NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

SEMESTER VIII

INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTES [IOS]

TITLE: LAW COMMISSIONS REPORT, BILLS- AS AN
EXTERNAL AID TO CONSTRUCTION

SUBMITTED BY: SUBMITTED TO:

SHUBHAM KAMAL Dr. DEBASHREE SARKAR
2019BALLB36

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................... 5

183rd LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA REPORT........................................................................7

EXTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION IN INDIA: STERN OPPOSITION TO

GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE............................................................................................................... 8

EXTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION....................................................................................... 8

LAW COMMISSION....................................................................................................................... 11

REPORTS OF COMMISSIONS AND COMMITTES..................................................................13

BILLS: WHETHER A LEGITIMATE TOOL FOR CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE?..........14

COCLUSION..................................................................................................................................... 18

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................................. 19

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Admittedly, it is a great privilege and a subject of great pleasure for me to convey my sincere
sense of deep gratitude to all the people that helped and encouraged me to achieve the project
goals. I would like to thank the Professor for his right to make efforts from the choice of the
project to its completion. She invested his valuable time in the need of guidance wherever I
was. In addition, I would really like to thank NLIU for facilitating this project with incentives
and tools for preparation and ultimate completion.

Shubham Kamal

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 SYNOPSIS
Statement of Problem –
Various concerns about the legitimacy of external aids were posed prior to the admissibility
of the 183rd law commission report. External aids to interpretation have been questioned in
the context of interpreting every legislation. External aids are not permitted unless the law is
unclear or ambiguous

Hypothesis -
External aids became permissible for statutory interpretation after the 183rd Law
Commission Report and the seminal landmark decision of Pepper v. Hart. Where literal
construction contributes to absurdity, external construction assistance may be used. Extrinsic
assistance in interpreting a statutory provision, on the other hand, can be justified only within
well-defined limits, and the effect of a statutory provision must be judged solely on the basis
of a fair and rational construction of the terms used

Aims and objectives -

1. To study and analyse the Background: looking beyond the words of the statute
2. To do in depth analysis of the External Aids to Interpretation in India
3. To critically analyse the External Aids to Construction(Law commissions reports and
Bills)

Research Questions -
1. Reports of commissions and committees as an external Aid to Construction
2. Bills: Whether a legitimate tool for construction of statute?

Methodology –
The project is basically based on the doctrinal method of research as no field work is done on
this topic.

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 LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Interpretation Of Statutes, N.S. Bindra (Author)

The verifiable situations within which interpretational principles operate are highlighted
in this new edition of Bindra's authoritative treatise on Statute Interpretation. It constantly
reminds the reader of the diversity of judicial decision-making while contextualizing the
decisions reached by courts in the cases covered by the current revision period. This
edition expands on recent developments in the field of interpretation while deliberately
preserving the original work's integrity. While the way in which courts use the canons to
figure out legislative intent is efficiently documented, the activist takeover of the courts is
also recorded.

2. Interpretation of Statutes, B.M. Gandhi (Author)

The process of interpreting a statute involves lawyers and the courts reviewing the statute's
intent and assessing its purpose. It is both an art and science. In order to make outdated and
existing provisions discourse relevant, courts use certain rules, precepts, and principles of
interpretation when determining their significance. This book examines the methods used to
interpret statutes.

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INTRODUCTION

The creation of judicial and administrative roles for interpreting a specific piece of legislation
is one of the most crucial steps for the growth and progress of the legal environment today.
The topic of statutory interpretation is becoming increasingly relevant, as evidenced by an
enormous increase in the number of cases involving statutory interpretation, as well as a
tremendous increase in the field of statutory interpretation literature. In basic terms, statutory
interpretation is the practice of reading laws by reviewing the law and determining the true
purpose and intent of the legislature.

However, the question of how stable the "interpretative doctrine"—the collection of laws,
guiding standards, and norms that the Courts use when interpreting a statute—is often raised.

When deciding cases, how much does the Court depart from its most conventional and
ingrained formulation? Why does the interpretative doctrine have such a weak foundation?
Among all of these, Justice Frankfurter challenged to what degree external conditions and
preparatory work could be used to give it judicial recognition.

Preparatory works are referred to as TravauxPréparatoires in French. It refers to all of the

resources used to create a law. It contains legislative records, committee papers, and
discussions throughout the drafting process. It serves as a secondary form of interpretation
that can be used to decode the makers' intent. Simply stated, it is a set of documents from
negotiations prior to the signing of a treaty. It has been mentioned that it can be extended to
any interpretation scenario.

Although there are many internal aids and mechanisms for interpreting a law, the need for
external assistance; TravauxPreparatories comes into play in some difficult situations when
internal aids fail. External aids may be helpful in determining the true object, meaning, and
character of a provision, expression, or word. TravauxPreparatories mainly consists of
Legislative History, official records of negotiations, selection committee papers, speeches
and their contexts, speeches made during bill debate, and so on.

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BACKGROUND: LOOKING BEYOND THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE

TRADITIONAL APPROACH- THE DARK DAYS OF LITERALISM

The conventional approach to interpreting a statute was to simply look up the plain sense of
the statute, believing that the statute is the best guide for interpreting the legislature's
purpose. In this basis, the court continued to interpret the statute, preventing the judiciary
from engaging in overt lawmaking in its interpretation of the statute. However, because of
the inevitable problems of legislative drafting, the judiciary gradually recognized the need for
statutory interpretation aids, both internal and external.

However, external aids to interpretation were deemed redundant and inadmissible

because the law itself was deemed adequate for reading the true meaning and purpose
of the legislation, and therefore external aids were deemed unnecessary. External
assistance was thought to be in contrast with the statute's clear sense. However, such
reasoning began to neglect the importance of developing new methods for interpretation in
cases where internal assistance fails and the need to arrive at the most satisfactory
interpretation of the legislation is compromised.

As a consequence, it is incorrect to conclude that extrinsic factual aids are ineffective in

shedding new light on language that seems to be straightforward. Furthermore, it would be
entirely fictitious and illogical for foreign assistance to contradict the law, "Because such a
claim would be based on a rule that facts can be permitted to justify but not to contradict a
writing," which ignores the fact "that no reasonable distinctions may be made between
‘explanation' and ‘contradiction."

As a result, where the reach of deriving the real intentions is restricted, a wider contextual
interpretation is needed, as is the need for more reformatory aids to prevent incorrect
application of the statute.

183rd LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA REPORT

The commission looked at case law such as B. PrabhakarRao and others v State of A.P.
and others, in which Justice [Link] Reddy claimed that when internal aids are
inadequate to discover the purpose of legislation, external aids could always be used.

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The Supreme Court observed in District Mining Officer and others v. Tata Iron & Steel Co.
and others that external aids can be used to evaluate the true sense and purpose of legislation.

PEPPER V. HART-

THE DAWN OF A NEW ERA OF INTERPRETATION

With the ruling in Pepper v. Hart, Lord Brown Wilkinson repealed the exclusionary rule and
replaced it with the inclusionary rule of allowing parliamentary materials as an external aid
to construction in order to address constitutional interpretation flaws. Purposive Approach
ensures that courts will use a much broader variety of materials when reading a statute in
order to arrive at the most authentic and valid interpretation of the law. Lord Wilkinson
treated Parliament's purpose as a "crock of gold" in this situation.

As a result of this case, courts have become more willing to embrace the concept of extrinsic
aids for statutory interpretation and have attempted to establish a cordial relationship
between courts and parliament.

EXTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION IN INDIA: STERN

OPPOSITION TO GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE

Various concerns about the legitimacy of external aids were posed prior to the admissibility
of the 183rd law commission report. External aids to interpretation have been questioned in
the context of interpreting every legislation. External aids are not permitted unless the law is
unclear or ambiguous, as in the case of A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras. It was decided
that assembly proceedings, papers, and debates should be used with extreme caution
and only when latent uncertainty needs to be resolved.

The basic principle was that the legislature's meaning can be deduced from the language of
the law itself, and that no external proof can be used to interpret those terms.

External aids became permissible for statutory interpretation after the 183rd Law
Commission Report and the seminal landmark decision of Pepper v. Hart. Where literal
construction contributes to absurdity, external construction assistance may be used. Extrinsic
assistance in interpreting a statutory provision, on the other hand, can be justified only within
well-defined limits, and the effect of a statutory provision must be judged solely on the basis
of a fair and rational construction of the terms used.

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Therefore, where the statute's terms are plain, straightforward, and descriptive,
hence there is no need for outside assistance in constructing it. External assistance
would still not be justified by the courts in such situations because it would be in
violation of the clear terms of the clause. External aids as in form of legislative
debates, reports of drafting or selection committees can now be allowed to evaluate and
identify the true purpose of the legislature where even the language is vague and
ambiguous and does not explicitly point out the act's purpose and spirit.

EXTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

A. Parliamentary History, Historical Facts and Surrounding Circumstances

If the terms are simple and transparent, the historical setting cannot be used as a help. If the
interpretations are vague, the historical context may be used to help decide the correct
construction. The historical context includes parliamentary records, historical facts, subject
and purpose statements, and expert committee reports.

The Supreme Court recently declared in R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab and

others1that it is indeed an established position that debates in the Constituent Assembly
can be used to define a constitutional provision since it is the Court's job to figure out
what the framers of the Constitution intended.2

B. Social, Political and Economic Developments and Scientific Inventions

A law must be interpreted to provide situations or conditions that did not exist or were
unheard of at the time of its enforcement. Any significant shifts in social circumstances or
technology should be taken into account. When construing legislative provisions, courts
should consider both of these developments.

It was mentioned in P. Gupta v. Union of India3 that “the interpretation of any statutory
provision must keep pace with evolving concepts and values, and it must, to the degree that
its language permits or rather does not preclude, changes through judicial interpretation so as
to conform to the requirements of the fast-changing society.”

1 (2001) 7 SCC 126 [4]

2 Mayank Shekhar, External Aids to Construction, Legal Bites
3 AIR 1982 SC 149

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C. Reference to Other Statutes

“When two Acts are being read together, each specific part of each Act must be interpreted
as if it were included in a single composite Act. Nevertheless, if there is a strong
inconsistency, the latter Act would override the former. When a single clause in one Act is to
be read or extended to another, it must be read in the same way it was construed in the first
Act. In this way, even though only a clause of the first Act was implemented, the entire first
Act can be mentioned or referred to in the second”

When an old Act is repealed, it no longer has any effect. However, such a pealed element can
still be considered when constructing the unrepealed part. Courts will look to other
legislation for guidance in interpreting or construing a statutory provision. Statutory aids is
another name for it. Statutory assistance is exemplified by the General Clauses Act of 1897.
The use of this rule of construction has the advantage of preventing any inconsistency
between a set of statutes dealing with the same subject, and it enables the use of an earlier
statute to shed light on the significance of a term used in a later statute concerned with much
the same matter.

Using the same logic, where terms in an earlier statute have been authoritatively interpreted
by a superior court, usage of the same words in a similar sense in a later statute would give
rise to a belief that the legislature aims for such words in the later statute to be construed in
the same way.

D. Dictionaries

When a term is not specified in the law, it is permissible to review dictionaries to determine
the general meaning of the term in everyday use. However, when choosing between the
different definitions of a term, the system, context, and legislative history must always be
considered.

E. Judicial Decisions

When judicial pronouncements are used as a guideline, it really should be noted that
the rulings are Indian; if they are international, then it must be assured that the foreign
country follows the same form of jurisprudence as ours and that these decisions were
made on the same legal basis as ours.

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Such foreign decisions have only persuasive value and are not binding on Indian courts.
When binding Indian decisions are available, referring to foreign decisions is pointless.

F. Other Materials

Likewise, in Ramlal v. State of Rajasthan 4, the Supreme Court used information which
are on the web to define a constitutional provision. Courts even cite excerpts and
references from texts, as well as journal articles and papers.z

“These external aids are very useful tools not only for the proper and correct interpretation or
construction of the statutory provision but also for understanding the object of the statute, the
mischief sought to be remedied by it, circumstances in which it was enacted and many of the
relevant matters. In the absence of the admissibility of these external aids, sometimes the
court may not be in a position to do justice in a case”

LAW COMMISSION

A legislation is the textual expression of the legislature's will. The method of interpreting or
constructing a statute is as ancient as language itself. Even at the earliest stages of Hindu
civilization and culture, complex rules of interpretation were established. The rules provided
by ‘Jaimini,' the author of the Mimamsat Sutras, which were originally intended for srutis,
were also used to interpret Smrities. (Chapter 2, Para 2.2, 60th Report of the Law
Commission of India). It is a well-established legal concept that, since a statute is an edict of
the legislature, the traditional method of reading or construing a statute is to look for the
legislature's purpose.

The legislative intent combines two elements: one carries the concept of "value," i.e., what
the word means, and the other carries the concept of "cause" and "object," or the "reason" or
"spirit" that runs through the statute. As a result, the building method blends both literal and
purposeful methods. However, the need for clarification will occur only if the language of a
statutory law is vague, unclear, or if two interpretations are possible, or if the provision
provides a different meaning, defeating the statute's purpose. There would be no need for
clarification if the language was simple and straightforward and not unambiguous.5

4 (2001) 1 SCC 175

5Law commission report, [Link]

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 In this regard, a Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court in R.S.
Nayakv A.R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 has held:

“If the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to
give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of
construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used
in the Statute would be self-defeating.”

Recently, again Supreme Court in Grasim Industries Ltd. v Collector of Customs, Bombay,
(2002)4 SCC 297 has followed the same principle and observed:

“Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the
intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for court to take upon itself
the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions.”

The court must obviously use a variety of internal and external aids in order to establish or
interpret the law. Internal aids are materials that are available in the legislation itself, even
though they were not used in the enactment. Long title, preamble, headings, marginal notes,
illustrations, punctuation, proviso, timetable, transitory provisions, and so on are examples of
internal aids. Where internal resources are insufficient, the court must turn to outside
resources. It may be legislative content, historical context, committee or commission papers,
official statements, dictionary definitions, international decisions, and so on. 6

The Supreme Court has accepted the necessity of external aids in interpretation of
statutory provision. [Link] Reddy J. in B. PrabhakarRao and others v State of
A.P. and others , AIR 1986 SC 120 has observed :

“Where internal aids are not forthcoming, we can always have recourse to external aids
to discover the object of the legislation. External aids are not ruled out. This is now a
well settled principle of modern statutory construction.”

Recently, in District Mining Officer and others v Tata Iron & Steel Co. and another ,
(2001) 7 SCC 358, Supreme Court has observed:

“It is also a cardinal principle of construction that external aids are brought in by widening
the concept of context as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but

6Law commission of India, 185th revie on Indian evidence act,

[Link]

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its preamble, the existing state of law, other statutes in parimateria and the mischief which
the statute was intended to remedy.”

“So far as admissibility and utility of these external aids are concerned, law is almost settled
in our country now. The Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese v Income Tax Officer Ernakulam,
AIR 1981 SC 1922 has stated that interpretation of statute being an exercise in the
ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible”

Reports of Parliamentary Committees and Commissions

Prior to the enactment of a Bill, reports of commissions, such as the Law Commission, or
committees, such as Parliamentary Committees, may be used in court as proof of factual
fact(Historical), underlying conditions, or mischief or bad expected to be remedied. These
materials will obviously be used by courts as an additional aid in interpreting the Act. 7

Even Though, the Supreme Court has refused to take the recourse to the Report by the
special Committee which had been appointed by the Government to examine the provisions
of the Partnership Bill for construing the provisions of the Partnership Act, 1932

In CIT, A.P. v Jaylakshmi Rice and Oil Mills Contractor Co 8., yet in another case
HaldiramBhujiawala and another v Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar and another, (2000)
3 SCC 250,

“The Supreme Court took recourse to the very same report of the Special Committee (1930-
31) for construing the provisions of section 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932. The Supreme
Court in the above case held that decision in CIT v. Jaylakshmi Rice & Oil Mills (supra) in
this respect is no longer good law. Law Commission’s Reports can also be referred to where
a particular enactment or amendment is the result of recommendations of Law Commission
Report. (seeMithileshKumariv PremBehariKhare9). Similarly, the Supreme Court in Rosy
and another v State of Kerala and others, (2000) 2 SCC 230 considered Law Commission of
India, 41st Report for interpretation of section 200 (2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure,1898.”

7[Link]
8AIR 1971 SC 1015
9AIR 1989 SC 1247

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REPORTS OF COMMISSIONS AND COMMITTES

No reference was permissible as regards to report the committee which actually brought out
the legislation. One of the reasons was that the intention of the parliament as manifested in
the statute expressly cannot be curtailed down by referring to such materials. In the
prevailing case of CIT, AP, v Jayalakshmi Rice and Oil Mills Contractor Co; there was
special committee which was appointed to look into the provisions of the Partnership Act,
although the report wasn’t admitted as an aid for the interpretation.10

AN IMPORTANT TOOL WHEN MEANING OF STATUTE IS DOUBTFUL

When enacting a law, the parliament requests committee’s advice to ensure that the act is free
of any uncertainty or confusion. Likewise, in order to determine the purpose behind the
provisions, the courts may consult the commission's reports. The courts decided in 1986 to
allow the compilation of information about enactment to be used as external construction
aids. 67 If, on the other hand, the terms used are straightforward and simple, with no
ambiguity, the courts are less likely to look for a commission or investigation committee.

The investigation committee or commission investigates the historical evidence or

preparatory works and attempts to correct the misconduct. Reports are often referred by
courts in order to arrive at the most appropriate legislative purpose, according to judicial
patterns.11

The preceding discussion clearly demonstrates that legislative content, including

committee and commission reports, is admissible external aid for statutory
interpretation.

BILLS: WHETHER A LEGITIMATE TOOL FOR

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE?

10 183rd report on general clauses Act, 1897, [Link]

formInput=law%20commission%20reports
11Department of justice, Reports and publications,
[Link]

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JUDICIAL TRENDS REFLECTING NARROW AND RIGID VIEW

At the period, it was widely assumed that the court was unaware of the conditions and what
was going on in the legislative council, and that certain bills were not credible sources of
construction where even the context was clear. The bill cannot be used to interpret the terms,
even if they can be interpreted in multiple ways.

Initially, it was believed that debates in parliament on bills should not be used as an external
aid to interpretation as they were subjective and thus unreliable. As circumstances have
changed, nevertheless, the courts started to consider bill debates as credible sources of
interpretation.12

The Supreme Court of India stated in ChiranjitLalChowdhary v Union of India that debates
and speeches are encouraged during the introduction of a bill in parliament in able to find
the most essential form of statute. As a result, the court deemed it to be a valid source of
interpretation. Following that, the Supreme Court constantly referred to [Link]'s
speech to aid interpretation, stating, “that the debates in the Constituent Assembly may be
relied upon as an aid to interpretation of a constitutional provision is borne out by a series of
Supreme Court decisions”

Finally, in the case of [Link] v State of Kerala, the supreme court held that, while
there may be subjectivity in the remarks of bill supporters and that they cannot be relied on
as a source of definitive interpretation of statutes, they can be used to determine the sponsor's
purpose and intent, and therefore can be used in a selective and careful manner.

Furthermore, the discussion over such bills provides the court with the most realistic
elements, which aids in deciding the legislature's actual purpose.

Internal and external aids to interpretation are used by the Indian judiciary when interpreting
a law. The preamble, marginal notes, and notations of the applicable legislation, for example,
are internal aids, while external aids provide legislative history and surrounding social
circumstances, among other things. External aids are used only when internal aids have failed
to overcome any uncertainty. A speech given by a minister who introduces legislation in
parliament is one example of external assistance. From 1950 to 2015, the judiciary has given
greater weight to such speeches in terms of evidentiary meaning.

12Saniya Mirani, External aids of construction, legally India

[Link]
who-present-the-bill

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The Supreme Court took two positions in the 1950s and 1960s. As per one line of cases, a
single minister's speech seems unable to convey the majority vote's meaning, which
contributed to the legislation's passage. Instead, the minister's "subjective motive" is only
hinted at in the address. As a result, the minister's speech was ruled inadmissible facts in
reading a statute in these circumstances. The case of ChiranjitLalChowdhuri v. Union of
India was set against this. In this case, Justice Fazl Ali relied heavily on the speech given by
the Minister of Industry, who had introduced the bill (later legislation) in question, to
understand the context of the dispute. A similar position was taken by dissenting Judge
Shah in ShyamlalMohanlal v. State of Gujarat:

“In construing the words used by the Legislature, speeches on the floor of the Legislature are
inadmissible. I do not refer to the speech for the purpose of interpreting the words used by
the Legislature, but to ascertain the historical setting in which the statute came to be enacted”

As a result, by the late 1960s, there were two points of view. Those speeches, according to
the first viewpoint, are absolutely not admissible. These speeches, on the other hand, were
deemed inadmissible for the intent of reading the law by the second viewpoint. The speeches,
on the other hand, were deemed essential in deciphering the statute's historical context.

The emergence of a new evidentiary threshold for speeches, in my view, was the second
opinion. Nonetheless, this threshold was aligned with the first view by ensuring that a law
was not given a specific meaning based on a single speech given during its creation. The
speech was merely used to comprehend the sense in which a particular law was passed. In
doing so, the court consistently followed the logic presented in the first line of cases, which
held that the subjective intent of one speaker could not be enforced in order to limit the
statute's generality.13

The judicial paradigm has supported the second view since the 1970s. Justice Krishna Iyer,
appearing for the Court in State of Mysore v. R.P. Bidap, noted that the very first view has
been whittled down and that there is no point in accepting all extrinsic proof that is logically
important, but only where there are ambiguities in the plain meaning understanding. This
viewpoint was taken forward by Justice Iyer. and explicitly held in B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan

13By Team; Law times journal, Aids to interpretation of laws, [Link]

of-statutes/

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that one can no longer ignore the “voices from parliamentary debates” and that it is essential
to listen to the “legislative authors when their artefact is being interpreted”.

Since then, this viewpoint has been expressed in a variety of court decisions. However, it
should be noted that the speeches have never been used by the Court to expressly interpret a
statute, but rather to decipher the sense in which the statute was passed.

On January 2, 2017, the Apex Court delivered a much-debated judgment of Abhiram

Singh v. C.D. Commachen, which interpreted Section 123(3) of the Representation of
People Act, 1951 (hereinafter, RPA). Section 123(3) defines a “corrupt electoral
practice” as:

“The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a
candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of
his religion, race, caste, community or language or.”

The issue before the court was whether the word “his” in the section referred to – (i) the
religion of the candidate (or his agent) making the appeal, (ii) the religion of the elector,
or (iii) both (i) and (ii).

Both the majority view and the dissenting Judge Chandrachud cited the speech provided by
law minister A.K. Sen during the passage of an amendment to Section 123 RPA. The
majority focused on the speech to figure out why the amendment was proposed. However, a
careful reading of Justice Chandrachud's opinion reveals that he interprets the word "his"
using the law minister's speech. He states:

“The speech of the Law Minister, who moved the Bill leaves no manner of doubt that the
expression ‘his’ referred to the religion of the candidate (or his caste, community, race or
language) for whom votes were sought or of the candidate whose election was sought to be
prejudicially affected by an appeal to refrain from voting.”

I acknowledge that the judge later refers to the speech in order to comprehend the problem
that RPA is attempting to address. However, the above-mentioned part of the judgment
suggests that the use of the law minister's speech was used to engage in interpretative
practice. If the learned Judge intended this, it would strengthen the evidentiary weight given
to speeches delivered by legislators. It would imply that, because these speeches were

17
deemed inadmissible, we have arrived at a point where they can be used to define an entire
clause in the event of uncertainty.

Such a scenario, in my view, would be alarming. That would be tantamount to forcing the
opinion of the bill's sponsor on someone else who is affected by the rule. In the case of
legislation enacted decades ago, that will result in the imposition of a viewpoint that may or
may not be relevant in today's world. As a result, ministerial speeches should be used
sparingly and deliberately to ensure that the statute's generality is not hampered by the views
of a few.

Held in cases such as A.K. Gopalan v. the State of Madras 1950 AIR 27, State of Travancore
v. Bombay Company Limited14, Aswini Kumar Ghosh and Anr. v. Arabinda Bose and Anr.
1952 AIR 369, and State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1964) 1 SCR 371.

This shift has been recognised by Justice Bhagwati in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, ¶266
MANU/SC/0080/1981. “The learned Judge clearly held that while a speech on the floor of a
legislature was inadmissible in ascertaining the real meaning of the word used by the
legislature, the historical setting in which the statute was passed could doubtless be
admissible. This decision, therefore, make a clear departure, on the point of admissibility of
historical setting, from the minority dissenting judgment of Das J. as indicated above.”

14AIR 1952 SC 366

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 CONCLUSION

The Commission Report also recommends a number of additional changes and amendments.
It is critical to recognize that the law commission's goal is to create a strong advisory
structure by analysing various statutes as well as foreign judgments.

In its own way, the 185th Law Commission Report was very precise and yet very
explanatory. With brilliant jurisprudence and multiple case laws, the commission was able to
analyse each section and provision of the Act. There are a few provisions in the Act that were
added after the recommendation, but they are few in number. In practice, the government has
not been able to incorporate all of the Commission's recommendations..The 69th Report was
written a long time ago, and new provisions were desperately needed, especially since
technology had taken a drastic turn after the 1990s. As a result, the Act had to include
technological evidence. The Commission had looked into it and refined it so that it was in
line with the current situation.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Interpretation of Statutes, N.S. Bindra (Author)

2. Interpretation of Statutes, B.M. Gandhi (Author)

Websites –

1. [Link]
%20commission%20reports
2. [Link]
3. [Link]
[Link]

Articles -
1. [Link]
2. [Link]
1_13_2018.pdf
3. [Link]
of-india/
4. By Team; Law times journal, Aids to interpretation of laws,
[Link]
5. Saniya Mirani, External aids of construction, legally India
[Link]
speech-orated-by-ministers-who-present-the-bill

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