Alfredo M. De Leon v. Hon. Benjamin B.

Eseguerra
G.R. 78059 – August 31, 1987

Facts:

 Barangay elections were held on May 17, 1982 in Barangay Dolores, Tanay, Rizal
 Alfredo D. De Leon was elected as barangay captain and other petitioners as barangay councilmen
 On February 9, 1987, Alfredo received a memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, signed by
respondent OIC Governor Eseguerra on February 8, 1987 designating other persons as the barangay
Captain
 The OIC claims that the decisions were “by authority of the minister of local Government”
 Petitioners moved for a petition to declare the memorandum of February 8, 1987, as null and void,
prohibiting the respondents from taking over their positions in the barangay based on the following
grounds:

1. Under section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982, the term of office should last for six (6)
years starting on June 7, 1982 up to June 7, 1988
2. The ratification of the 1987 constitution, unauthorizes the OIC Governor to replace them and
designate successors

 The respondents argue that under section 2 of Article III of the provisional constitution, all those
elected officials under the 1973 constitution can remain in office until otherwise by proclamation or
executive order of a successor.

Issues:

Whether the memorandum dated December 1, 1986, replacing the sitting barangay captain and officials under
the 1987 constitution, supersedes the Barangay Election Act of 1982 under the 1973 Constitution

Ruling:

No. The court ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring the designation of the respondents as the barangay
captain and officials of no legal force, granting at the same time the writ of prohibition towards the respondents.
The court cited Section 3, Art. XVIII of the 1987 constitution which states that all existing laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuance not inconsistent, with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System

G.R. 122156 – February 3, 1997
Facts:

 On December 8, 1986, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell 30% -51% of
Manila Prince Hotel’s outstanding shares
 On September 18, 1995, two (2) bidders participated with the following offer:

1. Manila Prince Hotel Corporation – P41.58 per share for 15,300,000 shares (51%)
2. Renong Berhad – P44.00 per share for 15,300,000 shares (51%)

 On September 28, 1995, MPHC matched the bid price of P44.00 per shared tendered by Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm.
 On October 10, 1998, MHC sent a manager’s check issued by Philtrust Bank for thirty-three Million
Pesos (30,000,000) as bid security
 GSIS refused to accept
 the petitioner filed a writ of prohibition and mandamus
 On October 18, 1995, the court issued a temporary restraining order preventing GSIS from closing the
deal with the Malaysian firm
 On September 10, 1995, the case was accepted by the Court En Banc

Issues:

Whether GSIS needs to give preference to MPCH, a Filipino Corporation, whose bid matches that of a
Malaysian firm with regard to Section 10, 2 nd paragraph, of Article XII of the 1987 constitution stating that, “In
the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the states shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

Ruling:

Yes. The court ruled in favor of Manila Hotel Corporation by directing GSIS to cease and desist from selling
51% of the shares of Manila Hotel Corporation to Rendong Berhad, and to accept the marching bid of Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation.

The court held the act of GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC falls under the categories of "state
action" in constitutional jurisprudence. This transaction, despite being a state action, is subject to constitutional
command as it is a public function, significantly involved with the private actor. In Addition, the Court affirmed
that ff a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding for rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the Filipino should be allowed to match the foreign entity's bid. If the
Filipino matches the foreign firm's bid, the award should go to the Filipino, ensuring the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution is fulfilled.

Class notes:

- Manila hotel is not just a hotel, it’s a landmark, which counters the argument of GSIS that Filipino first
policy should be applied

Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., Et al. v. House of Representatives

G.R. 160261 – November 10, 2003
Facts:

Issues:

Ruling:

The Collector of Internal Revenue v. Antonio Campos Rueda

G.R. L-12350 – October 29, 1971

Facts:

 Maria Cerdeira, a Spanish citizen, died in Tangier, Morocco in 1955.

  She left properties in Tangier and the Philippines, including intangible personal properties
 Antonio Campos Rueda, her Philippine estate administrator, paid estate and inheritance taxes on her
real properties
 Rueda refused to pay deficiency estate and inheritance taxes on her intangible personal properties,
claiming exemption under Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code (1939)
 The CIR denied the exemption, arguing Tangier was not a "foreign country" and lacked international
personality
 The CIR also argued no reciprocity of tax exemption

Issues:

Whether the requisites of statehood or international personality must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall
within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, holding that international personality is
not a condition sine qua non for Tangier to be considered a "foreign country" within the meaning of Section 122
of the National Internal Revenue Code.

Notes

- Posterity – means all future generations

- Detailed facts kay atty
- Who what where when why and how
- Doctrine of constitutional supremacy - ??? Francisco v. HOR??? - THE CONSTITUTION IS THE
GOAT
- There are politicians who do not know the doctrine of constitutional supremacy
- If there is a law that was passed unanimously but violates the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the
law will be unconstitutional because the constitution is the GOAT
- Laws passed shall not contravene the constitution
- Laws shall be in harmony with the constitution

Effort must have something to do with giving you

- Peace
- Purpose
- Profit
Filipino first policy
Doctrine of constitutional supremacy
Posterity

- Constitution is conventional, written, and rigid

- what does it mean the constitutions is rigid? The constitution is not easy to amend and revise
- article 17 of the constitution – amendments and revisions

a good written constitution should have the 3 elements:

- constitution of govt – prescribe, structure, the power of the govt
- constitution of liberty – provisions in the constitution that grant or regulate the freedom of the citizen
(bill of rights)
- constitution of sovereignty – resides from the people and emanates from them so they can have the
power to change and amend the constitution
- people themselves are empowered, given authority to amend and revise this constitution in exercise of
their right

- the constitution assumes that all people know what amendments and revisions mean

how do we distinguish amendment and revisions:

- quantitative – it depends on the number of articles which are subject to be changed
- amendment – onti lang
- revisions – madami

- qualitative – far-reaching
- amendment – wala masayong change sa quality ng revision
- revisions – Malaki ung pinalit

what if those who do not know the constitution which are now sitting in the government are the ones who
amend and revise the constitution with the intent of making it favorable to them in order to pass their
ordinances?

Assignment:
- amendments and revisions
- concepts of state

Gonzales v. COMELEC

Facts:
- Romeo Gonzales, a mayoral candidate, was disqualified by COMELEC for affiliating with the KBL
despite filing under the Bicol Saro Party. His motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue:
- Whether Gonzales was denied due process by the COMELEC in the disqualification proceedings

Ruling:
- the SC held that Gonzales was denied procedural due process by COMELEC, who disqualified him
without hearing his evidence or resolving his factual issues.
- The Court rejected the argument that Gonzales was estopped from questioning the disqualification.
- The SC reversed the COMELEC’s decision

Module 3 – concept of state

Article 1 – national territory

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the island and water embraced therein, and
all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial,
aerial domain, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and all other submarine
areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimension, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

Collector of internal bureau V. Campos Ruedas

Facts:
Antonio Campos Rueda, who’s the executor of Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira’s estate, is
appealing a decision by the Collector of Internal Revenue. The Collector is demanding P161,874.95 in estate
and inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties, for the transfer of Maria’s intangible personal
property in the Philippines. Maria Cerdeira, a Spanish national, lived in Tangier, Morocco, from 1931 until
her death on January 2, 1955. When she passed away, she left behind some intangible personal property in the
Philippines. On September 29, 1955, Antonio filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return for all of
Maria’s property. At the same time, the Collector assessed state and inheritance taxes in the amounts of
P111,592.48 and P157,791.48, totaling P269,383.96, which Antonio paid. On November 17, 1955, Antonio
filed an amended return, claiming that some of the intangible personal property was exempt from taxes. On
November 23, 1955, while the case was still under investigation, the respondent sent another assessment for
estate and inheritance taxes. It was for P202,262.40 and P267,402.84, respectively, or a total of P469,665.24.

On January 11, 1956, the respondent denied the request for exemption. They said that the law of Tangier doesn’t
work the same way as Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. So, they demanded the payment of
P239,439.49, which is the amount due for estate and inheritance taxes, plus penalties, surcharges, interests, and
compromise penalties.

On February 8, 1956, the petitioner asked for the decision to be reconsidered. They wanted the respondent to
reconsider the denial of the tax exemption for the intangible personal properties and the imposition of the 25%
and 5% ad valorem penalties.

But the respondent denied the request again on May 5, 1956, and received the petitioner’s response on May 21,
1956. The respondent said that there was no reciprocity between Tangier and Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Tangier was just a principality, not a foreign country. So, they demanded the payment
of P73,851.21 and P88,023.74, which is a total of P161,874.95, as the deficiency estate and inheritance taxes,
plus penalties, surcharges, interests, and compromise penalties.

- The case went to the Court of Tax Appeals. Since both sides agreed on the property values and the
math of the deficiency, the main issue was reciprocity and the Collector of Internal Revenue’s
claim that Tangier wasn’t a foreign country under Section 122. The Court ruled against the
Collector, saying: “In short, we think so and say so. The word ‘foreign country’ in the last part of
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code means a government of that foreign country that
doesn’t tax our citizens who live there or who have laws that let them avoid taxes. So, Tangier doesn’t
have to be on our government’s list to get the exemption benefits of Section 122 of our Tax Code.”

Issue:
- Whether the reciprocal exemption under Section 122 of the Philippine Tax Code applies, given the
laws of Tangier.

Ruling:
- The Court ruled that intangible personal property of a non-resident foreigner, subject to estate tax, is
exempt if the foreign country does not impose similar taxes on Filipino citizens. This exemption is
based on reciprocity and must be honored.

Magallona v. Ermita
Facts:

• Maritime Baseline Law: Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) was passed in 1961 to define the
Philippines’ maritime baselines as an archipelagic state.
• UNCLOS and Territorial Sea: The breadth of the territorial sea was not determined by the 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (UNCLOS I).
• Domestic Law Update: RA 3046 remained largely unchanged for nearly five decades, with a
correction made in 1968 (RA 5446) for typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.
• Purpose of RA 9522: To make RA 3046 compliant with the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III).
• Key Changes in RA 9522: Shortened one baseline, optimized basepoint locations, and classified the
Kalayaan Island Group and Scarborough Shoal as “regimes of islands”.
• Petitioners’ Argument: RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory and undermines Philippine
sovereignty and national security.
• Petitioners’ Argument: RA 9522 results in the loss of maritime area and prejudices the livelihood of
fishermen.
• Respondents’ Argument: RA 9522 complies with UNCLOS III, preserves Philippine territory, and
does not undermine national interests.
• Court’s Decision: The court left unacted the petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.

Issue:
- Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional for allegedly reducing Philippine territory and sovereignty,
especially over the KIG and Scarborough Shoal.

Ruling:
- The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522. The Court found that the law was
enacted to make the Philippines’ baselines compliant with UNCLOS III, which prescribes specific
technical requirements for archipelagic baselines. The Court explained that the exclusion of the KIG
and Scarborough Shoal from the archipelagic baselines did not mean the Philippines was relinquishing
its claim over these territories. Section 2 of RA 9522 expressly affirms the country’s continued
sovereignty and jurisdiction over these areas.

- Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

Link: magallona v. ermita

In the Matter of South China Sea Arbitration; RP v. People’s republic of China

Facts:
 - In 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings against China under Annex VII of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The dispute revolved around maritime
entitlements and the legality of certain Chinese actions in the South China Sea, particularly in areas
within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. China vehemently
opposed the proceedings, asserting a lack of jurisdiction and maintaining its claim over most of the
South China Sea through the so-called “nine-dash line.”

Issues:
- The validity of China’s “nine-dash line” and claims to historic rights over maritime areas beyond its
entitlements under UNCLOS.
- The status of various maritime features (islands, rocks, low-tide elevations) in the South China Sea and
their capacity to generate maritime zones.
- The legality of Chinese activities (e.g., fishing, construction, law enforcement) within areas claimed by
the Philippines.
- The environmental impact of China’s activities in the region.

Ruling:
- Jurisdiction: The Tribunal found it had jurisdiction over most of the Philippines’ submissions, as they
concerned the interpretation and application of UNCLOS, not sovereignty over land territory.
- Historic Rights: The Tribunal ruled that China’s claim to historic rights within the “nine-dash line” is
incompatible with UNCLOS and has no legal basis where it exceeds the maritime entitlements
provided by UNCLOS.
- Status of Features: The Tribunal classified various features in the Spratly Islands and Scarborough
Shoal, finding that none of the features in the Spratly’s are “islands” capable of generating an EEZ or
continental shelf; most are rocks or low-tide elevations.
- Maritime Entitlements: The Tribunal held that certain areas claimed by China are within the
Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf, and that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights by
interfering with fishing and petroleum exploration, constructing artificial islands, and failing to prevent
Chinese fishermen from exploiting marine resources.
- Environmental Protection: The Tribunal found that China had caused severe harm to the marine
environment by its large-scale land reclamation and construction activities.
- Aggravation of Dispute: China’s actions were found to have aggravated the dispute during the
pendency of the proceedings.

Doctrine:
- The Award is a landmark in international maritime law, clarifying the limits of maritime entitlements
under UNCLOS and rejecting expansive “historic rights” claims not grounded in the Convention.
- The decision is expressly recognized in Philippine law, notably in RA 12064, which mandates that the
Philippines exercise its maritime rights in accordance with UNCLOS and the South China Sea
Arbitration Award.
- The Award is not directly enforceable but is binding on the parties under international law. It has been
cited in Philippine policy, legislation, and diplomatic practice.
- “The Philippines shall exercise all other maritime rights and jurisdictions in accordance with the
UNCLOS, the South China Sea Arbitration (PCA Case No. 2013-19), international law, and other
pertinent laws and regulations of the Philippines.” — RA 12064

Hypothetical:
Suppose a foreign vessel is found fishing within 150 nautical miles off Palawan, in an area classified as part of
the Philippines’ EEZ under the South China Sea Arbitration Award. The vessel claims it is exercising “historic
fishing rights” recognized by its government.
 What legal remedies are available to the Philippines under Philippine law and international law?
 How should Philippine authorities proceed, considering the South China Sea Arbitration Award
and RA 12064?

Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) v. Delos Angeles, et al.

Facts:
- Various tobacco producers filed complaints against the PVTA for its failure to pay for tobacco
shipments. Both parties submitted a "Stipulation of Facts" to the court, and a partial judgment was
 rendered based on the admissions. The PVTA attempted to appeal, but the court denied the appeal,
noting that the partial judgment had already been executed and the amounts ordered had been paid.

Issue:
- Whether the PVTA could still appeal from the partial judgment after it had been executed and
payments made

Ruling:
- The Supreme Court denied the PVTA's petition. The Court held that since the partial judgment had
already been executed and the amounts ordered had been paid, the PVTA was estopped from appealing
the judgment. The acceptance of payment and execution of the judgment precluded further appeal.

Link: PVTA v. delos angeles

Government of the Philippine Islands v. El Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Manila

[Link]
Facts:
- In 1863, a devastating earthquake struck the Philippine Islands. To aid the victims, a relief fund was
raised through a subscription campaign, with contributions generously provided by the Queen of Spain
and other donors across the Spanish dominions.

Royal order established a central relief board to oversee the distribution of the funds. However, a
substantial portion (80,000 pesos gold) was inadvertently deposited with El Monte de Piedad y Caja de
Ahorros de Manila, a charitable institution, as a loan.

As a result, the intended beneficiaries failed to receive the funds, leading to the dissolution of the
central relief board.

Recognizing the injustice, the Philippine Government, through the Insular Treasurer, initiated legal
proceedings to recover the funds from Monte de Piedad. This action was authorized by Act No. 2109
(1912), which stipulated that the funds should be distributed to the rightful beneficiaries or their heirs.
Issue:
- Whether the $80,000 given to Monte de Piedad was a donation subject to a condition or a loan, and
whether the Philippine Government can recover the funds.

Ruling:
- The Supreme Court ruled that the 80,000 pesos was a loan, not a donation, and Monte de Piedad was
obligated to return it. The institution had previously agreed to return the sum upon demand.

- The Court also ruled that the Government of the Philippine Islands, as a sovereign entity, is not bound
by any statute of limitations, meaning its right to recover the loan had not expired.

- Furthermore, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Act No. 2109 (1912), which authorized the
Treasurer to recover and distribute the funds.

- As a result of the ruling, Monte de Piedad was ordered to reimburse the Government the sum of 80,000
pesos, with legal interest accruing from February 28, 1912, and to cover the costs of the legal
proceedings.
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh

Facts:
- Co Kim Cham, also known as Co Cham, was a party in a civil case (No. 3012) that was initiated and
partially heard during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, under the regime of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines. After liberation, the presiding judge refused to continue the proceedings,
citing a proclamation by General Douglas MacArthur that declared all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the courts during the Japanese occupation as invalid. Co Kim Cham filed a petition for
mandamus to compel the judge to proceed with the case.

Issue:
- Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts established during the Japanese occupation
valid and effective after the liberation of the Philippines?

Ruling:
- Yes. The Supreme Court held that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese
occupation, which were not of a political nature, are valid and remain valid after the liberation of the
Philippines. The Court reasoned that the governments established during the Japanese occupation (the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines) were de facto governments.
Under international law, the acts of a de facto government, especially those of a judicial or civil nature,
are considered valid to maintain social order and protect private rights.
- The Court further explained that the principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law
provides that acts done by an invader, within his competence, remain valid even after the legitimate
government regains control, except for acts of a political nature. The Court also clarified that General
MacArthur’s proclamation should not be interpreted to invalidate all judicial acts, as this would
paralyze the administration of justice and disrupt social order.

Laurel v. misa

Facts:
- Anastacio Laurel, a Filipino citizen, filed a petition for habeas corpus, contending that he could not be
prosecuted for treason for acts committed during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. He argued
that during the occupation, the sovereignty of the legitimate government (the Commonwealth of the
Philippines and the United States) was suspended, and thus, his allegiance to that government was also
suspended. Laurel further claimed that with the proclamation of the Philippine Republic, there was a
change of sovereignty, precluding prosecution for treason against the former sovereign.

Issue:
- Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto
were suspended during the Japanese occupation.

Ruling:
- The Court emphasized that a citizen’s allegiance to his government is absolute and permanent, not
suspended by enemy occupation. The sovereignty of the legitimate government remains, even if its
exercise is temporarily prevented by the occupier.
Ruffy v. chief of staff

Facts:
- Ramon Ruffy and others, officers in the Philippine Army, were tried and convicted by a general court-
martial for violations of military law. They challenged the jurisdiction and authority of the court-
martial, arguing that only regular civil courts had the power to try and convict them for criminal
offenses, and that the Supreme Court should have appellate jurisdiction over their case as an "inferior
court" under the Constitution.

Issue:
- Does the term "inferior courts" in the Constitution include courts-martial, thereby giving the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over their decisions?

Ruling:
- The Supreme Court held that courts-martial are not "inferior courts" as contemplated by the
Constitution. The term "inferior courts" refers to regular civil courts established under the judiciary, not
military tribunals. Therefore, the Supreme Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over decisions of
courts-martial in the same manner as it does over civil courts.

- The Court explained that courts-martial are not part of the regular judicial system but are special
tribunals created by military law to enforce discipline within the armed forces. Their jurisdiction,
procedures, and review mechanisms are governed by military statutes, not by the general rules
applicable to civil courts.

People v. gozo

Facts:
- Venerando Gozo y Velasquez was charged with statutory rape for allegedly having carnal knowledge
of AAA, a six-year-old girl, in October 2011. Both Gozo and the victim's father worked at the same
restaurant, where the incident occurred. The victim testified that Gozo inserted his fingers and penis
into her vagina. After the incident, AAA immediately reported the matter to her father, who then
brought her to the police and for a medical examination, which confirmed fresh lacerations in her
hymen.

Issue:
-