerable groups as rights-holders with
constitutional remedies.
 Eg: Article 32 empowers citizens to directly approach the Supreme Court for
enforcement of rights.
3. Democratic authorship by the marginalized: Representation of SCs, STs, women and minorities
in the Constituent Assembly ensured inclusive constitution-making.
 Eg: Hansa Mehta and Dakshayani Velayudhan contributed to debates on gender and caste
equality.
4. Redistribution of opportunity: The State is empowered to take affirmative action for educational
and employment access.
 Eg: Article 15(4) enables special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes.
5. Peaceful constitutional revolution: It allows power shifts through legal reform rather than violent
upheaval.
 Eg: CJI B.R. Gavai’s elevation (2023) as India’s second Dalit Chief Justice symbolizes
social mobility.

9
Constitutional guarantees operationalizing this vision

1. Fundamental Rights as justiciable safeguards: Articles 14-18 guarantee equality, non-

discrimination, and protection of dignity.
 Eg: Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018) upheld women's right to
temple entry.
2. Directive Principles shaping state action: Articles 38 and 46 mandate promotion of social justice
and protection of weaker sections.
 Eg: National Food Security Act, 2013 fulfills the right to food for marginalized households.
3. Reservation system institutionalizing representation: Constitutional quotas ensure participation of
vulnerable groups in governance structures.
 Eg: 103rd Constitutional Amendment Act (2019) introduced EWS reservations, expanding
inclusion beyond caste.
4. Dedicated constitutional institutions for oversight: Statutory commissions monitor the
enforcement of safeguards and address grievances.
 Eg: NCSC’s 2023 report flagged high pendency in SC atrocity cases in certain states.
5. Special provisions for vulnerable regions: The Constitution provides targeted measures for socio-
economically backward regions and communities.
 Eg: Fifth and Sixth Schedule protections for tribal areas in North-East and central India.

Extent of internalization in Indian democracy

1. Improved political empowerment: Legislative reservations have enhanced marginalized

representation in law-making bodies.
 Eg: 106th Constitutional Amendment Act (2023) ensures 33% reservation for women in
legislatures.
2. Judicial expansion of rights: Courts have widened the scope of fundamental rights to include
privacy, dignity, and autonomy.
 Eg: Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) decriminalized homosexuality,
recognizing LGBTQ+ dignity.
3. Continuing caste and gender-based violence: Social prejudices continue to fuel atrocities and
exclusion.
 Eg: NCRB 2023 data recorded over 50,000 atrocities against SCs/STs, indicating persistent
vulnerabilities.
4. Economic disparity remains entrenched: Despite welfare measures, marginalized groups face
disproportionate poverty levels.
 Eg: UNDP-Oxford Global MPI 2023 found 16% Indians multidimensionally poor,
heavily concentrated among SCs/STs/OBCs.
5. Implementation and accountability gaps: Corruption, bureaucratic apathy, and weak grievance
redressal blunt the constitutional vision.
 Eg: CAG 2023 report exposed underutilization of SC/ST sub-plan funds in multiple states.

Conclusion

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India’s Constitution laid the foundation for a profound social transformation. Yet, completing this silent
revolution demands unwavering constitutional morality, effective governance, and sustained societal
commitment to genuine inclusion.

Q. Discuss the limits of constitutional silence in ensuring non-partisan behaviour of

constitutional functionaries. Evaluate how this impacts democratic accountability. (10 M)

Introduction
Constitutional silences reflect the framers’ faith in conventions and democratic ethos. However, rising
political partisanship has exposed the limits of such silences in ensuring neutrality of constitutional
functionaries.

Body

Limits of constitutional silence in ensuring non-partisan behaviour

1. Lack of explicit neutrality clauses: The Constitution does not mandate Governors, Speakers or
Election Commissioners to act independently.
 Eg: Article 163 leaves Governor's discretion vaguely defined, leading to misuse in states like
Maharashtra 2019 (SC, 2020 Shiv Sena case).
2. Absence of enforceable conventions: Unlike UK, India lacks well-established conventions to guide
functionaries’ non-partisan conduct.
 Eg: Madhya Pradesh 2020 political crisis where Speaker's delay in floor test raised neutrality
concerns.
3. Wide discretionary powers without accountability: Discretionary powers under constitutional
provisions remain loosely defined.
 Eg: Article 356 misuse leading to repeated imposition of President’s Rule before S.R. Bommai
case (1994 SC ruling) imposed judicial checks.
4. No transparent appointment process: Political executives dominate appointments, reducing
functional autonomy.
 Eg: Election Commission appointments controversy (2023), SC in Anoop Baranwal vs
Union of India recommended independent selection committee.
5. Judicial reluctance in some cases: Courts sometimes invoke 'non-justiciability', allowing executive
discretion unchecked.
 Eg: Rameshwar Prasad case (2006) on premature dissolution of Bihar Assembly initially saw
delayed intervention.

Impact on democratic accountability

1. Erosion of public trust in institutions: Perceived bias undermines faith in neutrality of key
constitutional bodies.
 Eg: West Bengal Governor vs State tussles (2022) reflected increasing politicisation.
2. Disruption of federal balance: Misuse of constitutional offices distorts Centre-State relations.
 Eg: Tamil Nadu Governor delaying bills (SC hearing 2024) strained federal functioning.
3. Skewed electoral competition: Partiality by constitutional functionaries compromises level playing
field in elections.
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  Eg: Use of state machinery during 2024 Lok Sabha elections raised concerns on EC
independence (ADR reports).
4. Weakening of institutional checks: Lack of neutrality disrupts inter-institutional accountability.
 Eg: Speaker’s role in delaying anti-defection proceedings (Manipur defection case 2020).
5. Reduced legitimacy of democratic processes: Frequent allegations of bias affect overall
democratic credibility.
 Eg: Delays in appointment of Lokpal till 2019 questioned commitment to institutional integrity
(Transparency International report).

Conclusion
Constitutional silences require a robust political culture, but where conventions erode, legal reforms must fill
the void. Strengthening independent appointments, clearer norms, and proactive judicial oversight are
essential to protect democratic accountability.

Functions and responsibilities of the Union and the States, issues and
challenges pertaining to the federal structure, devolution of powers and
finances up to local levels and challenges therein.
Q. In the absence of State support, courts often prescribe welfare remedies. Analyse the role
of judiciary in addressing social protection failures. Evaluate if this undermines executive
accountability. (15 M)

Introduction

India’s judiciary, through its rights-based interpretation of justice, has increasingly stepped into welfare
delivery gaps—most recently seen in the 2025 POCSO judgment under Article 142, reflecting its moral
guardianship amid State failure.

Body

Role of judiciary in addressing social protection failures

1. Enforcing fundamental rights under Article 21: Courts act decisively when executive apathy
violates life and dignity.
o Eg: Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992) held the right to education is part of Article
21.
2. Delivering complete justice via Article 142: SC bypasses statutory rigidity to ensure immediate,
holistic relief.
o Eg: In the 2025 POCSO case, the SC exempted the accused and ordered welfare relief for
the victim.
3. Issuing guidelines in absence of legislation: Courts fill legislative voids in urgent social contexts.
o Eg: Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan (1997) laid down sexual harassment guidelines before
Parliament enacted a law.

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 4. Monitoring scheme implementation: Judiciary enforces accountability for underperforming
welfare schemes.
o Eg: PUCL v. Union of India (2001) led to Supreme Court oversight over PDS and midday
meal schemes.

Does this undermine executive accountability?

Yes, it undermines accountability

1. Blurs separation of powers: Repeated interventions erode executive policy autonomy under
Articles 73–74.
o Eg: State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Balu (2017) liquor ban seen as encroachment into State
policy domain.
2. Reduces incentive for reform: Reliance on courts delays proactive institutional corrections.
o Eg: Despite SC oversight, MC Mehta cases saw minimal systemic improvement in pollution
governance.
3. Weakens political accountability: Citizens bypass legislative pressure, turning to courts for relief.
o Eg: NHRC Report (2024) shows lack of public pressure despite vacant State Human
Rights Commissions.
4. Judiciary gets overburdened: Courts assume administrative roles, diverting from core functions.
o Eg: In Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India (2016), SC monitored drought relief due to
executive inertia.

No, it strengthens accountability

1. Acts as constitutional check on inertia: Judiciary safeguards basic rights when governance
collapses.
o Eg: 2025 POCSO case exposed total breakdown of victim protection by both family and
State.
2. Bridges protection gaps in emergencies: Courts offer time-sensitive welfare where the State lags.
o Eg: In PUCL (2001), SC ensured distribution of food grains during starvation crises.
3. Upholds dignity and rights of the vulnerable: Court-ordered support is grounded in social justice.
o Eg: Shakti Vahini v. Union of India (2018) mandated preventive measures against honour
killings.
4. Fulfils constitutional promises of equity: Judiciary enables Directive Principles when State
delays.
o Eg: Bandhua Mukti Morcha (1984) recognised bonded labour as a rights violation
needing proactive protection.

Way forward

1. Codify judicial limits under Article 142: Draft a statutory framework for "complete justice" to
avoid overreach.
o Eg: Law Commission could propose structured guidelines on judicial discretion in welfare
matters.
2. Reform executive delivery institutions: Fill critical vacancies, digitise monitoring, and ensure
grievance redressal.
13
 o Eg: Rollout DBT + Social Audit Act integration across welfare schemes.
3. Enable judicial–executive coordination forums: Promote structured compliance reviews while
maintaining independence.
o Eg: Suggested by Punchhi Commission (2010) for inter-institutional federal coordination.
4. Strengthen statutory watchdogs: Empower NHRC, SCPCR, NCPCR with better staffing, budget,
and autonomy.
o Eg: NHRC Annual Report (2024) noted poor State compliance due to lack of deterrent
capacity.

Conclusion

Judicial interventions in welfare reflect the conscience of the Constitution, but enduring justice demands a
restoration of executive capability and institutional synergy, not judicial substitution.

Q. The 74th Amendment sought to institutionalise urban decentralisation. Critically analyse

why this objective remains only partially fulfilled. Examine recent trends in state-level
interventions. Suggest pathways for effective urban federalism. (15 M)

Introduction
India is witnessing rapid urbanisation, yet its governance architecture has not evolved in pace with this
transformation. The 74th Amendment sought to create empowered, democratic urban local bodies, but its
objectives remain far from realised due to systemic, political, and fiscal barriers.

Body

Why the objective of urban decentralisation remains partially fulfilled

1. Lack of fiscal autonomy: Despite constitutional intent, ULBs remain financially dependent on state
and central grants, unable to raise sufficient own revenues to plan and execute priorities
independently.
o Eg: As per RBI Report on Municipal Finances 2022, ULBs contribute merely 0.6% of
national GDP, and property tax collections in India stand at just 0.2% of GDP, far below
global benchmarks.
2. Weak functional devolution: Many critical functions listed in the 12th Schedule remain with state
departments or parastatal agencies, severely limiting municipal control over urban services.
o Eg: CAG Report 2023 highlighted that in Maharashtra and Punjab, core functions like
water supply, sewerage, and urban planning are still largely managed by state-level boards
rather than elected ULBs.
3. Absence of empowered political leadership: Most cities lack directly elected, empowered mayors
with full executive authority and clear accountability to citizens.
o Eg: Delhi, Mumbai, and Chennai continue with ceremonial mayors, with executive powers
vested in state-appointed commissioners, violating the spirit of democratic local governance.
4. State government dominance through discretionary powers: States often exercise excessive
administrative and legislative control, undermining the autonomy of ULBs.
o Eg: The creation of Greater Bengaluru Authority (GBA), 2025, chaired by the Chief
Minister, has sidelined the BBMP, reducing the role of elected councillors.

14
 5. Institutional and capacity deficits: ULBs often lack professional staff, planning expertise, and
systems to manage modern urban challenges.
o Eg: According to MoHUA 2023 Report, over 70% of ULBs in India lack even one full-
time qualified urban planner, resulting in ad-hoc and poorly coordinated urban development.

Recent trends in state-level interventions

1. Creation of supra-municipal bodies: States are forming umbrella authorities or metropolitan bodies
that bypass ULBs, consolidating power under state executives.
o Eg: GBA in Karnataka (2025) is the latest example, replicating similar models like HMDA
in Hyderabad and MMRDA in Mumbai.
2. Use of SPVs to bypass elected bodies: Under centrally sponsored missions, states are setting up
SPVs to implement projects, weakening the role of municipal institutions.
o Eg: Under Smart Cities Mission, as of March 2024, SPVs have been used in 97 cities, with
CEOs often being state-appointed officers, not accountable to local citizens.
3. Shift towards project-based, discretionary funding: New funding models like Urban Challenge
Fund favour metros and Tier-1 cities and promote state-driven projects, side-lining ULBs' own
priorities.
o Eg: The ₹1 lakh crore Urban Challenge Fund 2025, backed by the ADB’s $10 billion
programme, focuses largely on metro systems and rapid transit corridors, with little space
for participatory budgeting.
4. Politicisation of ULBs through appointment and control: States often delay elections, interfere in
appointments, or use nomination powers to influence ULBs.
o Eg: Chandigarh MC elections in 2024 saw significant delays over nomination disputes
between state-appointed administrators and elected representatives.
5. Limited functional autonomy over land and planning: Key areas like land use regulation,
transport, and environmental planning are still managed by parastatals or state-level agencies.
o Eg: In Delhi, the DDA continues to control land-use planning and building norms, even
under Delhi Master Plan 2041, bypassing the elected Municipal Corporation of Delhi.

Pathways for effective urban federalism

1. Enhance fiscal autonomy: ULBs must be allowed greater own-revenue generation and receive
predictable formula-based fiscal transfers.
o Eg: The 15th Finance Commission (2020-25) recommended ₹1.21 lakh crore in tied and
untied grants, which should be made unconditional to enhance local flexibility.
2. Full implementation of 12th Schedule: All 18 functions should be legislatively devolved with clear
accountability.
o Eg: Second ARC on Local Governance (2007) strongly recommended that functional
devolution must be mandatory, not left to state discretion.
3. Empowerment of mayors and councillors: Major cities should have directly elected mayors with
fixed tenure, executive authority, and transparent oversight.
o Eg: Fourth Delhi Finance Commission (2021) proposed greater executive powers to the
Mayor to enable accountable governance in Delhi.
4. Statutory Metropolitan Planning Committees: Article 243ZE provides for MPCs with
representation from elected bodies, which should be activated in all metros.
15
 o Eg: Kolkata MPC is still weak and consultative; reforms could learn from London’s
Greater London Authority, which integrates planning and elected accountability.
5. Creation of Indian Urban Service: A specialised cadre of professional urban administrators and
planners should be institutionalised to strengthen municipal governance.
o Eg: The NITI Aayog Urban India 2047 Vision Document (2023) recommends building an
Indian Urban Service akin to IAS or IFS for technical capacity.

Conclusion
Urban India’s future depends on genuine democratic decentralisation, empowered and accountable local
governments, and professionalised capacity — only then can Indian cities meet the aspirations of their
citizens in the 21st century.

Separation of powers between various organs dispute redressal mechanisms

and institutions.
Comparison of the Indian constitutional scheme with that of other countries.
Parliament and State legislatures—structure, functioning, conduct of
business, powers & privileges and issues arising out of these.

Structure, organization and functioning of the Executive and the

Judiciary—Ministries and Departments of the Government; pressure
groups and formal/informal associations and their role in the Polity.
Q. “Delays in India’s district judiciary stem from deeper failures of institutional design rather
than mere underfunding”. Discuss. (15 M)

Introduction:
The district judiciary, handling over 87% of India’s total pending cases (NJA, 2024), suffers not due to
lack of resources alone but because of systemic design failures undermining judicial efficiency.

Body

Deeper failures of institutional design causing delays

1. Opaque disciplinary mechanisms: Fear of arbitrary action restricts judicial independence.

o Eg: District Judge K Ganesan’s dismissal (Madras HC, 2021) based on hearsay evidence
illustrates the Kafkaesque nature of inquiries.
2. Flawed performance appraisal: Unit-based targets distort judicial priorities.
o Eg: “Unit system” allows equal credits for simple and complex cases (NITI Aayog’s
Strategy for New India, 2018).
3. Frequent judicial transfers: Revolving docket hampers case continuity.
o Eg: Law Commission 230th Report (2009) highlighted how transfers prevent single-judge
accountability for case disposal.
4. Lack of specialized judicial management: Administrative functions handled by judges reduce
adjudicatory time.
16
 o Eg: Court Manager Scheme (13th Finance Commission, 2010) remains poorly
implemented across states.
5. Inadequate integration of technology in procedural reforms: E-filing and virtual hearings remain
underutilized.
o Eg: e-Courts Phase III (2023) rollout is still inconsistent across district courts (Source:
Department of Justice, 2024).

Implications

1. Erosion of public trust: Persistent delays weaken faith in justice delivery.

o Eg: India Justice Report (Tata Trusts, 2023): 71% citizens distrust lower courts for timely
justice.
2. Socio-economic burden: Delays disproportionately affect weaker sections unable to bear long
litigation costs.
o Eg: CESTAT (2022) noted over 35% of district court litigants are first-generation litigants
from vulnerable groups.
3. Increased case backlog: Structural inefficiencies amplify pendency despite judicial expansions.
o Eg: As per NJDG (2024), 4.5 crore cases pending, with 3.3 crore in district courts.
4. Distortion in legal outcomes: Incentive to prioritize easy disposals undermines quality adjudication.
o Eg: High acquittal rates in complex criminal trials (NCRB, 2023) reflect weakened trial
quality.
5. Rise in judicial corruption perception: Opaque governance fosters rent-seeking behaviour.
o Eg: Transparency International (2022) identified judiciary among top five institutions
vulnerable to corruption perceptions.

Way Forward

1. Reform disciplinary processes: Ensure transparency, due process and appellate oversight.
o Eg: SC in C.S. Karnan Case (2017) stressed fair procedures even for judges; RTI Act
(2005) should cover inquiry reports post-conclusion.
2. Revamp performance evaluation: Move to complexity-weighted disposal metrics.
o Eg: Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy (2021) recommends differentiated disposal targets based
on case difficulty.
3. Stabilize judicial postings: Limit mid-trial transfers and adopt ‘one judge one case’ model.
o Eg: UK's Continuous Trial Model ensures stability throughout trial duration.
4. Separate judicial and administrative roles: Professional court managers to assist judicial
functioning.
o Eg: 13th Finance Commission recommendation (2010): Dedicated cadre of trained court
administrators.
5. Accelerate digital integration: Expand e-Courts, AI-based scheduling, and virtual hearings.
o Eg: Justice Chandrachud’s e-Sewa Kendra model (SC e-Committee, 2023) enables
remote filing and hearings.

Conclusion:
Unless design failures are addressed, resource infusion alone cannot resolve systemic delays. A
governance-driven judicial reform can secure both efficiency and constitutional legitimacy.

17
Q. “Judicial reinforcement of free speech remains vital in the face of non-state censorship”.
Examine with recent examples. Analyse its implications for India’s democratic resilience. (10
M)

Introduction
Rising instances of mob-driven censorship in India highlight the crucial role of judicial interventions in
safeguarding constitutional freedoms and upholding the rule of law against extra-legal pressures.

Body

Judicial reinforcement of free speech remains vital in the face of non-state censorship

1. Rising trend of mob intimidation: Vigilante groups increasingly use threats to suppress certified
creative works.
o Eg: The Kerala Story (2023) faced bans and mob threats in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu
despite CBFC clearance
2. Judiciary as protector of Article 19(1)(a): Courts have reinforced that freedom of speech cannot be
curtailed by public sentiment alone.
o Eg: Padmaavat (2018) where SC restrained states from banning the film (SC judgement)
3. Reaffirming state’s law and order duty: Judiciary holds that states cannot abdicate their role in
ensuring lawful expression.
o Eg: K M Shankarappa v Union of India (2001) — CBFC certification binding, states must
uphold it
4. Preventing moral policing by mobs: Judicial orders limit the spread of majoritarian censorship
through violence or threats.
o Eg: 2025 SC remarks — "We can’t allow mobs to take over"
5. Balancing rights and social order: Courts maintain the line between genuine public order concerns
and unlawful suppression.
o Eg: S. Rangarajan v P. Jagjivan Ram (1989) — mere threat of demonstration not valid
ground to suppress speech (SC judgement)

Implications for India’s democratic resilience

1. Preserving institutional integrity: Judicial clarity strengthens the role of CBFC and tribunals in
protecting artistic freedoms.
o Eg: SC 2025 observations affirming CBFC’s certification
2. Promoting pluralism and dissent: Protects diverse voices and fosters democratic debate.
o Eg: Aarakshan case (2011) — SC prevented bans on films discussing caste issues
3. Safeguarding individual choice: Reinforces the public’s right to view or reject creative works
without coercion.
o Eg: Justice Manmohan’s 2025 remarks — watching a film is a personal choice
4. Deterring mob veto and vigilantism: Discourages unlawful censorship through intimidation or
violence.
o Eg: SC stay on West Bengal ban on The Kerala Story (2023) prevented similar bans
5. Reinforcing constitutional governance: Strengthens accountability of the executive to uphold
rights.

18
 o Eg: Padmaavat (2018) judgement reasserted that executive cannot yield to public pressure
(SC judgement)

Conclusion
A vigilant judiciary is central to India’s democratic resilience. Strengthening institutional accountability
and building robust enforcement mechanisms can further fortify constitutional freedoms against non-state
censorship.

Q. How is the Governor’s role defined and limited by the Constitution? How do recurring
tensions with elected State governments affect federalism? Suggest reforms to uphold
neutrality and accountability. (15 M)

Introduction
The Governor, envisaged as a constitutional figurehead, has become a flashpoint in Centre–State relations
due to frequent political interference and symbolic assertiveness, raising concerns over India’s cooperative
federalism.

Body

Constitutional definition and limitations on Governor’s role

1. Aid and advice of the Council of Ministers: Article 163 mandates the Governor to act on the
advice of the Council of Ministers except in specified discretionary cases.
o Eg: Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) – Supreme Court ruled that the Governor
is bound by ministerial advice in all but rare exceptions.
2. No independent executive authority: As per Article 154, the Governor has no real powers
independent of the elected government.
o Eg: B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly clarified that the Governor is merely a
constitutional head, not an executive decision-maker.
3. Discretionary powers are limited: Use of Article 200 (assent to Bills) or Article 356 (report to
President) is subject to judicial review.
o Eg: Nabam Rebia case (2016) – SC restricted the use of discretion to prevent arbitrary use
in recommending President’s Rule.
4. Doctrine of constitutional morality: The Governor’s actions must align with constitutional values
and democratic norms.
o Eg: S.R. Bommai case (1994) – SC upheld secularism and federalism, curbing misuse of
Governor’s powers under Article 356.
5. No power to use unrecognised symbols: Constitutional decorum prohibits the use of cultural-
religious imagery in official functions.
o Eg: Kerala Raj Bhavan controversy (2025) – Displaying Bharat Mata image in official
state events was challenged for lacking constitutional sanction.

Impact of Governor–State government tensions on federalism

1. Erosion of State autonomy: Persistent interference weakens the authority of elected State
governments.

19
 o Eg: NEET Bill in Tamil Nadu (2022) – Governor delayed assent for months, obstructing
State policy implementation.
2. Politicisation of key appointments: Unilateral decisions on university VCs or trust votes often
undermine State prerogatives.
o Eg: West Bengal VC row (2023) – Governor appointed Vice-Chancellors without State
consultation, escalating conflict.
3. Administrative deadlocks and delays: Withholding assent or ordinances disrupts governance and
service delivery.
o Eg: Punjab Budget address deadlock (2023) – Governor withheld approval, creating
constitutional friction.
4. Breakdown of cooperative federalism: Frequent confrontations hinder Centre–State cooperation
envisioned in the Constitution.
o Eg: Maharashtra political crisis (2019) – Midnight oath-taking exposed misuse of
gubernatorial discretion.
5. Bypassing electoral mandates: Governors have often been accused of enabling governments that
lack majority.
o Eg: Karnataka hung assembly (2018) – Governor invited the largest party despite a post-
poll coalition majority.

Reforms to uphold neutrality and accountability

1. Consultative appointment process: Appointment of Governors should involve the Chief Minister
and Opposition.
o Eg: Punchhi Commission recommendation – Proposed a consultative and bipartisan
mechanism for appointment of Governors.
2. Fixed tenure and removal safeguards: Security of tenure and clear grounds for removal will
insulate Governors from political pressure.
o Eg: Sarkaria Commission (1988) – Advocated 5-year fixed tenure and constitutional
removal process.
3. Code of conduct for Governors: A written code can help curb partisan conduct and preserve
constitutional dignity.
o Eg: Venkatachaliah Commission (2002) – Recommended a binding code of conduct for
all constitutional authorities.
4. Strengthened judicial review: Fast-tracking constitutional cases involving gubernatorial overreach
can act as deterrent.
o Eg: Uttarakhand President’s Rule case (2016) – SC overturned arbitrary dismissal of
State government based on Governor’s report.
5. Revive Inter-State Council mechanism: Periodic reviews of Centre-State ties can include
examination of the Governor’s role.
o Eg: Punchhi Commission – Suggested regular Centre-State consultations to defuse
emerging constitutional conflicts.

Conclusion
Reforming the office of the Governor is essential to safeguard the federal spirit and uphold constitutional
morality. Institutionalising neutrality will help restore trust and strengthen the democratic fabric.

20
Salient features of the Representation of People’s Act.
Appointment to various Constitutional posts, powers, functions and
responsibilities of various Constitutional Bodies.
Q. What are the constitutional and statutory functions of the National Commission for
Scheduled Castes (NCSC)? Critically evaluate the effectiveness of its institutional functioning
in recent years. (10 M)

Introduction
Created under Article 338 of the Constitution, the NCSC serves as a vital institution to uphold
constitutional safeguards and monitor socio-economic justice for historically disadvantaged groups.

Body

Constitutional and statutory functions of the NCSC

1. Monitoring of legal safeguards: NCSC monitors the implementation of safeguards under the
Constitution and laws.
o Eg: In 2024, NCSC directed action in the Jalore school caste-atrocity case, invoking
Article 17 and the PoA Act (NCSC Annual Report).
2. Inquiry into rights violations: It investigates complaints regarding denial of rights or safeguards.
o Eg: In 2023, NCSC sought explanation from DU administration over alleged discrimination
in faculty recruitment.
3. Advisory role in development: Advises central and state governments on socio-economic
upliftment measures.
o Eg: 2022 recommendations included suggestions for residential hostels and post-matric
scholarships in rural regions.
4. Annual reporting to the President: Submits detailed reports on the status of rights implementation
and violations.
o Eg: The 2021–22 report highlighted lapses in reservation policy enforcement in IITs and
central universities.

Critical evaluation of effectiveness of NCSC functioning

A. Positive aspects

1. Proactive in urgent cases: NCSC has shown institutional assertiveness through suo motu actions.
o Eg: In 2025, it issued notices in the Telangana Gurukul school incident, citing violation of
dignity and institutional equity.
2. Accessible grievance redressal: E-platforms and helplines have improved visibility and citizen
outreach.
o Eg: The NCSC grievance portal, revamped in 2022, received over 28,000 petitions in a
year (NCSC data).
3. Collaboration with law enforcement: Works with police and civil authorities to ensure timely
investigation in atrocity cases.

21
 o Eg: In MP (2023), it coordinated with the DGP’s office to expedite pending atrocity FIRs
under SC/ST Act.
4. Focus on education and employment data: Actively tracks representation in higher education and
government jobs.
o Eg: NCSC’s 2022–23 report flagged shortfalls in Group A recruitment in several central
PSUs.

B. Limitations

1. Lack of enforcement power: NCSC’s recommendations are advisory, limiting its ability to compel
action.
o Eg: Despite repeated warnings, many states failed to implement the SC Sub Plan guidelines
(NITI Aayog, 2023).
2. Delayed reporting and action gaps: Long delays between incident, inquiry, and institutional action
reduce its impact.
o Eg: The 2018–19 report was laid before Parliament only in 2021, delaying accountability on
key issues.
3. Concerns over autonomy: Political appointments and executive influence raise questions on its
neutrality.
o Eg: 2023 Standing Committee flagged lack of independent vetting in selection of
Commission members.
4. Underutilisation at the grassroots: Awareness about NCSC remains limited among rural and semi-
urban populations.
o Eg: A TISS study (2022) found only 11% of rural SC respondents were aware of NCSC
complaint mechanisms.

Conclusion
To make NCSC a truly effective watchdog, it must be given greater institutional autonomy, time-bound
compliance frameworks, and grassroots outreach capacity to transform safeguards into everyday justice.

Q. Post-retirement appointments of key constitutional authorities often blur the line between
neutrality and political alignment. Analyse their impact on institutional credibility. Assess the
need for a cooling-off period. (10 M)

Introduction

The credibility of democratic institutions rests on their perceived independence from political incentives.
The trend of appointing retired constitutional functionaries to executive or political roles raises concerns
over institutional neutrality.

Body

Impact on institutional credibility

1. Perception of compromised neutrality: Post-retirement roles may create a belief that decisions
during tenure were influenced by political considerations.

22
 o Eg: Former CAG Vinod Rai’s comments on political outcomes post-2G audit led to public
debates on audit independence.
2. Erosion of public trust: Citizens may lose faith in constitutional roles if retirements lead to quick
political absorption.
o Eg: Former CJIs Ranjan Gogoi and P Sathasivam took post-retirement roles in Rajya
Sabha and as Governor, triggering debate.
3. Chilling effect on dissent: Serving officials may avoid decisions that displease the political
executive, fearing post-retirement fallout.
o Eg: Former EC Ashok Lavasa’s transfer to ADB after dissenting on Model Code
violations raised concerns over institutional pressure.
4. Weakening of checks and balances: Constitutional posts act as counterweights to executive excess.
Post-retirement incentives may dilute this role.
o Eg: Election Commission’s silence on electoral bond transparency during 2019 raised
questions on executive influence.
5. Politicisation of regulatory and quasi-judicial bodies: Frequent appointments of ex-officials can
alter the independence of oversight institutions.
o Eg: Former bureaucrats appointed to tribunals and commissions without open selection,
violating SC directives (Madras Bar Association v. UoI, 2020).

Need for a statutory cooling-off period

1. Restoring neutrality and dignity of office: A gap period can remove perceived linkage between
decisions in office and political rewards.
o Eg: Loksatta’s proposal (2020) suggested 2–3-year cooling-off for SC judges, ECs, and
CAGs to ensure credibility.
2. Preventing conflict of interest: Cooling-off helps prevent direct benefit from prior regulatory
decisions.
o Eg: TRAI Act already bars its chairperson from future government employment post-tenure.
3. Global best practices: Mature democracies enforce restrictions to protect institutional sanctity.
o Eg: In the USA, top public officials observe a mandatory lobbying ban post-tenure under
ethics legislation.
4. Legal clarity and uniformity: Absence of a standard rule leads to arbitrary post-retirement
placements.
o Eg: 2nd ARC Report on Ethics in Governance (2007) recommended codifying post-
retirement restrictions across constitutional offices.
5. Strengthening institutional independence: Curbing incentives ensures decisions are based solely
on law and conscience.
o Eg: Law Commission of India recommended clear norms for appointments to tribunals
and commissions.

Conclusion

Ensuring institutional neutrality demands that public functionaries are insulated from post-retirement
temptations. A statutory cooling-off period can institutionalise this firewall, restoring faith in the
architecture of India’s constitutional governance.

23
Q. What are the constitutional provisions governing the election and tenure of the Deputy
Speaker? How does their status differ from that of the Speaker? (10 M)

Introduction
The office of the Deputy Speaker plays a crucial constitutional role in ensuring continuity of legislative
proceedings, acting as the presiding officer in the absence of the Speaker.

Body

Constitutional provisions governing election and tenure

1. Election by the House: Deputy Speaker is elected by the members of Lok Sabha or State Assembly
from among themselves.
 Eg: Article 93 (Lok Sabha), Article 178 (State Assemblies).
2. No mandatory timeframe: The Constitution uses the phrase “as soon as may be” but does not fix
any deadline for the election.
 Eg: The 17th Lok Sabha (2019–2024) remained without a Deputy Speaker throughout its
tenure.
3. Election process: Elected through a simple majority of members present and voting.
4. Tenure co-terminus with the House: Holds office till the dissolution of the House unless removed
or resigns earlier.
 Eg: Article 94 (Lok Sabha), Article 179 (State Assemblies).
5. Resignation procedure: Resignation is submitted to the Speaker.
 Eg: Article 94(b), Article 179(b).
6. Removal procedure: Can be removed by a resolution of the House passed by an effective majority
(majority of total membership).
 Eg: Article 94(c), Article 179(c).

Status differences between Speaker and Deputy Speaker

1. Presiding authority: Speaker presides over House regularly; Deputy Speaker presides only during
Speaker’s absence, vacancy or when delegated.
Eg: Article 95(1), Article 180(1).
2. Administrative control: Speaker controls Lok Sabha Secretariat and administrative affairs; Deputy
Speaker has no independent administrative authority.
3. Committee roles: Speaker is ex-officio chair of key parliamentary committees; Deputy Speaker
generally heads select committees as assigned (e.g. Private Members’ Bills Committee).
4. Authority while presiding: Deputy Speaker, while presiding, exercises all powers of the Speaker
and rulings are binding.
5. Warrant of Precedence: Speaker holds 6th rank; Deputy Speaker has lower position in the Warrant
of Precedence.

Conclusion
Ensuring timely election and strengthening the functional role of the Deputy Speaker can reinforce
legislative balance, procedural neutrality, and constitutional accountability.

24
Q. “The structure of the Finance Commission appointment process creates the perception of
partisanship”. Critically examine. How does this affect cooperative federalism in India? (15
M)

Introduction:
In India’s evolving fiscal federalism, the Finance Commission under Article 280 plays a critical role, but
concerns over its appointment process have intensified amidst widening regional and political divergence.

Body

The perception of partisanship in the appointment process

Reasons for perception of partisanship

1. Centralised appointment authority: The Union government holds complete control over
appointments, excluding states from the selection process.
o Eg: In the appointment of the XVI Finance Commission (2023), no formal consultations
were held with states.
2. Regional imbalance in representation: States with higher economic contribution often find
minimal representation despite contributing significantly to national revenue.
o Eg: Southern states contributing nearly 35% of India’s GDP had only one representative
in XVI FC.
3. Inclusion of individuals perceived close to the establishment: Selection of persons seen aligned
with central ideology raises neutrality concerns.
o Eg: Members with previous policy advisory roles for the central government have been
appointed in earlier Commissions
4. Terms of reference perceived as centrally driven: The Union’s unilateral drafting of ToRs can
embed priorities that may disadvantage some states.
o Eg: XV FC’s mandate to use 2011 Census data and factor defence spending was criticised
by population-stabilised states.

Why perception may be overstated

1. Constitutionally valid process: The appointment mechanism adheres to Article 280 and has been
consistently applied since 1951.
2. Expert-based composition ensures competence: Eminent administrators and economists provide
technical rigour and fiscal expertise.
o Eg: Chairs of recent Commissions have held extensive experience in economic governance
and public administration.
3. States participate during consultations: States submit memoranda and appear for detailed
discussions before the Commission.
o Eg: All 28 states presented submissions to XV FC reflecting their fiscal positions.
4. Parliamentary oversight mechanism: Recommendations are tabled and debated in Parliament,
enabling wider political scrutiny.
o Eg: The XV FC report was extensively debated during the 2021 Budget Session.

How this affects cooperative federalism

25
 1. Weakening of federal trust: Lack of inclusivity erodes mutual trust and affects intergovernmental
relations.
o Eg: Southern Chief Ministers’ Conference (2025) expressed concerns over exclusion in FC
appointments.
2. Skewed devolution outcomes: Perceptions of bias may influence resource allocation favoring
certain regions disproportionately.
o Eg: Performance-based grants in XV FC led to concerns of uneven benefit distribution
across states.
3. Intensification of regional tensions: States may collectively oppose central fiscal decisions,
hampering cooperative governance.
o Eg: Some states approached the Supreme Court over delayed GST compensation and
central fiscal policies.
4. Erosion of institutional credibility: Persistent charges of bias weaken public trust in constitutional
bodies like the Finance Commission.
o Eg: Academic reviews in EPW (2023) warned of growing executive dominance in fiscal
institutions.

Way forward

1. Mandate state consultation during appointments through Inter-State Council as recommended by

the Punchhi Commission on Centre-State Relations (2010).
2. Ensure balanced zonal representation by adopting principles of equitable representation suggested
in the Sarkaria Commission Report (1988).
3. Establish independent expert selection panel involving judiciary, states, and domain experts on
lines similar to recommendations of the Second ARC (2007) on constitutional body appointments.
4. Frame Terms of Reference jointly through consultative bodies like NITI Aayog Governing
Council to ensure wider consensus and transparency.

Conclusion:
Transparent, inclusive reforms in the appointment process are essential to uphold the neutrality of the
Finance Commission and preserve India’s delicate fiscal federal balance.

Statutory, regulatory and various quasi-judicial bodies.

Q. What are the core constitutional and statutory foundations for mediation in India. Why is
institutional mediation gaining traction in judicial reform? How can it be made legally and
procedurally robust? (15 M)

Introduction

With over 5.8 crore pending cases across Indian courts (National Judicial Data Grid, 2024), mediation is
emerging as a constitutional promise for speedy, inclusive and accessible justice, moving beyond
adversarial litigation.

Body

Constitutional and statutory foundations for mediation in India

26
 1. Article 21 and access to speedy justice: Mandates the right to a fair and expeditious trial as a
component of life and liberty.
o Eg: In Hussainara Khatoon vs State of Bihar (1979), SC linked delay in trials to violation
of Article 21.
2. Article 39A and legal aid: Directs the State to provide equal access to justice via suitable
legislation or schemes.
o Eg: NALSA, created under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, anchors mediation
through legal aid camps.
3. Section 89 of CPC, 1908 (amended 2002): Enables courts to refer disputes for ADR including
mediation, arbitration, conciliation.
o Eg: In Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India (2003), SC upheld validity of
Section 89 and encouraged court-annexed mediation.
4. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987: Empowers legal services institutions to organise Lok
Adalats and mediation camps.
o Eg: Under NALSA's mediation framework, over 5.5 lakh pre-litigation cases were settled
in 2023.
5. Mediation Act, 2023: Provides a statutory framework for voluntary, institutional mediation
with time-bound processes and enforceability.
o Eg: The Act mandates mandatory pre-litigation mediation for civil and commercial
disputes up to ₹3 crore.

Reasons for rise of institutional mediation in judicial reform

1. Reducing judicial backlog: Institutional mediation offers an organised, scalable alternative to tackle
systemic case pendency.
o Eg: The 'Mediation for the Nation' campaign (July–Sept 2025) targets pending cases from
taluka to High Courts, under NALSA and MCPC.
2. Standardisation and professionalism: Institutional mediation ensures trained mediators,
protocols and monitoring.
o Eg: Supreme Court’s Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee (MCPC) monitors
quality and training since 2005.
3. Hybrid and digital accessibility: Institutions are better placed to enable online and hybrid
mediation, enhancing rural access.
o Eg: Online mediation by District Legal Services Authorities under the 2025 campaign
supports remote participation.
4. Inclusion of new dispute categories: Institutional setups now cover family, consumer, service,
land and cheque bounce cases.
o Eg: The 2025 campaign includes partition, service matters, DV cases in its mediation
scope.
5. Support from judiciary and policy: Judicial pronouncements and recent laws have institutionalised
mediation in policy discourse.
o Eg: Justice S.A. Bobde Committee (2020) on ADR promoted court-linked mediation
infrastructure.

Measures to make mediation legally and procedurally robust

27
 1. Clarify legal enforceability of settlements: Ensure clear statutory recognition and enforcement
of mediated agreements.
o Eg: Mediation Act, 2023, under Section 28, treats agreements as decrees under CPC.
2. Create a national accreditation framework: Develop uniform training, certification and ethics
standards for mediators.
o Eg: India International Arbitration Centre model offers best practice for accrediting
neutral third parties.
3. Incorporate mediation into judicial workflow: Courts must integrate mandatory mediation
stages in case management.
o Eg: Delhi High Court Mediation Centre refers pre-litigation and pending cases as
routine.
4. Establish performance-linked monitoring mechanisms: Track success rates, neutrality, and
satisfaction through institutional dashboards.
o Eg: MCPC Mediation Monitoring Committees at state level track outcomes of the 90-day
campaign.
5. Expand legal literacy and public trust: Awareness programmes and incentives for early
settlement can increase participation.
o Eg: NALSA’s legal literacy camps in 2024 saw 43% rise in voluntary participation in
matrimonial mediation.

Conclusion

India must shift from a reactive litigation model to a proactive resolution-based culture. Mediation, when
institutionally integrated, procedurally safeguarded and legally empowered, can become the
cornerstone of a more humane and efficient justice system.

Government policies and interventions for development in various sectors

and issues arising out of their design and implementation.
Q. What are the main reasons behind the continued incarceration of poor undertrials in
India? Suggest short- and long-term reforms to address this systematically. (10 M)

Introduction:
The undertrial crisis in India is not just a legal failure but a systemic denial of liberty rooted in poverty,
delayed processes and institutional apathy.

Body

Reasons for continued incarceration of poor undertrials

1. Inability to furnish bail bonds: Poor prisoners often lack sureties or funds to post bail even when
granted.
o Eg: As per India Justice Report 2025, over 25% of undertrials remain in custody despite
being granted bail due to non-payment of sureties.
2. Lack of legal aid awareness and access: Many undertrials are unaware of free legal aid or do not
receive effective counsel.

28
 o Eg: NCRB 2023 shows only 13% of prisoners accessed legal aid lawyers; most lacked
consistent representation.
3. Delays in police investigation and filing of chargesheets: Undertrials suffer long detention due to
slow case processing.
o Eg: In the Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) case, SC highlighted how delays in
chargesheet filing prolong custody.
4. Judicial backlog and systemic delay: Courts are overburdened, leading to prolonged pre-trial
detention.
o Eg: As per NJDG 2025, over 4.7 crore cases are pending in Indian courts, with 71% of
prison population being undertrials.
5. Discretionary and inconsistent application of bail norms: Courts often deny bail for similar
offences due to subjective standards.
o Eg: The Law Commission 268th Report noted inconsistent bail practices as a key cause of
pre-trial injustice.

Reforms to address the issue

A. Short-term reforms

1. Operationalise the Support to Poor Prisoners Scheme: Actively identify eligible inmates and
disburse funds for bail/fines.
o Eg: MHA’s 2023 scheme remains underutilised despite funds allocated via NCRB and clear
SOPs issued.
2. District legal aid clinics inside jails: Regularly monitor undertrials and assist with bail applications.
o Eg: Delhi Prisons Legal Aid Model shows success in weekly paralegal interface and bail
filing.
3. Mandatory bail review hearings for long-term undertrials: Periodic judicial review for those
detained beyond prescribed limits.
o Eg: SC direction in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) led to speedy trial
being recognised as a fundamental right.
4. Digitisation of undertrial data with tracking: Real-time prison-court coordination to track
eligibility and avoid delays.
o Eg: ePrisons project by MHA enables real-time prisoner data tracking and flagging of long-
term detentions.

Long-term reforms

1. Codify uniform bail norms through legislation: Reduce judicial discretion and ensure equity in
pre-trial release.
o Eg: Recommended by Criminal Justice Reforms Committee (Madhava Menon, 2007) for
structured bail guidelines.
2. Increase judicial capacity and special bail benches: Appoint more judges and create fast-track bail
courts.
o Eg: Justice Ramana’s 2021 recommendation to increase judge strength from 21 to 50
per million population.

29
 3. Community bail bond and public surety schemes: Use of state/NGO-verified sureties for indigent
accused.
o Eg: Telangana’s pilot bail bond pooling scheme (2022) showed success in reducing
undertrial numbers.
4. Strengthen undertrial review committees (UTRCs): Regular monthly meetings with measurable
accountability.
o Eg: NCRB Guidelines 2023 recommend active tracking of undertrial cases through District
Legal Services Authorities.

Conclusion:
India cannot afford a justice system where liberty is priced by economic status. True criminal justice reform
must begin by dismantling the structural barriers that keep the poor locked behind bars without conviction.

Development processes and the development industry —the role of NGOs,

SHGs, various groups and associations, donors, charities, institutional and
other stakeholders.
Welfare schemes for vulnerable sections of the population by the Centre and
States and the performance of these schemes; mechanisms, laws, institutions
and Bodies constituted for the protection and betterment of these vulnerable
sections.
Q. Rigid expenditure controls dilute the demand-driven design of employment guarantee
schemes. Analyse this statement. Examine how the current cap disrupts the MGNREGA
implementation architecture. (10 M)

Introduction
Employment guarantee schemes like MGNREGA were designed to automatically respond to rural distress;
rigid fiscal controls undermine this fundamental design principle.

Body

How rigid expenditure controls dilute demand-driven design

1. Violation of statutory entitlement: MGNREGA legally guarantees employment on demand under

Section 3 of MGNREGA 2005.
o Eg: The recent 60% cap for FY 2025-26 limits funds irrespective of actual demand
(Ministry of Rural Development, 2025).
2. Failure to address seasonal and climatic variations: Employment demand fluctuates with
agricultural cycles and weather shocks.
o Eg: Karnataka exhausted 70% of its MGNREGS budget in 6 months in 2023 due to
extreme drought conditions.
3. Disincentivising timely supplementary allocation: Rigid ceilings discourage timely release of
additional funds during periods of rural distress.
o Eg: In FY 2024-25, supplementary allocations were delayed, resulting in Rs 21,000 crore
pending dues.
30
 4. Erosion of welfare state principle: Fiscal caps undermine Article 21’s evolved interpretation as a
positive right to livelihood.
o Eg: Swaraj Abhiyan v Union of India (2016) held that financial inability cannot override
statutory duties.

How current cap disrupts MGNREGA implementation architecture

1. Distorts planning at state level: State governments face difficulty in forecasting labour demands
within central budget limits.
o Eg: States like Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh reported job card holders being denied
work post fund exhaustion (NREGA Sangharsh Morcha, 2025).
2. Leads to wage delays and legal violations: Section 3 and Schedule II of MGNREGA mandate
timely wage payments within 15 days.
o Eg: As of June 2025, wage arrears stood at Rs 19,200 crore (Rural Development Ministry,
2025).
3. Weakens demand-based monitoring systems: Expenditure caps replace real-time demand-based
fund flows with arbitrary limits.
o Eg: The NREGASoft MIS portal shows pending transactions piling up despite active job
demand (NREGASoft Dashboard, 2025).
4. Dilution of participatory planning: Gram Panchayats lose autonomy to plan shelf of projects due
to uncertain fund availability.
o Eg: CAG Report 2023 highlighted that Gram Sabhas often curtailed project proposals
fearing non-release of funds.

Conclusion
The viability of employment guarantee schemes rests on flexible and responsive fund allocation; fiscal
rigidity risks reducing MGNREGA into a token welfare program rather than a statutory right-based safety
net.

Q. Explain how the adoption of AI-based criminal justice tools affects the rights of
marginalised groups in India. Assess the institutional vulnerabilities that may aggravate this.
(10 M)

Introduction

The rise of AI-powered criminal justice tools in India, without inclusive safeguards, risks deepening
historical social inequities and weakening constitutional protections for marginalised groups.

Body

Impact of AI-based criminal justice tools on rights of marginalised groups

1. Reinforcement of existing bias: Biased training datasets reflect caste, religion, and gender
prejudices embedded in society.
o Eg: NCRB Prison Statistics 2018 show 66% of undertrials belong to Dalit, Adivasi,
OBC, and minority groups.

31
 2. Violation of right to equality: Discriminatory outcomes violate Article 14 and undermine equal
protection of law.
o Eg: COMPAS tool in the US rated Black defendants as higher risk (ProPublica, 2016),
showing global pattern of bias replication.
3. Denial of due process: Algorithmic risk assessments may override individual case contexts,
violating Article 21 protections of fair trial.
o Eg: Punjab and Haryana High Court used ChatGPT in bail rejection in 2023.
4. Privacy infringements: AI surveillance tools such as facial recognition systems threaten privacy
rights recognised under Puttaswamy judgment (2017).
o Eg: National Automated Facial Recognition System (AFRS) lacks privacy regulations.
5. Exclusion from data representation: Underrepresentation in digital datasets marginalises Dalits,
Adivasis, women, and rural poor.
o Eg: Oxfam India Inequality Report 2022 shows women use internet 33% less than men;
rural access only 31%.

Institutional vulnerabilities aggravating the risks

1. Lack of legal framework: Absence of a dedicated AI regulatory law allows unchecked

deployment of flawed technologies.
o Eg: No specific legislation governs AI in criminal justice as of 2025 (NITI Aayog AI
Strategy Report, 2021).
2. Limited judicial capacity: Judiciary lacks technical expertise to scrutinise algorithmic decisions
effectively.
o Eg: Justice B.N. Srikrishna highlighted lack of AI literacy in courts (Bar & Bench,
2023).
3. Concentration of control: Privately developed AI tools with proprietary algorithms reduce state
accountability and transparency.
o Eg: Amazon AI hiring tool scrapped in 2014 due to gender bias.
4. Weak institutional oversight: Existing bodies like NHRC or National Commission for SC/ST
have limited capacity to review algorithmic bias.
o Eg: NHRC has yet to release guidelines on AI and human rights violations (NHRC
Annual Report, 2024).
5. Opaque procurement processes: AI tools procured without public scrutiny risk embedding flawed
technologies in official use.
o Eg: Facial recognition pilots launched in multiple states without public consultation
(Internet Freedom Foundation, 2024).

Conclusion

Without robust legal, ethical, and institutional checks, AI may reproduce structural injustice under the guise
of efficiency. An inclusive, rights-based AI governance model must be prioritised to protect the most
vulnerable.

32
Q. What are the key legal gaps in India’s approach to refugee protection? Analyse how this
affects the socio-economic integration of long-term refugees. Recommend steps to align
domestic frameworks with international best practices. (15 M)

Introduction
India hosts over 200,000 refugees, but the absence of a national refugee law or formal legal status has led to
inconsistent and ad hoc responses, limiting the protection and integration of long-term refugee populations.

Body

Key legal gaps in India’s approach to refugee protection

1. No dedicated national refugee law: India lacks a consolidated legal framework defining refugee
status, rights, and protections.
 Eg: India is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol
(UNHCR, 2025).
2. Absence of legal recognition of refugee status: Refugees are treated under the Foreigners Act,
1946, which conflates them with illegal migrants.
 Eg: Sri Lankan refugees in Tamil Nadu are classified as “foreigners” under the Act.
3. Lack of codified non-refoulement principle: No statutory safeguard exists against forced return of
refugees to danger zones.
 Eg: The Supreme Court in Mohammad Salimullah case (2021) highlighted the lack of
binding non-refoulement provisions.
4. No uniform rights-based framework: Refugee access to employment, education, and legal identity
varies across groups and states.
 Eg: Tibetan refugees benefit from Tibetan Rehabilitation Policy (2014), while Sri Lankan
refugees lack such protections (MHA Annual Report 2024).
5. Inconsistent judicial interpretations: In the absence of national law, protection depends on varying
judicial discretion.
 Eg: SC observation (2025) — “India is not a dharamshala” — in Sri Lankan refugee case
under UAPA.

Impact on socio-economic integration of long-term refugees

1. Restricted employment opportunities: Without legal recognition, many refugees are barred from
formal employment sectors.
 Eg: Only 5% of Sri Lankan engineering graduates in Tamil Nadu secure employment in
their trained fields.
2. Barriers to education and healthcare: Inconsistent entitlements hinder access to quality education
and public services.
 Eg: Rohingya refugees in Delhi face school enrolment barriers due to lack of formal identity
documents (UNHCR India, 2024).
3. Perpetuation of dependency on aid: Camp-based refugee models reinforce cycles of dependency
rather than promoting self-reliance.
 Eg: Rehabilitation camps house two-thirds of Sri Lankan refugees in Tamil Nadu for over
40 years.
33
 4. Legal insecurity and social exclusion: Lack of legal clarity fosters marginalisation and xenophobic
attitudes.
 Eg: Increased targeting of Rohingya refugees during communal tensions in Hyderabad
(NHRC Report, 2024).
5. Limited participation in local governance: Refugees lack civic representation, hampering social
inclusion and voice.
 Eg: No representation for Sri Lankan refugee youth in Tamil Nadu local governance
bodies.

Steps to align domestic frameworks with international best practices

1. Enact a comprehensive national refugee law: Codify status, rights, and protections aligned with
constitutional principles and international norms.
 Eg: Draft Model National Refugee Law proposed by NHRC, 2017.
2. Incorporate non-refoulement into domestic law: Embed this principle in line with Article 21
(right to life and liberty) of the Constitution.
 Eg: Cited in Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi vs Union of India (1999) by Gujarat HC.
3. Develop inclusive socio-economic policies: Ensure access to education, healthcare, skilling, and
employment pathways.
 Eg: Tibetan Rehabilitation Policy (2014) offers a model for expanding refugee welfare
(MHA Annual Report 2024).
4. Harmonise central and state approaches: Create coordinated frameworks respecting federal
structure under Seventh Schedule.
 Eg: Collaboration between Centre and Tamil Nadu on refugee welfare.
5. Institutionalise UNHCR cooperation: Strengthen ties with UNHCR India for transparent refugee
status determination.
 Eg: UNHCR partnerships in Nepal and Bangladesh provide useful best practices (UNHCR
2025 Global Trends Report).

Conclusion
A robust, rights-based refugee law aligned with constitutional values and international best practices can
transform India’s refugee governance — balancing national security with human dignity and fostering long-
term socio-economic integration.

Q. Vulnerable groups often face ‘institutional invisibility’ in governance structures. Explain

this idea. How can institutions be redesigned to recognise and include the undocumented and
marginalised? (10 M)

Introduction

Governance systems that rely solely on formal documentation often fail to acknowledge the lived presence
of undocumented individuals, leaving them invisible to state services and democratic protections.

Body

Meaning and causes of institutional invisibility

34
 1. Exclusion from services due to lack of formal ID: Absence of Aadhaar, ration cards, or birth
certificates leads to denial of entitlements.
o Eg: Homeless citizens in Mumbai were excluded from COVID relief and shelters due to
lack of address proof (TISS Report, 2021).
2. Digitalisation without inclusion safeguards: Digital-first governance marginalises those without
internet access or tech literacy.
o Eg: Nomadic tribes in Rajasthan were denied PDS and pension access due to biometric
mismatches in Aadhaar (NHRC Report, 2023).
3. Rejection of community-based or oral identity proofs: Institutions overlook locally validated
documents and oral histories.
o Eg: In Assam NRC, panchayat certificates issued to married women were deemed invalid
despite SC guidance (Rahima Khatun v. State of Assam, 2021).
4. Data invisibility translates to policy invisibility: Absence in official datasets leads to under-
targeting in schemes.
o Eg: Seasonal migrant workers were excluded from relief during the 2020 lockdown due to
non-registration in NSS or SECC (ILO–India Migration Report, 2022).
5. Presumption of illegality over lived citizenship: Poor and stateless populations are often
criminalised despite generational presence.
o Eg: In Jaynab Bibi case (2025), a woman was declared foreigner despite decades of
residence in Assam, later stayed by SC (SC Order, June 2025).

How institutions can be redesigned for inclusion

1. Accept multi-layered identity proofs: Allow for alternative documents like self-declarations, local
body certificates, and community attestations.
o Eg: Rajasthan’s Bhamashah Scheme and SECC 2011 accepted gram panchayat–verified
self-declarations for welfare inclusion (Planning Commission, 2014).
2. Conduct human rights audits in exclusion-prone systems: Periodic review of exclusion in welfare
delivery by independent bodies.
o Eg: SC in Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India (2016) directed states to review PDS and
MGNREGA exclusion patterns.
3. Strengthen decentralised grievance redressal platforms: Community-based helpdesks and
multilingual, mobile appeals units can reduce exclusion.
o Eg: Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) uses community volunteers to link
slum dwellers with welfare schemes.
4. Include vulnerable voices in institutional design: Representation in governance boards and gram
sabhas enables inclusion from within.
o Eg: Forest Rights Act, 2006 mandates ST and forest-dweller participation in land claims
decisions (MoTA Report, 2023).
5. Ensure portability and presence-based access to welfare: Decouple entitlements from fixed
residence or state-bound identity.
o Eg: One Nation One Ration Card (2020) enabled migrant workers to access food grains
anywhere in India (NITI Aayog Evaluation, 2022).

Conclusion

35
A democracy must be capable of seeing and serving even those without papers. Designing institutions for
dignity, flexibility, and proximity is vital for inclusive citizenship.

Q. Criminal justice reform must go beyond laws to include institutional preparedness and
public trust. Discuss the institutional challenges in enforcing India’s new criminal codes. How
can the system ensure citizen-centric justice? (10 M)

Introduction
Laws alone cannot transform justice delivery unless supported by institutional readiness, technological
adaptation, and citizen trust in enforcement agencies.

Body

Institutional challenges in enforcing new criminal codes

1. Digital infrastructure deficit: Limited devices, outdated systems, and poor connectivity at police
stations hinder adoption of digital tools.
 Eg: As per R.K. Vij the e-Sakshya app cannot run on phones below Android 10, yet IOs are
using personal devices due to lack of official provision.
2. Lack of forensic capacity: Insufficient FSLs, unnotified cyber labs, and delay in expert deployment
weaken evidence quality.
 Eg: The State FSL in Chhattisgarh is yet to be notified under the IT Act, affecting cyber
evidence admissibility
3. Judicial integration gaps: Courts are not directly integrated with ICJS platforms like NGC, leading
to duplication and manual submissions.
 Eg: IOs still submit evidence via pen drives, despite uploading it to Sakshya Lockers,
causing delays and inefficiencies
4. Shortage of trained personnel: New provisions require real-time video documentation, but IOs lack
proper training and support staff.
 Eg: Only one tablet was provided per police station in several states, despite multiple IOs,
affecting timely compliance
5. Ambiguous legal drafting: Vague clauses create confusion in application and enable selective
enforcement.
 Eg: Section 303(1) of BNS on theft under ₹5000 is inconsistently applied, while Section 112
on petty crimes remains open-ended and misused.

Measures to ensure citizen-centric justice

1. Strengthening last-mile digital access: Equip all IOs with secure, standardised devices and enable
seamless uploads.
 Eg: The CCTNS-ICJS integration roadmap (MHA, 2024) includes offline-to-online
syncing to support remote rural stations.
2. Timely forensic and medical reporting: Expand certified labs and ensure timely digital reporting of
medico-legal data.
 Eg: MedLEaPR platform (NIC Haryana) under trial in Chhattisgarh aims to speed up
post-mortem and medical reports
36
 3. Victim-sensitive procedural reforms: Institutionalise privacy, time-bound action, and easy legal
access for victims.
 Eg: Section 184 BNSS mandates a 7-day deadline for submission of rape survivor medical
reports to police.
4. Stakeholder consultation and feedback loop: Institutionalise field-level feedback from IOs and
victims to adapt reforms.
 Eg: The Law Commission 277th Report recommended periodic reviews based on IO
feedback and public trust metrics.
5. Judicial capacity-building: Train judiciary in digital evidence handling and improve court-ICJS
integration.
 Eg: Though Section 530 BNSS allows video-based witness examination, it is underused
due to court-level digital lag.

Conclusion
True justice flows not from codebooks but from capacity and trust. A responsive, tech-enabled, and citizen-
aligned system must anchor India’s criminal justice reforms.

Issues relating to development and management of Social Sector/Services

relating to Health, Education, Human Resources.
Q. “The future of higher education lies not in a single model but in dynamic, decentralised
networks that evolve with societal needs.” Examine the features of an ecosystem model for
tertiary education. Assess its potential to transform the future of education delivery and
learning outcomes. (15 M)

Introduction

India’s goal of achieving 50% GER by 2035 under NEP 2020 calls for moving beyond rigid institutional
structures to dynamic education ecosystems that adapt to evolving learner needs and industry relevance.

Body

Dynamic networks and evolving needs in higher education

1. From single-purpose to multi-mission institutions: Education must combine academic learning

with skilling, research, and entrepreneurship.
o Eg: The MCC-MRF Innovation Park links departments with incubators and industry-
driven upskilling modules.
2. Expansion of alternate learning pathways: Certificates, online modules, and micro-credentials are
gaining legitimacy.
o Eg: As per Inside Higher Ed (2024), 65% US adults believe certification suffices for a
good job.
3. Millennial focus on ROI and outcomes: Youth demand employability, entrepreneurship, and
visible returns from education.
o Eg: NIRF 2024 shows higher placements in institutions with strong industry-academia
interfaces.

37
 4. Shifting industry needs require modularity: Rapid tech change demands continuous curricular
updates.
o Eg: India Skills Report 2024 stresses hybrid skillsets in AI, design thinking, and data
analytics.
5. Localised and community-responsive learning: Education models now align with local economies
and social needs.
o Eg: Kerala Knowledge Economy Mission integrates higher education with local gig
platforms.

Features of an ecosystem model for tertiary education

1. Multi-actor collaboration without hierarchy: Diverse actors including universities, startups, and
NGOs function in synergy.
o Eg: NEP 2020’s cluster approach encourages collaborative institutional networks.
2. Academic-industry feedback loops: Real-time input from industry helps shape curriculum and
pedagogy.
o Eg: AICTE 2023 mandates internships and live projects in undergraduate education.
3. Interconnected yet independent roles: Institutions play flexible, complementary roles without rigid
ranking.
o Eg: Smelser’s multi-campus model envisages interdependent learning ecosystems.
4. Continuous curriculum innovation: Ongoing feedback ensures pedagogy reflects current needs.
o Eg: Hackathons at MCC Innovation Park collect industry pain points to design student
projects.
5. Lifelong and flexible learning pathways: Entry-exit options allow diverse learners to engage over
time.
o Eg: Academic Bank of Credits enables credit mobility across institutions and modes.

Transformative potential for education delivery and outcomes

1. Learner-centric modular delivery: Students gain autonomy to personalise academic journeys.

o Eg: Platforms like SWAYAM and NPTEL allow self-paced, credit-worthy learning.
2. Stronger employability and job alignment: Ecosystem models reduce the industry-academia
disconnect.
o Eg: NSDC–Tata STRIVE integrates vocational skilling into higher education.
3. Boost to innovation and entrepreneurship: Learning becomes practice-oriented and problem-
solving driven.
o Eg: ARIIA 2024 rewards institutions for patents, incubators, and startup support.
4. Improved access and social inclusion: Ecosystem approach allows decentralised access to
underserved groups.
o Eg: Odisha’s Community Colleges (2023) take tertiary education to tribal and rural regions.
5. Agility in adapting to societal shifts: Flexible ecosystems evolve with environmental, economic,
and technological changes.
o Eg: UNESCO’s Futures of Education (2022) stresses the role of lifelong, adaptive learning
systems.

Conclusion

38
To future-proof India’s higher education, institutions must evolve into ecosystems of learning, innovation,
and inclusion—capable of responding to society’s fast-changing needs while delivering value-driven
outcomes.

Q. Why has the RTE quota failed to ensure access to quality education for underprivileged
students? Examine the limitations in school-level implementation. Suggest reforms to make
inclusion pedagogically meaningful. (15 M)

Introduction:
The Right to Education Act’s 25% quota was a transformative promise of social justice through schooling,
yet its potential has been undercut by institutional inertia, exclusionary practices, and weak integration.

Body

Reasons for failure of RTE quota in ensuring quality education

1. Exclusionary admission processes: Many elite schools make the process non-transparent and
difficult for marginalised parents.
o Eg: NCPCR 2022 found top schools in Delhi asking for excessive documentation and
screening interviews, violating RTE norms.
2. Inadequate reimbursement rates: The cost fixed by states does not match actual private school
expenditure, discouraging compliance.
o Eg: Maharashtra reimburses ~Rs 17,000 per child vs. actual costs of Rs 40,000–Rs 60,000
3. Social discrimination and peer bias: Quota students often face verbal stigmatisation and are subtly
isolated.
o Eg: A 2021 Vidhi Centre study found children being called “free quota kids” and seated
separately in classrooms.
4. No significant improvement in learning outcomes: The promise of better education is diluted due
to academic neglect.
o Eg: ASER 2022 reported minimal gains in reading and numeracy among RTE students in
private unaided schools.
5. Loopholes through minority institution exemption: Many schools convert to linguistic/religious
minority status to escape quotas.
o Eg: Over 15,000 schools sought minority status post-2017 (Ministry of Education data).

Limitations in school-level implementation

1. Teacher bias and lack of sensitisation: Many teachers lack training to handle mixed socio-
economic classrooms.
o Eg: A 2023 TISS study found 45% of teachers in private schools unaware of inclusive
teaching strategies.
2. Segregated classroom practices: Schools often separate RTE students into different batches or
sections.
o Eg: In Tamil Nadu, RTE students were reported to have exclusive classrooms and
restricted activity access.

39
 3. Absence of remedial and bridge learning: RTE students get no support to bridge prior learning
gaps.
o Eg: NCERT’s 2022 RTE review flagged that 70% of schools had no academic support for
first-generation learners.
4. Hidden charges and informal fees: RTE families are often asked to pay for uniforms, books, or
transport.
o Eg: Reports from Gujarat (2023) highlighted quota students being denied books unless
“voluntary donations” were made.
5. Weak grievance redressal and monitoring: Parents lack channels to report exclusion or
mistreatment.
o Eg: As per UDISE+ 2023, over 30% districts lacked any functional RTE monitoring
committee.

Reforms to make inclusion pedagogically meaningful

1. Mandatory inclusive training for teachers: Sensitisation and pedagogy modules should be part of
teacher certification.
o Eg: NEP 2020 recommends capacity-building in inclusive education and socio-emotional
learning for all teachers.
2. Realistic and indexed reimbursement: Reimbursement must reflect actual per-child expenditure
and inflation.
o Eg: The Anil Bordia Committee (2013) proposed linking reimbursements to actual district-
wise per capita costs.
3. Bridge learning programs with periodic assessment: Support RTE children through accelerated
learning initiatives.
o Eg: Delhi SCERT’s 2024 Bridge Course showed 22% improvement in foundational
numeracy over 3 months.
4. Annual social inclusion audits in schools: Schools must be evaluated on integration, dignity, and
academic parity.
o Eg: Karnataka’s 2022 diversity audits under Samagra Shiksha tracked integration metrics
across districts.
5. Centralised digital dashboards for RTE monitoring: Ensure transparency in admission, fund
flow, and dropout tracking.
o Eg: Madhya Pradesh’s 2023 RTE portal enabled real-time monitoring of reimbursements
and school-wise enrolment.

Conclusion:
The RTE quota must evolve from a legal entitlement to a lived reality of equitable learning. True inclusion
lies not in admission alone, but in fostering a classroom that enables equal participation, support, and
respect for every child.

40
Issues relating to poverty and hunger.
Important aspects of governance, transparency and accountability, e-
governance- applications, models, successes, limitations, and potential;
citizens charters, transparency & accountability and institutional and other
measures.
Q. Public officials misusing power for personal gain undermines the credibility of state
institutions. Evauate how regulatory coercion affects citizen trust. Suggest administrative
measures to restore integrity. (10 M)

Introduction

The misuse of power by regulatory officials transforms institutions from protectors to predators, leading to
deep erosion of public trust, compliance, and constitutional legitimacy.

Body

How regulatory coercion affects citizen trust

1. Loss of institutional legitimacy: Citizens view regulators as extortionists, not enforcers of justice.
o Eg: CBI arrest of IRS officer for soliciting a ₹45 lakh bribe in a tax case damaged faith in
the tax system.
2. Decline in voluntary compliance: Fear of arbitrary penalties reduces willingness to follow rules.
o Eg: Income tax compliance ratio remains under 6% of population despite growth in
formal employment.
3. Democratic disengagement: Harassed citizens avoid civic participation, weakening democratic
accountability.
o Eg: CPR study (2023) reported significant drop in public grievance redressal usage in
harassment-prone departments.
4. Proliferation of informal economy: People shift to informal systems to escape regulatory
overreach.
o Eg: NSSO (2024) data shows over 85% of workers remain informal, reflecting fear of
regulatory systems.
5. Violation of rule of law: Coercive practices violate Article 14 and corrode constitutional
protections.
o Eg: Vineet Narain case (1997) underscored that executive control over investigations
undermines public trust in fairness.

Administrative measures to restore integrity

1. Mandatory conflict of interest disclosures: Officers must declare personal and familial commercial
affiliations.
o Eg: Hota Committee (2004) proposed a statutory Code of Ethics for civil servants including
disclosure norms.
2. Digital governance and faceless enforcement: AI-led automation reduces discretionary power.

41
 o Eg: Faceless assessment scheme (2021) by CBIC eliminated in-person interface in scrutiny
and audits.
3. Rotation and fixed tenures: Prevent long-term collusion networks in sensitive roles.
o Eg: CVC circular (2022) mandated rotation of enforcement staff every 3 years to reduce
familiarity-based corruption.
4. Strengthened whistleblower protection: Encourage internal reporting of misconduct with safety
nets.
o Eg: Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014—currently under review—needs better
implementation in regulatory agencies.
5. Creation of independent regulatory ombudsman: Enable citizens to report coercion and
harassment externally.
o Eg: RBI’s Integrated Ombudsman Scheme (2021) offers a model for institutional
grievance redress in public-facing bodies.

Conclusion

Trust is the invisible currency of governance—restoring it requires a shift from opaque, person-centric
regulation to transparent, accountable, and citizen-sensitive institutions.

Q. Performance-based governance models are gaining traction in India. Analyse their core
features. How do they impact institutional accountability? (10 M)

Introduction

India’s governance model is undergoing a transition from entitlement-based administration to performance-

driven delivery, emphasising outcomes, citizen-centricity, and data-led decision-making.

Body

Core features of performance-based governance models

1. Outcome-driven policymaking: Policies are assessed based on measurable impacts, not just
intentions.
o Eg: The Aspirational Districts Programme ranks 112 districts using Delta Ranking across
indicators like health and education (NITI Aayog, 2024).
2. Real-time monitoring and analytics: Governance uses digital tools to track performance metrics
and service gaps.
o Eg: The Poshan Tracker App enables real-time monitoring of child nutrition under ICDS
across states (MWCD, 2024).
3. Incentive-based funding: Resource allocation is linked to performance outcomes to nudge
institutional reforms.
o Eg: The 15th Finance Commission allocated performance grants to states for urban
governance and power sector reforms (2021-26).
4. Ranking and benchmarking: Comparative metrics foster competition and highlight best practices.
o Eg: The Swachh Survekshan annual city rankings improved municipal performance on
cleanliness indicators.

42
 5. Citizen-centric feedback mechanisms: Service delivery is aligned with public input and grievance
redressal systems.
o Eg: The CPGRAMS 2023 reform uses AI-based sorting for faster redressal and public
tracking of complaints.

Impact on institutional accountability

1. Enhanced transparency and public visibility: Data dashboards improve access to service
performance information.
o Eg: The Jal Jeevan Mission Dashboard provides real-time village-level data on tap water
coverage.
2. Shift towards outcome-based accountability: Institutions are judged on end results rather than
bureaucratic compliance.
o Eg: The PM Gati Shakti Portal tracks multi-ministerial infrastructure projects using GIS-
linked performance indicators.
3. Reduced bureaucratic inertia: Emphasis on results fosters innovation and proactive service
delivery.
o Eg: The Smart Cities Mission empowered city-level SPVs to innovate using localised
planning and digital tools.
4. Risk of data manipulation and superficial compliance: Focus on rankings can incentivise
misreporting.
o Eg: The 2023 Parliamentary Standing Committee flagged concerns over data fudging in
foundational literacy outcomes under NIPUN Bharat.
5. Tension with decentralised governance: Centralised metrics may overlook local contexts and
autonomy.
o Eg: States expressed reservations on the applicability of UDISE+ indicators in remote tribal
and hill regions.

Conclusion

Performance-based governance has redefined delivery and transparency, but its long-term credibility hinges
on data integrity, institutional resilience, and context-sensitive benchmarks to ensure genuine
accountability.

Role of civil services in a democracy.

Q. Examine the existing gender imbalance in India’s urban bureaucratic architecture.
Analyse how this affects service delivery and inclusivity. Suggest systemic reforms for
enhancing women’s representation in administrative and technical roles. (15 M)

Introduction
A gender-imbalanced urban bureaucracy risks perpetuating policies and infrastructure that ignore the needs
of half the population, undermining the inclusiveness of India’s urban growth trajectory.

Body

Existing gender imbalance in urban bureaucratic architecture

43
 1. Low share in IAS and allied services: Despite overall progress, only 20% of IAS officers today are
women, limiting gender perspectives at decision-making levels (IndiaSpend 2022).
o Eg: In Maharashtra, only 18% of municipal IAS officers are women, with most
concentrated in welfare departments (MoHUA 2024).
2. Severe under-representation in technical cadres: Women’s representation remains below 10% in
critical fields like planning, engineering, and transport, resulting in male-dominated design of city
services.
o Eg: Delhi Development Authority reports just 7.5% women among sanctioned urban
planners, constraining inclusive spatial design (DDA Annual Report 2024).
3. Gender gap in urban policing: Women constitute only 11.7% of police personnel (BPRD 2023),
with very low presence in field duties, limiting gender-sensitive community policing.
o Eg: In Mumbai Police, only 2 out of 93 police stations are headed by women officers,
impacting effective outreach on gender-based crimes.
4. Limited women in municipal leadership: Across 100 Smart Cities, fewer than 5% municipal
commissioners are women, reinforcing a masculine leadership culture in urban governance.
o Eg: Bengaluru and Pune have not had a woman municipal commissioner in the last
decade, despite high urbanisation (Janaagraha 2025).
5. Concentration in low-impact roles: Women are over-represented in health and welfare roles, but
are missing from finance, infrastructure, and core city management.
o Eg: In Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 90% of women employees are confined to
social welfare, with no representation in engineering or transport wings (AMC HR Data
2024).

Impact on service delivery and inclusivity

1. Poor responsiveness to gendered mobility needs: Urban transport planning lacks sensitivity to
women’s multi-stop, caregiving-linked travel patterns, undermining mobility equity.
o Eg: ITDP-Safetipin study (2023) found that 84% of women depend on public or shared
transport, yet first/last-mile safety remains a persistent gap in Delhi and Mumbai.
2. Neglect of community-level infrastructure: Sanitation, safe public spaces, and childcare remain
underfunded due to absence of gender perspectives in decision-making.
o Eg: UN Women (2023) study found that ULBs led by women elected representatives
invested 27% more in public sanitation compared to male-dominated councils.
3. Low gender-sensitivity in urban policing: A male-dominated police force reduces the comfort
level and trust of women in accessing law enforcement.
o Eg: NCRB (2024) reports that states with higher female police representation saw a 38%
increase in reporting of gender-based violence cases.
4. Public spaces remain unsafe: Poor lighting and unsafe design of public spaces disproportionately
affect women’s participation in economic and social life.
o Eg: Safetipin audit (2019) across 50 cities found 60% of public spaces poorly lit, directly
limiting evening-time access for women.
5. Reduced public trust and civic engagement: Lack of gender diversity in governance structures
undermines public trust, especially among women citizens.
o Eg: ICRIER (2023) found that gender-balanced ULBs reported 40% higher civic trust
scores among female constituents.

44
Systemic reforms for enhancing representation

1. Reservation in municipal technical roles: Mandating 33% reservation in planning, engineering,

and core municipal cadres will institutionalise diversity.
o Eg: Tamil Nadu Urban Policy (2024) has introduced a 33% reservation for women in
technical roles, aiming to bridge structural gaps.
2. Targeted scholarships and recruitment: Creating gender-focused pipelines through scholarships
and active recruitment in urban governance education and hiring.
o Eg: Kudumbashree-NIT Calicut (2023) collaboration launched fellowships for women in
urban planning and design disciplines.
3. Gender-responsive HR policies: Promotion pathways that account for career breaks and support
professional advancement of women in technical and leadership roles.
o Eg: South Korea’s Gender Equity Act (2022) has led to 50% parity in promotions within
public service by adopting flexible promotion policies.
4. Mandatory gender audits: Regular gender audits of staff composition linked to performance
appraisal and funding, creating accountability for diversity.
o Eg: Philippines’ Local Government Code (2023 Amendment) mandates annual gender
audits for all municipal bodies.
5. Gender-focused capacity building: Institutionalising mandatory gender-sensitisation and equity
training for urban bureaucrats at all levels.
o Eg: Kerala’s Institute of Local Administration (KILA) runs annual gender-sensitisation
programs for municipal staff (2024).

Conclusion
To realise inclusive urbanisation, Indian cities must mainstream gender equity in their bureaucratic
structures. Empowered, gender-diverse administrative cadres will ensure cities are truly designed for all.

India and its neighborhood- relations.

Q. The resurgence of China-led trilaterals in South Asia marks a turning point in regional
geopolitics. Discuss the motivations behind these alignments. Analyse the risks they pose to
India’s security. Suggest a coherent counter-strategy. (15 M)

Introduction
The emergence of China-led trilaterals involving Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan reflects a
deeper strategic recalibration aimed at limiting India’s influence in South Asia. These alignments reveal
Beijing’s attempt to convert economic clout into geopolitical leverage.

Body

Motivations behind China-led trilateral alignments

1. Containment of Indian strategic assertiveness: China seeks to counter India’s proactive postures
post-Doklam (2017) and Galwan (2020).

45
 o Eg: The Kunming Trilateral (June 2025) with Pakistan and Bangladesh came after India’s
Operation Sindoor following the Pahalgam terror attack.
2. Reviving Pakistan’s regional relevance: Beijing aims to restore Pakistan’s standing amid its
economic and diplomatic isolation.
o Eg: Post-Pahalgam, China backed Pakistan’s call for a “political resolution”, deflecting
attention from India’s retaliatory strikes.
3. Creating entry points for BRI expansion: Trilateralism offers China indirect access to
infrastructure and energy networks across South Asia.
o Eg: The China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Trilateral (May 2025) proposed CPEC extension
into Afghan territory.
4. Neutralising pro-India regimes through engagement: By influencing new governments, China
aims to dilute India’s bilateral leverage.
o Eg: Increasing outreach to Bangladesh’s new government (2024) after India’s ties
weakened due to Teesta impasse and border incidents.
5. Shaping multilateral narratives against India: Beijing seeks to institutionalise strategic
encirclement through regional consensus.
o Eg: China’s UN shielding of Pakistan-backed terrorists, combined with regional
trilaterals, frames India as a destabilising actor.

Risks these trilaterals pose to India’s security

1. Strategic encirclement and maritime threats: China's presence in littoral South Asia enhances its
capacity for dual-use infrastructure near Indian Ocean chokepoints.
o Eg: Gwadar Port in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka add to India’s maritime
vulnerability (Source: IDSA, 2024).
2. Facilitation of cross-border terrorism: China-backed Pakistan influence in Afghanistan and
Bangladesh may promote extremist networks.
o Eg: The Pahalgam attack (April 2025) used Chinese-origin UAVs and communication
jammers deployed from Pakistani bases.
3. Breakdown of regional trust and cooperation: Trilateral alignments isolate India diplomatically
within SAARC and BIMSTEC ecosystems.
o Eg: India excluded from China-led disaster and energy coordination talks involving
Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (2025).
4. Undermining India’s deterrence credibility: Frequent interventions by China in favour of Pakistan
erode India’s punitive posture.
o Eg: Post-Surgical Strike 2.0 (2019) and Operation Sindoor (2025), China called for
restraint, diluting international support for India.
5. Constraining India’s regional economic integration: Parallel corridors and funding undercut
India’s connectivity projects and development aid.
o Eg: Delay in India-Nepal-Bangladesh energy grid vs progress in China-Bangladesh-Nepal
power corridor talks (MEA brief, May 2025).

Coherent counter-strategy for India

1. Deepening bilateral strategic convergence: India must fast-track military, economic and
infrastructure cooperation with neighbours.
46
 o Eg: India-Maldives defence pact renewal (June 2025) neutralised initial anti-India stance
of President Muizzu.
2. Revitalising regional multilateralism: Strengthening BIMSTEC and promoting IORA can provide
an inclusive, India-led alternative.
o Eg: India hosted the 2025 BIMSTEC Disaster Resilience Summit with Thailand and Sri
Lanka in May 2025.
3. Leveraging G20 and Quad platforms for diplomatic signalling: India can showcase commitment
to rules-based order.
o Eg: During India’s G20 Presidency (2023), Delhi pushed for debt sustainability and
transparency, contrasting with China’s opaque lending.
4. Countering debt-trap diplomacy through competitive financing: Expand Lines of Credit and
development grants with local employment clauses.
o Eg: India’s $500 million solar park funding in Sri Lanka (2025) undercut China’s stalled
BRI energy project.
5. Enhancing defence readiness and forward diplomacy: Integrated military-civilian coordination in
border and maritime zones is key.
o Eg: Launch of “Mission Shakti Suraksha” in Northeast (June 2025) post-Chinese
outreach to Bangladesh.

Conclusion
To prevent strategic isolation, India must combine smart diplomacy, regional leadership and credible
deterrence. A nimble foreign policy backed by consistent neighbourhood engagement will be key to
navigating the new China-Pakistan-led regional order.

Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India

and/or affecting India’s interests.
Q. “Latin America is the untapped frontier in India’s quest for strategic economic
diversification”. Examine the opportunities and challenges of India’s outreach to
MERCOSUR. Outline steps to strengthen India’s presence in Latin America. (15 M)

Introduction
Latin America offers a geopolitical and resource-rich avenue to recalibrate India’s trade diplomacy, reduce
overdependence on traditional markets, and leverage South-South cooperation amidst a shifting global order.

Body

Opportunities in India’s outreach to MERCOSUR

1. Access to critical minerals and energy security: Latin America is rich in lithium, copper, and rare
earths essential for India’s green transition.
o Eg: Paraguay’s hydropower capacity and lithium reserves in Bolivia and Argentina are
key to India’s electric mobility goals (NITI Aayog, 2023).
2. Diversification of trade partnerships: Engagement can reduce India’s reliance on China, EU, and
the US.
o Eg: India-MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) since 2004 covers 450
items but trade remains below USD 15 billion annually (MEA, 2024).
47
 3. Untapped agri-food export market: Demand for rice, pharma, and textiles in Latin America
remains high.
o Eg: India is the 4th largest supplier of generic drugs to Brazil, with pharma exports
crossing USD 700 million in 2023 (Pharmexcil, 2024).
4. Strategic leverage via multilateral groupings: Engagement strengthens India’s presence in global
South-South platforms.
o Eg: IBSA and BRICS cooperation with Brazil and South Africa aligns with India’s
multilateral diplomacy.
5. Complementary digital and space sectors: India’s IT and space capabilities match Latin American
development needs.
o Eg: ISRO’s cooperation with Argentina’s CONAE for satellite launches reflects high-tech
synergies.

Challenges in deepening India-MERCOSUR relations

1. Logistical and connectivity constraints: Long distance and absence of direct shipping lines
increase transaction costs.
o Eg: No direct air or sea routes between India and most South American countries as of
2025 (FIEO, 2024).
2. Low institutional presence and outreach: Diplomatic missions are limited and trade offices sparse.
o Eg: India opened its embassy in Paraguay only in 2022, and still lacks resident missions in
several MERCOSUR nations (MEA, 2024).
3. Internal divergences within MERCOSUR: Political ideologies differ, affecting bloc cohesion.
o Eg: Argentina’s right-leaning Javier Milei vs. Brazil’s leftist Lula da Silva show intra-
bloc friction .
4. Overlapping trade pacts with China and EU: India faces stiff competition in Latin American
markets.
o Eg: China-Latin America trade crossed USD 450 billion in 2023, outpacing India’s
modest presence .
5. Limited awareness and language barriers: Indian exporters face hurdles due to
Spanish/Portuguese language and legal differences.
o Eg: FICCI’s 2023 survey showed that over 65% of MSMEs found Latin America difficult
due to regulatory opacity.

Steps to strengthen India’s presence in Latin America

1. Upgrade PTA to a comprehensive trade agreement: Broaden scope beyond goods to cover
services and investments.
o Eg: Commerce Ministry’s 2025 proposal to expand India-MERCOSUR PTA to include
pharma, IT, and agri-tech.
2. Institutionalise India-Latin America summits: Create regular high-level forums to coordinate
policy and trade.
o Eg: India-Africa Forum Summit model can be replicated for Latin America with rotating
host countries.
3. Enhance diplomatic footprint and trade facilitation: Open more embassies and Invest India desks.

48
 o Eg: Vietnam model of trade attachés in niche markets has boosted their exports in Latin
America.
4. Strengthen logistic linkages and shipping routes: Invest in direct maritime and air connectivity.
o Eg: Sagarmala-linked Indo-Pacific shipping partnerships can extend to Atlantic ports in
Brazil and Uruguay.
5. Leverage diaspora diplomacy and cultural exchange: Promote goodwill through cultural missions
and scholarships.
o Eg: India-Brazil Festival of Democracy (2023) improved soft power ties and academic
collaboration.

Conclusion
India must look beyond traditional geographies to shape a resilient and multipolar economic future. Latin
America offers that possibility—what is needed now is sustained diplomatic will and institutional
commitment.

Q In what ways does India’s current diplomatic approach fall short in shaping long-term
international opinion? Propose institutional reforms. (10 M)

Introduction
India's growing geopolitical heft is often undermined by its ad-hoc and reactive diplomatic messaging,
lacking institutional depth and continuity.

Body

Shortcomings in India’s diplomatic approach

1. Lack of strategic continuity: India lacks a bipartisan and enduring foreign policy narrative.
o Eg: No formal foreign policy doctrine unlike the US’s National Security Strategy, leading
to policy swings post-government change.
2. Weak institutionalised narrative-building: There is no centralised agency to coordinate strategic
communication globally.
o Eg: India lacks a counterpart to the US Global Engagement Center (GEC), which
counters propaganda and builds public diplomacy.
3. Event-driven outreach over long-term engagement: Diplomacy is often reactive to crises rather
than proactive.
o Eg: The seven parliamentary delegations post-Pahalgam massacre (2025) were formed
abruptly, not part of a larger strategic communication effort (The New Indian Express).
4. Diplomatic teams lack subject-matter depth: Delegations include members without expertise in
counter-terrorism or global affairs.
o Eg: The Operation Sindoor outreach delegations included politicians and liaison officers
but lacked intelligence or CT experts (Ajai Sahni, June 2025).
5. Underutilisation of diaspora and soft power assets: India does not institutionalise diaspora
engagement for strategic influence.
o Eg: China’s use of Confucius Institutes and diaspora-backed think tanks like CIIS
contrasts with India’s informal and fragmented approach.

49
Proposed institutional reforms

1. Set up a National Strategic Communication Authority: A body under MEA to coordinate all
international messaging.
o Eg: The NSAB (2021) recommended creating a unified platform to counter misinformation
and amplify India's narrative globally.
2. Establish a Global South Diplomacy Division: Dedicated to sustained engagement in the Global
South beyond crisis diplomacy.
o Eg: India’s limited media and think-tank presence in Africa and Latin America, unlike
China’s CGTN en Español.
3. Form a Parliamentary Committee on Global Narrative: For bipartisan review and continuity in
foreign policy positions.
o Eg: UK’s Foreign Affairs Committee ensures consistent global messaging across regimes.
4. Institutionalise Track-II diplomacy networks: Build formal bridges with foreign universities,
think tanks, and opinion-shapers.
o Eg: China and Western countries regularly engage institutions like Chatham House, but
Indian representatives are underrepresented.
5. Professionalise IFS training in narrative diplomacy: Equip diplomats with tools in global media
handling and storytelling.
o Eg: France’s ENA integrates communication strategy into diplomat training—India’s SSIFS
needs a similar upgrade.

Conclusion
India must shift from episodic messaging to a well-architected, institutionalised public diplomacy model—
only then can it shape the narrative, not just react to it.

Q. Analyse the evolution of India’s multilateral diplomacy on cross-border terrorism since the
1990s. What factors have limited its success? How should India align its layered diplomatic
strategies to counter terrorism effectively? (15 M)

Introduction
India’s global efforts against cross-border terrorism have transitioned from normative appeals to proactive
strategic diplomacy, but entrenched global ambiguities continue to constrain tangible outcomes.

Body

Evolution of India’s multilateral diplomacy on terrorism

1. CCIT proposal at UN (1996): India’s push for a Comprehensive Convention Against International
Terrorism aimed to define terrorism globally.
o Eg: The CCIT draft submitted by India in 1996 remains pending due to disagreements on
state-sponsored and freedom-struggle-related terrorism.
2. Post-9/11 global momentum: India leveraged global attention on terrorism to raise Pakistan-based
threats.
o Eg: After 2001 Indian Parliament attack, India cited UNSC Resolution 1373 to demand
action against cross-border terror infrastructure.

50
 3. Institutional engagement with UNSC bodies: India worked through the UN CTC and FATF to
designate individuals and entities.
o Eg: India’s efforts led to the UN listing of Masood Azhar (2019) after overcoming a
Chinese technical hold at UN 1267 Committee.
4. G20 and BRICS platform activism: India has raised terrorism as a priority theme in economic and
political groupings.
o Eg: The BRICS Summit Declaration 2023 condemned cross-border terrorism without
naming Pakistan, reflecting partial success.
5. Post-Uri and Balakot narrative shifts: India’s global pitch now invokes the right to self-defence
under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
o Eg: In 2025, India justified Operation Sindoor under self-defence and proportionality,
briefed to P5 and G20 partners.

Factors limiting the success of India’s global strategy

1. Lack of global consensus on terrorism definition: Differing views on ‘freedom struggle’ vs.
‘terrorism’ dilute efforts.
o Eg: OIC and some Western states cite Palestine and Kashmir to resist binding terrorism
definitions (UNGA debates).
2. Geopolitical realignments and veto politics: Strategic interests often override security concerns.
o Eg: China blocked India’s attempts to blacklist Pakistan-based actors at UN Sanctions
Committees for years.
3. Non-alignment of domestic laws with global protocols: India lacks a unified framework linking
international conventions with enforcement.
o Eg: India is not yet a party to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) which affects coordination
on terror financing and arms diversion.
4. Perceived militarisation of counter-terror responses: India’s strategic strikes are viewed
cautiously in forums promoting restraint.
o Eg: The UNSC did not formally endorse Balakot airstrikes (2019) despite India’s
diplomatic outreach.
5. Hyphenation with Pakistan in global forums: Historical framing of Kashmir as a bilateral dispute
clouds India’s terror narrative.
o Eg: UN maps still carry disclaimers on LoC and Kashmir, affecting narrative clarity.

Strategies to align India’s layered diplomacy effectively

1. Recalibrating bilateral engagement for credibility: India must strengthen high-level dialogues
with key powers to pre-empt neutrality.
o Eg: India’s post-Sindoor special envoy briefings in May 2025 helped clarify intent to
France, UAE and Japan.
2. Leveraging regional groupings beyond SAARC: Use of IOR, BIMSTEC, SCO can expand
India’s consensus base.
o Eg: The BIMSTEC counter-terror framework (2023) was initiated under India’s
leadership for intelligence sharing.
3. Institutionalising a unified counter-terror doctrine: India should integrate foreign policy, legal,
and military frameworks.
51
 o Eg: A proposal for a National Commission on Counter-Terror Diplomacy was floated by
think tanks like IDSA in 2024.
4. Linking counter-terrorism with global development goals: Framing terror as a barrier to SDGs
can widen support.
o Eg: India’s G20 presidency (2023) linked terror-financing and illicit trade with Goal 16
(Peace, Justice and Institutions).
5. Enhancing legal diplomacy and treaty harmonisation: Push for binding international legal
instruments on terror financing, extradition and border control.
o Eg: India ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in 2022,
but follow-up legal reforms remain pending.

Conclusion
To succeed in the long term, India must balance legal legitimacy, strategic restraint, and multilateral
coalition-building, ensuring its terror narrative transcends regional contestations and anchors itself in global
security frameworks.

Q. The low level of intra-regional trade in South Asia reflects deeper trust and security
deficits. Analyse the roots of this deficit and its impact on regional economic potential. Also
suggest a pathway for balanced progress. (15 M)

Introduction
South Asia, home to 25% of the global population, remains among the least economically integrated
regions, with intra-regional trade at barely 5-7% of total trade (UNESCAP, 2024), primarily due to deep-
rooted political and security distrust.

Body

Roots of trust and security deficit

1. Historical conflicts and unresolved border disputes: Partition legacies, Kashmir conflict, and un-
demarcated borders sustain political mistrust.
o Eg: Indo-Pak trade shrank from $2.4 billion (2018) to $1.2 billion (2024) post-Pulwama
attack and Article 370 abrogation.
2. Cross-border terrorism and insurgencies: Persistent terrorist activities foster a perception of
economic engagement as a security threat.
o Eg: The Pahalgam terror attack (2025) led India to freeze bilateral trade discussions with
Pakistan.
3. Political instability and regime shifts: Changing governments shift regional priorities, undermining
long-term economic planning.
o Eg: Leadership turnover in Sri Lanka (2022) delayed finalisation of the Indo-Lanka ETCA.
4. Militarised foreign policy approaches: Dominance of security agencies in foreign relations
discourages economic openness.
o Eg: Pakistan’s National Security Council blocked efforts to revive cross-LoC trade in 2023.
5. Weak institutional mechanisms in SAARC: Lack of binding enforcement or conflict-resolution
forums inhibits trust-building.

52
 o Eg: The SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (1987) remains
poorly operationalised.

Impact on regional economic potential

1. Stunted trade volume: Intra-SAARC trade remains at $23 billion, far below the projected $172
billion (UNESCAP, 2024).
o Eg: Bangladesh’s trade potential with SAARC neighbours remains 93% unexploited.
2. Failure to develop regional value chains: High trade costs and regulatory bottlenecks discourage
regional production linkages.
o Eg: It remains 20% costlier for an Indian exporter to trade with Pakistan than Brazil, 22
times farther (World Bank, 2024).
3. Limited foreign investment: Political tensions deter FDI inflows into the region.
o Eg: Pakistan’s FDI inflows dropped by over 30% in 2023 following Indo-Pak trade
suspension (UNCTAD, 2024).
4. Poor infrastructure connectivity: Inadequate transport and digital links raise logistics costs.
o Eg: The BBIN Motor Vehicle Agreement, signed in 2015, is still awaiting full ratification.
5. Escalating trade deficits: Trade deficit rose from $204 billion (2015) to $339 billion (2022) due to
growing import-dependence.
o Eg: World Bank South Asia Economic Update (2024) highlights regional imbalances.

Pathway for balanced progress

1. Reviving and reforming SAARC frameworks: Implement SAFTA with binding commitments and
arbitration.
o Eg: UNESCAP 2024 recommended reactivating the SAFTA Arbitration Council.
2. Strengthening sub-regional initiatives: Leverage BBIN and BIMSTEC for focused integration.
o Eg: BIMSTEC Master Plan on Transport Connectivity (2023) identified 267 priority
infrastructure projects.
3. Decoupling trade from political disputes: Establish clear protocols insulating trade from
diplomatic crises.
o Eg: The EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) shows how trade frameworks can
remain functional amid political frictions.
4. Harmonising standards and reducing NTBs: Align customs and regulatory processes across the
region.
o Eg: ASEAN Single Window Initiative cut intra-regional trade clearance times by over 20%.
5. Building regional security dialogue: Institutionalise counter-terrorism cooperation at SAARC level.
o Eg: Proposal for a SAARC Counter-Terrorism Centre discussed at 2024 SAARC
Secretariat meet.

Conclusion
A forward-looking, pragmatic approach combining sub-regional cooperation, institutional reforms and
security dialogue can unlock South Asia’s immense trade potential — vital for shared prosperity in the
region.

53
Q. Analyse India’s recent Mediterranean outreach as part of its West Asia and Europe policy.
Evaluate Cyprus’s role as a gateway for Indian economic interests in Europe. (10 M)

Introduction
India’s Mediterranean diplomacy today strategically bridges its West Asia focus with European ambitions,
enhancing connectivity, trade, and geopolitical balancing in an evolving multipolar order.

Body

India’s recent Mediterranean outreach as part of its West Asia and Europe policy

1. Bridging IMEC through Eastern Mediterranean: The region enables India’s India-Middle East-
Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) vision to connect with Europe
o Eg: PM Modi’s 2025 Cyprus visit linked directly to promoting IMEC connectivity,
positioning Cyprus as a transit hub (Indian Express, June 2025).
2. Counterbalancing Turkey-Pakistan-Azerbaijan axis: Strategic ties with Greece, Cyprus,
Armenia act as regional balancing against hostile alignments
o Eg: Deepened India-Cyprus-Greece defence and diplomatic partnerships post Pahalgam
attack and Operation Sindoor (ORF Report, June 2025).
3. Expanding India’s European engagement beyond traditional centres: India now actively
engages Central Europe, Baltics, Nordics and Mediterranean
o Eg: Raisina MED Dialogue in Marseille (Feb 2025) launched as an extension of Raisina
Dialogue for Mediterranean outreach.
4. Strengthening maritime and energy diplomacy: Mediterranean engagement supports India’s
interests in Eastern Mediterranean gas fields and blue economy
o Eg: India-Cyprus Bilateral Defence Cooperation Programme 2025 includes maritime
security and energy dialogues (MEA release, 2025).
5. Leveraging EU dynamics through smaller states: Partnering with countries like Cyprus helps
India influence EU strategic and trade policies
o Eg: Cyprus’s upcoming EU Council Presidency in 2026 offers India an entry point to
shape FTA and regulatory discussions (Indian Express, 2025).

Cyprus’s role as a gateway for Indian economic interests in Europe

1. Strategic geographic location: Cyprus sits at the crossroads of Europe, West Asia and North
Africa, ideal for Indian market access
o Eg: PM Modi called Cyprus a “gateway to Europe” at the India-Cyprus CEO Forum
(June 2025).
2. High FDI inflows into India: Cyprus is among the top 10 FDI sources for India due to its investor-
friendly tax regime
o Eg: Cypriot FDI into India exceeded USD 11 billion by 2025, primarily routed through
European investments (DPIIT data, 2025).
3. Emerging fintech and payment linkages: Cyprus may soon adopt India’s UPI platform for cross-
border digital transactions
o Eg: MoU signed between NSE Gift City and Cyprus Stock Exchange (June 2025) to boost
fintech and cross-border payments.

54
 4. Bilateral platforms for economic integration: The new India-Greece-Cyprus Business and
Investment Council (2025) fosters trilateral economic synergy
o Eg: Launched in 2025 to accelerate joint ventures and investment in sectors like civil
aviation, shipbuilding, innovation.
5. Supporting India’s EU trade goals: Cyprus’s diplomatic support strengthens India’s push for
India-EU FTA and market access
o Eg: Cypriot government prioritised India-EU FTA conclusion ahead of its EU
Presidency 2026.

Conclusion
By leveraging Cyprus’s geoeconomic position and aligning with emerging Mediterranean dynamics, India is
crafting a robust bridge between West Asia and Europe, crucial for its long-term strategic autonomy.

Q. “Cross-border terrorism continues to test the limits of multilateral forums like the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)”. Analyse. How can regional mechanisms be
strengthened to ensure credible and coordinated counter-terrorism action? (10 M)

Introduction

India’s refusal to sign the SCO Joint Declaration (June 2025) over diluted language on terrorism
highlights growing dissatisfaction with regional inaction. Despite platforms like RATS-SCO, collective
counter-terrorism efforts remain fractured by geopolitical interests.

Body

Cross-border terrorism and limits of SCO

1. Geopolitical divergence among members: Conflicting national interests, especially between India,
Pakistan, and China, hinder consensus on naming and punishing state sponsors.
o Eg: In June 2025, India protested Pakistan’s exclusion from condemnation in the SCO
Defence Ministers’ Joint Declaration on terrorism.
2. Consensus-based decision-making: SCO’s principle of unanimity leads to lowest-common-
denominator positions on terrorism.
o Eg: RATS (Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure) has failed to evolve into an operationally
active intelligence-sharing body due to lack of trust (Source: SCO Charter, 2002).
3. Lack of binding enforcement mechanism: SCO does not have legal authority to impose sanctions
or conduct joint operations against terror entities.
o Eg: Unlike UNSC sanctions committees, SCO has no listing mechanism for terror groups.
4. Safe havens and state complicity: Members accused of sponsoring terrorism—like Pakistan—enjoy
impunity within SCO due to political shielding.
o Eg: India has consistently raised cross-border terror from Pakistan during SCO meetings,
including the 2023 Goa Summit (Source: MEA Briefs, 2023).
5. Insufficient regional intelligence integration: Fragmented threat assessments and weak
coordination limit operational response to terror threats.
o Eg: India’s calls for structured real-time intel exchange under RATS have seen limited
uptake (Source: IDSA Analysis, 2024).

55
Strengthening regional counter-terrorism mechanisms

1. Operationalising RATS into an active platform: RATS must evolve into a secure real-time
coordination centre with binding mandates.
o Eg: Proposal to transform RATS into a regional fusion centre like the EUROPOL Counter
Terrorism Centre (Source: EUROPOL, 2023).
2. Institutionalising a regional blacklist mechanism: SCO should adopt a UNSC-style listing system
for terror groups and individuals.
o Eg: India’s 2024 proposal at SCO to sanction LeT proxies like The Resistance Front post-
Pahalgam attack was blocked by Pakistan.
3. Legal harmonisation of terror definitions: A uniform regional definition of terrorism is essential
for joint operations and prosecution.
o Eg: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)’s 1993 Terrorism
Convention attempted this but lacked implementation.
4. Establishing a joint rapid response taskforce: A coordinated taskforce can deter cross-border
attacks through joint patrolling and pre-emptive action.
o Eg: ASEAN’s Our Eyes Initiative for coordinated surveillance against transnational terror
(Source: ASEAN, 2022).
5. Independent verification and monitoring body: A neutral body under SCO to verify cross-border
attacks and assign accountability.
o Eg: India’s call for third-party verification of terror bases post-Operation Sindoor (2025)
was supported by Iran and Kazakhstan.

Conclusion

Regional forums like SCO must evolve from being dialogue platforms to enforcement-oriented
institutions. India’s assertive diplomacy offers a blueprint for collective security grounded in accountability
and strategic clarity.

Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on

India’s interests, Indian diaspora.
Q. India-Australia defence cooperation has moved beyond symbolic ties towards operational
synergy. Examine this transformation. What challenges remain in deepening integration
between the two nations? (10 M)

Introduction
India and Australia’s defence engagement, once limited to diplomacy, has gained operational momentum
driven by shared Indo-Pacific security concerns and institutional depth.

Body

Transformation towards operational synergy

1. Institutional consolidation of partnership: Strategic dialogues and agreements now ensure long-
term continuity.

56
 o Eg: Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2020) and 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue (2021)
institutionalised bilateral defence coordination (MEA, 2021).
2. Logistics and access integration: Enabling real-time interoperability in missions and humanitarian
operations.
o Eg: Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (2020) allows Indian and Australian forces to
use each other's facilities.
3. Tri-service military exercises: Enhanced operational trust through regular joint and multilateral
drills.
o Eg: Exercises like AUSINDEX (Navy), AUSTRAHIND (Army), Malabar, and Pitch
Black have increased force-level cooperation (Australian DoD, 2024).
4. Air force collaboration through enablers: Expanding aerial capabilities through technical
coordination.
o Eg: RAAF refuelled IAF Su-30MKIs in November 2024 under air-to-air refuelling
arrangement, enhancing reach.
5. Emerging defence industry linkages: Beginning collaboration in niche defence sectors like MRO
and coastal security.
o Eg: India’s naval MRO contracts with UK/US extended to talks on joint patrol boat
production for island nations .

Challenges in deepening integration

1. Mismatch in strategic focus: India’s continental priorities differ from Australia’s maritime outlook.
o Eg: India faces border tensions with China and Pakistan, while Australia is realigning
through AUKUS and Pacific outreach .
2. Understaffed defence representation: Lack of tri-service presence limits deeper military
interaction.
o Eg: India has only a Navy-led Defence Adviser in Canberra, with no Army or Air Force
support.
3. Disconnect in MSME and startup ecosystems: Missed opportunity to co-develop dual-use tech and
innovation.
o Eg: Absence of a joint MSME forum or INDUS-X model hinders engagement between
defence startups.
4. No shared joint operational doctrine: Strategic alignment is yet to be codified in joint mission
planning.
o Eg: No regular classified war-gaming or joint planning exercises exist to build tactical
understanding .
5. Weak personnel and academic exchange frameworks: Limited interaction constrains mutual
doctrinal awareness.
o Eg: No permanent staff college fellowships or officer exchange programs are active
between the forces.

Conclusion
To sustain momentum, India and Australia must invest in doctrinal synergy, institutional expansion, and
innovation co-development, positioning themselves as independent anchors of Indo-Pacific security.

57
Q4. U.S. tariff actions increasingly undermine WTO’s multilateral dispute resolution framework.
Analyse the legal challenges posed by U.S. tariffs. Evaluate India’s strategic response. Suggest ways
India can strengthen multilateral trade institutions. (15 M)

Introduction
The rise of unilateral tariff actions by the U.S., bypassing WTO rules, signals a deeper erosion of global
trade norms, challenging weaker economies like India in securing equitable outcomes.

Body

Legal challenges posed by U.S. tariffs

1. Violation of WTO’s MFN principle: U.S. tariffs breach Article I of GATT mandating equal
treatment for all members.
o Eg: Trump-era steel and aluminium tariffs (Section 232) applied discriminatory duties up
to 50% on India (June 2025) while excluding select allies.
2. Abuse of national security exception: Frequent invocation of GATT Article XXI undermines
objective security threats requirement.
o Eg: WTO Panel ruling (2022) in disputes by China, EU, Norway, Türkiye held U.S.
tariffs unjustified under national security exception.
3. Bypassing WTO dispute settlement system: U.S. blocks appointment of Appellate Body members,
paralyzing the system since December 2019.
o Eg: WTO Appellate Body crisis (Source: WTO Dispute Settlement Body Reports, 2024).
4. Expansion of unilateral executive authority: Domestic laws like Trade Expansion Act 1962
(Section 232) enable the executive to impose tariffs without legislative oversight.
o Eg: Trump One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB), 2025 proposal, seeks immunity from judicial
oversight on trade actions.
5. Undermining multilateral rule-making: Aggressive U.S. pursuit of plurilateral deals sidelines
consensus-based WTO reforms.
o Eg: U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), 2023, excluding comprehensive
tariff negotiations.

India’s strategic response

1. Mutually agreed settlements to defuse disputes: India pragmatically withdrew WTO disputes in
return for sectoral gains.
o Eg: India-U.S. mutually agreed solution on steel dispute (2023) (Source: Ministry of
Commerce, 2023).
2. Targeted retaliatory tariffs: Imposed counter-duties within WTO-permitted framework to protect
domestic sectors.
o Eg: India’s 2019 retaliatory tariffs on 28 U.S. products after U.S. GSP withdrawal.
3. Leveraging services trade surplus: India emphasizes its strength in services trade during
negotiations.
o Eg: U.S. services trade surplus with India estimated at USD 35-40 billion (Global Trade
Research Initiative, 2025).

58
 4. Active G-20 advocacy for multilateralism: Pushed for WTO reforms and Appellate Body revival
during India’s G-20 Presidency (2023).
o Eg: G-20 New Delhi Declaration, 2023, reaffirmed commitment to WTO reform (Source:
MEA G20 Secretariat, 2023).
5. Diversifying trade partners: Pursues FTAs with EU, UAE, and Australia to reduce overdependence
on U.S. market.
o Eg: India-EFTA Trade Agreement signed in March 2024 (Source: Ministry of Commerce,
2024).

Ways India can strengthen multilateral trade institutions

1. Proactive WTO coalition building: Align with developing nations to collectively advocate dispute
settlement reforms.
o Eg: India’s role in G-33 coalition on food security issues (WTO Ministerial, Abu Dhabi
2024).
2. Institutional legal capacity enhancement: Build expert teams to litigate and defend India’s
interests at WTO forums.
o Eg: Centre for Trade and Investment Law (CTIL), Ministry of Commerce initiative
(2023).
3. Support Appellate Body reforms: Advocate structured Appellate Body reforms addressing U.S.
concerns while preserving independence.
o Eg: India’s joint proposal with EU and others (WT/GC/W/752, 2023).
4. Promoting binding multilateral digital trade rules: Actively engage in WTO e-commerce
negotiations ensuring data sovereignty.
o Eg: India’s submission to WTO Joint Statement Initiative on e-commerce, 2024.
5. Push for new disciplines on unilateral coercive measures: Advocate for global rules restricting
arbitrary trade actions citing security grounds.
o Eg: Proposal at WTO General Council (2024) to initiate discussions on misuse of GATT
Article XXI.

Conclusion
As unilateralism threatens global trade stability, India’s resolve must be to champion a reformed, rules-based
multilateral system that protects both its national interest and global economic fairness.

Q. U.S. tariff actions increasingly undermine WTO’s multilateral dispute resolution

framework. Analyse the legal challenges posed by U.S. tariffs. Evaluate India’s strategic
response. Suggest ways India can strengthen multilateral trade institutions. (15 M)

Introduction
The rise of unilateral tariff actions by the U.S., bypassing WTO rules, signals a deeper erosion of global
trade norms, challenging weaker economies like India in securing equitable outcomes.

Body

Legal challenges posed by U.S. tariffs

59
 1. Violation of WTO’s MFN principle: U.S. tariffs breach Article I of GATT mandating equal
treatment for all members.
o Eg: Trump-era steel and aluminium tariffs (Section 232) applied discriminatory duties up
to 50% on India (June 2025) while excluding select allies.
2. Abuse of national security exception: Frequent invocation of GATT Article XXI undermines
objective security threats requirement.
o Eg: WTO Panel ruling (2022) in disputes by China, EU, Norway, Türkiye held U.S.
tariffs unjustified under national security exception.
3. Bypassing WTO dispute settlement system: U.S. blocks appointment of Appellate Body members,
paralyzing the system since December 2019.
o Eg: WTO Appellate Body crisis (Source: WTO Dispute Settlement Body Reports, 2024).
4. Expansion of unilateral executive authority: Domestic laws like Trade Expansion Act 1962
(Section 232) enable the executive to impose tariffs without legislative oversight.
o Eg: Trump One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB), 2025 proposal, seeks immunity from judicial
oversight on trade actions.
5. Undermining multilateral rule-making: Aggressive U.S. pursuit of plurilateral deals sidelines
consensus-based WTO reforms.
o Eg: U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), 2023, excluding comprehensive
tariff negotiations.

India’s strategic response

1. Mutually agreed settlements to defuse disputes: India pragmatically withdrew WTO disputes in
return for sectoral gains.
o Eg: India-U.S. mutually agreed solution on steel dispute (2023) (Source: Ministry of
Commerce, 2023).
2. Targeted retaliatory tariffs: Imposed counter-duties within WTO-permitted framework to protect
domestic sectors.
o Eg: India’s 2019 retaliatory tariffs on 28 U.S. products after U.S. GSP withdrawal.
3. Leveraging services trade surplus: India emphasizes its strength in services trade during
negotiations.
o Eg: U.S. services trade surplus with India estimated at USD 35-40 billion (Global Trade
Research Initiative, 2025).
4. Active G-20 advocacy for multilateralism: Pushed for WTO reforms and Appellate Body revival
during India’s G-20 Presidency (2023).
o Eg: G-20 New Delhi Declaration, 2023, reaffirmed commitment to WTO reform (Source:
MEA G20 Secretariat, 2023).
5. Diversifying trade partners: Pursues FTAs with EU, UAE, and Australia to reduce overdependence
on U.S. market.
o Eg: India-EFTA Trade Agreement signed in March 2024 (Source: Ministry of Commerce,
2024).

Ways India can strengthen multilateral trade institutions

1. Proactive WTO coalition building: Align with developing nations to collectively advocate dispute
settlement reforms.
60
 o Eg: India’s role in G-33 coalition on food security issues (WTO Ministerial, Abu Dhabi
2024).
2. Institutional legal capacity enhancement: Build expert teams to litigate and defend India’s
interests at WTO forums.
o Eg: Centre for Trade and Investment Law (CTIL), Ministry of Commerce initiative
(2023).
3. Support Appellate Body reforms: Advocate structured Appellate Body reforms addressing U.S.
concerns while preserving independence.
o Eg: India’s joint proposal with EU and others (WT/GC/W/752, 2023).
4. Promoting binding multilateral digital trade rules: Actively engage in WTO e-commerce
negotiations ensuring data sovereignty.
o Eg: India’s submission to WTO Joint Statement Initiative on e-commerce, 2024.
5. Push for new disciplines on unilateral coercive measures: Advocate for global rules restricting
arbitrary trade actions citing security grounds.
o Eg: Proposal at WTO General Council (2024) to initiate discussions on misuse of GATT
Article XXI.

Conclusion
As unilateralism threatens global trade stability, India’s resolve must be to champion a reformed, rules-based
multilateral system that protects both its national interest and global economic fairness.

Q. Assess how India’s participation in G-7 outreach summits reflects its evolving role in global
conflict resolution. Discuss the opportunities and risks involved. (15 M)

Introduction

India’s presence in G-7 outreach summits signals its transition from a regional power to a credible conflict
management actor amid shifting global equations.

Body

India’s evolving role in global conflict resolution through G-7 outreach

1. Platform to project principled neutrality: India uses G-7 to advocate sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and peaceful resolution.
o Eg: PM Modi’s 2023 Hiroshima speech emphasized UN Charter adherence without
directly condemning Russia (MEA, 2023).
2. Strategic autonomy balancing: India leverages G-7 to balance relations with both Western powers
and Russia without compromising interests.
o Eg: 2024 G-7 Apulia Summit saw India maintaining independent stand on Ukraine while
strengthening Western trade ties.
3. Global peace facilitator profile: Participation builds India’s credentials as a neutral facilitator in
conflict resolution.
o Eg: Ukraine’s 2025 request inviting India to facilitate Russia-Ukraine dialogue.
4. Voice for Global South in conflict forums: India highlights concerns of developing nations
affected by global conflicts.

61
 o Eg: G-7 Hiroshima 2023 discussions on food security saw India raise concerns of
developing economies facing grain shortages (MEA, 2023).
5. Engagement with conflict-related global norms: G-7 provides India space to contribute to global
security, sanctions, and legal debates.
o Eg: India’s discussions in G-7 Cornwall 2021 on vaccine equity and rules-based order
strengthened its image as a responsible actor (MEA, 2021).

Opportunities for India

1. Global power projection: G-7 inclusion enhances India’s image as a responsible global stakeholder
and future rule-shaper.
o Eg: PM’s 2024 Apulia Summit interactions with NATO members showcased India’s
growing geopolitical weight .
2. Strategic diversification of partnerships: Provides avenues for advanced tech transfer, defence
cooperation, and economic agreements.
o Eg: India-Japan 2024 defence tech talks were facilitated during G-7 outreach engagements
3. Leadership on multilateral reforms: India can push global governance reforms reflecting
developing country concerns.
o Eg: PM Modi’s G-7 pitch for UNSC reforms in 2023 Hiroshima (UNGA, 2023).
4. Access to high-end technology frameworks: Participation exposes India to cutting-edge AI, digital
trade, and green tech regimes.
o Eg: G-7 Digital Compact discussions 2023 opened channels for India’s cooperation on
ethical AI development.
5. Space for non-aligned hedging: India can retain decision-making freedom while engaging all major
blocks.
o Eg: India continued oil imports from Russia despite G-7 energy price cap consultations in
2023-24.

Risks involved

1. Pressure for geopolitical alignment: G-7 may expect India to adopt stronger positions against
Russia or China.
o Eg: US Congress 2024 debates urging India to reduce Russian defence imports.
2. Strategic discomfort for traditional partners: BRICS and SCO members may view India’s G-7
involvement with suspicion.
o Eg: Russia’s 2024 remarks expressing concern on India’s closeness to G-7
3. Diplomatic double standards criticism: India’s neutral posture may be perceived as selective
principle-based diplomacy.
o Eg: Western media critique on India’s Ukraine abstentions at UNGA in 2023-24
4. Constraints in G-7 core decision-making: India remains outside G-7’s inner circle limiting real
policy influence.
o Eg: India’s exclusion from G-7 AI regulatory outcomes 2024 despite participating in
discussions.
5. Domestic sensitivities on foreign policy choices: G-7 engagements may spark internal political
debate on India’s independent foreign policy.
o Eg: 2024 opposition criticism of India’s cautious stand on Russia at G-7 Apulia Summit.

62
Conclusion

India’s calibrated engagement with G-7 reflects a maturing foreign policy navigating complex global
conflicts. Future influence will depend on India’s ability to combine principled diplomacy with pragmatic
interests.

Q. The collapse of bilateral arms control regimes in the Global North is fuelling a multipolar
nuclear race. Analyse. What challenges does this pose for Global South diplomacy? (10 M)

Introduction
The breakdown of bilateral arms control treaties has disrupted deterrence stability, replacing it with
competitive modernisation and unchecked proliferation. This has reshaped nuclear geopolitics and
undermined the diplomatic leverage of Global South nations.

Body

Collapse of arms control and rise of a multipolar nuclear race

1. End of New START and absence of successor treaty: The expiry of the last arms control pact has
removed the final constraint on US-Russia arsenals.
o Eg: New START (2010) capped US and Russian deployed warheads at 1,550 each; no
successor treaty exists as of mid-2025 (US State Dept).
2. Nuclear modernisation without limits: Key nuclear powers are investing in new warhead designs
and delivery systems without oversight.
o Eg: China’s arsenal doubled to over 600 warheads by 2024, with projections of 1,000 by
2030 (SIPRI Yearbook 2024).
3. Strategic ambiguity and tactical deployments: Nations are redeploying or expanding nuclear reach
through tactical weapons.
o Eg: Russia’s 2023 tactical nuclear deployment to Belarus challenges prior disarmament
trends (Carnegie Endowment).
4. Collapse of INF and Open Skies treaties: The breakdown of verification and medium-range
missile controls weakens transparency.
o Eg: US withdrawal from INF in 2019 and Open Skies in 2020 led to Russia’s retaliatory
exit in 2021.
5. Rise of new nuclear actors and doctrines: Informal nuclear powers and aggressive doctrines
complicate strategic predictability.
o Eg: Israel’s 2025 airstrike on Iran highlights pre-emptive deterrence logics beyond treaty
constraints.

Challenges for Global South diplomacy

1. Marginalisation in global nuclear governance: Non-nuclear Global South countries are excluded
from key decisions by the P5.
o Eg: TPNW 2017, supported by over 90 Global South nations, was boycotted by all
nuclear powers.
2. Breakdown of disarmament legitimacy under NPT: Nuclear states are ignoring Article 6’s
disarmament obligation, weakening faith in the regime.
63
 o Eg: India’s 2023 UNGA speech criticised the NPT’s structural inequity and stagnant
disarmament progress.
3. Regional destabilisation from strategic spillovers: Nuclear build-ups near the Global South create
direct security threats.
o Eg: China’s expansion of nuclear bases in Tibet escalates threats along India’s northern
borders (IDSA 2024).
4. Proliferation incentives among regional actors: Insecurity and lack of deterrence parity may
encourage nuclear aspirations.
o Eg: Saudi Arabia’s 2023 statement warned of developing nuclear weapons if Iran acquires
them.
5. Loss of moral authority on disarmament: The Global South’s push for disarmament appears
ineffective amidst great power defiance.
o Eg: NAM’s 2022 working paper on disarmament failed to influence any policy shift
during the NPT RevCon 2022.

Conclusion
The Global South faces a crisis of relevance in nuclear diplomacy. Only a unified, reform-oriented
multilateral push can restore fairness, prevent proliferation, and reinvigorate the global disarmament
discourse.

Q. The Iran-Israel conflict is redrawing West Asia’s strategic map amid a fragmented global
order. Enumerate the key drivers of this shift. Evaluate the risks it poses for India’s energy
and trade security. Suggest India’s optimal diplomatic posture. (15 M)

Introduction
The intensifying Iran-Israel conflict reflects not only old rivalries but also new alignments as West Asia
witnesses shifting alliances, external power vacuums, and evolving security doctrines amidst the growing
multipolarity of global geopolitics.

Body

Key drivers of the shift in West Asia’s strategic map

1. Sectarian rivalries and ideological contestation: The enduring Shia-Sunni divide continues to fuel
conflicts and realignments.
o Eg: Iran’s support to Hezbollah, Hamas and opposition to Gulf Sunni monarchies
2. Proxy warfare and hybrid conflicts: State and non-state actors are increasingly using proxies,
cyberwarfare and drones.
o Eg: Israel’s targeting of Hezbollah and Iranian missile networks (2025)
3. US strategic recalibration: The relative decline of direct US intervention has emboldened regional
players to pursue independent agendas.
o Eg: Abraham Accords (2020) strengthening Israel-Gulf ties in absence of US guarantees
4. Iran’s nuclear ambitions: Accelerating Iranian nuclear program is prompting pre-emptive Israeli
actions.
o Eg: 2025 Israeli strikes on Natanz nuclear facility (IAEA Reports, May 2025)

64
 5. Fragmented global order and great power competition: Russia-Ukraine war and US-China
rivalry are weakening multilateral conflict management.
o Eg: Ineffectiveness of UN Security Council on recent West Asia escalations.

Risks for India’s energy and trade security

1. Oil price volatility: Disruption near Strait of Hormuz impacts India’s oil imports (~80%
dependence on Gulf).
o Eg: Brent crude rose by $10/barrel in June 2025 after Israeli strikes (IEA Report, 2025)
2. Maritime trade disruptions: Risk to shipping lanes and ports vital for India’s exports-imports
(~40% through Gulf).
o Eg: Drone attacks on Gulf shipping by Iranian proxies (2024–25) (Indian Navy MARSEC
Bulletin)
3. Insurance and freight cost escalation: Increased war-risk premiums on Indian merchant fleet.
o Eg: Marine insurance premiums surged 30% post-April 2025 attacks (Lloyd’s of London
Reports)
4. Risks to diaspora: Over 8 million Indians in Gulf could face evacuation or economic distress.
o Eg: Operation Rahat during Yemen crisis (2015) sets precedent (MEA Report)
5. Energy payment disruptions: Potential disruption of rupee-rial payment mechanisms with Iran.
o Eg: Sanctions post-JCPOA collapse (2018) forced India to halt Iranian oil imports
(MoPNG, GoI)

India’s optimal diplomatic posture

1. Preserve strategic autonomy: Avoid overt alignment, maintain balance between Israel, Iran, Gulf
states.
o Eg: 2025 MEA statement emphasising non-partisan engagement
2. Backchannel diplomacy: Quiet engagement with Tehran and Tel Aviv to defuse escalation.
o Eg: Track II dialogues via academic and business forums (ORF Policy Briefs, 2025)
3. Protect maritime security: Strengthen Indian Navy deployments in the Gulf of Oman and Arabian
Sea.
o Eg: Mission-based deployments by Indian Navy under SAGAR policy (Indian Navy
Annual Report, 2024-25)
4. Engage multilateral forums: Push for de-escalation through SCO, IORA and BRICS.
o Eg: India’s BRICS Chairmanship 2026 agenda includes West Asia dialogue (MEA
Projections)
5. Diversify energy sources: Accelerate deals with US, Brazil, and African producers to reduce Gulf
dependence.
o Eg: 2024 Indo-US strategic energy partnership for LNG imports (MoPNG, GoI)

Conclusion
India’s nuanced diplomacy must preserve strategic autonomy while enhancing resilience in energy and
maritime domains—turning this challenge into an opportunity to reinforce its role as a stabilising power in
West Asia.

65
Q. “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a product of the Cold
War era, yet it remains central to today’s nuclear order”. Assess the treaty’s contemporary
relevance and the key challenges it faces. (10 M)

Introduction
Over five decades after its adoption, the NPT remains the foundational legal framework governing nuclear
weapons, shaping global norms and state behaviour — even as new strategic, technological, and normative
challenges emerge in today’s multipolar world.

Body

Contemporary relevance of NPT

1. Foundational legal instrument against proliferation: The NPT defines legally binding obligations
that deter new states from developing nuclear weapons.
o Eg: 191 states are party to the NPT, with only 4 non-signatories — India, Pakistan, Israel,
North Korea (IAEA, 2024).
2. Global verification through IAEA safeguards: The treaty enables IAEA inspections, crucial for
building transparency and trust.
o Eg: IAEA conducted 1,150 inspections across 69 states in 2023, covering both declared and
undeclared sites (IAEA Annual Report 2024).
3. Constrains horizontal proliferation trends: Despite regional tensions, the NPT has prevented
widespread proliferation beyond the original nuclear states.
o Eg: No new officially declared nuclear weapon states added since North Korea’s 2006 tests
(UNSC Resolution 1874).
4. Enabler of peaceful nuclear cooperation: The treaty facilitates civilian nuclear technology sharing
with safeguards.
o Eg: India’s civil nuclear deals with US (2008) and France (2010) — though India is not a
signatory, IAEA frameworks applied.
5. Global forum for diplomatic engagement: Regular NPT Review Conferences promote consensus
on disarmament and peaceful use.
o Eg: 2022 NPT Review Conference addressed Article VI concerns and new proliferation
risks (UNODA, 2022).

Key challenges faced by NPT

1. Structural discrimination entrenched in P5 privilege: Only the five nuclear powers of 1967 are
recognised, undermining equity.
o Eg: Repeated protests from NAM states — over 120 nations — in latest Review Conferences
(NAM Ministerial Declaration, 2022).
2. Non-implementation of Article VI disarmament: P5 states have failed to progress on
comprehensive disarmament obligations.
o Eg: SIPRI 2024 Report shows rising modernisation of US, Russia, and China’s arsenals,
despite NPT commitments.
3. Regional proliferation flashpoints: Middle East and Asia remain vulnerable to new nuclear arms
races.

66
 o Eg: Iran’s enrichment beyond 60% uranium purity since 2023 amid JCPOA breakdown
(IAEA Board Resolution, June 2025).
4. Technological and doctrinal loopholes: New weapon systems (AI, hypersonics, space assets) evade
existing treaty structures.
o Eg: AI-enabled nuclear command systems debated at UNIDIR 2025 forum (UNIDIR
2025 Report).
5. Risk of treaty exit weakening norms: The withdrawal clause can be legally invoked, undermining
enforcement and deterrence.
o Eg: North Korea’s 2003 withdrawal followed by unrestrained nuclear testing (IAEA
archives).

Conclusion
To remain relevant, the NPT must evolve through strengthened verification, accelerated disarmament
efforts, and updated frameworks for emerging technologies — ensuring it can anchor global nuclear
stability in the 21st century.

Q. Evaluate how the US-Iran escalation may impact India’s connectivity initiatives such as the
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC). Analyse strategic options for India
to insulate its regional interests. (10 M)

Introduction
The June 2025 US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites have aggravated geopolitical instability in West Asia,
threatening India’s flagship connectivity initiative — the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor
(IMEEC) — amid rising regional tensions.

Body

Impact on IMEEC and regional connectivity

1. Rising security risks for infrastructure: US-Iran tensions elevate risks to ports, terminals, and rail
links critical for IMEEC.
o Eg: Iran’s move to block the Strait of Hormuz (June 2025) poses a direct threat to
maritime sections of IMEEC.
2. Supply chain disruptions and insurance costs: Regional instability disrupts freight movement and
increases costs.
o Eg: Houthi drone attacks in the Red Sea (June 2025) forced rerouting of India-Europe
shipments.
3. Diplomatic coordination challenges: Divergent interests among IMEEC partners delay project
milestones.
o Eg: Saudi Arabia’s and UAE’s muted response post-US strikes affected joint
coordination talks (MEI June 2025).
4. Investor confidence erosion: Strategic instability deters private capital for corridor infrastructure.
o Eg: Post-strike spike in risk premium on FDI in Middle East logistics sector (UNCTAD
June 2025).
5. Threat of escalation into broader conflict: Wider regional conflict could indefinitely stall IMEEC
timelines.

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 o Eg: Israel’s July 2025 mobilisation against Hezbollah raised fears of prolonged West Asia
instability.

Strategic options for India

1. Balance regional diplomacy: Engage all sides — US, Israel, Iran, Arab Gulf — to maintain project
momentum.
o Eg: PM Modi’s June 2025 call with Iran President reinforced India’s balanced diplomatic
stance.
2. Fast-track alternative corridors: Accelerate Chabahar Port, INSTC and Eurasian links to hedge
risks.
o Eg: India-Iran joint statement (May 2025) pledged fast-tracking Chabahar-Zahedan
railway.
3. Diversify energy imports: Reduce overdependence on Gulf routes via long-term energy
partnerships.
o Eg: India-Norway LNG MoU signed in May 2025 expanded non-Gulf energy sourcing.
4. Build maritime security partnerships: Strengthen anti-piracy and security coordination in Red Sea,
Arabian Sea.
o Eg: India-France joint maritime drills in Gulf of Aden (April 2025) enhanced corridor
security.
5. Promote regional multilateralism: Use platforms like IORA, IBSA to collectively address regional
risks.
o Eg: India-led IORA Council 2025 initiative on maritime safety aimed at stabilising
regional sea lanes.

Conclusion
India must proactively hedge IMEEC against evolving geopolitical risks through diversified connectivity,
agile diplomacy, and stronger multilateral engagement — ensuring long-term strategic resilience in West
Asia.

Important International institutions, agencies and fora - their structure,

mandate.
Q. “The UN Security Council remains structurally frozen in a post-1945 order”. Critically
examine the need for permanent membership expansion. Discuss the case for including India
and Global South representation. Suggest steps to democratise the Council’s composition. (15
M)

Introduction
Despite massive geopolitical shifts, the UN Security Council (UNSC) remains bound to the post-World
War II power structure, limiting its legitimacy and effectiveness in addressing contemporary global
challenges.

Body

Need for permanent membership expansion

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 1. Power asymmetry in global governance: P5 no longer reflects current geopolitical and economic
realities.
o Eg: India, Germany, and Brazil are among the top economies and troop contributors but
are excluded from P5 (IMF 2024, UN Peacekeeping Report 2023).
2. Ineffectiveness in crisis resolution: Frequent vetoes stall timely intervention in global conflicts.
o Eg: Russia’s vetoes blocked UNSC resolutions on Ukraine (2022–24), undermining
collective action.
3. Legitimacy deficit and trust erosion: Perceived Western dominance alienates much of the Global
South.
o Eg: African Union criticized UNSC silence on Sudan and Congo, demanding reforms.
4. Lack of representation for populous regions: Africa and Latin America remain without permanent
voice in global security.
o Eg: 54 African nations make up over a quarter of UN membership but have zero P5
representation (UNGA data 2024).
5. Inability to address emerging threats: New issues like cyberwarfare, climate migration, and
pandemics require broader participation.
o Eg: UNSC's slow COVID-19 response (2020) highlighted its narrow security lens (WHO-
UN Review, 2022).

Case for including India and Global South

1. India’s strategic and economic credentials: India is a major global actor across defence,
technology, and trade.
o Eg: India’s G20 Presidency (2023) led on climate finance and inclusive growth (MEA
2023).
2. Democratic and peacekeeping legacy: India consistently supports multilateralism and global
stability.
o Eg: Over 250,000 Indian troops have served in UN missions (UN Peacekeeping Stats,
2024).
3. Disproportionate burdens on Global South: These countries face the worst impacts of war and
climate without decision-making power.
o Eg: SIDS and African nations are climate-vulnerable but lack UNSC influence (UNFCCC
2023 Adaptation Report).
4. Moral leadership and diplomatic balance: India has taken principled, balanced stances in global
crises.
o Eg: India called for dialogue and humanitarian aid in both Russia-Ukraine and Israel-
Gaza conflicts (UNGA Voting Records, 2023–24).
5. Support from major powers: India’s candidature is backed by leading global actors.
o Eg: France, UK, USA, and Russia support India’s inclusion in UNSC.

Steps to democratise UNSC composition

1. Expand permanent membership inclusively: Include powers from Africa, Latin America, and
Asia.
o Eg: G4 Proposal (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan) and L.69 Group support regional
diversity.
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 2. Reform veto power with accountability: Introduce veto restraint and mandatory justification.
o Eg: French-Mexican Veto Restraint Initiative and ACT Group proposals recommend
public disclosure.
3. Introduce semi-permanent rotating seats: Regional leaders can be given medium-term
memberships.
o Eg: Razali Ismail Proposal (revived in 2023 UN working paper) suggests 8–10-year non-
veto seats.
4. UN Charter amendment reform: Relax P5 ratification monopoly under Articles 108 and 109.
o Eg: Existing rules allow any one P5 member to block globally supported changes.
5. Enhance General Assembly’s moral authority: Activate Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950) to
override UNSC deadlock.
o Eg: Used during Ukraine conflict (2022) when UNSC action was blocked by Russia.

Conclusion
To stay relevant in the 21st century, the UNSC must evolve from post-war rigidity to modern inclusivity.
A reformed, representative, and transparent Council is vital not just for legitimacy but for delivering
effective global leadership.

Q. What are the key institutional roles of the IAEA in the global nuclear governance
architecture? How do recent conflicts involving nuclear sites challenge these roles? (10 M)

Introduction
Founded in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) anchors the global nuclear governance
framework by promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring non-proliferation. Recent attacks
on Iran’s nuclear sites (2025) highlight emerging challenges to its role.

Body

Key institutional roles of the IAEA

1. Verification of non-proliferation commitments: IAEA conducts safeguards to verify civilian

nuclear material is not diverted to military use.
o Eg: IAEA verified Iran’s nuclear programme under JCPOA until US withdrawal in 2018
(IAEA Annual Report 2023)
2. Promotion of peaceful nuclear technology: Facilitates the use of nuclear science in energy,
agriculture, medicine.
o Eg: Rays of Hope initiative (2022) for cancer therapy expansion in Africa
3. Nuclear safety and security standards: Sets global benchmarks on nuclear safety, waste
management, and physical security.
o Eg: IAEA’s 2024 guidelines for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)
4. Technical assistance and capacity building: Provides training and equipment to member states for
peaceful nuclear applications.
o Eg: IAEA assistance to Ukraine (2022) to maintain nuclear safety amid war (IAEA Board
Brief, 2022)
5. Early warning and emergency response: Coordinates international monitoring and response to
nuclear emergencies.

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 o Eg: IAEA’s rapid radiation monitoring after Iran site attacks (2025).

How recent conflicts challenge these roles

1. Restricted site access: Active conflicts obstruct IAEA teams from conducting inspections.
o Eg: IAEA inspectors blocked from Fordow and Natanz after Iran strikes (2025)
2. Unaccounted nuclear material risk: Potential diversion of nuclear materials during evacuations or
attacks.
o Eg: Iran’s relocation of 400 kg enriched uranium to undisclosed sites (2025)
3. Threat to inspector safety: Deployment of IAEA staff in warzones exposes them to physical harm.
o Eg: IAEA withdrawal of staff from Zaporizhzhia NPP in Ukraine (2023)
4. Weakening verification credibility: Delayed or incomplete reporting erodes trust in IAEA findings.
o Eg: IAEA delayed assessments after Iran nuclear site attacks (2025) leading to UN
debates
5. Politicisation of IAEA role: Geopolitical rivalries may compromise IAEA neutrality and credibility.
o Eg: US-Iran tensions stalling IAEA Board consensus on Iran inspections (2025).

Conclusion
To safeguard its global nuclear governance role, the IAEA must be empowered with enhanced legal
backing, secured access rights, and stronger multilateral support for impartial operations even amidst
conflicts.

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